AN ARGUMENT IN METAPHYSICS Z 13

In Metaphysics Z 13 Aristotle argues that no universal can be substance. Prima facie, this appears to rule out the possibility that any universal can be substance, species as well as genera. Nevertheless, many commentators have denied that this chapter intends to rule out the possibility that any universal can be substantial. Aristotle, it is thought, cannot wish to deny that any universal can be substance because he believes that some universals are substances, viz. species. So Aristotle is denying only that genera as opposed to species can be substance. In this paper I will argue that in Z 13 Aristotle does intend to deny that any universal can be substance. I shall proceed as follows. First I shall examine the argument in 1035b8-15 and suggest two possible interpretations. On either interpretation the argument contends that no universal—including species—can be substantial. Next I consider and reject the interpretation of the argument according to which it is intended to rule out genera as substances but allows that species can be substances. Finally, I shall briefly consider and reject Michael Wood's interpretation of the chapter.

At 1035b8-15 Aristotle presents the following argument:

For it seems to be impossible that anything predicated universally be substance. For, first of all, the substance of each thing is private to it, does not belong to anything else, but the universal is common. For that is called universal which naturally belongs to many things. Of what will this be substance? Either all or none, but it cannot be of all. But if it is to be in the substance> of one thing the rest will be identical with this. For those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one.

At first sight, Ross's interpretation of the argument seems quite plausible. It goes: The universal cannot be substance because the substance of a thing belongs to it alone and to nothing else, whereas the universal is precisely that which belongs to many things. This seems quite straightforward, but the rest of the argument raises problems. According to Ross it should be read: Of what will the

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3 In my translation of this paper we based on W. D. Ross's translation of the Metaphysics Z 13.
contradict (3). It is possible I think that \textit{1038b}12–15 should be understood as an argument which is independent of 9–12, and in such a way that 'but if it is to be \textit{<the substance> of one thing}' is not taken to be a countermove to 9–12 on the part of the Platonist. Rather, the argument might be understood in the following way: Of what will \textit{F} be the substance? (‘Of what will this \textit{be substance?’})

Either of a, b, and c or of none of them. (‘Either of all or of none.’) But \textit{F} cannot be the substance of \textit{a}, \textit{b}, and \textit{c}. (‘But it cannot be of all.’) (And now the basis for this last statement is not the previous argument in 9–12, but the argument which follows, viz.:) For if \textit{F} is the substance of even one of them, say \textit{a}, then \textit{b} and \textit{c} will be identical with \textit{a}. (‘But if it is to be \textit{<the substance> of one} thing, the rest will be identical with this.’) For those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one. Therefore, since \textit{F} is the substance either of all or of none of the particulars falling under it, and it cannot be the substance of all, it is the substance of none.

Thus understood, it is clear why (1) must not be taken to mean (1’), and why those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one’ presupposes that every member of the extension of \textit{F} has \textit{F} as its substance. For it is precisely the view that a universal is the extension of \textit{every} member of its extension that Aristotle is arguing against. He gives the alternatives ‘Either of all or of none,’ ‘asserts ‘but it cannot be of all,’ and then proceeds to give his argument why it is not possible. So no problem arises if we take the argument to be directed against ‘of all’ (\textit{πάτωρως}) rather than ‘of one’ (\textit{ένός}).

However, the argument can also be understood differently. This alternative interpretation is suggested by the argument in \textit{1038b}16–23 which seems to me to be exactly parallel to the one we are considering. It runs,

So the universal cannot be substance in the way that essence is, but can it belong to this, as animal belongs to man and horse? Therefore it is clear that it is a kind of definition of it. Nor does it matter if it is not a definition of everything in the substance; none the less this will be the case in which it occurs, so that the same thing will result again; for it will be the substance of that, such as the animal, in which alone it occurs.

Although I cannot justify it here, I construe the argument as follows. Suppose that the universal can be substance as belonging to essence in the way in which the genus animal belongs to the species man and horse. Therefore it is clear that it (e.g. the genus animal) is a kind of definition of the essence (e.g. the species man). It does not matter if animal is not the definition of everything in the substance; nevertheless animal will be the substance of

\textit{it is hard not to take 11.14-15 (τό εξ αυτού από λόγους . . .) as providing a reason for what is asserted immediately before, especially as it is readily intelligible as a reason for it.} (Michael Wood, ‘Problems in \textit{Metaphysics Z}, Chapter 13’, op. cit., p. 219). And that premiss is used for the same conclusion in at least two other places in the \textit{Metaphysics} (999b21-2, 1040b17). See below.

\textit{On the use of this example in the argument see Cherniss, \textit{ACPA}, op. cit., p. 320 n. 223. It is also possible, however, that Aristotle is using the term ‘man’ and ‘horse’ in 18 to refer to the souls of a man and a horse (cf. 1043b36-b4, 1033b29, b17-18, 1035a6-9, b1-3, 1036b16-17, 1037b7-8, \textit{De Caelo} 278b13-15, \textit{De Gen. et Corr.} 321b19-22), which he certainly does consider to be essences (1017b14-16, 21-3, 1035b14-16, 1073b22-9, 1043b2-4, \textit{De Anima} 412a10-17).}
one sort of universal cannot be substance but allow that the other sort is or may
be substance. In particular, he does not divide universals into species and genera
and argue that while genera cannot be substances there is nothing to prevent
species from being substances. Nevertheless, as I pointed out at the beginning
of the paper, many commentators have claimed that this is the position of Z 13.
For example, Rogers Albritton says: 'The thesis of Z 13 is primarily that nothing
universal in relation to species, nothing common to species, as their genus or
otherwise, is the substance of any of them (1038b6-16, 1039b34-1039b44).
He seeks to show that nothing common to species can be the substance of any
species.'

Now in the first place, this interpretation cannot be supported on the grounds
that by 'universal' Aristotle means to refer to genera and not to infima specie.
For Aristotle constantly refers to the species man as an example of a universal
(e.g. 1033b24-6, 1033b27-30, 1037b2-10, 1056b11-12, 33; De Int. 1738b6-
b6; An. Pr. 433b25-32; An. Post. 106a17-b1; Top. 141b29-32; De Gen. Anim.
768b13, b13-14; Rhet. 1378b54). And I believe there is evidence which shows
conclusively that it cannot be correct. The disagreement can be seen as centring
on the interpretation of the premis: 'For those things whose substance and
essence are one are themselves one.' According to the interpretation I am disputing,
'those things' (γεν) here refers to species, and the premis says that those things
whose substance and essence are one are themselves one. According to myself,
those things refers to individuals and the premis says that those things whose
essence and substance are one are themselves one in number.

One difficulty with Albritton's interpretation of 1038b8-15 as arguing for the
thesis that no genus is the substance of any of the species contained in it is that it
can give no reasonable explanation either of this premis or of the resulting argu-
ment. According to it, 'those things whose substance and essence are one are
themselves one' is the premis which allows us to conclude that if, say, animal is
the substance and essence of man and horse, then man and horse are one. How-
ever, it is now faced with the difficulty of specifying in what sense it will turn out
that man and horse are one, and in such a way that the following conditions are
met: (i) the argument cannot impose on the Platonist a requirement for being
substance which Aristotle himself does not accept; (ii) the first premis (i.e.
'those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one') must be
a proposition which Aristotle accepts or can accept; (iii) the conclusion of the
argument must be a conclusion which Aristotle rejects or cannot accept. For
the argument is a reduction ad absurdum and (as I shall set it out) it is the second
premis which is being reduced to absurdity. Now, the possibly relevant senses
of 'one' appear to be 'one in number', 'one in species', and 'one in genus'. So
let us consider how the argument would run on each of these interpretations.

On the assumption that the relevant sense of 'one' is 'one in number' the
argument is:

8 'Forms of Particulars in Aristotle's
Metaphysics', op. cit., p. 705. Cf. Syra-rius's
reply to Aristotle's argument in Aesclenus'
Commentary (In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria,
A-Z Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin,
1888), 433, 26-30.

9 It is so understood by Pa.-Alexander
(In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria,
ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), 523-4,
Aesclenus, op. cit. 430 and Syra-rius, in
Aesclenus, 433.

(1) Those species whose substan-
c is a genus which is one in number are them-
selves one in number.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in
number.
Therefore, man and horse are one in number.

The argument so construed fails to meet the first condition. On Albritton's
interpretation of our passage the argument as it stands has no force against the
suggestion that animal is the substance of man and horse. For the argument
assumes that if the genus animal is the substance of man and horse, then it is one
in number. But that assumption is not open to Aristotle on Albritton's inter-
pretation since according to it being one in number is not a requirement for
being substance.10 The point of this interpretation is to understand Z 13 in such
a way that it is compatible with species being substances, and species are not one
in number. And if the species man is a substance even though it is not one in
number, then animal may be the substance of man and horse even though it is
not one in number. Furthermore, on this account Aristotle must accept the view
that genera are one in number — individuals — and as an interpretation of
Aristotle that is absurd.

Suppose next that the sense of 'one' in question is 'one in species'. So con-
strued the argument would go:

(1) Those species whose substance is a genus which is one in species are
themselves one in species.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in
species.
Therefore, man and horse are one in species.

This version fails because the first premis must be a premis which Aristotle
himself believes to be true. But (1) presupposes that the genus animal is one in
species, and that, in Aristotle's view, is clearly false. As Michael Woods explains,
Aristotle considers an item to be ἔ θ ἐ ν ἐ δέ ν when it is ἀ δαυηρον ἐ δέ ν, i.e. ἀ ἰ ρομαν
in the sense that it is not capable of further differentiation. This is precisely what
is not the case with γέ νη.11 On this interpretation, then, the second condition is
not met, and so it too must be rejected.

Finally, suppose that the sense of 'one' in question here's one in genus. Then
the argument would run:

(1) Those species whose sub-
stance is a genus which is one in genus
are themselves one in genus.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in
 genus.
Therefore, man and horse are one in genus.

This account also fails because it does not meet the third requirement. In Aris-
totle's opinion, the statement that man and horse are one in genus is not absurd
but obviously true (1016a2-7, 1018b5-6; cf. Top. 103b13-14).

It appears, then, that Albritton's interpretation of 1038b8-15 cannot be
 correct since on this interpretation the argument in the passage cannot be given
a reasonable explanation. In particular, if, in the premis 'those things whose

10 'Forms of Particulars in Aristotle's
Metaphysics', op. cit., 705.

11 Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter
13', op. cit., p. 224. Cf. 999b4: ῥά ή ἕ γεν
διασπέται εἰς ἄ δην, and 1059b36-7, 1016b24-7,
Top. 103b13-14.
substance and essence are one are themselves one, 'those things' is taken to refer to species and 'substance' to a genus, then no sense of 'one' can be specified such that the argument is one which Aristotle himself could have advanced.

Furthermore, other passages in the Metaphysics where the same argument is used count heavily against Albritton's interpretation and in favour of my own. Of these (cf. 1016b8-11, 1018a5-11, 1021a11), the most important occurs in Z 16 (1040b16-27):

But since the one is said just as being, and the substance of one thing is one, and those things whose substance is one in number are one in number, it is clear that neither the one nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be. But we ask what, then, the principle is that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Being and the one would be substance rather than the principle or the element or the cause, but not even the former are substance, since nothing common is substance, for substance belongs to nothing but itself and to that which has it, of which it is substance. Again, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but what is common occurs in many places at the same time; so it is clear that no universal occurs apart and separate from particulars.

In the statement ἡ ὁριστικὴ τοῦ ἴδιου μία, καὶ ἄν μία ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἀριθμῷ (... the substance of one thing is one, and those things whose substance is one in number are one in number ...); cf. Physics 227b1-2, 228b7-8, 229b1-13), ἴδιος and μία in the first clause must be understood as having the same meaning as μία and ἐν in the second clause. So it says that (1) the substance of something one in number is itself one in number, and (2) those things whose substance is one in number are themselves one in number.

Note the last argument ('Again, that which is one ...'). 'That which is one' (τὸ ἕν) in 25 cannot mean 'that which is one in form' because there is nothing to prevent what is one in form from being in many places at the same time. It is what is one in number that cannot be at many places at the same time. And this means that it cannot belong to many particulars at the same time, as 27 (τὰ καθ ἑκατον) makes clear. Now, 'common' (κοινόν) in 23 cannot mean anything different from what 'what is common' (τὸ κοινὸν) in 25 means. And therefore 22-4 are saying the following: the one and being are not substance, since nothing which is common to particulars, i.e. no universal, can be substance. For substance belongs only to itself and to that particular of which it is the substance.

This passage, then, provides strong evidence against Albritton's interpretation of 1038b8-15. For it gives an argument against the suggestion that universals are substance which is exactly parallel to that passage. 1040b23-4 argues that no universal can be substance 'since nothing common is substance; for substance belongs to nothing but itself and that which has it, of which it is substance.' At 1038b9-12 Aristotle argues that no universal can be substance on the grounds: 'For, first of all, the substance of each thing is private to it, does not belong to anything else, but the universal is common.' At 1040b17 Aristotle says that a universal cannot be substance on the grounds that 'those things whose substance is one in number are one in number.' At 1038b14-15 Aristotle argues that no universal can be substance on the grounds that 'those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one.' There can be no doubt that the arguments in 1040b16-27 are the same arguments as those in 1038b8-15. And so, since we know that 1040b16-27 is arguing that no universal in relation to particulars can be substance, 1038b8-15 too is arguing for the conclusion that no universal in relation to particulars can be substance.

Another passage which shows the sense of the premiss in question is 999b20-3: 'Besides these, whether the substance of all things is one, such as of all men? But that is odd, for all things whose substance is one are one. But is it many and diverse? That too is unreasonable.' The force of the argument is evidently that if all individual men have the same substance, then they will be identical with one another, since all things whose substance is one are themselves one. Here, that which is hypothesized to be the substance is a species and not a genus, and those things of which it is hypothesized to be the substance are individual men, not species.

Furthermore, the solution to the aporia seems to require individual substantial forms. As Albritton says, 'Why "many and diverse"? Why not many and the same in universal formula, like your form and mine in A? The dilemma seems to invite the question. May we not conclude that Aristotle, though he omits to say so, has escaped by this route, a theory of particular forms?14 However, Albritton proceeds to argue that this conclusion cannot in fact be drawn because there is an alternative solution to the dilemma. 'One might distinguish, as Aristotle does, ways of being one, and argue that things whose substance is one need not be one in every way, but only in that of their substance. But the universal form of man is not one in number. It is only one in form. And men are one in form. The one form of man may, therefore, be their substance.'15

If Albritton were right, then the initial argument in 999b20-3 could not be used to support my interpretation of Z 13, 1038b8-15, but, on the contrary, might raise doubts about that interpretation. I take him to be saying that Aristotle's response to the aporia in 999b20-3 might have been this: the difficulty is not resolved by positing individual substantial forms. Rather, the initial argument is ambiguous, and is rendered harmless once it is disambiguated. The argument is,

(1) Those things whose substance is one are μίας
(2) The substance of men is the species man.
Therefore, all men are one.

The sense of the argument depends on what is meant by 'one'. If 'one' means 'one in number', then the conclusion is absurd. But on this reading, the first premiss is false since it presupposes that the substance of, say, men is one in number. But the substance of men is the species man, and this is not one in number but only one in form. So on this reading the argument can be rejected since it rests on a false premiss. On the other hand, if 'one' means 'one in form', then the first premiss is true, but also the conclusion is true, not absurd. So on this reading the argument does nothing towards showing the falsity of the second premiss.

Even on Albritton's interpretation, the argument would deal with species and individuals rather than genera and species. However, if his account were accepted, it might be thought that 1038b8-15 should be understood in the same way. And since, on Albritton's account, 999b20-3 does not aim to refute the view that species are substances, this might lead to a position similar to that of Michael

12 Cf. Ps.-Alexander, 366, 30-1.
13 This 'is confirmed by 1035b16-21.
14 'Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's Metaphysics', op. cit., p. 705.
15 Ibid.
Woods according to which 1038b8-15 too is not meant to refute the view that species are substances, but merely ‘forces the Platonic to formulate his position more carefully’. So Albert’s interpretation of 1039a20-3 must be rejected if my own interpretation of 1038b8-15 is not to be thrown in doubt.

There is, in fact, sufficient evidence to show that Albert’s alternative escape from the dilemma of 1039a20-3 could not have been Aristotle’s. In the first place, at 1040a17 Aristotle tells us that ‘the substance of one thing is one’, and, as we have seen, the rest of the sentence shows that this means that the substance of something which is one in number is itself one in number (cf. 1016b1-3, 3-9, 1052b34-4). Hence, the substance of Socrates, who is one in number, must itself be one in number. Since the universal species man is not one in number, it cannot be the substance of Socrates or any other man. This position is in line with Aristotle’s view that the principles of individuals must themselves be individuals (1072a20-4, Phys. 195b26). And an example of this assumption occurs in Z 14 (1039a3-20): ‘If there is a man in himself who is “this” and exists apart, those things from which he is composed, for example animal and two-footed, must also be “this” and separable (κόσμουτ) and substances’ (cf. 1040a18-19). While Albert’s alternative solution to the dilemma of 1039a20-3 may indeed be an alternative solution, it cannot be Aristotle’s solution.

A further difficulty with Albert’s suggested escape from the dilemma of 1039a20-3 is that Aristotle argues against the immediately following passage (1039b24-6): ‘Again, one might be puzzled about the principles for the following reason. If they are one in number, nothing will be in number itself, even the one itself and being itself.’ I take the argument to be that the principles of things are one in number only, then nothing will be in number. And since this is absurd, the principles of things cannot be one in number only. This interpretation is supported by 1086b37-1087a4. In both passages Aristotle is considering the same problem: the principles of things universal (i.e. one in number only (cf. 1052a29-31) or particulars (i.e. one in number only)) 1039b24-6 says that the consequence of the assumption that the principles are one in number only is that nothing will be in number.

In 1086b37-1087a4 Aristotle says: ‘But if the principles are universal, either the substances composed from them will also be universal, or what is not substance will be prior to substance; for the universal is not substance, but the element or principle is universal, and the element or principle is prior to those things of which it is the principle or element.’ The part of the sentence following the semicolon states the premises justifying the second alternative conclusion of the hypothesis that the principles are universal (cf. 1038b23-9, 1070a2-4, 1088b3-4, Phys. 189a33-4), but it is the first alternative that is relevant here. It rests on the assumption that if the principles are universal, then that of which they are the principles must also be universal. And so, if all the principles are universal, then all the things of which they are the substance will also be universal, i.e. nothing will be in number. Here, as in 1099b24-6, Aristotle treats this conclusion as evidence absurda.

We are not yet justified in taking the argument in 1039b24-6 as expressing Aristotle’s own view since it occurs in the statement of the arguments supporting in 1087a8. But even if he is right, that the resulting sentence, when left intact, expresses a view that Aristotle would asent to is shown by 1087b22-1 quoted below, p. 83.

14 On Ross’s account 1039b24-7 presents only one argument against the suggestion that the principles of things are one in form: The argument may be paraphrased thus: If a principle discovered by analysis of one thing can only be in kind with a principle discovered by analysis of another, no two things will ever have a numerically identical principle; if there is not this, if there is not a eidos poutai how is knowledge possible? (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, op. cit. i. 242). That this is not correct can be seen from the fact that Ross presupposes that things are one in number, whereas Aristotle says that this is ruled out by the hypothesis that the principles are one in number only. Furthermore, the conclusion that nothing is one in number, and so the absurdity is the conclusion that number will not be possible. Thus in M 10, the conclusion that all things are universal is considered absurd in itself (1086br7-1087a2, 21-4) and there it is certain that no epistemological considerations are in question.

Ernst Tugendhat does not agree. He glosses 1039b24-7: ‘Sind die ideitischen ἀρχαί hingenommen es, so sind sie als ἀρχαί des Einzelnen selbst je inclinieren, untereinander gleich. Doch "wie ist dann ein Wissen möglich" fragt Aristoteles 1099b27 ‘wean es eicht ein Eines über den Vielen (es οὐκ αὐτοῖς) geben’”’ (EIKONAI KATHE KINH) (Freiburg, 1968), pp. 103-4). Like Ross, Tugendhat fails to see that there are two difficulties here, not one. Nor does Aristotle’s hypothesis that the principles are one in number allow that they are one in number. What Aristotle says is that if the principles are one in number are the same in number and the same in kind and in this way there is no difficulty in their constituting many “BA’s. Whereas if there is not one ‘A, clearly not more than one ‘A can exist (cf. 1060b29-30).

So both the hypothesis that the principles are one in kind only and the hypothesis that the principles are one in number only lead to unacceptable results.15

15 Thus Joseph Owens (The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1963), p. 245) is mistaken in saying that the point of the aporia is that
Aristotle’s own solution is not hard to divine. If the principles are one in number and form in such a way that there are many principles the same in form, none of the problems with the other views arises. The first problem with the view that the principles are one in form only was that as a result nothing can be one in number. Of course if the principles are one in number, this difficulty disappears. The second problem with this view was that it is hard to assert knowledge is possible ‘if there is not a one over many.’ I have already pointed out that Aristotle rejects this argument. 20 And finally the problem with the thesis that the principles are one in number vanishes if we allow that there may be many principles of the same form.

1002b12-32 proves both that this is Aristotle’s solution to the aporia and, if it needs proof, that the view that the principles are one in number in such a way as to be unique in kind is the Platonic theory of Forms. There, Aristotle explains that one reason why the Forms were posited was that, since sensible objects and the intermediates have only specific unity, if Forms were not posited there would be no definite number of principles. And he refers back to 999b27-1000a4 when he says (1002b30-2): ‘But if we posit the Forms and that they are one in number but not in form, we have mentioned the impossibilities that necessarily result’ (cf. 1039a3-4, 9, 1040a8-9, 26, Top. 143b29-32). Again, the analogy of letters is used to explain what the situation will be if one does not accept, as of course Aristotle does not, the theory of Forms: there will be an unlimited number of principles of the same form (1002b17-25).

Finally, M 10 states his solution to the aporia.21 Again using the analogy of

‘the two types of unity seem incompatible in the same principles.’ Significantly, he quotes 999b24-1000a4 but omits 1028b-31 where Aristotle points out precisely that the difficulty in the thesis that the principles are one in number arises just in case the principles are one in number only and not also one in form. Similarly, the thesis that the principles are one in form must be the thesis that the principles are one in form only since otherwise the conclusion that ως & των & ως των & ως των & ως των would too obviously fail to follow. And as I try to show below, Aristotle does accept this argument.

Owens also misdescribes the argument of the aporia. On 999b24-7 he says: ‘If the unity in the principles sought by Wisdom is specific, nothing will be singular, not even the highest so-called genera, Being and the “one”’. But then there can be no scientific knowledge; for scientific knowledge requires a specific unity in singulars’ (246). What Aristotle says is that if nothing is one in number, και των εις την ταυτατα μετα και μετα των, ει μη του εις την ταυτατα μετα των. Clearly it is the εν των εις την ταυτατα which is assumed must be εν ενωμενει if there is to be knowledge (He is assuming the Platonic view that the object of knowledge must be one in number. Cf. 1002b12-17, 22-5, and Cherniss, ACPl, op. cit., p. 221-2). He is not making the

point that αδικα των μαθων must be εις την ταυτατα μετα των.

Owens continues: ‘On the other hand, if each of the principles is numerically one and so not an instances of a species, there will be nothing apart from it. A species in this case would be a principle prior to the first principles. No scientific knowledge of such individual principles would be possible’ (ibid.). In fact, in the passage in question (999b27-1000a4) Aristotle neither says nor implies anything about species or knowledge. And of course it is not the thesis under examination — that the principles are one in number — which in 999b24-1000a4 is said to lead to the conclusion that knowledge is not possible but rather the first hypothesis that the principles are one in form.

21 Cf. Physics 187b10-11: των δ’ ἀκρον ονομα και κατά πλήθος και κατ’ εἶδος διάνοιαν εἰς τινα τιγμων γε τοι τοιων (cf. 996a1, 1002b17-19, 22-5, Phys. 189b12-13). Aristotle’s solution to the aporia is that although unlimited in number, the principles are not unlimited in kind.

21 Aristotle begins the chapter by stating the aporia to be discussed has already been pointed out in B. A comparison of 999b27-33 with 1086b20-32 should suffice to show that 999b24-1000a4 is at least part of what he is referring to in B. (Cf. Robin, La Théorie platonicienne, op. cit., p. 529 n. 478). There is no warrant for Ross’s claim that the question in 999b24-1000a4 is ‘the same question’ as that raised in Z 14 (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, op. cit., I. 242). Nor, as he claims, is A 4 or relevant since there the question is whether the principles are the same by analogy and this is distinct from the question whether they are the same in number or the same in form.

31 Syllables are used as analogues of substances, and the συνεχεία of syllables as analogues of the principles of substances. The view expressed in this passage is presupposed in 1074a31-3. Cf. 1074a23, De Caelo 278a18-20.
that the form of the species man is a substance. But this seems inconsistent with the doctrine that nothing is absolute, that is, that no substance can be a substance: for man is surely predicated universally of Socrates, Callias, etc. How can the species man be an őnria, if any őnria has to belong, as is done to that of which it is the őnria?23

Woods’s proposed solution to the problem is that Aristotle wishes to deny only that the őnria of man is a substance, i.e. universal that are not species, while the őnria of man is a substance. It seems clear that this distinction between the őnria of man and the őnria of man is wholly illusory. First, Z 13 itself appears to contradict Woods’s suggestion. Aristotle’s second argument against the suggestion that the universal is a form is (1038b15-16): εἰς οὐδὲν λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ’ ὑποκειμένον, τὸ δὲ őνραστον καθ’ ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς λέγεται δεί. Woods says that this has to be regarded, on the view I am defending, as claiming, not that everything universal is of őnria of man but that everything predicated universally is of őnria of man.24 It is this feeble defense. Even if that is a possible reading of the sentence it is clearly highly unlikely. Secondly, Aristotle uses the őnria of man and the őnria of man interchangeably even in chapter 13 in a way which would be inexplicable if Aristotle attached the fundamental importance to the distinction which Woods claims. Thus at 1038b6-9 we read: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ őνραστον τῶν ὑπνρτῶν εἶναι μάλιστα, καὶ εἶναι ᾧ ὑποκειμένῳ τοῦ őνραστον διὰ ἐπεξεργασίαν περὶ τοῦτον ἔοικα γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὦνραστον εἶναι ὦνραστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.25

According to Woods, Aristotle says here, ‘Let us discuss x’ and then proceeds to discuss y. Similarly, when Aristotle denies that universals are substances he uses the őnria of man and the őnria of man interchangeably (τὸ őνραστον τὸ καθ’ ὑποκειμένον – 1038b8-9, 1014a4; τὸ őνραστον – 1003b8, 1042b21, 1053b16, 1062b16, 1087b2). Furthermore, Aristotle defines a universal as what can belong to, and therefore be predicated of, many particulars (999b34–1000b1; De Int. 17c38–40), expressly licenses such predications,26 and makes himself,27–8

I wish to conclude by pointing out that in denying that any of Aristotle’s substances are universals I do not mean to deny that some Aristotelian forms are universals. Some forms are universals but point out that none of these universal forms are substantial. Only individual forms are substances. That Aristotle did draw this distinction between individual substantial forms and universal non-substantial forms is shown by a passage in M 10. In that chapter, Aristotle is defending the view that the principles of substances (1086b20), which are χωριστά and one in number (1086b16–19), are themselves χωριστά and one in number (1087b7–25), but in such a way that there are many principles which are the same in kind (1087b7–10; cf. 999b28–31). It is clear that the principles that individuate Aristotle is defending are forms. Prior to offering his defence, Aristotle develops aporiai which arise for the view that the principles are particular and for the view that the principles are universals. However, the aporiai for both positions present difficulties for the Platonic view that the principles of substances are universals separate from sensible substances, but also one in number and thus unique in their kind. So that after developing the aporiai Aristotle says (1087b4–7): ‘These all follow reasonably when they make the Ideas from elements and apart from the substances [and Ideas] having the same form (τὸ ὕποκειμένον, τὸ καθ’ ὑποκειμένον),’ and claim that there is a single separate entity.’ Difficulties arise, Aristotle says, when apart from the substances having the same form, the Platonists separate a single form. Clearly ‘the same form’ (τὸ ὕποκειμένον) here does not refer to a Platonic Form since it is explicitly distinguished from such a Form, but rather to the form which is shared by substances that are the same in kind (cf. 1071a12–13). And since it is common to many particular substances it is a universal (De Part. Anim. 644b27–8). It is also clear that Aristotle does not consider this universal form to be a substance, since two lines earlier he has said ‘the universal is not substance’ in support of the view, which is his own, that the principles of substances cannot be universals. So it should be evident that Aristotle clearly distinguishes this universal form which is not a substance from the substantial forms which are the principles of the substances which have that universal in common.28

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