The Labour Government and the End of Empire
1945–1951

The British Documents on
the End of Empire Project
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the Leverhulme Trust.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE END OF EMPIRE

General Editors D J Murray and S R Ashton
Project Chairman D A Low

Series A Volume 2

The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951

Editor
RONALD HYAM

Part I
HIGH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

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Contents

	page
Foreword	vii
The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951: Schedule of contents: parts I–IV	xv
Abbreviations: part I	xvii
Principal holders of offices 1945–1951: parts I–IV	xix
Introduction	xxiii
Notes to Introduction	lxxiii
Summary of documents: part I	lxxix
Documents: part I (nos 1–73)	1
Chapter 1 Origins of the transfer of power	1
Chapter 2 Administrative plans, surveys and policy studies	97

Foreword

The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and Tinker respectively.[1] The successful completion of *The transfer of power* and *The struggle for independence*, both of which were based on British records, emphasised the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. In their absence, scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule, as well as from Britain itself, lack an important tool for understanding and teaching their respective histories. But BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another.

BDEEP is a sequel, not only to the India and Burma series but also to the still earlier series of published Foreign Office documents which continues as Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO). The contemporary volumes in DBPO appear in two parallel series covering the years 1945 to 1955. In certain respects the documents published in the BDEEP volumes will complement those published in DBPO. On issues where there is, or is likely to be, direct overlap, BDEEP will not provide detailed coverage. The most notable examples concern the post-Second World War international settlements in the Far East and the Pacific, and the immediate events of the Suez crisis of 1956.

[1] Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, *Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 1942–47*, 12 vols, (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, *Constitutional relations between Britain and Burma: the struggle for independence 1944–1948*, 2 vols, (London, 1983–1984).

Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of the twentieth century, while having its roots in the Second World War and before. Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems, but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the available official record.

In recognition of these differences, and also of the fact that the end of empire involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence, and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series – series C – will be published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). The handbooks will be published in two volumes as an integral part of BDEEP and also as PRO guides to the records. They will enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. Volume One of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of *The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices* (by R B Pugh) which was first published in 1964, is entitled *Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office*. It covers over two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume Two, entitled *Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records*, focuses more specifically on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. These two volumes have been prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne Thurston, honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies

in the University of London.

The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in individual volumes will be explained in the introductions written by the specialist editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in previous series. Each volume will also list the PRO sources which have been searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense, in which the empire is viewed in terms of Britain's position as a world power, and of the inter-relationship between what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider context of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. The central themes are the political constraints, both domestic and international, to which British governments were subject, the economic requirements of the sterling area, the geopolitical and strategic questions associated with priorities in foreign policy and in defence planning, and the interaction between these various constraints and concerns and the imperatives imposed by developments in colonial territories. Secondly, there is investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were specifically – but not exclusively – the concern of the leading department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,[2] the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major policy decisions made in Britain.

Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be fully documented in the country volumes, but some especially significant documents do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of

[2] The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service – salaries, gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation – within the colonial and related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local information to London began to diminish.

Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and DBPO, BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years, or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Where necessary, volume editors will provide details of potentially significant files or individual documents of which they are aware and which they have not been able to consult.

A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first line.[3] The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). In headings, a subject entry in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator devised by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldly to reproduce in its entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have generally been omitted as confusing and needlessly complicating, and are retained only where they are necessary to a full understanding. In the headings to documents and the summary lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, Mr Creech Jones, not secretary of state for the colonies).[4] In the same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. Ambassadors,

[3] The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the file.

[4] This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.

governors and high commissioners are given in the form 'Sir E Baring (South Africa)'. Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial select list of which principal offices were held by whom, with a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Minor figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are sometimes used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions, and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety. The footnote reference 'not printed' has been used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Each part of a volume has a list of abbreviations occurring in it. A consolidated index for the whole volume appears at the end of the final part.

One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and Burma series, is that BDEEP will reproduce many more minutes by ministers and officials.

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* * * *

BDEEP has received assistance and support from many quarters. The project was first discussed at a one-day workshop attended by over thirty interested scholars which, supported by a small grant from the Smuts Memorial Fund, was held at Churchill College, Cambridge, in May 1985. At that stage the obstacles looked daunting. It seemed unlikely that public money would be made available along the lines provided for the India and Burma projects. The complexities of the task looked substantial, partly because there was more financial and economic data with which to deal, still more because there were so many more territories to cover. It was not at all clear, moreover, who could take institutional responsibility for the project as the India Office Records had for the earlier ones; and in view of the escalating price of the successive India and Burma volumes, it seemed unlikely that publication in book form would be feasible; for some while a choice was being discussed between microfilm, microfiche and facsimile.

A small group nevertheless undertook to explore matters further, and in a quite remarkable way found itself able to make substantial progress. The British Academy

adopted BDEEP as one of its major projects, and thus provided critical support. The Institute of Commonwealth Studies served as a crucial institutional anchor in taking responsibility for the project. The Institute also made office space available, and negotiated an administrative nexus within the University of London. Dr Anne Thurston put at the disposal of the project her unique knowledge of the relevant archival sources; while the keeper of the Public Records undertook to provide all the support that he could. It then proved possible to appoint Professor Michael Crowder as project director on a part-time basis, and he approached the Leverhulme Trust, who made a munificent grant which was to make the whole project viable. Almost all those approached to be volume editors accepted and, after consultation with a number of publishers, Her Majesty's Stationery Office undertook to publish the project in book form. There can be few projects that after so faltering a start found itself quite so blessed.

Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a Project Committee chaired by Professor Anthony Low, Smuts professor of the history of the British Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge, with Professor Shula Marks, director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, as his deputy. Professor Michael Crowder became general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who now holds the position of executive editor. Dr Ashton previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the India and Burma series. When BDEEP was launched in 1987, eight volumes in series A and B were approved by the Project Committee, and specialist scholars were commissioned to research and select documents for inclusion in each. Collectively, these eight volumes represent the first stage of the project, which begins with an introductory general volume covering the years between 1924 and 1945, but which concentrates on the period from the Second World War to 1957, when Ghana and Malaya became independent.

It is fitting that the general editors should begin their acknowledgements with an appreciation of Professor Crowder's contribution. The late Professor Crowder supervised the launch of the project, ensuring in the process that it was speedily transformed from a theoretical concept into a practical proposition. His death was a grievous loss but the published volumes in Stage One bear testimony to his resolve and dedication during the project's formative phase. The project benefitted from an initial pump-priming grant from the British Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Council of the Academy for this grant and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major projects. The principal funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. We are deeply indebted to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grant to cover the costs of the first stage, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of the grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton's appointment.

Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encouragement. Professor Low, chairman of the Committee, has made a singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. In addition to the annual meeting of the Project Committee, the project holds an annual seminar to discuss issues arising from the research of the editors. Valuable comments have been received from academic colleagues attending the seminars by invitation. Professor Marks and the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial surroundings within which the general editors work. The editors of volumes in Stage One have profited considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants during the preparation of the records handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editors wish to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. They wish also to record their appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation emanating from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor of the volume in series A on *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951*, played an important role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to HMSO for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the editors wish to thank the keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at Kew, the project would not be viable.

S R Ashton
D J Murray

BDEEP Stage One[5]

Series A

Volume 1 *Colonial policy and practice 1924–1945* (J M Lee and P B Rich)
Volume 2 *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951* (Ronald Hyam)
Volume 3 *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* (David Goldsworthy)

Series B

Volume 1 *Ghana* (Richard Rathbone)
Volume 2 *Sri Lanka* (K M de Silva)
Volume 3 *Malaya* (A J Stockwell)
Volume 4 *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East* (John Kent)
Volume 5 *Sudan* (Douglas H Johnson)

[5] Volume 1 in series A is a single-part volume; volumes 2 and 3 and the five volumes in series B are multi-part volumes.

The Labour Government and
the End of Empire 1945–1951

Schedule of contents: parts I–IV

		Doc nos
PART I	HIGH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION	
Chapter 1	*Origins of the transfer of power*	
	(1) High policy decisions: Indian sub-continent and Middle East, 1945–1947	1–31
	(2) High policy decisions: Egypt and Persia, 1950–1951	32–38
Chapter 2	*Administrative plans, surveys and policy studies*	
	(1) The new African policy	39–57
	(2) African Governors' Conference, 1947	58–67
	(3) General colonial policy and administration	68–73
PART II	ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
Chapter 3	*Economic policy*	
	(1) Colonial economic policy: general	74–103
	(2) African development policy: major reports	104–111
	(3) Economic policy: Africa	112–137
Chapter 4	*International relations policy*	
	(1) Colonial aspects of foreign policy: European integration, and the struggle against communism	138–163
	(2) The Hong Kong crisis, 1949	164–172
	(3) International colonial collaboration and criticism: the United Nations	173–194
PART III	STRATEGY, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE	
Chapter 5	*Political and constitutional policy*	
	(1) East and East-Central Africa	195–211
	(2) West Africa	212–228
	(3) Cyprus	229–247
	(4) West Indies	248–255
	(5) Other territories	256–272

		Doc nos
Chapter 6	*Strategic and defence policies*	
	(1) The strategic debate about the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1945–1947	273–282
	(2) The future of the ex-Italian colonies	283–318
	(3) Colonial and Commonwealth defence strategy	319–343
PART IV	RACE RELATIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH	
Chapter 7	*Social, racial and research policies*	
	(1) Race: general issues	344–360
	(2) Social welfare policy	361–370
	(3) Research	371–379
Chapter 8	*The Commonwealth*	
	(1) The Commonwealth relationship: India and Ireland	380–404
	(2) Smaller colonial territories: future status	405–410
	(3) Southern African issues: relations with the Union government	411–444

Abbreviations: part I

ADC	assistant district commissioner
ADO	assistant district officer
AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (Burma)
AGC	African Governors' Conference (1947)
AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AKEL	Reform Party of Working People (Communist Party of Cyprus)
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States [Pact]
BDEEP	British Documents on the End of Empire Project
BSI	Burma: Struggle for Independence (Burma documents series)
CAS	Colonial Administrative Service
CD(&)W	Colonial Development and Welfare (Act)
CIGS	chief of the imperial general staff
CM	Cabinet conclusions (minutes), Labour government, 1945–1951
CO	Colonial Office
Col	Colonial
COOC	Colonial Office Organisation Committee
COS	Chiefs of Staff
CP	Cabinet memoranda, Labour government, 1945–1951
CPP	Convention People's Party (Gold Coast)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
CSS	Cambridge Summer School
DBPO	Documents on British Policy Overseas
ECA	Economic Co-operation Administration (United States)
FAO	French Overseas and Associated Territories
gov	governor
gov-gen	governor-general
govt	government

H of C Debs	*House of Commons Debates* (Hansard)
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IPS	Indian Police Service
KC	King's Counsel
memo	memorandum
MP	member of parliament
NAS	Native Authority System
PC	provincial commissioner
PM	prime minister
SAHC	South African High Commission
S of S	secretary of state
SNA	secretary for native affairs
TOPI	Transfer of Power in India (India documents series)
UN(O)	United Nations (Organisation)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
US(A)	United States (of America)
WT	water transport/warrant travel

Principal holders of offices 1945–1951: parts I–IV

1. *Ministers*

(a) *Cabinet ministers*

Prime minister	Mr C R Attlee (26 July 1945–26 Oct 1951)
Lord president of the Council	Mr H S Morrison (27 July 1945) Viscount Addison (9 Mar 1951)
Chancellor of Exchequer	Dr H J N Dalton (27 July 1945) Sir Stafford Cripps (13 Nov 1947) Mr H T N Gaitskell (19 Oct 1950)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr E Bevin (27 July 1945) Mr H S Morrison (9 Mar 1951)
S of S colonies	Mr G H Hall (3 Aug 1945) Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946) Mr J Griffiths (28 Feb 1950)
S of S dominion affairs (Commonwealth relations from 7 July 1947)	Viscount Addison (3 Aug 1945) Mr P J Noel-Baker (7 Oct 1947) Mr P C Gordon Walker (28 Feb 1950)
S of S defence	Mr C R Attlee (27 July 1945) Mr A V Alexander (20 Dec 1946) Mr E Shinwell (28 Feb 1950)
S of S India and Burma	Lord Pethick-Lawrence (3 Aug 1945) Earl of Listowel (23 Apr–14 Aug 1947 for India; to 4 Jan 1948 for Burma)

(b) *Cabinet Committees*

(i) *Commonwealth Affairs Committee*

The Committee sat between Oct 1947 and Dec 1950, taking over the work of the India and Burma Committee and the Colonial Affairs Committee.

Prime minister (chairman), S of S defence, lord privy seal (Lord Addison), lord chancellor (Lord Jowitt), S of S colonies, S of S Burma (to 4 Jan 1948), S of S Commonwealth relations, minister of civil aviation (Lord Nathan, to May 1948, then Lord Pakenham).

A representative of the Foreign Office attended meetings. The attorney-general (Sir H Shawcross) or the solicitor-general (Sir F Soskice) were invited to attend meetings at which constitutional issues were to be discussed.

(c) *Junior ministers*

(i) *Colonial Office*

Minister of state	Earl of Listowel (4 Jan 1948) Mr J Dugdale (28 Feb 1950)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state	Mr A Creech Jones (4 Aug 1945) Mr I B Thomas (4 Oct 1946) Mr D R Rees-Williams (7 Oct 1947) Mr T F Cook (2 Mar 1950)

(ii) *Dominions/Commonwealth Relations Office*

Parliamentary under-secretary of state	Mr J Parker (4 Aug 1945) Mr A G Bottomley (10 May 1946) Mr P C Gordon Walker (14 Oct 1947) Lord Holden (2 Mar 1950) Lord Ogmore (5 July 1950) (formerly D R Rees-Williams) Earl of Lucan (2 June 1951)

(iii) *Foreign Office*

Minister of state (not formally attached until 1950)	Mr P J Noel-Baker (3 Aug 1945) Mr H McNeil (4 Oct 1946) Mr K Younger (28 Feb 1950)

2. *Civil servants*

(a) *Secretary to the Cabinet*	Sir Edward Bridges (1938–1946) Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962; additional secretary, 1945–1946)

(b) *Colonial Office*

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state	Sir George Gater (1939–1940; 1942–1947) Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947–1956)
(ii) Deputy under-secretary of state	Sir Arthur Dawe (1945–1947) Sir Sydney Caine (1947–1948) } joint Sir Charles Jeffries (1947–1956) } joint Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)
(iii) Assistant under-secretary of state	C J Jeffries (1939–1947) Sir Gerard Clauson (1940–1951)

G E Gent (1942–1946)
T I K Lloyd (1943–1947)
G H Creasy (1943–1948)
S Caine (1944–1947)
J M Martin (1945–1956)
G F Seel (1946–1950)
A H Poynton (1946–1948)
C G Eastwood (1947–1952; 1954–1966)
A B Cohen (1947–1951)
W L Gorell Barnes (1948–1959)
J J Paskin (1948–1954)
J B Williams (1949–1953)
S E V Luke (1950–1953)

(c) *Dominions/Commonwealth Relations Office*

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state	Sir Eric Machtig (1940–1949) Sir Percivale Liesching (1949–1955)
(ii) Deputy under-secretary of state	Sir John Stephenson (1940–1948) Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (1948–1949) Sir Cecil Syers (1948–1951)

(d) *Foreign Office*

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state	Sir Orme Sargent (1946–1949) Sir William Strang (1949–1953)

3. *Chiefs of Staff*

First sea lord	Sir John Cunningham (1946–1948) Lord Fraser of North Cape (1948–1951)
Chief of imperial general staff	Sir Alan Brooke (Lord Alanbrooke) (1941–1946) Viscount Montgomery (1946–1948) Sir William Slim (1948–1952)
Chief of air staff	Sir Arthur Tedder (Lord Tedder) (1946–1950) Sir John Slessor (1950–1953)

4. *Select list of ambassadors, high commissioners and governors*

Ambassador in Washington	Earl of Halifax (1941–1946) Lord Inverchapel (1946–1948) Sir Oliver Franks (1948–1952)
Ambassador to the UN	Sir Alexander Cadogan (1946–1950) Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1950–1954)

Gov-gen in British territories in South-East Asia (to 1948); commissioner-gen in South-East Asia	Mr M J MacDonald (1946–1955)
High commissioner in South Africa	Sir Evelyn Baring (1944–1951)
Gov of Cyprus	Sir Charles Woolley (1941–1946) Lord Winster (1946–1949) Sir Andrew Wright (1949–1954)
Gov of Gold Coast	Sir Alan Burns (1941–1947) Sir Gerald Creasy (1948–1949) Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (1949–1957)
Gov of Kenya	Sir Philip Mitchell (1944–1952)
Gov of Nigeria	Sir Arthur Richards (1943–1947) Sir John Macpherson (1948–1954)

Introduction

During the middle of the Second World War, probably in 1942 when he was secretary of state for dominion affairs, Attlee set down his thoughts on post-war colonial policy. 'The colonial problem will not be solved', he wrote, 'by a combination of an eye to business and humanitarian sentiment. Nor on the other hand will it be solved by looking backwards and imagining that we can recreate the conditions of a past age'. Britain must therefore, he concluded, 'set aside sentimental imperialism and take a realist view of our problems'. He believed they were committed to giving India self-government (treating India as 'a political entity with which an accommodation has to be reached'). As far as the rest of Asia was concerned, he considered that it consisted of 'a group of peoples on the way towards self-government requiring tutelage for many years yet and susceptible to much economic development which should be directed primarily to the welfare of the indigenous populations and to the general service of the world'. He did not mention Africa.[1]

In office, Attlee proved indeed to be a realist, committed to the maintenance of British global interests where they could still be justified after rigorous re-examination. The 'old colonialism' must die, but the sense of providing tutelage remained strong. The Labour government's years in power coincided with a creative period in the history of the CO. The result was a fruitful congruence of ministerial and official thinking.

Two quintessential themes dominated the colonial policy of the Labour government between 1945 and 1951: economic recovery and Russian expansion. Almost all overseas policy-making evolved within the fundamental parameters provided by the dollar shortage and the cold war. Both problems predicated enhanced interest in the empire in general and in Africa in particular. The minister of defence (A V Alexander) in October 1949 defined the three main policy objectives of the government as: (i) to secure 'our people against aggression', (ii) to sustain a foreign policy dominated by global 'resistance to the onrush of communist influence', and (iii) to achieve 'the most rapid development practicable of our overseas possessions, since without such colonial development there can be no major improvement in the standard of living of our own people at home'.[2] A CO minister might have added some rather more altruistic goals, but there is no doubt that Alexander reflected the sense of priorities held by the majority of the Cabinet. As far as the immediate context of colonial policy as such is concerned, there were several new developments in the 1940s which had to be taken seriously into account. There was the growth of colonial nationalism. There was the emergence of the communist threat. And there was the unprecedented development of international interest in and criticism of colonial regimes. Militant colonial nationalism was for the moment confined to Asia, but it was obvious that it was about to spread to parts of Africa. Whether or not nationalism could be made into a constructive force in colonial development and political advancement was one of the major issues of post-war

policy (document no 72, para 75). The new communist threat was expected to be ruthlessly prosecuted in the colonies, which to Russian eyes might seem an Achilles heel of capitalist systems. An international critique focused in the United Nations was especially worrying, since it posed the prospect of 'prejudiced, ignorant and hostile' interference in colonies by 'fifty-eight back-seat drivers without responsibility', trying to force on the pace of self-government, without taking account of readiness for it. This, it was thought, would be a sure recipe for post-imperial disintegration. The 'anti-colonial bloc' was led by the Philippines, Egypt, and Cuba, and, most regrettably from the British point of view, by India. British policy was to accept international co-operation in matters to do with the empire, but not to recognise any United Nations' rights of international supervision of colonies beyond those which would be accepted for sovereign states (such as action against drugs or prostitution) (72, paras 80–84; 176, 183, 188 para 7).[3] Although membership of the United Nations seemed to produce some overall advantages to Britain, handling it proved frustrating and hard work in the colonial field (187, 189). Britain was pulled in contrary directions by the prevailing forces around her. The emergence of nationalism, and UN criticism, together with the increased strain on her resources, made it much harder to take the measures which seemed imperatively required to combat the growth of the Soviet menace.

Although a large proportion of official thinking was focused upon Africa (and this is reflected in the documents selected here), it should not be forgotten that South-East Asia was an equally key area, a subject of central concern to the Labour government. This was evident early on, for there was much ministerial anxiety about food shortages (especially acute in rice) and the shape of the post-war settlement in the wake of the Japanese conquests. Bevin feared a 'major catastrophe' in the east, particularly since other powers seemed less ready to acknowledge the need to meet nationalist aspirations sympathetically. Communism and emergent nationalism were to be distinguished, however. The onset of the communist insurrection in Malaya from 1948 was met with a state of emergency. The Malayan insurgency served to sharpen British perceptions of the wider international significance of South-East Asia to her in raising dollars and containing communism. A measure of this significance is seen in the successive regional organisations which the government set up and monitored carefully: under the FO special commissioner (Lord Killearn, 1946–1948), the CO governor-general (Malcolm MacDonald, 1946–48) and then the amalgamated post of commissioner-general (MacDonald, 1948–1955). The latter co-ordinated British colonial, diplomatic, economic and military interests and activities in the region and was answerable jointly to the secretary of state for the colonies and the foreign secretary (178, paras 10 & 11). Malaya was recognised as the cornerstone of the whole British position in the Far East, while Singapore was the bastion of strategic power and planning in a wide area (335). Considerable amounts of money and manpower were drafted in to secure Britain's 'weak rear' in the cold war (265, 270–272), although ministers were well aware of the danger of Malaya's 'devolving into a bottomless pit, devouring all our resources, and playing straight into Russian hands'.[4]

The policies supported by the CO to meet the combination of post-war circumstances were essentially three in number: (i) a modernised multi-racial Commonwealth (linked to the maintenance of the sterling area), (ii) closer relations with the United States and perhaps with France, and (iii) political advancement for

colonial peoples, proceeding in a smooth, gradual and orderly way and not outrunning the necessary improvement of economic capacity to sustain it. From 1948 the government's policy was officially defined as follows: 'The central purpose of British colonial policy is simple. It is to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter' (71). Confrontation with genuine national desire was to be avoided (179, para 24). No virtue was seen in keeping colonial peoples in a state of unwilling dependence; but equally there was reckoned to be no case for launching ill-prepared independent states prematurely into a dangerous world. The aim was to establish, within the Commonwealth, stable, effective and democratic successor states, which could resist both external domination and internal unrepresentative dictatorship. Approached in this way 'the transfer of power is not a sign of weakness or of liquidation of the Empire, but is, in fact a sign and source of strength' (72, para 84).

High policy and the origins of the transfer of power

This formulation just quoted was a legacy of high-policy discussion in the context of India, Burma and Ceylon. The presentation of the transfer of power in India was something the Cabinet worried over for many months in 1946. They did not want to be accused of weakness or 'a policy of scuttle unworthy of a Great Power' by simply withdrawing and leaving Indians to fight out their own problems. This, it was thought, would cause general consternation throughout the Commonwealth, upset the Americans, damage British prestige, and encourage the Russians to interfere in the sub-continent. On the other hand, 'one thing was quite certain, viz, that we could not put the clock back and introduce a period of firm British rule'. Neither the military nor the administrative machine 'was any longer capable of this' (13 & 15). Britain had to look to the unacceptable costs of holding India, and, as Attlee pointed out, she also depended on 'tens of thousands of lesser functionaries', whose loyalty was waning by the week.[5] At the same time the Chiefs of Staff warned that to try to hold on in India might permanently antagonise the Indians, thus militating against the long-term British strategic need for access to bases, airfields and manpower.[6] Dalton (Chancellor of the Exchequer) expressed the essence of the problem in a splendidly monosyllabic way: 'If you are in a place where you are not wanted, and where you have not got the force, or perhaps the will, to squash those who do not want you, the only thing to do is to come out'. This 'very simple truth', he added, would have to be applied to other places too, notably Palestine.[7]

Fixing a definite date for British withdrawal would, it was hoped, force Indians into co-operation and settlement. The transfer of power to Pakistan took place on 14 August, and to India on 15 August 1947 at the midnight hour. Burma became independent on 4 January 1948 and immediately left the Commonwealth. Ceylon became a dominion on 4 February 1948. The British Mandate in Palestine was terminated on 14 May 1948. The inter-relationship between this cluster of high-policy decisions was very close, and not just in the sense that they were sometimes items on the same Cabinet agenda. India's independence tended almost automatically to take Burma with it. As Attlee said in Cabinet in December 1946: 'if the principle of independence was sound for India it was also sound for Burma' (14). The question was one of timing: 'there is an obvious risk in moving so fast, but an equal risk of disturbances if the return to civil government is delayed'. Governor Sir

Hubert Rance advised that they could not afford to concede by force later what they could concede with dignity now. AFPFL and Aung San should be backed, because there was no alternative which was not less moderate.[8]

But if Burma was to be independent there was no gainsaying the claims of Ceylon, however reluctant the government might be to meet them. This was because she had been much more loyal than Burma during the war, and it would never do to be charged with rewarding disloyalty while penalising loyalty. In any case Lord Soulbury, the chairman of the Ceylon Commission on Constitutional Reform (1944–1945), had already articulated the doctrine which was to run like the proverbial scarlet thread through the history of decolonisation: 'I believe that in the long run giving too much and too soon will prove to be wiser than giving too little or too late' (3). In Ceylon as in Burma there seemed to be no alternative: they must back the moderate Senanayake, for without him power would pass to the 'extremists'. So it would be better to modify the ideal gradualist timetable in order to enable Senanayake to retain his support. In a memorandum of 29 April 1947 Creech Jones wrote as follows:

> I have given anxious thought to this matter, more particularly in view of the accusation which has been made against the present government of 'scuttle' and of 'squandering the empire'. It seems to me that, on the contrary, if this matter is rightly handled, we have an excellent opportunity not only of keeping Ceylon within the British Commonwealth and of securing our vital defence interests here, but of demonstrating to the world that our proclaimed policy for the Colonial peoples is not an empty boast, and that an independent status in the Commonwealth is not, in practice, reserved for people of European descent. Such a demonstration would both confound our critics and give deserved encouragement to loyal and progressive elements in the Colonial peoples.[9]

Ceylon was to be the first CO territory to proceed to self-government and independence (1, 4, 25), and it was inevitably an inspiration to others. But the decision to move in this direction was not taken easily. Bevin as foreign secretary was concerned about the effects of this further loosening of the imperial grip (26). Others had doubts about the future protection of the Tamil minority. Senanayake, however, made plausibly reassuring noises.

In Palestine as in India the preservation of future goodwill became a crucial determinant in decision-making. The FO insisted on the need for Arab friendship, since antagonising the Arabs over Palestine would almost certainly throw them – and their oil – into the arms of the Russians, thus bringing about the very conjunction which Bevin thought it must be a priority to prevent. Making a bid for Israeli friendship would bring no comparable gain, for a Jewish state, even if it could be persuaded to offer strategic facilities, could never provide a worthwhile base because it would be surrounded by implacably hostile Arabs. The government's policy was to do what it could to produce a settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs, but, if this was impossible (as it proved to be), then it would follow the dictates of British interests, which pointed to trying to keep on the right side of the Arabs. There could be no question of expending hard-pressed British resources to enforce a settlement against the wishes of both parties. Once the United Nations had proposed an unacceptable partition there was no alternative but to pull out. At the Cabinet on 20

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September 1947 Attlee referred to the obvious analogy with withdrawal from India by a definite date (30).

Analogy from India also worked in favour of the Sudan. As with Burma the argument was that if Indians could be trusted with the management of their own affairs so could the Sudanese. Sudan, it could be contended, was a bridge between the transfer of power in India and the transfer of power in Africa, and an inspiration in African administration* (67). In April 1946 the governor-general (Sir Hubert Huddleston) declared that Sudanisation would be accelerated, because the 'government is aiming at a free independent Sudan'; even within the next five years 'a great advance' could be made, and 'in twenty years' time the Sudanese will be governing their own country' (5). These remarks – which created a stir locally – were inspired by Bevin ('I have to face certain modern tendencies in regard to colonial or quasi-colonial problems'), and the FO had willingly helped with the drafting of what amounted to a declaration. The impression in the FO was that the Sudan administration was still too narrow and old-fashioned. Bevin replaced Huddleston with Sir Robert Howe, who (with the aid of the civil secretary, Sir James Robertson) proved to be a promoter of Sudan's right to self-determination, holding the ring against re-assertions of Egyptian sovereignty (which Bevin also worried about), and steadily preparing it for independence. In 1948 a legislative council and an executive council were set up. Sudanisation was intensified. But Bevin was against Attlee's idea of fixing a date for deciding its future.[10]

The implications for Malaya of these policies – especially in comparison with the difficulties the Dutch seemed to be making for themselves in Indonesia – soon became apparent.[11] In June 1946 H T Bourdillon (the CO official who headed the Malayan Dept) defined the aim there as 'to build the foundations for self-government, and then move in that direction as rapidly as Malaya itself will permit'. This policy was described as one of *political advancement*, since progress to self-government ought to be orderly; its timetable was to be determined by Britain's own 'enlightened' programme, and not by seeming to yield to nationalist pressure, although the Malay nationalism the British encountered was, if anything, pressing for a delay in political advance until Malays were in a position to contain the communist challenge. At all events it was understood that Britain must come to terms with a genuine young Malay nationalist movement, promote improved living standards and assist the development of a Malayan community capable of resisting communism (270). By the end of 1950, with fears that Malaya was becoming 'a second Palestine', Strachey (War Office minister) believed they 'needed a Mountbatten' (272). And Griffiths applied the fundamental CO insight generated by India, Burma and Ceylon: 'post-war events have shown that the danger lies in too slow rather than in too rapid progress' towards self-government, which could no longer be set as far ahead as twenty-five years (271). The Malayan Emergency was not allowed to interfere with political advancement and social development any more than it had to. Progress must continue *pari passu* with the necessary search for a military victory over the rebels.[12] This insight was later applied by a Conservative government in fighting Mau Mau in Kenya.[13]

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* Some ex-Indian Civil Service officers transferred to the Sudan Service. Sir Alan Burns's famous minute on Africanisation was inspired by a Sudan model (347). In education, the experiment of Griffiths at Bakht-er-Ruda was regarded as a prototype for Africa (CO 859/89/8, memo by W E F Ward, 7 May 1946). Sir James Robertson moved from the civil secretaryship of the Sudan to the governorship of Nigeria in 1955.

Meanwhile the Labour government was evolving equally significant high-policy insights into the management of nationalism in the Middle East. One of Bevin's first memoranda was devoted to the idea of 'a partnership with Arabs': working in future through 'people not pashas', recognising that western military and political props could not be enduring, and trying to find much more in the way of economic aid for the Arabs so as to raise living standards for the masses. His policy was to shift the future defence of the Suez Canal base conceptually onto Anglo-Egyptian co-operation and away from the idea of British occupation (2, 7). Realising that effective use of the base was critically dependent on Egyptian goodwill, and that ideal strategic requirements would have to be sacrificed in order to ensure it, Attlee in 1946 tried to set the tone for the treaty re-negotiation. In his summing up in Cabinet (8) he declared that Britain could 'not remain forcibly on the ground': British interests 'would only be impaired if we insisted on remaining in Egypt against the will of the Egyptian people and so worsened our relations with the remainder of the Arab world'. Treaty negotiations collapsed, however, partly because the Egyptians insisted on linking them to their claims to sovereignty in the Sudan. Bevin, driving a hard bargain on the evacuation timetable and refusing absolutely to 'sell the Sudanese into Egyptian slavery', saw all his hopes of a fresh but favourable treaty dashed. The Labour government continued to try to tempt Egypt into some sort of 'equal partnership' in a new Middle East defence scheme, but negotiations remained deadlocked (32–35). Attlee was unable to deliver Britain out of her Egyptian bondage, although it is worth remembering that the settlement eventually negotiated by the Conservative government in 1954 followed almost entirely the lines of Labour's earlier approach.[14]

The Persian oil crisis of 1951, which dominated the last weeks of the life of the Labour government, completed the emerging pattern of a consistent policy in dealing with nationalist challenges. After some initial dithering, Attlee obtained a Cabinet decision not to use force (36–38). Rather against the instincts of the foreign secretary (Morrison), 'gunboat diplomacy' was unequivocally ruled out. This policy was welcomed by officials as proof that the days were over of 'thinking in Edwardian terms of the use of military and economic power we no longer possess'. Nationalism, all seemed to be agreed by October 1951, must be met with diplomacy and publicity, and not with intervention and force. It was something to be accommodated, not smashed.[15]

More generally the experience of the Labour government in dealing with Asian and Arab (and to a lesser extent African) nationalism between 1945 and 1951 pointed to the necessity of recognising the limitations imposed on the exercise of continuing power by Britain with her limited economic resources, overstretched defence requirements and over-riding geopolitical need to win the cold war – fighting the new Russian imperialism by rooting out the vulnerable vestiges of the British 'old colonialism'; of recognising the impossibility of holding on to territories and facilities without popular goodwill and local collaboration, and the difficulty of withholding equal concessions to similar states (especially if neighbours); of recognising the counterproductiveness of coercive methods, and the need to maintain policies of political advancement even while defeating rebels. Experience also suggested the necessity of recognising the importance of keeping the initiative, being one jump ahead of the nationalists, making timely and graceful concessions from a position of control, showing willingness to modify ideal timetables in

response to circumstances, being prepared to go faster rather than slower, avoiding giving too little and too late; of recognising the fundamental need to decide who the moderates were, then backing them and outmanoeuvring the 'extremists', and finding ways of turning nationalism to constructive account. Finally, it had become recognised that all this was the only sure way to preserve the long-term friendship and goodwill of former colonies on which future trading and strategic facilities and continuing membership of the Commonwealth (and thus of the western alliance) would ultimately depend.

Although these pragmatic tactics operated over a broad spectrum of colonial problems, there was nothing in the way of an overall 'strategic plan' for 'the end of empire'. The nearest approach was J S Bennett's memorandum of 30 April 1947, written very much under the influence of the economic crisis and impending independence for India. He envisaged winding up as rapidly as possible British commitments in the Middle East, North Africa and South-East Asia, and then concentrating on African advancement as the core of their future action – with American help. Bennett's memorandum was pigeon-holed. The bureaucracy was ill-equipped to deal with such large issues (174).

Nor as yet did it trouble itself unduly over emerging colonial nationalist leaders. Whitehall was well aware of Bustamante and Manley in the West Indies, Nkrumah and Azikiwe in West Africa, but of almost nobody else. Nationalism was discussed, but only in general terms. This does not mean, however, that policy-analysis was simply unreal or unduly conducted in the abstract, for territorially organised African nationalism, except in the Gold Coast, was still largely in its latency period before 1951.

The new African policy

A publicity statement in 1946 announced that 'British "imperialism" is dead' (68). CO officials saw themselves as being engaged after 1945 not only on what they called a 'new policy' for Africa, but also a 'gigantic experiment' (H T Bourdillon), 'a world-wide experiment in nation building' (72 para 2).[16] The central aim of British policy was to lead colonies (except the smaller isolated ones) to self-government as rapidly as possible – though that was not expected to be soon – and to consolidate the links with Britain so that ex-colonies would remain in the Commonwealth. Bourdillon wrote: 'in this conception of the evolving Commonwealth I see the boldest stroke of political idealism which the world has yet witnessed, and on by far the grandest scale'; the great experiment was something 'surpassing in importance any of the much publicised political experiments indulged in by the Soviet Russians or anybody else'. The great task of the CO for the future, Bourdillon continued, was not to impose a master-plan but to let each colony develop in its own way under the direction of the governor and his officers, who would foster political developments. The role of the CO would be to 'respond, stimulate (if necessary) and guide' (70). This euphoric attitude was not unusual. A H Poynton (the CO's international relations expert) declared at the United Nations that 'the present time is one of unprecedented vigour and imagination in colonial policy'. It was 'one cheerful thing in a depressing world'.[17] A carefully considered formulation of CO policy (probably drafted by A B Cohen, the head of the African Dept) in 1948 was certainly high-minded:

> The fundamental objectives in Africa are to foster the emergence of large-scale societies,

> integrated for self-improvement by effective and democratic political and economic institutions both national and local, inspired by a common faith in progress and Western values and equipped with efficient techniques of production and betterment.[18]

Africa was regarded after 1945 as 'the core of our colonial position' (43, 174), an area where, even as late as 1951, it was assumed that it was still possible to mould events and control nationalism (56). The call for a redefinition, redirection and broadening of the goals of African administration came first from G B Cartland (a seconded Colonial Service officer) early in 1946. Government, he wrote, had urgently to reverse both the drift of African policy since the 1930s and the prevailing poor morale among serving officers (39). Promoting this call, Cohen took a series of soundings. What emerged under his guidance was a plan for a three-stage programme of consultation. To start with there would be a summer school on the problems of local government in Africa (held in Queens' College, Cambridge, August 1947); then there would be a conference of African Governors (November 1947); and finally a larger gathering of African members (official and unofficial) of legislative councils (September 1948). Cohen was congratulated on his initiative by his colleagues ('one of the most important and valuable things which has happened recently in this Office') (43). As Thomas (the parliamentary under-secretary of state) put it, the reason for it was that the internal African situation combined with the pressure of international opinion 'demand a new approach to policy in Africa'. He expected the African Governors' Conference to mark 'a turning-point in colonial thought' (58). Officials sought to articulate a unified, logical, coherent and convincing policy – to define a 'broad objective' without imposing a stereotyped master-plan. There was to be a 'general stocktaking' of African policy (41), an attempt to get beyond the obsolescent nostrums of 'indirect rule' (48, 49). The chances of a new Lugard or Cameron emerging seemed small, so the CO must become its own theorist, inspirer and catalyst of policy. Effective economic development required a new political instrument, namely African participation. Seeing the departure of Burma from the Commonwealth as a sober warning of what could go wrong, the CO wanted to find ways of building the future in Africa on a 'broad basis' of popular support, and 'not as in India and Burma a narrow one' (111). The detailed thinking of the CO on the basic problems was mainly concentrated in the preparation of the agenda papers for the African Governors' Conference (59). These papers proved to be useful not least in preparing a comprehensive answer (106) to Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery's charge that not enough was being done in and for Africa (104).

The centrepiece of the new African policy was the promotion of 'efficient, democratic and local government', the theme of a well-known despatch which Sir G Seel (an assistant under-secretary of state) hailed as 'a notable State Paper' (44). This policy was not an end in itself. Sound, representative local government was emphasised as a way of providing a training-ground for higher responsibilities, an accessible means of getting the necessary political experience to run central government (57, 71). Behind it was a notion that the future rulers of Africa should be diverted from 'pure politics' into learning the science of administration: true political education meant not theoretical 'airy nothings' but acquiring the solid discipline of government administration from the bottom up. Through local government, men would, it was hoped, 'bring to the councils of central government a very much more

mature political sense than the professional politicians whose political equipment is usually confined to a collection of high-sounding political catchwords' (Cartland)[19] (349). With respect to East and Central Africa, according to Cohen:

> It seems to us that the whole political future of the territories, both in its substance and in its pace, depends on the development of local government for Africans, particularly in the rural areas . . . . The speed of development, effective and representative development, of local government bodies in these territories is likely, therefore, in my personal view, to determine the speed at which the territories move forward towards responsible self-government.

He recognised that it might be necessary to move faster than the masses found acceptable, and radically grapple with the extreme conservatism of the majority: 'I think one element of the new policy is that it is now generally recognised that one can no longer accept fully the proposition that the development of local government must take place at the pace which the people of the area are prepared to accept'. This was because 'without the successful development of local government political advance will be one-sided in the extreme'.[20] The local government strategy was designed to bring in the masses to redress the balance of the professional politicians, who were reckoned to be bent only on removing the colonial power for their own benefit (43). A chain of representation from the people in their villages to the legislative council would be built up, thus preventing the exploitation of the 'ignorant and gullible majority' by unrepresentative oligarchies (216), neutralising the 'evils of a class of professional politicians' (40). There was a considerable amount of feed-back and follow-up to the local government despatch (45–50), including an attempt to convince 'the more conservative African administrators' that it was a logical development from the old indirect rule policy (49).

In more general terms, the aim in Africa was seen as devolving more authority to colonial governments (ie, the existing governments) from Whitehall, in future exercising influence more by consultation and advice than formal control, by discussion rather than instruction. There would be no fixed blue-print (59, para 5). Friendly association would replace benevolent domination. There would be a redistribution of power between colony and metropolis based on relinquishing formal control in executive government. An advisory capacity would supersede executive function. Efficiency would supersede tradition. The modern state would replace empire. Institutions would become more important than personalities. Partnership with colonial peoples would replace trusteeship. The long-term aim was preparation for self-government which was soundly based, representative and beneficial to all. It would be reached by a gradual, carefully controlled process. The slogan was to 'secure more Ceylons and fewer Burmas' (64, para 19; 70, paras 4 & 6). All government officers must accordingly learn to become public relations men, and to turn themselves into enthusiasts for Africanisation (108, 109, 111). Nowhere was this policy more sharply articulated than in the Gold Coast, where Governor Sir Alan Burns advised serving officers that steady Africanisation was the settled policy and Africans must be given 'all the help that lies in our power'. 'There will soon be little room for officials who do not regard the training of African staff as their primary responsibility'. Those 'die-hards' who thought government was moving too fast in Africanisation and in giving power to colonial peoples 'should consider seriously

whether they can conscientiously continue to serve a Government with whose policy they are in fundamental disagreement. For this policy is clear and there is no prospect of it being changed except in the direction of still faster progress' (347).

Organisation and administration

For the 'gigantic experiment' the CO would need to be properly equipped administratively. From 1947 the African division was expanded, and an African Studies Branch was set up. These African arrangements were regarded by many as a model pointing the way ahead more generally (377). Rees-Williams (parliamentary under-secretary of state) wrote a memorandum in July 1948 on the 'reorientation of the Colonial Office', in which he argued that it needed to be more of a 'thinking and planning department on a world-wide scale', less preoccupied with day-to-day routine responsibilities. As he put it, the CO should be 'far less Auditor-General, Home Office, Agriculture, Town and Country Planning', and 'far more the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, MI5 and Economic Policy Committee'. Politics and defence should become more important, he believed: 'we have to deal today with a new threat on a world-wide basis and our organisation must be prepared to cope with the problem'.[21]

A committee on CO organisation was set up under the permanent secretary Sir Thomas Lloyd in 1948. The members were Lord Milverton (formerly Sir A Richards), Sir P Liesching (CRO), J I C Crombie (Treasury) and A H Poynton. Its conclusion was unadventurous, even lame: the existing organisation of the office was basically satisfactory, but some small adjustments could be made – a limited number of papers should be transferred from Production and Marketing, and from Social Service, to the geographical departments. The clerical section should be split up between the geographical departments. They also recommended that interchanging staff with the Colonial Service should be extended to the maximum possible extent; and that interdepartmental consultation should be expedited. Since Africa should not be treated uniformly, they decided against a separate secretary of state for Africa (54, 55). They did not want to see the creation of a historical studies branch, suggesting instead that colonial history in the universities should be encouraged. The crux of the problem was the old one (going back to 1907 at least) of the distribution of work between subject and geographical departments. It was generally agreed now that the main purpose of the CO was political and therefore that the basis of organisation should be the geographical departments, since constitutional development must be related to local circumstances. (Griffiths in 1951 came to a rather different conclusion, however (55).) In Bourdillon's words (in a submission to the committee), they ought to recognise 'the all-importance of the political factor, in its broadest and fullest sense, in our future dealings with the Colonial Empire'. It was of course widely understood that the economic side had become of the greatest importance (see below, p xlv), but this had to be treated within a political context: decisions on economic matters without regard to political consequences would be dangerous. As the political consciousness of nationalism grew, so the CO expected they would have to watch ever more carefully for any niggardly reassertion of 'Treasury control'.[22]

More and more advice was sought from outside the office. Conferences and summer schools became regular features, generating some intensive examination of colonial problems (73, para 13). Academic input was, on the whole, welcomed,

though only by invitation. The preferred pundits of the day were Prof Margaret Read and Prof Kenneth Wheare. Of central significance in the broadening of consultation was the African Governors' Conference of 1947. It was the first time governors had met in this way. Creech Jones in convening it said it would undertake 'a thorough review of the whole of our policy in Africa'.[23] He himself chaired the political and education sessions. Rees-Williams took charge of the economic meetings and Sir Thomas Lloyd the rest. The Colonial Office spokesmen were: A B Cohen on political and racial issues, S Caine on economics, W E F Ward on education, Dr Wilson Rae on medicine, Sir Charles Jeffries on the Colonial Service, A H Poynton on international organisations, and K W Blackburne (the CO director of information services) on public relations. Observers from other governments, expressly South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, were not allowed: 'a number of the policies being discussed would be entirely antipathetic to the two governments' (Cohen). In addition to the main business documented below (59–67), Caine (deputy under-secretary of state) put forward suggestions for a customs union between the UK and the colonies (AGC 27): this seemed more advantageous to Britain than the colonies and was not favoured by the conference. There was also a discussion of fisheries (AGC 9), of colonial medical policy (AGC 10: 'prevention is better than cure') (376), and research (AGC 26: suggested by the governor of Kenya, Sir P Mitchell). Official assessment of the value of the conference was somewhat mixed. The local government policy was emended from 'democratic' to 'representative'. Cohen's overall comment was that it had been 'very hard work but I think very useful'.[24] Cartland, the conference secretary, believed it was not as satisfactory as the preceding summer school, 'which was generally felt to have been extremely successful'. This was because 'the governors by no means accepted the contents of all the papers, but I think that we could hardly have expected this'. Although many of the conclusions of the papers were accepted in principle, 'discussions revealed . . . a good deal of difference in outlook between the Colonial Office and governors, and between East Africa and West Africa' (67).[25] Sir Philip Mitchell was notably unimpressed by what was going on ('Creech blathered a good deal', etc). He thought much of the discussion unreal, naive and utopian.[26] No other governor tried to mount so forceful a critique of government policy (eg 45).

The African Governors' Conference was followed up by a gathering at Lancaster House of officials and unofficials in 1948, known as the African Conference (52, 376). This third stage in the sequence of conferences was judged of sufficient importance to be addressed by the prime minister, but Attlee had to cancel through illness.[27] Nor did the organised taking of advice stop there. Further summer schools were held annually in Cambridge (eg 57). The African Governors' Conference was the model for a gathering of West Indian governors in November 1949 under the chairmanship of the minister of state, the Earl of Listowel. It gave an informal opportunity to meet Sir Hubert Rance, who was reporting on the prospects of federation.[28] It went some way towards placating those who had felt excluded from Creech Jones's conference the previous year at Montego Bay (251). Meanwhile, a South Pacific Commission based in Canberra was set up in 1947 to advise on the problems of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, New Caledonia, Dutch New Guinea and elsewhere in the 'south seas' (72, para 59). This involved co-operation with the Americans, the French and Dutch, as well as with the Australians and New Zealanders who would provide the nucleus of the organisation. It dealt with inter-island communications, native welfare,

medicine, copra, and anthropological research; the establishment of the School of Pacific Studies in Canberra was a related project.[29]

There were changes in the Colonial Service too. The principal problems concerned recruitment, training and indigenisation. A major stock-taking was provided by the CO's veteran 'recruiting officer', Sir Ralph Furse, at the end of 1947 (69). The problems surrounding the recruitment of 'native born' Africans and others to the higher grades of the civil service were surveyed from a number of different perspectives (220, 347, 356–358, 360).

Constitutional policy

Constitutional advance towards self-government is in the first instance publicly focused on the legislative council, wherein political control by its elected members is won in a number of stages which change the relative numerical balance between them and the nominated official and unofficial elements. When there is an elected majority in the executive council also, and the legislature has achieved control over the executive by appointing its own members (now usually to be called ministers), 'responsible government' (internal self-government) has arrived. Progress towards an embryonic cabinet system essentially starts when executive councils move beyond being merely consultative or advisory bodies, and some of their members take over the running of some (less important) government departments.* This first stage had by mid-1947 been reached (or was planned) in Jamaica, Malta, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. A principal recommendation of the officials' agenda-report for the African Governors' Conference was that this executive system should be adopted at the earliest possible moment in all other African territories, and in Nigeria and the Gold Coast as a matter of urgency. (59, appendix III, para 8.) Further progress towards self-government in Africa, however, they envisaged as being carefully controlled, integrated with and underpinned by social and economic advance. In Caine's opinion, for example, 'perhaps within a generation many of the principal territories of the Colonial Empire will have attained or be within sight of the goal of full responsibility for local affairs' – hardly a radical proposition. The agenda-report's constitutional paper, with reference to the Gold Coast, was equally cautious and qualified: 'internal self-government is unlikely to be achieved in much less than a generation'; while elsewhere 'the process is likely to be considerably slower'. Britain must plan to rule for 'twenty or thirty years or indeed longer' (59, III). The Gold Coast, and following Nigeria, were seen as exceptional in the degree of their political advancement. Moreover, in assessing this report, the vital difference

* The development of 'responsible government' is a complex process with various elements, and is brought about by extending the franchise, by increasing the number of elected members in the legislature, by admitting to the executive elected members drawn from the legislature, and, finally, by converting executive councils into cabinets. A legislative council makes laws and raises taxes; initially it consists entirely of nominated official members; but with constitutional progress towards a parliamentary system it is expanded to include, first, nominated unofficials (ie not office-holders), and second, elected unofficial members; and the elected element is then progressively increased until the elected are in a majority, first over the nominated unofficial members and ultimately over the nominated unofficial and official members combined. When the elected unofficials have this majority, a decisive stage has been reached, and *representative government* comes into being, though the governor remains 'responsible'. This is usually an interim stage towards full *responsible government*, which is achieved when the governor withdraws from the executive council and it becomes a cabinet responsible to the elected representatives of the legislative council. (See 72, n 23.)

between 'self-government' and 'self-determination', has to be realised. Only the former was mentioned. Only the latter equates with independence, and embraces the crucial freedom to secede from the Commonwealth. The 1947 'self-government' plan for the Gold Coast and Nigeria falls far short of this. It was, however, believed that if Africans were given responsibility for those domestic matters which vitally affected them they would be satisfied. Thus the appropriate description for the government's policy is that it was one of *political advancement* – and it was closely combined with *community development* (see below, p lxi). It was a policy which enabled territories to advance towards self-government as and when they seemed to qualify for its responsibilities, which would be achieved largely through sponsored mechanisms of self-help and gradually reduced 'spoon-feeding' (216).

In the spring of 1949, Creech Jones's assessment was that full self-government was unlikely to be achieved under any foreseeable conditions except by Nigeria, Gold Coast and Malaya or by regional federations such as the West Indies (407). There would be some residual smaller colonial territories who could not expect to proceed to viability and independence (see below p lxviii).

Nor could there be any question of planning an eventual independence for territories which the Chiefs of Staff pronounced to be strategically vital, such as Cyprus. But there were other reasons as well for the gradualist policy of political advancement. Few if any Labour ministers had a particularly high opinion of Africans. Attlee did not regard them as anything like as civilised or advanced as Asians; in Rhodesia he issued some sharp warnings about 'a long way to go' and 'politics can't be learned from a book'.[30] Morrison said self-government for many dependent territories would be like giving a child of ten 'a latch-key, a bank account and a shot gun'.[31] According to Rees-Williams, 'the West African is nothing like as advanced as the Malay or the Burman and of course far behind the Chinese'; Africans had a mendicant, even childlike attitude to government, seeing it 'as a gigantic Father Christmas' (111). Creech Jones took up some surprisingly harsh standpoints towards Africans. For example, he wanted to ride roughshod over local opinion in the Gold Coast in 1946 by imposing a single unitary university college for the whole of West Africa, situated in Nigeria, complaining that Africans simply did not understand the issues involved (361). Or again, he described their prejudice against making it easy for expatriates to continue in the Gold Coast administrative service as 'cutting off their nose to spite their face' (220). He had some hard things to say about the 'irresponsibility' of many East African nationalists as well. There was to be no question of declaring that European settlers had no future. Bevin did not believe colonial expansion could or should be bottled up (127, note). Even Attlee wanted to expand white settlement in the 'waste spaces' of Africa in the interests of economic development (115). But above all the policy of gradualism was reinforced by the threat of South African expansion. No account of Britain's long-drawn-out approach to the transfer of power in Africa can possibly ignore the salience of the South African factor. This was memorably analysed by Commonwealth relations secretary Gordon Walker in April 1951 (433):

> One of our prime aims must be to *contain* South Africa . . . but we must not subordinate all else to it . . . . It should be a policy of *equal* weight and importance in our eyes with the political advancement of the Africans in our Central and East African territories.

The keystone of the policy of containing South African expansion was to be keeping Southern Rhodesia out of the Union by constructing the Central African Federation as a sort of shock-absorber (434, 435). Some accommodation also had to be reached with the Kenya settlers if they were not to be driven into the arms of South Africa (201).

With the wealth of documentation now being made available, historians are able to set in a much fuller perspective the progress of the Gold Coast towards self-government. In particular it can now be seen that what was happening in Libya and the Sudan constituted vital breakthroughs. It nevertheless remains the case that the Gold Coast occupies a central position in the history of the transfer of power in Africa.[32] This was recognised at the time at every stage: in the Burns Constitution of 1946 (225), in the appointment of a chairman to inquire into the Accra riots of 1948 (213); in Cohen's alerting of the governor of Nigeria to the wider implications of the Watson Report (214, 215); and in the reaction to the Coussey Report. On the technicalities, Sir Thomas Lloyd emphasised that the points at issue were of the greatest importance, 'not merely for the Gold Coast but as setting the pattern of constitutional development, possibly years hence, in other parts of Africa'. Cohen minuted in September 1949 upon the Coussey Committee's recommendations:

> The whole problem raised by the report is probably as important, if not more important, than any constitutional issue which has so far arisen in any of our African Colonial Territories and the decisions taken will affect the course of events not only in the Gold Coast but in other territories for a long time to come.

He urged immediate consultation with other West African governors in order to make sure nothing was done which would make things more difficult for them. Governor Beresford-Stooke was able to give assurances that the proposals would not 'destroy me in Sierra Leone'.[33] The governor of Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson, was less happy, telegraphing in October 1949:[34]

> I have been very much concerned at the fact that Gold Coast announcements must be made when our constitutional review is only half-way through. I entirely understand that this cannot be helped, but our problem here is not one of how far and how fast we are prepared to go, but of reconciling views of the northern majority (which, for instance, will not hear of Ministers at the Centre) with those of the southerners, who will press for something on the Gold Coast model. The conflict of views will be intensified as a result of Gold Coast decisions, and all our endeavours must be directed to avoiding a serious split between the north and south on several basic issues. We can only hope that we shall be able to guide our own people toward some workable compromise.

In the event careful management enabled Macpherson to keep the initiative in Nigeria. The decision to go ahead in the Gold Coast followed the reasoning of Sir Charles Jeffries (the deputy under-secretary of state):

> . . . I am impressed by the feeling that it may be better to give the substance of responsibility over certain matters than the shadow of responsibility over all. If the Gold Coasters can be allowed to feel that they really have 'self-government' in the matters which are of local interest in their daily life, they should be the less likely to agitate for it in the wider fields in which they would probably themselves admit that they have not the experience or resources to exercise independence.[35]

The Cabinet accepted the case presented by Mr Justice Coussey and Governor Sir Charles Arden-Clarke for providing sufficient constitutional progress to prevent 'the alienation of the moderates', but this fell short of full self-government and they refused to say when they would discuss that (217–219). In 1951, however, Nkrumah was asking to take over from the governor the selection of ministers and to be given the title of prime minister. Arden-Clarke could see no alternative to the Convention People's Party (224). Cohen explained the importance of further timely concession to retain the collaboration of the 'moderates', even if this meant bringing in changes four years earlier than planned: 'It would be fatal . . . to forfeit the goodwill of Mr Nkrumah and his colleagues by holding back excessively' (226).

Nigeria followed only a degree or two behind the Gold Coast. The principles of Nigerian political advancement were approved by the Cabinet in May 1950: greatly increased Nigerian participation in the executive, both at the centre and in the three regions; increased regional autonomy (within the unity of Nigeria which was not negotiable); larger and more representative regional legislatures with increased powers. The Cabinet was particularly anxious to ensure smooth Africanisation, along the lines of the hand-over which they felt had worked well in India (221, 222). Sierra Leone and Gambia, however, were expected to be satisfied with much more limited constitutional advance for a considerable time to come, as their nationalist movements were far less vocal. (Sierra Leone proceeded to a majority of elected members in the Legislative Council in 1951, the membership of the Executive Council being equally divided between officials and unofficials.) But throughout West Africa the same theory was applied: to provide for increased African participation in local and central government and the administration in such a way as to ensure 'the best defence against communism' and the 'best chance' of getting future African states to remain in the Commonwealth (228, 356, 357).

For East Africa the general principles were the same, though seriously complicated by the presence of Indians and Europeans. The ring had to be held for Africans to 'emerge'. Time must be allowed for them to 'catch up'. At the same time the two immigrant communities were not being asked to agree to their eventual eviction. The goal was a 'true partnership' between the three races, based on participation as equals (204–208). Such a future looked rather difficult for Zanzibar, where the old Arab hegemony felt threatened by local government reform, and electoral arrangements for the Legislative Council were bedevilled by the Muslim-Hindu divide within the Asian community.[36] For Kenya the objective looked harder still, and its only constitutional gain was to proceed to an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council in 1948. In Tanganyika, however, equality of representation in the Legislative Council between Europeans, Africans and Asians was arranged in 1951 (210, 211). The planners did not favour in East Africa either an African or a European nationalism as a basis for the future, believing that one group or other would always feel threatened by it. 'Partnership' was thus a device to promote stability. The East African High Commission established in 1948 was a large-scale experiment in regional integration, but local enthusiasm for a closer association of the territories had worn thin by 1951. It had long been an unpalatable idea in Uganda, which was more obviously an 'African state'. The main problem in Uganda was the relationship of the Baganda kingdom to the state as a whole. Its Legislative Council was enlarged in 1950.

In Nyasaland progress was made with educated African representation on

provincial councils (195, 196, 197). In Northern Rhodesia from 1948 African unofficials represented African interests in the Legislative Council; two of them were Africans elected by the African Representative Council. Creech Jones had pressed hard for the two Africans. When Roy Welensky had claimed that as many as two could not be found Creech Jones argued that the increasing pressure of international and African opinion made it necessary to be 'forthcoming' in constitutional matters and to take some risks; it was better to increase African opportunities while the gift could still be made freely (198). Attempts by the Lozi of Barotseland to alter their status within Northern Rhodesia were resisted (202, 203).

Outside Africa there were constitutional landmarks for a number of colonies. Newfoundland's entry to the Canadian Confederation was arranged in 1948 (257, 258, 264). Though the government had to push Newfoundlander leaders in this direction, they were in the end aided by the generosity of Canada's terms. (According to the FO these 'shone like a good deed in a naughty world in these depressing times').[37] It was decided in 1947 to restore self-government to Malta (261). For Gibraltar, demands for a legislative council were reluctantly agreed to by ministers (though it seemed to introduce 'over-government') (405). Barbados achieved a degree of constitutional advance in 1946. In 1948 it was agreed to increase the elected element in the Executive and Legislative Councils of Trinidad, enhancing the administrative activity of the former (252). Jamaica's governor, Sir Hugh Foot, proposed in 1951 'limited but vital changes', which increased the number of elected members of the Executive Council (putting them in a clear majority), and gave ministers more executive authority (255). Smaller constitutional reforms for the Leeward and the Windward Islands were announced in 1950. Federation of the West Indies was not yet an idea whose time had come. The Rance Report (1949) said independence for the West Indies as a federation was practicable, but not for individual units (254). Privately Sir Hubert Rance believed federation was 'not a rising tide of public feeling, and I don't know that the tide is even approaching . . .'.[38]

Sarawak was taken over by the CO, after some uncertainty, at the dispirited invitation of its last and rather sad white raja, Vyner Brooke (256, 260). Local government was then energetically pursued as a panacea to redress the previous state of 'patriarchal felicity', introducing the population to political life for the first time (72, para 44). The second governor, D G Stewart, was assassinated in December 1949 by Sarawak Malays as a protest against imperial rule. North Borneo obtained a legislative council in 1950. In Malaya an important decision was taken not to entrench a permanent Malayo-Muslim political supremacy, but to insist on racial unity and equality in a future multi-racial state. Malay resistance to the Malayan Union (1946) (72, para 23) and Britain's need for Malay co-operation during the Emergency (72, para 31 ff), however, forced the British to compromise their commitment to genuine multi-racialism. Despite the Emergency, municipal elections were arranged for 1951 (271). Ministers would have liked to see constitutional progress in Hong Kong, but the political apathy of the populace, combined with the darkening international scene in China and Korea, were severely discouraging (172).

Possible constitutional changes were thoroughly considered for Fiji, but there was little genuine popular support, and, remarkably, the unofficial members of the Legislative Council in the end said they did not want (or think desirable) substantial reform. The British government had no intention of forcing changes upon Fiji or

anywhere else in those circumstances (259, 267). Elsewhere in the South Pacific there was said to be not even a flicker of interest in British-style self-government, although local government reforms in the central Solomon Islands from 1950 were successful in the struggle against a powerful post-war political non-co-operation movement known as Marching Rule* (72, para 58). Of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands it was written that the problem of self-government 'in the modern sense can hardly be said to arise'.[39] The situation in a number of smaller colonies and protectorates was not very satisfactory. Many possible administrative reforms were looked at, in keeping with the general atmosphere of the post-war period; but fewer changes were actually made. The New Hebrides Condominium with France was not working effectively but it was not easy to see what should be done (262, 266). The Solomon Islands might also in theory have been more logically ruled from Australia, but there were objections to this (269). So there were, too, to uniting the British Virgin Islands with the American ones; their Legislative Council was restored in 1950. There was talk of linking the Seychelles with East Africa, but again it was decided not to proceed; meanwhile the governor's enthusiasm for adult suffrage was dampened down. In the more homogeneous societies adult suffrage made widespread progress, including in the Falkland Islands, where it was introduced under a new constitution (1948) with, for the first time, a single unified governorship and single Executive Council for the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies – a development which inadvertently facilitated the later extension of Argentinian claims to South Georgia.[40] The High Commission Territories were supposedly destined to be transferred to South African administration, but this was rapidly receding to the Greek Kalends (426). Basutoland experienced a big post-war shake up in chiefly jurisdiction. Aden (and its protectorate) was a future trouble spot, but quiet in these years. A Legislative Council for the colony was established in January 1947; while in the protectorate the policy was to discharge British responsibilities until this group of small Arab states was 'able to stand on its own feet' (268).

Cyprus, although not yet much in the public eye, was nevertheless vexing the policy-makers sorely in this period. It occupies a central position in the history of Labour government policy, illuminating problems of general interest, and as such deserves an extended comment here. Ministers (except for Bevin) (229) were anxious to relaunch Cyprus on a constitutional path. As their chosen governor, Lord ('Rex') Winster (the former minister for civil aviation) was specially commissioned with this task. However, he was not a success and no political advance was achieved. This was certainly not from any lack of will on the part of the Mediterranean desk in the CO, where J S Bennett was a consistent advocate of promoting internal self-government, continually challenging the argument that Cypriots were 'unfit' for it and repeatedly criticising the 'lofty disapproval' of successive governors. He warned of the danger that without progress to self-government Cyprus would be left stranded as an anachronism (235). 'Both geographically and politically Cyprus is in the front line as a test of the sincerity of HMG's declared policy of political development in the Colonies' (238, 241, 243), and thus a 'vulnerable salient in the present world ideological struggle' (244). It was all very well for the Chiefs of Staff to contend that it would be a strategic necessity in a 'hot' war, but meanwhile it was an embarrassment in the cold war. This was because it could be used to upset relations between

* 'Marching' is an anglicised pronunciation of *maasina*, which means 'brotherhood'.

necessary allies (Britain, the USA, Greece and Turkey), and because Russia could use it to discredit Britain as a colonial power. The only possible justification for holding on was the strategic argument – an argument which could not be used in public, because it would be a gift to Russian propaganda. Bennett's critique was in line with that put forward by FO pundits, who favoured a policy of timely concession (before the agitation turned to terrorism), bringing Cyprus into line with policy in India, Burma, Cyrenaica, and the withdrawals from Egypt, Palestine and Greece (230, 234). These analogies were of course the very nub of the case put by the Cypriot leaders themselves. It was, they complained, bad enough that they were denied the measure of self-determination or independence allowed to Indians, Burmans, Newfoundlanders, Jews, Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqis, Egyptians and even Indonesians; but they were surely entitled to treatment at least equal to that which was being proposed for Libyans, Somalis and Sudanese. To the Cypriot Ethnarchy, British rule was 'enslavement under a foreign yoke'. They were increasingly prepared to say so loudly to the whole world.[41]

Enosis was ruled out. That was perhaps the one consistently clear negative element in British policy, where almost every course of possible action seemed wrong. Cession would be bad for British prestige, especially with the Arab world (246); and it would constitute a dangerous precedent for the Falklands, Hong Kong and Gibraltar. Almost nobody in British government had a good word to say of Enosis. Governor Winster called it 'the Cyprus measles', a disease of political infancy. Comparisons along the lines of 'undulant fever' or 'children's make-believe' abounded. Mary Fisher (on the Mediterranean desk in the CO) employed the whole gamut of derogatory metaphor from nailbiting to hereditary syphilis. Attlee himself, who usually had a sure instinct in discerning ephemeral nationalism from the real thing, 'froth not tide',[42] regarded Enosis as a delusion. The danger of Enosis was that Greece was so unstable that she might become hostile to Britain overnight, with or without going communist. This was the crux: the high-minded analogy from India broke down because of Enosis. On the other hand, it was clear to the CO that British rule could not be allowed to go on unchanged. Attitudes in Government House, Nicosia were so unimaginative and small-minded that school children were even forbidden blue pencils lest they should draw the Greek flag. Officials there treated educated Greeks – and, most ill-advisedly, even visiting British civil servants – as their inferiors.[43]

At the end of 1947, AKEL, the Cypriot Communist Party, petitioned for the type of constitution being reinstituted in Malta, providing internal self-government. The CO responded with a comparatively liberal constitution which would give limited home rule, with 'proper safeguards' for British strategic interests (the importance of which the Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed in April 1947). It would provide for the active participation of Cypriots in their internal affairs, while the governor retained wide powers. Also proposed was the possibility of considering responsible government in five years. To the deep consternation of officials (238), the Commonwealth Affairs Committee in January 1948 rejected this timetable, largely as a result of Attlee's magisterial intervention, in which he argued from Indian experience (going back to the Simon Commission) that dyarchy and 'interim' constitutions were unworkable (236–238). The Cabinet itself decided to proceed cautiously. It wanted more emphasis on local government, and was not attracted by the alternative (to a 'transitional' constitution) of immediate responsible government. In April proposals

were approved by ministers for an elected legislature and an advisory executive council responsible to the governor, together with two-way links between these bodies; Britain would remain in control of foreign and defence affairs (240). This constitution was ill-received. Only the Turkish Cypriots supported the offer. It was rejected by the Enotists and disapproved of by AKEL, several of whose representatives walked out of the Consultative Assembly. There was a General Strike in August 1948, and the Assembly was dissolved. As a result of this stalemate, the British government had to decide whether to go ahead and impose the constitution or put it into cold storage. The Commonwealth Affairs Committee was against imposing it, though CO officials felt imposition would hardly worsen the situation. Rather against CO instincts the constitution was shelved in August 1948. It was not withdrawn. The ball was left in the Cypriot court. If 'responsible leaders' came forward to ask for its re-examination or implementation they would be welcomed. After the developments in the Gold Coast by 1951 it became unlikely that the Cypriots would accept anything less than a further advance towards a ministerial system. But already the British position was worsening from 1949. The constitutional impasse and loss of British initiative in Cyprus became more serious as a result of several developments favouring Enosis: (i) AKEL embraced it, (ii) the Greek government revived its campaign for it, and (iii) the Cypriot Ethnarchy held a plebiscite which voted 96.4 per cent for it.

The appointment of a new governor, Sir Arthur Wright, seemed to provide the opportunity to break the deadlock (241). But Wright was an old Cyprus hand, with twenty years' service there from 1923 to 1943, and his return proved to be a Bourbon restoration. To the despair of the officials he was an unregenerate hard-liner who advocated a policy of firmness and repression, coercion and censorship. Bennett was scornful about the 'folly and impracticability' of Wright's policy. Lord Listowel agreed with Bennett; the governor's proposed policy of coercion was 'contrary to our experience in India, Ireland and Palestine'. Predictably Creech Jones was less sure, while the FO felt the powers the governor wanted could be justified (244). Wright got most of what he wanted.

Cyprus policy thus seemed to some officials to be in a confused state. The Chiefs of Staff were asked to provide some clarification. This they did in June 1950 with (to the CO) the unwelcome though hardly unexpected reply that the retention of Cyprus was most emphatically a strategic necessity. As Britain's one firm piece of ground in the Middle East it must not fall under communist control, while the importance of Turkish co-operation against Russia was emerging ever more strongly. It was thus increasingly necessary to take seriously the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot minority viewpoint (246). The CO thus resigned itself to remaining 'an occupying power'; they accepted that the Chiefs of Staff's opinion was definitive, and so there could be no question of reopening the issue for several years. Denied the possibility of positive policies, the CO concentrated on trying to keep the Cyprus problem out of the newspapers and the United Nations. Leading officials regretted that Wright could not be replaced by a governor with the Mountbatten touch, for they believed the slow use of local government here was not going to work (247). But the office was quickly brought back to the recurring inability to find a solution: an imposed constitution, Griffiths pointed out, would not satisfy the United Nations. At the same time he was worried about the danger of 'drifting into another Palestine'.[44] Officials needed no reminder. Bennett for one had long understood the fragility of the situation and its

parallels (235, 242): so far there had been no effective rebellion or mobilisation of international opinion, but he doubted whether this would remain true in the 1950s; nor had the Cypriots as yet shown much fighting spirit, but if that should ever change the position would be gloomy indeed. And so it proved to be.

Economic policy

Post-war colonial economic policy was naturally influenced by the prevailing world economic situation. There was a universal shortage of food supplies, especially rice, so all colonies had to produce more of their own requirements instead of relying on imports. The demand for most colonial products was bigger and stronger than it had ever been; cocoa, fats and oilseeds were in short supply, where previously they had been in surplus. Capital development engineering goods were extremely scarce and no longer available on demand. There was an imbalance between imports and exports in most countries of the world, with the result that some currencies were very hard and some very soft. The world political situation also remained so disturbed that western nations felt they had to strengthen their defensive war potential; in doing so they expected colonies to contribute strategic war materials. All these factors seemed increasingly to point to the need for more conscious and centralised planning of colonial production and trade, and proper integration of colonial planning with domestic planning, hitherto neglected.[45] As the international scene deteriorated yet further in 1947, all British hopes of an early economic recovery after the war were falsified, while a domestic economic crisis increased the pressure on the colonies. The war converted Britain into the world's principal debtor nation. A despatch was sent to all colonial governors in September 1945 to emphasise the limitations on development caused by the financial results of the war for Britain (75). Lord Keynes warned ministers of the prospect of a 'financial Dunkirk' without substantial American aid after the abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease (74). The size of the American loan which he negotiated (3,750 million dollars) was generous enough in itself, but some tough and disagreeable 'strings' were attached. Despite a good deal of grumbling, the Cabinet concluded that there seemed to be no alternative but to accept.[46]

In the total structure of British overseas interests, the strength of the UK economy was a vital element. Sufficient gold and dollar reserves, and a strong pound were essential. Only economic independence would ensure American respect for Britain as a partner in world affairs. Commonwealth ties and colonial development depended on the availability of adequate capital investment. The economic component in British power was, however, the one most in danger of disintegration (162). Wholly inadequate post-war reserves made Britain inherently vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy; and this was intensified by the problem of the sterling balances. The existence of large sterling balances (various holdings in London by overseas governments, totalling £3,150 million), available for spending outside British control, was an ever-present threat to sterling. War had greatly increased the magnitude of these balances through overseas military expenditure and payment for essential imports. The American loan provided for the cancellation of a portion of the sterling balances. Writing off was not really practical politics for the colonies (who held about a quarter of the total), since, as Caine pointed out, it would look 'extremely odd as an offset' to CDW. (In effect the government would be taking away with one hand approximately the same sum as it was granting with the other.) Some

formal and technical concession seemed required, however, and in February 1947 the CO suggested conversion to interest-free loans. It remained difficult to see how the problem could be resolved in such a way as not to prejudice a settlement of the larger claims of Egypt and India (77, 95, 98).

The life of the Labour government was regularly punctuated by successive economic crises: the convertibility crisis of 1947, the devaluation crisis of 1949 and the rearmament crisis of 1951. Because of the unexplained assumptions made in the documents a short account of them is necessary.

(1) *Convertibility crisis, 1947.* The post-war dollar shortage arose because exports and invisible earnings to the dollar area had shrunk dramatically during the war, and because the dollar area was virtually the only source of food, materials and equipment; America was the one dominant supplier in a devastated world hungry for goods, a world desperate enough to pay for them in gold and dollars. Moreover, dollar currency was at a premium world-wide. Thus Britain's principal post-war economic concern was to balance its trade with dollar countries (66). Under the terms of the American loan, one of the conditions was that the convertibility of sterling (ie, making it acceptable equally with the dollar, by the removal of controls on the free exchange of sterling for dollars), should be introduced in July 1947. Keynes and the British ministers had tried to prevent the imposition of this 'string', but to no avail. It is generally accepted that the attempt to introduce convertibility so soon was premature and misguided (*de jure* convertibility did not in fact come until 1958). The essential inconvertibility of sterling arose partly from the weakness of the pound and partly from the strength of the dollar. In 1947 the problem of rising British domestic consumption and persistent shortages turned into a nightmare. Coal output had been seriously below the demand level, and, with the extraordinarily cold weather of 1946/47, the result was a fuel crisis. (In the bleak mid-winter Britain was said to be 'shivering with Shinwell and starving with Strachey'.)[47] As the convertibility deadline approached, there was increasing pressure on the exchange rate, causing a loss of reserves and the imminent exhaustion of the American loan (which had not been expected to occur before 1951). Possible defence cuts were examined, but in the main Britain was rescued by the American withdrawal of convertibility (20 August 1947) and by mounting an export drive to improve the balance of payments. The beneficial effects of Marshall Aid began to flow in April 1948. (It was organised through a European Recovery Programme, whose agent was the inter-governmental OECC.)[48]

(2) *Devaluation crisis, 1949.* A major contributory factor to the continuing lack of confidence in sterling was the existence of large sterling balances (97). Another element was the intractable deficit with Canada. In September 1949 there was a massive devaluation of the pound: from 4.03 dollars to 2.80 dollars. This was a 30.5 per cent devaluation, which was far larger than seemed warranted; but once he had come to accept it (largely on the initiative of his junior ministers at the Treasury), Sir Stafford Cripps wanted to find a permanent solution and give British exports a real competitive edge in the North American markets. The theory was that devaluation was the only effective way of redirecting sterling area exports towards dollar markets, thus helping to reduce the dollar deficit. It was essentially a scheme to stop British reserves falling to a dangerous level and to restore international confidence in sterling. Cripps saw the issue as being as much a matter of foreign policy as of economic policy, though economists have not subsequently agreed whether this

approach was more confused than realistic. Export earnings in the dollar area began to pick up nicely (from £920 million in 1946 to £2,254 million in 1950).[49] Things might well have stabilised but for the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. (3) *Rearmament crisis, 1951.* Korea put at risk at a critical time the whole process of industrial recovery, which it was hoped would lead to the attainment of economic viability by the end of 1952. Rearmament halted the rise in investment and reduced exports just when they were building up to the set target-levels. America intervened on behalf of South Korea, but in Whitehall her policy in Korea was not trusted (160). The Cabinet's response to the Korean War reminded some ministers of 1940.[50] Rearmament estimates were increased from the 1949/1950 level of £740 million to £950- (for three years) in July 1950, to £1,130- (for three years) in August 1950, and finally to a staggering £1,555 million (for three years) in January 1951. This was the largest rearmament programme ever planned in peacetime in Britain, the rationale behind it being that the Korean episode might be only diversionary and 'there could be no certainty that a major war would not break out'. The War Office warned that a major war was now 'possible in 1951 and probable in 1952'. Almost certainly this programme was pitched at an impossibly high level, but the clinching fear was that without such a commitment America would refuse her protection. In that sense the rearmament policy was seen as one of self-preservation. The production of more arms reduced the amount of British goods available for export, absorbing all the benefits of the estimated increase in industrial productivity. The drain caused by the large dollar deficit was compounded by the fact that dollar surpluses run by independent sterling area countries had largely disappeared during 1951.[51]

All of these crises had profound implications for colonial policy. For ministers, the Bevanite split on the rearmament programme shattered Labour unity and cost them the 1951 election. For the policy-makers, psychologically the devaluation crisis was a watershed. It brought home to them as nothing else could the fragility of the British position in Europe and the world and the difficulty of financing constructive action on behalf of colonial peoples. For the colonies themselves it was the dollar shortage and ensuing convertibility crisis which had the most obvious results. The government's response to it was to seek to increase productivity and exports, reduce imports and increase colonial food production. Aneurin Bevan (minister of health) acknowledged in Cabinet that matters were so serious he was prepared to contemplate the most drastic action, such as the complete exclusion of American films.[52] Cripps said the development of Africa was 'absolutely vital' from the point of view of the world economy (66). Attlee agreed this development should be 'actively pursued'. Creech Jones projected Britain's economic difficulties as the colonies' opportunity, hoping the dollar shortage could be turned to mutual advantage.[53] However, the danger of being charged with exploiting the colonies was ever present (52, 84, 89, 121). All colonies were now repeatedly asked to do all they could to increase their production for local use and export. Schemes under consideration included (generally) demands for more linseed, soya bean and timber; from Borneo – rice, manila-hemp and coal; from Sierra Leone – rice and manganese ore; from Southern Rhodesia – jute-substitute and tobacco; from Nigeria – coal; from the Cameroons – bananas; from Tanganyika – lead, rice and groundnuts. Rehabilitation grants were made to Malaya, Mauritius and Trinidad. The large-scale cultivation of linseed and fertilisers was investigated for several territories (80, 82, 83, 88, 91). Colonial dollar import ceilings were fixed for each colony for 1949. In addition the

colonies were requested not to run their sterling balances down (95). An £80 million gold loan from South Africa was negotiated in September 1948 (416).

Although the colonies in no sense provided economic salvation, they certainly made a contribution to Britain's recovery (94). For the first half of 1948 the index of the volume of colonial exports was 148 compared with 100 in 1946 and 118 in 1936. The colonial contribution to the total value of UK imports went up from 5.4 per cent in 1938 to 10.2 per cent in the first half of 1948. Gross dollar earnings in the first half of 1948 were at an annual rate of 600–700 million dollars; and the colonial empire (which was in dollar deficit in 1945) was in July-to-September 1948 a net dollar earner at the rate of 200 million dollars per annum. Aggregate colonial public revenues (excluding grants from CDW) rose from £115 million in 1946 to £140 million in 1947. (They had been £58 million in 1938.)[54]

The other effect of the convertibility crisis was a whole series of administrative changes. The CO accepted that it had not been adequately organised to resist the sudden heavy pressure at the margin of British supplies of all kinds on which the colonies were relying, or even to realise at once that it was taking place. If colonial development was to become an important element in the recovery of British economic health this had to be effectively organised (80). Changes were accordingly made to strengthen the economic division of the CO, which thereafter accounted for one third of its entire administrative establishment (88). The office was also strengthened by the appointment of a minister of state (Lord Listowel). A colonial economic research committee was set up. Outside the CO, a new Economic Intelligence and Planning Department was created, to act as a think-tank under a Chief Planning Officer, Sir Edwin Plowden. Plowden also chaired a Working Party on capital needs. E A Hitchman chaired another on colonial development (90, 93). Investigation into colonial primary products followed.[55] A cabinet committee on colonial development was set up in December 1948, charged with studying the fuller co-ordination of colonial and domestic economic planning. The Colonial Development Corporation (to help the colonies, mainly) and the Overseas Food Corporation (to produce food for the UK, and not restricted to the empire) were established. The CDC would close a principal gap in colonial development planning (81, 84). Finally, the Lord President's Department (373) began to organise annual *Economic surveys* as planning exercises. Quite how effective all these changes were is open to doubt. The late start to planning remained a built-in handicap. The principle of planning perhaps attracted more lip-service than genuine commitment in Whitehall. The steam behind it was detectably running out from the middle of 1948. In general the changes of 1947 were probably more cosmetic than real, and no significant shifts of direction took place. Perhaps it was just as well. As far as colonial planning in particular was concerned, a major inhibition was the inability to apply central direction, master-plans and blue-prints to a highly diverse set of colonies (90, 106, 107 etc). A centralised 'grand design' as called for by Lord Montgomery (104), simply 'would not be practical politics' (106). The Economic Policy Committee accepted that central colonial economic planning was essentially limited because it would conflict with the fundamental political policy of gradually transferring real responsibility to self-governing regimes (129). Moreover, Creech Jones was especially insistent on the necessity of seeking the views of the people on all colonial development and improvement plans, in order to get their fullest co-operation and active involvement. The Resident of Zanzibar, Sir Vincent Glenday, was rebuked, mildly, for ignoring this.[56]

Officially the government defined its economic policy for the colonies as designed to promote the economic well-being of the people (93), 'with due regard to the interest of the Commonwealth, other colonial territories, and world economic developments, and to bring them to the point where they are able economically to sustain the financial burdens of self-government and to stand on their own in the world economy'.[57] Their good intentions were supposed to be made manifest in the arrangements the CO wanted for paying fair prices to colonial producers (59, 78, 79, 85, 86), and getting rid of 'undesirable' forms of forced labour (364), but it was often difficult to bring practice into line with policy (79). Two major economic initiatives were launched in the spring of 1946: a circular despatch on the promotion of colonial agricultural productivity, and the groundnuts scheme for Tanganyika. Caine master-minded the one and instantly backed the other, from the moment the first approach reached the Colonial Office from F Samuel, the managing director of Unilever's United Africa Company. Cohen, equally, gave his full support to both (112, 113). The agriculture despatch (119) – pointing out the vital importance of making revolutionary changes in agricultural production (necessary to raise living standards), and drawing attention to the significance of local government and its bearing on the successful operation of agricultural reform – issued on 22 February 1947. Response to it was disappointing. Perhaps it was overshadowed by the local government despatch issued only three days later (44). By April 1948 only Zanzibar had replied. In July Caine reflected that the despatch seemed to have failed with its object of making governors 'think more adventurously'. He and Cohen organised a sharp reminder despatch (it was 'essential' to have their views on a 'matter of paramount importance to the whole development of Africa', 13 July 1948); yet even by February 1949 very few replies had been received.[58] This is the not uncommon fate of circular despatches. A lot of effort goes into their preparation, but little direct comment is ever received; it is as if governors are almost overawed by them. This does not mean that they have no effect. An unspoken subliminal effect may still operate.

The groundnuts scheme was not primarily a measure of colonial development (although Tanganyika received some incidental infrastructural benefits), but a means of dealing with the urgent and profound world shortage of oils and fats.[59] The trade in these commodities was forty per cent down on pre-war levels, while only sixty per cent of Britain's requirement came from empire sources. The groundnuts scheme was administered by the Ministry of Food. Although misgivings were expressed in the Colonial Office and elsewhere – the principal difficulties in fact being almost uncannily forecast – there was enthusiastic support for the project at the top (112). Caine saw it as a 'new approach' (using massive mechanisation) to the problem of low African productivity, the improvement of which was fundamental to raising African living standards. Cohen described it as 'the most important single act of government ever undertaken in British tropical Africa'. It was larger even than the Gezira cotton-growing scheme in any one phase of development (108, 109). It could, if properly organised, Cohen believed, by attracting workers' families into good housing, 'lead to an experiment in the stabilisation of labour'.[60] Despite reservations being expressed over details, Creech Jones assured officials that 'undoubtedly the enthusiastic support of the government would be forthcoming'.[61] Strachey, who was to superintend it, passionately believed the scheme was a socially desirable method of public enterprise which would enable African possessions to be developed rapidly and

become an asset, and 'not a liability as they largely are now' (116). Notoriously, however, the groundnuts scheme was a disaster. The major miscalculation was over the initial clearance of the bush, which cost ten times more than estimated. The schedules proceeded with painful slowness. Seven-eighths of the entire budget was spent on clearing only 46,000 acres of the projected total area of 3,210,000 acres. There were some stunningly recalcitrant roots embedded in the red earth, which could only be shifted by bulldozers. Second-hand tractors and other machines were commandeered from all over the place, from Canada to the Philippines. They kept breaking down. Often they would not start owing to a shortage of acid for batteries. The workers disliked every aspect of their job and conditions; the result was frequent strikes and a rapid turn-over of labour. By the end of 1950 the costs were £38,870,000. The scheme was almost certainly set up too quickly, without waiting for a pilot scheme. For this ministers must take much of the blame (117, 132). But the flaws were fundamental. Ecologically and mechanically, financially and administratively, the scheme was no good.[62] Although this rapidly became apparent, complete abandonment was almost unthinkable: the blow to prestige, and the discouragement to enterprise, were simply too great to contemplate, for the groundnuts enterprise had become a symbol.[63] Cabinet discussion centred on how to salvage something from the wreckage (133, 134, 136, 137). Something was.

This fiasco made the whole problem of removing obstacles to economic growth in Africa seem more intractable than ever (108–110). It was easy enough to identify what those obstacles were: the ubiquitous shortage of money, men and materials; the structural defects (poor soil, inadequate water-supplies, traditional and often highly complex land tenure systems, tired and skeletal transport networks); the dangerous dependence on monoculture; the debilitating endemic diseases and entomological pests (92). There was a severe shortage of consumer goods, such as bicycles and clothes, to provide incentives for Africans to work harder at cash-cropping and mining. Above all there was a desperate shortage of steel and machinery. This held up railway improvement, but there were innumerable other competing needs as well – everything from the construction of new universities and the Owen Falls hydro-electric scheme (108), to the provision of baling hoops for Ugandan and Rhodesian cotton.[64] To solve the pervasive difficulty of low productivity Whitehall was prepared to contemplate some drastic and not infrequently surprising remedies. Officials and ministers alike were willing to welcome foreign investment, including American investment (87, 188). Some of them were prepared to allow the settlement of more Europeans, or consider the drafting in of Italian labourers (127).[65] Cohen believed in 1946 that compulsory labour schemes might be necessary to combat the unwillingness of the average African peasant to face radical changes in agricultural production. 'More work and more efficient work' by Africans was demanded by Sir Gerard Clauson (an assistant under-secretary of state), who argued that their money-consciousness ought to be raised. Sir George Gater (permanent under-secretary) mentioned possible 'compulsory improvements' in soil conservation in Kenya (113). Cohen wanted a 'much more diffused policy of experimentation . . . in a variety of small-scale activities all over the African continent'. Rees-Williams advocated compulsion to promote proper agricultural methods and soil conservation, and deal with over-stocking and over-grazing.[66] But after the groundnuts débâcle, the calls for such drastic state intervention died away. Improved transport was widely regarded as the key to development, but progress was painfully slow (108,

111). The Lake Tana scheme to control Nile waters was described by a junior minister as 'the most important of all development possibilities in Africa' (109), but it was fraught with political complications (131).

Increasingly, the poverty of some colonies, such as Zanzibar and British Honduras, was a source of concern. Honduras was important not only because of the boundary dispute with Guatemala but because it was Latin America's window on the British empire (374). Bevin was keen to press on with its economic development, but it was far from easy.[67] In Zanzibar there was a serious fall of revenue in 1948 as a result of 'sudden death' disease in the cloves industry, overwhelmingly the mainstay of government income. As with 'swollen shoot' in the Gold Coast cocoa industry (92), radical cutting out of the affected trees and the surrounding area was essential, but (learning from the West African example) it was accepted that heavy expenditure on compensation was necessary, in order to reduce the unpopularity of the treatment. Few funds for this were available from the dwindling resources of CDW, although a supplementary allocation was arranged.[68] In the West Indies too there were worrying economic problems to be overcome. Poor, remote island communities still had not been able to diversify to any extent owing to the setbacks of the Depression in the 1930s, while they were also coping with the strains of social regeneration (72, para 60 ff). At the high-policy level the problem of economic stability and solvency would be tackled through a federation which could lead West Indians to independence. This was not something Britain could impose. Progress towards it was protracted (367).

After narrowly winning the election of February 1950, the government brought in a new Colonial Development & Welfare Act, at the insistence of Creech Jones and Griffiths (99, 100). Quite apart from finance, however, there was the continuing problem of keeping up the supplies of imported materials for colonial development, especially under the impact of the 1951 rearmament programme. If political harmony was to be maintained in the progress of the Gold Coast to self-government, it seemed imperative to implement the ten-year development plan to the fullest possible extent. Except briefly in 1949/1950 the Gold Coast had in effect been investing in the UK since the beginning of the war. As the Committee on Colonial Development noted in August 1951: 'The continuance of such a situation would present very serious political difficulties, and the success of the experiment in controlled transition to self-government might very well in large measure depend on whether the Colonial governments now in office could show results in the field of economic development'.[69]

Outside the formal empire, Bevin repeatedly urged the importance of raising standards in order to improve resistance to communism. In the Middle East he hoped to promote 'economic partnership', and social betterment, by encouraging each state to draw up its own economic development plans (275). In the Far East, Bevin was the prime mover behind the Colombo Plan adopted early in 1950. The Colombo Conference arose out of two considerations on his part. His first aim was to prevent communist encroachment in South-East Asia and the Far East. His second aim was to foster the Commonwealth connection, especially the relations of the old and new (Asian) members, in such a way as to enable Britain clearly to play a major role, in order to maintain her world-wide influence; Bevin had feared India and possibly Australia might seize the initiative in South-East Asia without the voice of Britain being properly heard. It was important to show that Britain had a constructive policy for the region. A purely political approach to political difficulties

often met, Bevin believed, with no success, and it was desirable to deal with the problem of communist encroachment by helping Asians in the economic field, where there was a good deal the West had to offer. (This emphasis was also expedient, given Nehru's sensitivity on the issue.) The Colombo Plan was based on the belief that higher living standards represented the best barrier to communism. Closer economic collaboration in the region might pave the way to political co-operation. A stable South-East Asia might even (Bevin hoped) influence the situation in China, making it possible to redress the position there. The broad objective was to create a framework for consultation and assist economic development by bringing together for better presentation various individual programmes. In this way it could be more effectively demonstrated to America that her assistance in men, money and materials was required.[70] The Colombo Plan was not a consolidated regional programme or integrated master-plan, but, rather like 'community development' in Africa, based on the idea of encouraging local self-help. It was an important piece of the Labour government's overall policy. Griffiths described it as 'of great psychological significance in the Far East'[71] (96, 97, 101, 102). By 1959 the UK spent £101 million on capital aid and technical assistance for the members of the Plan, while other Commonwealth countries also made considerable contributions.

International policy

From the outset, the Labour government and its advisers assumed that Britain would remain a great power (68, 70, 138, 162). Crucial to this assumption was the belief that she still possessed what Bismarck called *Bündnisfähigkeit*, the quality which makes a desirable ally: her supposed prestige and political maturity, experience and efficiency, moral leadership (64) and cultural eminence, together with the dispersed empire and the international diffusion of the English language.[72] But, as Sir Orme Sargent (one of Bevin's principal advisers) pointed out (139), it would be an uphill task to maintain Britain as a world power in the face of the challenge from the United States. The way to get the respect and greater collaboration of the Americans seemed to be by 'building ourselves up as THE great European Power'. This meant close relations with France, and maximising the potential of the empire and Commonwealth. It was a project to which Bevin responded enthusiastically. Though he wished to work in closest harmony with the United States, his policy was always to maintain the political and economic independence of the United Kingdom: 'the British Commonwealth had a separate contribution to make in world leadership, which it would be unable to make if the United Kingdom became dependent on the United States'. He regarded America as 'a well-intentioned but inexperienced colossus'.[73] He believed it should be possible to develop British power and influence to a position of equality with the United States and Russia: 'we have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union' (142). Seeing himself as trying to preserve Britain's global position, he was at first opposed to what he saw as the break up of the empire. He was against fixing a date for leaving India, complaining to Attlee about 'this awful pessimism'. (Attlee replied tartly: 'I am not defeatist but realist'.)[74] Bevin protested to Creech Jones about 'all this talk of independence' with regard to Ceylon (26, 28). He held up the attempt to return Cyprus to a constitutional path (229). His schemes were sometimes neo-

Palmerstonian. He would sell Sierra Leone's manganese ore to America, Wankie coal to Argentina in return for beef (140); he would establish a 'new triangle of trade' between East Africa, India and Australia, and (like some Raffles *redivivus*) build up Singapore as the focal point of a vast potential market in the Far East linked to Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India.[75] He would drive a road across Africa from Lagos to Mombasa, and link South Africa and Kenya by rail (277, 319, 322 & Map at 118). He wanted to build a nuclear reactor near the Victoria Falls (415). Almost without exception these exuberant schemes proved on investigation to be unworkable.

In searching out areas where British power could assert itself independently of the United States, Africa was the obvious place. American influence in Africa during the war had been studiously kept at arm's length. During the 1940s no comprehensive American policy had been formulated for Africa south of the Sahara, and until well into the 1950s her consular posts remained small, widely separated and inadequately staffed – reflecting the limited United States stake in the continent and the consequent low priority given to African policy.[76] Following through Orme Sargent's hint, and supported by Cohen in the CO, Bevin was always keen on the strategy of building up Africa in co-operation with the French and making collaboration a matter of the highest policy (64, paras 27–28; 145): 'If we only pushed on and developed Africa, we could have the United States dependent on us and eating out of our hands in four or five years'. The United States, he continued, was 'very barren of essential minerals', and 'in Africa we have them all'.[77] A number of post-war conferences about Africa were held between Britain and France, sometimes with Belgium too, on such issues as education, medicine, veterinary matters, transport, nutrition, mycology, rinderpest, trypanosomiasis, and labour problems (178). By the end of 1947 Creech Jones acknowledged that regular tripartite conferences between Britain, France and Belgium were 'now part of major foreign policy and frequently the subject of ministerial discussion'.[78] Technical co-operation was by then well established. In 1947 some officials attempted to shift things onto a higher plane. Bennett wanted to tackle the French about a real political issue, Ewe reunification in British and French Togoland, if only to put some substance into the 'very holy line' the British took in setting themselves up as 'enlightened colonial administrators' (173). Cohen in Paris in the autumn began broaching with the French the idea of starting to exchange ideas about policy, studying the long-term problems involved:

> The aim of our policy in Africa must surely be to develop African civilisation as part of the Western and, above all, the European world. We shall have to contend against the strong force of nationalism in Asia and the anti-colonial pressure which is developing so powerfully in the United Nations. We cannot, I think, expect to maintain, still less to strengthen, our position, as we must, unless we at any rate have a full understanding of the ultimate aims of the other Powers administering African territories.[79]

Cohen identified three main reasons why alignment of French and British policies was necessary: the policy of Western Union (see below), international criticism, and Marshall Aid (182). To these reasons D G Pirie (a temporary principal) added a fourth:[80]

> Both France and Britain are now being forced to consider how best to reconcile their policies, not only because of outside international opinion but also because of the

> internal nationalist movements . . . . The nationalist and autonomist movements are still comparatively small, but they are growing rapidly, and unless we and the French take joint action now to meet their demands we shall both meet our 'Burma' in the very near future. We must reconcile our two policies now, otherwise it will be too late, and we shall find the inhabitants of those territories taking it upon themselves to break down the white man-made boundaries and setting up their own state or states.

In any policy alignment, however, the officials were adamant that Britain could not change her own constitutional objective of bringing colonies 'in course of time to a position of full self-government'. Britain was seeking from France something more than an exchange of information, but less than an obligatory consultation-process which might hinder her own decision-making. But, providing it did not seem to be 'ganging up' to exploit Africa, of the benefits of a lasting association between Europe and Africa no-one had any doubt.[81] Dalton (addressing the African Conference in September 1948) explained how the high-policy conception of Western Union must have its African counterpart: 'an African Union of some sort, made up of all the colonial territories now linked with the units which are to form part of the Western Union in Europe'[82] (175, 177, 178, 180, 182).

It was the devaluation crisis which finally persuaded ministers that this 'Eurafrica' policy was unworkable. Only then did Bevin seriously turn to the development of the Atlantic alliance as the alternative into which Western Union was transmuted. By October 1949 Bevin was arguing that 'the best hope of security for Western Europe lies in a consolidation of the West on the lines indicated by the Atlantic Pact' (152).

International collaboration became important in the fight against communism. The Labour government was assiduous in its attempts to educate the Americans about Britain's colonial policy, hoping thereby to get the USA on her side in the UN, thus reducing the embarrassments of international and especially Soviet bloc criticism (176, 180, 183, 186–194). Considerable progress was in fact made (194), so that the possible euthanasia of American anti-colonialism – at least in government circles – was pretty well discernible by 1951. (Reservations about particular issues, such as Central African Federation, remained.) 'Better let the British bear their burden as long as they were willing and able, before their inevitable retirement' became the American attitude.[83] For this new amenability Britain owed a lot to the imperatives of their shared fears of the growing communist threat: to the aggressive moves of Russia in Greece, West Berlin and Iran, the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Chinese communist victory in 1949. The whole world – or at least that Eurasian heartland ('world island') and middle belt of the planet which mattered – seemed threatened either directly by Russian expansion or indirectly by communist subversion (145, 149, 150). For the Americans communism was now a much greater danger than residual colonialism, and they came to accept that the only way newly independent states could be kept free of communism was by ensuring continuing links with their former colonial masters. When American diplomatic and consular representatives met in Lourenço Marques in 1950 to start drawing up an American policy for Africa (188, para 5) their approach was 'governed by the cold war'. There was 'no hint of boldness with respect to the promotion of decolonisation'. Instead they supported the development of 'mutally advantageous economic relations' between Europe and Africa.[84] By the time they met their British counterparts in May 1950 they claimed to have 'a perfectly open mind' on colonial problems (188).

As the year 1948 opened, Bevin launched his comprehensive analysis of and plans

for dealing with the communist threat to western civilisation (142–146). He proposed a Western Union – a somewhat mysterious concept apparently envisaging a democratic system involving if possible Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece, with Germany and Spain added as soon as circumstances permitted. When the inclusion of Portugal was queried, he confirmed that Portuguese participation was indeed most important because of her colonies in Africa. He believed that all colonies were a vital element in building up western power (144). Eventually he hoped to bring within it every country outside the Soviet group. Britain must, he said, organise and consolidate all possible 'ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this western civilisation of which we were the chief protagonists' (142). (This is almost the exact language of Palmerston in 1848.) But Buddhism and Islam should also contribute their spiritual strength too. The alternative was to acquiesce in continued Russian infiltration and helplessly to witness the collapse of one western bastion after another to 'the baleful tenets of communism'. By May 1950 the emphasis had significantly shifted: in order to withstand 'the great concentration of power now stretching from China to the Oder . . . for the original conception of Western Union we must now begin to substitute the wider conception of the Atlantic community' (156).

From as early as October 1946 Bevin believed it 'was now clear that Russia sought by every means to bring about the dissolution of the British Empire'.[85] Little was done, however, to deal with the colonial aspects of the communist problem before the middle of 1948, when the CO began to accept the need for a better collation of intelligence and for an improved propaganda which would alert colonial peoples to the destructive nature of communism (147, 148). According to Creech Jones, communism was 'an evil thing' whose purpose was 'to destroy social democracy altogether by repression'.[86] Legitimate nationalist agitation should be carefully distinguished from it. He did not fall into the easy trap of believing initial local reports that the Accra riots were simply the product of communist trouble-making (212). In 1950 Griffiths said they faced an 'ideological battle in the world, especially in the colonies' in the next ten years (190). Bevin renewed his call for 'a firm and realistic policy' to meet an anticipated major Russian drive against British Africa (149) and to resist Chinese pressure in South-East Asia (151).

Four types of communist threat could be differentiated by 1950: (i) communist infiltration of and support for nationalist movements, (ii) embryo communist parties, fastening onto and corrupting youth movements, (iii) indoctrination of African students in Britain by the Communist Party (349, 351), and (iv) the visits of British communists to Africa.[87] Not many colonial communist leaders could be named as yet. Nkrumah was no longer a communist, although evidence remained against Dr Azikiwe in Nigeria. Makhan Singh in Kenya was clearly marked down as a communist, as was Dr Jagan in British Guiana. Communist literature was entering some colonies, such as Nigeria, Gold Coast and British Guiana, but not all of it necessarily caused alarm. Officials refused to over-react to news that the *Communist Manifesto* was available in British Guiana. As one of them minuted in August 1949, 'we do not want (nor need) to turn this colony into a police state'.[88] Cohen in April 1949 was convinced there was as yet no communist influence in any of the West African territories. Nor was there much more evidence of communism among East and Central African populations, except perhaps in the Copperbelt and in the groundnuts area. In fact there was no organised overt communist party in any colony

except Malaya and Cyprus. Nearly all colonies, however, had small groups of professed communist sympathisers who might stir up discontent. (Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Kenya and Guiana all needed a watchful eye in this respect.)[89] Alarm about communism was much greater in South-East Asia than Africa (155), with fears that communists might be able one day to dominate the entire 'rice-bowl' (150, 160). The position of India as a bulwark was absolutely critical. The danger of communism was thought to lie not in its political theory, nor even in its anti-capitalism, but in its critique of 'colonialism'. Accordingly, the antidote was reckoned to be the removal of the economic and social conditions in which it might thrive, ensuring fair wages and improving colonial living standards.[90] Hand in hand with attempts to dispel the causes of popular dissatisfaction must go the improvement of crowd control, counter-intelligence and propaganda. Policing would be modernised. Attlee thought more attention should be paid to the role of overseas broadcasting.[91]

Hong Kong was identified as the first point in the East where, if things went wrong, Britain's ultimate determination to repel communist aggression would have to be successfully demonstrated (164–171). If she failed to hold Hong Kong in the face of a Chinese challenge, the dominoes would assuredly start to fall, beginning with Thailand and Burma, and putting India at risk. The 1949 communist take-over in China sparked off a ministerial debate about the future of Hong Kong. How should Britain react if it were attacked on a larger or smaller scale by the new Chinese regime? Some ministers were anxious about defending 'a relic of colonialism'; Cripps thought Hong Kong should be abandoned. Attlee received sage advice from the Cabinet secretary. Brook thought it would be best to keep a low profile in order to avoid such an attack: it would be wrong to project Hong Kong as 'the Berlin of the east' or even as 'an outpost of western democracy', because it would be the more humiliating if withdrawal were subsequently forced on Britain. Equally, however, the government should avoid the language of 'scuttle' or any hint of withdrawal.[92] The prime minister insisted that they had to show their determination and ability to defend the security of Hong Kong, otherwise British prestige would be seriously damaged and the whole common front against communism was likely to crumble. The Cabinet agreed, as a precaution, to send some modest reinforcements to Hong Kong, but it was politically impossible for Britain to do much more alone. Commonwealth assistance was the only way to make any further military build-up internationally acceptable (165, 167). The support of India was essential if the continued presence of Britain in Hong Kong was to be asserted and made to seem reasonable to Asian opinion generally. But prime minister Nehru was opposed to 'colonialism' in Hong Kong as elsewhere. Canada was critical of the policy of holding Hong Kong against China, indicating that she might not support Britain at the Security Council if it came to a row. South Africa was not interested and did not even reply to Attlee's appeal. Pakistan was preoccupied with Kashmir. New Zealand promised to provide at least two frigates, but this would hardly constitute a solid contribution. Australia's reply was especially disappointing: vague indications were given of the forces that she might possibly make available, but 'some doubts' were clearly expressed about the whole object of the exercise. Nor could American opinion be counted on (169). Dalton regarded the position in the summer of 1949 with considerable disquiet: it was, he wrote in his diary (referring to Noel-Baker's performance), 'pathetic to see poor old peace-loving Phil applying his usual optimistic delusions, and saying replies from Commonwealth countries are

"encouraging" '. There was in fact, Dalton feared, a serious risk of Britain's getting drawn alone into an unmanageable situation, in which a 'hopeless scene' would be compounded by internal subversion, a refugee problem and food shortages.[93] The Cabinet (more or less following the line Brook had suggested to the prime minister) concluded in August 1949 that the abandonment of Hong Kong to the Chinese was an impossible option because of the repercussions this would have in Malaya, Thailand and Burma. On the other hand it was no good proclaiming longer term commitments which could not be fulfilled. The Cabinet thought the best that could be done was to hold on quietly and try to raise living standards, in order to make life under the British flag seem more attractive, not least to people elsewhere, than the alternative. The idea of turning Hong Kong into an international port was put forward only to be quickly rejected, also on the argument that it would be interpreted as a sign of British weakness. It was decided to wait until they were satisfied that a friendly and stable government was genuinely in control of a united China before discussing the long-term future of Hong Kong with them (170, 171).

In January 1950 Britain announced diplomatic recognition of the new Chinese communist government, despite American refusal to do the same. There were two reasons for the British decision. First, there was the economic importance of giving the obvious minimum protection to British business communities, which it was hoped would then enable them one day to re-develop the potentialities of the China trade in more propitious circumstances. Second, there was the political importance also of keeping a foot in the door: 'if we are not to drive Communist China into the arms of Moscow we must do our utmost to maintain western contacts'. In the event, recognition provided no real benefit for trading interests. Many businessmen pulled out of China between 1950 and 1952. Bevin described the picture as 'exceedingly dark'. Nevertheless the Cabinet refused to break off diplomatic relations. The 'fundamental political reason' for recognition still held good. Any change of policy would lead to reproaches from India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and expose Hong Kong to an increased risk of Chinese hostility or retaliation.[94]

Apart from Hong Kong, there were other territorial claims against British colonies, notably Guatemala's to British Honduras, and Argentina's to the Falklands (185). Bevin offered in vain to take the former dispute to the International Court.[95] The latter was not actively pursued in this period (263).

Increasingly, inter-state disputes tended to come before the United Nations. Britain was keen to make international arbitration and peace-keeping machinery work, but so often loyalty to the UN seemed to conflict with her vital interests. The Trusteeship Council held its first meeting in March 1947. Experience with the four-power involvement in the Italian colonial settlement (see below, p lvii) suggested that it was contrary to the interests of colonial peoples to be regulated by the UN (72, section iv). Discussion in the General Assembly always appeared to encourage the politically-inspired expression of 'extremist views'. By the autumn of 1947 Bennett could describe the situation in the UN as becoming one of 'open war' – 'colonial powers against the rest'; but he was critical of the 'Athanasian' or '1940s spirit' displayed there by his colleague Poynton in response. Bennett believed it would be better, in the interests of the colonies, to try to lower the temperature, 'quite apart from the question whether the UK, in its present state, can hope to win such a slogging match in the end'. It would be different, he continued, if Britain had 'the force and prestige to tell the United Nations exactly what they might and might

not do under Chapter XI and to get away with it', but she did not. Chapter XI of the UN Charter dealt with 'non-self-governing-territories', enabling them voluntarily to be placed under the international trusteeship system managed by the UN Fourth Committee. The latter, however, was trying to establish what was seen in the CO as a kind of 'back-door' trusteeship, which would supervise all non-self-governing-territories whether or not placed under Chapter XI. Moreover, although article 73(e) of the Charter required the transmission of information about economic, social and educational conditions in colonies, and did not require political and constitutional reports, the Fourth Committee was now seeking to obtain them. In this way, the British feared, 'international accountability' for all colonies would be established *de facto*; this would be a retrogressive step for colonies who were already set on the path to self-government, for, once it had the information, the UN would be bound to 'meddle' detrimentally in political advancement. Creech Jones made it clear to the office that he was 'vitally interested' in all this, and would follow developments closely. British policy was thus firmly to resist the pretensions of the UN.[96] This was coupled with a more positive attempt to take the wind out of the sails of international hostility by improving British colonial publicity, especially with the Americans (70–72).

Strategic policy

Perhaps the most remarkable ministerial attempt to rethink the fundamentals of policy in any field during the life of the Labour government was Attlee's initiation of a debate on strategy in the Middle East (273). This arose originally out of discussions about the future of the ex-Italian colonies in North and North-East Africa (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Somaliland and Eritrea), but it quickly turned into an examination, in the light of changing world strategic circumstances (the establishment of the United Nations and the development of the atom bomb) and the approaching independence of India, of the whole traditional rationale of 'holding' the Middle East. Attlee wanted to give up a 'hopeless' attempt to defend the Middle East oil-producing areas, and to work routinely in future round the Cape to the east and Australia, instead of relying on an ever-more problematic Mediterranean route. He pursued a confrontation with the Chiefs of Staff on these issues through endless committee meetings, and thoroughly rattled them. Attlee was supported by Dalton, but opposed by Bevin, relying on his FO advisers. This battle of the titans lasted almost eighteen months (274–282). It ended with a victory for the traditionalist doctrines of the Chiefs of Staff (apparently threatening resignation), backed by Bevin and his formidable team at the FO. The argument of the latter was that withdrawal from the Mediterranean route would leave a vacuum, into which Russia (even if not bent on world domination) would move, since 'the bear could not resist pushing its paw into soft places'. This would at the very least make a gift to Russia of Middle East oil and manpower. They rejected Attlee's concept of a disengagement from a 'neutral zone', putting a 'wide glacis of desert and Arabs between ourselves and the Russians'.[97]

It was Gladwyn Jebb who described the intractable problem of the ex-Italian colonies as 'a very baffling one, and no solution which is practicable seems very good, nor any very good one practicable'.[98] Some of the early ideas on the subject were in fact neither good nor practicable. In Cabinet in September 1945, Bevin envisaged a possible Commonwealth Somali trust administered by South Africa, and Morrison

talked of setting up a satellite Zionist settlement in Cyrenaica (283, 284). There were many permutations of possible solutions, both at the British official and inter-state levels of policy-making. Difficulties in obtaining international agreement between the great powers resulted in frustrating delays and repeated changes of British tactics. But for all the complexity of the manoeuvrings in the search for a settlement, it is quite easy to define four British aims in respect of the ex-Italian colonies. One: to satisfy strategic requirements with defence facilities in Cyrenaica, which was regarded as a strategic bastion of the British position in the Middle East; Tobruk was less than five hundred miles from Cairo, and it was essential to pre-empt control by another power of the line of imperial communications, as well as to have the means of 'acting on the soft under-belly of Europe from the Mediterranean', as Bevin put it in neo-Churchillian language (290). Two: to exclude the Russians from obtaining a foothold in Africa through a specific territorial trust, and to minimise her share in any collective, joint or international trust. Three: to meet the needs and wishes of the inhabitants; though great issues were at stake, 'they cannot be treated simply as pawns in the game' (Bennett). Four: to secure American support (to relieve the financial burdens of any responsibilities Britain might have to enter into, and to head off Russian involvement); and to get Arab approval, which was necessary in the interests of Middle East policy as a whole (290).[99]

The return of any of the colonies to Italy appeared in 1945 to be more or less unthinkable, on account of the hostility of the inhabitants to this after their liberation. It was thought collective trusts would be hard to operate, and prevent the attainment of British strategic objectives. The preferred solutions of the CO were accordingly: (i) to promote an independent Libya, (ii) to unite British and Italian Somaliland, and (iii) to split Eritrea. A united Somaliland would include the Ogaden and 'Reserved Area' disputed with Ethiopia. As compensation Ethiopia would get about half of Eritrea, with the other half going to Sudan; a corridor to the port of Zeila was also offered to Ethiopia as part of the compensation package (299). As for working towards an independent Libya, Bennett thought the case was unanswerable: 'there is a lot of paper being generated now at New York about human rights. Here is a practical test case, worth any amount of paper'.[100] Political advancement he did not consider to be immediately practical in Africa, so the chance of seizing the initiative for it in Libya should be welcomed as an easy way to get international credit. Officials generally seemed satisfied that Libyans were at least as ready for self-rule as Iraqis had been in the 1930s. Then as to Somaliland, unification would rectify the crudities of the nineteenth-century partition and iron out anomalies. Existing boundaries cut across the natural grazing grounds of the nomadic Somalis, especially those of the British tribes, to the south of their frontier. This made constructive development towards self-government impossible. Maintenance of the status quo, Cohen argued with some feeling, would be 'utterly contrary to all the principles of colonial progress to which we and other nations are committed to the hilt' (296).

Unfortunately, as Thomas pointed out in March 1947, the disposal of the ex-Italian colonies was mainly a question of foreign policy. CO interests did not seem to him to be so great as to outweigh diplomatic considerations: a line should not be taken against the paramount interests of foreign policy unless built upon 'irrefragable foundations', which he did not think had been demonstrated (296). Clearly the ex-Italian colonies had to be dealt with as a whole, trying to balance requirements in one against concessions in another (306). Almost all the other powers came round to

thinking that Italy, purged of fascism, should be allowed to return in trust to some or all of her former colonies. This was the attitude of the Americans as well as the French and Russians, the South Africans as well as South Americans. (Five million Italians in the USA guaranteed a generous American attitude to Italian claims.) These views could not be ignored by Britain because French and American support was needed to secure a trust in Cyrenaica (305). The upshot was that a united Somalia had to be sacrificed in order to hold onto strategic requirements in Cyrenaica, which were defined as 'the overriding need'. Even Attlee by 1948 accepted that Britain should 'insist on securing for ourselves a position in Cyrenaica which would give us complete freedom of action' (303). The Chiefs of Staff had insisted that no matter how difficult, or how serious the political implications, the insecurity of British tenure in Palestine and Egypt made it essential to get defence facilities in Cyrenaica.[101] Tactically, the FO thought it might be easier to obtain these paramount requirements by asking for a trust in the first instance rather than pressing for independence. The CO did not like this procedure, but in the circumstances, saw no alternative (300).

In August 1948 all four deputy ministers of the great powers agreed in principle that Somaliland should be returned to Italy. Then, after a long and acrimonious discussion, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided Italy should have Italian Somaliland as a trust. (International opinion simply could not accept the purity of British motives in regard to United Somalia, even though it would have involved submerging its own Somali protectorate.) Bevin was well aware of the dangers of upsetting pro-Arab and pro-African policies by involving Britain in the return of Italy. He perhaps regretted moving too close to Italian claims, for the short-term reason that a 'blank turn-down' to the Italians would be disastrous in the context of their 1948 elections. Although he had no intention of restoring Italian rule with British bayonets, it nevertheless seemed of the utmost importance in the interests of Western Union that some Italian aspirations (however misguided) should be met. Italy was after all to be part of the anti-communist strategy, and yet it was the 'weakest link in the chain' (145, 146). It could only play into the hands of the communists if Russia were able to say she had supported Italian claims against Britain. Bevin also held that it was necessary to give Ethiopia some satisfaction in Eritrea, otherwise she would make things difficult for Britain over the Lake Tana water development (131, 305). As a result of these wider considerations extraordinary risks were taken. What, for example, if Italy became communist? Obviously, the ex-Italian colonies question gave rise to many anomalies in policy-making, as well as tendentiously detailed official explanations (307, 308). Perhaps the oddest scheme of all was Bevin's notion of creating an international zone (*à la* Trieste) around Tripoli to be administered by the four great powers – in order to induce Russian consent to British strategic rights in Cyrenaica. It came to nothing.[102] Libya became independent under UN auspices in 1951. Emir Idris honoured his commitment (312) to grant Britain generous defence facilities.

In 1947 the Chiefs of Staff advised ministers that the risk of a major war in the next five years was negligible, and that Britain was in any case economically incapable of fighting one. The risk in the five years after that was likely to increase gradually as the rehabilitation of Russia gathered momentum. By 1957 Russia would probably have the atom bomb, and an unconventional (nuclear) war would need to be planned for.[103] Strategic thinking in regard to this threat rested on 'the three pillars': defence

of the United Kingdom (especially in the air and the Atlantic), defence of its sea communications, and defence of the Middle East – in that order. The collapse of any one of the three 'would bring the whole structure down'.[104] These were the only strategic objectives which could be defined as vital, although the Chiefs of Staff agreed it was their aim also to defend Western Europe as far to the east as possible (326). In the autumn of 1947 they wanted to add a possible fourth pillar – which 'would give a most desirable addition of strength' – namely, 'the co-operation of India and Pakistan, the provision of the necessary assistance to ensure their security and the development of the air offensive base in Western Pakistan'. It took less than a year to expose the chimerical nature of this plan: by September 1948 the inclusion of Western Pakistan as one of the 'three possible bases for offensive action' had been abandoned.[105] The main support areas were North America, southern Africa and Australia (321). The hub of strategic defence planning remained the Middle East. It was important for its oil, and because of its uncomfortable susceptibility to Russian penetration. But more than that: the Middle East was a centre of communications, the home of Islam, the land bridge of Eurasia, the shield of Africa from communism, and a potential offensive air base (332). It also had an economic importance, as £150 million-worth of exports went there, and Britain imported a lot of high quality Egyptian cotton.[106] Accordingly it was a major objective to prevent the Middle East falling behind the iron curtain. By the spring of 1947 it was clear that a Middle East base – wherever it might be – was essential to Commonwealth strategy. East Africa was proved to be no proper substitute (332). The importance of the Middle East and dependence on its oil continued to increase, yet there was by 1950 still a serious discrepancy between the forces required to defend it and those known to be available.[107] Moreover, British influence with Arabs could already be described as in decline, partly owing to Britain's being blamed for creating Israel, 'an enigma if not a Frankenstein' (163).

Any extension of the Soviet area of domination would, it was thought, weaken the British political and strategic position, but not all Russian expansion would put Britain in mortal danger (143). In this context the vital strategic concerns were: (i) France, the Benelux countries and West Germany (*not* including the British Zone in West Berlin), in order to ensure the security of the United Kingdom; (ii) Spain, Portugal and North Africa, in order to protect sea communications; and (iii) Turkey, Iraq, Southern Iran and all the countries to the south and west of these, in order to secure the Middle East, which was principally necessary for the maintenance of the (Egyptian) base. By 1948 the Chiefs of Staff had evolved a clear idea of future strategy based on a 'stop line', beyond which it would be British policy to prevent any spread of communism. This would run roughly from North Cape east of Scandinavia, France and the Benelux countries, and to the north of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.[108] Attlee was not happy with this. He was disturbed about resurrecting 'a continental commitment' (sending land forces to defend Europe) and about building Germany up again. It was dangerous to believe Russia to be the only potential enemy: he taunted the Chiefs of Staff with the observation that their predecessors might have expressed the same view in 1922. More fundamentally he had two further objections. The first was about the nature of Russian encroachment. He could see that it was right to build up the military forces of the western powers, but what if communist influence spread westwards by a series of political *coups d'état*: would the Chiefs of Staff consider Russian penetration beyond the 'stop line'

to be a *casus belli*? The prime minister's second reservation concerned rigidity of planning: 'our defence policy should not be too rigid; a future world war need not necessarily begin in Europe, for it might break out in the Far East between Russia and America'.[109] Attlee also reiterated warnings about defence overspending. Britain would be playing Russia's game and lose the cold war if they tipped the balance too far and ruined the economy.[110] As the minister for defence put it:

> the problem has seemed to me to be whether, after the exhaustion of the war years the UK has the power and the resources to maintain armed forces equipped to modern standards such as are required to permit us to play the part of a Great Power. I have always conceded, in public and in private, that the prime necessity for our survival is that we should win the battle for economic recovery. That is fundamental. But what is no less important is to ensure that, in taking the necessary measures to deal with the economic situation, no such crippling penalties are inflicted upon the Services as would render them inefficient . . . .

Economic difficulties, Alexander argued, must not be allowed 'to stampede us into withdrawal of our outposts throughout the world'; this, the Chiefs of Staff warned, would be 'equivalent in the political field to a major disaster in the "cold war" '. Bevin agreed it would only intensify the cold war. The government was thus locked into the old dilemmas which had plagued Neville Chamberlain and Inskip before the war. As a compromise the defence estimates for 1950–1951 were fixed at £740 million a year.[111] (These calculations, as we have seen above, were then upset by the Korean War.)

To cope with this perennial problem of 'strategy versus finance', and ensure preparedness to meet communist aggression in any part of the world, it was clearly essential to try (as often in the past) to mobilise the resources of the Commonwealth and the colonial empire more effectively. This mobilisation was approached by the Defence Committee in two main ways: (i) with a geopolitical zonal plan to divide the world into regions of strategical responsibility (with the predominant partner in any region initiating strategy and plans for that area), and to get a substantial Commonwealth input into this system (278); and (ii) with a manpower plan to make more use of colonial population resources. The ceiling placed on the defence estimates for economic reasons made it essential to obtain more help from the Commonwealth in terms of production and supply,[112] and from Africa in terms of troops (322, 323). Attlee became very determined about all this, pointing out that Australia and New Zealand had only a fifth of Britain's population, yet spent much less per head, so they ought to be prepared to take over commitments in the Pacific.[113] (Defence expenditure per head in 1946–1947 was: Britain £38, Australia £31, New Zealand £25, Canada £14, South Africa £1.8.)[114] Prospects were not good. Canada was already co-operating in NATO, which would absorb most of her potential. India and Pakistan were strategically insecure and politically uncertain, and could not be expected to help outside their own sub-continent; in any case they were suspicious of approaches for western collaboration because of their non-alignment. So at the end of 1948 the immediate need was narrowed down to discussions with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Though it was realised that all of them were wary of large overseas commitments, it seemed unthinkable in Whitehall that Britain should continue to plan and co-ordinate her defence with the USA (as she had been doing for some years), and within Western Union, and not with the Commonwealth, which it was being assumed would make substantial contributions to the 'three

pillars' strategy. Without these contributions planning would mostly remain largely unrealistic, stultified and possibly dangerous.[115] The response was not encouraging. Only New Zealand reacted positively. Australia was concerned with the Far East, South Africa with her African hinterland. And Australia and New Zealand were increasingly looking to the USA for their defence, continuing the trend initiated by the fall of Singapore in 1942. However much the emerging ANZUS Pact might have been disliked in Whitehall, the reality was grasped that unless Australia and New Zealand felt fully secure at home they would not contribute to a Commonwealth defence of the Middle East (341–343). In the long run, British governments continued to hope that defence agreements with India and South Africa could also be worked out, but it was recognised that the pace could not be forced (437).

If the chances of Commonwealth collaboration were disappointing, the prospects of increasing the use of colonial manpower were not much better. The Chiefs of Staff, though acknowledging the need to find some sort of replacement for the Indian Army, and at first impressed by the potential resources of East and West Africa, became decidedly unenthusiastic once serious investigation was under way. On this matter, as on so many others, Attlee continued to press them hard. In December 1949 he issued a directive calling for a further examination of whether they could plan to place increasing reliance on colonial manpower in the cold war.[116] The CO and the Chiefs of Staff considered the question carefully.[117] They agreed that any increase would not affect the size of British forces overseas, nor form part of a 'strategic reserve' (which had to be able to go anywhere). The total manpower available from East, West and Central Africa (including those already serving) was put at a ceiling of 400,000 troops. There would be a fair range of uses to which they could be put, though within a strictly limited general scope; also, they would free British servicemen for deployment elsewhere. Thus the CO was able to confirm that there were resources which could be tapped, and they would help in this if necessary; but 'it was a military decision', and before anything could be done colonial governments would have to be consulted. The Chiefs of Staff, however, remained sceptical: colonial manpower did not offer a good return for the money and trained personnel devoted to it; and it was difficult to provide the necessary instructors, officers and NCOs to lead colonial units (325, 336–340).

Thus by 1951 Africa appeared to be strategically more peripheral than had seemed likely only five years before. This down-grading was not unrelated to the increasing difficulties of co-operating with South Africa (see below, p lxv). It also had a good deal to do with the intractable problems of improving strategic railway links, such as the enormous survey, development and operational costs, the shortage of steel and other supplies, the involvement of other governments in unifying the gauges, and so forth (108, 118, 128, 130, 135, 324). Nor did the proposed major base in East Africa emerge (319, 320, 324). Although a non-operational store-holding depot was opened at Mackinnon Road in 1948, sixty miles inland from Mombasa, the difficulties experienced with its construction were discouraging: transport by railway was poor and worse by road, water had to be piped in, there was a lack of local skilled labour and no amenities for Europeans. Work on it was abandoned in 1950.

Social, racial and research policies

As we have already seen above (p xxxiv), the Labour government attached much importance to the social advancement of colonial peoples, as part of an integrated

political and economic policy. Improving the social outlook of African peoples in particular came to assume a high priority. Tribal attitudes seemed to have 'iron-curtained the imaginative power of the African', cramped initiative, and made it hard for him to entertain the notion of progress as it had been understood in Europe since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. How could the colonial power encourage initiative in African societies? (51). At the centre of the government's social policy was 'mass education', or community development as it was later called. This was a programme designed to apply to all communities, large and small (365). It covered all forms of community betterment in agriculture, health (376), housing and education to raise living standards by fostering a spirit of self-help. Community development was involved with the 'everyday world' of the vet, the doctor, the agriculturist, the education officer and so on. It was not merely a narrow educational or literacy programme (although Creech Jones regarded 'smashing illiteracy' as a major policy in its own right),[118] for all improvements in living standards, it was thought, would contribute to a better performance in schools. The technique was to select a project with a carefully chosen local objective, set up a provincial team to get it going, and then hand over to African leaders who would carry on the process of self-betterment. Providing the incentive to keep programmes going was all-important, and the theory was that this was more likely to come from Africans themselves. The participation of the people was vital, otherwise community development might become merely incidental to enlightened administration, just a subsidiary variant of development. This seemed a constant danger. Official theorists had to go on pointing out that the emphasis should be not on the schemes but on the people themselves. Stimulating a lively interest in the people for their own improvement was the essence of the concept. Schemes did not have to be large or expensive. Encouragement of farming improvements was a typical programme, but all kinds of things were attempted: first-aid posts and reading rooms, land reclamation and grass regeneration projects, making roads and lorry-parks.

The idea behind community development was not new. It derived some inspiration from war-time and demobilisation methods used with troops. What was new was the dispensing of reliance on central government, approaching administrative problems instead through the stimulation of popular initiative. The motive power must come from below, but government officers, both administrative and technical, must expect to get involved, by setting things up and giving guidance. A clearing-house of information about community development was established at the Colonial Department of the University of London Institute of Education (headed by Prof Margaret Read), with an officer in charge, paid for by CDW funds.[119]

A degree of urgency was injected into the whole idea as a result of the 1947–1948 drive to increase colonial production. A circular despatch was issued in November 1948 (365) emphasising that 'mass education is to be regarded as one of the central features of the African policy of His Majesty's Government'. It was now a settled policy, and along with local government, should be placed in the forefront of development policy in Africa. Copies of this despatch were then sent out in the following May to all colonial governors, challenging them with the question: how far can this apply to you? Three principles of community development were now confidently adumbrated: devolution, co-ordination and association. Local needs were best looked at on the spot, so planning must be devolved in relation to local requirements; a co-ordinated approach and team-work were also necessary; and local

opinion should be associated with the actual constructive planning.[120] Lord Listowel took this gospel of self-help to the West Indies in 1949, where he recommended colonial governments to 'become enthusiastic supporters of a policy which would include it among the main tasks of government'. Experience in Africa had shown, he declared, 'how much village self-help can achieve in poor and backward areas'.[121]

Thus it is clear that the Labour government's African policy rested upon a dual foundation of local government and community development (or mass education) (57). The two were mutually reinforcing. Both fostered self-help and initiative from the village level upwards. Labour government ministers always emphasised social and economic progress as the indispensable preparation for political advancement. This is why government policy stressed mutual aid, voluntary service, trades unions, co-operative movements, community development and education. Trades unions – self-help bodies par excellence – were seen as having a significant role: free and democratic trades unions would be one of the soundest defences against communism (369, 370). Emerging nationalism was to be co-opted and developed as 'really sound social action by the community for its own advance', as Creech Jones put it, addressing the African Conference of officials and unofficials in September 1948 (52). One of his central presuppositions was that 'the creation of initiative and how to link that initiative with dynamic nationalism is a great problem at the present time'. He attached considerable importance to the people's co-operating in government: 'the dynamics of progress must be created in the people themselves'.[122] It proved hard to sell these doctrines to some colonial governments. Uganda received an exhortation in June 1949:[123]

> I should like to repeat once more the very great importance which I attach to community development as a central feature of policy in all African territories. The success with which community development programmes will meet depends to a large extent on the degree to which the people themselves can be given a constructive part in the working out of development plans and can be raised to enthusiasm for these plans.

Creech Jones warned that 'a fierce searchlight of international opinion' would play over colonial education (65), not least in the trust territory of Tanganyika. He had a keen special interest in education, having been vice-chairman of the Elliot Commission investigating higher education in West Africa in 1943–1944 (361, 362). The minority report, which he signed and probably drafted, stressed that there could be no effective progress to self-government without educational and economic development, but there must be simultaneous progress at all levels of education: Indian experience illustrated the need for this balance.[124] Five new universities or university colleges were set up in the colonial empire between 1945 and 1951 (Malaya, West Indies, Nigeria, Gold Coast and East Africa). But what should be done for schools? Africans demanded the full literary 'European' education, but this (as in India) was officially thought to be too 'bookish' for them. Development had to be pursued for political and economic reasons, and this required a more vocational and technical product. And what about political education, 'education for citizenship' – the need for 'public-spirited' citizens? There was a problem to be solved here, the experts advised, if the general development of colonial peoples was not to take 'a disastrously wrong turning'. Creech Jones as early as October 1945 urged that the role of teaching and all kinds of educational processes, together with the

fundamental contribution they could make to development, should be investigated broadly. He defined the subject for inquiry as 'the educational problem, with a developing people, of building up a sense of public responsibility, tolerance, and objectivity in discussion and practice, an understanding of social values and democratic practice, and an appreciation of political institutions, their evolution and progress, etc. etc.'. A committee was accordingly set up under W E F Ward, the CO deputy educational adviser, eventually reporting in somewhat abstract fashion (363, 368), for which it was fiercely criticised by Sir Philip Mitchell.[125]

Development also had to be underpinned by welfare research (371–379). Government recognised that it must articulate a role of investigating, demonstrating and encouraging. The CDW Acts of 1940 and 1945 (72 annex, 76) opened up entirely fresh, indeed revolutionary possibilities (or so it seemed then) for the co-ordination and integration of colonial research. At the same time it also encouraged colonial governments to make their own additional contributions. Over two hundred colonial research projects had been set up by 1947 (379). With large sums available – at least by comparison with what had previously been the case – new advisory committees to supervise expenditure were brought into being between 1942 and 1949. The Colonial Research Council was the central mediating body. The subjects covered by the other committees were: colonial products research, fisheries, agriculture, medicine, social sciences, economics, land tenure, insecticides, and trypanosomiasis.[126] Of these, the CO found the Colonial Medical Research Committee the most difficult to handle, at least under its old chairman, Sir E Mellanby. It was dominated by the Medical Research Council (MRC), and the CO suspected the doctors wanted to run all colonial medical research by themselves.[127] Although this was anathema to officials, they did not relish a quarrel, because it would adversely affect colonial research; on the other hand a fundamental principle about CO control was at stake, and they were not going to be bullied (378). Under a new chairman (Dr Eric Himsworth), they found the committee became more co-operative. So too did the Trypanosomiasis Committee after the departure of the seventy-seven-year-old Sir G Marshall, though not before he had upset Cohen with some of the roughest and most undeferential treatment that august mandarin was ever to experience.[128] Trypanosomiasis was a key area of research, because the presence of the tsetse fly knocked out four million square miles of Africa for cattle-raising. This resulted in a widespread general under-utilisation of land, since Africans were reluctant to live where cattle could not thrive (72 annex, 125). At close quarters the problem seemed so desperate that the experts called for government direction of peasant settlement, but the Colonial Office was reluctant to go that far. Instead, it concentrated on the infrastructure of research, setting up the West African Institute for Trypanosomiasis in Northern Nigeria, before turning to East Africa, where the intention was to establish something similar.[129] Generally speaking the financing of CDW research by the Treasury was considerably loosened up in these years. By the beginning of 1951, officials felt their record on research was becoming better all the time. Their relations with scientists and doctors had much improved. Accordingly they felt on stronger ground than ever in resisting calls for the appointment of a chief scientific officer. (They would not have minded if he could have been someone of the calibre of Sir H Tizard, but this seemed unlikely.) Nor did the idea of a separate central colonial research institute find favour. Here too decentralisation and local devolution were the order of the day (375, 378).[130]

In the field of race, the government's approach to policy within its own territories was relatively uncomplicated. Ministers believed in the political and moral importance of good race relations (63). Officials had no difficulty in subscribing to United Nations' enunciations and definitions of 'human rights' (346). They would have liked in principle to appoint a coloured governor (360). They accepted the need to press ahead with Africanisation of civil services (356–358). They believed in accepting multi-racialism, and in allowing the free movement of peoples, except where it was already demonstrably dangerous to social harmony, such as the migration of Indians into East Africa and Fiji (344, 345). Although some alarm was expressed about West Indian (especially Jamaican) immigration into Britain, the Cabinet was unwilling to restrict it legislatively (352–355, 359). The professed aim was a Commonwealth in which there should be 'no discrimination on grounds of race, colour or religion' (71). There was a tough clamp-down on any residual manifestations of a colour-bar in Britain or its colonies (348, 350). This was not purely altruistic, it being recognised that any other policy would make Britain vulnerable to communist propaganda, if only because of the presence of colonial students (351). Creech Jones declared that the government was trying to 'create the conditions of free nationhood' and plan social development: 'fundamentally, this human problem cannot be solved by colour bars and discriminatory conventions whether economic or social . . . the ultimate objective must be some form of common citizenship, however obscure and difficult the way to this objective may be'.[131]

Anglo–South African relations

Not surprisingly, Creech Jones believed the National government of South Africa after 1948 was pursuing a 'wicked racial policy'.[132] His successor Griffiths spoke of *apartheid* as 'totally repugnant'.[133] The Union's policy, however, posed a portentous dilemma for the British government. On the one hand, *apartheid* was unacceptable, and it was obvious that any suspicion of sympathising with South African policy would produce an angry backlash in the colonies. On the other hand there were good reasons for maintaining friendly links with South Africa. Here were two states bound together by common interests, a mutually advantageous economic relationship (108), and by an almost equal alarm about United Nations interference in colonial territories. Britain could not simply dissociate herself from South Africa, even in African administration, where South Africa had a lot to contribute in terms of knowledge and resources. The Union also had a potential stranglehold over the High Commission Territories. Britain needed South African help with her general economic and strategic requirements. Some ministers thought the latter of overriding significance. A close defence relationship with South Africa was necessary for an effective South African contribution to the cold war; but too close a co-operation was incompatible with the attempt to mobilise Asians, Arabs and Africans in a multi-racial Commonwealth acting as a morally-inspired, almost spiritually-directed, system of anti-communism (421, 437). Above all, Britain wanted South Africa in this Commonwealth system because her own international credibility would be fatally compromised by the departure of 'a founder member'. It would seem a failure of statesmanship which might not easily be lived down. Sir Evelyn Baring, the high commissioner, advised doing nothing which might worsen the volatile South African internal situation – nothing which would 'unite and inflame' white

opinion behind Dr Malan and his National Party government (441). It was in this context that the unpopular British official reaction to Seretse Khama's marriage was set (422, 424, 440). Those who would break with South Africa and ostracise her, said Gordon Walker, 'completely fail to understand the realities of the situation' (433). The Labour government articulated a basic South African policy of trying to co-operate as far as possible with the Union. And for four reasons: a strategic reason, an economic reason, a Commonwealth reason, and a High Commission Territories reason, the latter being the most potent of all (428, 429, 431). This policy was not adopted, however, without qualification or without countervailing action in particular spheres, most notably seen in the setting up of the Central African Federation as a means of containing Afrikaner expansion (417, 418, 433–436, 444).

By 1950, co-operation with South Africa was already increasingly difficult. As public opinion became aroused with suspicion during the Seretse affair, British policy options narrowed considerably. There is a marked contrast between the initial attempts of the Labour government to help Smuts over South-West Africa, and the much less sympathetic position taken up later (412–414, 427, 429, 431). The South-West African issue propelled the Union into the spotlight of the international arena, where it was of cardinal importance for Britain not to get isolated as the only supporter of South Africa at the United Nations. The conflicting tensions in British South African policy were nowhere more acutely felt than at the United Nations. When Smuts's request for the incorporation of South-West Africa came before the Assembly, the Indians led the opposition to it, and it was rejected by 37:0, with seven abstentions. The abstainers included Britain. (South Africa's pretensions to Namibia were probably in the long run fatally compromised by this result.) As to the argument in Whitehall about whether to be represented at the International Court hearings, Britain had reasons of her own for not wanting extensions of United Nations jurisdiction over colonial regimes. There was an inter-departmental debate about this (428). Remarkably, however, even once the officials had agreed on a fairly united front, their advice was rejected by the Cabinet in May 1950 on strictly political grounds. This clearly represented a further hardening of opinion against South Africa (431). South-West Africa was the most public issue between the two states. But in fact South Africa displayed petulance about British policies across a wide range. She was opposed to the arming and training of black troops, in case it led to a more effective communist or nationalist rising against European settlers (citing the example of the recent Malagasy Revolt).[134] She disliked the Libyan independence solution worked out at the United Nations and supported by Britain. Above all she reacted strongly against the whole thrust of British policy for the Gold Coast.[135] Dr Malan's outburst against it in February 1951 (432) was the first of many. South Africa's particular fear was that the Gold Coast policy – 'creating more Liberias' – would be applied to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Already the Union was losing confidence in Britain as an African power and protector.[136]

One of the most striking features of Britain's South African policy in these years is that in no other sector of colonial policy did some ministers so frequently reject, on political grounds, official advice. Lord Pethick-Lawrence questioned the India Office and FO view that Indians in South Africa were a matter of domestic jurisdiction only.[137] Sir H Tizard and Bevin favoured the idea of constructing a nuclear reactor in Central Africa with South African help, but Creech Jones protested there were 'serious political difficulties in allowing the South African Government to sponsor a

project in Rhodesia' (415). In May 1950 (as we have just seen) the Cabinet spurned carefully presented inter-departmental advice on the South-West African issue. In the following year the CRO was ready to soften the conditions for a transfer of the Simonstown naval base in order to secure a settlement, but the Defence Committee maintained a tougher line (423, 438, 442, 443). No agreement on Simonstown was reached in the lifetime of the Labour government. Stalling on Simonstown – holding out for an unequivocal guarantee of availability in peace or war – resulted in a favourable settlement in 1955.

This hardening of attitudes against South Africa is perhaps most usefully illustrated here in a specific but little-known example which cannot easily be adequately represented in the selected documents: the discussion of how to provide proper appeal court facilities for the High Commission Territories. (It also throws light on a number of issues other than those directly related to Anglo–South African relations: on financial constraints, on concern for the future of smaller colonial territories, and on the administration of justice in the empire, especially the arrangements for regional superior courts.) The need was to provide for Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland appeal facilities which would be an alternative to the limited, expensive, inconvenient and slow recourse to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (430). The inadequacies of the latter were demonstrated in the case of Adrian Els, whose appeal against the death sentence in Swaziland in 1945 for the murder in a fit of sexual jealousy of a European farmer took fourteen months. This long delay was widely criticised in Britain as well as South Africa. It eventually led Baring to commute the sentence to life imprisonment with hard labour, despite rejection of the appeal by the Privy Council. The increase of ritual murder in Basutoland then imparted a certain frisson to the question. Establishing a permanent appeal court for the Territories seemed like taking a sledgehammer to crack a fairly small nut, so the most obvious, practical and simple solution would be to allow appeals to the Union Appeal Court. Baring favoured this. He satisfied himself that Africans in the Territories had no objection. The Dominions secretary, Lord Addison, was more doubtful, but Jowitt, the lord chancellor, convinced him that there was at least no reason why Baring should not informally sound out the South African government; in any case he could not see an obvious alternative.[138] Malan's government were more than willing to offer the necessary facilities (December 1948). It emerged, however, during the detailed feasibility study, that there were legal doubts as to whether *alternative* options could in fact be made available, or whether use of the Union Court would become obligatory on all inhabitants of the Territories. This presented no problem as far as the Europeans were concerned, but it would not be right for the Africans. At this juncture (May 1949), Gordon Walker urged that the best and cheapest solution would be to establish not a permanent but an *ad hoc* appeal court for the Territories. This would nevertheless involve a degree of expenditure unacceptable to the high commissioner's office. Two other possibilities were therefore examined in 1949. However, one of these, a peripatetic colonial court, it was argued, would be 'hard on the judges' (though Gordon Walker riposted that it would not be any more arduous than the Assize Court in the time of Henry II); it was also queried whether it would be used by anyone else except the Falklands and St Helena. Resort to the appeal court of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was mooted, only to be eliminated as too big 'a slap in the face' for South Africa, who had after all offered facilities and still awaited a reply. It therefore seemed to boil down

either to using the Union Court or to doing nothing: precisely the policies most likely to be criticised at home. By mid-June Gordon Walker finally ruled out the Union option: 'we cannot possibly let appeals go to the Union Court', for it would be regarded by British public opinion as bringing Africans in the Territories within the ambit of *apartheid*.[139] This definitive change of view stemmed above all from two developments in the Union. The first cast doubt upon the independence of its hitherto respected judiciary. The report of the inquiry (May 1949) into the Durban riots, written by a South African Appeal Court judge, was described by Baring as 'simply a political essay in support of the Nationalist attitude to non-Europeans'. The second, even more dismaying, episode was the South African government's declaration of Seretse as a prohibited immigrant. This concentrated the mind as to what was at stake over an appeal court, for it meant that if Britain were using the South African court Seretse would have been unable to appear at any hearing in the Union concerning himself. In the CRO Sir Percivale Liesching (the permanent under-secretary) summed up the implications of these developments: the British parliament and public had become angry as well as vigilant where South Africa was concerned, and 'anything that is done by HMG which can be interpreted as a policy of appeasement or a weakening of our attitude towards the Union Government is now likely to be so interpreted and to meet with severe criticism and opposition'.[140] Just when every conceivable solution appeared to be impossible, Rees-Williams produced a suggestion which seemed clever enough at the time: why not enlarge the East African Appeal Court to cover the Territories? Although East Africa was some way away it was not as far as London, and air communications were good. Rather unexpectedly, however, the East African governors were uniformly suspicious and unco-operative. They all protested that their populations feared it would involve an extension of South African influence. This might not seem logical, but there could be no doubt about the strength of their opposition. Meanwhile the CO was considering the possibilities of a London-based colonial appeal court, which Baring was prepared to accept as an answer to the problem. The defect was of course the old one of the inherent delay and expense to appelants in such an arrangement. The way was now clear for the solution Gordon Walker had advocated all along, the *ad hoc* regional appeal court. All possible options having been unequivocally exhausted, he insisted that government had to accept the costs of establishing a special court for the Territories. In so far as this raised embarrassments in turning down the South African offer, the high commissioner would just have to brave out their reaction. It was in fact some little time before the new high commissioner (Sir John Le Rougetel) felt able to do this, but by 1952 it was done. The new appeal court was formally established in October 1954. In short: the British government went to a great deal of trouble and some expense to abandon the simple solution of using the Union Court, which had once seemed so obvious, and had to do so because British opinion had turned so much against South Africa that any other course was politically impossible. A principle of judicial decentralisation for regional superior courts emerged as a result, and separate appeal courts were eventually constituted for St Helena (1964) and the Falklands (1965).[141]

The dilemmas over South Africa were also mounting in the Commonwealth arena. Outspoken criticism of and opposition to South Africa might lead her to leave the Commonwealth, which would damage its credibility; whereas British criticism would please African countries – indeed it was actually becoming almost a necessary means

of validating Britain's good intentions towards them. Sir Thomas Lloyd complained of 'numerous and growing embarrassments' flowing from failure to denounce reactionary South African policies.[142] However, as early as 1952 Sir Charles Jeffries believed that if a choice had to be made, Britain would support 'a parti-coloured Commonwealth rather than South African membership'. This can hardly be represented as Conservative policy, but he might well have been stating what he took to be the logical conclusion of the Labour government's attitude.[143]

Commonwealth policy

The Commonwealth was taken seriously by the Labour government, and by Attlee more than anyone. Indeed, his chief governmental effort probably went into preserving and developing the Commonwealth as a flexible and evolving organism. Certainly the amount of time spent at Cabinet level on the future relations of India and Ireland to the Commonwealth was unusual (13–16, 388–393, 396–399, 401–403). Attlee saw it as a challenge to prevent the secession of newly independent states. Burma must be the last to leave, otherwise the loss of prestige generated by another secession would seriously diminish British world influence. More positively, as the CO saw it, 'an ever-widening circle of democratic nations exerting a powerful stabilising influence in the world' was highly desirable (72, para 7). The Commonwealth would have links with all parts of the non-communist world except Latin America. Bevin's attitude was ambivalent, but he came round to seeing the Commonwealth as principally a 'partnership between East and West', a weapon against communism, which, functioning as 'a smaller duplicate of the United Nations', could play a unique part in preserving the peace of the world.[144] However, it could never be a 'Third World Power' (ie, after Russia and the USA), because the attraction created by the pound sterling and the royal navy was now less strong than that of the dollar and the atomic bomb (152). The Commonwealth could acquire substance by promoting economic improvements in under-developed countries, but its cohesion might be ruined by disputes between members. The Labour government was alarmed by the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir after 1947, not just because of the implications of an interruption of jute supplies for packaging materials, but because proliferating chaos in the sub-continent would play into the hands of communism.[145] Until 1951 at any rate, Kashmir was felt to be the greatest weakness of the Commonwealth (162). South Africa was worrying in another way. It was not at all clear that she would accept the idea of an enlarged Commonwealth, especially one embracing multi-racial ideals. Malan indeed accused the British government of 'liquidating the Commonwealth' (432). A lot of thought was therefore given to the idea of instituting a 'two-tier' Commonwealth in order to preserve the old club-like relationship of the white members. In the end it was abandoned.[146] At the official level too, much work was done on formulating a policy for the smaller colonial territories which were not expected to proceed to self-government – a problem to which Attlee had first directed proper attention (405–411). The major difficulty with these territories was their sheer diversity: what had the Seychelles, the Falklands and Gibraltar got in common? Forward-planning for them was far from finished by 1951. The report of Sir Fred Rees was the base-line for future discussion (410). *Inter alia* it ruled out colonial representation at Westminster which the CO had examined in 1947 (58).

It was, however, India and Ireland which dominated ministerial attention. A

noticeable feature of the way they were handled was the determination to be friendly and practical. Noel-Baker was anxious to do everything they could to meet de Valera on revision of the British nationality law (380), avoiding 'forms of words which needlessly embarrass him, or are distasteful to Irish nationalists'.[147] Similarly, Gordon Walker advocated going as far as possible to meet India over an alternative to the term 'British subject'. The lawyers suggested 'citizen of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. Although Gordon Walker conceded that this term, though cumbrous, was the best formula and technically better than the Indian suggestion, 'my own strong inclination would be to go straight for "Commonwealth citizen" ', as the Indians wanted.[148] And this was done in the British Nationality Act, 1948, which the historian of the subject has described as a genuine attempt to emphasise shared rights in the Commonwealth: 'India, and Indians in the Commonwealth, had achieved a moment of equality'.[149] When the Irish government proposed to repeal the External Relations Act there was a good deal of misgiving in London. Eire seemed to put formal independence before the reunification of Ireland. Although in fact partition was not negotiable, if only for strategic reasons (381), the Labour government feared they would find it awkward to have to support partition positively and give Ulster the vigorous protection which would almost certainly be demanded. It seemed as if Eire was renouncing Commonwealth obligations while hanging on to many advantages in practice. There were also worries lest Britain be accused later of bad faith should the republic subsequently discover too many disadvantages in the new arrangements. Attlee was all for putting the implications squarely to the Irish and being as co-operative as possible. He suggested they should get some of Eire's ministers to come and discuss the practical difficulties with selected Commonwealth ministers. This would 'have the advantage of accepting the fact that Eire has decided on this step, but recognises that Eire does not want to cut herself off and brings the question down to practical rather than theoretical questions'. From consideration of actual practice he hoped that 'we might arrive at some conclusion on the constitutional arrangements'.[150] Regrets at the end of 'external relations' were swallowed and the Irish argument respected that, by removing 'the unreal situation' brought about by the Act, they genuinely hoped to develop friendlier and effective though informal relations with the Commonwealth. It was also realised that there would in any case be formidable practical difficulties if Britain did not continue to treat Eire (the republic of Ireland) as 'not foreign'.[151]

The argument about whether it was worthwhile trying to hold a republican India in the Commonwealth to some extent ran concurrently and was never far away during the first third of 1949. Some officials saw the attempt to accommodate India as a dangerous dilution of the Commonwealth (383). Indeed, many FO officials thought they should let India go. If India remained a member, it might jeopardise the closeness and devotion of the existing club. But if she departed – other advisers pointed out – this could be disastrous to prestige, to sterling, and to the British position in the United Nations and in South-East Asia, where an excluded India might form an anti-western bloc. Not to include her might be represented as a 'failure of statesmanship' exploitable by 'extreme nationalists' in colonies where self-government was planned. To the question 'would India be a satisfactory member?' Attlee gave a decisive answer: she was at least as satisfactory as South Africa was.[152] Attlee was determined to find a formula whereby republican India could remain in. His performance in leading ministers to that result was, as Gordon

Walker recognised, impressive: the prime minister 'drove the argument steadily forward' through successive committee meetings. Gordon Walker's line in support was 'let's fit India in as a republic based on the reality of a common act of will' (396, 399, notes). He proposed the 'headship' formula. When it was objected that this would not stand up in international law, Attlee and Cripps retorted: international law was made for the people and not vice versa, and so international law must adjust itself. The search was for the *slightest* form of Crown-link, something which made political rather than legal sense. (The legal–historical view is that 'headship' is 'pragmatic nonsense'.)[153] Thus Gordon Walker cut the Gordian knot. The problem was solved by side-stepping it – by declaring in effect that there was no problem; all members, as constitutional monarchies, could in a sense be regarded as 'republics' anyway. Meanwhile, in contrast to this admirably bold commonsense, Attlee had slipped tactically into some decidedly unpragmatic nonsense, making a personal appeal to Nehru to the effect that the Commonwealth was a projection of family life comparable 'with that of the Holy Family in the Christian world', who were not considered Jews, but as (for example) Welsh in Wales and Dutch in Holland. Nehru most politely declined to be moved by this kind of 'mystique', but he did eventually agree to India's remaining in the Commonwealth (385, 386). Once the Labour government had taken its decision on 'headship', Attlee left nothing to chance, dispatching personal representatives to each member-state in order to ensure their acceptance of the idea. Gordon Walker went to Pakistan and Ceylon, Sir Percivale Liesching to South Africa, Lord Listowel to Australia and New Zealand, Sir Norman Brook to Canada. The central role in enabling India's continuing membership was undoubtedly Attlee's, but he had been strongly supported by Gordon Walker and Norman Brook in working out the mechanics.[154]

With such an investment in the future of the Commonwealth it was perhaps inevitable that the pull from Europe was less than irresistible. At first there was caution but open-mindedness. Attlee summed up the views of the Economic Policy Committee on 26 January 1949 on the economic side:

> We should not embark on a policy of co-operation on the assumption that we were ready to extricate other countries from their difficulties at the cost of sacrificing ourselves. But we should be prepared to initiate a policy of multi-lateralism, and to take some risks, provided that the other countries were prepared to do the same. We must face the fact that co-operation would involve certain results which would be unpleasant to us; but we must accept these in the expectation of greater advantages in the long run.[155]

Europe, however, did not grow in attractiveness. By October 1949 the government's basic position was one of supporting European social and cultural co-operation, but not getting involved in the political and economic fields beyond the point of being able to disengage. They were trying to reconcile two aims. On the one hand, they saw the need to play a full, even a leading, part in revivifying Europe; the overriding need to resist communism meant they should not be too cautious or discouraging towards European unity. On the other hand, the Commonwealth had an important part to play in preventing the spread of communism, so they did not want to do anything to damage Commonwealth relations, and, 'almost equally important, our new relationship with the United States'. These considerations, Bevin argued, ensured that Britain must remain 'as we have always been in the past different in character

from other European nations and fundamentally incapable of whole-hearted integration with them' (154). In the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff it seemed unlikely that even an integrated Europe could ever be strong enough to resist Russian aggression alone. Accordingly, no excuse (such as a strong European federation) must be given to the Americans to retreat into isolationism. At a crucial Cabinet on 8 May 1950, Bevin stressed the supreme necessity of 'the closest co-operation with the United States and Canada', bringing in the New World 'to restore the shattered balance of the old', through a North Atlantic and not a purely European defence pact (156). Officials strongly supported the government's attitude towards Europe. The FO's Sir Roger Makins believed that if Britain were organically bound into Europe, 'we should soon lose our world position' (162). An officials' committee recommended rejection of the invitation to participate in the Schuman Plan for the integration of the French and German steel industries (157, 158). This invitation was regarded as far from warm or considerate, which underlined the feeling that it was much easier to do business with America and the Commonwealth than with Europe. In any case, the whole procedure of creating institutions, rather than letting them evolve through shared experience, made the pragmatic British feel uneasy. The natural priorities thus seemed to be to stick with the United States and the Commonwealth, and not to shift to Europe.

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The main focus of the present volume is upon central policy-making for the colonial empire, within the wider context of Commonwealth and international affairs. A preliminary opening chapter sets the scene by high-lighting those salient features of high policy for India, Burma and Ceylon, and for Palestine and Egypt, which had resonance for the subsequent transfers of power in the colonial empire. But there is no in-depth coverage of these or any other regions, which are covered by earlier documentary collections, or by the 'country' volumes (current and anticipated) of BDEEP itself (eg Malaya). Issues of foreign policy in the narrower sense are for the most part excluded from this volume, such as the post-war settlement in Europe, the Far East and the Pacific, the problem of the United States bases in the West Indies and elsewhere, the Guatemala boundary question, and the Anglo–Iranian oil crisis of 1951 (but see 36–38 on the latter). Bilateral relations between Britain and Commonwealth countries other than South Africa, or disputes between its member-states (such as that over Kashmir) are likewise not dealt with here, unless they involved some more general principle of policy as seen from the centre, for example the nature of the Commonwealth relationship in future, or its defence structure. To put matters more positively: the emphasis is on those colonial issues which had a contemporary as well as a long-term significance. Despite our concern to produce a selection of major documents (in the sense that the word 'major' would have been understood by officials and ministers at the time), it is not necessarily the case that substantive matters in the contemporary decision-making process, which took up substantial amounts of time, have been accorded that proportion of space which would accurately reflect the surviving quantity of paper about them. For example, the selected documentation on the Seretse Khama affair, the Tanganyikan

groundnuts project, and the combating of trypanosomiasis, has had to be ruthlessly pared down. Nothing has been included on (at one level) Colonial Service gradings, promotions or pensions, or (at another) on the scrutiny of estimates for colonial budgets or ten-year plans.

In these areas, the principles governing the density of selection have been the result of editorial judgment. Editors, however, have no control over the availability of material in the Public Record Office. A number of items have not yet been released to the public. No serious documentary coverage of policy towards the Falklands dispute is at present possible for this (or any later) period. Also, the withholding of the proceedings of the Africa Committee for 1950 and 1951 is regrettable; so too is the absence from the record of certain documents relating to defence, Hong Kong and Malaya. But whilst these gaps are unfortunate, they have not constituted a calamity for the present editor, nor created any insuperable difficulty in trying to reconstruct a reasonably full picture of the key issues of the time.

Despite these various limiting factors, the quantity of source material which remains available for selection here is formidable indeed. The central core of files on which this volume is based is made up of the conclusions and memoranda of the Cabinet and about a dozen of its committees, together with the prime minister's correspondence in PREM 8, and the CO supplementary 'secret' correspondence in CO 537, which alone has over 6,500 files. This central core is then buttressed by the geographical and subject class records of the CO. In addition, many other departmental files have been searched: DO, CRO, and FO, together with the papers of the Treasury, the Chiefs of Staff, the lord president's department and the ministry of food. With so many tens of thousands of files in the original data-base, it has clearly been impossible to examine them in their entirety. The procedure followed has been to inspect the lists provided in the Public Record Office for each series of chosen class files – or, in the case of those not yet listed (a not inconsiderable proportion of the CO records for the period 1945 to 1951), the registers of correspondence – and then call up for examination those files which from their listed titles may be adjudged of potential interest or relevance. The editor of a volume of this kind must be prepared to define 'interesting' and 'relevant' in very broad ways; allotted file titles can be misleading, and significant material may lurk in unlikely-looking places. It should be stressed that I began with as few presuppositions as possible. The shape of my collection is not dictated by starting with the existing secondary literature and then trying to illustrate or elaborate the preconceptions and themes it suggests; rather, I have by a process of archival total immersion let myself be led by the documentary record itself into a sense of what is significant. The method involves a fundamental examination of the records *de novo*.

Once the leading issues have been identified in this way, the next step is to decide which papers about them to eliminate and which to include. And as far as the detailed selection is concerned, what I have tried to do is to concentrate on the highest level of decision-making reached for any given issue (Cabinet decisions thus being valued highly); but also to provide some impression of steps in the evolution of policy and of the range of different types of document to which it gave rise. The selection therefore embraces scribbled ministerial minutes as well as formal reports and memoranda drafted by influential civil servants, contributions from unknown principal officers in the CO as well as famous proconsuls overseas; there is reflective assessment and forward-planning included as well as immediate reaction to crisis

and unexpected proposal. It has been a criterion for selection that a document should at least be meaty if it cannot be pithy; there is a premium on that which is concise but comprehensive, rather than the elusive, snippety, disconnected or rambling. On some themes there is a shortage of documents which are in this sense suitable for reproduction. A degree of unevenness in the coverage of particular subjects is thus unavoidable. The reader should also bear in mind that the publisher has imposed strict limitations on space. So every document has had to justify its selection in rigorous comparison with rejected alternatives. What is presented here, then, represents essentially a creaming-off of the 'best' 444 documents on colonial policy viewed overall for a six-year period.

Thus it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this collection is a *selection* of documents, covering only a small percentage of the surviving record within its field – the surviving record itself being only a proportion of the unweeded original files. It is also a selection made by one far from omniscient historian, even if he has laboured long (almost fifteen years), and lately had the good fortune to be part of a team whose members have frequently guided him towards fruitful material. My thanks to all my colleagues on the project.

Extracts from the Gordon Walker diaries printed in the introductory notes to two of the documents (396, 399) are quoted by kind permission of the Master, Fellows and Scholars of Churchill College, Cambridge.

R Hyam

Notes to Introduction

1 CAB 118/73, note on post-war colonial policy; see also PREM 8/59, Attlee to Sir S Cripps and Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 22 Dec 1945.

2 CAB 129/37/3, CP(49)245, annex A, 'The requirements of national defence', memo by A V Alexander, 18 Oct 1949.

3 CO 537/4589 (esp note by Creech Jones, Oct 1949); CO 537/5708; CO 537/5698; CO 936/56/6; CAB 129/24, CP(48)36; FO 371/107032, no 1; FO 371/107076, no 10; CO 859/142/1, memo by A H Poynton, 23 Feb 1948.

4 PREM 8/1486/2, MAL(C)(50)6, 21 Apr 1950; FO 800/461 & 462 for Bevin's interest in South-East Asia.

5 PREM 8/564, Attlee to Bevin, 2 Jan 1947, reprinted in *TOPI*, vol IX pp 445–446.

6 *TOPI* vol VII pp 889–900, memo by COS, 12 June 1946.

7 Dalton Papers, I/35, p 16, diary, 24 Feb 1947, repr in H Dalton, *High tide and after: memoirs, 1945–60* (London, 1962) p 211.

8 H Tinker, ed, *Burma: the struggle for independence* vol II *From General Strike to Independence, 31 August 1946 to 4 January 1948* (London, 1984) p 197, Sir H Rance to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 17 Dec 1946.

9 CAB 129/18, CP(47)144, memo by Creech Jones, 29 Apr 1947, repr in BDEEP series B, K M de Silva, ed, *Sri Lanka*.

10 PREM 8/1388/1, tel from Bevin to Lord Stansgate, 31 Aug 1946; PREM 8/1388/2, minute from Bevin to Attlee, 12 Nov 1946. See also BDEEP series B, D H Johnson, ed, *Sudan*.

11 BDEEP series B, A J Stockwell, ed, *Malaya*.

12 CAB 134/497, MAL (C)(50) & (51).

13 CO 822/444, minute by P Rogers, 3 Oct 1952.

14 BDEEP series B, J Kent, ed, *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East*.

15 CO 936/217, minute by Trafford Smith, 22 July 1952. Gordon Walker in a speech at Portsmouth (13 Oct 1951) declared: 'In all these difficult problems in the Middle East and Asia the essential thing is that we should keep our heads and understand the forces and factors at work. You can't take each problem by itself and try to solve it by blustering and blundering and threatening all the time to use force' (Gordon Walker Papers, GNWR 3/3, no 19).

16 For a diplomatic service perspective see FO 371/107032, no 1, Sir G Jebb to Mr Eden, 12 Jan 1953.

17 CO 847/36/4, no 27, speech by A H Poynton at United Nations, 3 Oct 1947.

18 CO 852/1053/1, Cambridge Summer School paper CSC(48)4.

19 CO 859/89/8, no 39, note, 16 Sept 1946.

20 CO 859/143/3, CP(African)1176, minutes of the African Conference, 29 Sept–9 Oct 1948, pp 32–35, 74–75; see also CO 537/6492, no 13, 'Notes on colonial constitutional changes, 1945–1950', Information Dept memo, Apr 1950.

21 CO 866/49, no 27, COOC 23, 23 Oct 1948.

22 CO 866/49; CO 866/50.

23 CO 847/36/1, S of S to African governors, 16 June 1947.

24 CO 795/156/45433/47, no 49, letter from A B Cohen to Sir S Gore-Browne, 25 Nov 1947.

25 CO 847/36/1, no 180, letter from G B Cartland to E E Sabben-Clare, 25 Nov 1947.

26 Quoted in R D Pearce, *The turning-point in Africa: British colonial policy, 1938–48* (London, 1982) p 179, from Mitchell diaries (Rhodes House, Oxford), 8 & 10 Nov 1947.

27 PREM 8/732.

28 CO 318/485/4.

29 CO 537/1437; CAB 129/17, CP(47)66, memo by Creech Jones, 3 Mar 1947.

30 CO 1015/107, minute by J E Marnham, 5 June 1952.

31 *Manchester Guardian*, 11 June 1943.

32 BDEEP series B, R Rathbone, ed, *Ghana*; see N Mansergh, ed, *Documents and speeches on British Commonwealth affairs, 1931–1952* vol II (Oxford, 1953) pp 1234–1267 for texts of Coussey Report and the 1950 Gold Coast Constitution.

33 CO 96/800/1, minute by Sir T Lloyd, 28 Sept 1949; minute by Cohen, 5 Sept 1949 (repr in R Rathbone, op cit, part 1, 53). Creech Jones minuted (15 Sept): 'Yes. I agree with Mr Cohen throughout . . .'. For Beresford Stooke's response, see no 44.

34 *ibid* no 41, tel from Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd, 1 Oct 1949.

35 *ibid* minute by Sir C Jeffries, 10 Oct 1949.

36 CO 618/87/1; CO 618/88/5.

37 FO 371/70191, minute on despatches from Sir A Clutterbuck, dated 7 Nov & 2 Dec 1947. For the Canadian terms, see Mansergh, ed, *Documents and speeches on British Commonwealth affairs* vol II pp 896–902.

38 CO 318/483/71295, no 55, 15 Sept 1948, quoted in D J Morgan, *The official history of colonial development* (5 vols, London, 1980) vol II *Developing British colonial resources, 1945–51* p 149.

39 CO 83/244/10, no 13, paper by J E Shuckburgh, May 1946.

40 CO 530/706/58330/1/49, report on Seychelles by C G Eastwood; CO 537/4887 (Virgin Islands); CO 537/6105; CO 537/7355.

41 CO 67/361/1.

42 CO 1015/144, no 15, tel from Sir G Rennie to CO, 20 Aug 1952.

43 FO 371/67083, no 10953, minute by A Watson, 16 Aug 1947; FO 371/72296, no 10104, minute by A Watson, 1 Sept 1948.

44 CO 537/7453, no 18, 20 July 1951, note on meeting with Sir A Wright.

45 CO 866/49, no 22, minute by A H Poynton, 30 Sept 1948.

46 CAB 128/4, CM 50(45), confidential annex, 6 Nov 1945; CM 57(45)3, confidential annex, 29 Nov 1945; CM 59(45), confidential annex, 5 Dec 1945.

47 Quoted in Dalton, *High tide and after* p 5. Shinwell was minister of fuel and power, Strachey minister of food.

48 CAB 129/20, CP(47)221, memo by Dalton, 30 July 1947.

49 CAB 129/42, CP(50)247, memo by Bevin and Gaitskell (DO(50)91), 23 Oct 1950. For Canada see CAB 128/16, CM 48(49)2, 25 July 1949.

50 P M Williams, ed, *The diary of Hugh Gaitskell, 1945–1956* (London, 1983) p 226 (10 Jan 1951).

51 CAB 128/17, CM 29(50)3, & CM 50(50)2, & CM 52(50)2, & CM 53(50); CAB 128/18, CM 87(50); CAB 128/19, CM 3(51)3, & CM 7(51)4.

52 CAB 128/10, CM 65(47)2, 29 July 1947.

53 CAB 134/221, EPC(49)7, memo by Creech Jones, 'Colonial development: Colonial Office organisation', 10 Feb 1949; CO 852/1052/3, no 22.

54 CAB 21/2278, minute M 333/47, Attlee to Bevin, 16 Sept 1947; CO 852/1052/3, no 22, CO letter to Dalton's private secretary, 6 Oct 1948.

55 PREM 8/923; CAB 134/216, EPC 18(48), 6 May 1948, & EPC 35(48)4, 9 Nov 1948; CO 537/3153, no 28, briefs for Anglo–French economic talks, by K E Robinson and Working Party, 6 Feb 1948; T 229/711.

56 CO 618/82/10, no 4, draft official despatch, 30 Nov 1946.

57 CO 866/49, no 23, COOC 19, paper on 'Colonial Office objectives and functions', 1948.

58 CO 852/1003/4.

59 T 223/17; T 161/1371/S 53997/1; T 161/1371/S 53997/2; T 161/1371/S 53997/3; CO 852/603/6; CO 852/603/7.

60 CO 852/913/2, no 72, press conference, 5 Feb 1947.

61 CO 852/603/6, minute [? 26 Oct 1946] by Creech Jones.

62 T 223/84; T 223/85; CO 852/912/4; CO 852/913/1; CO 852/914/1.

63 MAF 83/193, no 24 A, minute by Sir F Lee, 21 Oct 1949.

64 CAB 134/230, EPC(51)90, memo by Griffiths, 'Steel exports and colonial requirements', 26 July 1951.

65 CO 537/3631; CO 533/534/1.

66 CO 852/1003/4, minute by Cohen, 16 Apr 1948.

67 *DBPO* vol I pt IV (London, 1987) pp 27–28.

68 CO 618/85/1; CO 618/85/2; CO 618/86/3; CO 618/86/4.

69 CAB 134/67, CD 2(51)2, 15 Aug 1951; memo, 1 Aug 1951 (CD(51)12).

70 FO 800/445, ff 9 & 211; FO 800/483, f 60.

71 CAB 134/228, EPC 7(51)4, 3 Apr 1951. The members of the Colombo Plan were: UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines (Singapore was added later).

72 CO 854/184, Ministry of Information paper no 38 A, 19 July 1945.

73 FO 371/65589, no 8399, 24 Nov 1947; PREM 8/1439, Bevin to Attlee, 12 Jan 1951.

74 PREM 8/564, Bevin to Attlee, 1 Jan 1947, & Attlee to Bevin, 2 Jan 1947; repr in *TOPI* vol IX pp 431–433, & 445–446.

75 CO 537/1437, PMM 1(46), 23 Apr 1946; Dalton Papers, I/34, diary, p 13, 22 Mar 1946; DO 35/3737, no 39 (Wankie scheme).

76 *Foreign relations of the United States, 1955–1957* vol XVIII *Africa*, ed J P Glennon & S Shaloff (Washington, 1989) pp 15–20, 203–207.

77 Dalton Papers, I/36, diary, f 42, 15 Oct 1948.

78 CO 537/3151, minute [nd: 8 Jan 1948].

79 FO 371/67718, no 9727, 30 Oct 1947.

80 CO 537/4611, no 26, 12 Apr 1947.

81 CO 371/73039, no 5432, minute by Cohen, 25 June 1948 and draft CO memo on Anglo–French talks.

82 CO 859/143/3, CP(African)1176, pp 158–159.

83 G McGhee, *Envoy to the middle world: adventures in diplomacy* (New York, 1983) p 113 & ch 11, 'Developing an African policy' pp 114–133.

84 McGhee, *Envoy to the middle world* pp 215–216, 375.

85 CAB 131/1, DO 27(46), 16 Oct 1946.

86 CO 859/143/3, CP(African)1176; minutes of African Conference, 29 Sept–9 Oct 1948, pp 212–216; CO 537/2758.

87 DEFE 4/30, COS 69(50)6, confidential annex, 1 May 1950.

88 CO 537/6115, minute by I B Watt, 30 Aug 1949.

89 CO 968/198, minute 8 Apr 1949; CO brief for House of Lords debate, 13 Apr 1949.

90 DO 35/2962, tel from Bevin (in Colombo) to FO, 11 Jan 1950.

91 PREM 8/1145, minute 25 May 1948, & Sir R Glynn to Attlee, 12 Nov 1948; CO 537/5324, no 2, CO report on colonial police, 27 Feb 1950.

92 PREM 8/945, minute by Brook to Attlee, 12 May 1949.

93 Dalton Papers, I/37, diary, 1 June 1949, pp 24–25; see also p 34.

94 CAB 129/39, CP(49)73, CP(49)180, & CP(49)214.

95 CAB 128/5, CM 3(46)2, 8 Jan 1946; see also *DBPO* vol I pt IV (London, 1987) pp 27–28.

96 CO 537/2057 & 2058, esp minutes by J S Bennett (17 June & 13 Sept 1947) and Creech Jones (18 Mar 1947).

97 Dalton Papers, I/34, pp 10–11, diary, 9 Mar 1946.

98 CO 537/2081, no 47 B, to Mr Thomas, 1 Apr 1947.

99 CAB 134/594, ORC(45)21, memo by Bevin and Hall, 25 Aug 1945, & ORC 4(45)2, conclusions, 30 Aug 1945.

100 CO 537/1474, minute 30 May 1946.

101 CO 537/2082, minute by Galsworthy, 10 Oct 1947.

102 CO 537/2087, minute by Thomas, 24 July 1947.

103 DEFE 4/4, COS 64(47), 14 May 1947; DEFE 4/6, COS 106(47)1, 20 Aug 1947; DEFE 4/9, COS 156(47), 13 Dec 1947.

104 DEFE 4/11, COS 39(48)3, 17 Mar 1948; DEFE 4/33, COS 102(50)2, 1 May 1950.

105 DEFÈ 5/6, COS(47)227(O), 19 Nov 1947.

106 CAB 134/222, EPC(49)99, memo by Cripps, 26 Sept 1949.

107 DEFE 4/4, COS 59(47), 30 Apr, & COS 61(47), 7 May 1947; DEFE 4/38, COS 190(50)4, 1 Dec 1950 & JP(50)173, 9 Dec 1950.

108 DEFE 5/10, COS(48)74(O), 6 Apr 1948; DEFE 4/11, COS 39(48)3, 17 May 1948.

109 DEFE 4/10, COS 16(48), 2 Feb 1948, & COS 18(48), 4 Feb 1948; DEFE 4/11, COS 42(48)1, 19 Mar 1948.

110 DEFE 4/16, COS 136(48)2, 24 Sept 1948.

111 CAB 129/37/3, CP(49)245, memo by Attlee: 'Defence estimates for 1950–51', 8 Dec 1949, & annex, memo by Alexander, 'Requirements of national defence', 18 Oct 1949.

112 DEFE 4/17, COS 150(48)1, 22 Oct 1948, & COS 155(48), annex II, 4 Nov 1948.

113 CAB 131/1, DO 1(46), 11 Jan 1946.

114 DO 35/1207.

115 DEFE 4/15, JP(48)71, 3 July 1948.

116 CO 537/5324, no 2, 23 Dec 1949, minute M 292, 23 Dec 1949.

117 DEFE 4/36, COS 152(50)3, 20 Sept 1950; DEFE 4/37, COS 185(50)3, 24 Nov 1950; DEFE 4/39, COS 1(51)1, 2 Jan 1951.

118 CO 852/1052/3, African Conference 1948, address by Creech Jones, 30 Sept 1948, and paper no 9, AC(48)6; see also CO 852/1053/1, Cambridge Summer School, 1948, paper no 27.

119 CO 847/42/4; CO 847/43/3; CO 847/43/5; CO 847/53/3; CO 847/53/7.

120 CO 859/135/2, no 24, 25 May 1949.

121 CO 859/179/3, no 1, report on the West Indies, section X.

122 CO 967/51, paper by Creech Jones on 'Labour's colonial policy', 1950; CO 859/143/3, addresses by Creech Jones to the African Conference, 1948, CP(African)1176, pp 20–24, 212–216.

123 CO 847/41/5, S of S to Sir J Hall, 24 June 1949.

124 BDEEP series A, J M Lee & P B Rich, eds, *Colonial policy and practice 1924–1945*. For Tanganyika see CO 691/197/42259/5.

125 CO 859/89/8, no 30, EC 10/46; CO 859/176/4; CO 859/171/1, Mitchell to Creech Jones, 19 May 1949.

126 CO 927/116/2, no 3, 'Notes on colonial research'; CO 847/36/4, no 28.

127 CO 927/115/1.

128 CO 847/27/4, minute by Cohen, 22 Feb 1949.

129 CO 847/33/1, no 1; CO 847/35/4, no 7.

130 CO 927/116/1, minute by C G Eastwood, 4 Mar 1950.

131 CO 859/143/3, CP(African)1176, address by Creech Jones to the African Conference, 30 Sept 1948, pp 20–24; DO 35/3776, no 98.

132 CO 537/4612, 17 June 1949.

133 CO 537/5896.

134 DEFE 7/934, CRO memo on South Africa's foreign policy, 11 Apr 1950. The Malagasy revolt against French rule in Madagascar began in March 1947, and took over a year to suppress; 28 Europeans were killed.

135 DEFE 7/936, no 48, record of conversation between Brig C E R Hirsch and Maj-Gen Du Toit, 15 Feb 1951.

136 Poynton correctly predicted in June 1948 that the attitude of the new South African government to remaining in the Commonwealth was likely to be generally determined by the attitude of the UK to South

Africa in international conferences where African policy was discussed (CO 537/3477, minute 15 June 1948).

137 *TOPI* vol VIII, pp 859–860, Lord Pethick-Lawrence to Viceroy Wavell, 1 Nov 1946.

138 DO 35/1182/Y 993/2; DO 35/1182/Y 993/3, esp no 5. The incidence of *diretlo* murders (to obtain a magic 'medicine') reached a climax of 30 cases in 1947 and 1948 alone.

139 DO 35/4097, esp minutes by Gordon Walker, 31 May 1949, 7 June 1950, 22 Apr 1951, 28 May 1951, & no 61, letter to lord chancellor, 4 Jan 1951.

140 *ibid*, minute by Sir P Liesching, 6 June 1950.

141 *ibid*, esp minutes by Rees-Williams, 10 July 1950, & G H Baxter, 9 Nov 1950 & 2 June 1951, and J P Gibson, 1 May 1950 (no 32), & 6 Dec 1950; K Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and colonial law* (London, 1966) pp 430–432.

142 CO 936/217, Sir T Lloyd to Sir W Strang (FO), 9 Sept 1952.

143 CO 1032/10, minute by Sir C Jeffries, 21 Nov 1952; see also BDEEP series A, D Goldsworthy, ed, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957*.

144 CAB 131/1, DO 1(46), 11 Jan 1946.

145 For the Kashmir dispute, see PREM 8/1457; Gordon Walker Papers, GNWR I/6, diary, 4 Apr, 6 Apr & 21 Apr 1948; CAB 134/225, EPC(50)41, memo on Indo–Pakistan dispute, 24 Mar 1950; DO 121/23.

146 CO 537/7098; Goldsworthy, op cit.

147 DO 35/3531, minute by Noel-Baker, 11 Nov 1947.

148 DO 35/3532, no 308, minute by Gordon Walker to Attlee, 9 Apr 1948.

149 H Tinker, *Separate and unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920–1950* (London, 1976) ch 10 p 394. For the Act, see Mansergh, ed, *Documents and speeches . . . 1931–1952* vol II pp 949–979.

150 DO 35/3962, no 1 B, note by Attlee, 13 Oct 1948.

151 DO 35/3960, esp minute by W Dale, 13 Sept 1948; DO 35/3964; DO 35/3965, no 164.

152 PREM 8/950/3, minute [nd] on FO paper, 31 Jan 1949.

153 G Marshall, *Constitutional conventions: the rules and forms of political accountability* (Oxford, 1984) p 170.

154 PREM 8/950/3, Attlee to Nehru, 20 Mar 1949; CAB 21/2280, minute M 94/49 by Attlee, 3 May 1949.

155 CAB 134/220, EPC 5(49)2, 26 Jan 1949.

Summary of Documents: Part I

Chapter 1 Origins of the transfer of power

(1) High policy decisions: Indian Sub-Continent and Middle East, 1945–1947

NUMBER			*SUBJECT*	*PAGE*
1	Cabinet meeting CM 30(45)3	11 Sept 1945	Conclusions on Ceylon constitution; discussion of Soulbury Report	1
2	Cabinet meeting CM 38(45)6	4 Oct 1945	Conclusions on Middle East; future policy	2
3	Lord Soulbury to Mr Hall	5 Oct 1945	Letter giving his present views on self-government for Ceylon [Extract]	4
4	Cabinet meeting CM 46(45)4	26 Oct 1945	Conclusions on Ceylon, constitutional reform	5
5	Sir H J Huddleston (Sudan)	17 Apr 1946	Opening speech by gov-gen to the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan; future status of the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan [Extract]	7
6	Prime Ministers' meeting	28 Apr 1946	Minutes (confidential annex) about revision of Anglo–Egyptian Treaty; views of Field-Marshal Smuts	8
7	Cabinet meeting CM 57(46)1	6 June 1946	Conclusions on Anglo–Egyptian negotiations: treaty revision	10
8	Cabinet meeting CM 58(46)	7 June 1946	Conclusions on Anglo–Egyptian negotiations for revision of treaty	14
9	Mr Hall	8 July 1946	Cabinet memo, 'Long-term policy in Palestine'	17
10	COS Committee paper	10 July 1946	Cabinet memo on Palestine, 'Anglo–US report – military implications'	21
11	Cabinet meeting CM 67(46)4	11 July 1946	Conclusions on Palestine, report of the Anglo–American Committee	22
12	J S Bennett, J M Martin, Sir G Gater & Mr Creech Jones	30 Oct–21 Nov 1946	Minutes commenting on Sir D. Harris's assessment of international practicability of the partition of Palestine	26

NUMBER			SUBJECT	PAGE
13	Cabinet meeting CM 104(46)3	10 Dec 1946	Conclusions (confidential annex) on India; the constitutional position	31
14	Cabinet meeting CM 107(46)2	19 Dec 1946	Conclusions on Burma; the constitutional position	32
15	Cabinet meeting CM 108(46)	31 Dec 1946	Conclusions (confidential annex) on India; the constitutional position	34
16	Cabinet meeting CM 4(47)1	8 Jan 1947	Conclusions (confidential annex) on India; the constitutional position; revised draft statement about transfer of power	37
17	Mr Bevin	14 Jan 1947	Cabinet memo, 'Palestine'; the main policy options, + *Annex*: 'The present position'	39
18	Cabinet meeting CM 6(47)3 & 4	15 Jan 1947	Conclusions (confidential annex) on Palestine; military implications of future policy; political implications of future policy	44
19	Mr Creech Jones	16 Jan 1947	Cabinet memo, 'Palestine: future policy'	51
20	Cabinet meeting CM 11(47)2	22 Jan 1947	Conclusions (confidential annex) on Palestine; policy to be followed at resumed London Conference	55
21	Mr Bevin & Mr Creech Jones	6 Feb 1947	Joint Cabinet memo, 'Palestine' – self-government proposals	57
22	Cabinet meeting CM 18(47)2	7 Feb 1947	Conclusions on Palestine; future policy and progress of London discussions	60
23	Mr Bevin & Mr Creech Jones	13 Feb 1947	Joint Cabinet memo, 'Palestine' – submission of the problem to the UN General Assembly in September	63
24	Cabinet meeting CM 22(47)2	14 Feb 1947	Conclusions on future policy in Palestine; decision to refer to United Nations	66
25	Cabinet meeting CM 44(47)2	6 May 1947	Conclusions on Ceylon, constitutional development; Mr Senanayake's request for independence	70
26	Mr Bevin to Mr Creech Jones	20 May 1947	Letter about Ceylon policy	71
27	Mr Attlee	22 May 1947	Cabinet memo, 'Indian policy', proposed statement on partition	73
28	Mr Creech Jones to Mr Bevin	23 May 1947	Letter (reply) about Ceylon policy	74

NUMBER			SUBJECT	PAGE
29	Mr Bevin	18 Sept 1947	Cabinet memo, 'Palestine'; policy of withdrawal [Extract]	75
30	Cabinet meeting CM 76(47)6	20 Sept 1947	Conclusions on Palestine; the policy of relinquishing the Mandate and the line to be taken at the UN	76
31	Mr Bevin & Mr Creech Jones	3 Dec 1947	Joint Cabinet memo, 'Palestine'; attitude of HMG at UN [Extract]	79

(2) High policy decisions: Egypt and Persia, 1950–1951

32	Mr Bevin	12 Dec 1950	Cabinet memo, 'Egypt: defence', the present negotiations	80
33	Cabinet meeting CM 23(51)6	2 Apr 1951	Conclusions on Egypt; Anglo–Egyptian treaty negotiations	82
34	Cabinet meeting CM 24(51)3	5 Apr 1951	Conclusions on Anglo–Egyptian treaty negotiations	83
35	Cabinet meeting CM 39(51)4	31 May 1951	Conclusions on progress of discussions on revision of Anglo–Egyptian Treaty and future of the Sudan	86
36	Cabinet meeting CM 51(51)2	12 July 1951	Conclusions on Persia; action to be taken in Anglo–Iranian oil dispute	87
37	Mr Morrison (FO)	20 July 1951	Cabinet memo, 'Persia'; arguments for and against the use of force	91
38	Cabinet meeting CM 60(51)6	27 Sept 1951	Conclusions on Persia; the decisions not to use force to maintain British staff at Abadan and to refer the dispute to the UN Security Council	93

Chapter 2 Administrative plans, surveys and policy studies

(1) The new African policy

39	G B Cartland	[Jan 1946]	Memo, 'Factors affecting native administration policy'	97
40	A B Cohen	3 Apr 1946	Memo, 'Native administration policy; notes for further discussion'	103
41	Sir G Gater to Sir J Hall (Uganda)	22 May 1946	Letter about proposed general stock-taking of African policy	110
42	A B Cohen	28 Sept 1946	Memo, 'Native administration policy'	112

NUMBER			SUBJECT	PAGE
43	F J Pedler	1 Nov 1946	Minute on Cohen's memo about native administration policy	117
44	Mr Creech Jones to African governors	25 Feb 1947	Circular despatch on local government	119
45	Sir P Mitchell (Kenya) to Mr Creech Jones	30 May 1947	Despatch commenting on local government despatch, + *Annex*: note by the governor	129
46	A B Cohen to Sir J Hall	29 Oct 1947	Letter about local government in Uganda, + *Minute* by A B Cohen	142
47	A B Cohen	11 Dec 1947	Minute on response to local government despatch	145
48	G B Cartland	29 Dec 1947	Notes for draft statement of local government policy in Africa, + *Appendix*: notes by R E Robinson	148
49	R E Robinson (African Studies Branch)	[1947]	Memo, 'Some recent trends in native administration policy' [Extract]	153
50	Mr Creech Jones to African governors	13 Jan 1948	Circular despatch on progress in local government policy	158
51	Mr Creech Jones	19 Aug 1948	Opening address to the CO Summer Conference, Cambridge	162
52	Mr Creech Jones	18 Oct 1948	Cabinet memo, 'The African Conference' of officials and unofficials at Lancaster House	173
53	Sir N Brook (Cabinet secretary) to Mr Attlee	25 May 1949	Minute proposing an official Africa Committee	175
54	CO brief for Lord Hall (House of Lords)	13 Oct 1950	Notes on Lord Winster's motion on the appointment of a secretary of state for the colonial African empire	176
55	Sir T Lloyd & Mr Griffiths	7 & 13 Feb 1951	Minutes on matters arising from the House of Lords debate on Lord Winster's motion, 24 Oct 1950	180
56	R H Scott, J N Henderson, E H StG Moss, E J W Barnes & J G Tahourdin (FO)	9–12 July 1951	Minutes on increasing FO interest in African policy	181
57	Mr Griffiths	20 Aug 1951	Opening address to CO Summer Conference, Cambridge – local government [Extract]	183

NUMBER		SUBJECT		PAGE
	(2) African Governors' Conference, 1947			
58	Mr Thomas, Sir T Lloyd & Mr Creech Jones	18 Jan–30 May 1947	Minutes on proposed African governors' conference and the work of the preparatory committee	186
59	CO Agenda Committee on the Conference of African Governors (chairman: S Caine)	22 May 1947	Report of the Committee on the Conference of African Governors, + *Appendixes*:	190
			(i) Directive	198
			(ii) General political development	198
			(iii) Constitutional development	203
			(iv) Local government	214
			(v) Colonial Service	225
			(vi) Economic development	235
			(vii) Marketing policy	246
			(viii) Education policy	251
60	Mr Creech Jones to Mr Attlee	11 June 1947	Minute on proposed African Governors' Conference	260
61	African Governors' Conference, AGC 8	Nov 1947	Paper on public relations in the colonies, + *Appendix*: quotation from R G Casey	260
62	African Governors' Conference, AGC 12	Nov 1947	Paper on local government in Africa; conclusions of CO Summer School at Cambridge	269
63	African Governors' Conference, AGC 14	Nov 1947	Paper on race relations; conclusions of Summer School	278
64	African Governors' Conference, AGC 17	Nov 1947	Paper on the colonies and international organisations	281
65	African Governors' Conference meeting	Nov 1947	Draft minutes on education policy	292
66	African Governors' Conference, AGC 22	12 Nov 1947	Speech by Sir S Cripps (minister of economic affairs)	298
67	African Governors' Conference meeting	Nov 1947	Draft minutes on constitutional development in Africa	303
	(3) General colonial policy and administration			
68	Committee on Overseas Information Services	17 Aug 1946	Statement on the projection of Britain overseas	306
69	Sir R Furse	9 Nov 1947	Memo on Colonial Service recruitment and training, + *Minute* by Sir S Caine [Extract]	309

NUMBER			SUBJECT	PAGE
70	H T Bourdillon for CO Organisation Committee	10 May 1948	Note, 'Reflections on Colonial Office organisation' [Extract]	320
71	CO circular memo no 28	Mar 1949	Notes on British colonial policy + *Annex*: CO Information Dept circular (outline)	326
72	CO International Relations Dept	[May 1950]	Paper on 'The colonial empire today; summary of our main problems and policies'	334
			(i) The end in view	334
			(ii) The size of the job	336
			(iii) The main problems: brief review by regions	337
			(a) The African territories	337
			(b) South-East Asian territories	339
			(c) South West Pacific	348
			(d) The West Indies	350
			(e) The Mediterranean colonies	353
			(iv) Our position and difficulties as a colonial power in the United Nations	354
			+ *Annex*: some facts illustrating progress to date in the colonial empire	361
73	Sir C Jeffries	7 Aug 1951	Memo on need to improve co-ordination of colonial policy and inter-governmental communication	367

CHAPTER 1

Origins of the Transfer of Power

Document numbers 1–38

1 CAB 128/1, CM 30(45)3 11 Sept 1945
'Ceylon': Cabinet conclusions on constitution and discussion of the Soulbury Report

At their meeting on the 3rd September the Cabinet had authorised the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enter into confidential discussions with Mr. Senanayake[1] on the basis of the Soulbury Report.[2]

The Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (45) 164), proposing that on Mr. Senanayake's return to Ceylon he should take with him for confidential disclosure to his Ministers, but not for general publication, copies of the Soulbury Report, and that copies should also be made available to the India Office in order that the Governor-General might disclose them confidentially to his Executive Council at the same time as copies were given to the Ceylon Board of Ministers.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he had nearly completed his discussions with Mr. Senanayake, who would be leaving for Ceylon on the 17th September. It seemed clear that the proposals in the Soulbury Report would have a better chance of acceptance if it were shown confidentially to the Ceylon Board of Ministers before its publication, while, so far as the Government of India was concerned, a definite pledge had been given by his predecessor that, in view of their interest in minorities in Ceylon, they would have an opportunity of considering the proposals before His Majesty's Government accepted them.

In the course of the discussions which had taken place Mr. Senanayake had made it plain that the primary purpose of his visit was to request the grant to Ceylon of Dominion status. This was not the purpose for which he had been invited to come to this country and it was proposed to make it clear to him that His Majesty's Government adhered to the 1943 Declaration as the basis for the grant of a new constitution and were not prepared to grant any form of Dominion status.

In discussion the view was expressed that if the Soulbury Report were shown confidentially to the Ceylon Board of Ministers and the Governor-General's Executive Council, its contents would be bound to leak out. For this reason it was felt that it would be better to publish the report simultaneously in this country, in Ceylon and

[1] Don Stephen Senanayake, leader of Ceylon State Council and vice-chairman of Board of Ministers from 1942; first prime minister of Ceylon, 1947–1952.

[2] *Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform in Ceylon* (chairman, Lord Soulbury), Cmd 6677, 1945, see BDEEP series B, K M de Silva, ed, *Sri Lanka*.

in India. The publication of the Report did not mean that its recommendations had been accepted by His Majesty's Government and would not be inconsistent with the pledge that the Government of India would be given time to formulate their conclusions before His Majesty's Government reached a final decision.

With regard to the question of Dominion status for Ceylon, it was pointed out that, while there could be no question of accepting the claim put forward by Mr. Senanayake, it would be undesirable to make any pronouncement at all on this matter before the Cabinet had considered the recommendations in the Soulbury Report. In any event it did not lie with His Majesty's Government to grant or withhold Dominion status.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to arrange that the Soulbury Report should be published simultaneously in this country, in Ceylon and in India on the date on which copies were given to the Ceylon Board of Ministers and the Governor-General's Executive Council.

(2) Agreed that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should refrain from making any statement with regard to Dominion status for Ceylon in the course of his discussions with Mr. Senanayake.

2 CAB 128/1, CM 38(45)6 4 Oct 1945

'Middle East: future policy': Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (45) 174)[1] submitting recommendations on Middle East policy based on the discussions at the Conference held in September with British Representatives in the Middle East.

The Foreign Secretary said that, in his view, it was essential to broaden the basis of British influence in the Middle East by developing an economic and social policy which would make for pro[s]perity and contentment in the area as a whole. It would be the object of this policy to remedy the mal-distribution of purchasing power in the Middle East communities and to raise the standard of living of the masses of the people. The Middle East Supply Centre had, during the war, pursued a policy of economic co-ordination throughout the Middle East and the good work which it had started should not be lost. We had to face a threatening situation in Palestine, an agitation in Egypt for the withdrawal of our forces, and the difficulties with France in the Levant. If, however, we could promote economic development and social reform in the area these military and political problems would be more easily solved.

So far as concerned defence, the Chiefs of Staff were considering the possibility of basing in British territory, rather than in Egypt, the forces required for the protection of the Middle East. If this could be arranged, responsibility for the defence of Egypt could be shared by a common agreement which would leave with us the responsibility for the defence of the Suez Canal area.

With regard to the Levant his aim was to arrive at a clear-cut agreement which would finally remove French suspicions about our intentions in this area; and he had made some progress in discussions which he had held with M. Bidault[2] during the

[1] See part 3 of this volume, 275.

[2] G Bidault, French foreign minister.

Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed to pursue the matter further with the French Government alone before summoning a conference on the lines suggested in paragraph 5 (*c*) (iv) of C.P. (45) 174. M. Bidault had asked for our support for the proposal that France should obtain from the United Nations Organisation authority for a base in the Levant. He did not rule out the possibility of France's obtaining such a base when the time came for a settlement of the question of bases, but he had avoided giving in advance any pledge of British support for such a claim.

With regard to Persia, he had had an exchange of letters with M. Molotov[3] in which undertakings had been given that both the Russian and the British troops would be withdrawn from Persia, in accordance with the Treaty, before the 2nd March, 1946.

The following were the main points raised in discussion:—

(a) *The Minister of Fuel and Power*[4] drew attention to the recommendation in paragraph 5 (*b*) (iii) of C.P. (45) 174 that we should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into the Middle East. He hoped that the line which had been taken in the recent Anglo–American oil discussions would not be regarded as inconsistent with this recommendation.

It was generally agreed that there would be advantages in getting the United States to accept greater political responsibility in this area; and that on this account we should not resist their seeking further expansion of their oil concessions as contemplated in the recent discussions. *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to keep this point in mind.

(b) *The Chief of the Imperial General Staff*[5] said that the Chiefs of Staff were continuing to examine the problems of defence in the Middle East. While the Mombasa area was in many ways suitable as a base, there were difficulties with regard to road and rail communications and port facilities. A joint arrangement with the Government of Egypt on the lines indicated by the Foreign Secretary would be desirable from the point of view of the defence of the Suez Canal.

(c) *The Secretary of State for the Colonies* asked that the Chiefs of Staff should, in due course, submit a fresh appreciation of the strategic importance of Cyprus in the light of the review which they were making of the general problem of defence in the Middle East.

(d) *The Secretary of State for India* asked whether the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf would be a member of the British Middle East Conference recommended in paragraph 5 (*g*) (ii) of C.P. (45) 174.

The Foreign Secretary said that the inclusion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf as a member of the Conference might raise suspicions in Russia and that he would prefer that the interests of the Government of India in this area should be represented by that Government or by the India Office. He would, however, look into this point in consultation with the Secretary of State for India.

(e) *The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs* said that if the proposals were approved he would wish to convey them to the Dominions for their information.

(f) The question was raised whether the proposals in paragraph 5 (*h*) of C.P. (45) 174 would not unduly encourage a development of the Arab League which might prove a source of embarrassment to us. *The Foreign Secretary* said that he would see

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[3] V M Molotov, Soviet minister for foreign affairs.

[4] Mr E Shinwell.

[5] Sir Alan Brooke.

to it that relations with the League were kept on an informal basis.

(g) *The Secretary of State for the Colonies* said that he was anxious to offer any assistance in his power, although it was doubtful whether the Colonies could make much of a contribution in the way of technical experts.

(h) *The Minister of Labour and National Service*[6] asked whether it was desirable that His Majesty's Government should support the view that the proposed International Labour Office Middle East Regional Conference should be held at an early date.

The Foreign Secretary said that it would be preferable to defer any such conference until further progress had been made with the proposals which he had made.

(i) *The Foreign Secretary* said that in constituting the British Middle East Conference proposed in Section K of the Report annexed to C.P. (45) 174 he would propose to defer including His Majesty's Minister at Beirut until such time as French suspicions about British intentions in the Levant States had been allayed.

The Cabinet:—

Approved, subject to the points noted above, the recommendations on Middle East policy, and on the machinery required to give effect to that policy, which were put forward by the Foreign Secretary in C.P. (45) 174.

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[6] Mr G A Isaacs.

3 CO 54/986/6, no 174 — 5 Oct 1945

[Ceylon]: letter from Lord Soulbury[1] to Mr Hall, giving his present views on self-government [Extract]

. . . My own personal opinion is that H.M.G. should now go considerably further in the direction of giving self-government to Ceylon than the Commissioners recommended. There would, of course, be the risk of mis-government and there would be opposition from the minorities in the State Council, despite the difficulty that some of them would have in explaining away their votes on the Sri Lanka Bill. I should not expect serious protests from the Muslims; and whatever further powers of self-government are conceded to Ceylon, whether to the extent of Dominion status or short of it, there will be antagonism from the leaders of the Ceylon Tamils who profess themselves to be content with nothing less than equality of representation for the minorities, both in the Legislature and in the Executive. The Commissioners found themselves quite unable to agree to that.

Provided that the safeguards which we recommended for the minorities are embodied in any new constitution, I do not myself believe that H.M.G. could do much more to protect them.

I realize that the immediate grant of Dominion status to Ceylon may be premature and the risk too great; and there may be other cogent factors of which I am unaware. It is evident that Mr. Senanayake also realizes this, for in preparing and submitting the draft of a new constitution he has indicated his willingness to accept a good deal

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[1] H R Soulbury, Baron, Conservative MP for Lancaster, 1929–1941; president of Board of Education, 1940–1941; chairman of Ceylon Commission, 1944; gov-gen of Ceylon, 1949.

less than Dominion status. On the lines of his draft, I have little doubt that he could get a new constitution through the State Council and I am of opinion that H.M.G.'s proposals should be framed as nearly as possible to meet his views. To do so would admittedly confer upon Ceylon considerably wider powers of self-government than the Commission felt itself able to recommend, but in view of the change in the political atmosphere of Ceylon and in Mr. Senanayake's personal position to which I have alluded, and the defeat of Japan, I think that the wider powers for which Mr. Senanayake asks should be conceded.

As a protection for the minorities H.M.G. might consider the desirability of repeating the condition imposed by the Declaration of 26th May, 1943, i.e. that Mr. Senanayake's proposals should receive the approval of three-quarters of all members of the State Council of Ceylon excluding the Officers of State and the Speaker or other presiding officer.

When we were in Ceylon no reference to this condition was made by any of the witnesses, majority or minority, and we did not think fit to include it in our recommendations because the constitution to be based upon our Report was not a constitution devised and submitted by the Ceylon Ministers. This consideration does not apply with the same force to Mr. Senanayake's draft constitution and I do not think that he could resist the condition.

It seems to me that a great opportunity has now arisen to make permanent the good feelings that exist in Ceylon towards Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, and to cement the loyalty of the Island to the British Crown. It is an opportunity that may not present itself again. Certain parallels can be drawn between Ceylon and Ireland. Many of the Ceylonese resemble the Irish in temperament and intelligence and like the Irish they have long memories. It would be a tragedy to repeat in Ceylon any of the colossal mistakes we have made in Ireland. The treatment of South Africa by the Liberal Government of 1906 is a much happier example. To hit the golden mean between caution and magnanimity is perhaps impossible but I believe that in the long run giving too much and too soon will prove to be wiser than giving too little and too late.

4 CAB 128/1, CM 46(45)4 26 Oct 1945

'Ceylon': Cabinet conclusions on constitutional reform[1]

The Cabinet had before them a report by the Chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee (C.P. (45) 244) on constitutional reform in Ceylon.

The Lord Privy Seal[2] recalled that at their meeting on the 11th September the Cabinet had approved the publication of the Soulbury Report. The Report had been published on the 9th October, and it was desirable that a statement defining the Government's attitude towards its recommendations should be made without delay. The Colonial Affairs Committee proposed that the draft statement annexed to C.P. (45) 244 should be published forthwith as a White Paper in this country and in Ceylon. In his conversations with the Colonial Secretary Mr. Senanayake had made it clear that, now the war was over, the Ceylon Ministers were no longer willing to

[1] Previous reference: see 1.

[2] Mr A Greenwood.

proceed on the basis of the 1943 declaration on the reform of the Ceylon constitution and wished to press for the grant of Dominion status; and it was doubtful whether, without some concession by His Majesty's Government which would demonstrate that his mission to London had not been fruitless, Mr. Senanayake would be willing to sponsor the Soulbury recommendations before the Ceylon State Council. The Colonial Affairs Committee had accordingly felt that the proposed statement of policy should include a promise that six years after the introduction of the new constitution the Government would initiate a further review of the constitutional issue in consultation with the Ceylon Government. The object of this review would be that Ceylon should take her appropriate place in the Commonwealth with full internal self-government under a constitution on Dominion lines.

In discussion the following points were raised:—

(a) Past experience had shown that a promise to take a further step forward in constitutional reform after a fixed period of years was likely to create unwillingness to give a fair trial to the constitution in force in the interim period. The proper road towards the achievement of Dominion status was by the gradual development of new constitutional practice in the working of existing institutions.

A promise of a review after a period of six years was also open to the objection that the question of constitutional reform would be a major issue in the general election which would be due to be held five years after the present reforms were introduced.

Paragraph 10 of the draft statement annexed to C.P. (45) 244 should be recast so as to make it clear that our objective was to enable Ceylon to attain Dominion status, but that this objective could be reached only through the evolution of the capacity for self-government based on the practical working of the reformed constitution now offered. The statement should not imply that a further instalment of constitutional reform would follow after a fixed period, irrespective of the progress made.

The First Lord of the Admiralty[3] asked that, in recasting this part of the statement, special attention should be given to the probable need for reserved powers in respect of defence and foreign policy.

(b) The last sentence of paragraph 12 of the draft statement of policy, which made it clear that His Majesty's Government did not regard themselves as bound by the provision in the 1943 declaration that there should be a three-quarters majority of the Council in favour of the reforms, seemed to be inconsistent with the earlier part of the paragraph. If His Majesty's Government did not intend to be bound by this condition there was no point in referring to it, and some other formula to secure the protection of the minorities should be devised.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was willing to omit any reference to the three-quarters majority.

(c) *The Secretary of State for India* drew attention to paragraph 6 of C.P. (45) 244, which set out the views of the Government of India on the Soulbury Report. These views had been fully considered by the Colonial Affairs Committee and he did not feel that he could press them further. At the same time, he was bound to point out that the proposals were looked upon in India with considerable misgiving.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he had good hope that, now the war was over, some of the points at issue between the Government of India and the Government of Ceylon would be settled by direct negotiation.

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[3] Mr A V Alexander.

The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that the new constitution for Ceylon should follow the general lines proposed by the Soulbury Commission.
(2) Invited the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Lord Privy Seal, the President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to reconsider paragraphs 10 and 12 of the proposed statement of policy in the light of the points made in discussion.

5 FO 371/53252, no 1743 17 Apr 1946

[Sudan]: opening speech by Sir H J Huddleston[1] to the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, on future status [Extract]

. . . Before we proceed to the Agenda with which this Council has been specifically called to deal I feel it is due to you that I should make reference to the Political situation. Some of your number have asked for an opportunity to be given you now for a formal debate on the future status of the Sudan. This request has been most carefully considered by me and by my advisers and I have decided that the time for a formal debate has not yet come. Both His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government have announced their readiness to discuss the revision of the Treaty and have appointed their representatives for the purpose but those representatives have only just assembled and preliminary conversations have only just begun. I assure you once again that the question of your future will not be decided without your advice. Since we last met the Condominium Governments have both endorsed my assurance. Egyptian Government spokesmen have said that the aspirations and hopes of the Sudanese will be considered in any settlement. The British Government, through their Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bevin, have categorically stated that they consider that no change should be made until the advice of the Sudanese has been sought through constitutional channels such as this Council. When the time comes, therefore, this Council will be summoned to give its views.

I would, at this time, draw your attention to two other phrases in Mr. Bevin's speech. He referred to the objects of the Sudan Government as being to build up the organs of self-Government with the aim of eventual independence and to accelerate the transfer of responsible posts to Sudanese in consultation with Sudanese representatives. I wish to take this opportunity of declaring again that these are fundamental objects of the Sudan Government policy and to announce to you the following methods of attaining them more quickly, which I intend to put into practice at once.

With regard to the former, I propose to call a conference forthwith, at the close of this session under the chairmanship of the Civil Secretary, to study the next steps in associating the Sudanese more closely with the Administration of their country. The recommendations of this conference will be laid before you at your next session for full discussion and consideration.

Secondly, as regards accelerated Sudanisation you will perhaps have noticed in the public press that I have set up a joint British and Sudanese Committee of Civil

[1] Gov-gen, 1941–1947.

Servants to enquire into the present plans for Sudanisation and to make recommendations as to how they may be accelerated. I hope that this Committee will prepare a scheme in carefully defined stages, designed to show the expected progress of Sudanisation. This Committee or a similar body will remain in existence and meet at regular intervals to review progress. I have recently discussed the question with many Heads of Government Departments and have urged them to speed up the process without waiting for the Committee to submit their plans.

I wish definitely to deny any suggestions that the Sudan Government is unsympathetic to Sudanese aspirations. The Government is aiming at a free independent Sudan which will be able as soon as that independence has been achieved to define for itself its relations with Great Britain and Egypt. There is much to be done; hard thinking and hard work lies ahead; but with good will and a cessation of political upheavals I see no reason why even in the short space of the next five years a great advance should not be made; and in the ensuing five when our educational developments have gained a further impetus, progress should be sufficiently rapid to satisfy everybody except our most extreme critics.

I feel confident that in twenty years' time the Sudanese will be governing their own country assisted and advised by a certain number of non-Sudanese specialists and technicians. These dates, of course, are only estimates but when we meet again to discuss the views of the Conference which I have just announced to you, I hope that a more definite timetable can be given.

The achievements of the Sudan Government have been very great, they have been acclaimed in many parts of the world; they are well known to you all; you should have confidence based on what has been done and on what you have seen in the past that the Government will continue on the task it has set itself, that is to establish an independent Sudan. The best help that you can give in this task is to co-operate in every way you can with the Government in achieving it . . . .

6 PREM 8/1388/1, PMM 6(46) 28 Apr 1946

'Revision of Anglo–Egyptian Treaty': minutes (confidential annex) of meeting of prime ministers discussing the views of Field-Marshal Smuts[1]

Field-Marshal Smuts said that he had been greatly concerned to hear that His Majesty's Government were proposing, at the outset of the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, to offer to withdraw all British troops from Egypt. For years past Egypt had been considered a vital link in the British chain of communications through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. The British Commonwealth, unlike the other two great Powers of to-day, depended for its power and influence on its communications; and the position which we had held for years in Egypt, at the very centre of those communications, should not be cast away without anxious consideration.

Mr. Bevin said that His Majesty's Government had originally intended to propose that all British troops should be withdrawn from Cairo and Alexandria and that

[1] Prime minister of South Africa, 1939–1948.

combatant troops should be withdrawn from other parts of Egypt, leaving only the administrative troops required for the maintenance of a base in the Canal Zone. They had, however, been advised that, in view of the very strong political feeling on this point in Egypt, the Egyptian Delegation would be obliged to reject such a proposal. The truth was that we had retained our troops for too long in Cairo and Alexandria, and had provoked strong nationalist feelings which would not now be satisfied with anything short of an offer of complete evacuation. The British Delegation had, however, advised that, if an offer of complete withdrawal were made at the outset of the negotiations, this would create an atmosphere in which it would be much easier to conclude satisfactory arrangements under which British troops could rapidly take up positions in Egypt on a threat or outbreak of war. It was in these circumstances that His Majesty's Government had authorised the British Delegation to offer complete withdrawal by specified dates, viz., the evacuation of Cairo and Alexandria by 1948 and complete withdrawal by 1951.

Field-Marshal Smuts said that, while he agreed that British troops should be withdrawn from Cairo and Alexandria, he thought it important that the British Commonwealth should maintain a military base elsewhere in Egypt. Such a base, if it was to be effective, must be established and maintained in peace; it could not be improvised on the outbreak of war. It should not be forgotten that the British Commonwealth had won the last war in the Mediterranean—in campaigns based on their prepared positions in Egypt.

During his stay in Cairo in the last few days he had discussed this matter with the King of Egypt. He had told him that South Africa had faced a similar problem in the past. They had wished to terminate the régime under which United Kingdom troops and installations were scattered throughout South Africa; and they had done so by offering Simonstown as a military and naval base for use by United Kingdom troops in peace and in war. By that means South Africa had secured her objective of the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from all other parts of her territory, and at the same time the essential needs of the United Kingdom had been met.

Field-Marshal Smuts said that this seemed to have made a deep impression on the King, and he had subsequently spoken in similar terms to Sidki Pasha.[2] The latter had raised the objection that, as the British already had bases at Malta, Haifa and Cyprus, they had no need of further bases in Egypt. To this the Field-Marshal had replied that Egypt was a nodal point in the British line of communications through the Mediterranean and that, in his view, a British base in Egypt was essential to the defence of the British Commonwealth.

Mr. Bevin said that His Majesty's Government were as anxious as Field-Marshal Smuts that the British Commonwealth should retain appropriate military facilities in Egypt. They had been advised that, so long as they indicated their readiness to agree to the complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, the Egyptian Government would probably be willing to agree to arrangements which would enable us to maintain installations on their territory in such a condition that British troops could be rapidly reintroduced on a threat of war. They had, however, been advised that it would be inexpedient to seek to secure concessions on bases as a condition of evacuation. If we had sought to force through our original proposals, disorder would have broken out in Egypt and we should probably have had to maintain our position

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[2] Prime minister of Egypt.

there by force. The resulting situation would have been brought before the Security Council, on the basis that we were retaining British troops in foreign territory against the will of the local Government. If, however, we approached the matter by first offering complete evacuation, as a concession to political feeling in Egypt, there were good prospects that we should be able subsequently to arrive at satisfactory agreements in respect of our essential military needs. In any event, we were not offering to complete the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt until 1951.

Field-Marshal Smuts said that he was gravely concerned at the risks which were being run. Even though the concession of a base were not made a condition of withdrawal, he would greatly prefer that the two agreements should be made simultaneously; and he still hoped that it might be possible to secure at an early stage satisfactory assurances about the retention of the military facilities required by the British Commonwealth in the Canal Zone.

7 CAB 128/5, CM 57(46)1 6 June 1946

'Anglo–Egyptian negotiations': Cabinet conclusions on treaty revision

The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (46) 219) on the negotiations for a revision of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty.

The Foreign Secretary said that this memorandum had been prepared after discussion with the Secretary of State for Air and his advisers who had returned from Cairo. It was clear that the Egyptian Delegation would not agree to embody in a new Treaty clauses giving us the right on a threat, or actual outbreak, of war to send troops into the country or to have military facilities of the type given by the 1936 Treaty. Nor would they be ready to include the alternative provisions which we desired regarding the maintenance of installations and facilities in time of peace. Their attitude was that we could obtain the substance of our requirements through the medium of staff conversations and agreements between the military authorities. It was now for the Cabinet to consider whether or not we should be prepared to accept something on these lines. He realised the dangers of acceptance. At the same time, he felt that in practice the implementation of any defence scheme short of the peacetime occupation of the country by our forces (which we had agreed must come to an end) was dependent on Egyptian goodwill. He had therefore attempted, in Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the draft Treaty annexed to his memorandum, to provide for consultation on defence matters through the medium of a Joint Defence Board on the analogy of the United States–Canada Defence Board. A protocol would be attached to the Treaty providing for the terms of the evacuation and Articles III and IV of the draft of this protocol, which was also attached to his memorandum, provided for the evacuation to be co-ordinated with the plans for the future to be drawn up by the military Staffs.

The Foreign Secretary said that his draft Treaty was an adaptation of an earlier draft to which Sidky Pasha had personally agreed, and he thought that the proposal now introduced for a Joint Defence Board might also appeal to the Egyptians. While the first reaction of the delegation had been unfavourable, the King had been attracted by it. On the one hand it would carry with it no implication of inferiority and, on the other hand, it would give Egypt an assurance regarding her own defence.

In drafting these Articles he had had it in mind that Egypt might herself be

associated under the Covenant of the Arab League with other Arab States in a regional security organisation and that our association with her in a Joint Defence Board might open the way to association with that regional organisation. He had also had it in mind that agreement on these lines might form a useful precedent in the negotiation of a Treaty with India.

The Secretary of State for Air[1] said that, having discussed matters fully with every member of the Egyptian delegation, with the King and with many prominent Egyptians, he had no doubt whatsoever that the Egyptians were unanimously of the opinion that the new Treaty could not include provisions which would appear to place Egypt in a position of inferiority. They were, however, perfectly ready to consider any proposal for a Treaty between equals.

The Secretary of State pointed out that the 1936 Treaty only entitled us to keep forces in Egypt for the defence of the Canal. During the war we had enjoyed facilities far in excess of these and we still maintained in the country a large headquarters organisation and air bases for long-range attack. He understood that we now had some 200,000 troops* in the country, in addition to 100,000 prisoners of war. We could not pretend that the existing Treaty entitled us to all the facilities we now enjoyed and we could not expect to obtain recognition of them in the present negotiations. The only argument we could use to persuade the Egyptians to cede them to us in the Treaty was that we enjoyed them at the moment and would not willingly give them up. The Cabinet must realise that the alternative to a Treaty on the lines now proposed would be an Egypt united in hostility to us and supported by the Arab world.

The very large number of British troops at present stationed in the centre of Cairo and Alexandria was, understandably, a constant irritant to the Egyptian public; and it was of the greatest importance that, without waiting for the result of the negotiations, as many as possible of these troops should be moved as soon as possible either out of the country or to some place where they would be less conspicuous. It should be possible in a matter of a few weeks to hand back to the Egyptians buildings in the centre of Cairo at present occupied by us, for instance, the Citadel, and the more than [? that] could be made of any such gesture the better.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff[2] said that the Chiefs of Staff had not yet had time to consider the Foreign Secretary's draft as fully as they would wish. When the proposal had been made that we should agree to evacuate Egypt, the Chiefs of Staff had understood that we had hoped to obtain complete freedom to return in an apprehended emergency. It now appeared, however, that we were not to obtain even this. He felt that we had embarked on a slippery slope of concessions. Our first concession, designed to secure the goodwill of the Egyptian negotiators, had not been successful. It was now suggested that we should make a second. Was there any assurance that it would be successful either? He could not but remember the analogy of the Irish ports.

In his view, the proposals for a Joint Defence Board gave us no firm assurance. The Board could only "advise and recommend" action to the two Governments. It might well be that the advice of the Egyptian members of the Board would carry little

* See later comments on this figure by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in C.M. (46) 58th Conclusions.[3]

[1] Lord Stansgate, leader of the British delegation. [2] Now Lord Alanbrooke. [3] See 8.

weight with their Government. Moreover, any agreements made would not be published, and there would be nothing to prevent a future Government from refusing to implement them.

Finally, he emphasised that in the conditions of modern war it was more than ever important for defence purposes to be ready with our defence preparations before the outbreak of war. Article 5 of the draft Treaty gave us no guarantee that those essential preparations could be made.

The discussion which followed turned mainly on the question whether it would be practicable to persuade the Egyptian Government to accept Treaty provisions which laid on them specific obligations to give us military facilities on a threat, or actual outbreak, of war. There was general agreement that it would be advantageous if specific provisions on these lines could be included in the Treaty. Ministers felt, however, that the question now at issue was, not what we should like to see included in the Treaty, but what we could persuade the Egyptian Government to accept. And all concerned in the negotiations at Cairo were satisfied that there was no practical possibility of persuading the Egyptian Government to accept a Treaty containing provisions on the lines of Article 7 of the Treaty of 1936. There was indeed good reason why the Egyptian Government, from their point of view, should be unwilling to accept such a provision. Their acceptance of these obligations would mean that, by our own action, we could at any time involve them in war. Our self-governing Dominions would not accept such a position: they insisted on reserving an independent right to decide whether they would join in any war in which the United Kingdom became involved. Yet they had all the common ties implied by membership of the British Commonwealth. Why should Egypt, which was an independent State, accept obligations which were not undertaken by the Governments of the British Dominions?

As against this it was suggested that, though Egypt was an independent State, her defence interests were the same as ours, and it was her geographical position rather than any Treaty obligation which would implicate her in any war in which we were involved. It was pointed out, however, that these arguments could be applied to Holland and Belgium; but it was not contended that on this account the Governments of those countries should accept Treaty obligations giving us military facilities in their territory for the defence of British interests.

It was further argued that, if we stood out for specific Treaty provisions authorising the maintenance in Egypt of the military facilities which the Chiefs of Staff now had in mind, we should be asking for more than had been guaranteed to us by the terms of the 1936 Treaty. We had in fact established larger installations, and maintained more troops, in Egypt than was justified by the letter of that Treaty. The facilities which we had secured in Egypt had been gained by the goodwill of the Egyptian Government and went far beyond the specific obligations assumed by them under the Treaty of 1936. To this extent past experience suggested that it was preferable to rely on good relations with Egypt rather than the precise words of a Treaty provision.

It was also to be remembered that the Treaty of 1936 had been negotiated when Egypt lay under the threat of Mussolini's imperialism. That threat had now passed; and, as the Treaty itself contemplated revision after ten years, it was natural that the Egyptians should expect us to be willing to negotiate a new Treaty which involved them in lighter obligations. The fact was that we could not expect now to negotiate a

new Treaty which laid upon the Egyptian Government the same obligations as those which they had been willing to assume in 1936. If we decided to take our stand on the terms of the 1936 Treaty, we could not expect to secure, without the goodwill of the Egyptian Government, the same military facilities which we had been able to secure in the past. And if we attempted to maintain our position in Egypt by force, it was to be assumed that the resulting situation would be brought to the notice of the Security Council. It was in these circumstances that our advisers in Cairo suggested that we should refrain from pressing our demand for specific Treaty provisions about military facilities and should rely on the goodwill which we should thus win to secure by informal arrangements the assurance we needed that military facilities would be accorded to us in Egypt on a threat, or actual outbreak, of war.

At the same time, it was recognised that it would be desirable, if possible, to strengthen the provisions of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the new draft Treaty. Thus, it might be possible to strengthen the drafting of Article 4 so as to secure a greater measure of assurance that the recommendations and advice of the Joint Defence Board would be accepted and implemented by the two Governments.

The Foreign Secretary said that he was not committed to the wording of the present draft and would be glad to consider any amendments which could be devised for this purpose.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs suggested that it might be useful to study the precise terms of the agreement between the United States and Canada for the setting up of their Defence Board.

The Lord Chancellor[3] suggested that the Egyptian Government might perhaps be willing to accept a provision to the effect that in the event of a threat, or actual outbreak, of war the Egyptian Government should notify His Majesty's Government and the latter should be under an obligation to come to their assistance.

Points in further discussion were:—

(a) *The Foreign Secretary* recommended that we should be ready to bear the cost of building the temporary accommodation we should need in the Canal zone. Under the 1936 Treaty the Egyptian Government should already have built this accommodation, but this had not been done and he did not think it would serve any useful purpose to endeavour to persuade them to pay for it now.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed with this view. At the same time, he reminded the Cabinet that Egypt was the second largest holder of sterling balances, about which there would have to be negotiations later on. We should not, therefore, be unduly generous in these negotiations, but should endeavour to ensure that the Egyptians paid a fair price for installations and equipment which were to be handed over to them.

(b) Articles I and II of the draft protocol contemplated that specific dates would be prescribed for the various stages of the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. What were the dates which were to be inserted in these two articles?

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that it would probably be possible to complete the first stage of the evacuation within about a year, particularly if an early decision could be taken as to the future site of the Middle East headquarters.

The Foreign Secretary said that the Egyptian Government were not likely to be

[3] Lord Jowitt.

content with so long a delay. We should, in his view, aim to have completed this stage at the latest by March 1947.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff to consider what amendments could be made in the new draft Treaty and protocol annexed to C.P. (46) 219 with a view to meeting the points which had been raised in the discussion.

(2) Agreed to resume their consideration of the Foreign Secretary's memorandum at a further meeting on the following day.

8 CAB 128/5, CM 58(46) 7 June 1946

'Anglo–Egyptian negotiations': Cabinet conclusions on treaty revision[1]

The Cabinet resumed their discussion of the memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (C.P. (46) 219) regarding the negotiations for a revision of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty. They also had before them a report by the Chiefs of Staff (C.P. (46) 224) commenting on the proposals in C.P. (46) 219.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the Chiefs of Staff could not regard the proposed Joint Defence Board as an adequate safeguard for our minimum military requirements. There was no reason to believe that the Egyptian military representatives on the Board would be competent or would carry any weight with their own Government; and, under these new proposals, even more than under the proposals already put to the Egyptian delegation, it would be a gamble whether the Egyptians would, in fact, give us the facilities that we required. From the military point of view the Chiefs of Staff must therefore advise that the new proposals were unacceptable. The Chiefs of Staff could see no alternative to their previous recommendations and felt that to secure the facilities which we needed and which, in view of the considerations set out in paragraph 11 of C.P. (46) 224, we were entitled to demand, certain fundamental amendments in the draft Treaty attached to C.P. (46) 219 would have to be made. In particular the provision for the Joint Defence Board should be omitted, we should be given the right to enter Egypt in an "apprehended international emergency," as well as in the event of war, and the Treaty should set out the minimum military facilities that we required.

The Chiefs of Staff realised that the Cabinet might feel unable to accept these proposals. In that case, they considered that the proposal for a Joint Defence Board could be improved by establishing a Joint Anglo–Egyptian Council on a Ministerial level, advised, if need be, by a Joint Defence Board on the lines proposed by the Foreign Secretary.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff added that there had been a misunderstanding at the previous meeting as to the number of troops at present in Egypt. The number was, in fact, only about 106,000, of which 68,000 were British, including one division in reserve for Palestine. The British troops in the Cairo district had been reduced from 71,000 in August 1945 to 38,000, and a further 4,000 were leaving shortly. Considerable reductions in our installations had been made over the last twelve months. He had earlier in the day seen General Paget and impressed on him

[1] Previous reference: see 7.

the urgency of removing our troops from Cairo and Alexandria. General Paget appreciated the position and had said that it should be possible to move his headquarters to the Canal zone within nine months, though they would probably have to live in tents for a while.

The Foreign Secretary said that it must be remembered that the alternative to a new Treaty acceptable to the Egyptians was not the retention of our present position in Egypt. The facilities we enjoyed at present were far greater than those given by the 1936 Treaty; and it was very doubtful how far we could actually rely on that Treaty to give us our minimum military requirements in the face of a hostile Egyptian Government. Article 7 of the Treaty must be read in conjunction with the Agreed Minute attached to it which provided that there should be mutual consultation before an emergency arose; and the Law Officers had advised that, though the Treaty might be kept on foot by a refusal on the part of His Majesty's Government to agree to a revised Treaty, the provisions of Article 7 would be of little value if, when an emergency arose, the Egyptians were unwilling to implement the spirit of the Treaty. It must also be remembered that in such circumstances any facilities enjoyed under this Treaty would come to an end in ten years' time. For all these reasons he did not feel that the 1936 Treaty provided firm ground on which to stand. Thus, the real choice before the Cabinet lay between a new Treaty freely negotiated with the Egyptian Government, and the maintenance of our position in Egypt by force. He did not think that the British people or Parliament would regard the latter alternative as an acceptable course. On the other hand, he was convinced that the Egyptian Government would not agree to a new Treaty which specified the minimum military facilities that we required; nor, for historical reasons, would they accept the proposal that the Joint Defence Board should be supplemented by a Joint Council on a Ministerial level.

In accordance with the Cabinet's decision at their meeting on the previous day, he had considered what amendments might be made in the draft Treaty annexed to C.P. (46) 219 and he now proposed that in Article 6 the phrase "the steps which should be taken to enable the armed forces of the two High Contracting Parties effectively to resist aggression" should be amended to read "the steps which should be taken to enable the armed forces of the two High Contracting Parties *to be in a position* effectively to resist aggression." The words added implied that preliminary arrangements would be made before an emergency arose. He also proposed that Article 4 should be redrafted on the lines shown in the Annex to this Minute. The revised draft emphasised that both countries shared in the obligation to discharge the common task, and, by providing that the competent military authorities on the Joint Defence Board might be assisted by such other representatives as the two Governments might appoint, would enable Egyptian Ministers to be associated with the Board. The fact that the redraft was based on the agreement setting up the United States–Canada Defence Board should commend it to the Egyptian Government. If we could obtain a Treaty on the lines of that attached to C.P. (46) 219, with the modifications he now suggested, we should, in his view, be in a more satisfactory position than we had ever been under the 1936 Treaty.

The Lord Chancellor said that, short of using force, the only alternative to the Foreign Secretary's proposal was to rely on the terms of the 1936 Treaty. Unless we had the goodwill of the Egyptian Government, this Treaty would in effect expire after ten years and even in the period during which it remained in force would not give us

what we wanted, since a hostile Egyptian Government could easily render its provisions nugatory by denying on any particular occasion that the situation was such as to justify our intervention. Moreover, though he believed that the point was a bad one, it was arguable that the 1936 Treaty had lapsed with the end of the League of Nations.

In discussion there was very full realisation of the weight of the arguments advanced by the Chiefs of Staff. In particular, it was appreciated that reliance on the terms of the revised Article 4 meant taking a considerable risk at a time when there was no firm assurance of any other base from which our Middle Eastern interests could be protected.

The Minister of Fuel and Power emphasised that the oil resources in the Middle East were vital to our security. We could not afford to leave them unprotected.

The following points were also made:—

(a) If negotiations were resumed on the basis of the revised Article 4, our negotiators should insist that the functions of the Joint Defence Board should include the co-ordination of measures for mutual defence in the region of the Middle East and not merely in the territories adjacent to Egypt; and if a firm attitude were adopted in the negotiations, it should be possible to secure this. It was most important that we should not give the Egyptians an impression of weakness, since they would be only too ready to exploit it.

(b) Confidence was expressed in the ability of the British Staff representatives who would serve on the proposed Joint Defence Board to ensure that provisions on the lines proposed by the Foreign Secretary would work satisfactorily.

(c) Nothing in politics was stable and we should remember that the situation in Egypt would not necessarily always be so unfavourable to us as at the moment. Would it not be possible during the period over which the withdrawal of our troops from Egypt would be spread to foster by unofficial means a more friendly attitude towards us?

(d) The withdrawal of troops from the Cairo district would mean a considerable loss to the Egyptian business community. Might it not be advisable to spin out the negotiations in the hope that the Egyptians would realise what they stood to lose economically by the withdrawal of our troops and so be brought into a more reasonable frame of mind?

In reply it was pointed out that it was now eight months since the original request for a revision of the 1936 Treaty had been made and that there was every indication that further delay would only serve to make the Egyptian Government more irreconcilable. Further, it was only too likely that any economic distress due to the withdrawal of our troops from the Cairo district would be attributed to our continuing presence elsewhere in Egypt.

(e) *The Secretary of State for Air* pointed out that Article 5 of the *avant-projet*, which Sidky Pasha hoped the Egyptian Delegation would accept, gave good grounds for the belief that a satisfactory basis of agreement could be achieved by the approach recommended by the Foreign Secretary.

(f) It was suggested that if, as the Foreign Secretary had indicated, it was proposed to bring Ministerial representatives into the Joint Defence Board discussions it would be desirable to substitute the words "together with" for the words "assisted by" in the second sentence of the revised draft of Article 4.

Summing up the discussion, *The Prime Minister* said that the Chiefs of Staff had

very properly drawn attention to the fact that the Foreign Secretary's proposals did not give us an assurance of the facilities which we should require in the event of war or the imminent threat of war. The Cabinet must, however, consider what would be the alternative to proceeding with these proposals. It seemed clear that to stand on the 1936 Treaty would not give us what we wanted and we should therefore be driven to remain in Egypt forcibly on the ground that only by doing so could we safeguard our military security. There was no more justification for this than for our claiming that our neighbours on the Continent of Europe should grant us bases for our defence. Our oil interests in the Middle East were indeed important, but our ability to defend them would only be impaired if we insisted on remaining in Egypt against the will of the Egyptian people and so worsened our relations with the remainder of the Arab world. For these reasons he was convinced that the proposals made by the Foreign Secretary should be accepted, and it was clear that this was the general view of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed in principle that the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty should be continued on the general lines proposed by the Foreign Secretary in C.P. (46) 219.

(2) Agreed that Articles 4 and 6 of the draft Treaty annexed to C.P. (46) 219 should be revised on the lines which had been suggested by the Foreign Secretary.

(3) Took note that the Foreign Secretary would obtain the views of His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on the draft Treaty and Protocol as so revised.

9 CAB 129/11, CP(46)259 8 July 1946

'Long-term policy in Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Hall

[On 4 Oct 1945 Bevin proposed to the Cabinet that the United States government should be invited to join in an Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. This was agreed, and the Committee duly presented their report in April 1946. Before inter-governmental consultations on it could take place, however, President Truman on 30 Apr 1946 unilaterally called for immediate action on one of its ten recommendations, that which provided for the authorization of 100,000 immigration certificates to admit Jewish refugees into Palestine forthwith. Attlee refused in no uncertain terms to proceed in this way. Bevin suggested that American and British experts should meet to study the implications of the report and make recommendations about its implementation. Accordingly, an American delegation of officials under Mr Henry Grady arrived in London in June 1946 for negotiations with a British group led by Mr Morrison and Sir Norman Brook. This conference reached full agreement on a plan for provincial autonomy in Palestine, the original draft of which had been prepared in the CO. In the event, this scheme was emphatically rejected by both Arabs and Jews. So too was an alternative plan approved by the Cabinet on 7 Feb 1947 for a five-year period of trusteeship leading to an independent state (see 22). On 14 Feb 1947 it was decided to refer the matter to the United Nations (see 23). A useful summary of events was given by Bevin to the Cabinet on 15 Jan 1947 (see 18, minute 4).]

Included in the agenda for the discussions between British officials and the representatives of the American Cabinet Committee is the question of future long-term policy for Palestine. The Anglo–American Committee of Enquiry have given us no guidance in this respect beyond stating that the constitution should be such that mere numerical majority should not give one race the power to dominate the other. They volunteer no suggestion how this result is to be achieved, but admit

that their proposal is likely to result in an almost indefinite period of trusteeship.

2. It would seem from the report that the Committee visualise a continuance of the present system of government, with changes in detail only, but any such arrangement must surely be dismissed as impracticable. We are at present holding the position (in so far as it is held) by force of arms and can hardly contemplate continuing so to hold it for all time; this position, at present bad, will be made much worse if the recommendations in the report are implemented. On the one side, we shall have incurred the undying hostility of the Arabs; on the other, we shall still be subjected by the Zionists, in Palestine and in America, to pressure in favour of an ultimate Jewish State and shall still have to face the problem of illegal immigration, which, at the last, we know ourselves powerless to control.

3. Apart, moreover, from purely practical considerations, it would probably be found impossible to draft a Trusteeship Agreement perpetuating the present system of government which would not be open to serious challenge as contravening Article 76 (*b*) of the Charter of the United Nations. This Article lays down, as one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, the progressive development towards self-government or independence of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. It would be difficult to argue that the existing régime in Palestine is designed to operate to these ends.

4. It is, of course, too early to forecast the results of the forthcoming official conversations, but it is at least possible that the verdict will be that it is impracticable to implement the Committee's recommendations as a whole. Should that be the case, it is clearly desirable that we should have concrete proposals to advance in place of them.

5. The only indication given by the Committee of their views on long-term policy (other than the general statement, already referred to, that numerical majority shall not confer powers of domination) is in the recommendation made in paragraph 4 of Chapter X that local administrative areas might be formed, some purely Arab or Jewish in composition, but some of mixed population where a corporate sense of civic responsibility can be encouraged and a new beginning made in the development of self-government. The Palestine Government has prepared an outline scheme of such a system, providing for six administrative areas or counties, with area councils which would be entrusted with responsibility for the administration of social services, agricultural and veterinary matters, and public works of "county" origin. These councils would also act as spokesmen for their areas before the central government.

6. Another plan designed to encourage self-government has been worked out in amplification of the Committee's suggestion, made under Recommendations Nos. 5 and 9, that an Arab Community, similar to the Jewish Community already in existence, should be established in Palestine to control Arab social services and education. The plan envisages the creation of two Communities, one Arab and one Jewish, responsible for a considerable range of subjects capable of being administered on communal lines, and acting as spokesmen between the respective Communities and Government.

7. Both schemes present certain difficulties (as must any scheme for government in Palestine) but both would be worthy of close examination were it decided to maintain the essentials of the present system of government and merely to take steps to encourage the growth of local autonomy within that framework. But, should it be

found that the present system cannot be maintained, neither plan is designed to provide an alternative. They are not nearly far-reaching enough to form the basis for a new start, and, in particular, they leave all the difficulties connected with immigration outstanding and do little to solve the burning question of land sales.

8. The fact has to be faced that progress in the solution of the problems with which Palestine is confronted, including progress towards the attainment of self-government, is likely to be negligible for so long as Palestine continues as a unitary bi-national State. In such a State, one of two alternative forms of democratic government is possible. Either the majority must rule (an alternative which the Committee categorically rejects) or the representation of the two races must be on the basis of parity. The latter alternative, seeing that the Arabs and the Jews are at variance on every matter of importance, could only lead to a complete deadlock in the administration. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a bi-national State in Palestine, other than one administered as at present by a bureaucratic Government under the aegis of the machine-gun, is an impracticable conception. This was the finding of the Royal Commission ten years ago; the happenings of subsequent years have served to emphasise its validity and to reinforce the Commission's view that the only hope of a solution lies in some arrangement which will, to the greatest possible extent, allow each race to manage its own affairs.

9. Such an arrangement might take one of two forms, either partition into independent States or the creation of semi-autonomous areas under a central Trustee Government. The former is the solution recommended by the Royal Commission and there have lately been indications of a certain swing of opinion in favour of it on the part of both Arabs and Jews. It has, of course, always been recognised that it is fraught with grave difficulties and the difficulties have not decreased with the passage of time. The background of the problem has also changed with the establishment of the United Nations and a new complication has thereby been created. Even assuming (a somewhat doubtful assumption) that both communities could be induced to accept partition in principle, it is certain that either would emphatically reject any boundary which would satisfy the other. An endless wrangle would ensue and one in which His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States could hardly claim the position of sole arbiters. The boundaries of new States being in question, the matter would probably have to be fought out before the United Nations and a quick decision would be highly improbable. It is, indeed, likely that neither side would accept independence in any area to which the other could be brought to agree, and the United Nations would scarcely be prepared to force independence on an unwilling people. During this period either we should have to deal with short-term policy, including the recommendations in the report, without any idea of what the ultimate long-term policy was to be (a course which it seems most important to avoid) or we should have to postpone all action until the long-term policy was finally settled. The latter course would result in an impossible situation. Apart from the question of countering pressure from America, something positive must be done in the near future if only because of the impossibility of stemming illegal immigration if the legal intake is not increased.

10. The best hope may thus well lie in the adoption of the alternative arrangement, namely, the creation of semi-autonomous areas under a central Trustee Government. A description of a scheme on these lines (prepared before the

Anglo–American Committee reported) . . . and may form a basis for discussion. It is not contended that the scheme is free from serious difficulties, both administrative and financial, but the same is true of any scheme that could possibly be devised. There is certainly no easy road out of our present embarrassments.

11. The great advantage of this type of partition is the fact that it can be effected unilaterally at any time as a mere change in the present system of administering Palestine, since it involves no departure from the provisions of the Mandate. We could thus, if the scheme were brought into force, approach the question of Trusteeship at our own time and on our own terms. Although, for the proper operation of the plan, it would be necessary for each community to assume charge of its own area, refusal to do so would not prevent its being brought into force. In the event of such refusal, the central Government would, for the time being, administer the area in question. It may well be held that Palestine would be easier to administer in this way, which would admit of a pro-Jewish bias in one part and a pro-Arab bias in the other, than it is under the existing system where the scales have to be held evenly balanced throughout.

12. Under the scheme, since the Mandate would remain unaltered, our strategic position in Palestine would remain exactly as it is at present, and we should continue to have at our disposal all the facilities which we now enjoy.

13. There would seem to be quite a reasonable chance of securing United States support to the plan, as it would permit of the admission of the 100,000 immigrants recommended by the Committee. Nor should Arab repercussions to the immigration, if affected against the background of a provincial autonomy scheme, be too severe. The resulting Jewish settlement would be confined to a definite and comparatively small compartment of Palestine and the fear of the remainder of eventual displacement or submergence would be thereby removed. It is undoubtedly fear of such displacement and submergence which has made the Palestinian Arabs place the repeal of the Land Transfers Regulations, together with the indefinite continuance of Jewish immigration, in the forefront of their attack on the Committee's proposals.

14. From the point of view of the Arab States (who are obviously seriously perturbed about the whole question and who must realise that a compromise is necessary) there would seem to be some advantage at least in a plan which freed three-quarters of the Palestinian Arabs, once and for all, from any fear of Jewish domination, granted a semi-autonomous status, with prospects of full ultimate autonomy, to the great majority of them and provided powerful safeguards for the protection of the rights of the remaining quarter.

15. The scheme has the advantage that, while providing a type of constitution which should be immediately workable, it leaves the door wide open for further advance. Such advance might be in one of two directions. The two provinces might elect to become partners in a federal constitution; the prospect of Anglo–Jewish co-operation in such a federation is at least far greater than that of their co-operation in any form of unitary government. On the other hand, if the centrifugal forces proved to be too strong, partition might be the ultimate outcome. There is no reason now to prejudge the final decision; provincial autonomy appears to provide a convenient stepping-stone to either federation or partition and the choice between them can be left to be made when the present explosive atmosphere has disappeared and in the light of the conditions then prevailing.

10 CAB 129/11, CP(46)267 10 July 1946

'Palestine: Anglo–US report—military implications': Cabinet memorandum, report by COS

We have had an opportunity of seeing the Report by the Secretary of State for the Colonies[1] on the implications of giving effect to the Anglo–U.S. Report on Palestine. We emphatically endorse what is said by the Secretary of State on the strategic effects of adopting the Report—paragraphs 25 and 26.

2. We would emphasise to the Cabinet once again, that in our view the reaction throughout the Middle East to the adoption of the Report would be extremely unfavourable, and disastrous to British interests. The present belief of the Arab States in British good faith and in the benefits arising from friendship with Great Britain would be destroyed. There will in consequence be a long period of unrest throughout the Arab world, the military implications of which are formidable.

3. All our defence requirements in the Middle East, including maintenance of our essential oil supplies and communications, demand that an essential feature of our policy should be to retain the co-operation of the Arab States, and to ensure that the Arab world does not gravitate towards the Russians. In view of the increasing interest of the United States in the area it is also of importance to the Americans to retain the goodwill of the Arabs.

4. We cannot stress too strongly the importance of Middle East oil resources to us both in peace and war. We consider that this factor alone makes the retention of Arab friendship essential. The vulnerability of our existing sources of oil makes it imperative that we should seek to develop areas more remote from possible attack, but our ability to do this will be seriously prejudiced if we incur the hostility of the Arabs.

5. We cannot therefore afford a long period of unrest throughout the Arab world. Moreover, without the facilities in Egypt, and without any permanent or assured control of Cyrenaica we should find it difficult to counter this disorder effectively and protect our vital interests in the Middle East unless we had full control in Palestine.

6. As regards the military results in Palestine itself, we clearly foresee the following:—

(a) There will be a general Arab rising in Palestine, more serious and more widespread than in 1936 and 1938/1939. This rising will be supported by volunteers and arms from neighbouring Arab States. In addition, attacks on British and Jewish personnel and property will take place.
(b) Jewish territorists will seek every occasion to continue their campaign of violence.

7. The reinforcements we shall require to meet the resulting situation in the Middle East are as stated by the Secretary of State:—

2 Infantry Divisions (One as a general reserve, not necessarily stationed in the Middle East, but at short notice).
1 Armoured Brigade
3 Infantry Battalions

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[1] CP(46)258.

Reinforcements would also be required to Naval and Air Forces in Palestine.
All these forces would be needed for a prolonged and indefinite period.

8. We should remind the Cabinet of some of the more serious implications of finding these reinforcements from British resources:—

(a) Extreme difficulty in meeting the man-power target for December, 1946, for all three Services, and in the case of the Army, an obligation not only to defer demobilisation, but to resort to calling back men already released.
(b) Difficulty in sustaining the morale of British troops called upon to take action against Arabs in support of Jews, whose terrorist activities have already inflicted upon them irritations, insults, hardships and casualties.
(c) A total annual cost of £96,000,000 for maintaining the armed forces required in Palestine. This figure, which does not allow for operational expenditure, is £38,000,000 in excess of the cost of maintaining existing British forces in the Middle East.

9. Presumably, it would be out of the question to accept the first of these implications: but there is no other way of meeting the requirement from British resources. We cannot walk back on our commitments in Germany, India and elsewhere. Nor can we meet a prolonged and indefinite commitment by short-term borrowing from Italy and Greece, since we are already relying upon the early liquidation of these commitments to enable us to meet our man-power target.

10. The only alternative is to ask the Americans for assistance. We feel that the chances of obtaining American army reinforcements are slight, since the Americans are themselves experiencing difficulties in meeting their occupational commitments and the demands of public opinion for rapid demobilisation.[2]

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[2] This report was signed by Lord Tedder, Marshal of the RAF and chief of the air staff; Admiral Sir J H D Cunningham, chief of naval staff; and Lt-Gen Sir F E W Wallace, vice-chief of the imperial general staff (for CIGS).

11 CAB 128/6, CM 67(46)4 — 11 July 1946

'Palestine: report of Anglo–American Committee': Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them the following memoranda:—

C.P. (46) 258: by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, summarising the difficulties which would arise in giving effect to the recommendations of the Anglo–American Committee on Palestine.
C.P. (46) 267[1]: by the Chiefs of Staff, on the military implications of the recommendations in the Anglo–American Report.
C.P. (46) 263: by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, summarising the statements made by President Truman on the proposal for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine.
C.P. (46) 259[2]: by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, outlining a policy for Palestine which might be adopted as an alternative to some of the recommendations of the Anglo–American Committee.

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[1] See 10. [2] See 9.

The alternative policy outlined in C.P. (46) 259 was put forward with a view to remedying the deficiencies of Recommendation 3 of the Anglo–American Committee, which proposed that the future constitution of Palestine should be such that one race would be unable to dominate the other, but contained no practical suggestions for achieving this result. Under this head the Committee's Report seemed to leave no alternative but the continuance of the existing mandate; for it was likely to prove impossible to secure a trusteeship agreement for a system of government which offered no prospect of enabling the inhabitants to develop towards self-government and independence. The memorandum therefore put forward an alternative proposal for the creation of two semi-autonomous provinces, one Jewish and one Arab, under a central Trustee Government. This scheme, while providing a type of constitution which should be immediately workable, would leave the way open for further advance—either towards partition into two independent States, or towards partnership in a federal constitution. The details of this alternative policy were set out in a memorandum annexed to C.P. (46) 259.

The Prime Minister said that, as the Foreign Secretary could not attend the Cabinet's meeting, he had asked Sir Norman Brook to go over to Paris to ascertain his views on the memoranda now before the Cabinet and on the way in which the forthcoming discussions with United States officials should be conducted. He invited Sir Norman Brook to report to the Cabinet the results of his discussion with the Foreign Secretary.

Sir Norman Brook said that the Foreign Secretary was anxious to avoid being put in a position in which he would have to oppose the recommendation for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine. He proposed to inform the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, that he would not oppose this recommendation, so long as there was proper consultation with representatives of the Jews and the Arabs. What he had in mind was that there should be a conference in London, preferably in the early part of September before the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, at which representatives of the United Kingdom and United States Governments could discuss with representatives of both Jews and Arabs all the issues raised by the Report of the Anglo–American Committee. He proposed, however, to tell Mr. Byrnes that the Arab opposition to this particular recommendation about Jewish immigration would be substantially reduced if an early announcement could be made that a substantial number of Jewish refugees from Europe would be admitted to the United States, even though this meant enlarging the existing quota; and he intended to press strongly for an early concession of this kind by the United States Government.

The Foreign Secretary was favourably disposed towards the alternative policy outlined in C.P. (46) 259, and he agreed that this should be explored in the forthcoming discussions with United States officials. He doubted, however, whether this scheme for provincial autonomy would provide a lasting solution of the Palestine problem. He therefore suggested that the Foreign Office and Colonial Office should consider, with the Chiefs of Staff, whether it would be practicable to adopt, as our long-term aim, a scheme under which the major part of the Arab province would be assimilated in the adjacent Arab States of Transjordan and the Lebanon, and the Jewish province established as an independent Jewish State, with perhaps a somewhat larger territory than that suggested for the Jewish province proposed in C.P. (46) 259. He hoped that any intermediate solution on the lines proposed in C.P.

(46) 259 would contain nothing which was inconsistent with this long-term aim.

Special provision would have to be made for Jerusalem. He himself thought it would be advantageous to create a special Council, representing all the interested religions, which would control the Holy Places in Jerusalem; and he would like to see this incorporated as an additional feature in the scheme outlined in C.P. (46) 259, on the understanding that the administration of the city would remain a responsibility of the mandatory Power. If his long-term proposals were realised, he would hope that Jerusalem would become an international area under the United Nations, the control of the Holy Places remaining in the hands of such a special religious Council.

As regards Anglo–American collaboration in respect of Palestine, the Foreign Secretary thought that the United States Government should certainly be pressed to promise us full political support in announcing a new policy for Palestine, in negotiating this with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews, and in defending it if necessary to the United Nations. He did not, however, contemplate continuing American participation in the administration of Palestine. The United States Government should also be asked for financial assistance, not only in the settlement of Jewish immigrants, but also in whatever measures were agreed to be necessary for raising the standard of living of the Arabs in Palestine. As regards military assistance, we should make it clear that, if it became necessary to impose a solution by force, we were neither willing nor able to do this alone and should have to ask for active American assistance. This should be used as an argument to persuade the United States Government to join with us in seeking a solution which would not have to be imposed by force and in making every effort to get such a policy agreed with the Arabs and the Jews before it was put into effect.

In discussion there was general agreement that the recommendations in the Report of the Anglo–American Committee offered no practical prospect of progress towards a solution of the constitutional problem in Palestine, and discussion turned on the alternative policy outlined in C.P. (46) 259. The view was expressed that, if the Cabinet were disposed to agree that the ultimate solution was to be found in partition, it would be advantageous if the suggestions thrown out by the Foreign Secretary for a long-term plan were put forward at once in the forthcoming discussions as a solution of the immediate problem. If a separate Jewish State were created now, the Jews could be left to fix the limit for immigration and to bear the whole cost of settling the immigrants. Our own strategic needs in this area might be secured through Treaty arrangements with the Arab States which, under the Foreign Secretary's proposals, would be taking over the Arab parts of Palestine. We could then look forward to early release from the political and financial commitments involved by our obligations under the mandate.

As against this, it was pointed out that proposals for immediate partition of Palestine would encounter strong opposition. The Anglo–American Committee had themselves felt unable to recommend partition as the solution. If independent sovereign States were to be created, long and difficult negotiations would have to be undertaken over frontiers, customs barriers, &c., all of which were avoided by the intermediate scheme outlined in C.P. (46) 259. So long as there was a central Government responsible for customs, communications and other reserved subjects, there would be much less difficulty in determining boundaries which were no more than the administrative boundaries of provinces and could be adjusted in the light of later experience. The intermediate scheme had the great advantage that it separated

sovereignty from cultural autonomy. It would also afford a valuable period of actual experience of separate administration, during which means of surmounting some of the practical problems of partition could be devised.

The Minister of Fuel and Power said that he was opposed to partition and was anxious that the Cabinet should not dismiss the possibility that, if the economic difficulties could be removed, some accommodation might be found between the Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine. Improvement of the standard of living of the Arabs must be an essential part of any policy for Palestine. He would himself prefer the creation of a number of semi-autonomous regions rather than a single province for the Jews and another for the Arabs. The most important point was, however, to secure time for a more fully considered approach to the long-term problem of Palestine.

The Chief of the Air Staff[3] said that, whatever solution of the constitutional problem was put forward, the Chiefs of Staff were anxious that the strategic considerations should not be overlooked. Our strategic needs in the Middle East, in respect of both communications and oil supplies, depended on retaining the goodwill and co-operation of the Arab peoples. The Chiefs of Staff had submitted, in C.P. (46) 267, their views on the military implications of the policy recommended in the Report of the Anglo–American Committee. They had not yet been able to assess the strategic implications of the alternative policy outlined in C.P. (46) 259; and, until they had had time to do so, they would not wish to be committed to support of that policy.

The Cabinet's general conclusion was that it would be inexpedient to put forward at this stage proposals for the partition of Palestine into two sovereign States. The intermediate solution outlined in C.P. (46) 259 was, however, a constructive and imaginative plan which (subject to consideration of any objections which might be raised by the Chiefs of Staff) should be commended to the favourable consideration of the Jews and the Arabs if United States support for it could be secured.

The Cabinet then went on to consider the tactics to be adopted by the British Delegation in the forthcoming discussions with United States officials.

It was agreed that it would be inexpedient for the Delegation to confine themselves to destructive criticism, on the lines indicated in C.P. (46) 258, of the policy recommended in the Report of the Anglo–American Committee. It would not be enough to adopt a purely negative attitude. At the same time, we had promised to take the Report of the Anglo–American Committee as the basis for the official consultations, and it would be unwise for the British Delegation to throw over that Report at the outset and to seek to substitute the alternative policy outlined in C.P. (46) 259. They must seek the appropriate moment for bringing forward this alternative plan; and this would probably come after they had exposed the weaknesses in the recommendations (Nos. 3 and 6) of the Anglo–American Committee regarding the future constitution of Palestine and future immigration policy.

The consultations should therefore begin with the first recommendation of the Anglo–American Committee, regarding the problem of the Jews in Europe. The Delegation should emphasise the Committee's failure to make any constructive

[3] Lord Tedder.

proposals under this part of their terms of reference; and should stress the fact that the Arab opposition to the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine would be substantially strengthened if this movement began before there was any indication that other countries outside Europe would make their contribution towards the solution of this problem. Mr. La Guardia had just announced his intention to propose, on behalf of U.N.R.R.A., that 120,000 Jews should be admitted to the United States, all unused immigration quotas being made available for that purpose. This would reinforce the suggestion which the Foreign Secretary was proposing to make to Mr. Byrnes; and the British Delegation might ask whether the United States Government would be willing to make an early announcement of their attitude towards these proposals. It was, however, important to maintain the principle that the settlement of Jewish and other displaced persons from Europe was an international, not an Anglo–American, responsibility; and that remedial action should be taken through the machinery of the United Nations. It might be some time before the United Nations established an effective organisation for handling the refugee problem as a whole; but any appeal to Governments to make an interim contribution by receiving a proportion of these displaced persons in territories under their control should be made by the United Nations, not by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Approved in principle the alternative policy for Palestine outlined in C.P. (46) 259, subject to modification to meet the Foreign Secretary's suggestion for the creation of a Council representing all the interested religious bodies to control the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

(2) Subject to any comments which might be received from the Chiefs of Staff, authorised the British Delegation to put forward this alternative policy at the appropriate stage in the forthcoming discussions with officials of the United States Government.

12 CO 537/1783, pp 12–15, 21, 136–138 30 Oct–21 Nov 1946

[Palestine]: minutes by J S Bennett, J M Martin, Sir G Gater and Mr Creech Jones commenting on Sir D Harris's[1] assessment of the international practicability of partition

[With a view to the forthcoming conference on Palestine to be held in December 1946, Harris wrote a memo on 28 Oct. Examining the options, he argued that the government's plan of 'provincial autonomy' should be the basis of future policy, but if this encountered greater resistance and hostility than they were prepared to face, they should refer the future of Palestine to the UN (CO 537/1783, no 95). He also believed that there was 'no hope of enforcing partition without a reference to U.N.O.' (ibid, minute, 1 Nov 1946).]

. . . The Charter imposes no absolute obligation on us to bring our future policy in Palestine before the United Nations for approval; but to offset this, there are obviously the strongest political and moral pressures on us to [do] so, so that the strict legal interpretation is not really very relevant in considering future action. It

[1] Sir Douglas Harris, commissioner on special duty in Palestine, 1934–1936; reconstruction commission, 1943–1945; seconded to CO, 1945–1947.

must also be remembered (and I have recently drawn attention to this on another file) that we supported a *League of Nations*[2] resolution, at the final session of the League in April this year, which noted the declared intention of the mandatory powers to continue to administer in accordance with the principles of the existing mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed upon between the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers". Since the League is dead, and there is no legal continuity between it and the United Nations, the exact binding force of this resolution on H.M.G. is a nice matter, but at least it may be considered as adding to the political and moral obligation to bring our future policy in Palestine before U.N.O.

3. Thus, while no absolute legal grounds can be advanced in its support, I entirely agree with Sir Douglas Harris's assessment of the international practicability of partition (paras 11–13 of his note at No. 95) on political and moral grounds. I think it would be deluding ourselves to suppose that H.M.G. could impose partition without the support—which in practice would have to be prior support—of some representative international gathering; and for practical purposes that would have to be the United Nations or else an *ad hoc* conference of all interested states (which would amount to much the same thing).

4. The Foreign Office letter at No. 94 asks a slightly different question, although it is not quite clear *what* view they want us (in their third paragraph) to confirm. Taking the literal wording, it is of course absurd that H.M.G. could ever have committed themselves to anything which would "preclude them from taking such measures as may be necessary to ensure the future peace and good government of the country". But that gets us nowhere, because what is at issue is whether partition *is* a measure coming within this definition. Many interested states would be unlikely to accept as final a mere statement by H.M.G. that *they* thought partition the best way of ensuring peace and good government, and those states would demand the right to be satisfied on the point before letting us "get away with it". As stated above, H.M.G. have no legal commitment *under the United Nations Charter* to satisfy the other interested states, nor have they made any binding statement on the subject *at the United Nations Assembly*. It comes back again to the question of what is practical politics internationally.

5. On the other hand, if I am asked in general terms, without specific reference to the United Nations, whether H.M.G. have ever committed themselves in such a way as to tie their hands about partition (in the absence of some kind of international assent to it), I have no hestitation in answering "Yes". It would be wearisome to recite all the grounds for this statement; but there are moments when one must state one's opinion quite frankly, and I hope I may be forgiven (on the strength of ten years' contact with the problem, in London, in the Middle East, and recently from the UNO angle) for doing so now.

6. In the first place, there is the Covenant of the League of Nations, which H.M.G. signed. The often-quoted passage from Article 22 runs:—

> "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be

[2] Emphasis throughout in original.

provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

Partition means that, having used our period as mandatory to allow squatters to occupy parts of the premises placed in our trust,[3] we withdraw leaving them in legal possession of the ground-floor flat, and the original residents in a state of considerable congestion upstairs. It might be argued, of course, that the Covenant of the League was a long time ago, and the League is dead, and consequently that any commitment there may have been is no longer applicable. If so, however, there is no apparent reason why this process of wastage with the passage of years could not be held to apply equally to other international instruments of equivalent age and status, particularly the Palestine mandate and the Balfour Declaration which it embodies. Yet so far as I have been able to follow current policy from these papers, the mandate and the Balfour Declaration are still regarded by H.M.G. as binding.

7. Coming down to more recent times, there is another statement of policy by H.M.G.,[4] issued at the time with considerable solemnity, part of which runs as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made subjects of a Jewish State against their will."

Partition, imposed by H.M.G., means that the Arab population of that part of Palestine allotted as the Jewish State *would* be made subjects of a Jewish State against their will. It might be argued, of course, that the statement referred to was (a) a unilateral statement by H.M.G., and therefore not binding internationally, and/or (b) issued by a previous Government, and therefore not binding on the present Government. The same might be said with equal justice, however, of the Balfour Declaration. If a distinction is to be made between the binding value of the two statements, it must apparently be based not on relative "commitment" but on political grounds.[5]

8. Thirdly, at various times during the war the most solemn assurances were given by His Majesty's representatives in various Middle Eastern countries, to the Governments to which they were accredited, that the 1939 declaration of policy referred to in paragraph 7 was definitive and would not be withdrawn or altered as a result of Jewish pressure. These assurances were given on the instructions of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office should presumably know about them. I do not know whether they would regard them as "commitments". In any normal circumstances I would suppose that they were. Again, the question of getting round this obstacle (if it is regarded as such) appears to be a political one. As has sometimes

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[3] J M Martin sidelined the passage from 'Partition' to 'trust' and noted in the margin: 'What about the obligation under the Mandate to "facilitate Jewish immigration" and "encourage close settlement of Jews on the land"?'

[4] The Palestine White Paper of 1939: Cmd 6019, 1939, para 4.

[5] J M Martin sidelined the last sentence of para 7 and noted in the margin: 'The White Paper, unlike the Balfour Declaration, was not endorsed internationally.'

been suggested in some quarters, it is, no doubt, always possible to ask the Governments concerned to release us from any commitment involved by urging them to "face realities", i.e. to say to them in effect that we are sorry but the Jewish pressure has been too strong and we are no longer able to resist it. (The effect of such an admission on any fresh assurances we may give about our new policy is, of course, another matter. That is why I have always agreed . . . that, whatever else partition may be, it certainly *won't* be "final". The Jews will only accept it, if at all, as a step towards something further; so far as they are concerned, it will be no more final than Hitler's successive "last territorial claims in Europe"; and so far as H.M.G. may hope to stabilise things by guaranteeing frontiers or similar means, we shall *ex hypothesi* have been unable to hold the Jews to the 1939 limits, so any new assurances by H.M.G. are not likely to be regarded as of any great weight).

9. So far as I can judge from (96), the case for partition (as opposed to other possible solutions) appears to be based primarily on the fact that it is the policy most acceptable to the Jews; while from (95) it appears that the case against the other extreme—the policy advocated by the Arab States at Lancaster House—rests primarily on the supposition that the Jews would resist it and that nobody would be in a position to overcome their resistance. If the basis of policy is to be what Zionism—backed by its sanction of armed force—will accept, then it seems to be a waste of time to examine further the question of what "commitments" there may be in any other direction.

J.S.B.
30.10.46

. . . I do not propose to comment at length on the view expressed by Mr. Bennett; but the short answer of advocates of partition would be that it offers the only, or, at any rate, the best means of giving effect to the double obligation (towards Arabs and Jews) under the Mandate: the problem would of course be much easier if there were an obligation only to one side. It is hardly necessary to add that my brief comments in (96) do not purport to state the case for partition. . . .

J.M.M.
31.10.46

Secretary of State
I attach a memorandum which Sir Douglas Harris has prepared on future policy for Palestine. . . . I would like to add that, speaking for myself, I believe that from the point of view of the Colonial Office partition is the only really satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem. The Arab scheme is unthinkable. It is impossible to remain in Palestine as we are now. The autonomous area scheme is likely to be subjected to the strongest criticism from both sides, and it is by no means improbable that both sides would attempt to resist it by force. It does not in itself embody any final solution, nor does it relieve H.M.G. in its present form of the onerous task of determining the extent of Jewish immigration into the Jewish Province. In what I have just said I do not mean to imply that when we consider tactics we should necessarily put partition proposals to UNO in the first instance. I agree with Sir Douglas Harris that it may well be desirable to take a middle course between the proposals put forward by the two parties. We ought nevertheless to be quite clear as to what is to be our destination, and I believe that destination must in the end be partition.

I have two criticisms of Sir Douglas Harris's draft. First of all, I do not think the case for partition is fairly stated. Every possible objection against it is urged, but there is no real attempt to bring out the solid advantages of partition, as was done by the Cabinet Sub-Committee under Mr. Morrison's chairmanship in 1943. My second criticism is that he seems not to give sufficient weight to the attitude of America. The Foreign Secretary is determined to secure, if he can, American co-operation. If he should be successful, it seems to me that this will have a vital influence on the attitude we ought to adopt in dealing with UNO. If for instance we were assured of solid backing by the U.S.A. on the basis of a partition scheme, it is certainly questionable whether it would not be desirable for us to take the lead in putting a partition plan to UNO. I think our experience with that body hitherto has been that we have done best where we have given a strong lead. Where we have allowed the initiative to be left in the hands of others we have at times found ourselves in grave difficulties.

To sum up, I agree with Sir Douglas Harris that it is in the highest degree unlikely that any agreement will be secured by H.M.G. with the Jews and the Arabs on any policy for Palestine, and that reference to UNO will be necessary. If we cannot secure support from the United States, I should agree to Sir Douglas Harris's tactics of putting the position to UNO indicating the three schemes, British, Arab and Jewish. If, however, we can secure the support of the United States, I would be prepared to put to UNO any scheme on which there was agreement between H.M.G. and the U.S.A.

G.H.G.
21.11.46

The point about this Paper is that it is an argument for steering the discussions at the Conference in favour of the Government's Provincial Autonomy Scheme. The scheme may be as good as any that can be devised and its advantages may be all those advanced for it. But however desirable, it is not practical politics for the reason that both Arab and Jew are utterly opposed to it, that America has denounced it and no side would work it. It is clear that the Government on the resumption of the Conference has (a) to listen to the Jews, (b) present some answer to the Arab scheme, (c) determine whether a compromise arrangement is at all possible and practicable, (d) make up its mind whether it

(1) will offer a scheme to both Jews and Arabs, or
(2) will go to the United Nations and report that it is no longer able to administer the old Mandate because of the continuing conflict and irreconcilability of the parties.

There are grave difficulties about (2) because on strategic grounds Britain by withdrawing from Palestine is prejudiced and it is damaging to our prestige to admit failure, and (b) [sic] it will open the way either for the intervention of other objectionable powers or it will undoubtedly continue a disturbing area in the Middle East.

As to (1) if we offer a scheme to Jews and Arabs and they accept it, or it appears that they are likely to work it, it will have to be submitted to U.N.O. The measure of American support for it would help to determine who would assume responsibility for the administration. If it is rejected, the scheme, with the alternative schemes,

should be submitted to U.N.O. and with a recommendation.

The scheme to be aimed at should move away from the Government's Provincial Autonomy Scheme towards Partition. In this Paper we should state (a) the case against the Arab Scheme as already set out by Sir Douglas, (b) the difficulties expressed by Arabs and Jews against the Government proposals—using all the reasons advanced in this paper but showing how impossible they are of Jewish and Arab acceptance, and then (c) the possibilities of a Partition Scheme using first all the objections to it, see paras 13 to 20 and 33 and 34, and answering them with a modified scheme which meets the worst of the Arab objections. It is towards this that the Conference will need to be steered and all the advantages for it set out with an indication of what advantages it concedes to both Jews and Arabs. Could we not use the Cabinet Sub-Committee 1943 draft? It is probable that partition would have the support of the U.S.A. and I agree we should give a definite lead. We should also examine the strength of the Arab League, the attitude of the respective Arab States, and give appraisals of positive Arab reactions to partition. Partition is most likely to satisfy Parliament and public opinion here.

A.C.J.
[nd]

13 CAB 128/8, CM 104(46)3 10 Dec 1946

'India: constitutional position': Cabinet conclusions (confidential annex)

[This document has been printed in TOPI, vol IX, no 181.]

In the course of the Cabinet's discussion on the results of the recent visit of Indian leaders to this country, *The Prime Minister* said that it was impossible to be confident that the main political Parties in India had any real will to reach agreement between themselves. Pandit Nehru's[1] present policy seemed to be to secure complete domination by Congress throughout the government of India. If a constitution was framed which had this effect, there would certainly be strong reactions from the Muslims. Provinces with a Muslim majority might refuse to join a central Government on such terms at all; and the ultimate result of Congress policy might be the establishment of that Pakistan which they so much disliked. The Prime Minister warned the Cabinet that the situation might so develop as to result in civil war in India, with all the bloodshed which that would entail. There seemed to be little realisation among Indian leaders of the risk that ordered government might collapse.

The Cabinet felt that, however much the Indian politicians might abuse the British Raj, there was always at the back of their minds the sense that the Army was there and would be able to deal with civil disorder. This dulled their sense of responsibility for the consequences of their political policies. Apart from this, however, such confidence in the authority of the Army was no longer fully justified. The strength of the British Forces in India was not great. And the Indian Army, though the

[1] Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, president of Indian National Congress, 1946; member for external affairs and Commonwealth relations in Interim Govt of India, 1946–1947; first prime minister of India and minister for external affairs from 1947.

Commander-in-Chief had great personal influence with it, could not fairly be expected to prove a reliable instrument for maintaining public order in conditions tantamount to civil war. One thing was quite certain viz., that we could not put back the clock and introduce a period of firm British rule. Neither the military nor the administrative machine in India was any longer capable of this.

Some Ministers felt that in the event our only course might prove to be to evacuate India and to leave the Indians to find, after a period no doubt of chaos, their own solution to their own problems. The Cabinet were assured that plans were being made for evacuating, in an extreme emergency, both British troops and civilians from India. Other Ministers felt, however, that even if such evacuation were practicable as a military operation—and it would not be an easy operation to carry out—it was not, politically, realistic to suppose that we should be able to adopt that course. Would it be acceptable to Parliament and to public opinion that we should leave India in chaos, having obtained no guarantee of fair treatment for the Muslims or for the other minorities? That would indeed be an inglorious end to our long association with India. World opinion would regard it as a policy of scuttle unworthy of a great Power.

There was general agreement that so grave a decision could not be taken without the most anxious thought. The decision need not be prejudged at this stage. Matters might not reach so serious a pass. It was certainly the wish of the great masses of the Indian people that there should continue to be ordered government throughout India and the leaders of the political Parties in India might well be forced to take account of this.

For the moment, the important thing was to secure that these leaders faced the difficulties which inevitably accompanied major constitutional changes in India. We should do anything that we could to bring home to them the heavy weight of responsibility which rested on them.

14 CAB 128/6, CM 107(46)2 19 Dec 1946

'Burma: constitutional position': Cabinet conclusions

[This document has been printed in BSI, vol II, no 145.]

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Secretary of State for Burma (C.P. (46) 465) and the Minister without Portfolio[1] (C.P. (46) 464).

The Prime Minister recalled that on 12th December the Cabinet had considered that no further assurances should be given about constitutional developments in Burma in advance of the discussions which would be held if the Executive Council accepted the invitation to send a delegation to London. The Governor of Burma had now, however, reported (telegram No. 262 of 17th December) that, from conversations which he had since held with Aung San,[2] he was satisfied that the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.) would not agree to a delegation visiting this country unless an assurance were given in advance that Burma would be free to

[1] Mr A V Alexander, who became minister of defence the following day.

[2] President of AFPFL from 1945; member of governor's Executive Council and counsellor for defence, 1946–1947; assassinated July 1947.

choose whether or not she remained within the British Commonwealth. The position had been considered by the India and Burma Committee that morning and they had agreed to recommend to the Cabinet that a statement to this effect should be made to Parliament before the Recess.

All the advice from Burma was that the A.F.P.F.L. commanded great influence throughout the country and that if their leaders left the Executive Council the administration of the country would be paralysed, there would be a police strike, and it would be impossible to maintain Government without the use of force. Indian troops could not be used for this purpose, and British troops could not be made available without serious consequences elsewhere. One brigade could be brought from Malaya. A second brigade could be made available at the cost of weakening our Forces in India or delaying the demobilisation scheme. But, even so, the administrative troops required to support these brigades would be lacking if, as must be assumed, we were unable to use the Indian administrative troops now in Burma. Finally, even if these could have been provided, it would not be possible with this strength to do more than hold Rangoon and a few other key points; and the countryside generally would be outside our control.

There would, therefore, be great military difficulty in attempting to govern Burma by force. Nor was it clear to what useful result such an attempt would lead. It would probably serve only to strengthen national feeling in Burma and to increase the influence of those who advocated early secession from the British Commonwealth.

Apart from military considerations, the political background must also be taken into account. Pledges had been given that Burma's constitutional advance would not be prejudiced by its separation from India. India had now been informed that she could choose whether or not she remained within the Commonwealth, and Burma expected the same treatment. It was also desirable that we should not seek to pursue in Burma a policy inconsistent with that which we had pressed the Netherlands Government to follow in the Dutch East Indies.

In these circumstances the India and Burma Committee had felt that an assurance should be given on the lines suggested. If the Cabinet shared this view, the Prime Minister suggested that he might settle the terms of the statement in consultation with the Secretary of State for Burma and the President of the Board of Trade.

The Minister of Food[3] said that he was counting on Burma to export 1½ million tons of rice during the next season. If there were widespread civil disturbances this would not be available, and the consequences, directly for South-East Asia and indirectly for the whole world cereals situation, would be most serious.

While some Ministers regretted that the pressure of events had forced the Governor to go further in his consultations with Aung San than the Cabinet had intended, and disliked in principle giving, in advance of negotiations, assurances on points to be discussed in these negotiations, the general view of the Cabinet was that there were strong arguments both of expediency and of principle in favour of the course proposed. It had always been intended that Burma should be assisted towards self-government. If, as it appeared, Aung San was disposed to be friendly and to work for keeping Burma within the Commonwealth, there were advantages in strengthening his position in Burma.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies[4] emphasised the importance of securing

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[3] Mr J Strachey.

[4] Now Mr Creech Jones.

proper safeguards for the hill tribes and Shan States. He also pointed out that the proposed statement would have repercussions in Ceylon, and said that he would submit a memorandum to the Cabinet on this aspect of the matter.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed that a statement should be made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the following day on the lines suggested by the Governor of Burma; and took note that the terms of this statement would be settled by the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Burma and the President of the Board of Trade.

15 CAB 128/8, CM 108(46) 31 Dec 1946

'India: constitutional position': Cabinet conclusions (confidential annex)

[This and the following document have been printed in TOPI, vol IX, nos 235 and 262.]

The Cabinet considered memoranda by the Prime Minister (C.P. (46) 456) and the Minister of Defence (C.P. (46) 468) on the constitutional position in India.

The Prime Minister, in amplification of his memorandum, informed the Cabinet of the discussions which the India and Burma Committee had had with the Viceroy since the departure of the Indian representatives. The Viceroy had urged that, if it became clear that the Muslim League would not co-operate in the work of the Constituent Assembly and that the plan of the Cabinet Mission could not be carried through, we should have in readiness a definite policy which would then be announced. In the Viceroy's opinion we should not be able to enforce British rule in India beyond 31st March, 1948. The Committee had considered that an announcement of our intention to leave India by a specific date might have the effect of bringing the two communities together. It would also have the advantage that it would make it possible for us to take the first steps towards our departure. They therefore proposed that a statement should be made on the lines of the draft annexed to C.P. (46) 456. Legislation must be deferred until the final stage of our departure. It was therefore proposed that Parliament should be invited to pass a resolution endorsing the statement of policy, so as to provide some Parliamentary sanction enabling the Government to proceed with the gradual devolution of their authority in India.

The Prime Minister explained that the Viceroy had at first suggested that the initial steps towards our departure should take the form of complete withdrawal from the four Southern Provinces. After discussion, however, it had been agreed that, while British troops might be withdrawn from those areas and British officials serving there posted to other parts of the country, it would be necessary, in the initial stages, to maintain the present constitutional forms.

Discussion turned first on the question whether it would be wise to announce in the near future a precise date for our withdrawal from India. Was it wise to commit ourselves to a precise date when we had no assurance that there would by then be a representative authority to whom we could hand over power? It might be that if we left India at that date we should leave only chaos and the prospect of civil war behind

us. It was also necessary to consider the effect of such an announcement on other parts of the Empire and on world opinion in general. Some Ministers felt that an announcement in the terms of the draft attached to C.P. (46) 456 might be regarded as the beginning of the liquidation of the British Empire: and it would be bound to have serious repercussions in Burma, Malaya and elsewhere. Nor must we forget that a breakdown of ordered central Government in India would provide opportunities to her neighbours, which they would not be slow to take, to interest themselves in Indian affairs. We might well find that in this area lay the seeds of a future world conflict.

The Foreign Secretary thought that the announcement proposed would have serious repercussions in the Middle East. He recalled that in the negotiations with Egypt we had claimed that it would not be practicable for us to withdraw our troops from that country before 1949. How should we reconcile this claim with a statement that we were prepared to evacuate the whole of India by the spring of 1948?

The general feeling of the Cabinet was that withdrawal from India need not appear to be forced upon us by our weakness nor to be the first step in the dissolution of the Empire. On the contrary this action must be shown to be the logical conclusion, which we welcomed, of a policy followed by successive Governments for many years. It was too late to reverse the whole direction of our Indian policy, even if we had had any desire to do so, and there was no reason to fear special repercussions from the completion of that policy. Our main objective now was to bring the principal communities in India to co-operate, so that there should be a properly representative authority to whom we could hand over power. If the Viceroy was correct in his estimate that we should in any case be unable to continue effectively to rule India beyond the early part of 1948, and if the announcement of our intention to leave India by a specified date might have the effect of bringing the communities together, then it would be well to derive whatever advantage we could from the early announcement of action which would, in fact, be inevitable.

The Cabinet then considered what would be the best method of securing Parliamentary approval for the gradual devolution of authority in India.

The Minister of Defence explained that his object, in putting forward the draft resolution annexed to C.P. (46) 468, was to secure for His Majesty's Government a greater latitude in handling a fluid situation which might well produce developments which could not be foreseen. For this reason he would wish to avoid making a detailed public statement on all the specific points covered in the draft annexed to C.P. (46) 456, and would prefer to ask Parliament to adopt a resolution on broader lines which would authorise His Majesty's Government to take such steps as might be required to ensure the orderly transfer of power to the appropriate authority or authorities in India.

On the other side it was argued that Parliament would be reluctant to give the Government so wide a discretion as was pre-supposed by the draft resolution annexed to C.P. (46) 468; that the Government spokesmen in the debate on such a resolution would in any event be obliged to give information on most of the specific points covered in the draft statement of policy annexed to C.P. (46) 456; and that the more detailed statement was likely to produce a greater impact on public opinion in India.

The Cabinet's conclusion on this point was that the preferable course would be to make a statement of policy, as proposed by the Prime Minister in C.P. (46) 456, and to invite Parliament to approve that statement. It would, however, be advantageous if

the resolution approving the statement could be drawn in such terms as to afford some sanction for departing, during the transition period, from strict compliance with all the obligations resting on His Majesty's Government under the Government of India Act.

Discussion then turned on the form of the draft statement annexed to C.P. (46) 456. The view was expressed that a statement in these terms would give the impression that we were being forced out of India because we were unable to maintain our position there. In fact, our withdrawal would be the final stage in a deliberate policy of encouraging India's development towards self-government, to which successive Governments in this country had subscribed for the last thirty years. It was certainly the desire of the present Government that the Indian people should assume full responsibility of self-government. There was, therefore, no occasion to excuse our withdrawal: we should rather claim credit for taking this initiative in terminating British rule in India and transferring our responsibilities to the representatives of the Indian people. For these reasons it would be preferable that the detailed proposals set out in the draft annexed to C.P. (46) 456 should be set in a wider framework. The statement should recall the main stages in India's evolution towards self-government, as a process to which successive Governments in this country had been committed ever since the end of the last war, and should present the transfer of control to an Indian Government or Governments as the final phase in this process of evolution. The specific proposals for the withdrawal of British troops and officials should be presented as incidents in that transfer of authority. If the statement were re-cast on these lines, it should be possible to include passages calling upon the Indian people to demonstrate their capacity for self-government and to make adequate provision for safeguarding the rights of minorities.

The Cabinet agreed that the draft statement annexed to C.P. (46) 456 should be re-cast on the lines indicated above.

The Cabinet next considered the timing of such a statement. The India and Burma Committee had contemplated that the statement should not be made until it was known, towards the end of January, whether the Muslim League were unwilling to collaborate in the work of the Constituent Assembly. In support of this proposal for deferring the statement until then, it was pointed out that some members of the Muslim League were dissatisfied with Mr. Jinnah's[1] present attitude and there was some possibility that the League might be brought to agree to participate in the work of the Constituent Assembly. Other developments might occur in India during the next few weeks which might affect the position. Further, there were strong arguments against making such a declaration of policy at a time when Parliament was in recess.

On the other side, it was argued that, as the primary object of the declaration was to force the two Parties in India to face the realities of the situation and find means of collaborating with one another, there was much to be said against postponing it until after the Muslim League had taken a definite decision against collaboration. It was also argued that it was not constitutionally necessary that such a declaration should first be made in Parliament; and that, even if it were thought expedient that this should be done, it would be possible to convene Parliament for this purpose before the date on which it was now due to re-assemble. This would have the further

[1] M A Jinnah, president of All-India Muslim League; first gov-gen of Pakistan, 1947–1948.

advantage that Parliamentary time for debating the declaration would not have to be found at the expense of other Government business. . . .

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that it was most important that His Majesty's Government should take Dominion Governments into their confidence in this matter at the earliest possible stage. He hoped that, as soon as the form of the proposed declaration had been settled, he might be authorised to communicate it to Dominion Governments, so that they might have an opportunity for comment before the declaration was made. This was agreed to.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the India and Burma Committee to revise, in the light of the Cabinet's discussion, the draft statement annexed to C.P. (46) 456.

(2) Agreed to resume their discussion of this matter when a revised draft of the statement was available.

16 CAB 128/11, CM 4(47)1 8 Jan 1947

'India: constitutional position': Cabinet conclusions (confidential annex) on revised draft statement about transfer of power[1]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C.P. (47) 1) covering a revised draft of a statement of policy regarding the transfer of power in India.

The Prime Minister said that this revised draft had been prepared by the India and Burma Committee in the light of the Cabinet's discussion on 31st December. Since then there had been developments in the political position in India. Congress had decided to accept the interpretation placed by His Majesty's Government on the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16th May; and the Muslim League were now to consider whether, in view of this decision, they would collaborate in the work of the Constituent Assembly. There was therefore no occasion for the immediate issue of the statement for the purpose of overcoming a definite refusal by the Muslim League to co-operate in the framing of a constitution. But, while the Cabinet had felt that the primary object of such a statement would be to force the two Indian Parties to face the realities of the situation, the Viceroy had attached primary importance to the announcement of a definite plan for a phased withdrawal of British authority from India and it was likely that for this purpose he would still wish an early statement to be made. On the method of transferring power in India, however, there was a divergence of view between the Viceroy and the members of the India and Burma Committee. The Viceroy conceived this as a withdrawal, planned on the lines of a military evacuation from hostile territory; and it was on this account that he had attached such great importance to his original plan of withdrawing Province by Province. The India and Burma Committee, on the other hand, considered that our aim should be to secure a friendly transfer of power from British to Indian authorities, with an increasing acquiescence by the Viceroy and British officials in the wishes of the Indian Governments. It was even probable that, if discussions could be opened on a friendly basis about the means of transferring power, we should be asked to give continuing assistance in various forms to the Indian Governments. If,

[1] Previous reference: see 15.

however, the whole process was viewed as a military operation of withdrawal, it was possible that these questions would never be discussed in a friendly spirit with the Indian Governments and that an atmosphere of hostility would be created from the outset. The difference between Ministers and the Viceroy was, fundamentally, one of approach; and it seemed unlikely that the Viceroy's attitude could be changed by means of instructions conveyed by telegram. It would be preferable that he should be asked to return to London for further personal talks with Ministers.

In discussion there was general agreement with the views expressed by the Prime Minister. It was important that the senior European officers in the Indian Service should also understand the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the forthcoming transfer of power in India; and efforts must be made, through the Viceroy, to ensure that they approached this difficult task in the proper spirit. Similar considerations applied to European officers of the Indian Army; and the earliest possible opportunity should be taken of discussing with Indian leaders who would in future be responsible for the control of the Indian Army, the basis on which the Commander-in-Chief and some senior European officers might be expected to continue to serve after the transfer of power. *The Foreign Secretary* said that, from his point of view, it was most important that all possible efforts should be made to hold the Indian Army together and to make adequate provision for the future defence of India.

In further discussion the following points were also made:—

(a) *The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs* recalled that at their discussion on 31st December the Cabinet had agreed that Dominion Governments should be informed of our intentions in this matter at the earliest possible stage. As it was not now intended to make the proposed statement of policy at an early date, he doubted whether it would be wise to communicate the text to Dominion Governments at the present time. He would, however, wish to give them some general information about our intentions.

(b) It was agreed that the final sentence of paragraph 14 of the draft statement annexed to C.P. (47) 1 should be deleted. It was further agreed that in the preceding sentence of this paragraph the emphasis on British interests in the development of Indian industry was open to misrepresentation, and that the sentence should be redrafted so as to lay greater emphasis on the fact that the commercial connection between the United Kingdom and India had been, and would continue to be, of mutual advantage to both countries.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the issue of the statement of policy annexed to C.P. (47) 1 should be deferred for the time being;

(2) Approved the amendments of the draft statement noted in paragraph (b) above; and asked that Ministers wishing to suggest any further amendments of drafting should communicate their suggestions to the Prime Minister;

(3) Took note that the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Secretary of State for India, would arrange for the Viceroy to return to London for further discussions with Ministers;

(4) Took note that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs would consult the Prime Minister about the nature of the general information to be communicated to Dominion Governments at the present stage about our intentions regarding the transfer of power in India.

17 CAB 129/16, CP(47)30 14 Jan 1947

'Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin on the main policy options. *Annex*: 'The present position'

1. The London Conference on Palestine is due to re-open on 21st January. The Cabinet is now called upon to determine the line of policy we must follow in the opening stages of the Conference.

2. The many suggestions which have been put forward resolve themselves into three main proposals:—

(a) the plan for provincial autonomy drafted last July by the conference of British and American officials;
(b) a unitary independent State, as proposed by the Arabs at Lancaster House;
(c) partition, which the Zionists want.

These proposals are examined in the memorandum annexed to this paper.

3. It is quite clear that proposal (a) in its present form is unacceptable to either Arabs or Jews. Proposal (b) is unacceptable to the Jews. Proposal (c) is unacceptable to the Arabs.

4. To deal with (c) first, partition would also be unacceptable to the United Nations, and I am advised that we could not give effect to this policy without previously obtaining the consent of the United Nations. Personally, I would have no very violent objection to partition if I thought it would prove to be a solution. But I cannot conceive of the British Government, even aided by the United States, being able to carry partition with the requisite majority.

5. We must therefore consider another line of action. We must take the proposals made by the British and American officials as our basis, while amending them in such a way that they point towards an independent unitary State and incorporating into them as much as possible of the Arab plan. We must of course make it clear that we cannot accept the Arab proposals on immigration, though steps must be taken to prevent a real flooding of the country by Jewish immigrants.

6. With this as our aim, we can ask the British Delegation to re-open the Conference by telling the Arabs that we have not been convinced that their proposals deal adequately with the problem; that we have therefore not withdrawn our own plan; but that we are ready to examine with them the possibility of arriving at a compromise which would enable us to discharge our obligations in Palestine and to satisfy world opinion. The Delegation would report constantly to the Cabinet, and its course of action would be subject to review as the Conference proceeded.

7. If we allowed the Jews to insist on partition and the creation of a Jewish State (which was not promised in the Balfour Declaration) then we would face defeat in the United Nations. Even if we follow the plan of merging the Arab and the British proposals, I think the issue will have to go before the United Nations. But in that event I am satisfied that we should get sufficient support.

Annex to 17

1. The London Conference on Palestine is due to re-open on 21st January. All the

States members of the Arab League will again be represented, and on this occasion there may also be a delegation representing the Arabs of Palestine. The Zionist Executive are precluded from participating in the Conference by the terms of the resolution passed at their recent Congress in Basle, but they are arranging to meet in London on 22nd January and will be available for informal consultations which can be held at the Colonial Office while the Conference proceeds in St. James' Palace. It thus appears likely that the interested parties will be more fully represented in the forthcoming discussions than they were at Lancaster House last September.

2. The British Delegation cannot profitably resume the Conference with the Arabs, or open discussions with the Jews, unless it has clear instructions from the Cabinet based on a decision as to the objective at which British Policy is aiming in Palestine. Furthermore the local situation in that country makes it imperative that the decision of His Majesty's Government on future policy should be announced with the minimum of delay after the end of the forthcoming consultations.

3. It is already clear that there is no hope of reaching a settlement by means of a tripartite agreement between Arabs, Jews and ourselves, or even of devising a policy which His Majesty's Government could impose with the tacit acquiescence of both peoples. If we are to undertake the responsibility for giving effect to a settlement of this problem, we must be prepared to carry it out in the face of resistance from either Arabs or Jews, or in the worst case from both.

4. The only alternative to a firm decision by His Majesty's Government, and its resolute enforcement, is an attempt to divest ourselves of all further responsibility for Palestine by surrendering the mandate either to the United States or to the United Nations. Even if we wished to transfer Palestine to the United States, and the United States Government agreed to accept it, we should still have to effect the transfer through the machinery of the United Nations. We might announce our readiness to evacuate Palestine as soon as the United Nations were prepared to establish an alternative administration. Or we might go further, and announce that our troops and civil administration would be withdrawn on a given date, whether or not the United Nations were then in a position either to take over the Government themselves or appoint another State as a trustee.

5. This possibility is not examined in the present paper, because at a recent Staff Conference it was decided that the maintenance of our right to station troops in Palestine is essential to the preservation of our strategic interests in the Middle East as a whole. If this opinion is accepted, then we must remain in Palestine and accept responsibility for determining the future of that country.

6. Assuming a decision to stay in Palestine, there appear to be only four [? three] possible policies for the Cabinet to consider:—

(i) enforcing the plan for provincial autonomy which was approved in principle by the Cabinet last July, as a basis for discussion with Arabs and Jews;
(ii) partitioning the country now into a Jewish State and an Arab area which would be either absorbed into neighbouring Arab States or granted independence in the same way as the Jewish area;
(iii) negotiating with the Arabs, with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment in Palestine of an independent unitary State with a constitution embodying certain features of the plan presented by the Arab Delegation at the first part of the London Conference.

7. Before further consideration is given to these three proposals, attention must be drawn to our position as mandatory for Palestine in relation to the United Nations. We are not committed by the terms of the Charter to placing Palestine under trusteeship, but we are bound to observe the terms of a resolution passed with our concurrence at the final Assembly of the League of Nations in April 1946. This resolution took note of the expressed intentions of mandatory powers to continue to administer mandated territories in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers".

8. It is clear that we could neither partition Palestine, nor create an independent unitary State such as the Arabs propose, without previously obtaining the agreement of the United Nations. (On this point, see C.P.(47)28). Even if we were to adopt the less far-reaching proposal for provincial autonomy, and although we should be within our legal rights in giving immediate effect to it, there would be strong political arguments against doing so without reference to the United Nations. The fate of Palestine is so undeniably a matter of international concern that we shall in any case be required to account for our policy there. The only doubt, if we were to decide in favour of provincial autonomy, would be as to whether it was better to present the issue to the United Nations ourselves or to allow some other Government to take the initiative. This being our international position in the matter, we must not overlook the probable reception by the United Nations of any policy we decide to put forward.

(i) *Provincial autonomy*

9. Under provincial autonomy as under partition, the greater part of Palestine would be divided into an Arab and a Jewish area. Their provincial Governments, however, while exercising extensive powers, would not have control of foreign relations, defence or tariff policy, and their autonomy would be limited by the emergency powers of a Central Government under a British High Commissioner. This system might be expected to develop either towards partition or towards the formation of a federal State; the choice between these alternatives would not be predetermined.

10. This plan would avoid many of the practical difficulties of partition: e.g. the impoverished Arab area would not be thrown back on its own financial resources, and since the complicated frontiers between the two areas would have only an administrative significance they would not cause the same degree of inconvenience. It is probable that the Jews would resent provincial autonomy less bitterly than they would a unitary State with an Arab majority and possible that the Arabs would find it less unpalatable than partition. The Jews would at least acquire a larger measure of control over their own immigration and development. And the Arabs would be given some guarantee against the further territorial extension of the Zionist invasion. An initial period of disorder and violence might therefore be followed by the reluctant acquiescence of both communities.

11. The fact remains that the proposal for provincial autonomy has been formally and emphatically rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. Its introduction would be resisted both by non-co-operation and by armed rebellion on the part of both peoples. And even if, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs they were eventually to acquiesce in its operation, they would each continue the struggle for a

final settlement more in conformity with their national aspirations. The Jews would not relax their pressure for more territory nor the Arabs theirs for less immigration.

(ii) *Partition*

12. Partition is a vague word. The meaning and consequences of any particular scheme of partition would depend almost entirely on where the frontier was drawn between the Jewish and the Arab States. The frontier which was considered by a Cabinet Committee under the late Coalition Government was broadly similar to the line suggested as a provincial boundary in the more recent proposal for provincial autonomy. It may be assumed that, if partition were adopted in principle by His Majesty's Government the frontier proposed would provide for a Jewish State of roughly the same dimensions.

13. Partition on these lines would meet with the approval of a substantial body of opinion in this country. In principle the solution of partition also has strong backing in the United States but this is largely due to the knowledge that it would be acceptable (again in principle) to the Zionists. The Zionists, however, would indignantly protest against frontiers of the kind under consideration. Even if the leaders agreed in the last resort to administer a State within the area offered to them, they would first press the American Government to work for its enlargement, and in the long run they would not be able to suppress irredentist movements in their State. In these circumstances it is doubtful whether the settlement would command the support of American opinion.

14. A graver objection to partition lies in the effect which its enforcement would probably have on Anglo-Arab relations generally. The creation of a Jewish State even in the relatively restricted area now suggested would undoubtedly involve serious injustices for the Arab population of Palestine: a large Arab minority under Jewish rule, the loss of a large proportion of the Arab community's taxable capacity owing to the inclusion of nearly the whole citrus-growing area in the Jewish State, and the severance of Arab Galilee from the rest of the Arab territory by a corridor of Jewish land. Still more provocative of Arab resistance would be the fear that a Jewish State would be driven to pursue an expansionist policy.

15. The threat of partition would provoke an Arab rising in Palestine. It is not possible to foresee precisely how strong the revolt would be, how much active support it would receive from the Arab States, or how deep and lasting would be the effect on the attitude of the Arab Governments and peoples to Great Britain. But the certainty of Arab hostility to partition is so clear, and the consequences of permanently alienating the Arabs would be so serious, that partition must on this ground alone be regarded as a desperate remedy. The risk cannot be excluded that it would contribute to the elimination of British influence from the whole of the vast Moslem area lying between Greece and India. This would have not only strategic consequences; it would also jeopardise the security of our interest in the increasingly important oil production of the Middle East (see C.P.(47)11).

16. As has already been said, partition could not be put into effect without the previous consent of the United Nations. It is most unlikely that this consent could be obtained. The adoption of partition as our solution for the Palestine problem would therefore expose us to an almost certain defeat in the General Assembly, thus leading us back to our present situation, with the choice between continuing to govern

Palestine in accordance with the mandate or beginning again to search for an alternative policy.

(iii) *An independent unitary state*

17. The delegations of the Arab States at Lancaster House made proposals under which Palestine would be granted its independence, after a short period of transition, as a unitary democratic State with an Arab majority. There would be no further Jewish immigration except by Arab consent. The Jews would receive constitutional guarantees of their civil and religious rights, and of their representation in the legislative assembly in proportion to their numbers. These guarantees could not be modified without Jewish consent. It was contemplated that the independent State would enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain.

18. These proposals, to which the British Delegation have not yet made any reply, are not acceptable in their present form. But if we decided to aim at agreement with the Arab States, it would probably be necessary to adopt their proposals as a basis for negotiation; and there is reason to suppose that in these circumstances the Arab delegates could be induced to make substantial concessions.

19. The main issue on which the British Delegation would have to demand modification of the Arab proposals is of course Jewish immigration. It would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt a policy leading towards the creation in Palestine of an independent democratic State with an Arab majority unless they were able at the same time, and as part of the same plan, to grant a substantial number of immigration certificates. It would have to be ascertained at an early stage in the discussions that the Arabs were prepared to pay this price for a general settlement of the kind they have advocated. His Majesty's Government would also have to satisfy themselves that the position of the Jewish National Home was adequately safeguarded in the constitution of the proposed independent State. To this end they might press for extensive powers of local self-government approximating to those contemplated in the plan for provincial autonomy, thus enabling Jewish cantons to be established within the framework of the unitary State.

20. It is therefore not the Arab plan, but a settlement borrowing largely from that plan and worked out so far as possible by negotiation with the Arabs which forms the third of the possible policies considered in this paper. If the Palestinian Arabs, with their more intransigent attitude, do in fact attend the second part of the Conference, they will make it more difficult to reach any formal agreement. But it is reasonable to expect that a settlement on these lines would be broadly satisfactory to Arab opinion.

21. The principal objection to this proposal is that the Palestinian Jews would not submit to it without a struggle. The great majority of them have come to believe that the Balfour Declaration contained or implied a promise of a Jewish State; they are better prepared than the Arabs for an armed rising or a civil war; and, whatever the attitude of the Zionist Executive might be, leaders would be found to develop the present terrorist campaign into a major rebellion. This would occur during the period of transition in which ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of order would still rest with His Majesty's Government.

22. The announcement of this policy, and the ensuing clash between armed Jews and British troops in Palestine, would cause a violent outburst of indignation among the Zionists and their supporters in the United States. Much abuse of Britain would appear in the Press, and the Administration might be compelled to associate itself in

some way with this explosion of feeling. It is however doubtful whether American hostility towards us on this account would be either widespread or lasting. It is also to be noted that none of the other proposed solutions would satisfy the Zionists, and that any one of them might therefore have a similar effect, differing no doubt in intensity, on American public opinion.

25. [sic] Indeed the outstanding merit of the proposal now under consideration is that it is the only one likely to be supported by either of the two directly interested parties. It also offers the best hope of progress towards a settlement by means of negotiation with either side. These arguments for the proposal become even more cogent if it is agreed that one of our principal motives in retaining responsibility for Palestine is to secure our political and strategic position in the Middle East, which depends to so great an extent on the maintenance of Arab goodwill.

26. Any course which did not permit the British Delegation to enter into serious discussion with the Arabs would lead to an early breakdown of the Conference, and this might have disturbing consequences. For the failure of this Conference, followed by the announcement of a policy in Palestine which was unacceptable to the Arabs, would be represented in the Arab countries as a defeat for the Arab League and for the present Arab Governments. This would give rise to an immediate anti-British agitation in Iraq, Syria and possibly elsewhere. The present Iraqi and Syrian Governments, even if they were not swept away and replaced by Governments less friendly to ourselves, would probably be driven by fear of revolutionary nationalism to adopt a hostile attitude towards us in relation to Palestine and to connive at least in the transit of arms and volunteers to support Arab disorder in Palestine.

27. It is unlikely that our relations with the other Arab countries would be so immediately affected. But any policy which aroused Arab hostility would be challenged in the United Nations by the whole of the Arab bloc. There can be little doubt that in this event the Soviet group would align itself with the Arabs. We should thus have helped to bring about a diplomatic combination which it should be one of the first aims of our policy to prevent, and which if it lasted would weaken our position not only in the Middle East but also at the meetings of the United Nations.

28. Finally, a policy aiming at the early concession of independence to a unitary Palestinian State constituted on democratic principles would be in accord with the prevailing trend of world opinion on the treatment of dependent areas. It would therefore be more likely than any other policy to command the approval of the United Nations.

18 CAB 128/11, CM 6(47)3 & 4 — 15 Jan 1947

'Palestine': military implications of future policy; political implications of future policy: Cabinet conclusions (confidential annexes)

Minute 3. The Prime Minister said that it might become necessary to impose in Palestine a solution which would be actively resisted by one or both of the two communities there. He asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the question whether law and order could be preserved in Palestine in such circumstances.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff[1] said that, if there were active opposition from either Jews or Arabs alone, the situation could be handled with the military forces now available in Palestine. If there were active opposition from both communities, the situation could not be handled without military reinforcements. He would propose that these should be provided at the expense of our forces of occupation in Germany; and he considered that this could in the last resort be done without retarding the demobilisation scheme.

The Prime Minister then asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the strategic importance of Palestine as a factor in the defence of the British Commonwealth.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that it was the considered view of the Chiefs of Staff that there were three cardinal requirements for the future defence of the British Commonwealth—(i) the defence of the United Kingdom and its development as a base for an offensive; (ii) the maintenance of our sea communications; and (iii) the retention of our existing position and influence in the Middle East. These were the three vital props of our defensive position: they were all inter-dependent and if any one were lost the whole structure would be imperilled. Further, these were the fundamental principles of our defensive strategy. They would be unaffected by any technical changes in the nature and use of weapons. Equally, they remained unaffected whatever assumption was made about the potential enemy.

It was essential to our defence that we should be able to fight from the Middle East in war. It followed that we must maintain our foothold there in peace, for without that we should be unable to develop with sufficient speed a strong military position there in war. This did not mean that large forces must be stationed there in peace: we must, however, retain there bases and other facilities which, though lightly manned in peace, could be used for the rapid deployment of greater force against a threat of war. The importance of our ability to move forces rapidly to check a threat of aggression had been strikingly demonstrated by the recent despatch of a force to Basra. In future we should not be able to use India as a base for such deployment of force: it was the more essential, therefore, that we should retain other bases in the Middle East for this purpose.

Palestine was of special importance in this general scheme of defence. In war, Egypt would be our key position in the Middle East; and it was necessary that we should hold Palestine as a screen for the defence of Egypt. In peace, since we had undertaken to withdraw from Egypt, we must be able to use Palestine as a base for the mobile reserve of troops which must be kept ready to meet any emergency throughout the Middle East.

In reply to specific questions put to him by Ministers, *The Chief of the Air Staff* made the following further statements:—

(a) The facilities afforded by our Treaty of Alliance with Transjordan would not alone suffice to meet our military requirements in this area. It would be necessary to retain those facilities even though we secured full military facilities throughout Palestine.

(b) If Palestine were divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State and a Jerusalem Enclave under British administration, the military facilities required by the Chiefs of Staff could not be secured within the Jerusalem Enclave alone. Nor would it be

[1] Now Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery.

sufficient to secure military facilities from either the Arab or the Jewish State: it would be necessary, in order to secure full use of the ports, airfields and communications, to obtain military facilities by treaty arrangements with both States.

(c) So long as the necessary military facilities were obtained throughout Palestine, it was immaterial from the military angle whether Palestine was divided into two independent States or became a single independent State.

(d) The military situation would, of course, be greatly eased if a political solution could be found which was acceptable to both communities and brought to an end the existing state of tension in Palestine. If, however, one of the two communities had to be antagonised, it was preferable, from the purely military angle, that a solution should be found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs; for in that event our difficulties would not be confined to Palestine but would extend throughout the whole of the Middle East.

(e) The strategic policy for the Middle East outlined on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff was not wholly dependent on preserving the friendship of Spain, Italy, Greece and other countries bordering the northern seaboard of the Mediterranean. Our line of communication through the Mediterranean would still be of substantial value to us, even though some of these countries were hostile, provided that the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean were not also hostile.

The Prime Minister thanked the Chiefs of Staff for this expression of their views on the strategic importance of Palestine and of our position in the Middle East.

Minute 4. The Cabinet had before them two memoranda by the Foreign Secretary:—

C.P.(47)28: on the question whether it would be legally possible for His Majesty's Government to impose a solution of the Palestine problem, either by way of Partition or by the introduction of a system of Provincial Autonomy, without first obtaining the sanction of the United Nations.

C.P.(47)30:[2] reviewing three alternative policies for Palestine and discussing the line to be taken on the resumption of the Palestine Conference.

The Foreign Secretary explained that the first of these memoranda had been prepared by the legal advisers of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office and that both the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General were in agreement with the conclusions reached. These were that, before putting into effect a Partition solution, we should be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations; that we should not, from the strictly legal point of view, be obliged to obtain such previous approval for the introduction of the Provincial Autonomy plan; but that it would be politically inexpedient to attempt to introduce either solution without first bringing the matter before the United Nations.

The Colonial Office had not been consulted in the preparation of the second memorandum. The Foreign Secretary said that he was sorry that he had not been able to find time for such consultation; and he also apologised to his colleagues for circulating this paper on the morning of the Cabinet's meeting.[3] He had thought, however, that it might assist the Cabinet in their discussion to have before them a

[2] See 17.

[3] The meeting began at 10.30 am.

paper which focussed, as this was designed to do, the main issues for discussion.

The Foreign Secretary recalled the various stages in the consideration of the Palestine problem since the latter part of the late war. The Coalition Government had then favoured Partition as a solution; and it was possible that this might have been carried into effect without great difficulty if it had been imposed shortly before the end of the war. This opportunity had, however, been lost. When the present Government assumed office, their first endeavour had been to break away from the terms of the White Paper of 1939. They had sought Arab acquiescence in the continuance of Jewish immigration at the rate of 1,500 a month; and they had aimed to get the Palestine problem reviewed afresh against the background of Jewish sufferings in Europe. At that time there was reason to believe that the Jews would have been content with immigration at the rate of 4,000 a month. This policy was making some progress when President Truman intervened with his demand for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. This encouraged Jewish ambitions and led to the appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. When that Committee reported, His Majesty's Government had been ready to give sympathetic consideration to its recommendations, if they were taken as a whole; but they had found it necessary to stand firm against President Truman's desire that immediate effect should be given to the recommendation in favour of the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine in advance of full consideration of the remaining recommendations of the report. Thus, the approaches which His Majesty's Government had originally made towards a solution of this problem had been deflected by President Truman's intervention. The position had also been made more difficult by the decision of the Labour Party, at their Annual Conference, to endorse the Zionist demand for the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. We had now to contend with the further complication that we must find a solution which was likely to be endorsed by the United Nations. Even if we did not ourselves think it necessary to seek the approval of the United Nations, he had no doubt that the matter would be referred to the United Nations by some Government which disliked the solution which we adopted. It was his opinion that a solution by way of Partition would not command the support of a two-thirds majority in the United Nations. If we advocated Partition, we were likely to find ourselves with no effective support except from the United States. As against such a solution, the Arab States would advocate their plan for an independent unitary State, which they would defend as being in accordance with established democratic principles; and it was his view, based on his practical experience of discussions in the Assembly, that there would be a wide measure of support for the fundamental principles to which the Arabs would appeal in support of their plan. On the other hand, he believed that there was a reasonable prospect of securing majority support in the United Nations for a solution on the general lines of the Provincial Autonomy plan, especially if it could be adjusted to meet some of the objections which had been raised against it by both Arabs and Jews.

If we attempted to impose a solution, in pursuance of our powers as Mandatory, without reference to the United Nations, there would be widespread disorder in Palestine. One or other of the interested Governments would regard this as constituting a "situation" endangering world peace and would bring the matter before the Security Council. This would create for us difficulties even greater than those which we should have to meet if we ourselves brought the problem before the General Assembly.

He had at one stage hoped that a solution might be found on the basis of a "transitional period" during which Palestine would remain, under Mandate, as a bi-national unitary State but provision would be made that either of two provinces (Arab and Jewish) would have a right of secession after a fixed period of years. He had believed that, if such a system could be established, the two communities might during the transition period come to see the advantages of collaboration and that pressure for the creation of a separate Jewish State would subside. He was told, however, that the lack of finality in this solution would result in continuing disorder, to an extent which might cause a breakdown of our administration in Palestine. Nevertheless, he would still like to explore the possibilities of such a solution when the Palestine Conference was resumed.

There was no doubt that the situation would be eased if other countries could be persuaded to admit a number of Jewish immigrants from Europe. He had for some time been pressing the United States Administration to make such a gesture; and he was glad to see that President Truman had now included in his Message to Congress a proposal for a special immigration quota for displaced persons, including Jews. H.M. Ambassador in Washington had been asked to enquire how soon Congress might be expected to pass the necessary legislation. It would be most helpful if this lead could be followed by other countries, including the British Dominions. Hitherto we had had no success in the efforts which we had made to persuade Dominion Governments to accept a proportion of these refugees.

In conclusion, the Foreign Secretary said that he did not expect the Cabinet at their present meeting to reach final conclusions on this difficult issue. He would, however, be glad to have the advantage of hearing the views of his colleagues.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he would like more time to consider the proposals in the Foreign Secretary's latest memorandum (C.P.(47)30).

He informed the Cabinet of negotiations which had taken place with the Jewish Agency since the Zionist Congress at Basle. The Congress had decided that the Executive of the Jewish Agency should not take part in the London Conference unless "a change should take place in the situation". Mr. Ben Gurion,[4] when he had subsequently visited London, had pressed that His Majesty's Government should take some action, for instance as to the rate of immigration to Palestine, which would constitute a change in the situation. He had told Mr. Ben Gurion that no fresh policy could be announced before the Conference, but he had succeeded in arranging with him that the responsible members of the Executive would in fact assemble privately in London at the time of the Conference, so that they would be available for informal discussions while it was going on.

The Colonial Secretary said that representatives sent by the Palestine Arab Higher Committee would attend the Conference. This was satisfactory, though the persons chosen were not as widely representative or as suitable personally as might have been hoped.

The High Commissioner for Palestine was anxious that the Government should realise the urgency of finding a solution; the administration and the military forces in Palestine were working under great strain and early action to relieve this was, in his view, essential. The High Commissioner's own opinion was that, despite the

[4] David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel, 1948–1963 (with one short interval).

difficulties involved by the need for obtaining the approval of the United Nations, some form of Partition provided the only practicable solution.

The Secretary of State said that he himself was more and more inclined to share this view, which he felt sure would also command more general acceptance in this country than any other solution. He appreciated that there would be difficulties in the United Nations, but these would also arise over any other possible solution. If the scheme were not accepted by the Assembly, the responsibility would then be on the Assembly to find a better solution.

He himself could see no solution on the lines of the Arab plan for a unitary State, for illegal immigration of Jews would continue and the present state of tension would be perpetuated; and we should still remain responsible for law and order.

Nor did he favour the plan for Provincial Autonomy. The Jews would not accept as satisfactory any scheme which did not provide for a Jewish national State, whose nationals would have a Jewish nationality. He would circulate to the Cabinet a memorandum setting out other difficulties which the High Commissioner saw in this scheme.

As regards Partition much would depend on the boundaries drawn and on the size of the areas given to the two communities.

The Cabinet first considered whether a solution on the lines of Partition was likely to command the support of a two-thirds majority of the United Nations.

It was explained that the Charter itself did not provide that a two-thirds majority should be required for an issue of this kind. It was, however, open to any member State to propose that an important issue should be determined by a two-thirds majority, and this proposal was certain to be made in respect of the Palestine issue. While it was true that for this point of procedure only a simple majority was required, it would always be difficult to secure even a simple majority against a proposal that an important issue should be decided by a two-thirds majority.

The Foreign Secretary said that the Arab States would certainly oppose Partition; and he believed that the Soviet Government and the Slav group would also oppose it, partly because of a desire to support the Arabs against us, and partly because they would expect us, in the event of Partition, to secure military facilities by Treaty with the two independent States. It was unlikely that the United States would be able to secure the support of China for a Partition solution; and India was also likely to vote against it. In these circumstances he saw no prospect of obtaining a two-thirds majority in favour of Partition.

In discussion the view was expressed that, if the Soviet Government must be expected to vote against Partition for the second reason given by the Foreign Secretary, there could be no assurance that they would support the alternative of Provincial Autonomy. *The Foreign Secretary* thought, however, that in certain circumstances the Arab States might support such a solution and that some of the Slav States might also be persuaded to support it.

The view was also expressed, in discussion, that if all the arguments in favour of Partition were set forth in the discussions at the Assembly, and the disadvantages of the alternative courses were fully explained, the possibility could not be wholly excluded that, by a combination of skilful debating and tactical manoeuvring of the interested States, the necessary majority in support of this solution could be obtained.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer stressed the urgency of finding some early

solution which would terminate the existing conditions of disorder in Palestine. He suggested that the Cabinet should first consider what was the best solution on the merits and should then discuss separately the practical prospects of carrying that solution into effect. His own view was that, on the merits, the best solution was Partition. Events had shown that Jews and Arabs could not, and would not, work together in Palestine. It was also clear that the Zionists were determined to insist on the right of Jews to enter as immigrants, subject only to the control of a purely Jewish authority, some purely Jewish area in Palestine, however small it might be. That determination in effect ruled out all solutions other than Partition. If the Cabinet were agreed that Partition was the right solution, he could not believe it impossible to find ways and means of carrying that solution into effect.

The Minister of Health[5] endorsed the views expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was essential that an early solution should be found. If it were not, the consequences would be continuing disorder in Palestine, which we should be called upon to repress by force, and a general outbreak of anti-Semitism. This was a situation which this Government could not contemplate. He considered that Partition was the right solution; and he could not believe that it would be rejected by the United Nations if it were supported by the United Kingdom and the British Dominions, by the United States, and, as seemed probable, by some at least of the Governments of Western Europe. At the moment responsible Jews were ready to accept Partition as a solution. This, therefore, was the moment at which to put it forward. For it must be remembered that, for the Jews, Partition was a compromise solution; and that, because of the delays which had occurred in dealing with this problem, Jewish leadership was already passing into less moderate hands. If we failed to seize this opportunity, it was likely that the leadership of the Jews would pass to men who would advocate more extreme solutions and more violent courses.

The Minister also challenged the view that, from the angle of our strategic interest, it must be our objective to avoid estranging the Arab States. In his view, a friendly Jewish State in Palestine would give us a safer military base than any we should find in an Arab State. The Jews were under the continuing influence of countries friendly to ourselves. If, however, India and other Muslim countries passed under Russian influence, for how long could we expect to retain a secure military base in an Arab Palestine?

The Minister of Defence said that he too would favour Partition as a solution if it were possible to get both Arabs and Jews to accept it. He differed, however, from the Minister of Health on the strategic issues involved. If it came to a choice between antagonising Arabs or Jews, he thought there could be no doubt that from the point of view of our own strategic interest it would be more disadvantageous to us to incur the continuing hostility of the Arab States. For in that event the Soviet Government would undoubtedly support them, with the intention of undermining the position of the British Commonwealth and the United States in the Persian Gulf area. He thought it most important that, throughout their discussions, the Cabinet should keep it in mind that it was to the strategic advantage of Russia to win the Arabs over to their side. Our first task must be to try to find a solution which would do justice to both Arabs and Jews. If, however, that proved impossible we should look to our own

[5] Mr A Bevan.

strategic interests; and from that angle there could be no doubt that it was vital to us to retain the goodwill of the Arab world.

The Minister of Fuel and Power said that it was also important that we should not follow a course of action which would alienate the United States. They too had important interests at stake in the Middle East; and it had been our policy to try to induce them to shoulder increased responsibilities, together with us, in that area. Their support would, however, be given to a solution by way of Partition.

For his part, he had always hoped in the past that the Jews in Palestine would follow a policy of assimilation. No progress had been made, however, in that direction: and it was now quite clear that the Jews were determined to secure a political State, however small, of their own. To attempt to establish, against that determination, a unitary State in Palestine which provided no outlet for the aspirations of Zionism could only result in continued and increasing disorders in Palestine which would bring great discredit on the Mandatory Power. His conclusion was, therefore, that His Majesty's Government should advocate Partition and should strive to get that solution endorsed by the United Nations.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting.

19 CAB 129/16, CM(47)32 16 Jan 1947

'Palestine: future policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Creech Jones

At the meeting of the Cabinet on 15th January,[1] the Foreign Secretary advanced the proposal that we should adopt, as the basis of our future policy in Palestine, the plan for Provincial Autonomy amended in such a way that it points towards an independent unitary State and incorporates as much as possible of the Arab plan. As the Minister responsible for the administration of Palestine, I must submit that, after much inquiry and discussion, I cannot see any hope of a settlement of these lines. I realise, of course, that major issues of an international and strategic character are involved in the adoption of any solution of the Palestine problem and in this memorandum I am dealing mainly with the position as I see it from the point of view of the administration of that country, though I am not unmindful of these wider issues. For this purpose I think that it may be of use to my colleagues if I first refer to the three plans now before H.M.G. (the Foreign Secretary's proposal is a combination of two of these plans) and state my views regarding them.

2. The three plans are: our own plan for a system of Provincial Autonomy: the Arab plan for a unitary Palestinian State under Arab majority rule: and Partition.

Provincial autonomy

3. My colleagues are familiar with the main features of the Provincial Autonomy scheme. This plan was put forward by my predecessor, was adopted by the Anglo-American experts, and was announced in Parliament by the Lord President as the basis for consultation with the Arabs and the Jews. It was, however, always realised that the primary requirement of the Provincial Autonomy plan was the willingness of the two communities to operate it and unfortunately both communi-

[1] See 18.

ties have already voiced their refusal to do so. Without such willingness the plan is a paper plan only. Its success depends on the co-operation of the two communities and such co-operation cannot, in existing circumstances, be achieved nor is it likely to be achieved for a long time to come. So long as the plan leaves the ultimate policy to be pursued in Palestine for future determination it will continue to be rejected by both parties; if that policy is declared in advance it will be rejected even more vehemently by one of them. The Arabs would take no part in Provincial Autonomy to be followed by Partition, the Jews would take none in Provincial Autonomy to be followed by a unitary State. It has become clear that the Jews will accept no solution which denies their claim to Statehood; moreover, the High Commissioner has pointed out the grave administrative difficulties inherent in the operation of the plan having regard to the present situation in Palestine. In view of the further fact that the Government of the United States has refused categorically to endorse it, I do not consider that it can any longer be regarded as a practical proposition.

The Arab plan

4. The Arab plan visualises Palestine as a State under Arab majority rule, in the government of which the Jews would be represented in accordance with their numbers, i.e. one Jew to two Arabs. It is designed to give the Arabs full control both over the framing of the constitution and over any Government which may be constituted under it. It is practically a repetition of the plan embodied in the White Paper of 1939 but with additional restrictions on Jewish rights.

5. It has been argued, and not without force, that the Arab plan is founded on normal democratic principles since the will of the majority will prevail. It is also claimed that it is in conformity with the provisions of Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations in that it spells progressive development towards self-government in accordance with the "freely expressed wishes of the people concerned", using the words as referring to the wishes of two-thirds of the population of Palestine.

6. On the other hand, while the plan can be defended in theory, there is not the slightest hope of its proving workable in practice. The Jews would not even be in a minority in Palestine in the sense in which a political party may be in a minority under an ordinary democratic system, with prospects of coming one day into power themselves and thus being in a position to implement their own policies. Future Jewish immigration, if any, being designated under the plan as a matter to be determined by the Arabs alone, the Jews would be condemned to the status of a permanent minority with no such possibility in view.

7. Not only does the plan incorporate every feature of the White Paper of 1939 to which the Jews then took exception, but it introduces new conditions equally repugnant to Jewish sentiment. These include the provisions that no immigrant arriving in Palestine shall have a note [?vote] until he has resided in the country for ten years and that the Jewish educational system shall be subjected to majority Arab control. It can be stated unhesitatingly that not even the most moderate Jew would be prepared to acquiesce for a moment in the state of affairs visualised in the plan. It would spell the cessation of immigration, the arrest of Jewish development in Palestine, and the permanent subjugation of the National Home, with its highly organised European population and its extensive commercial and industrial interests, to a backward Arab electorate, largely illiterate and avowedly inimical to its further progress.

8. While it might be possible to persuade the Arab States to agree to certain modifications of their plan, there is no prospect of their consenting to waive any of its three cardinal conditions, majority control of the Government of Palestine, Arab control of Jewish immigration, and the early withdrawal of mandatory supervision. These features will be resisted by the Jews with every resource which they possess. Were effect given to the Arab proposal that the plan should be enforced regardless of Jewish opposition, the inevitable result would be an organised revolt on the part of the latter, coupled with a refusal to recognise or to pay taxes (of which they contribute at least two-thirds) to the Government thus constituted. The position in Palestine would thereby be rendered far worse even than it is today since the administration and the Armed Forces would have to deal not only with terrorism but with the organised opposition of the whole Jewish population. Implementation of the further Arab proposal that, having put the plan into operation, H.M. Government should withdraw and declare Palestine independent whether the Jews co-operate or not, would mean abandoning the country to civil war, a war which would have wide repercussions as it would probably lead to a wave of persecution, directed against Jewish communities elsewhere throughout the Middle East.

9. In my opinion, the cost of enforcing this plan would be disorder and bloodshed on a scale which we could never contemplate. It would raise an issue of first-class importance with the United States where the Executive and Legislature would probably vie with one another in denunciation. There would also be adverse reactions in the Empire itself. It would moreover, in my view, be impossible for His Majesty's Ministers to defend the resulting position either in Parliament or in the country. It would mean a gross betrayal of the Jews if, after undertaking responsibility for the original establishment and subsequent safeguarding of the Jewish National Home, we were to hand them over to the mercy of the Arabs as subjects of a State, of which, in all probability, the Mufti would be the Head, with no power of interference from outside. The policy would be in diametrical conflict with the undertakings given by the Labour Party, prior to its assumption of power, regarding the development of the National Home.

The plan proposed by the foreign secretary

10. The plan proposed by the Foreign Secretary is a combination of the two plans which I have described and, in my opinion, has most of the disadvantages of both. He suggests an initial period of Provincial Autonomy. I have already given reasons why, after consultation with my advisers and with the High Commissioner, I do not believe this to be possible. I am circulating to my colleagues a note by the High Commissioner setting out the objections from the point of view of the Palestine Administration. Jewish refusal to operate the plan would be even more vehement were it modified as suggested so as to point to a unitary State and so as to incorporate any of the main features of the Arab proposals. Nor do I believe that a unitary State in Palestine is a practicable proposition. The gulf between the two communities has become too deep. Such a State must mean the subordination of the Jews to the Arabs, and the complete frustration of Jewish national aspirations; any attempt at such subordination would, I am convinced, bring about a situation in Palestine in which the Jews would have to be held in subjection by force and by force alone.

Partition

11. In my opinion, the only reasonable solution of the Palestine problem is that recommended by the Royal Commission of 1936, namely the partition of the country between the Arabs and the Jews. This solution possesses an element of finality which is elsewhere absent. It would give to each community a maximum degree of power to manage its own affairs and a minimum degree of power to interfere in the affairs of the other.

12. Certain of the objections to Partition are fresh in the minds of my colleagues from the last discussion and I need not repeat them here. I would merely say that I doubt whether this policy would evoke such serious repercussions as are sometimes foreshadowed. In Palestine, because of the recent deterioration of Arab feeling, its implementation would undoubtedly cause some violence and disorder on the part of the Arabs, but this may not be on so large a scale as has sometimes been represented. If a decision is not too long delayed, it might even be confined to local rioting in the main towns.

13. I would be the last person to under-estimate the difficulties of Partition and more particularly of finding a plan of Partition which, while not demonstrably unfair to the Arabs, could be regarded as in any way satisfying Zionist aspirations. It cannot be denied that the scheme of Partition prepared by the Cabinet Committee of 1944 involves certain serious injustices to the Arabs. I have since had a revised scheme prepared which obviates, to some extent at least, certain of these injustices, but whether it does so to the extent necessary to make the plan acceptable to the United Nations I am unable to say. But I believe that our object should be to prepare a scheme of partition which does the maximum possible justice to both communities and then to stand upon this scheme as our future policy.

I realise further that under partition we may not get all the strategic advantages which the Chiefs of Staff require. It is not impossible that we may be refused facilities in the Arab area, should it not be linked with Trans-Jordan, or that the United Nations may consider that Jerusalem and the surrounding territory should be placed under a joint trusteeship in which His Majesty's Government would obtain no particular advantages. But these are possibilities which, in my opinion, have to be faced and regarded as the price of escape from our existing embarrassments.

14. In short, I can see in Partition a hope of the solution of the Palestine difficulties; I can see none in any other plan. It is the solution most in harmony with the trend of public opinion and of the Press in this country and is that most likely to win United States support and the endorsement of the Labour Party. Otherwise, I regret that I can see little hope of order or of sound administration.

Conclusion

15. It seems quite certain that we can put no new policy into effect in Palestine without reference to the United Nations. Such a reference is necessary in strict law if either the Arab plan or Partition is to be adopted; in the case of provincial autonomy a reference might be obviated for a short time, but we should almost immediately be challenged to produce a trusteeship agreement in respect of the territory. It is, moreover, probable that even before this challenge one of the Arab States would appeal to the Security Council. It seems to me therefore that the problem before us is not what policy we shall immediately implement in Palestine, but what policy we shall recommend to the United Nations for implementation.

16. In my opinion, we should now decide to make a last attempt to produce a plan of Partition which does the least injustice to both communities and, having produced such a plan, recommend it to the United Nations, indicating at the same time the difficulties inherent in the alternative schemes. I myself feel in some doubt how the United Nations will vote on this issue, but even on the assumption that it would be defeated, we should at least have recommended what seems to us to be the best solution, and the responsibility for rejecting it and for finding an alternative solution would rest fairly and squarely with the United Nations. It will be necessary to make it abundantly plain to them that, if they reject Partition, the onus of producing an alternative solution is on them. The present position in Palestine is intolerable and cannot be maintained; if the United Nations fail to find an answer which we deem acceptable it will be necessary to consider whether we should not announce our intention to withdraw from a situation which will have become impossible.

17. On the resumption of the Conference we should, I suggest to my colleagues, attempt to explore with both parties all the various possibilities open, explain the difficulties which each presents and try to lead them in the direction of a reasonable scheme of Partition as the best and most equitable solution.

20 CAB 128/11, CM 11(47)2 22 Jan 1947

'Palestine: policy to be followed at resumed London Conference': Cabinet conclusions (confidential annex)

The Cabinet resumed their discussion[1] of the line to be taken on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the Palestine Conference and in the informal conversations which were to be held at the same time with Jewish representatives.

They had before them two memoranda by the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

C.P.(47)31: giving the comments of the High Commissioner for Palestine on the plan for Provincial Autonomy; and

C.P.(47)32:[2] giving the views of the Secretary of State on the relative merits of the four main solutions which had been put forward, and suggesting that the aim of our Delegates, in the forthcoming discussions, should be to explore with both parties the various possibilities, explain the difficulties which each presented, and try to lead them in the direction of a reasonable scheme of Partition as being the best and most equitable solution.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had considered very carefully, in the light of the Cabinet's discussion on 15th January, how he should handle the forthcoming discussions with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews. He himself was not opposed in principle to a solution by way of Partition; but he was impressed by the difficulty of imposing any solution against the active opposition of either community in Palestine. If it came to the point of using force against the Arabs, he was not sure how this would be accepted by public opinion in this country. And he was certain that such action would create a "situation" in Palestine which would be brought to the notice of the Security Council as likely to endanger world peace. He considered,

[1] Previous reference: see 18.

[2] See 19.

therefore, that a further effort should be made by negotiation to bring the two parties somewhat nearer together. If this attempt failed the question would have to be brought in some form before the United Nations. He hoped, however, that the Cabinet would not attempt to decide, before the negotiations began, what recommendation they would make to the United Nations if they failed in this last attempt to secure an agreed settlement. And he thought it would be a mistake for the Cabinet to commit themselves to support of any particular solution before Ministers entered upon the negotiations.

The Colonial Secretary agreed that the Cabinet should not now be asked to decide what policy should be followed if the conversations broke down. He hoped that the Cabinet would leave the negotiators as much latitude as possible. Their object should be to move both the Jews and the Arabs from their present irreconcilable positions, in the hope that as a result there would emerge some conclusion which we could put forward with some hope that it would not be wholly unacceptable to either of the two parties.

He himself felt that such a solution must be along the lines of Partition. He could not see any prospect of agreement on any other line. It had been argued that Partition could not give a viable State to both Jew and Arab, but he was not convinced of this. There should be no great difficulty in making the Jewish share reasonably viable, while the Arab share might become viable if it were linked with Trans-Jordan. It had also been argued that Partition would alienate the Arab world. He was not convinced that this would necessarily follow. The Arab States were bound to us by economic and strategic interests; and, while some Arab countries would no doubt oppose Partition, he was by no means certain that they would all be united in that policy for long. Trans-Jordan, for instance, might favour Partition, since she stood herself to gain from it, while there were some indications that Ibn Saud[3] might not be wholly opposed to it.

The Minister of Fuel and Power said that he was in favour of Partition. This policy would, among other things, have the advantage that it would be acceptable to the United States. If it was necessary to choose between the friendship of the Jews and of the Arab world, he felt that on a long view the friendship of the Jews was more valuable to us than that of the Arabs. Recent experiences in Egypt and India should warn us that, if a unitary State with an Arab majority were established in Palestine, it would not necessarily remain friendly towards us or willing to allow us to maintain a strategic base in Palestine.

In subsequent discussion Ministers agreed that, failing an agreed settlement, any solution of this problem would have to come before the United Nations. The General Assembly was not due to meet until September; and, although a special meeting could no doubt be called earlier, the atmosphere would probably be more favourable at the September meeting. On the other hand, if the forthcoming discussions produced no agreement, it was doubtful whether the internal situation in Palestine could be held until September.

Discussion in the United Nations, whether at the General Assembly or in the Trusteeship Council, was bound to be embarrassing. There would be much discussion of the various promises that had been made on behalf of His Majesty's Government, not all of which were easy to reconcile with one another, and critics

[3] Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd, 1902; King of Hejaz, 1926; King of Saudi Arabia, 1932–1953.

would dwell on the long history of our failure to find a solution of the problem by ourselves. Some Ministers felt that, if we were unable to secure an agreed settlement, there would be much to be said for leaving it to the United Nations to find a solution. On the other hand, we could not lightly take such a course, which might mean that we should be unable to secure the military facilities in Palestine which were necessary to our strategic position in the Middle East.

As regards oil supplies, the two ports at which the pipe-lines terminated or would terminate were Haifa and Gaza. According to the Jewish ideas of Partition, both would be in the Jewish area, though it might be arranged that Gaza should be in the Arab area. For the use of Middle East oil, however, we depended, not only on the security of the ports where the pipe-lines terminated, but on the friendship of the countries in which oil was produced and through which the pipe-lines passed. Apart from Persia, all these countries were Arab countries.

The Cabinet's conclusion was that it would be a mistake to decide at this stage what policy should be followed if the forthcoming conversations broke down. During the conversations, Ministers should try their utmost to move the two parties from their present irreconcilable positions. The Cabinet should be kept informed of the progress of the discussions; and they should, in particular, be consulted further before any indication was given to either Arabs or Jews that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support any particular solution of the problem.

21 CAB 129/16, CP(47)49 6 Feb 1947

'Palestine': joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin and Mr Creech Jones on fresh proposals for self-government

Under the authority given to us by the Cabinet on 22nd January (C.M. (47) 11th Conclusions, Minute 2)[1] we have spent the last ten days in exploring, in conversations with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews, the possibility of finding some settlement of the Palestine problem which might be broadly acceptable to all parties. These conversations have confirmed our fear that there is no prospect of finding such a settlement.

2. *The Arabs* have again put forward the plan which they presented at Lancaster House in the autumn—that Palestine should be given early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. They have, however, indicated that they would be ready to discuss modifications of their political proposals *if* they were first given a firm assurance that:—

(a) we were prepared to exclude the possibility of Partition as a solution; and
(b) we agreed that there should be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine.

3. We are satisfied that there is no possibility of moving the Arab Delegations from the first of these conditions. They are implacably opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine, and they will go to any lengths to prevent it. Delegates representing the younger generation of Arabs have stated their sincere conviction that their contemporaries would take up arms to resist the imposition of Partition. Whatever doubts there may have been on this point in the past, we must

[1] See 20.

now take it, as one of the facts of the situation, that Partition would be resisted by the Arabs of Palestine with the support of the Governments and peoples of all the Arab States.

4. On the second condition, about Jewish immigration, there is a possibility of some compromise. The point on which the Arabs will insist to the last is that they must have some satisfactory assurance that it will not be possible for the Jews, by continuing immigration, to secure a majority in Palestine. For this purpose, however, it is not essential to provide, as the Arabs are now demanding, that there shall be no further Jewish immigration at all. Other safeguards less drastic than this could secure the Arab objective of ensuring that the Jewish community shall not, by immigration, obtain an absolute majority in Palestine. Provided that satisfactory assurances could be given on that point, we should not despair of securing some agreement on immigration.

5. *The Jews* still interpret the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as implying a promise that a Jewish State will be established in the whole of Palestine. Their first suggestion was that we should rescind the White Paper of 1939 and continue to hold the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to build the foundations of that State by unrestricted immigration and economic expansion. We made it clear that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to maintain in Palestine a purely tutelary administration under the protection of which such a Jewish policy could be carried out. The issue we presented to the Jewish representatives was the need to find some practical means of initiating in Palestine self-government evolving towards independence.

The Jewish representatives then indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine". They would not themselves propose a plan of Partition, but expressed willingness to consider such a proposal coming from His Majesty's Government.

6. The essential point of principle for the Jews is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. And the essential point of principle for the Arabs is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. These, for both sides, are matters of principle on which there is no room for compromise. There is, therefore, no hope of negotiating an agreed settlement.

7. In these circumstances we have tried to find a solution which, even though it may not be acceptable to the two communities in Palestine, is one which we could conscientiously recommend and defend to public opinion in this country and to the United Nations.

8. We have been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that such a solution cannot be found along the lines of Partition. Partition has certain intrinsic weaknesses. Wherever the frontiers were drawn, large Arab minorities would be left within the Jewish State. The area left to the Arabs could not be economically self-supporting and even if it could be attached to Transjordan, the standard of services which it now enjoys could not be maintained. The location of Jewish settlements is such that the Jewish State would have to include the major economic assets of the Arab community. Thus, any scheme of Partition which would satisfy the Jews would be demonstrably unfair to the Arabs.

Apart from the merits, we must also consider the consequences of advocating Partition. If we did so, we should have to face the resolute hostility of the Arab world.

Even if we were prepared to accept the consequences of this hostility, it is by no means certain that we could count on the support of the Jews. They have not been willing to put before us any detailed plan of Partition; but, from the general statements which they have made, it is clear that they would expect to obtain under Partition a very substantial area of Palestine. It is therefore most unlikely that they would support any Partition plan which His Majesty's Government would feel justified in putting forward.

Furthermore, the existing Mandate gives us no authority to move in the direction of creating an independent Jewish State, whether under Partition or otherwise. For any solution along these lines it would be necessary for us to obtain the prior assent of the United Nations. We should have little chance of securing the necessary two-thirds majority in support of any scheme of Partition. For a scheme which was not endorsed by the Jews it is even doubtful whether we could rely on the full support of the United States. The views expressed on behalf of the State Department in recent telegrams leave us with the impression that the United States Government will to the end remain an uncertain and unreliable factor in this problem.

9. In these circumstances we seek the authority of the Cabinet to put before the Arabs and the Jews the alternative plan outlined in the Appendix[1] to this memorandum.

This has as its primary object the development of self-government in Palestine, with the aim of enabling the country to achieve its independence after a short transition period under Trusteeship. It provides for a substantial measure of local autonomy in Arab and Jewish areas; and enables Arabs and Jews to collaborate together at the centre. It contains special safeguards for the "human rights" of the two communities. It provides for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants over the next two years and for continuing immigration thereafter by agreement between the two communities or, failing that, by arbitration under the United Nations. Thus, it should go some way towards allaying Arab fears of unrestricted Jewish immigration, while avoiding the extreme course of denying to the Jews any further immigration without Arab consent.

10. This plan incorporates many features taken from the Provincial Autonomy scheme and from the proposals put forward by the Arab Delegations. It will not, of course, meet the Jewish claim to sovereignty; but it does make reasonable provision for Jewish immigration and economic development. It should meet the views of a large number of moderate Jews throughout the world who do not support the more extreme claims of Zionism.

It is consistent with the principles of the Mandate; but it adds, what has hitherto been lacking, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up from the bottom political institutions rooted in the lives of the people.

The initial steps in such a policy could be taken at once under the existing Mandate; and if we concluded that it was possible to do so, we could avoid the practical difficulties which would arise in the country if there were a long interval between the announcement of a new policy and its initiation after approval by the United Nations. At the same time, the plan is fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and provides for regularising the position by the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement. These features would cause the United States Government

[1] Not printed.

to hesitate before opposing the plan.

11. We recognise that these proposals offer no guarantee for the preservation of our military position in Palestine after the five-year period of Trusteeship. On the other hand we do not think that either of the alternatives open to us would be more advantageous from a strategic point of view. If we had to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations without ourselves making any recommendation as to its solution, we could have no guarantee that British troops would be able to remain in the country even for so long as five years. And Partition, far from conferring any strategic advantages on us, might not only involve us in a heavy military liability in Palestine, but might also weaken our strategic position in the Middle East as a whole. At a time when it is one of our main pre-occupations to reduce our overseas military expenditure and to avoid any further slowing down in the planned rate of demobilisation, we should find it difficult to justify the great military risks involved in a policy of Partition.

From a purely military point of view, the most satisfactory solution would no doubt be for His Majesty's Government to continue to administer Palestine under the existing Mandate without applying for a Trusteeship Agreement. We are convinced, however, that the maintenance of British administration without reference to the United Nations would be so strongly challenged that we should soon find our position untenable.

12. We therefore ask for authority to put to the Arabs and the Jews the scheme outlined in the Appendix to this memorandum on the understanding that, if agreement were reached on this basis, we should proceed to give effect to it.

If, as is more likely, we find that no agreement can be reached, we shall report to the Cabinet whether in our judgment this solution is likely to meet with any substantial measure of acquiescence from even one of the two communities in Palestine; and shall invite the Cabinet to decide whether His Majesty's Government would be justified in bringing it into operation on their own authority pending the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement.

If we are unable to report any such prospect of acquiescence, we believe that the only course then open to His Majesty's Government will be to submit the problem to the United Nations, explaining the efforts we have made to find a solution but making no positive recommendation.

22 CAB 128/9, CM 18(47)2 7 Feb 1947

'Palestine: future policy; progress of London discussions': Cabinet conclusions[1]

The Cabinet considered a joint memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (47) 49)[2] reporting the progress of the discussions with Arab and Jewish representatives about the future of Palestine, and seeking authority to put before them as a basis for further negotiation the fresh proposals outlined in the Appendix to the memorandum.

The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear from the discussions that the Arabs were implacably opposed to Partition. Apart from their opposition, there would be

[1] Previous reference: see 20. [2] See 21.

grave practical difficulties in giving effect to Partition; and it was also doubtful whether any scheme of Partition which would be acceptable to the Jews would be regarded by His Majesty's Government as defensible. The Arabs also demanded that there should be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine; but on this point there should be some room for compromise if means could be found of allaying the Arab fears that, by immigration, the Jews would achieve a numerical majority in Palestine.

The Jews claimed that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate implied a promise that a Jewish State would be established in the whole of Palestine. They were willing to consider as a compromise the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine." The essential point of principle for the Jews was the creation of a sovereign Jewish State.

In these circumstances the Colonial Secretary and he had tried to find a solution which, even though it were not accepted by either community, was one which His Majesty's Government could conscientiously support and in which the two communities might finally acquiesce. They now sought authority to put before the Arabs and the Jews the plan outlined in the Appendix to C.P. (47) 49. This had as its primary object the establishment of self-government in Palestine leading to independence after a transition period of five years under Trusteeship. It provided for a substantial measure of local autonomy in Arab and Jewish areas, and enabled Arabs and Jews to collaborate together at the centre. It contained special safeguards for the "human rights" of the two communities. It provided for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants over the next two years and for continued immigration thereafter by agreement between the two communities or, failing that, by arbitration under the United Nations. The plan incorporated features of many earlier schemes. It was consistent with the Mandate and, if it commanded a reasonable measure of acquiescence from either of the two communities, it could be set on foot at once and regularised subsequently by a Trusteeship Agreement.

If it were found that a plan on these lines was likely to command such a measure of acquiescence, the Cabinet would be asked to decide whether His Majesty's Government should go ahead with it. If on the other hand there was no prospect of acquiescence, it would then be necessary to submit the whole problem to the United Nations, explaining the various efforts which had been made to find a solution but making no recommendations.

The Foreign Secretary said that he thought it most desirable that the negotiations should not be allowed to come to an end at this point. Hitherto, neither side had been prepared to discuss in a rational spirit any plan that had a chance of acceptance by the other side. In the last two days, however, there had been some signs of a more accommodating spirit; and there was every advantage in continuing by patient endeavours over the next few days to seek a basis for detailed discussion of a practical plan.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he had previously thought that Partition afforded the only way out of the present deadlock in Palestine; and he had been confirmed in that opinion by the views expressed to him by the High Commissioner and by his advisers in the Colonial Office. He confessed, however, that, the longer he had examined the detailed implications of Partition, the more he was impressed by its practical difficulties. It would be very difficult to establish a viable Jewish State without prejudicing the vital interests of the Palestine Arabs; and wherever the frontiers were drawn, large numbers of Arabs must inevitably be left

under Jewish rule. He was also impressed by the difficulties of securing the assent of the United Nations to a scheme of Partition. But perhaps the greatest difficulty of all was that the enforcement of Partition was, he was now convinced, bound to involve conditions of rebellion and disorder in Palestine which might last for a considerable time and would involve a substantial military commitment for us.

He was therefore in full agreement with the proposals in C.P. (47) 49, which had been explained to the Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary. He believed that these proposals would go some way to meet the Jewish point of view on immigration and on land transfer. There were signs of some division of opinion among the leaders of the Jewish Agency, and some elements in the Jewish community both here and in the United States considered that the Agency's demands were too extreme. He therefore hoped that the Jews might regard this plan as one which they were prepared to discuss.

On the strategic implications of this plan, *The Minister of Defence* suggested that it would be mistaken to set a limit of five years for the period of Trusteeship. Even if both communities acquiesced in the scheme, it was doubtful whether in five years we could produce in Palestine a stable State ready for independence. The Chiefs of Staff were much concerned at this time-limit, for there could be no certainty that we should be able to maintain a military base in Palestine thereafter, and this was essential for the defence of our interests in the Middle East as a whole. It was therefore suggested that the period proposed should be increased to ten years or, alternatively, that we should not do more than promise that the continuance of the Trusteeship should be reviewed after five years.

The general view of the Cabinet was, however, that unless we now proposed a definite and relatively short period of Trusteeship we should be unable to convince the two communities that we were sincere in our intention to enable Palestine to achieve independence. Moreover, the knowledge that the period of Trusteeship was to be relatively short would provide both communities with the necessary incentive to collaborate with one another. As to our strategic needs, we must in any event rely on a military Alliance with an independent State when the period of Trusteeship ended; and there was no reason to suppose that this need be more difficult to obtain in Palestine than it had been in Iraq and Transjordan.

It was pointed out that the proposals now put forward were based on the hope that Jews and Arabs would collaborate in a unitary State. This had been the foundation of our policy for many years, but no signs had been forthcoming of any readiness to collaborate. Would this fresh attempt to secure collaboration meet with any more success?

The general view of Ministers was that, nevertheless, there was every advantage in putting forward these proposals to both parties as a basis for negotiation. The results of the further discussions should be reported to the Cabinet. It was also agreed that the negotiations must be brought to a point within the next week or so. If there was no measure of acquiescence in the proposals, then it seemed that reference to the United Nations would be necessary.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Authorised the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to put before the representatives of the Arabs and the Jews the proposals outlined in the Appendix to C.P. (47) 49 on the understanding that, if an agreement were reached on this basis, His Majesty's Government would proceed to give effect to it.

(2) Took note that, if in these further discussions no agreement were reached, the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary would report to the Cabinet whether in their judgment these proposals were likely to meet with any substantial measure of acquiescence from either of the two communities in Palestine, and would then invite the Cabinet to decide whether His Majesty's Government would be justified in bringing the scheme into operation on their own authority pending the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement.

23 CAB 129/17, CP(47)59 13 Feb 1947

'Palestine': joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin and Mr Creech Jones on submission of the problem to UN General Assembly in September

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Cabinet on 7th February,[1] the proposals annexed to C.P. (47) 49 were communicated to the Arab Delegations at the Palestine Conference and to the Jewish Agency for Palestine. At meetings held on 10th February and 12th February respectively, Zionist representatives and the Arab Delegates declined to accept these proposals as a basis for further negotiation.

2. The Zionists condemn the British plan on the ground that it is likely to lead to the independence of Palestine as a unitary State in which the Jews would be condemned to the status of a permanent minority. The Arabs say, on the other hand, that the establishment of local government areas enjoying a measure of autonomy would lead inevitably to Partition. They are also absolutely opposed to the proposal for further Jewish immigration. Both sides are looking beyond the interim proposals for the administration of Palestine under a five year Trusteeship to what they fear would be the logical conclusion of such administration. Each is determined to do all in its power to prevent any step being taken now which might prejudice its position in five years' time.

3. The Jewish counter-proposal is that we should allow the Jewish community in Palestine to build up its strength under British protection in accordance with the terms of the existing Mandate as it was interpreted before the White Paper of 1939. From 1921 to 1932 this involved moderate Jewish immigration at an average rate of between 9,000 and 10,000 a year; but later, owing to Hitler's persecution of the Jews, the figure rose to a peak of 62,000 in 1935. Confronted with our refusal to undertake this continuing responsibility in the circumstances of Palestine today, they have expressed willingness to consider proposals for Partition. It is clear from the indications they have given us of the frontier for which they would ask, that, even if we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of Partition, there would be no prospect of Anglo-Jewish agreement on the size of the Jewish State.

4. The Arab Delegations stand by the proposals which they submitted to us last September. If we will not negotiate on that basis they appear to take the view that our proper course is to evacuate Palestine and leave its inhabitants to settle their own future. This is likely to be their proposal if and when the issue goes to the United Nations. But they would probably prefer that we should remain in Palestine until the United Nations have considered the problem.

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[1] See 22.

5. We understand that the latest British proposals have found some favour in the eyes of non-Zionist Jews and of sections of public opinion in this country, but the fears of both Jews and Arabs in Palestine are so acute, and their mood so intransigent, that, in our judgment, there is no prospect even of acquiescence in these proposals. We therefore do not advise that His Majesty's Government should attempt to put this policy into effect on their own authority alone. Indeed, we have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis whatsoever, except with the backing of the United Nations.

6. We might of course do what some of the Arabs appear to wish and evacuate the country now, leaving the United Nations to intervene if no settlement emerges from the resulting clash between the two peoples. We do not recommend the adoption of this humiliating course. Apart from the moral responsibility we should thereby incur for the bloodshed in Palestine, it would be incompatible with the obligations we undertook when we first accepted the Mandate and with the resolution on Mandates adopted by the last Assembly of the League of Nations under which we are committed to administer Palestine in general accordance with the Mandate until we can agree with the United Nations upon other arrangements.

7. It seems therefore that we must continue to shoulder our present responsibilities until we can submit the problem to the appropriate organ of the United Nations, namely, the General Assembly. The next annual session of the Assembly will be in September. Under the Charter, a special session may be convened by the Secretary-General at the request either of the Security Council or of a majority of the member States. The advisability of asking for a special session of the Assembly for the purpose of submitting the Palestine problem has not yet been fully examined, but in view of the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow it seems unlikely that a special meeting of the Assembly could be convened before the beginning of June. We are therefore inclined to think that we must proceed on the assumption that this matter cannot be discussed by the United Nations before the next regular session of the Assembly in September.

8. We must, however, draw the special attention of the Cabinet to the extremely critical situation which will confront the Palestine Administration between now and September. There is reason to believe that the volume of illegal immigration will grow as the weather improves. It is highly probable that the interception of these immigrants and their diversion to Cyprus will give rise to incidents which will increase the scale of Jewish terrorism in Palestine. In any event, terrorist activity will probably continue, and the Administration will therefore be compelled to maintain its present emergency arrangements. Under these the civil Administration of Palestine is virtually a besieged garrison, the members of which have little freedom of movement, are deprived of their families and are living under an abnormal and continuing strain. The plight of the military forces is little better, and we have repeatedly been warned of the danger of indiscipline among the troops if provocation by Jewish terrorists continues. There is no evidence at present suggesting that the Arabs are likely to resort to violence in the near future, but preparations are actively proceeding among the Arab population. The possibility must be faced that the High Commissioner may be compelled long before September to hand over control of the country to a Military Administration.

9. The risks described in the preceding paragraph are grave. On the other hand, the knowledge that His Majesty's Government intend to submit the whole problem to

the United Nations might in the interim have a restraining influence on both peoples. It is therefore of the highest importance that, if the Cabinet decide in favour of reference to the United Nations, this decision should be made public without delay.

10. The announcement of such a decision would have the further advantage of reducing the danger that some other Power would place the Palestine situation on the agenda of the Security Council. There is no immediate sign that any of the Arab States intends to take this step, but circumstances might arise in which they would wish to do so. If, for instance, we sought to increase the rate of Jewish immigration above the existing 1500 a month at any time between now and September, it is almost certain that the Arabs would raise the whole Palestine question in the Security Council.

11. We have stated above that the prospect of reference to the United Nations might deter both Arabs and Jews from resorting to violence, because neither people would wish to prejudice its case in the eyes of the General Assembly. From this point of view it would also be desirable that His Majesty's Government should refrain from taking any step which might be regarded as prejudicing the issues to be submitted to the Assembly. This would mean maintaining the status quo in Palestine between now and September. It may be, however, that on further consideration it will be found impossible on political or administrative grounds to avoid some relaxation of the present restrictions on Jewish immigration; and we think it right to warn our colleagues that we may have to submit further proposals on this point.

12. Our proposals, therefore, are:—

(1) That His Majesty's Government should give immediate notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine to the judgment of the General Assembly;

(2) That His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the existing Mandate in Palestine until the next regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

13. There remains to be considered the form in which the problem should be presented to the United Nations. On this we suggest that the British statement should begin with an historical account of the discharge of our trust in Palestine. It would point out that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable, that it has imposed on the Mandatory an impossible task, and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities have proved irreconcilable. It would go on to describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the resulting situation, viz. the present Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, and our own proposals. It would conclude by asking the General Assembly to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not propose that, in submitting the matter to the Assembly, His Majesty's Government should themselves make any recommendation.

14. The substance of the British proposals has already become public knowledge and the Palestine Conference will probably come to an end this week. In these circumstances, it will be necessary to make an announcement in Parliament early next week, and this will be followed by a request for a debate, facilities for which will probably have to be given later in the week.

We propose that a White Paper should be published in advance of the debate,

containing (a) the provincial autonomy plan, as described by the Lord President in the House of Commons on 31st July, 1946 (together with the map which accompanied the Report of the British and American officials, on which the Lord President's statement was based); (b) the proposals made by the Arab Delegations in September 1946, and (c) the latest British proposals.

24 CAB 128/9, CM 22(47)2 14 Feb 1947

'Palestine: future policy': Cabinet conclusions on reference to the UN

The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (47) 59)[1] reporting the results of the further discussions with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews on the future of Palestine.

Both the Arabs and the Jews had declined to accept as a basis for further negotiation the proposals approved by the Cabinet on 7th February.[2] The Jews had rejected them as likely to lead to an independent unitary State in which the Jews would be a permanent minority. The Arabs had rejected them as leading inevitably to Partition and also because they provided for further Jewish immigration.

In these circumstances, it was recommended that His Majesty's Government should give immediate notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine to the judgment of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In placing the question before the Assembly, His Majesty's Government should give an historical account of the discharge of their trust in Palestine, and should explain the various solutions which had been proposed; and, without themselves making any recommendations, should invite the Assembly to find a solution of the problem. The next Session of the Assembly would not be held until September, but it would probably be impracticable to arrange for a special Session to be held before then. Meanwhile, we must continue to administer the existing Mandate.

The Foreign Secretary recalled the various stages of the negotiations over the past eighteen months, and explained how the problem had become progressively more intractable. American Jewry now had great influence in the counsels of the Jewish Agency. He had made every effort to secure the assistance of the United States Government, but in the event their interventions had only increased our difficulties. When the first session of the London Conference had ended last autumn, he had not been without hope of a solution, but since then opinion on each side had hardened and the negotiations which had just taken place left no room for hope of a settlement acceptable to His Majesty's Government in which either side would acquiesce.

In the final stage of the negotiations the Jewish representatives had been prepared to consider a scheme of Partition, but when asked to define what they meant by their claim to a "viable State in an adequate area of Palestine" they had made it clear that they claimed a far larger area than any which His Majesty's Government would be justified in proposing for the Jews under a Partition scheme. A map indicating the extent of the Jewish claim was shown to the Cabinet.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had the impression that the representatives of the Jews had not believed that we should in fact refer the matter to the United Nations. He thought that both Jews and Arabs were anxious to avoid discussion of the

[1] See 23. [2] See 22.

problem in that forum, and it might be that, if we now announced our firm intention to take the matter to the United Nations Assembly, this might bring them to a more reasonable frame of mind. Even after such an announcement had been made, he would certainly continue his efforts to find a solution; and he had it in mind, in particular, to make a direct approach to the Rulers of the Arab States. Even though we gave notice of our intention to submit the matter to the United Nations, we could subsequently withdraw it from the agenda of the Assembly if between now and September a solution could be found which was acceptable to both parties.

The Lord Chancellor said that, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he had acceded to a request that he should grant an interview to Mr. Simon Marks[3] and Mr. Ben Gurion. The latter had made it clear that the Jewish Agency would prefer that we should not try to force a final solution of the Palestine question at the present time by submitting it to the judgment of the United Nations. The Agency believed that it would be easier to reach a final solution at some future date; and they desired that meanwhile His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on the basis on which it had been administered before the White Paper of 1939. If the Government were willing to do this, the Jews would be satisfied with two concessions. The first was that 100,000 Jews should be admitted to Palestine over the next two years, and that further immigration thereafter should be determined solely in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity. If it were clearly laid down in advance that immigration was to be regulated solely in accordance with that principle, they would be content that the rate of immigration should be finally determined by the High Commissioner. The second concession was that Jews should have the right to settle and buy land in any part of Palestine. Mr. Ben Gurion had added that, if those two concessions were made, he would be able to secure the co-operation of the Jewish community in Palestine in combating terrorist activities, and he believed that terrorism could then be brought to an end. He could not give any assurance that illegal immigration would cease, but he thought that it would shrink to small proportions if legal immigration were allowed to the extent which he had suggested.

The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that the object which Mr. Ben Gurion had in mind, in his conversation with the Lord Chancellor, was the same as that which the representatives of the Jewish Agency had advanced in their recent conversations with him and the Colonial Secretary, viz., that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate in such a way as to enable the Jews to attain, by immigration, a numerical majority in Palestine. Such a policy was bound to excite the active hostility of the Arabs in Palestine.

The Minister of Food said that he could not find, in the proposals now submitted by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, any hope of reaching finality in the Palestine problem. It was admitted that the present position in Palestine was unsatisfactory and was imposing a great strain on our troops and civil administration; and under these proposals he feared that this position would continue indefinitely. He would himself have preferred that we should support the Jewish claims. He believed them to be just; and he also considered that our strategic

[3] Retailer and business innovator; formerly director of Zionist headquarters in London following the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

interests would be best served by securing in a friendly Jewish State the military facilities which we desired.

As against this, it was pointed out that by adopting such a policy we should probably provoke an Arab rising in Palestine and should incur the hostility certainly of the Arab peoples and possibly of the whole Muslim world. Our main object in desiring military facilities in Palestine was to enable us to maintain our position and influence throughout the Middle East. It would be no advantage to us to secure a safe base in Palestine by means which estranged the surrounding Arab countries. Further, in view of the recent activities of Jewish terrorists in Palestine, it was not to be assumed that a policy of full support for the Jewish claim would be acceptable either to public opinion in this country or to the British troops in Palestine.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that, in the considered view of the Chiefs of Staff, it was vital to the security of the British Commonwealth and of the United Kingdom itself that we should retain bases adequate to maintain our military position in the Middle East; and in present circumstances we were relying on securing in Palestine some of our essential needs for such bases. If the future of Palestine were left to the decision of the United Nations, we could not be sure that we should be able to secure there the military facilities which we required. If in the event we were unable to secure adequate bases there or elsewhere in the Middle East, the foundations of Commonwealth defence would be undermined.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he still believed that Partition would afford the best means of securing both peace in Palestine and our own strategic interests in the Middle East. He presumed that the proposals now before the Cabinet did not exclude the possibility of a decision by the United Nations in favour of Partition. *The Foreign Secretary* confirmed that Partition was not excluded.

Further discussion showed that it was the general view of the Cabinet that the right course was now to submit the whole problem to the United Nations, on the basis proposed in C.P. (47) 59. This submission would not involve an immediate surrender of the Mandate; but His Majesty's Government would not be under an obligation themselves to enforce whatever solution the United Nations might approve. If the settlement suggested by the United Nations were not acceptable to us, we should be at liberty then to surrender the Mandate and leave the United Nations to make other arrangements for the future administration of Palestine.

The Cabinet next considered whether the matter could not be brought to the United Nations before the next regular Session of the General Assembly in September. It was admitted that this further delay would be most unfortunate. On the other hand, it was clear that a special Session of the General Assembly could not be convened until after the end of the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow; and the Dominion Governments desired that, after that, a Conference of the principal belligerent States should be held to discuss the peace settlement for Germany. There seemed, therefore, to be little prospect of arranging for the General Assembly to consider the Palestine problem before September. The Cabinet were also informed that the Trusteeship Council would not be competent to discuss this matter, as there was no trusteeship agreement in respect of Palestine. In these circumstances *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to enquire whether there were any means by which the United Nations could set in train preliminary enquiries and other preparatory measures with a view to ensuring that the General Assembly could proceed at once to a definitive discussion of the problem at its next regular Session in September.

Discussion then turned on the difficulties of holding the internal position in Palestine in the interim period before a decision was taken by the United Nations. *The Secretary of State for the Colonies* stressed the difficulties which this further delay would involve for the civil administration, and drew special attention to the statement in paragraph 8 of C.P (47) 59 that conditions might arise in which the control of the country would have to be handed over to a military administration. *The Chief of the Air Staff* said that the British troops in Palestine were now under great strain, but they had at least a definite objective, viz., the maintenance of the existing Mandate. Once it was announced that the question of Palestine's future was to be submitted to the United Nations without any recommendation from us, a new element of uncertainty would be added; and it would become more difficult to maintain the discipline and morale of the troops. It was also pointed out that the policy now proposed would involve a further delay in providing permanent accommodation for the troops in Palestine, who were now living under unsatisfactory conditions; and this would increase the difficulties of the military authorities.

The suggestion was made that the position might be eased if some concession could be made in respect of Jewish immigration in this interim period. *The Prime Minister* said that in his view the right course for His Majesty's Government would be to make every effort to maintain the *status quo* during this period, including the restriction of Jewish immigration to the present rate of 1,500 a month. Any concession on that point would excite the opposition of the Arabs and would also lead to pressure from the Jews for further concessions.

The point was also made that, once it was announced that the question was to be submitted to the United Nations, there was some reason to hope that both communities in Palestine would exercise restraint so as to avoid prejudicing the case which they would have to present to the General Assembly. It might be useful to suggest that the President of the United Nations should make an appeal to all parties to preserve the *status quo* in Palestine until the matter came before the General Assembly.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that His Majesty's Government should now give notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the basis proposed in paragraph 13 of C.P. (47) 59.

(2) Authorised the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Foreign Secretary, respectively, to communicate this decision to Dominion Governments and to the United States Government.

(3) Agreed that a statement of the Government's intention should be made in both Houses of Parliament early in the following week.

(4) Invited the Foreign Secretary to consider whether, in order to avoid further delay, preparatory measures could be initiated by the United Nations to ensure that the General Assembly could proceed to a definitive discussion of this problem when it met in September.

25 CAB 128/9, CM 44(47)2 6 May 1947

'Ceylon: constitutional development': Cabinet conclusions on Mr Senanayake's request for independence

The Cabinet considered a memorandum (C.P. (47) 144) on the constitutional position in Ceylon, submitted by the Minister without Portfolio[1] as Chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee. They also had before them a report by the Chiefs of Staff (C.P. (47) 147) on the military implications of the proposals put forward in that memorandum.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies recalled that, in the discussions in 1945 on the Report of the Soulbury Commission, Mr. D.S. Senanayake, the Vice-Chairman of the Ceylon Board of Ministers, had proposed the immediate grant of Dominion status to Ceylon. This proposal had been rejected by the Cabinet, but the constitution granted on the basis of the Statement of Policy of October 1945 (Cmd. 6690) gave the Ceylon Government full control of the internal affairs of the Island in the expectation of eventual evolution to Dominion status. In view of recent developments in India and Burma, Mr. Senanayake had now reopened the matter by asking that Ceylon should be promised "independence within the British Commonwealth" as soon as possible after the inauguration of the new Constitution in October 1947. He had undertaken that Ceylon would enter into agreements with His Majesty's Government for safeguards in respect of Imperial Defence and external affairs, but had asked that the promise of independence should not be made conditional on these agreements. Acceptance of this proposal would involve taking a risk on Mr. Senanayake's good faith and his chances of being returned to power; but refusal would strengthen the hands of the extremists in Ceylon, who were pressing for complete independence, and might prejudice the inauguration of the new Constitution. In that event, we might fail both to secure our defence requirements and to retain Ceylon within the Commonwealth. The Secretary of State therefore recommended that a statement should be made on the lines suggested by Mr. Senanayake. His proposals had the full support of the Governor of Ceylon, and had been endorsed by the Colonial Affairs Committee, subject to the views of the Chiefs of Staff and Dominion Governments.

The Chief of the Air Staff stressed the strategic importance of Ceylon. It was an essential base for the defence of the Indian Ocean. It was also an essential link in our air, cable and wireless communications with the Far East. The Chiefs of Staff considered that the grant of independence to Ceylon should be accompanied by reservations which would ensure that our defence requirements would be adequately and permanently met.

In discussion there was strong support for the view that it would be unwise to reach a hurried decision on a question of such major importance, which was of close concern to all the Commonwealth countries. The Dominion Governments should have full opportunity for comment before any commitment was made to Ceylon; and Australia and New Zealand, in particular, should be informed of the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of the proposal. The Cabinet should not expose themselves to the criticism of acting precipitately in response to an overture from a party leader on the eve of an election, of committing themselves without

[1] Mr A Greenwood.

adequate consultation either within or outside Ceylon, and of ignoring the position of the minorities whose interests had hitherto been carefully safeguarded. There was also a risk that an announcement on the lines proposed would be interpreted as an indication of weakness: there could be no assurance that Mr. Senanayake would keep his promise: and we should be encouraging demands for similar political concessions in Malaya and elsewhere. In any event was it not premature to agree to any further measure of constitutional reform in Ceylon? The new Constitution, which had been drawn up after full investigation and consultation in the Island and embodied a scheme put forward by Ceylon Ministers themselves, had not yet come into operation. The announcement now proposed would involve abandoning it even before an election had been held.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that a negative reply might have serious political results in Ceylon.

In discussion the following further points were made:—

(a) The implications of the term "independence within the British Commonwealth" should be carefully considered. The use of the word "independence," apart from giving Ceylon a right to apply for membership of the United Nations, might place His Majesty's Government in an embarrassing position in connection with demands for the withdrawal of troops from "independent" countries.

(b) Mr. Senanayake had suggested that it was unrealistic to suppose that His Majesty's Government would be willing to face a major clash with India in order to protect Ceylon's interests. It should be made clear to him that His Majesty's Government could not accept such an argument.

(c) Consideration should be given to the definition of an appropriate constitutional status for Colonial territories whose political development would soon enable them to expect some degree of independence within the Commonwealth.

(d) The arrangements agreed with the Union of South Africa for the naval base at Simonstown might provide an appropriate precedent for the agreement which would ultimately have to be made with the Ceylon Government for the safeguarding of our defence requirements in the Island.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to submit, for consideration by the Cabinet, the draft of the communication to be made to Mr. Senanayake in the light of their discussion;

(2) Invited the Chiefs of Staff to consider what arrangements for safeguarding our defence interests would have to be made with the Ceylon Government, if the Island attained a position of independence within the Commonwealth.

26 CAB 118/29 20 May 1947

[Ceylon]: letter from Mr Bevin to Mr Creech Jones about independence policy

[The CO in May 1947 prepared a draft announcement and message to Mr Senanayake indicating that though it would be impracticable to give 'an unconditional promise of independence now' the government was in sympathy with the desire of Ceylon to achieve an independent status in the Commonwealth. Mr Bevin objected not only to these statements in principle, but also to the wording of passages which said (i) that the British government was prepared to present heads of an agreement 'which would enable Ceylon

to attain full independent status within the Commonwealth', and (ii) that an Act of Parliament would authorize 'any transfer of power to an independent government in Ceylon', in order to make it fully effective. In response (see 28) to Mr Bevin's démarche, Mr Creech Jones submitted a revision which mentioned 'independence' once only (no advance commitment upon it). However, the final version had no reference to independence at all, merely to 'fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth' as the aspiration which the British government *understood* (rather than 'sympathised with')—but defence, external affairs and safeguards for minorities must first be effectively provided for. The removal of any reference to independence may well have been Mr Attlee's decision; he made amendments to the revised draft on 6 June 1947.]

Dear Arthur,

I cannot help feeling that your draft telegram to Mr. Senanayake goes too far, and further than the Cabinet wished. We must face this issue. While I am endeavouring to hold on to the Middle East, if the whole of the Indian Ocean is going together as well then the position of the British Empire is considerably weakened. There are so many implications in the letter that I think he would be quite justified in assuming that even if you do not give an unconditional promise of independence now, you intend to do so later on. Would it not be better to say, as it was said at the Cabinet, that we have entered into an agreement with him on the realisation of self-government, and to make it more pronounced and clear that any further discussion depends on the steps that are taken by the Government of Ceylon and ourselves which would be designed to make the next constitutional change effective? For example, assuming a Government is set up after this election, surely it would be possible to give a promise that we would then proceed to discuss defence, external affairs, safeguarding the minorities, and so on, and when that is firmly fixed that would enable us to proceed to deal with Dominion status.

I do not like the repetition of the word "independence" the whole time. There is quite a different meaning attached to this by the Eastern people from ours. Again, before this goes off, I think you should be conversant as to what is happening regarding India itself. Communications rather indicate that the India we visualised when this was discussed is not now likely to result from the discussion, and therefore will not the whole situation and outlook of the people of Ceylon change in consequence? I have not attempted to redraft the document, but I would like this statement to be taken into account and the Prime Minister to have my views before the message is agreed. I can assure you, however, that in all these matters the countries of the Middle and the Far East are watching every move we make, and if we go any further with this policy than we have done already then the moral authority of Great Britain in that area will be lost.

This constant desire to make further pronouncements in these territories I think should be resisted. We are moving away from war; the whole conception of our attitude is becoming understood, and in my view the pressure will get less if we take a rather firmer line than is suggested in the messages. Would it not be better to set out the steps:

(1) the present constitution to be operated;

(2) the discussion of the problems mentioned above for defence, external affairs, safeguarding the minorities and so on to be discussed and embodied in the agreement, with the understanding that that agreement will continue in the event of a further constitutional change; indeed, the constitutional change will carry these obligations with it; and

(3) any further constitutional change to be dealt with after (1) and (2) have been disposed of.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd) Ernest Bevin

27 CAB 129/19, CP(47)158 22 May 1947

'Indian policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Attlee: proposed statement on partition

[This document has been printed in TOPI, vol IX, no 516.]

The India and Burma Committee has had a series of discussions, first with Lord Ismay (Chief Adviser to the Viceroy) and later with the Viceroy himself.

2. Lord Mountbatten's instructions were to do his utmost to secure general acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan. If this proved impossible he was to report by the 1st October on the steps which he considered should be taken for the handing over of power in June, 1948.

3. Since his arrival in India Lord Mountbatten has had a prolonged series of conversations with the leaders of Congress and of the Muslim League and has also conferred with representatives of the Sikhs. His conversations have convinced him that there is no prospect of acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan or of a Union of India on any other basis. He is also convinced that a very early announcement of His Majesty's Government's intentions as to the manner in which power will be transferred in 1948 is essential if widespread and uncontrollable communal disturbances, especially in the North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab, are to be avoided. The India and Burma Committee are fully satisfied that this diagnosis is correct and that further initiative on our part is essential.

4. The Viceroy has convened for 2nd June a small Conference consisting of leaders of the Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikhs at which he will make a final effort to get a compromise on the basis of the Cabinet Mission's plan. If, as he expects, he fails to do so, he proposes to lay before the Conference the text of a Statement by His Majesty's Government. He will inform the Conference that he is prepared to consider any modifications of it which the Conference may agree to propose to him within a short but stated period. The proposed text of this announcement, as approved by the India and Burma Committee in consultation with the Viceroy, is contained in the annex[1] to this memorandum.

5. The Statement announces:—

(i) that the attempt to secure a Union of the whole of India on the basis of the Cabinet Mission's proposals must now be abandoned;
(ii) that arrangements must therefore be made whereby power can be transferred to more than one authority;
(iii) a procedure whereby the different parts of India can choose through elected representatives whether their future constitutions shall be framed by the existing

[1] Not printed.

Constituent Assembly composed of representatives of those areas that hold aloof from the main body;
(iv) provisions for setting up such new Constituent Assembly for the areas that opt for separation action.

6. The main purpose of the procedure proposed is to thrust upon Indians the responsibility of deciding whether or not India shall be divided and in what way. The elaborate nature of the procedure is unfortunately made unavoidable by the complex conditions existing in India, if a reasonably equitable expression of Indian opinion in the areas in question is to be obtained. The probable result will be that in the North-West Sind, Western Punjab, and possibly also the North-West Frontier Province will stand out from the existing Constituent Assembly. In the North-East there is some possibility of Bengal remaining united, but if this does not happen Eastern Bengal, and the one predominantly Muslim district of Assam, are likely also to stand out.

7. The Viceroy in his conversations with the party leaders has revealed to them the main outlines of his proposals and is satisfied that they will be accepted by Congress. Mr. Jinnah acquiesced in them in private conversation although in a subsequent public statement he has protested against any proposal to partition Bengal and the Punjab. The Viceroy thinks, however, that the Muslim League is likely to co-operate in working the procedure proposed.

8. The India and Burma Committee are satisfied that these proposals are the best available in the circumstances and recommend that the Viceroy be authorised to proceed accordingly.

28 CAB 118/29 — 23 May 1947

[Ceylon policy]: letter (reply) from Mr Creech Jones to Mr Bevin

Many thanks for your letter about Ceylon.[1] I am very grateful for your views. You will recollect that it was only by the narrowest margin that Mr. Senanayake was persuaded not to reject the Soulbury constitution in 1945–6 as not going far enough in the direction of independence. The Governor in a letter to me recently said that "there is still a chance of retaining Ceylon as a loyal and willing member of the Commonwealth, and I consider the most serious and urgent consideration should be given to Mr. Senanayake's proposals". Sir Henry Moore is as you know a most able and experienced Governor; and I feel we must give his view consideration when words like those come from him.

At the same time we must have regard to Commonwealth interests and in the light of your remarks I have attempted to redraft the public announcement and the message to Mr. Senanayake. I regret bothering you with my amended drafts again but I am anxious not to overstep your views in this matter. I have tried to be, as you suggest, more non-committal about "independence". I should be grateful if you would look through these drafts again and say whether you are now satisfied with them. I have still to agree them with the Governor for in their present form the drafts fall short of his views. But when I have cleared them with you and then him I will bring them to the Cabinet.

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[1] See 26.

29 CAB 129/21, CP(47)259 18 Sept 1947

'Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin on policy of withdrawal [Extract]

. . .

Withdrawal from Palestine

17. It appears from the preceding paragraphs that grave disadvantages would follow from a decision by His Majesty's Government to undertake the task of carrying out any of the three solutions which the Assembly may be expected to consider. If these disadvantages are held to preclude acceptance of responsibility for any of the three solutions, His Majesty's Government must be prepared for an alternative course of action. This would be equally necessary in the somewhat similar situation which would be created by a failure of the Assembly to carry any resolution whatever by the necessary two-thirds majority.

18. The present situation in Palestine is intolerable and cannot be allowed to continue. His Majesty's Government have themselves failed to devise any settlement which would enable them to transfer their authority to a Government representing the inhabitants of the country. If the Assembly should fail, or if it were to propose a settlement for which His Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility, the only remaining course would be to withdraw from Palestine, in the last resort unconditionally.

19. The threat of British withdrawal within a specified time, coupled with an offer to assist in giving effect to any agreement reached between the Arabs and the Jews before our departure, might conceivably have the result of inducing them to co-operate in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable civil war. But a withdrawal, if decided upon, should not be made conditional on such an agreement.

20. Withdrawal in the absence of Arab-Jewish agreement has disadvantages which should not be underestimated. There would be an interval between the announcement of our intention to withdraw and the actual withdrawal, an interval in which the task of the Administration might be more difficult than in any previous period. In the absence of a Government to which power could be transferred, the consequences of our evacuation would be unpredictable. Some or all of the Arab States would probably become involved in the resulting disorders; they might even quarrel among themselves over the country's future. In any event it is likely that the situation would before long be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

21. On the other hand our withdrawal from Palestine, even if it had to be effected at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country, would have two major advantages. British lives would not be lost, nor British resources expended, in suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other. And (at least as compared with enforcing the majority plan or a variant of it) we should not be pursuing a policy destructive of our own interests in the Middle East . . . .

30 CAB 128/10, CM 76(47)6 20 Sept 1947

'Palestine': Cabinet conclusions on relinquishing the Mandate and the line to be taken at the UN

[The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) submitted a majority report recommending a form of partition generally (but not sufficiently) favourable to the Zionist cause. The British government had no intention of enforcing a solution unacceptable to either side, and, after the Cabinet decision recorded here, warned the UN that its troops would be evacuated by 1 Aug 1948 at the latest. Despite this, the UN General Assembly endorsed a modified version of the UNSCOP majority report on 29 Nov without recommending any means for its enforcement. Even before the termination of the mandate on 15 May 1948, civil war was developing in Palestine.]

The Cabinet had before them:—

(i) a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (47) 259)[1] summarising the main recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and suggesting the line to be taken by the United Kingdom delegate when the Report of the Special Committee came before the General Assembly; and
(ii) a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (C.P. (47) 262) covering an appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff of the military and strategic implications of the plans proposed in the Majority and Minority Reports of the Special Committee.

The Foreign Secretary said that when the Report of the Special Committee came before the General Assembly the representatives of other countries might be tempted to put forward unworkable proposals, relying on the fact that it would be for His Majesty's Government to implement them. To obviate this, it was essential that the United Kingdom delegate should make the attitude of His Majesty's Government clear from the start. His own view was that there would be grave disadvantages in any decision by His Majesty's Government to undertake the task of carrying out either the recommendations of the Majority Report or any alternative plan of partition which might be proposed, or the recommendations of the Minority Report. He had therefore been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the right course was for His Majesty's Government to announce their intention to surrender the Mandate and, failing a satisfactory settlement, to plan for an early withdrawal of the British forces and of the British administration from Palestine. He did not wish to express any opposition to the recommendations in either Report, but he was satisfied that, unless His Majesty's Government announced their intention of abandoning the Mandate and of withdrawing from Palestine, there was no prospect of an agreed settlement; and he was not willing that British forces should be used to enforce a settlement which was unacceptable to either the Arabs or the Jews.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was in general agreement with the views expressed by the Foreign Secretary. It was to be hoped that the proposed announcement would produce an agreed settlement, but it had to be realised that no such settlement might be forthcoming, in which event His Majesty's Government would have to face the prospect of leaving Palestine in a state of chaos which would make it difficult to safeguard British interests, such as airfields and oil installations.

The Minister of Defence said that if the proposed announcement were to induce

[1] See 29.

the Arabs and the Jews to co-operate and invite His Majesty's Government to assist them in drawing up a new Constitution for the country, it should be possible to satisfy the strategic requirements of the United Kingdom in Palestine. If, however, there were no agreement His Majesty's Government would be faced with the choice between (i) ceasing to administer Palestine immediately and merely maintaining such order as was necessary to ensure the withdrawal of British forces and civilians, and (ii) announcing a date after which British administration in Palestine would cease and the withdrawal would begin, but attempting to maintain law and order throughout the whole country until that date. The former course could be adopted without further military reinforcements, but it would no doubt involve loss of life and property. On the other hand, to maintain law and order over the whole country until a specific date for withdrawal would require substantial reinforcements.

The Minister of Health[2] said that the first task of His Majesty's Government should be to convince all concerned that they did not wish to retain forces in Palestine for imperialist reasons. If this were made clear it would have a very great effect on opinion in the United States. He suggested that the draft statement annexed to C.P. (47) 259 should be recast in such a way as to emphasise that, whatever decision were reached, it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to relinquish the Mandate. This might be followed by an offer to co-operate with the Jews and the Arabs in carrying out any settlement agreed between them. It might also be desirable to offer to co-operate in carrying out any settlement agreed on by the United Nations, provided that other members of the United Nations shared adequately in this task by sending forces to Palestine.

The Minister of Fuel and Power[3] said that if the proposal to relinquish the Mandate and withdraw the British administration and British forces from Palestine was being put forward seriously and not merely as a threat to induce the contending parties to agree or other members of the United Nations to provide us with assistance to enforce the Majority Report, every effort should be made to enable the withdrawal to be carried out in an orderly way and to avoid its being interpreted as a confession of weakness on the part of His Majesty's Government. Otherwise, there was a danger that the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine would seriously undermine our position in the Middle East. He felt that, if the United Nations Assembly accepted the Majority Report and if the member nations were willing to co-operate fully in enforcing it, His Majesty's Government should not withhold their co-operation.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed that it should be made clear that His Majesty's Government intended to relinquish the Mandate finally. He also felt that a date for the withdrawal of the British administration and British forces should be announced as soon as possible, though he realised that it would be impolitic to name a date before the Assembly had been able to give full consideration to the Report of the Special Committee. If an agreed settlement could not be reached in Palestine, that country was of no strategic value to His Majesty's Government and the maintenance of British forces in it merely led to a heavy drain on our financial resources and to the creation of a dangerous spirit of anti-Semitism. He was strongly opposed to the despatch of any further British forces to Palestine, and he did not believe we could rely on any other members of the United Nations to provide forces to help in enforcing a settlement.

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[2] Mr A Bevan.

[3] Mr E Shinwell.

The President of the Board of Trade[4] supported the proposals made in C.P. (47) 259, but suggested the omission of the second sentence of paragraph 8 of the draft statement annexed to C.P. (47) 259, which stated that His Majesty's Government would be ready to hand over the administration of Palestine to any authority designated by the Assembly as soon as that authority declared itself in a position to assume full responsibility. An offer of this kind might lead to His Majesty's Government's being forced to retain responsibility for the administration for an indefinite period.

The Secretary of State for Air[5] said that he was convinced that acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the recommendations that the Mandate should be terminated and that independence should be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date would have a marked effect on public opinion, both among Jews and Arabs and in the United States. It might well be that in the course of the discussion in the Assembly neither the majority nor the minority plan would be accepted, and something approaching the scheme suggested by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1946 would be approved. He suggested that the statement by the United Kingdom delegate might include some reference to the eleventh recommendation of the Special Committee, which contained an appeal against acts of violence, and should stress the fact that unless Jews and Arabs were willing to co-operate in an agreed settlement the cause of Zionism was doomed.

The Prime Minister said that in his view there was a close parallel between the position in Palestine and the recent situation in India. He did not think it reasonable to ask the British administration in Palestine to continue in present conditions, and he hoped that salutary results would be produced by a clear announcement that His Majesty's Government intended to relinquish the Mandate and, failing a peaceful settlement, to withdraw the British administration and British forces. The draft statement annexed to C.P. (47) 259 should be revised in the light of the Cabinet's discussion. The revised statement should include the amendment suggested by the President of the Board of Trade, but it should not commit His Majesty's Government unconditionally to co-operate with other members of the United Nations in implementing any policy requiring the use of force, nor should it refer to the points mentioned by the Secretary of State for Air.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Approved generally the proposals outlined by the Foreign Secretary in C.P. (47) 259;

(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to revise the draft statement annexed to C.P. (47) 259 on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister;

(3) Authorised the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations to arrange to communicate copies of the revised draft statement to Dominion Governments.

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[4] Sir S Cripps.

[5] Mr P J Noel-Baker.

31 CAB 129/22, CP(47)320 3 Dec 1947

'Palestine': joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin and Mr Creech Jones on attitude to be taken at the UN [Extract]

. . . 6. The United Kingdom representatives at the United Nations, while assisting the respective Committees with factual information, have consistently taken the line that we would not comment on the substance of the partition proposal or any other proposal which was before the Assembly. Our position as regards the enforcement of this or any other settlement was, however, made abundantly clear as follows:—

(a) We would not be responsible for enforcing a settlement which was not agreed by both Jews and Arabs.
(b) If invited to participate with other United Nations in enforcing a settlement which was not agreed by Jews and Arabs, we would decide according to our idea of the justice of the settlement and the difficulty of enforcing it. (Repeated efforts have been made during the discussions at the United Nations to involve us in the implementation of United Nations recommendations. All such attempts have been resisted as this would have involved us in assuming the major role and the settlement in fact recommended is manifestly most unpopular with one of the parties.)
(c) We would in any case, failing Jewish-Arab agreement, withdraw from Palestine by 1st August, 1948.
(d) In the course of our withdrawal, our troops and administration could not be used to enforce a United Nations settlement which was not agreed by both Jews and Arabs or to support a United Nations Commission in enforcing it.

7. This neutral policy is amply justified on two main grounds:—

(a) We have tried on numerous occasions in the past to put forward solutions for the settlement of Palestine. Each has been rejected by one side or the other, or both. We have been suspected of ulterior aims in Palestine. If we had now associated ourselves with any positive proposal, we should have diverted on to ourselves the opposition and resistance of one or both of the parties.
(b) We undertook in the mandate to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people on the clear understanding that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It has proved impossible to reconcile these two objectives and we are therefore justified in laying down the mandate, which has proved unworkable. We did not undertake in the mandate to establish a Jewish or Arab State by force or to coerce either party in the interests of the other. If we were to undertake it, or to be associated in any way with the enforcement of a settlement as unpopular with one of the parties as that now recommended by the United Nations, the whole responsibility would fall on us, as the only armed forces on the spot are ours. It would thus clearly be against our interests to become involved in major repressive actions in Palestine, which would most seriously affect our whole political, strategical and economic situation throughout the Middle East and the Moslem world. . . .

32 CAB 129/43, CP(50)310 12 Dec 1950

'Egypt: defence': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin on treaty negotiations

The Cabinet will remember that when they last considered this question on the 30th November (C.M. (50) 79th Conclusions, Minute 4), they had before them two memoranda by me:— C.P. (50) 283 and C.P. (50) 284. The Cabinet then agreed that, in my discussions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, I should take the line indicated in paragraphs 20 to 27 of C.P. (50) 284. Briefly, this was to make it clear that, while we could not admit that the Treaty could be modified except by mutual consent, we were anxious to reach agreement which would take account of the defence needs of the Middle East as a whole, but would be fully in accordance with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.

2. I have now had three meetings with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on the 4th, 7th and 9th of December. During these meetings he has reiterated the Egyptian point of view on both the Defence Agreement and the Sudan, very much on the lines summarised in the memoranda under reference. He has made it clear that the Egyptian Government would be prepared to agree to the use by His Majesty's Government of the Egyptian base and to provide full facilities in Egypt for British forces and their allies in war-time, but that they cannot accept the presence of British, or any other foreign forces on Egyptian territory in peace-time and that they must continue to insist upon the evacuation of British troops from Egypt within one year. There are, however, indications that there might be some room for negotiation, at any rate over the period within which British forces should leave Egypt. As regards the Sudan, I shall be submitting a separate report in due course.

3. I have recently been considering provisional studies which have been made of the difficulties which Egypt could make for us in connection with the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone, if she wished to do so. Without going into detail, I should like to record my impression that these difficulties might be considerable. I have also been considering the fact that the Egyptians link together the problems of the Sudan and the evacuation of the British forces, and I have come to the conclusion that if the Egyptians decided to raise their differences with us once again at the United Nations, they could make out a much more convincing case against us on the latter issue than on the former. For this reason it is in our interest that, if the present negotiations come to a deadlock, it should be reached rather upon the Sudan issue than upon the issue of the presence of British troops in Egypt. Above all, however, I feel it is essential, in the light of the international situation, that we should, if possible, reach a settlement with the Egyptian Government on the issue of defence which will contribute to the establishment of good relations with Egypt. I do not believe that it would be to our interest to insist upon the retention of British forces in Egypt in direct opposition to Egyptian wishes, save in the last resort. I am, however, concerned that the base in the Canal Zone should remain British-owned, but that it should be maintained by the Egyptians who should give guarantees regarding its continued state of efficiency. Moreover, I have in mind the desirability of our being in a position to call upon Egyptian man-power, for use in all the numerous ancillary services which would be needed in the event of war. I feel, therefore, that it is of overriding importance that we should try to secure that the

Egyptians give us willingly what we need during the forthcoming critical period, our most important requirement being an integrated air defence system.

4. I have come to the conclusion that, in order to secure this, some concession on our part will be necessary. I have, therefore, asked the Egyptian Foreign Minister what would be his Government's reaction to a possible suggestion (making it clear that this was a tentative and purely personal conception) that a solution to the problem might be found upon the basis of an orderly transfer to the Egyptian Government of responsibility for the maintenance of the base in peace-time, together with the departure of British forces. Attached as an annex[1] to this memorandum is an outline of what I have in mind. I have not, however, put this to the Egyptian Foreign Minister in such detail, and in particular I have made no mention of any possible dates for the hand-over, though I have suggested that this might be done gradually and have made it clear that in my view there could be no possibility of effecting such a hand-over in one year. I have asked him in return for certain assurances, for example, regarding the continued presence in Egypt of a limited number of British technicians, and guarantees regarding the permanency and security of the base after responsibility for its maintenance has been transferred to Egypt. I have also suggested that any such transfer of responsibility should be made in accordance with the spirit and terms of the 1936 Treaty rather than as a decision to abrogate the Treaty and evacuate Egypt.

5. The outline of the plan which I have in mind will require amplification and detailed studies of both the military and political aspects. I understand that on the military side such a study is already being undertaken by the Chiefs of Staff, and that the results should be available early in January. The necessary political studies can be initiated at once.

Recommendations. I therefore ask my colleagues:—

(a) to agree that the necessary studies should be undertaken and the results made available without delay.

(b) to authorise me to inform the Egyptian Foreign Minister that His Majesty's Government had considered the method of approach outlined to him and to inform him that they had given instructions that the necessary studies should be made in order to see if this method of approach would satisfy the essential defence needs, and that I hoped to be able to discuss it more fully when these studies had been completed. I would not, for the present, go further than this, particularly in view of the danger of a leakage in Egypt if any definite proposals were put forward at this stage. I would, however, urge him to agree that public discussion both in the United Kingdom and in Egypt should be kept to a minimum until the Egyptian Government had had time to consider our more detailed proposals.

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[1] Not printed

33 CAB 128/19, CM 23(51)6 2 Apr 1951
'Egypt: Anglo-Egyptian Treaty': Cabinet conclusions on negotiations

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (51) 95) explaining the basis on which he proposed to reopen the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. At the invitation of the Cabinet (C.M. (50) 86th Conclusions, Minute 5) the Defence Committee had considered and approved proposals put forward by the Chiefs of Staff, and the probable effect of these proposals upon our position in Egypt and the Middle East was examined in the Foreign Secretary's paper.

The Foreign Secretary[1] said that his colleagues would wish to consider these proposals in relation to general policy in the Middle East and to the state of public opinion at home. One consideration which must be borne in mind was that, whatever individual Egyptian politicians might be willing to say in private about the removal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, they would feel obliged to take a very different line in public. In paragraph 7 of his memorandum he had summarised three possible courses of action: (i) to inform the Egyptian Government that we were not prepared to resume negotiations for the revision of the Treaty; (ii) to offer to negotiate and be willing to make further concessions in order to secure agreement; or (iii) to offer to negotiate on the basis of the proposals by the Chiefs of Staff, but to make no substantial further concessions. He did not feel that the second course was practicable, since our requirements as stated by the Chiefs of Staff could not be reduced without gravely endangering our military position in the Middle East. To adopt the first course, and stand firm until the Treaty became due for revision in 1956, was attractive from the point of view of immediate security, but it would make our position exceedingly difficult when the time came for revision. Accordingly he recommended the third course, though he pointed out that many of our proposals would certainly not be acceptable to the Egyptian Government. Moreover, the question of the future status of the Sudan would inevitably be raised by the Egyptians, and this might destroy the chances of agreement.

The Lord Privy Seal[2] said that he agreed with the Foreign Secretary that an offer to negotiate on the basis of the proposals by the Chiefs of Staff was the course best calculated to achieve our aims in the whole of the Middle East. Occupation of territory by foreign troops was increasingly out of line with world opinion. If we were able to revise the Treaty in such a way that the Egyptians felt that they were being treated as equal partners, it might form the first step towards similar arrangements elsewhere in the Middle East. We could not negotiate with Israel until we had come to terms with Egypt, but treaties with both might open the way to restoring satisfactory relations between the two. Both the negotiations and (if they were successful) the implementation of the new arrangements would need imaginative handling, but if we could impress the Egyptians with our sincerity and our determination to carry out the arrangements for our mutual benefit we might secure our essential military objectives in the Middle East. The process of removing our troops would be gradual, and we should make every effort, by employing the best

[1] Mr H Morrison, who became foreign secretary on 9 Mar 1951 following Mr Bevin's resignation on the grounds of ill health.
[2] Mr E Bevin.

men for the purpose, to carry out our obligation to train the Egyptian forces. The proposals provided for our re-entry into Egypt in an emergency, and we should best be able to exercise this right if we had been able to build up in the meantime relations of real cordiality between the armed forces of the two countries.

In a short discussion several Ministers drew attention to the complexity and importance of the issues involved, and to the change in the situation which had been brought about by recent developments in Persia.[3] Although the Egyptian Government were pressing us to open negotiations without delay, the Cabinet felt that they must take time for a fuller consideration of these issues.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed to defer further consideration of C.P. (51) 95 until their next meeting.

[3] See 36, note.

34 CAB 128/19, CM 24(51)3 5 Apr 1951

'Egypt: Anglo-Egyptian Treaty': Cabinet conclusions on negotiations[1]

The Cabinet resumed their discussion of the Foreign Secretary's memorandum (C.P. (51) 95) on the re-opening of negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

The Foreign Secretary recalled that in his memorandum he had suggested three possible courses of action, of which he favoured the resumption of negotiations with the Egyptian Government upon the basis of the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff. He recognised that it would probably prove impossible to reach an agreement acceptable to the United Kingdom; but, so long as discussions were continuing, the Egyptians would be less likely to take any drastic step which would worsen the present situation. It did not seem desirable to hasten conclusions on the withdrawal of British troops.

The Minister of Defence[2] said that the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff offered a basis on which discussions could begin. At a later stage fighting troops could be moved gradually out of Egypt, but it would be essential to maintain the base in an efficient condition, and to preserve the vast stores which had been built up in Egypt. It was also very desirable that we should retain a substantial R.A.F. organisation in Egypt, so that we could be ready to meet our defence commitments in the Middle East; but he recognised that the Egyptians were unlikely to agree that such large numbers of British troops should remain in Egypt. In his judgment it would be a mistake to take too stiff a line with the Egyptians in these negotiations. If negotiations went on for a year or so, the international position would have either improved or worsened in the meantime; and the protraction of the talks might make it easier to determine at a later stage what final policy should be adopted.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer[3] said that on 19th March the Defence Committee had instructed the Chiefs of Staff to examine, in consultation with the Treasury and the Foreign Office, the financial implications of their proposals regarding Middle East defence. The Treasury had not yet been approached on this subject. He hoped it would be possible to frame an agreed estimate of the cost of providing a base outside

[1] Previous reference: see 33. [2] Mr E Shinwell. [3] Mr H Gaitskell.

Egypt before His Majesty's Ambassador became involved in negotiations with the Egyptian Government. He feared that the estimates of cost which had been put forward by the Chiefs of Staff might be found to be too low.

In further discussion attention was drawn to the serious difficulties in the way of reaching a settlement with the Egyptian Government on defence matters, even if these could be treated in isolation from other outstanding difficulties between the two countries. The anti-British bias of all political parties in Egypt might be due to a desire not to be outdone in patriotic fervour by political opponents rather than to any definite *animus* against this country; but the fact remained that it would be difficult for any single political party to sign an agreement which contemplated that British troops would remain for an indefinite period on Egyptian territory, and there was little prospect of our being able to negotiate an understanding with all the Egyptian parties. It was therefore suggested that the subject of Middle East defence might be considered from a wider angle, with other friendly countries, including the United States, on the basis that the defence of the Middle East was at present very weak and that the western democracies could not afford to allow the oil resources of the Middle East to fall into Soviet hands. On this basis any approach to Egypt could be on the broader basis of the defence arrangements which the democracies felt to be necessary in the Middle East, and American and other forces might be associated with the defence of Egypt. While it was recognised that Middle East defence would have to be considered sooner or later in this wider context, it was the general view of the Cabinet that little progress could be made on these lines in any discussions with the Egyptians in the immediate future. The Egyptian Ministers had made it clear that they would object to the stationing of any international force on Egyptian territory, and they might even regard this as a worse solution than the continued presence of British troops. Moreover, neither the Government nor the people of the United States were yet prepared to contemplate substantial additional commitments in the Middle East.

On the basis that the Egyptian problem would have to be tackled by the United Kingdom Government alone, most Ministers considered that a mere announcement of our intention to remain in Egypt until the Treaty expired in 1956 would not be sufficient. We could not take our stand on the terms of the Treaty, since we were not ourselves complying with its terms, e.g., as regards the number of British troops stationed in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptian Government would probably counter any refusal to negotiate by denouncing the Treaty and taking other direct action. The working of the base depended on Egyptian co-operation, and our military strength in Egypt would be greatly weakened if we had to maintain ourselves there in the face of sustained Egyptian hostility. On military grounds, therefore, the balance of the argument was in favour of reopening the negotiations. It would, however, be dangerous, in view of the present world situation and the state of public opinion in this country, to remove any substantial number of fighting troops from Egypt before negotiations had begun, or at an early stage in their course. Public opinion in this country would not tolerate what would be regarded as a further weakness towards the Egyptians, before it had been seen whether the Egyptian Government were prepared to make concessions to the British point of view.

The Cabinet were informed that the Egyptian Government would probably be unwilling to reach a settlement unless some concessions were made to their point of view regarding the Sudan. In this country, on the other hand, any settlement with

Egypt would be judged by the manner in which it dealt with the question of Egyptian interference with the passage of tankers to Haifa through the Suez Canal.

It was suggested that the United Kingdom Government, at the outset of any further negotiations with the Egyptian Government, should make it clear that it was their aim to enable the Sudanese to attain self-Government at the earliest practicable opportunity, and that no understanding could be reached with Egypt which interfered with this objective. The Cabinet agreed that there could be no question of abandoning this policy towards the Sudan or of sacrificing the interests of the Sudanese as the price for an agreement with Egypt on defence. It would not, however, be practicable to refuse to discuss the Sudan with the Egyptian Government. The aim should therefore be to secure that, if these discussions broke down, they should do so because of a refusal by the Egyptian Government to subscribe to a reasonable statement of the principles which should govern the two countries in their future policy towards the Sudan.

There was general agreement that His Majesty's Ambassador, independently of the negotiations on defence, should continue to impress on the Egyptian Government the need for an early removal of the ban on the passage of tankers to Haifa through the Suez Canal. They could properly be told that Parliament was unlikely to agree to any fresh proposals regarding Egypt without a satisfactory solution of the tanker problem. The Egyptian Government's interference with the passage of tankers through the Canal raised the general question of international control over such waterways. It would always be in the peace-time interests of this country that these narrow channels, used by international shipping, should remain open for the passage of all ships, and careful thought should now be given to the question whether the international control of such channels should not be suggested as a general issue for discussion in some appropriate international forum. If the Egyptians felt that they were under attack from this angle, they might be more ready to reach a settlement on the other outstanding questions with this country.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo should re-open negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and invited the Foreign Secretary to frame, in the light of the Cabinet's discussion, instructions for the guidance of His Majesty's Ambassador in these negotiations.

(2) Agreed that, concurrently with these negotiations, His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo should bring continuous pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government to remove the ban on the passage of tankers through the Suez Canal.

(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to consider whether the general question of the control of the narrow channels used by international shipping should be raised in an appropriate international forum.

35 CAB 128/19, CM 39(51)4 31 May 1951

'Egypt: Anglo-Egyptian Treaty': Cabinet conclusions on progress of discussions and the future of the Sudan[1]

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (51) 131 and 140) on the progress of the discussions in Cairo regarding the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had hoped that His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo would have been able to keep these discussions going for some time on the basis of the proposals approved by the Cabinet on 5th April. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had, however, been unwilling to give serious consideration to those proposals and had now brought forward the counter-proposals set out in Annex II of C.P. (51) 140. These contemplated the complete withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt within one year and offered no constructive basis for negotiation. The Foreign Secretary therefore proposed that, in order to keep the discussions going, His Majesty's Ambassador should now be instructed to open conversations about the future of the Sudan on the basis of the principles set out in C.P. (51) 131, adding that in the meantime we should be making a careful study of the Egyptian proposals for the revision of the Treaty. It was understood that the Egyptian Foreign Minister was anxious to come to London to pursue discussions about the Treaty; but the Foreign Secretary, while not excluding such a visit, felt that it would be preferable that the discussions should be continued for a time in Cairo.

The Lord Privy Seal[2] said that, from his personal knowledge of conditions in Egypt, he was satisfied that no agreement could be reached with the Egyptian Government unless we were prepared to give an assurance that all combatant British troops would be removed from the Canal Zone within a reasonable period. He believed that, if the Egyptians could be given satisfaction on this point, they would be ready to agree that substantial British forces might be stationed in Egypt for the purpose of training the Egyptian army, and also that we should maintain a military base in Egypt manned by civilians. The proposals which His Majesty's Ambassador had put forward, in pursuance of the Cabinet's decision of 5th April, had been regarded by the Egyptians as an ultimatum rather than a basis for negotiation; and he feared that no progress could be made unless we could satisfy the Egyptians that we were prepared to make some concession towards their point of view regarding the evacuation of combatant troops from the Canal Zone. In these circumstances he saw no advantage in putting forward at this stage proposals regarding the future of the Sudan which would be equally unacceptable to the Egyptians. This was likely to exacerbate feelings still further and thus increase the difficulties of reaching any agreement on the Treaty.

On the other side it was argued that, if we had to break with Egypt, it was preferable that we should do so on the question of the Sudan, where our legal and moral case was so much stronger. Moreover, our main objective was to prolong the discussions in order to gain time; and from that point of view also there was advantage in introducing a new subject for discussion. There was in fact little prospect of our securing a satisfactory bilateral defence agreement with Egypt. Our

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[1] Previous reference: see 34.

[2] Mr R Stokes, since 26 Apr, following Mr Bevin's death.

best hope of finding a solution to this problem lay in developing some wider arrangements for the defence of the Middle East, from which Egypt would be unable to stand aside. We might be able to guide in that direction the increased interest which the United States Government were now showing in the defence of the Middle East. These developments would, however, take some little time to mature; and in the meantime our wisest course would be to avoid reaching any definite conclusion of the discussions with the Egyptians.

In further discussion the following points were also made:—

(a) *The Chancellor of the Exchequer* said that he had now learned that the proposals put to the Egyptian Government in pursuance of the Cabinet's decision of 5th April would have involved a net additional capital expenditure of £59 million and an additional annual expenditure of £9 million. *The Minister of Defence* said that the gross cost of the plan for redeploying our troops in the Middle East was estimated at £97 million.

(b) Had the Chiefs of Staff considered the possibility of securing military bases in Israel? The Cabinet were informed that, since his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces, General Robertson had undertaken a special mission to Israel and the conversations which he had held there had been encouraging. There was some possibility that we might be able to secure military facilities in Israel, but we were not yet in a position to put forward definite proposals.

(c) The United States Government, who were anxious that we should avoid any breakdown in the negotiations on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, had suggested that the Egyptians might be mollified by the supply of arms. The Cabinet expressed doubts about the expediency of considering any increase in the supply of arms to Egypt; this would certainly arouse suspicion and criticism in the House of Commons.

The Cabinet:—

Authorised the Foreign Secretary to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo to open discussions with the Egyptian Government on the future of the Sudan, on the basis indicated in C.P. (51) 131.

36 CAB 128/20, CM 51(51)2 12 July 1951

'Persia': Cabinet conclusions on action to be taken in Anglo-Iranian oil dispute

[The unilateral nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which operated in Persia on the basis of an oil concession originally made in 1901) was approved by the Iranian parliament at the end of Apr 1951, under the leadership of Dr M Mussadiq, chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission. At the same time Dr Mussadiq became prime minister. The British government was not prepared to treat the issue simply as one between the company and the Persian government, and it was decided in May to apply to the International Court of Justice for a ruling that the Persian government were obliged to submit the dispute to arbitration. Although prepared to accept the principle of nationalization, the British government wanted to negotiate a compromise settlement and compensation. The Court's interim ruling, made on 5 July, seemed favourable to the British case, the two parties being ordered to do nothing to aggravate the dispute; in the meantime, said the Court, the company should be allowed to carry on its operations. The Persian government rejected this order, and the situation of the company and its staff at

Abadan and in the oilfields began to deteriorate. Thus it became increasingly necessary to decide what measures should be taken by Britain to protect British property and personnel, and how to react if the remaining Britons were expelled – an eventuality which was reached on 25 Sept 1951.]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (51) 200) on the situation in Persia. This discussed the question of military intervention in Persia for the purpose of protecting British property, as distinct from British lives, and reached the conclusion that military intervention for the former purpose would be undesirable. It also recommended (i) that we should announce a phased withdrawal of the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A.I.O.C.) from the oil-fields and from Abadan, (ii) that the International Court should be informed of this decision, (iii) that the dispute should be referred to the Security Council, and (iv) that we should inform the United States Government of the steps we were taking and seek their support in the Security Council.

The Foreign Secretary said that, since this memorandum was prepared, the situation had again been changed by the Persian Prime Minister's acceptance of President Truman's offer to send Mr. Harriman[1] to Tehran for discussions. The United States Government, who had been informed of the general lines of the proposals in the memorandum, had suggested that in these circumstances reference to the Security Council would be premature. The Foreign Secretary said that he accepted that view: action on the recommendations made in his memorandum must at least be postponed until the effects of Mr. Harriman's mission could be judged. He hoped that Mr. Harriman would not seek to act as a mediator between the two parties to the dispute; and he intended to urge Mr. Harriman to impress upon the Persian Government their duty to conform with the interim ruling of the International Court as an essential basis for a settlement of the dispute.

Evacuation of A.I.O.C. staff

The Foreign Secretary said that he had not yet received the views of the United States Government on the proposal to announce a phased withdrawal of A.I.O.C. staff. Both the Company and His Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran were strongly in favour of adopting this course as the best method of demonstrating to the Persians our determination not to yield to their demands. Moreover, some withdrawals were already taking place, and an early statement was needed to prevent these from being regarded as a sign of weakness. He had now been convinced that this was the right course; but, in view of Mr. Harriman's mission, he suggested that any announcement should now be delayed for a few days.

In discussion some Ministers expressed the view that evacuation was bound to be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and that the Company ought to hold on, at least at Abadan, as long as possible. Evacuation would be regarded throughout the Middle East, as well as in the United States and in this country, as a capitulation to Persian pressure, and it was unlikely that the Company would be able to return once they had left. The Australian Government had for these reasons urged great caution in reaching a decision to withdraw. On the other hand, it was pointed out that withdrawal, from the oilfields at least, could not be deferred much longer, and that it

[1] W Averell Harriman, special assistant to President Truman since 1950; formerly US ambassador to Britain, 1946.

must be represented as an act of deliberate policy when it took place.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that, in view of Mr. Harriman's forthcoming discussions with the Persian Government, no announcement should be made for the time being regarding a phased withdrawal of A.I.O.C. staff from Persia.

Military action

In discussing the possibility of military intervention in Persia, the Cabinet were reminded that they had at one stage asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the military implications of seizing Abadan and holding it, if necessary against Persian opposition, for the purpose of refining there crude oil brought from Kuwait. The Cabinet were, however, impressed by the arguments developed in paragraphs 2–3 of C.P. (51) 200 against the use of force for the protection of British property, as distinct from British lives. They agreed that military action in excess of that required for the protection of British lives should not be contemplated unless there were some far-reaching change in the general situation, such as the fall of the present Government and the establishment of a Communist régime in Persia.

The Cabinet:—

(2) Agreed that military action in Persia, on a larger scale than that necessary for the protection of British lives, should not be contemplated unless there were some fundamental change in the general situation there.

Negotiations with the Persian government

The Prime Minister said that Dr. Mussadiq had been able to form his Government owing to the support of Persians who were dissatisfied with former rule by a corrupt clique. We could not safely assume that if we succeeded in upsetting the present Government their successors would be less unsatisfactory, and we should risk identifying ourselves with support of an equally undemocratic régime. If negotiations could be resumed it would be wise to stress, not only our acceptance of the principle of nationalisation, but also our willingness to operate the oil industry, on behalf of the Persian Government, on a basis of friendly partnership: we must not alienate genuine nationalist feeling in Persia by clinging to the old technique of obtaining concessions and insisting upon exact compliance with their terms.

In discussion attention was drawn to the need for considering how far we should be willing to go to enable the Persian Government to avoid making concessions which they regarded as humiliating. We had no legal right to interfere with Persian expropriation and operation of their oil industry but we had the right to require compensation for the A.I.O.C., and the Persian Government could only pay this if the industry was profitably operated. Mr. Harriman might be able to impress this point upon the Persian Prime Minister, and it might also be desirable to make it clear to the United States Government that we should not insist on the withdrawal of the nationalisation law if amendment could make it workable.

The Cabinet:—

(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to inform the United States Government that we considered acceptance by the Persian Government of the interim ruling of the International Court to be the necessary basis for a settlement of the dispute, and that we did not regard it as appropriate that Mr. Harriman should act as a mediator between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government.

Statement by the foreign secretary

The Foreign Secretary said that he did not wish to make a statement on Persia in the House of Commons before the results of Mr. Harriman's visit were known. If it was necessary to say something in the meantime, he would confine himself to a factual statement about the visit, emphasising that we were in close touch with the United States Government. He would not mention the withdrawal of the A.I.O.C. staff or a reference of the dispute to the Security Council.

The Cabinet:—

(4) Took note of the Foreign Secretary's statement.

Economic measures

The Prime Minister said that he had been informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was unable to be present, that after considering further the question of suspending the Memorandum of Understanding with Persia he had reached the conclusion that this would not be desirable unless we could show quite definitely that Persia was abusing the understanding. Unless this could be shown, suspension of the Memorandum would involve a clear breach of an agreement between two central banks, which might destroy the confidence of other countries holding gold and sterling in London. Moreover, we were in a position to check any Persian application to convert sterling into dollars, and the Cabinet would be able to consider whether action should be taken if there was evidence that any large and unwarrantable conversion was contemplated. To be effective such action could not be confined to simply suspending the Memorandum of Understanding, but would have to extend to blocking Persian sterling balances and Persian gold under our control. In the meantime a close watch would be kept on Persian dollar transfers.

The Cabinet:—

(5) Agreed that the Memorandum of Understanding with Persia should not be suspended for the time being.

The President of the Board of Trade said that consignments of steel rails and sugar for Persia were due to leave United Kingdom ports during the following two or three days. The ruling of the International Court no longer stood in the way of our stopping these consignments, since the Persian Government had made it clear that they rejected that ruling; but it was for consideration whether action should be deferred until the effects of Mr. Harriman's mission could be judged. The Government would be exposed to severe criticism if they allowed scarce goods to go to Persia while the Persian Government showed no sign of altering their intransigent attitude. If they held up these consignments, the Government would be liable to pay compensation to the consignors and shippers.

It was the general view of the Cabinet that action should be taken to prevent these goods from leaving for the time being. As far as possible no publicity should be given to this action.

The Cabinet:—

(6) Invited the President of the Board of Trade to arrange that no consignments of steel rails and sugar should leave the United Kingdom for Persia for the time being.

37 CAB 129/46, CP (51)212 20 July 1951

'Persia': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Morrison (FO): arguments for and against the use of force in the oil dispute

The Chiefs of Staff have now come to the conclusion, on the advice of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, that, once the measures now being undertaken in preparation for Operation "BUCCANEER", including the flying-in of three battalions of troops to Shaiba, have been completed, it would be feasible at short notice to occupy and hold Abadan against any opposition which the Persians unaided would be likely to be able to mount.

2. It has hitherto been assumed that such an operation, apart from the political objections referred to below, would not be justifiable except as a result of extensive preparations spread over several weeks. In view of this revised military opinion, coupled with the continued Persian intransigence, the probable failure of Harriman's mission, and the interim findings of the Hague Court, Ministers may wish to re-examine as soon as possible all the implications of carrying out an operation designed not merely to protect British lives if in danger but to hold and operate the refinery, if necessary on imported crude. It is not possible to forecast the exact circumstances in which the operation might be contemplated, but one obvious possibility is that it should be carried out if and when the Persian authorities announce their intention of occupying the refinery.

3. Such an operation would have obvious advantages.

(a) It would enable the refinery to be kept in at least partial production, the crude being brought from Kuwait or elsewhere, and would thus ensure the continued flow of at least a large proportion of the refined products to the United Kingdom and other normal markets.

(b) It would demonstrate once and for all to the Persians British determination not to allow the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A.I.O.C.) to be evicted from Persia, and might well result in the downfall of the Mussadiq regime and its replacement by more reasonable elements prepared to negotiate a settlement.

(c) It might be expected to produce a salutary effect throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, as evidence that United Kingdom interests could not be recklessly molested with impunity. Indeed, failure to exhibit firmness in this matter may prejudice our interests throughout the Middle East.

(d) Finally, it should be warmly welcomed by those sections of public opinion in this country which have been criticising His Majesty's Government's attitude over Persia as having hitherto been unduly weak.

4. The objections may be summarised as follows:—

(a) *United Nations*. Dr. Mussadiq's Government, if they did not fall as a result of the operation, might be expected to appeal immediately to the Security Council on the grounds that the United Kingdom had indulged in "aggression" against Persia. Having regard to the terms of the United Nations Charter, a majority might be found for a resolution enjoining us to remove our troops forthwith. In this event His Majesty's Government would be obliged either to comply or to use the veto (a course they have never hitherto adopted).

On the other hand I am advised that it might be possible to sustain a case in

International Law on the following lines: the Nationalisation Laws which the Persians are endeavouring to implement are in our view illegal. The Persian attempt to implement them has led to a highly inflammatory situation in which irreparable damage might be done to the Company's property and the lives of the British staff endangered. In such cases there is nothing in International Law or in the United Nations Charter which necessarily prevents a State from taking its requisite protective action to preserve life and to prevent irreparable injury to its interests.

(b) *United States*. The State Department have hitherto indicated that they would oppose the introduction of British troops into Persia except to protect British lives or in the event of Russian aggression or a Communist *coup d'etat*.

It is, however, conceivable that their attitude might be modified if Mr. Harriman failed completely, especially in view of Dr. Mussadiq's flouting of the Hague Court's interim decision.

(c) *The Commonwealth*. It seems possible that new Commonwealth countries at least would not support such action on our part, and the support of all the old Commonwealth countries cannot be assumed.

Much would, however, depend on how the case could be presented in our public statements and publicity, especially as regards the international legal issues referred to above.

(d) *Russia*. While over-much weight need not be attached to the argument that Russia could invoke the 1921 Perso-Russian Treaty to introduce troops into Persia if we did so, the possibility cannot be excluded that Russia would take such action on this or another pretext. Whether or not she would do so seems likely to depend on whether she is prepared to contemplate a global war at this juncture. The risk of the Russians occupying Northern Persia might be worth accepting provided that we retained full control of the Abadan refinery.

(e) *Persia*. It is arguable that Dr. Mussadiq's downfall is only a matter of time, in view of the harm to Persian economy and the alienation of world opinion which his policy has already caused; and that for us to introduce troops into Persia in order to protect the refineries might merely stiffen the nationalist elements and render more remote the chances of a more reasonable regime replacing his. It is also conceivable that these elements might be able by intimidation to prevent the Persian labour force in Abadan from working for the Company.

(f) *The Middle East*. It is also arguable that our use of force might produce violent nationalist reactions in the other oil producing countries in the Middle East. These countries are, however, all Arab, and the Arabs have little respect for the Persians. It seems, therefore, more likely that, while some ebullition of nationalist sentiment may be anticipated at first, the Arab peoples would be more likely to respect this display of determination on our part, and that they might therefore be deterred from taking action similar to Dr. Mussadiq's against British oil interests in their countries. In particular the present Iraq Government, which seems anxious to sign a revised agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company but has obviously been waiting on the outcome of events in Persia, might be encouraged to do so.

5. The opinions of H.M. Representatives in the countries concerned on the various factors outlined above is being sought, and Ministers may wish to take these

into consideration before reaching a final decision. Meanwhile it would seem desirable that, should it be necessary to execute operation "BUCCANEER" for the purpose of protecting British lives, His Majesty's Government should not commit themselves publicly to withdrawing their forces, in case circumstances might make it desirable to retain them in order to ensure the operation of the refinery.

38 CAB 128/20, CM 60(51)6 27 Sept 1951[1]

'Persia': Cabinet conclusions on decision not to use force at Abadan and to refer the dispute to the UN

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (51) 257) outlining the history of the oil dispute with Persia.

The Prime Minister said that the latest development in the situation was the instruction given by the Persian Government that the remaining British staff in Abadan should leave the country in a week's time. His Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran had been instructed to make strong representations to the Persian Foreign Minister against the proposed explusions, and the Ambassador was seeing the Shah that afternoon. It was difficult to get a clear picture of the political situation in Persia. In response to a message which he had sent to the President of the United States, he had now received a reply saying (i) that the United States Ambassador in Tehran was being asked to inform the Persian Government of the grave concern of the United States Government at the proposed action; (ii) that the United States Government would be unable to support any action involving the use of force to maintain the British staff in Abadan; and (iii) that it seemed desirable for the United Kingdom Government to put forward some fresh proposal to the Persian Government. The President added that he would send a further message in the next day or so dealing with the matter at greater length. The Prime Minister said that, in view of the attitude of the United States Government, he did not think it would be expedient to use force to maintain the British staff in Abadan. Moreover, an occupation of Abadan Island would not necessarily bring about a change in the Persian Government and might well unite the Persian people against this country, and neither the oil wells nor the refinery could be worked without the assistance of Persian workers. If we attempted to find a solution by force we could not expect much support in the United Nations, where the South American Governments would follow the lead of the United States and Asiatic Governments would be hostile to us. It would be humiliating to this country if the remaining British staff at Abadan were expelled, but this step would at least leave Dr. Mussadiq with the task of attempting to run the oil industry with inadequate facilities for refining oil and getting it away from Persia and he might then be driven to accept some form of agreement with this country. The Prime Minister said that he was seeing the leaders of the Conservative Opposition later in the day, and would explain to them whatever policy was approved by the Cabinet.

The Foreign Secretary said that the United Kingdom Government had acted with great reasonableness in the face of much provocation from the Persian Government.

[1] This was the last meeting of the Labour Cabinet.

The Persian Government had failed to respond to the many endeavours made to find some compromise and had ignored the findings of the International Court. In spite of President Truman's suggestion, it was difficult to see what fresh approach could be made by the United Kingdom Government. If the remaining British staff in Abadan were expelled and the Government's handling of the Persian dispute appeared feeble and ineffective, the repercussions throughout the Middle East and elsewhere would be very serious. Egypt might be emboldened to take drastic action to end the military treaty and possibly to bring the Suez Canal under Egyptian control, and British legal rights in many other parts of the world would be placed in jeopardy. In these circumstances he was inclined to think that the Persian Government should be told that the United Kingdom Government could not tolerate the expulsion of the remaining staff from Abadan and would, if necessary, take the necessary steps to ensure that they were not expelled. Recourse to the Security Council was unlikely to produce any effective result; but, if force had to be used, it would be necessary to explain to the Security Council without delay the circumstances which had rendered military action unavoidable.

The Cabinet first considered whether the military operation to seize Abadan Island, for which all preparations had been made, should be authorised, possibly after a final warning to the Persian Government. Preparations had been brought to a point at which the operation could be mounted in twelve hours. The Law Officers had, however, advised that, unless the Security Council had sanctioned the use of force by the United Kingdom, military operations designed to seize Abadan would in present circumstances be illegal. Some doubt was expressed whether this view took sufficient account of the rights of self-defence, which were independent of any action authorised by the Security Council. It was, however, the general view of the Cabinet that, in the light of the United States attitude as revealed in the President's reply and as previously outlined by the United States Secretary of State in a discussion with the Foreign Secretary on 13th September, force could not be used to hold the refinery and maintain the British employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Abadan. We could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind. The United States Government would not oppose the use of force if it were necessary to save the refinery from a Communist Government or to protect British lives; but on the latter point the Chiefs of Staff had inclined to the view that military operations might endanger British lives and, from the strictly military point of view, they would prefer to postpone launching any operation until after the British employees had left Abadan. In any event, the use of force would not necessarily bring nearer a solution of the dispute.

There was general agreement that, if the remaining British staff were expelled from Abadan, the prospects of re-establishing British management of the Persian oil industry would be greatly lessened. Every endeavour should therefore be made to prevent the explusions from taking place. In a review of the steps open to the Government the following points were made:—

(a) Some good effects might result from the support which the United States Ambassador in Tehran was now to give to the representations already made by His Majesty's Ambassador. The further communication promised by President Truman might also contain useful suggestions.

(b) The Security Council should at once be asked to take steps to compel the

Persian Government to respect the interim findings of the International Court. Some Ministers thought that, in view of the present composition of the Council and the possibility that Russia might exercise the veto, it was unlikely that any useful outcome could be expected from a reference to the Council. Moreover, time was short and some days might elapse before an effective discussion could be arranged. Most Ministers considered, however, that, while the outcome could not be foretold with any certainty, there was some chance that, if the British case were put forcibly before the Council, a resolution might be secured which could be made the basis of further action. United States opinion was more likely to support drastic action if it appeared to have the support of the Security Council or if that support would have been forthcoming but for the exercise of the veto by Russia. The Security Council could be brought together at short notice; and it would be sufficient to give a few hours' preliminary notice to the United States Government and to inform the Persian Government of what was proposed.

(c) There was general agreement that at the appropriate stage the Shah should be informed that drastic financial and economic action would have to be taken if the remaining British staff were expelled from Abadan. It was the general view of Ministers that no sufficient advantage would be gained by severing diplomatic relations with Persia, since the presence of a British Ambassador in Tehran afforded a channel of communication with the Shah, who might at some juncture be prepared to dismiss Dr. Mussadiq and find a more reasonable Government. Too much reliance should not, however, be placed upon any action by the Shah, who had repeatedly disappointed the hopes which had been entertained that he would dismiss the Mussadiq Government. The Aga Khan[2] had in the past shown a willingness to help; and the Lord Privy Seal, with whom the Aga Khan had recently communicated, would consider, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, whether the Aga Khan could usefully be asked to offer any advice to the Persians.

(d) On the question whether any hope should be held out of fresh British concessions in any resumption of the negotiations, the general view was that no concessions should be offered to Dr. Mussadiq. The Shah could, however, be told that the United Kingdom Government might find it possible to make proposals which would be more acceptable from the Persian point of view if they could deal with a more reasonable Persian Government. As to the form which any concessions might take, some Ministers thought that the prospects of a settlement would be greatly improved if the United Kingdom Government would offer the Persian Government a higher percentage of the profits than 50 per cent. On the other hand it was pointed out that any higher percentage would have serious repercussions on the financial terms governing oil concessions in other parts of the world, and would almost certainly be unwelcome to the United States Government. It might, however, be practicable, without formally altering the proposed basis for the sharing of profits, to give a higher financial inducement to the Persians by offering more generous compensation terms.

(e) One method of avoiding the humiliation of having the remaining British staff expelled from Abadan would be to instruct them to withdraw at once. It was, however, the general view of Ministers that the staff should remain at their posts and

[2] The Rt Hon Aga Sultan Sir Mahomed Shah; head of Ismaili Muslims; formerly president of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1937.

that the question whether they should withdraw or wait to be expelled should be considered at the end of the period of warning which the Persians had given to them.

With reference to the public reaction to the latest developments in the oil dispute, it was pointed out that the public expected some effective action to be taken, though not necessarily by the use of force. There might be a demand for a debate on Persia before the prorogation of Parliament; and it would be of advantage if then, or at some other time, public reference could be made to the attitude of the United States Government to the use of force.

The Prime Minister said that, in the light of the Cabinet's discussion, it was clear that, after a preliminary intimation to the United States Government of what was proposed, the United Kingdom Government should ask the Security Council to consider what action could be taken to compel the Persian Government to respect the preliminary findings of the International Court on the oil dispute. Meanwhile, the Shah should be informed that the matter was being taken to the Security Council and that, while the United Kingdom Government might find it possible to improve on the offers which they had so far made, if they were dealing with a reasonable Persian Government, he must expect that serious financial and economic consequences would follow the explusion of the remaining British staff from Abadan.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the Persian oil dispute should be referred immediately to the Security Council, which should be asked to consider as a matter of urgency what steps could be taken to compel the Persian Government to respect the findings of the International Court.

(2) Agreed that communications should be sent to the United States Government and to the Persian Government on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister.

The Cabinet also considered a memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (C.P. (51) 254) on the question whether the Vulcan Foundry Company should continue work on locomotives which were being made under contracts with the Persian State Railways.

After a short discussion, the Cabinet:—

(a) Agreed that the Vulcan Foundry Company should continue work on the contract from the Persian State Railways, in view of the fact, that, if necessary, other markets could probably be found for the locomotives, when they were completed.

CHAPTER 2

Administrative plans, surveys and policy studies

Document numbers 39–73

39 CO 847/25/7, no 1 [Jan 1946]

'Factors affecting native administration policy': memorandum by G B Cartland[1]

[Sir G Gater commented on this memorandum: 'It is a most admirable document and I should like to congratulate Mr Cartland on its good sense and balance' (minute, 15 Mar 1946). A B Cohen had distributed the memorandum to governors and various members of the Colonial Service, asking for comments. Governors complained of lack of money and staff. Many service officers complained they were worried over their domestic situation, frustrated by the millstone of routine and their uncertainty about government aims and policy. Inadequate pay and poor family housing were commented on. The spirit of the Colonial Service seemed to be threatened, not least by increasing disillusionment with vocal African criticism, and the more complex nature of the work. A H Dutton (administrative officer in Nigeria, seconded to the CO) drew a comparison with morale in RAF bomber command in the war. When the going got hard it was transformed by heightening strategic understanding and awareness of purpose: it was this, 'not allowances, bacon and eggs, nor squash courts which kept morale so high when losses were also high', and which gave self-confidence back to the airmen. Thus all depended now on whether government had 'a real policy to hand down to their servants' (CO 847/25/7, no 20, letter to Cohen, 14 May 1946). However, there was widespread scepticism about the value of vague general policy statements. Cohen used Cartland's memorandum as the basis for discussing native administration policy with Gater, Lord Hailey,[2] F J Pedler[3] and Cartland. He proposed a Summer School to discuss the issues (CO 847/35/6, minute, 30 Sept 1946).]

Even before the present war the certainty that Native Administration, as it had been practised, was the philosopher's stone of Colonial administration was being questioned not least by those responsible for its operation and guidance. Educated Africans and others of the de-tribalised and rising middle classes have always been in a greater or less degree suspicious of the policy. They have contended that it was an expedient of the European administrator to divert the natural political aspirations of the African. Although some of the new middle classes have found their place in the

[1] Principal officer, CO East and Central African Dept, seconded to CO, 1945; formerly district commissioner in the Gold Coast; subsequently administrative secretary, Uganda, 1949.

[2] W Malcolm Hailey (1st Baron cr 1936); ICS from 1895; member (Finance and Home Depts) gov-gen's Executive Council, 1919–1924; gov of Punjab, 1924–1928 and United Provinces, 1928–1930 and 1931–1934; director, African Research Survey, 1935–1938; member, Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations, 1935–1939; head of Economic Mission to Belgian Congo, 1940–1941; chairman, Colonial Research Committee, 1943–1948.

[3] F J Pedler, CO assistant secretary, head of Appointments, Dept 'B'.

scheme of Native Administration, many have not; and there is little doubt that this opinion is still current. Generally departmental officers have been highly critical of Native Administrations as instruments of policy on the grounds of their inefficiency. Even Administrative Officers have experienced a sense of frustration in their dealings with them. These views suggest the conclusion (1) that the basis of Native Administrations is not broad enough; (2) that the Native Administrations are not sufficiently efficient to rise to the duties imposed upon them; and (3) that the general policy requires review with a view to reinforcement and re-direction.

2. Apart from the natural evolution of the Native Administrations during the war two new factors emerge.

(1) Native Administrations as at present constituted may find it difficult to satisfy the more critical demands of the returning African troops, experienced as they will be, whether literate or illiterate, in the affairs of the world.

(2) The new policy of development on which we are now embarking will make increasing demands on the machinery of the Native Administrations and impose upon it a greater strain than in pre-war years. It is essential that real political development should keep pace with the material and social development which is planned, both in order to satisfy the widening political horizon of the new classes including the returned soldiers, and in order to play an effective part in the execution and administration of the new development policy. It is no longer sufficient for the Native Administration to be a mere expedient to provide the Central Government with cheap local agents to carry out the details of its day to day administration but it is necessary that it should become an active partner in, and an essential instrument of, the development policy.

3. The time, therefore, appears to be ripe to take stock of the present state of Native Administration; to review the policy in the light of progress already made and of the needs of the future; and, if necessary, to restate the policy giving it such new direction or emphasis as may be considered necessary. In addition other steps may be required to infuse new life into it.

4. It is most fortunate that we have a comprehensive and authoritative account of the state of Native Administration in Lord Hailey's confidential Report of 1940–42. A number of changes have taken place in different territories since that date, such as the introduction of the Native Authorities Ordinance in the Gold Coast Colony and the development of Provincial Councils in Central Africa. But, apart from these local developments, the broad picture described by Lord Hailey and the conclusions drawn in his first chapter on general principles remain substantially unchanged. I am not aware that any Secretary of State has ever issued an official statement of policy on the subject of Native Administration although a number of such documents have been drawn up locally and the general policy has been described in various unofficial works. In his Report Lord Hailey has drawn attention to a number of points requiring attention and to at least one point upon which it will be desirable to have a statement of policy. This point concerns the position of the Native Administrations vis à vis the Central Government and raises the question whether the Central Government should ultimately be formed of a federation of Native Administrations or whether the Central Government should continue in its present form with the Native Administrations acting as its local agencies. In other words the time has come to decide in broad terms the ultimate goal of the policy.

5. It seems clear, therefore, that there is a case for an authoritative statement of policy. This would of course have to be in general terms, as the local application of the policy of Native Administration differs very widely from territory to territory. If such a statement of policy were to be issued it might be worth while taking the opportunity to rename this system of Government and to describe it as local Government or African local Government. The advantages of this change would be (1) to eliminate the word "native", which, although it has not been widely criticised in this particular use, is generally objectionable in some parts of Africa; (2) to distinguish the new phase of the policy from the old by the new name which might help to overcome existing prejudices; and (3) to indicate the proper and intended sphere of this form of Government.

6. Since such a statement could only indicate policy in the broadest terms, the success of its local application, and in fact the actual form which it will take locally, will depend very largely on the men who are responsible for putting it into operation. The general territorial policy of any Colonial Government will, of course, be formulated by the Governor and his advisers, but the details will have to be settled at the provincial and district level owing to the wide differences of local circumstances and the tribal organisations existing within each particular territory. The working out of the policy and its execution, therefore, rests almost entirely upon the Provincial and District Administrations within the very broad terms of the general policy. They are responsible for formulating and applying the local policy and a very heavy responsibility rests upon them. The first requisite, therefore, for a successful local Government policy is that the district commissioners should be of the highest moral and intellectual calibre with a very definite vocation and faith in their work and its objects. Added to this is required inspiring, enthusiastic, capable and far-seeing leadership on the part of the Provincial Commissioners who must set the course.

7. In this connection it is rather disturbing to find that many District Officers suffer from a sense of frustration. This is no doubt due to a variety of circumstances, many of which are connected with war-time conditions. During the war the attention of officers has been increasingly absorbed in matters unconnected with their real work of developing Native Administrations and dealing with general native problems. In addition, long tours, overwork and increasingly difficult general conditions, a rising cost of living and a variety of war-time personal problems have made the work of the Colonial Service more difficult and have sapped both its energy and enthusiasm for tackling big problems. To some extent this sense of frustration was growing even before the war. It was as though the great impetus which the Lugard school gave to Colonial administration was slowing down and losing direction in the general aimlessness and drift of the thirties. This feeling was due in part to the pre-occupation of the Service with an increasing burden of petty routine duties which were felt to be keeping them from their real work. But the problem went much deeper than this. The results of the policy of Native Administration were not always heartening and progress was slow. Progress in fact seemed to depend on the individual officer and ground was often lost if a firm and energetic hand was withdrawn. The machinery often could not hold its own, let alone progress, without continued pressure and has suffered greatly from lack of continuity of staff and policy. Much hard work by individual officers must have been lost by failure to follow it up for one reason or another. The policy itself was in some places not felt to be

keeping pace with the times and, in the absence of any local statement or directive, was not very clearly defined except in unofficial writings. There was in fact a growing consciousness of an absence of leadership. This feeling has developed during the war and is very disturbing as, at no earlier date, was strong leadership more necessary. The problems are bigger and more pressing than ever before. There is a vast development problem to be tackled in a post-war setting of most complicated political and economic conditions. The morale of the Service has suffered and the recruits of the last five years have shown little sense of vocation. This is scarcely their fault. They joined the service when it was strained and at a low ebb. They have had no training and have little understanding of the history and policy of our Colonial administration. They have had little opportunity or encouragement to make amends by study even where books are available. This should, of course, correct itself to some extent when the probationers course is re-started but there still remains the problem of the present state of the Service which will influence the attitude of the new recruits.

8. In attempting to launch a revised policy of Native Administration the state of the Service is a factor which must be taken into very close consideration. Much could be done to improve the existing position by inspiring in the district staff a feeling that there is a conscious overall policy, and that the local application of that policy is being carefully planned by enlightened Provincial Commissioners, ready to give the district staff an enthusiastic and sympathetic lead. There are indications that, in some territories at least, the present service has lost confidence in some of its Provincial Commissioners. This of course, raises the question of the selection for these posts of enthusiastic and energetic officers endowed with both knowledge and vision to take the lead in implementing the new policy.

9. There are several ways in which new stimulus might be given to the work and policy of the service. Colonial Governments might make more adequate library facilities available for use by the District and Provincial Commissioners, so as to enable the officers to inform themselves on what is being done elsewhere, and on the general trend of thought in connection with local Government in Africa. They should also have access to works on local Government elsewhere, including this country. This provision of library facilities is a matter which should be taken up on a more general plane, as it applies to other aspects of Colonial policy with equal force.

10. It would also be well worth considering introducing an official Journal for circulation to all administrative officers and others concerned. The Journal would provide a medium for informing the Service on what was happening in African Affairs generally in all territories. Through the Journal experience gained in dealing with particular problems locally could be widely circulated. New legislation would be reported. Book notices would enable local libraries to be kept up to date. The scope of the Journal could usefully be extended to deal with matters affecting land, native law and the native courts. It would be essentially the professional Journal of the Administrative Service.

11. A further point with regard to personnel is the necessity of enabling District Officers to travel widely in their districts in order to visit and supervise outlying Native Authorities. This again is a matter of wider concern and is of pressing importance in regard to matters other than the development of Native Administration. To make touring possible it is essential that the amount of routine work performed by District Commissioners should be cut down either by relieving them of

such work or by increasing and improving the quality of their clerical assistants. Lord Hailey has suggested the development of an intermediate African Administrative Service. This has certainly been given some consideration on the West Coast, but nothing has so far been done about it. The advent of the Development Officer or the District Assistant, as he is called in some territories, may go some way towards meeting this problem although these appointments were designed primarily to meet the additional work which will arise out of the development programmes. There are many duties of a purely war-time and temporary nature which have been imposed on District Commissioners and which should be considerably reduced in the coming months and years; but even their disappearance will not solve the problem. Excessive routine and office work was becoming increasingly acute in pre-war years, and received mention in Lord Hailey's African Survey. If we wish to give the policy of Native Administration a maximum chance of success there is no doubt that this question of the District Commissioner's work must be given serious attention. Apart from this there are many duties which engage the District Commissioner's attention, which are not worthy of his education and training or the expense to the Government of his salary and incidental expenses. This is a matter which it may be necessary to bring some pressure on governments to tackle.

12. A step which could be taken to pool experience and to infuse new enthusiasm both into the Administration and into the local Governments would be the development of regular conferences. The practice of holding conferences of Provincial Commissioners, Conferences of District Commissioners within the provinces and Conferences of the Native Administration staff and dignitaries, followed in some territories should be extended.

13. As far as the administrative officers are concerned I think that a great deal could be done to maintain their interest and enthusiasm and keep their minds flexible by arranging regional conferences in East, West and Central Africa; and also by arranging visits to other territories to see how common problems are being tackled there. I consider that the administrative staff works far too much in watertight compartments and that we should take advantage of the unified service to ensure that promising officers have an opportunity of seeing how problems of administration are tackled in other countries. This might be done either by short visits or by secondment on an exchange basis for a period of two or three years. There is, I know, the argument that it is difficult to use an administrative officer in districts of a territory with which he is not familiar on account of differences of languages and customs. But against this must be set the advantage of bringing different and wider experience to bear on the local problems and I am quite certain that exchanges of officers and visits of officers would have a very healthy effect both on the Service itself and on the effectiveness of the work it performs.

14. Lord Hailey has suggested in his Report that the Secretary of Native Affairs and his office should be responsible for keeping policy up to date and for correlating and co-ordinating Native Administration policy and work inside the territory. There is no doubt that a great deal of benefit could be derived from the proper functioning of the Secretary of Native Affairs and his staff. This Office has, however, not been so generally successful as might have been wished and, in some territories at least, it has now been abandoned. There is no doubt that where the post is filled by an energetic and enthusiastic officer with both knowledge and vision it could be of extreme value in the application of a new local Government policy and its future

merits serious consideration.

15. In many parts of Africa the Native Administration has achieved little and is little more than a rather inefficient school for giving local dignitaries and their clerks some rudimentary training in administrative work. If the policy of Native Administration is justified then the native Authorities must be transformed into reasonably efficient organs of local Government, which must fulfil some useful local functions now while their personnel is gaining experience. It is useless to expect the machine to function satisfactorily unless there is a reasonably efficient local Government service. The pay and conditions of local service must be made sufficiently attractive to obtain a good type of recruit. They must be given systematic preliminary and refresher training. The remuneration and training of Chiefs or other Heads of the local Government bodies must be adequate to maintain their prestige and influence both among their traditional followers and among the new middle classes.

16. In this connection there is one other matter which should be considered. The standard of African public morality is low. There is a growing tale of leading Africans from the public service, the professions, native administration service and other positions of trust who have been convicted of various forms of dishonesty or betrayal of trust. Many people think that those caught are but a tithe of those guilty of this sort of conduct. What is even more distressing than individual lapses is the marked lack of public conscience in these matters exemplified by public subscriptions to finance appeals from convictions for dishonesty. In the case of a recent subscription of this sort I believe that the convicted beneficiary found it necessary to sue the Secretary and organiser of the fund for a portion of the proceeds which he had misappropriated. As a further example the Havers[4] Report on the cost of litigation on the Gold Coast does not reveal the local African bar in too good a light. There is no need to elaborate on the subjects of unprofessional conduct and an irresponsible press. This is a problem to which we cannot afford to be blind and its solution is probably the most difficult of all the problems raised in this memorandum. The question of moral standards might be regarded as the particular concern of the Missions and the educationists and they have undoubtedly done their best. But if African participation in local or central government is to be successful the Colonial governments must face their problem squarely. The question of what is to be done is extremely difficult. It is suggested that the problem should be closely examined, possibly by a committee, and a first step might be to obtain reports on the subject from psychologists or sociologists who are studying in Africa, with a view to determining whether anything can be done to raise the moral standards of the new African society. This is, of course, a matter which would require the most tactful and confidential handling in all stages.

17. I have not dealt in this memorandum with the details of the policy which should be laid down for African local Government but rather with some of the factors which will condition the success of the policy should an attempt be made to revise and to re-launch it.

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[4] C R Havers, KC, recorder of Chichester since 1939; commissioner in Gold Coast, 1944–1945.

40 CO 847/35/6, no 2 3 Apr 1946

'Native administration policy: notes for further discussion': memorandum by A B Cohen

What follows has been written in the light of our discussion on March 22nd and as a basis for further discussion. The discussion on March 22nd established that there are two aspects of the problem, (1) redefining the policy of native administration, (2) making proper use of the administrative staff. These two aspects are closely bound up with each other and cannot be considered separately. In dealing with (2) I have not attempted to cover points relating to conditions of service. These must be dealt with separately and will be considered by the Harragin Commission[1] and the corresponding commission which will go to East Africa.

2. *The problem*

The problem is to revitalise the policy and practice of native administration and to re-inspire the Administrative Service in Africa.

At present

(1) we have no up to date policy of native administration, although great changes have taken place in the last fifteen years and although we have a particularly critical period in front of us, in which we are faced with a rapidly increasing political consciousness among Africans, a rapid extension of the educated class and the special problem of returned soldiers. We are in fact at the end of the period during which we could rely on the white man's prestige to govern Africa.

(2) we (i.e. the Colonial Office and Colonial Governments) have to a large extent lost the confidence of our administrative officers, especially the younger ones, and cannot hope to get the best out of them unless we regain it.

The reasons for this are, I suggest, with regard to (1) that there has been no redefinition of the policy of native administration since Lugard[2] and Cameron[3]. We have no machinery for ensuring that such a redefinition takes place. Indeed it was only because Lugard and Cameron were intensely interested in these questions personally that they ever devised the policy at all. We cannot afford to leave this vital matter to the chance of new Lugards and Camerons coming forward in the future. We must establish machinery for keeping native administration policy under constant review and, as an immediate step, we must tackle its redefinition now.

With regard to (2), it is the very lack of policy which is largely contributing to the lack of confidence on the part of administrative officers. They go out on first appointment enthusiastic and full of ideas and find it impossible to do many of the things which are crying out to be done. Colonial Governments give their Provincial Commissioners and district staffs far too little scope and the Colonial Office, while it tends to give too little guidance in the big things, at the same time keeps too tight a

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[1] Sir Walter Harragin, chief justice of the Gold Coast, 1944–1948; led commission of inquiry into conditions of service in West Africa, 1946–1948 (see CO 554/155/2–5).

[2] F D Lugard (Lord Lugard), high commissioner for Northern Nigeria, 1899–1906; gov of Nigeria 1912–1918; theorist of Indirect Rule and author of *The Dual Mandate* (1926).

[3] D C Cameron (Sir Donald), gov of Tanganyika, 1925–1931, and of Nigeria, 1931–1935, who introduced into Tanganyika the principles of local administration he had evolved in his service in Nigeria, 1908–1924.

rein on the small ones. One of the main reasons for this is that there is no policy and that therefore all new suggestions have to be considered *de novo*. Without a broad framework of general policy there can be no proper decentralisation, the whole pace of government is hopelessly slowed down and individual initiative is crushed.

Very briefly therefore the problem is first what the policy should be, then how it should be formed and finally how it should be carried into effect.

3. *What the policy should be*

Here I can do no more than generalise in the widest terms. I suggest that the key to the new policy should be to look upon the native administrations as local authorities, in broadly the same relationship to the central government as local authorities in this country, i.e. receiving financial assistance for certain specified services and subject to the general guidance and directions of the central government on matters of policy, but at the same time entrusted by the central government in the responsibility for purely local matters (of course with the help of the District Commissioner whenever needed). The application of this conception to different territories and different areas in the same territory will vary widely. Where you have large units like the Kano emirate, the Buganda or Barotse or the kingdom [sic], the problem will be one of ensuring that these large administrations are properly in touch with the people themselves and have proper means of local government in each of the areas which they control. It will in fact be a problem of proper internal organisation. Where on the other hand you have a number of small and poor tribes inhabiting a single district, the problem will very often be one of combining these small native authorities into a single effective organ of local government. Where you already have native administrations of the right size, the problem will be one of increasing their efficiency and ensuring that they are qualified and equipped to deal with the various problems of local government. There will be no question of imposing a stereotyped blueprint. All we can do is to indicate the broad objective and then leave it to the Governments to work out the means of getting there, and more than that, make it quite clear to the Governments that they must leave purely local application largely to their Provincial Commissioners and district staffs.

4. Broken down into its separate aspects the problem of developing the native administrations as local authorities might be approached as follows:—

(a) *Division of functions with central government*. It will be necessary for each Government to decide what functions the native administrations should undertake and what functions should be reserved to the central government. This will vary widely according to the size and efficiency of the native administrations themselves. Having decided the division, it will be necessary to see that this is observed in the management of technical and other services in the provinces.

(b) *Political development*

(i) *Place of local authorities in political system of each territory*. It should be made clear that the ultimate aim is *not* a state consisting of a federation of native administrations, but a central government with native administrations as local authorities. At the same time in the political representation of Africans, in order to avoid the growth of a class of professional politicians out of touch with the people (such as already exists on the coastal fringe of West Africa), it is necessary to develop a chain of representation from the people through the

native administrations and provincial councils to the central legislature. This is already being developed in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Nigeria and the Gold Coast and, in special forms suitable to the territories, in Sierra Leone and Uganda. The same development will have to follow in Kenya and Tanganyika if the evils of a class of professional politicians are to be avoided in these countries.

(ii) *Internal political organisation*. Here the problem is to ensure, by whatever means is most suitable locally, that native administrations, as local authorities, properly represent the people, particularly the more progressive, enlightened and educated of the people, and are not merely out of date traditional institutions impeding progress and held in being only by the strength of tradition and the support of the Government. This means that, contrary to what is the case in many areas at present, a real place must be found both on the native administrations themselves and in their Service for the younger and more progressive men.

(c) *The problem of urban areas*. Special problems will arise in urban areas closely in touch with European communities, e.g. the Copperbelt. Here advisory councils of Africans already exist and are responsible for certain administrative and judicial functions in the native towns or compounds, and the aim should be to develop these into proper local authorities. But the question then arises whether there should be separate authorities for Africans and Europeans or whether the ultimate aim should be the inclusion of both on the same authorities.

(d) *Economic functions*. Everywhere except in the towns, i.e. over by far the greatest area, the principal economic problems at present are the problems of land tenure and of the organisation of production and marketing. Viewed from the angle of local government, the problem of land tenure involves establishing the right relationship between individual tenure and collective control and the aim should be to develop the native administrations as the local land authorities (this has already been suggested in the report of Lord Hailey's committee). On the production and marketing side, the problem is one of establishing co-operative societies either under the aegis of the native administrations or in some relationship with the native administrations to be determined. It is essential to have the best machinery for increasing the efficiency of peasant agriculture. A closely related problem is that of agricultural credit.

(e) *Legal functions*. The native courts are separate from the native authorities, but must be considered as part of the organisation of local government. Here the problem is to guide the development of African law and where necessary modify it by means of native authority legislation so as to make it conform with the social and economic needs of the people.

(f) *Efficiency*. The degree of efficiency of native administrations, and hence the extent of responsibility entrusted to them, will continue to vary widely, but if they are to undertake these responsibilities, greater attention must be paid to the training of chiefs, native authority councillors and native administration staffs. This training can be undertaken by the provincial administration or at training institutions such as Jeanes schools[4] or in other ways. Greater attention must also

[4] So called after the founder of a series of 'community colleges' for adult education in the southern USA; in its African form the Jeanes schools were training centres for married teachers and their wives—the first was set up in 1925.

be paid to the salaries and conditions of service of native administration staffs. In many parts of Africa the pay even of chiefs is so inadequate that it is impossible to expect them to do anything effective.

(g) *Finance.* To a large extent the key to success lies in finance. Native administrations must have greater resources if they are to have reality. How is this to be achieved? The ultimate objective should be to fix the Government native tax at an agreed level (as low as possible), leaving the native administrations to raise their own revenues by means of local rates, part of which would be in substitution of the present tax and part in addition to it (to tap sources not tapped at present and to enable new services to be carried out). In many areas it will be a long time before this objective can be reached, but there is a far better chance of developing native administrations as local authorities if they can raise their own rates for which the people will feel that they are responsible themselves. An important aspect of the financial problem is the working out of the most efficient means of raising revenue from the natives by means of local and central taxation. This needs far greater study than it has hitherto received.

5. *How to form the policy*

For the formation of policy on native administration it seems essential that proper machinery should be established both in the Colonial Office and under Colonial Governments. The Colonial Office has never had such machinery and badly needs it. It is suggested that what is wanted is first a Principal in the African Division who would concentrate on the technical problems of native administration both in West and East Africa and make it his business to know what was going on everywhere both by personal visits and by contact with officers on leave. The present system under which the work is divided between several Principals dealing with different colonies means that none of them has the broad general picture, so that the Colonial Office is not in a proper position to perform its co-ordinating function. Secondly there should be an Adviser on Native Administration who would spend a great deal of time travelling and would be able to hold conferences with Governors, Secretaries for Native Affairs etc. It must be emphasised that these changes are not intended to lead to a greater degree of centralisation, but a greater degree of decentralisation. The business of the Adviser and the Principal, who would act as his secretary, would be to know what was going on, to organise the exchange of information between different colonies and generally to put the Secretary of State in a position to lay down broad policy and keep it up to date. Having done this, the Colonial Office should leave the application of the policy to a much greater extent than at present to Colonial Governments. Unless this is done there can be no adequate decentralisation.

Secondly, each Colonial Government should have a properly staffed section of its central organisation to deal with native administration in all its phases. This should be under the Secretary for Native Affairs, or his equivalent, who should be a member of the Executive Council. It is a fallacy to suppose that Secretaries for Native Affairs are only needed in territories where there is a considerable European community and African interests require to be specially safeguarded. They are needed everywhere to handle the technicalities of native administration, which have tended to be neglected in the past through lack of machinery to deal with them, with the result that our policy has become obsolete. The Secretary for Native Affairs should be provided in the main territories with officers under him to deal with land tenure

(already suggested to Colonial Governments), law (the Judicial Officer), co-operative societies (the Registrar) and native administration proper. In the larger territories a special officer will be needed for each of these functions. In the smaller territories one officer may have to deal with more than one aspect. Such a team has already been established in Kenya. One of the principal functions of the Secretary for Native Affairs himself should be to tour the territory, keeping in the closest touch with Provincial and District Commissioners, so as to enable the Government to know what is going on and at the same time to leave the local application of its policy to the officers in the field.

6. *How to carry the policy into effect*

Broadly the following measures will be required to carry the policy into effect:—

(a) *Policy guidance*. The broad objectives of policy having been laid down by the Secretary of State, each Colonial Government should work out the local application of the policy and should then issue clear guidance on the subject to all members of the provincial administration.

(b) *Decentralisation*. Having declared its policy the Government should give the widest discretion to Provincial Commissioners, and under them District Commissioners, to carry the policy into effect without the necessity for constant reference to headquarters.

(c) *Leadership*. In order that Provincial Commissioners may effectively perform their task of directing the local application of policy by the district staffs, it is necessary that they should command the respect of their subordinates and therefore that they should be the best men selected on grounds of merit and not merely on seniority. Generally speaking Provincial Commissioners are at present promoted too late.

(d) *Freedom from routine*. In order that the district staffs may be free to carry out their real work of pushing ahead with the development of local government, it is important that they should be freed from the mass of routine work which they have to perform at present. This can be done in the following ways:—

(i) by laying it down that the real work of administration is the first priority for the district staffs and that the filling in of returns, dealing with cash and all the other minor routine is of less not greater importance. This is already recognised in theory but not followed in practice. It never will be followed in practice unless definite instructions to that effect are given by the Secretary of State.

(ii) by insisting that each district office should have a competent office manager capable of dealing with all the routine work, so that the District Commissioner and A.D.C. are largely freed of this. Wherever possible the office manager should be an African, but in most parts of Africa this is not yet possible. Meanwhile the post of office manager might be filled either by the District Commissioner's or A.D.O.'s wife or by an Asian clerk, or (particularly in stations in less primitive areas) by a European clerk either male or female. What is important is that the Secretary of State should insist that these office managers should be provided in one way or another in as many stations as possible. Wherever possible they must be accepted by the authorities as sub-accountants so as to take the responsibility for cash entirely off the District Commissioners' hands.

(iii) by providing District Commissioners with typewriters or even in some cases dictaphones (where electric power is available) and in the case of the typewriters by insisting that they use them. Other aids to efficiency should also be explored.

(e) *Continuity*. A great deal of good work done by District Commissioners is wasted through the short periods during which they remain in a district. This could be avoided by having a greater margin of staff for leave and sickness, but the need for economy will probably prevent this. A cheaper and more effective method would be the introduction of home leave by air annually in West Africa and perhaps once in 18 months in East Africa. The conception of tours could thus be done away with and officers could regularly return to their own work after a comparatively short break. This would be an immense help where they were engaged in the long term process of developing local government.

(f) *Staff management*. If Governments are to get the best out of their district staffs it is important that a much closer contact should be maintained between these staffs and the central government than has been possible in the past. This should be achieved by means of constant touring by the Secretary for Native Affairs (or his equivalent). In the larger territories he might require an assistant, whose special function would be to keep in touch on a personal basis with the district staffs, perhaps combining this with the work of co-ordinating policy, under the S.N.A., on native administration proper.

(g) *Information*. There is a great need for keeping the administrative staffs (and indeed also the technical staffs) much more closely informed than they are at present [about] what is going on at the centre, in other parts of the territory, in neighbouring territories and in the outside world. This can be done in the following ways:—

(i) by insisting that Colonial Governments keep their own officers much more closely informed of discussions on policy etc. (At present even in cases where the Secretary of State gives instructions for a wide distribution of a particular paper, e.g. the report of Lord Hailey's committee on land tenure, these instructions are not always carried out).

(ii) by means of District Commissioners' conferences held at regular intervals. These are already held in a number of territories. The practice should be extended.

(iii) by arranging for officers to attend courses, summer schools etc. while on leave in this country.

(iv) by arranging visits to other British territories in Africa and foreign territories when the staff situation allows.

(v) by establishing a monthly information bulletin issued by the Colonial Office and circulated to all administrative and technical officers. This would contain articles on matters of Colonial and general interest, would keep the service informed as far as possible on trends of policy and would include articles by serving officers in the field.

(vi) by encouraging the production of local periodicals produced on the initiative of local officers or departments (like Farm and Forest in West Africa).

(vii) by establishing circulating libraries at the headquarters of Colonial Governments from which a wide range of up to date literature could be obtained by all officers.

7. *Procedure*

How to work out the new policy in the first instance. Little will be gained by merely sending a circular despatch on all these matters to Colonial Governors. A means must be found of associating the African Governments themselves with the formation of the new policy. Two suggestions have been made as to the best way of doing this:—

(1) by holding a conference in London for the purpose of working out a new policy and inviting to this from each Territory one senior officer (the Secretary for Native Affairs or other suitable senior officer) and one junior officer who would be able to give the view of the younger men.
(2) by appointing a small informal committee which would discuss the requirements with as many officers on leave from Africa as possible and would then make recommendations.

The advantage of the first method would be that it would associate those most closely concerned in Africa with the problems of native administration with the working out of the new policy. On the other hand there would be a risk that the senior officers brought home for the conference would tend too much to take the view that changes were not necessary and that everything would go right when staffs were again at their proper level. A committee taking evidence from officers of all seniorities could avoid this, but the committee procedure would have the disadvantage that Colonial Governments would not be so closely associated with the recommendations, while the committee, relying as it would on officers coming on leave, would inevitably take a long time to report and might well have to visit both East and West Africa.

How to put the policy to the service when formed. The aim should be ultimately to produce a memorandum issued by the Secretary of State for circulation to all officers. This might have to be confidential, but at any rate part of it should be published, as it is no longer possible to withhold a document of this sort from unofficial including African opinion.

How to obtain the agreement of African Governments to the proposed review of policy. If this subject is to be pursued, it will be necessary to obtain the agreement of all the African Governors at an early stage. I am convinced that there is only one way of doing this and that is for the Secretary of State to write to all the Governments, saying that he has decided that such a review is necessary and asking for their full co-operation. I have often been told by senior officers in the Colonial Service, including Governors, that the best way of getting something important like this settled is to tell Governors that a decision has been taken by the Secretary of State rather than to sound them in advance. I believe that Governors prefer this.

41 CO 847/35/6, no 6 22 May 1946

[Proposed general stock-taking of African administration policy]: letter from Sir G Gater to Sir J Hall (Uganda)[1]

We have been giving a good deal of thought here recently to the question whether we ought to have a general stock taking regarding native administration. This is a large subject and nearly all the experts on it are in Africa and not in London. It is therefore in Africa and not here that policy must be worked out, but we have some ideas on the subject and have been considering whether to recommend to the Secretary of State that he should propose such a stock taking to Governors. Before we take the matter any further I am anxious that our ideas should be checked with a few reliable and experienced officers from Africa.

We should very much like to take the advice of Gayer[2] and I assume that you would have no objection to this. Discussions with him would be purely informal and exploratory, the object being to sound out the ground with a view to advising the Secretary of State on a communication to Governors. We should not of course regard Gayer as in any sense representing the views of the Uganda Government, but on the basis of the experience which he has had his advice would be of the greatest value. I hope that you will see no objection to this. He would of course report back to you the result of the talks and if, in the light of this, you had any comments to add, we should be very glad to have them.

Having now dealt with the immediate purpose of this letter, perhaps I may go on to give you some indication, briefly and very tentatively, of the way in which our minds are working, although it will all be very familiar ground to you. All the African Governments are committed to programmes of political, social and economic advance, but our success in achieving the ambitious objectives which we have set ourselves will depend largely in practice on the extent to which there is satisfactory machinery in the provinces and districts, that is at the native administration level, for carrying the programmes into effect and also the extent to which the people's co-operation can be enlisted through the local native administrations or councils. At every point we come back to the question of the efficiency of the local government machinery, and put at its briefest what we have in mind is a re-assessment of the policy of native administration in the light of the needs of political, economic and social development.

The sort of questions which are constantly coming up are the following:—

(1) In the social sphere, how far are the native authorities or councils capable of taking part in the building up of the expanded social services in the rural areas and their maintenance when built up?

(2) How far are they in a position to take the lead in securing the co-operation of the people themselves, both financially and in other ways, in the working of these services?

(3) In the political sphere certain territories have already put Africans on their legislative councils, but there is not in all cases a chain of representation

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[1] Similar letters were sent to govs Sir William Battershill (Tanganyika), Sir Philip Mitchell (Kenya) and Sir Edmund Richards (Nyasaland). Sir John Hall was gov of Uganda from 1944 to 1951.

[2] C M A Gayer, director of public relations and social welfare, Uganda.

connecting these members with the people themselves. What part are the native authorities or councils going to play in this system of representation and how far are they fitted at present to form the base of the political pyramid?
(4) To what extent are they finding a place for, and securing the support of, the more educated and progressive elements among the Africans?
(5) In the economic sphere it is being frequently stated that a radical change in the methods of production and marketing will be needed to secure the proper use of land and efficient agriculture. To what extent are the native administrations in a position to take their part in any such movement?
(6) To what extent is the present system of land tenure a bar to development and what part have the native authorities or councils to play in connection with land tenure?
(7) In what directions ought we to be encouraging the development of African legal systems?

These are some of the main questions and I know of course that Colonial Governments and individual officers are constantly thinking about them. Ultimately the answers must be provided by Colonial Governments and not by the Colonial Office, but we are inclined to believe that the present time is appropriate for ventilating these matters, since, with the end of the war, we are now in effect embarking on the period when the new conception of Colonial policy represented by the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act is about to be carried into effect.

There is another important aspect of the matter. We are constantly getting evidence that there is a pretty widespread feeling of depression and disillusionment in the Service. No doubt this is largely due to over-work and war strain, long absence from England, separation from wives and families, the high cost of living, etc. But from all that we hear, it is also due to uncertainties on the part of the officers concerned as to the objectives of Colonial policy. By this I do not mean to suggest that Governments are not keeping their officers sufficiently informed of policy and plans. I think that the problem probably goes a good deal deeper than that and that in these more complicated days it is much harder for an officer to see where his efforts are leading than it was twenty years ago. Possibly a new inspiration is needed. This side of the question seems to us particularly important at the present time when large numbers of new men are being recruited into the Service.

I hope that you will not think that I am asking you to take part in the production of a blue-print of native administration, or that we are trying to put ourselves in a position to bring to birth a declaration of policy composed of platitudes and idealistic generalisations. The objective which we have in mind is much less ambitious and I hope a good deal more practical. We believe that there are a number of problems to be tackled, all affecting native administration and all closely related with each other, and we are inclined to think that it would help us and Colonial Governments, and above all officers in the field, if a statement of these problems could be produced with some indication of the general method of approach in dealing with them. But we have an entirely open mind at present whether this is the right procedure and, if it is, what form such a statement should take and how it should be prepared.

I hope that what I have said will give you some indication of the sort of ideas about which we are thinking. Of course I realise that some of the points which I have made will apply with less force to some territories than to others. I want to emphasise in

the first place that these ideas are still in a highly tentative stage and in the second place that we have not yet put them to Ministers. If when we do so, the Secretary of State decides that some official action should be taken, this will of course consist of a communication to Governors. At the present stage all we want to embark upon is purely informal discussions with a few officers on leave and I have no doubt that you will agree that this would be useful.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a very early reply about Gayer as we want if possible to have these talks during June.

42 CO 847/35/6, no 12 28 Sept 1946

'Native administration policy': memorandum by A B Cohen

In May Mr. Cartland and I were instructed by Sir George Gater, following discussions with Lord Hailey, to undertake preliminary enquiries of certain officers of the East African Governments with regard to the necessity for a review of native administration policy. We have had lengthy discussions with Mr. Wyn Harris, a Provincial Commissioner in Kenya; Mr. Gayer, head of the new Public Relations and Social Welfare Department in Uganda; and Mr. Hudson, Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia. In addition I discussed the matter with Mr. Kennedy, Secretary for African Affairs in Uganda, and with one or two other officers in East Africa.

2. Broadly speaking, the main points on which we were consulting these various officers were:—

(1) Whether closer and more continuous contact between the Colonial Office and African Governments was required on questions of native administration policy, and whether closer contact and consultation between African Governments themselves was also required, with fuller interchange of information;
(2) Whether the machinery for dealing with native administration policy requires strengthening both in the African Territories and in the Colonial Office;
(3) Whether steps require to be taken to give further assistance to officers in the field in the execution of policy with regard to native administration;
(4) Whether there should be a general stocktaking with a view to the possibility of the preparation of a statement on the present objectives of policy in regard to native administration.

3. There was general agreement on the part of all whom we consulted as to the necessity for action on points (1), (2) and (3). The nature of the action proposed will be discussed below. Generally speaking, the officers concerned welcomed our approach to them on these matters. There was less unanimity with regard to (4). Mr. Hudson was in favour of the preparation of a statement which he thought would do much good to the Service. Mr. Gayer was inclined to be in favour. Mr. Wyn Harris was more doubtful. It must be emphasised that these officers were speaking purely personally.

4. The approach made to certain Governors by letter on this subject has not produced such encouraging results. Sir E. Richards[1] has sent a reply which, while of

[1] Sir Edmund Richards, gov of Nyasaland, 1942–1948.

considerable interest, in effect says that everything required is already being done in Nyasaland, and that no general review is necessary. Sir William Battershill[2] is opposed to any formal enquiry into the policy of native administration and is particularly anxious that no publicity should be given to any study of the subject which may be undertaken. Sir Philip Mitchell, while in favour of periodical study of different aspects of native administration in each territory, so as to keep other Governments and the Colonial Office and Parliament fully informed of what is going on and to stimulate examination of the subject on the spot, is not in favour of a stocktaking with too wide a canvas. Sir John Hall has sent no letter, and I have not discussed the subject with him, but I do not believe that his reaction to the letter sent to him was favourable. The West African Governors who have been consulted, while raising no objection to informal discussions by the Colonial Office with their officers, are sceptical of the results of any general examination of policy.

5. I do not think that these reactions should be regarded in too depressing a light. When I discussed the matter with Sir William Battershill, I discovered that he had not fully understood the purpose of our enquiry and that, while he was opposed to a formal or public enquiry into native administration policy, yet he fully accepted that the working of native administration required examination and would be very willing, when the staff situation permitted, to arrange for such an examination in Tanganyika by ordinary administrative methods. I think that the replies to the letters sent show that it would have been better either to have confined these letters to a simple request that the Governors should agree to informal discussions with their officers or to have explained at much greater length what was in fact in our minds. Moreover in the case of the West African Governors, who had no document at all in front of them, it is perhaps hardly surprising that they do not appear to have fully grasped our intentions.

6. While I was in East Africa[3] I had two long discussions on the subject with Sir William Battershill, and one with Sir Philip Mitchell. The results were encouraging. Sir Philip Mitchell is probably better qualified to advise on the subject than almost anyone serving in Africa. As an ex-Secretary for Native Affairs, who assisted Sir Donald Cameron in the preparation of his famous memoranda on Native Administration, he has a great experience of the whole subject, and that experience extends to all the East African Territories. I found that Sir Philip Mitchell expressed views similar to those which we had put forward in the course of discussion here and that encouraged me greatly to believe that there was something in the views which we had separately formed. He is very much in favour of a greater degree of interchange of information and visits between African Governments. He believes in the building up, under the Secretary for Native Affairs or the equivalent in each Territory, of Sections of the Central government Machine qualified to deal with the technical aspects of native administration policy. He said that he now thought that he had been wrong in having the Secretaryship of Native Affairs in Tanganyika abolished ten years ago. He believes that some reorganisation in the Colonial Office is required so that general policy on native administration may more effectively be kept under review. He thinks that, if such a reorganisation could be carried out, it might be possible for some general statement on the objections [sic] of policy to be produced in two or

[2] Gov of Tanganyika, 1945–1949.

[3] July–Aug 1946.

three years' time. He would welcome the holding of a conference with officers from the African Governments to discuss questions of native administration policy. Sir William Battershill's approach to the subject is that of one who has not previously served in Africa, but it has been borne in upon him that the so-called system of "indirect rule" is not in fact in operation in many areas of Tanganyika. He is anxious for the full facts of the present situation of native administration in Tanganyika to be assembled by his officers, with a view to reassessing the requirements of policy.

7. Generally speaking I am confirmed in my feeling that it is necessary for the Colonial Office to make its views felt in this matter. Much constructive work on native administration is at present being initiated or carried into effect in the three East African Territories; but there is little knowledge in each of them of what is being done in the other two. A great deal of what is being done has never been communicated to the Colonial Office and, in certain quarters there is a large degree of ignorance of the Colonial Office attitude to these questions. It has indeed been said recently in connection with the discussion of this subject that the Colonial Office, in what it does, is moved wholly by political rather than practical considerations. The extent to which we concern ourselves with the problems of administrative officers in the field is not appreciated, and there appear to be strong grounds for the Colonial Office to make it generally understood that it is deeply exercised about the whole problem of native administration and anxious to find every possible means of helping officers in this field in their task of carrying policy into execution.

8. The question therefore is what action should be taken and I deal with this in the succeeding paragraphs, taking points listed in paragraph (2) above one by one.

(1) *Closer contact between the Colonial Office and African governments and between African governments themselves on native administration policy*

There is general agreement that closer contact should be secured. With the resumption of administrative reports, much more general information will be available, but this in itself is not sufficient. A large number of printed and typed reports are prepared by all Governments and many of these could with advantage be circulated to other Governments and to the Colonial Office for information. The interchange of visits between territories should be encouraged. The Land and Law Panels at the Colonial Office are already organising the interchange of information on these matters. This should also be organised for the political and local Government side of native administration. The necessity for closer contact and for the interchange of information should form the subject of part of a circular despatch to Governments. This point could be elaborated, but sufficient has been said to show what is intended.

(2) *Improvement of machinery of African governments for dealing with native administration policy*

There is general agreement, on the East African side that a section of the central machinery of Governments, under the Secretary for Native Affairs or the equivalent, should be built up with a view to keeping native administration policy under continuous review and advising on its development. This should include officers specialising in African land tenure, African law, and in certain cases also social welfare and co-operation, etc. Such a group already exists in Kenya, although it is not yet in full operation. It is being built up satisfactorily in Northern Rhodesia and

in Uganda. In Tanganyika Sir William Battershill proposes to have a Secretary for African Administration and Local Government as part of his reorganised central machine of government. In Nyasaland similar machinery on a smaller scale will be required, but the opportunity for embarking on its establishment will probably not come for another year. It is desirable that the importance of this machinery should also be emphasised in a despatch to the East and Central African Governments. Whether something similar should be said to the West African Governments is a matter for the West African Department to consider.

(3) *Machinery at the Colonial Office to deal with native administration policy*
Proposals for putting the Colonial Office in a better position to keep general policy with regard to native administration under continuous review were made in section (5) of my memorandum of the 3rd April. The weakness of our present machinery is that native administration questions are dealt with in the Colonial Office by each of the Principals dealing with the various African territories. There is no single officer with special knowledge of the problems in all territories. The heads of the two African departments provide a coordinating link on each side and until recently the head of the African Division provided a link between East and West Africa. With the separation of the two African departments into two separate Divisions of the office, this final link has now been broken. But in any case we have never had effective machinery for keeping policy under review or for judging proposals from one territory in the light of the experience of another. We are thus not in a position to carry out our essential function of comparison and co-ordination.

I suggest that the first requirement is to arrange for a single Principal to deal with all work relating to native administration in East and West Africa, including African law and African land tenure, reporting to the Head of the West or East African Department as the case may be. This officer would be Secretary of the Land and Law Panels. The change could be made fairly easily and would place the Colonial Office in a much better position to perform its proper coordinating function. The officer concerned should be provided with a Research Assistant to carry out factual studies in particular subjects as and when required.

In addition I should like, as a suggestion to be carried into effect at greater leisure, to renew the proposal made in my memorandum of the 3rd April that an Adviser on African Local Government should be appointed in the office. His function would be to keep a general view of the development of native administration policies in East and West Africa. He would visit the territories frequently, would keep in close touch with officers on leave, and would study all the available written material on the subject. I would emphasise again that the suggested appointment is not intended to lead to a greater degree of centralisation in Whitehall. On the contrary, by keeping the Secretary of State more continuously informed of what was going on all the time in the Territories, the appointment should make it possible to achieve a greater degree of decentralisation. In any case the purpose of the appointment would be primarily so that the study and recording of development in native administration could be properly organised both here and in Africa. There would thus be no question of derogating from the powers of Governors to deal with the actual problems of administration.

I have always envisaged that such an adviser would be a retired officer from the African Service. But Sir Philip Mitchell, who is in favour of the appointment of an

adviser on these lines, suggests that it should be someone from outside, possibly from one of the Universities in this country. He emphasises that it is important that such an officer should have a scholarly mind, and he believes that someone with a University background could make a great contribution to the overall study of the whole subject.

(4) *Assistance for administrative officers in the field*
This point is dealt with at length in paragraph 6 of my memorandum of the 3rd April and I need not go into detail here. Action seems to be required particularly in relation to freeing officers in the field from routine duties in order to enable them to concentrate on the real work of native administration and in keeping officers better informed of the reasons for Government policy and of developments in other territories. All these points should, I suggest, be dealt with in a despatch to African governments and in particular emphasis should be laid on the necessity of providing each District Office with a competent Office Manager, and, on the information side, on the importance of informing all officers fully of the actions of Government and of arranging the interchange of visits between different territories, the holding of District Commissioners' Conferences and sending officers to courses, etc. in this country. The important question of establishing a periodical Colonial Office bulletin is being taken up separately.

(5) *The question of a general stocktaking on native administration policy with a view to the possibility of preparing a statement on the present objectives of policy*
Whether or not a statement of the objectives of policy is required, it is clear that most Governors are doubtful about the value of such a statement. Governors are nervous of anything like a blueprint of policy, which was of course not at all what was intended. Nevertheless it is evident that Governors will need a good deal more convincing before they would welcome such a statement and we ought, I think, to move cautiously in the matter. At the same time I believe that there are strong grounds for further consultation with officers of the African Governments both on native administration policy itself and on the machinery for forming it and carrying it into effect. I do not think that we shall get much further with individual consultation and I should be in favour of arranging a Conference with Secretaries for Native Affairs and others sometime next year. Sir Philip Mitchell suggested to me that this might take the form of a summer school at one of the Universities, an idea which he put forward before the war. I think that this is an excellent suggestion, and the summer school procedure would have the advantage of keeping the discussion informal, but at the same time providing an opportunity for getting down to the real problems with the various Secretaries for Native Affairs. The Conference should also be attended by other officers on leave, both senior and junior, although they would not necessarily attend all the sessions, alternative programmes being provided for them. Another advantage of having a summer school would be that if, after consultation, the Governors wished to limit the Conference merely to an exchange of ideas, with no attempt to produce any conclusions, a summer school could still usefully be held, although its value would be reduced. In other words the procedure would be highly flexible. I should envisage that the summer school would last for about 10 days and that about 40 people would attend it. Sir Philip Mitchell said that he would be quite prepared to send over one or two of his senior officers specially to

attend it. I need not deal here with the agenda for such a summer school, since that could be worked out at leisure if the general proposal were approved. I have made some enquiries of Sir Ralph Furse[4] as to the possibility of securing a college at Oxford or Cambridge about July if the idea were approved and he thinks that this might well be possible. He has promised to make further enquiries without involving any commitment. Colonial Governments would have to agree to meet most of the expenses.

(6) *Summary*

The proposals in the above note are as follows:—

1. A circular despatch to East and Central and, if desired, West African Governments should be prepared dealing with the following points:—

(a) The necessity for closer contact and exchange of information between the Colonial Office and African Governments and between African Governments themselves on native administration policy.
(b) The improvement of the machinery of African Governments for dealing with native administration policy.
(c) Methods of assisting administrative officers in the field in the execution of native administration policy.

The Department are preparing the first draft of such a despatch for consideration.

2. Consideration should be given to the improvement of the machinery of the African Division of the Colonial Office in relation to native administration policy. In particular one Principal should deal with native administration questions affecting both East and West Africa. A Research Assistant should be appointed with a view to carrying out studies on particular subjects. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of appointing an Adviser on African Local Government to the staff of the Colonial Office.

3. Arrangements should be made for the holding of a summer school on native administration at one of the universities next summer. African Governments should be invited to send their Secretaries for Native Affairs to this summer school and also certain other suitable officers who might be on leave at the time.

[4] Director of recruitment to Colonial Service, 1931–1948.

43 CO 847/35/6 1 Nov 1946

[African administration policy]: minute by F J Pedler, commenting on Cohen's memorandum[1]

I am most grateful to you for giving me an opportunity of saying what I feel on this question, for in my view the initiative which Mr. Cohen has taken is one of the most important and valuable things which has happened recently in this Office.

2. Africa is now the core of our colonial position; the only continental space from which we can still hope to draw reserves of economic and military strength. Our

[1] See 42.

position there depends fundamentally on our standing with Africans in the mass. And this depend[s] on whether we make a success of African *local* government.

3. Happily, for about forty years we have avoided fighting Africans, and during this time we have, by means of our administrative policy (native authorities, local native councils, and so forth) built up a most valuable goodwill between ourselves and the mass of primitive Africans.

4. This goodwill is now imperilled. The racial conflict deliberately fomented by Azikiwe[2] in Nigeria, and the Messianic fervour with which he is regarded by many Nigerians, raise a serious danger that we may come to blows with Africans in Nigeria. If this should happen it would immediately embitter our relations with Africans throughout the continent. While Nigeria appears at present to be the danger point, there are delicate situations in other places.

5. Since Africans first entered the executive council of the Gold Coast in 1942, the handing over of important positions in the central governments to the small minority of literate Africans has gone ahead very quickly. They are on executive councils in the West, in legislative councils in the East, in the Administrative Service in Nigeria and the Gold Coast; they have a majority in the Gold Coast legislature and may shortly expect a majority in the Nigerian legislature.

6. The pace of these changes testifies to the sincerity of our policy of granting self-government as soon as possible. But these changes represent concessions to a class of literate Africans who are a small minority. If this small minority were soundly based on the conscious, informed support of the illiterate mass, all would be well. But it isn't. I am not suggesting that the literates ought not to have their places in councils and so forth, but we need to call in the African masses to keep the balance. The illiterate masses can only take a positive part in government through the development of vigorous local authorities of suitable form and function.

7. Mr. Cohen says that officers in the field complain that the interest of the Colonial Office is "too political". There is no doubt that the impression has spread widely among Government officers and among Africans that the native authority policy is being allowed to fall into the background and that the future lies with central institutions and the literate African. This has had a depressing effect on the Administrative Service, who can raise much enthusiasm for local authorities, but from most of whom the central authority is remote.

8. What is wanted now is a vigorous policy of African local government which will progressively democratise the present forms and bring literates and illiterates together, in balanced and studied proportions, for the management of local finances and services. Failing this, we shall find the masses apt to follow the leadership of demagogues who want to turn us right out very quickly. The position and prestige of such persons has been much enhanced by our policy of the last four years.

9. I range myself with Mr. Cohen in advising that the objectives of policy should be stated. Indeed, without a definition of objectives, the rest is useless. All the emphasis on methods, exchange of information, etc., is futile if it is not clear to what end all this is intended.

10. My own view, for what it is worth, is that His Majesty's Government should give the fullest support to any measures which will enable the common people in any

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[2] B N Azikiwe ('Zik'), journalist, president of National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.

locality to participate in the management of their own affairs, and that the contrary claims of tribal chiefs, African politicians, centralised departments and financial purists should not be allowed to stand in the way unless there are very special reasons why they should.

11. Now, there is a tremendous field of "technique" in all this. Although Government is an art which cannot be learned from lectures, books, or circular despatches, it has, like other arts, a technique which needs to be studied and taught. How and when to persuade a chief to commit political euthanasia: how to arrange for illiterates to register votes: how to convert tribal customs such as the Ibibio "good son"[3] into a balanced representation of literates and illiterates: how to reconcile the claims of the native courts and the "European" courts: how to separate the judiciary from the executive functions in native authorities: how to solve the language problem in native courts: how to establish native institutions in multi-tribal urban communities: what dangers you incur if you leave the women out of account: how a local authority may be made to grow out of a single successful service such as a cattle insurance scheme or a lorry park: and so on. All these problems have been solved successfully, and most of them in other places have been unwisely and unsuccessfully handled. The job of knowing all this and seeing that the information gets passed around is a full time job for an officer enjoying at least the status of a full adviser. I should have thought that it deserved the whole-time attention of an Assistant Under Secretary of State.

12. I strongly support Mr. Cohen's proposals in his paragraph (6) with the provisos (a) that the "summer school" should be made an important function and should be used to test out thoroughly the reaction to a strong lead on the question of policy on the lines suggested above; and (b) that an Adviser or preferably an Assistant Under Secretary of State should be provided to devote his whole time to questions of African Local Government.

[3] The Ibibio were from eastern Nigeria. The editor is grateful to Sir Frederick Pedler for the following explanation of the term Ibibio "good son": In the Native Authority Councils most of the members were there by virtue of their position as heads of houses, families or villages. Such persons were usually elderly and of conservative disposition. However, each one would be accompanied by a younger man, who carried a small stool for the elder to sit on. During the proceedings of the council, the younger man would take a position behind his elder, and would be able to whisper in his ear. The younger man was the 'good son'. He might really be a son, or he might not. In the development of the councils at this time, importance was attached both by the government and by the Ibibio Union to the choice of 'good sons'. It was seen as a method of introducing younger, educated, progressive men into the deliberations.

44 CO 847/35/6, nos 15–24 25 Feb 1947

[Local government]: circular despatch from Mr Creech Jones to the African governors

[This document is one of the best-known in the whole ministerial canon of post-war policy-making. It was based on a series of discussions held by Cohen in 1946: 'The draft is a joint effort by Mr Cartland, Mr [K E][1] Robinson and myself'. A great deal of time was

[1] K E Robinson was at the time his opposite number as head of the West African Dept.

spent on wording it carefully. Its presentation emphasised the importance attached by the CO to local government, 'and also the fact that we are working against time, since the political development of the African territories is bound to proceed rapidly'. A substantial section was devoted to the organisation of the African division of the CO, in order to make the reorganisation at the other end carry more weight with governors. The latter part of the despatch dealt with the position of district staffs. Cohen thought this was in a way the most important part: 'The necessity for relieving District Commissioners of routine work has long been recognised, but far too little has been done to achieve this object. I believe that a strong statement by the Secretary of State would be most salutary and I have been impressed by the universal enthusiasm for getting something done on this subject of all Colonial Service officers with whom I have discussed it' (minute by Cohen, 24 Mar 1947). The despatch would come before the summer school later in the year. Sir G Seel commented: 'I agree entirely with what it contains and congratulate the compilers on what should be a notable State Paper', a judgment of its importance with which Sir T Lloyd agreed (minutes of 29 Jan and 17 Feb 1947). Mr Creech Jones's response was as follows (in a hasty and almost illegible scribble squeezed into the bottom corner of a page): 'I agree with this excellent draft. On the local government section I would hope that Lord Hailey has seen it, but possibly his views have been obtained. There is no mention of local government in the towns or urban centres of Africans or of Africans in sectors of towns. The relation to municipalities is not hinted at though I think the time ripe for a thorough study of municipalities – their power basis and their relation in government. The flexibility of local government to carry new responsibilities & additional strains is also important – how get the Councils less flexible [sic] & less feudal & less confined to the old. There is also the point about the young men – bringing them on to the Councils & advisory bodies' [nd]. The replies received expressed substantial agreement with the aims of policy laid down in the despatch. Cohen brought the comments together in his minute of 11 Dec 1947 (see 47).]

Since I took office as Secretary of State in October I have been considering some of the basic problems of African administration, and I think it right that I should now address you on this subject, since our success in handling these problems and the extent to which we can secure the active co-operation of the Africans themselves may well determine the measure of our achievement in the programmes of political, social and economic advancement on which we have now embarked. I believe that the key to success lies in the development of an efficient and democratic system of local government. I wish to emphasise the words efficient, democratic and local. I do so, not because they import any new conception into African administration; indeed these have been the aims of our policy for many years. I use these words because they seem to me to contain the kernel of the whole matter; local because the system of government must be close to the common people and their problems, efficient because it must be capable of managing the local services in a way which will help to raise the standard of living, and democratic because it must not only find a place for the growing class of educated men, but at the same time command the respect and support of the mass of the people.

2. In African administration the term local government must not be interpreted narrowly; it covers political questions such as the functions of native authorities, the composition and method of appointment of councils and the constitutional position of chiefs; financial questions such as the working of native treasuries and the relationship between central and local taxation; judicial questions such as the operation of native courts and the development of African law, both traditional and statutory; and economic questions such as the control of land usage and the evolution of systems of land tenure. In urban areas the special problem arises of developing municipal government, or, in some places, associating Africans with the non-African communities in municipal government where it already exists. In rural

areas local government bodies may be native authorities, large or small, or local native councils, as in Kenya. Where native authorities are large and responsible for hundreds of thousands or even millions of people, the problem is one of building up a system of local government below them in close touch with the people themselves: where they are too small to be effective, the problem is one of securing fusion or federation of existing units. The general policy must be applied differently in different areas; the broad aim of securing an efficient and democratic system of local government will, however, be the same everywhere.

3. The African Governments are now beginning to put their ten year development programmes into execution. The stage has been reached when paper plans must be translated into action, and it is in the townships and villages, among the people themselves, that much of this action must take place. There are many development schemes where success, in whole or in part, depends on the active co-operation of the people, and that co-operation can best be secured through the leadership of local authorities. Without an efficient system of local government the great mass of the African population will derive only partial benefits from the monies voted for development by the Colonial Legislatures and the grants made under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.

4. Local government has an equally important part to play in the sphere of political development. Since 1940 much progress has been made in the granting of increased responsibility to Africans in the central political and administrative machinery of government. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast Africans have been brought onto the Executive Councils and there are now African unofficial majorities on the Legislative Councils. In all the East African territories African members have been appointed to the Legislative Councils for the first time, and such appointments will before long be made in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Everywhere Africans are playing an increasing part in the making of policy by their service on boards and committees. For the most part these positions of responsibility are necessarily being filled by men from the educated minority, and in present circumstances almost all the leaders of African society must be drawn from this class. But this very situation, inevitable as it is, carries with it one danger for the future, in that it may result in the creation of a class of professional African politicians absorbed in the activities of the centre and out of direct touch with the people themselves. The problem is fully recognised by the African Governments and is being met in some Territories by the establishment of regional or provincial councils, through which a chain of representation from the people to the Legislative Councils can be secured. The Native Authorities, as the organs of local government, are the most important link in this chain. In countries where literate systems of voting cannot yet be used for the purposes of election, local government bodies must normally provide the electoral machinery so as to ensure that the representatives of the people on provincial, regional and central councils are chosen by the people in accordance with methods which they themselves accept and understand. Local government must at once provide the people with their political education and the channel for the expression of their opinions. An efficient and democratic system of local government is in fact essential to the healthy political development of the African Territories; it is the foundation on which their political progress must be built. But the rate of political progress cannot be regulated according to a pre-arranged plan; the pace over the next generation will be rapid, under the stimulus of our own development

programmes, of internal pressure from the people themselves, and of world opinion expressed through the growing international interest in the progress of colonial peoples. If local government is to keep pace with political progress and to exert its due influence on that progress, the Native Authorities must adapt themselves rapidly to the needs of the modern world, and the African Governments will have a major part to play in encouraging that process. In many parts of Africa the development of local government bodies has been held back by the lack of education and the ill health of the people. Where conditions are still primitive they cannot be transformed except through a laborious process of evolution. The political development of the Territories will, however, forge ahead in spite of conditions in the more backward areas, and, if this development is not to be one-sided, it is necessary that local government should everywhere progress as rapidly as possible to the stage at which it can play its effective part in the development of the Territories.

5. I do not intend in this despatch to attempt any general statement of my views on the means by which the policy of local government should be carried forward. Indeed I have not yet reached any final conclusion whether such a statement of policy is required at the present time. It is, I know widely held that conditions in the African Territories are so diverse as to make difficult, if not impossible, the laying down of any general principles of policy which would be of practical value. As at present advised I do not myself share this view and I believe that at the appropriate time there would be much advantage in producing a statement dealing not with the detailed application of policy, which must vary from territory to territory, but with its objectives, which are common to all territories, and the manner in which those objectives could best be approached. Such a statement would, however, demand the greatest care in preparation and I should wish its terms to be discussed with officers having up to date practical experience of the work of African administration in the field. As you know I am arranging to hold a summer school on this subject at Cambridge in August, which I hope will be as representative of the Administrative Service in Africa as the importance of the subject deserves. I intend that the main aspects of local government should be discussed at the summer school, and in particular I hope that attention will be given to the following points:—

(1) Means of securing an effective place in local government for those Africans who are best qualified to be real leaders of the people;
(2) Means of developing real financial responsibility in local government bodies both in relation to the raising of taxation and the control of expenditure;
(3) The division of functions between local government bodies and the Central Government and the place of local government bodies in political systems of the territories;
(4) The functions of local government bodies in relation to the control of land usage and the conservation and development of natural resources;
(5) The bearing of African legal systems on social and economic development and their evolution in relation to European law;
(6) The development of local government for Africans in urban areas.

6. I shall be in a better position after the Summer School has taken place to consider whether any statement of policy is required and, if so, what form it should take and whether it should be confidential or for publication. I should not of course regard the exchange of views at the summer school as a substitute for consultation

with Governors, and at the appropriate time I should wish to obtain Governors' views on these points. Meanwhile I shall take the opportunity in this despatch to address you on certain questions of machinery which I regard as essential to the successful formation and operation of any policy of African local government. I believe that the knowledge of the subject which undoubtedly exists throughout Africa must be made more readily available to all concerned, so that it may exercise the right influence on the formation of policy. For this purpose we must provide for a much more effective and continuous exchange of information between individual African Governments and between the African Governments as a whole and the Colonial Office; and equally the machinery both of African Governments and the Colonial Office must be so devised that policy with regard to local government for Africans can be kept constantly under review. At the same time, in recognition of the predominant part which the district staffs play in the execution of policy, means must be found of ensuring that they are enabled to devote the majority of their time and attention to this vital work. I shall deal with these matters at some length in the succeeding paragraphs.

Exchange of information

7. During my visit to East Africa last year I found that Administrative Officers were often unaware of developments in neighbouring British Territories in the field of local government, although these were directly relevant to their daily work. There is, I believe, insufficient knowledge of current developments in French and Belgian Territories. This lack of information applies not only to the districts, but also to Secretariats and the Colonial Office itself. That is partly due to the war; but even before the war, knowledge was often far from complete in the absence of any systematic arrangements for the compilation and exchange of information. I hope that it may be possible shortly to resume, and to expand, the system of published reports on African affairs, which some Governments issued annually before the war. Another possibility would be the periodic publication by each African Government of special studies on particular branches of local government, such as the functioning of courts, land administration, public health and social services. Such studies could perhaps be at three of [? or] five-yearly intervals in each case, so that one branch of the subject could be covered each year. There is also much to be gained by the circulation as between Governments, for the use of officers in Secretariats and the field, of confidential reports on policy and more detailed information on the technique of local government. These would include memoranda on special or general subjects, copies of legislation affecting African administration and reports from individual officers on their work in the field, particularly where interesting experiments have been tried or new techniques or procedures adopted. Much valuable experience collected in the field at present goes unrecorded, or if it is recorded, never receives the wide circulation which it deserves. Much information moreover which is not at present circulated could be made available to other Governments merely by means of extra duplication of papers without involving any additional work to the officers concerned. When so duplicated, these documents should be given as wide a circulation as possible.

8. I should be grateful if all African Governments would now consider how best they can establish, or re-establish, a system for the compilation and exchange of information on the development of local government for Africans, to be brought into

force as the staff situation permits, and I should be glad to be informed at an early date of the arrangements which it is proposed to make. These arrangements should be so devised as to ensure that there is a proper exchange of information between districts within each Territory; that the districts and other branches of Government are adequately informed about the progress of African administration in other Territories, both British and foreign; and that the Colonial Office and other Governments of British Territories in Tropical Africa are kept regularly informed of all important developments in each Territory. I may here mention that I am considering the possibility of arranging for the issue by the Colonial Office of a Colonial Service journal or magazine which could be used for the dissemination of certain types of information bearing on this subject and would in particular provide an opportunity of publishing some of the valuable accounts by individual officers of experiments carried out in the field. I shall be addressing you separately on this subject in due course.

Machinery for the review of policy

9. Arrangements for the exchange of information, however complete, will achieve little unless the policy and technique of African local government can be kept under continuous review, and both the African Governments and the Colonial Office must be provided with appropriate permanent machinery for the purpose. My predecessors' despatches of the 3rd November, 1944, and the 10th April, 1946, with which I am in full agreement, emphasised the need for such machinery in relation to the study of the problems of African land tenure and African law. Panels on the two subjects have already been set up in London and favourable replies from the African Governments indicate that the machinery required in the Territories themselves is either being established or will be established when the necessary staff is available. These arrangements should, I consider, be extended to cover the whole field of African local government. I suggest that what is required in the Territories themselves is that each Government should have an African affairs branch performing the following functions. In the sphere of policy this branch would keep all developments in local government under continuous review, would maintain the closest contact with all Administrative Officers in the field and would advise Government on all questions of policy relating to African administration. In the sphere of information it would perform the functions described in paragraph 7 of this despatch. In the sphere of research it would be responsible for organising investigations for the study of local government, for ensuring that suitable staff were provided for them and for co-ordinating their results. The African affairs branch would in fact be responsible for supplying Government with technical information and advice on local government for Africans in all its forms, including local government in urban areas except where for special reasons this may not be possible at present, as in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. The branch would include the specialists on land tenure and law whose appointment was recommended in the despatches referred to above. The branch would not of course be responsible for all questions affecting Africans, and its relations with other branches of Government, and particularly with those concerned with agriculture, health and education, would be part of the problem of the proper organisation of the government machine.

10. I do not wish to lay down any hard and fast rule on the form which these organisations should take, as this must obviously vary according to the needs of the

various Territories. In East and Central Africa an established pattern is beginning to be formed. In Kenya the functions described above are performed by the Chief Native Commissioner and by a group of officers working under him, each of whom specialises either in land tenure, law, native agriculture, native livestock, co-operation or social welfare. Similar groups are being built up on a smaller scale under the Secretary for African Affairs in Uganda and the Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia. In Tanganyika a new post on the Executive Council, covering both African Administration and Local Government and corresponding to the present post of Administrative Secretary, is likely to be created shortly, and it is to be hoped that, when the staff position in the Territory permits, a group of officers will be formed under him dealing with the various aspects of local government. I warmly welcome these developments and shall be prepared to give my full support to the organisations so established. I hope that they will be given a high degree of priority as regards staff, and that when staff has been provided it will be retained in this work for reasonable periods, since the subject requires knowledge which can be obtained only after a considerable period of study.

11. In the West African Territories the position is somewhat different, in that, in the larger of them the chief responsibility for advising the Governments on African affairs is in the hands of the Chief Commissioners, who are not stationed at Government headquarters. It may be found in Nigeria that it will be necessary for an African affairs branch on the lines suggested above to be established in each Chief Commissioner's Secretariat, but even so the need may be felt for a central repository of knowledge and a central clearing house for information. In that case it may perhaps be thought desirable to devise some machinery on the lines of the proposed new Lands Department which is described in Sir Arthur Richards'[2] despatch No. 224 of the 25th September, 1946, and I am sending copies of this to the other West African Governors. I should be grateful if the Governors would consider what organisation is needed and would let me have their views on the subject at an early date after consultation with their principal advisers.

12. To complete the machinery for dealing with this subject some re-organisation will be required within the African Division of the Colonial Office, which will have the same general function for Africa as a whole in the study of the problems of African local government as the African affairs branches of the Governments will have in individual Territories. The efficient performance of these functions will require a thorough knowledge of the problems of African local government, based on continuous and systematic study and on personal contact with a wide range of officers from the field. This knowledge is not at present available and a new approach to the problem of obtaining it is required.

13. I am giving active consideration to the best method of remedying this defect, and as a first step I have decided that one Principal shall be allotted the function of dealing, under the heads of the two African Departments, with all questions relating to African administration which are referred to the Colonial Office whether from West or East Africa. It will, I hope, be possible to provide him with a research assistant and, in due course, with such other assistance as may be necessary. He will also perform the function of Secretary of the Land and Law Panels and as such, in

[2] Gov of Nigeria, 1943–1947 (Lord Milverton).

accordance with the arrangements made, will keep in close touch with the officers specialising in these subjects in each of the African Territories. It will be desirable also that he should establish and maintain close personal contact with the officers dealing generally with the problems of African local government in each Territory. I attach the greatest importance to these personal contacts between officers working in the African Division of the Colonial Office and officers in the field and I hope that you will give every encouragement to your officers to establish and maintain them. I wish to emphasise that I am not making these arrangements in the Colonial Office with any intention of centralising the machinery for the formation of policy in each Territory. I should regard this as a retrograde step, since I believe in the maximum possible degree of decentralisation both in African local government and in other branches of Colonial administration. Full and effective decentralisation cannot, however be achieved except within the framework of a known and accepted general policy based on an authoritative body of information. The arrangements which I hope to see made are designed to secure that this information may be collected and that a settled policy when established by agreement between all concerned may be made known to every officer.

The district staffs

14. The principal instrument for putting into effect the policy of African local government is the District Commissioner and it is vital to the success of this policy that the best possible use should be made of his services. I wish to make known to the Service generally my deep concern for the welfare of all staff working in the field. Since I am here discussing the problems of local government, what I say is necessarily addressed to the position of the Administrative Officer, but the principle applies equally to all technical field staff and I should like this to be clearly understood. I am aware of the great discomforts which officers in the field, like others, have had to face during the war through separation from wives and families, shortages of staff, excessive lengths of tours and in some cases poor housing arrangements. In this despatch I am not primarily concerned with these material hardships, but with the relations between Governments and their district staffs. I regard it as of fundamental importance, and I know that Governors agree, that District Commissioners should be given by Governments the widest possible latitude within the general framework of policy to press on with the development of local government in their districts and that full scope should be given for the exercise of individual energy and initiative. For this purpose it is necessary that the district staffs should be kept fully and continuously informed of the broad lines of Government policy within which they must operate; that they should be relieved of the mass of routine which at present often makes it difficult for them to devote enough time and attention to their true work of local government; that every effort should be made, even at some sacrifice of convenience, to leave them in their posts for sufficiently long periods to enable real progress to be made during the term of office of each District Commissioner; and finally that one-man districts should be avoided so that regular touring may take place. I am aware that these problems have been engaging the attention of African Governments for many years. What I have to say is not new. I say it because I believe that the time has come to make renewed efforts to solve these problems of machinery, so as to ensure that the district staffs are in the best possible position to deal with the exceedingly difficult problems which lie ahead of us in Africa

in the immediate future.

15. You will have appreciated from the preceding paragraphs the importance which I attach to keeping the district staffs fully informed of developments both inside and outside the Territory. I suggest that this could be achieved in the following ways:—

(a) By providing officers in the field with information regarding current developments in the policy of the Government concerned, both while policy is still being formed and after decisions have been taken. Written information should be supplemented by personal contacts between headquarters and the district staff and it should be the special responsibility of the Secretary for African Affairs, or the equivalent officer, to maintain these contacts by frequent touring.
(b) By means of periodic conferences which are a regular feature in some Territories already and undoubtedly fulfil an extremely valuable function.
(c) By arranging for officers to attend courses etc. while on leave in this country.
(d) By arranging visits for officers to other British Territories in Africa and to foreign territories.
(e) By encouraging the production of local periodicals whether on an official basis or on the initiative of individual officers or departments.
(f) By ensuring the distribution of important Government publications, e.g. White Papers etc., published in the United Kingdom.
(g) By ensuring that all important publications affecting their work are made available officially to the district staffs and that they are kept up to date in the general literature of their profession. Arrangements should be made to circulate to them a list of recent publications on all matters affecting their work. In order to assist Governments in this I am examining the possibility of circulating book lists regularly to all Colonial Governments.
(h) By arranging that the district staffs have the means to keep abreast with world affairs and new ideas by means of station or office libraries and central or provincial lending libraries. Library facilities should be reviewed and where necessary supplemented.

16. Finally I come to the actual work of District Commissioners and to the complaint which has been heard on all sides for many years that the district staffs have become increasingly over-burdened with minor routine matters which make it impossible for officers to devote sufficient time and attention to their proper function of local government. You will, I am sure agree with the view I strongly hold that the development of African local government should be the principal function of district staffs, and I should be glad if this could be laid down emphatically for the guidance of all your officers. This does not of course apply to officers in towns or settled areas who are deputed to deal with the affairs of the non-African communities; nor is it intended to mean that in mixed areas the affairs of these communities should receive less than the attention which they deserve. I do, however, again wish to emphasise that work connected with local government is of greater importance than the submission of returns or the writing of routine reports. I am not suggesting that routine work should be neglected or put aside but I do consider that it should be subjected to careful scrutiny by Governments to ensure that demands made on District Commissioners by the Secretariat and departments are fully justified and that less important items may, where possible, be eliminated. If any question of

priority arises between the two functions, the work of local government must in my view take precedence over all but absolutely essential routine work.

17. Routine work must nevertheless continue, and to help the district staffs to deal with it I suggest, in the first place, that Governments should examine the possibility of increasing the mechanical aids to work at district headquarters and in particular that attention should be given to the increased use of typewriters, stenographers and even possibly dictaphones in the larger centres. I believe that it would be useful for any Government which has not recently done so to entrust one of its officers with the task of examining the possibility of adopting arrangements to increase office efficiency in the districts. Secondly, and far more important, I consider that arrangements should be made to relieve District Commissioners, and District Officers or Assistant District Commissioners, of the personal responsibility for the handling of routine work. In my view the aim should be to provide every district office with a competent office manager who, while coming under the authority of the District Commissioner, would himself be responsible for such matters as the local Treasury, the issue of licences, the handling of cash, the preparation of returns and such other matters as could be delegated to him. This office manager should himself be recognised as sub-accountant for the district so that he and not the District Commissioner himself could carry the financial responsibility. Such posts should be filled by Africans whenever suitable Africans are available; and, where they are not at present available, by Asians or by Europeans whether male or female. It may be that as a result routine and financial work might in some cases be handled with slightly less efficiency than when dealt with by Administrative Officers themselves, but this could be offset by establishing a system of travelling inspectors of the work of these office managers. In any case, any loss of efficiency involved in the change at first would, in my view, be more than balanced by the advantage of freeing Administrative Officers for the exercise of their proper functions. In permitting highly trained and highly paid Administrative Officers to devote large parts of their time to dealing with minute details of routine administration, I consider that we are acquiescing in an arrangement which is most uneconomical and I feel sure that this state of affairs must be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. I wish to make it clear that I attach great importance to this point; indeed I regard it as essential that steps should be taken without delay to relieve Administrative Officers of routine work and to ensure that they are able to devote themselves primarily to travelling extensively throughout their districts and to the problems of political, economic, and social development and above all the development of local government.

16. I have dealt in this despatch with a number of problems which are already familiar to you and I am aware of the considerable practical difficulties in the way of giving effect to some of the suggestions which I have made. If, however, rapid progress is to be made with the development of local government for Africans it is essential that these difficulties should be overcome. I ask you, therefore, to give the questions which I have raised the very closest consideration and I should be grateful if during the next three months you would let me have your views on these points and a report on the steps which you are taking to deal with them.

19. In view of the importance of this despatch and of its general interest to serving officers, I would ask that, unless you give strong reasons to the contrary, copies of it should be made available confidentially to all Administrative Officers.

There may be other officers to whom, in your opinion copies could properly be distributed. I am having the despatch printed for confidential circulation and shall be grateful if you could let me know immediately by telegram the number of copies you require.

45 CO 847/35/6, no 88 30 May 1947

[Local government]: despatch from Sir P Mitchell (Kenya) to Mr Creech Jones, commenting on the circular despatch. *Annex*: 'Note by the governor of Kenya'

I have the honour to acknowledge your Confidential Despatch No. 41 of 25th February 1947,[1] and to offer some comments on it, mainly from the East African, and particularly the Kenya point of view. With the substance of the Despatch I find myself in general agreement and I think the discussions of important subjects which will result from it most opportune at this time.

2. The matters discussed in your Despatch are a very important part of the general problem of Colonial administration at the present time, but a part which, it seems to me, cannot be realistically discussed in isolation and without reference to more general questions. While I do not wish to add to the length of this Despatch by including matter beyond the immediate scope of the subject, I could not let my comments go to you without an expression of my views on the wider matters connected with it. I have accordingly attached a general note written from that point of view.

But I must here say at least this, that I believe it to be imperative to recognise that the confidence and enthusiasm which are necessary for the task we have to undertake have suffered serious damage in the last few years and that it is essential to restore both, not less in the United Kingdom than in Africa, if we are to succeed. It is not by any apologetic or defensive attitude, either before our own people at home or in Africa, or in international gatherings largely composed of representatives of the most corrupt and abominable misgovernment extant today, that we shall do what we have to do, but by a restored and reinvigorated belief in ourselves, our own strength and our own determination to persevere in the task to which we have set our hands, which I conceive to be no less than to civilise a great mass of human beings who are at present in a very primitive moral, cultural and social state, albeit many of them have gone a long way in material things and most are eager to go further. How primitive the state of these people is and how deplorable the spiritual, moral and social chaos in which they are adrift at the present time, are things which can perhaps only be fully realised by those who are in close personal touch with the realities of the situation. It is not my purpose now to attempt an account of these aspects of the problem with which we have to deal; some comments on it will be found in the Note appended hereto. But I do want, at this stage, to emphasise that, whatever may be the case elsewhere, the only way in which the multitude of East African tribes can enjoy the benefits of civilised government, both central and local, now and for generations to come, before they have become themselves civilised, is

[1] See 44.

under the forms of Colonial Government administered by a strong and enlightened Colonial power and directed, as British Colonial policy has been for centuries, to the achievement not of any particular political system but of a state of society in which the men and women of which it is composed—or at least a large part of them—have reached a state of spiritual, moral, social, cultural and economic development capable of supporting and operating such democratic forms of government as may then appear desirable to them.

There are people, in our own country and abroad, who call all this "British Imperialism" and mean it as a term of abuse; I can only say that for myself and I make no doubt for the thousands of my countrymen who have engaged themselves for life in the task it is an expression of faith and purpose: but it is a long range purpose and the processes by which it can be accomplished are inevitably neither rapid nor spectacular—indeed they are often barely perceptible to the contemporary observer and irksome to the impatient; while to the demagogue they offer endless opportunity for misrepresentation and calumny. That is, no doubt, regrettable but it is inherent in the business.

3. I agree emphatically with what you write about the importance of efficient, democratic local government. As to efficient, it may however be wise to add a word of caution; Africans are by nature easy going people, unpunctual and inexact, and zeal for efficiency on the part of supervising British authorities has to be tempered with tolerance and human understanding if there is not to be disillusion and frustration on the one hand and irritation and fractiousness on the other. Moreover, although standards of common honesty may be declining in Great Britain, even today it can be an assumption that there is little difficulty in obtaining honest cashiers, to take an example: in modern East Africa it is so difficult that only the most exceptional local African authority succeeds in doing so for any length of time. Indeed this relatively simple moral question is today perhaps the greatest practical obstacle to the progress we all want to see.

As regards "local", experience shows that Administrative Officers are prone to confuse local authorities, when they are African, with sovereign governments, and to encourage such false conceptions as frequently animate tribal chiefs and some African politicians; it may be worth while to stress that, unless there is some sovereignty reserved by treaty (as in Buganda) all African units of tribal authority are local authorities deriving their powers solely from, and liable to revocation of powers by, the Central Government.

Further, the expression "Chief" is used to mean both the hereditary or traditional head of an African unit of society, holding office, certainly, by consent of the Central Government but not beholden to it for appointment, and an officially appointed Government servant: in other words as the head of the local authority on the one hand, and the tail of the Central Government hierarchy on the other. There are good reasons, and functions, for both, but it is desirable for us to be clear, when we use the word "Chief", if we mean the Chairman of a County Council or the Prefect of a French Department.

For the sake of historical record I should perhaps add that in Kenya, in pre-British days, civil administration as we know it did not exist beyond the village circle, though there were rudimentary judiciaries, which had no power of enforcing their decisions. We created the Chiefs in Kenya and they are still regarded as an exotic growth, not only by the people at large but by exotics [sic] of later origin such as

African political associations.

It should be noted that, *ex hypothesi*, local government should not be racial—that is to say that not only must a place be found for Africans in municipal and local government bodies such as the Nairobi Municipal Council and local District Councils, but that where others than Africans are lawfully resident in an African area they must be given an opportunity of participating in the bodies now commonly called "Native Authorities". This may present difficulties of time and method but admits of no denial in principle.

These and many other matters connected with African local government in rural areas have been under examination here for a considerable time and important proposals for the development of the bodies now called Local Native Councils have been agreed in principle and are now being worked out in detail in the form of a draft Bill to be introduced, we hope this year, in the Legislative Council. The Bill will give increased powers to these bodies, which it is now proposed to call "African District Councils" and will make changes in their composition designed to meet the needs of the situation as it appears to us today. The Kenya delegates to the Summer School will be able to give a full account of these matters.

One last comment; in the utilitarian world in which we live, sight is sometimes lost of the importance of ceremony and pageantry in the eyes of nearly all people, especially Africans, together with a proper regard for hospitality in traditional forms, music and dancing. To efficient, democratic and local, another adjective might be added: human.

4. As to your paragraph 4, the following comments might be made. First, I take educated minority to mean what it says and not the large number of Africans who have barely achieved the education of an English boy of fourteen and suppose themselves to be educated. Confusion of these with really educated people can—and does at times—lead to distortion of judgment and mistakes of local policy.

It is indeed true that there is always present a danger of the evolution, generally from the ranks of the partially educated, of a class of politicians absorbed in the activities of the centre, an absorption, with some honourable exceptions, usually inspired by self-interest and accompanied by a marked lack of concern for truth, honesty, justice or good government. The Central American Republics and, on our doorstep, Ethiopia, are glaring examples of what premature political independence means in suffering misery and degradation for the mass of the people when it is no more than the independence of a small group of competing political factions at the centre to do what they like to the mass of the people, who have neither the understanding nor the local institutions within their control, to enable them to protect themselves.

For these reasons, while not dissenting from the view that political progress cannot be regulated according to a pre-arranged plan and that the pace over the next generation will be rapid, the Government of Kenya feels that it should observe that its responsibility is to the great mass of the people and that it would consider itself morally bound to resist processes which might be called "political progress" by the misinformed or opinionated but which would in fact be no more than progress towards the abdication of its trust in favour of that class of professional politicians which is discussed above. It may often be difficult, but will for a very long time be necessary, to dispose of the moral courage and political integrity to say "no" to proposals for apparent progress of that kind, especially when the saying of it is held

up to obloquy as "British Imperialism" and the rest of the current rubbish. But, as soon as Africans are appointed to membership of Legislative Councils, a group—if not a class—of politicians is created at the centre, and if arrangements are not made to provide some organic means of collaboration with Government, it is certain that they will drift into an opposition which may often be sterile and unconstructive; they will not lack for examples in East Africa. It is for this reason that we are considering, here in Kenya, their association with the Chief Native Commissioner in certain important functions described in later paragraphs.

5. My advisers and I have learnt with great interest and encouragement of the important part which you propose to assign to the Summer School to be held at Cambridge this year in the discussion and formulation of policy, especially the important matters listed in paragraph 5. of your Despatch. We agree that the question of issuing a general statement of Colonial policy for publication could best be examined after the School has been held. It is not easy at this stage to see how anything could be said which has not been said already; and in the event it may prove that a succinct record of achievements would be preferable to a new statement of policy.

6. As regards paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Despatch, I agree that it is of great importance that there should be adequate means for disseminating information. But account has to be taken of the mass of statistical, departmental and financial papers, mainly of a routine kind, which today clutter up the processes of administration, so that officers not unnaturally feel that anything written, or to be written, is at best a nuisance and probably actively harmful. The whole problem needs expert examination, particularly of method, so that means may be devised of improving the presentation of material and drastically reducing the volume of it which reaches officers in the field.

In out of the way places, it is extremely difficult to keep alive the intellectual curiosity and vigour of officers whose daily work tends to become continuously more stereotyped and regulated, and to increase the quantities of official documents sent to them is not in itself likely to achieve the desired aim.

But in spite of the difficulties there is no doubt that the matter can be greatly improved; I am now discussing with my advisers the most effective way to put into effect certain measures to be described in the following paragraphs, which relate as much to paragraphs 9–13 (Machinery for the review of policy) and Paragraphs 14–17 (The District Staffs) as to paragraphs 7–8; and will be discussed therefore in a general way with reference to the remainder of your Despatch.

7. In our view in Kenya the key to the whole range of problems discussed in the latter half of the despatch is the Chief Native Commissioner, as the officer is called here, or Secretary for Native Affairs. The scope and nature of his office are broadly described in your Despatch in terms with which we agree; and we are considering if we should designate the organisation of which he is the head "The African Affairs Commission", a title which should help to make clear both the importance which we attach to it and the nature of its function as the branch of the government responsible, not for day to day execution of policy and conduct of administration, but for the continuous study of the problems falling within its scope; for consultation within the Government and outside it, for dissemination of information and, in general, as the source and inspiration of the knowledge, enthusiasm and enterprise which the Government itself at the centre and the field staffs must have for the

discharge of their difficult tasks.

A start has been made here in the direction indicated, and if it falls short in achievement of what had been hoped, it has served to provide useful experience of the manner in which development can take place. It has to be remembered that simultaneously with the outbreak of the war this Government lost its Secretariat in a fire, and with it the accumulated records of half a century and a very valuable library. It has not been possible to do much to repair these losses up to the present; some indeed are irreparable, but a new Secretariat and a new library must—and will—be provided in due course. Not until that has been done will it be possible to obtain the full benefit of the projected African Affairs Commission.

8. There have developed in recent years certain activities new in Colonial practice, notably Information Offices and Social Research, much of the latter research into questions of social welfare. While these activities have some connection with the other races, the need, at any rate in Kenya, is so overwhelmingly strong in the case of Africans, that it seems best to this Government to organise them primarily as African services under the control of the Chief Native Commissioner. This is not to say that there is no need for organised public relations with the public of other races, nor that their social problems do not require research, but only that in so far as their needs are not met by services directed primarily to the African people, they can be met most appropriately by other means, notably the press, their own cultural and philanthropic organisations and local government bodies.

It becomes clear as the problem is studied that Information and Welfare services fall naturally into two divisions. In the first the direction and organisation, study and research, co-ordination in respect of policy with administrative and departmental activities and things of that kind; and in the second, the day to day business of putting news and entertainment across to the people, organising certain specialised types of education, developing maternity and child welfare clinics, social activities, and the hundred and one things that go to make up what is today called "social welfare", most of which, if it is to have real value, must largely take the form of community self-help. This second division must necessarily be a function of the local administration, very often of local government bodies, but at any rate of whatever is the authority which carries on the day to day business of administration in each local administrative area. It will normally do these things with specially trained staff engaged, or placed at its disposal, for the purpose. To attempt to introduce special separate central government agencies for these purposes is not only very expensive but would encroach upon local Government responsibilities, add to departmental overlapping and detract from the efforts now being made to fuse departmental and administrative functions and activities in a single, co-ordinated organisation, be it as part of the central government or of local government bodies.

But the first division, direction, organisation and so on, is manifestly an appropriate function of the Native Affairs Commission and should be the direct responsibility of the Chief Native Commissioner himself; and to this there can conveniently be added other matters which fit readily into such an organisation: the functions in relation to African law and courts to be discharged by the Judicial Adviser, for example, research into systems of African land tenure and special studies of land administration.

9. My Advisers are at present studying the best means of bringing into being an organisation on these lines: most of the parts (other than an appropriate building

and the library) exist already and the problem is not therefore the creation of a wide range of new activities but the integration of existing work and services.

Final decisions have not yet been taken and we will not now take them until we have had the advantage of considering the discussions at the Summer School; our present inclination is towards the arrangement described briefly below:—

The Chief Native Commissioner. His general functions have been described in the Despatch and amplified above. It is only necessary to add that he will be the Member of Executive Council responsible for the African Affairs Commission and for African interests generally; in fact he is the principal active, operative agent of the Trust which the Government exercises on behalf of the African people.

In matters such as education, land utilisation, settlement and reclamation and the like where executive authority and responsibility lie with other Members of the Executive Council, he will be closely associated with important decisions and direction, either by membership of committees of the Executive Council set up for the purpose where formal participation seems desirable, or by less formal, but frequent, consultation.

The Native Affairs Commission may later include the African Members of the Legislative Council (see paragraph 10) but will at first consist of:—

(i) a Secretary, comparable in general function to the Secretaries of other Members' groups of Departments; he may also have to be the Librarian; and may in due course be also editor of a journal or magazine. Provision for the post now exists under the title of "Personal Assistant to the Chief Native Commissioner."
(ii) The specialist officers now charged with study, investigation and general direction in African law, land, social welfare and any others of a similar kind who may be appointed.
(iii) The Information Office, which is to be developed as a two-way instrument for
(a) disseminating information, news and feature material among the African people, not only touching Government policy and activities but with a general cultural and entertainment object, and
(b) conveying to Government, especially the Central Government, information as to African public opinion and attitude.

10. It is hoped that the Commission will bring to an end the defective practice of referring African problems piecemeal as they arise by circular to all Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners and will develop into an organisation to which the Governor and Members of the Executive Council, the Heads of Departments and the Central Government generally, can turn for expert and up-to-date advice on matters within its range of responsibility; which will organise and carry out special studies of particular subjects, visits by its own officers or Administrative and Departmental Officers of the Government to other countries, British or Foreign, for special investigations and research, and visits of a like nature to this Colony by officers from outside; and which will be at the service of the Provincial Commissioners and other officers in the field for consultation, advice, library services and, indeed, anything within the wide field of "African Affairs" in which it may be able to be of help. It is also intended that it should maintain close contact with the appropriate faculty at Makerere College, the Social Research Institute which is about to be started, and with other universities and institutions outside the Colony and, *a fortiori*, with the branch of the Colonial Office which is to be organised for the same

general purposes. In this way the Commission should fill what is at present a serious gap in the general staff organisation of the Colony.

Finally, it is my earnest hope that the Commission, both by its work and its personal composition, may come to form an important and trusted bridge between the Colonial Government and the African people, and to provide in increasing measure for those human contacts and opportunities for consultation which are so necessary if Colonial Governments are to avoid drifting into an anonymous, impersonal and bureaucratic relationship with the people over whom they exercise authority, a relationship which is doubly dangerous when the parties to it are of different races. For this reason it is likely that we shall try to associate with the Chief Native Commissioner (as was recently done in Fiji) the African Members of the Legislative Council as Members of the Commission under his chairmanship. In the first instance we propose to do this on an informal consultative basis lest we should arouse suspicion.

11. As has already been recorded, the greater part of the staff and activities involved in this project exist already, and require only to be integrated and organised. Some additional expense there will certainly be, but it is not expected to be large and it should be offset by the additional efficiency which may be expected and by the savings it should bring about in the utilisation of the very substantial sums which are now being spent without a sufficiently organised and defined central directorate and control on information services, social welfare in various forms, and other matters. If it achieves all that we hope from it, it would be cheap at any price.

The project is ambitious and will depend for success on the Chief Native Commissioner and the staff serving under him, who must be men of vision and enthusiasm, wide human sympathies and understanding and a sense of the urgency, importance and value of the work entrusted to them comparable only to that which carried the great Colonial and missionary leaders of the last century through the apparently insuperable hazards and difficulties which confronted them. If we have no Livingstones and no Lugards we shall fail: but our recent history seems to me conclusive proof that we have the men: it is for us to see that they have the opportunity and the tools.

12. I have written at interminable length and must confine myself now to very brief observations on the latter part of your Despatch.

As regards District Staffs I am most anxious to emphasise the essential unity of the task which confronts Provincial and District officials, be they administrative or technical. I am happy to say that there is a growing appreciation of, and acquiescence in, this view in Kenya, and no doubt elsewhere, and that it is now generally realised that an efficient ship is one in which all members of the crew work together in mutual goodwill and confidence: it is no derogation from the invaluable services of engineers and radio officers to recognise that there has to be somebody on the bridge. Accordingly, while expressing general agreement with paragraphs 14–17 of your Despatch, I should like to add that I regard the offices of Provincial and District Commissioners as being composed not only of the Administrative officers bearing those particular designations, but of all the officers associated with them in their work. What you have to say applies to the "District Staffs" in the wider sense as much as in the narrower.

Orders have been given that Administrative officers posted to take charge of Districts are to be left there normally for five years, that is to say for a full tour and at

least part of a second; and I am asking the Members of Council concerned to see that the same practice is observed by the principal Departments. It will not be possible to make this fully effective until Staffs are nearer full strength. But it can be made much more effective than is commonly supposed, given determination to do it.

13. We have a special problem in this country in the Northern Frontier Province, for which special measures will have to be devised. I have already arranged for officers serving there to have local leave twice a year; additional transport and W.T. facilities are being provided and I hope to see that every quarter has a refrigerator. In addition a large building programme is to be carried out, and important improvements in water supplies are projected, mainly for the local tribes, but residents on Government stations will also benefit. Isolation is already much less than it was, due to improved communications and broadcasting, and, as a matter of fact, during a recent tour I thought the officers in this Province compared very favourably, as regards morale, alertness, enterprise, smartness and self-confidence with any I have seen in the Colony.

14. I cannot close this Despatch without paying a tribute to the Asiatic and African Staffs of District Offices with whom I have been associated all over East Africa for the last thirty-five years. Their housing is often very bad, their pay generally low, and their conditions of service often trying: they have given us invaluable service and we are in honour bound to set our minds to improving their conditions of service and living, and to finding more responsible and better paid employment for the best of them: for they are the key to our modern problem of the pressure of routine work upon District Commissioners and their Assistants. When we have learnt how to make the best use, in modern conditions, of these admirable men we shall have gone a long way to solve it.

15. I am sending copies of this Despatch to the Governors of East and West African territories and to the British Resident in Zanzibar, and I hope that they will be good enough to send me copies of their Despatches to you, so that we may have the advantage of their views.

Annex to 45

The Secretary of State has recently sent out an important Confidential despatch (No. 41 of 25th February 1947) on the subject of local government in African dependencies and has invited Governors to comment. I have done so in my despatch to which this Note is appended but I feel obliged to add some observations of a more general nature, for it seems to me that there are certain assumptions which must be made in respect of the despatch and that it is important that we should be clear as to what exactly those assumptions are.

2. To one resident in Africa it does not appear that the matters discussed in the Secretary of State's despatch can be treated by themselves as if they were, so to speak, a detached piece of scientific research. Since the whole Colonial position is being attacked to-day it is necessary to approach Colonial problems not only in the light of current ideas and events but in their historical setting and in relation to social and economic as well as political facts and circumstances, and, since the preservation of the British Commonwealth is vital to the existence of the dependencies, it is necessary also to take account of strategic questions. All these things have their

bearing on the matters discussed in the despatch, for together they make up the foundations upon which everything has to be built.

3. To many foreigners and some people in the Colonies it appears that the British Empire to-day has reached the stage of Colonial history reached by the Spanish about a century or a little more ago, and that its liquidation, by a series of "liberations", is about to begin, while local nationalisms are already being manufactured against the day when local demagogues may reasonably hope to achieve the liberty to exploit and oppress the mass of the people which they have so successfully established in Central and most of South America. The "Nigerian Nation" has already appeared in print, and "the African community" is a commonplace with Kenya African politicians; neither has, of course, any existence in fact or in history. The support which movements of this kind secure from certain quarters in the United Kingdom, provided they are expressed in terms sufficiently offensive to Great Britain, must often make it appear to others that the will to retain authority and responsibility is no longer present among the people of the United Kingdom, and that no more is needed to delude or frighten British Governments than a liberal use of current catch phrases or violent words and a little rioting. It is not surprising therefore that there should be, as there undoubtedly is, a growing loss of confidence in the permanence of British sponsored institutions. The development of local government has a very important part to play here in East Africa so long as there remains—or can be restored—confidence in the intention of the British to maintain their authority until they have fulfilled their civilising task and there is a proper understanding of what that task is; but without that confidence and understanding it is inevitable that attention should be diverted to the attractions of the premature synthetic nationalisms of demagogues who see in present circumstances unlimited opportunities. It is particularly essential that British officers should be able to feel confident of the robust determination of the Government that has set them so arduous a task to see it through until "liberation" comes about in the British way by the gradual evolution of responsible government in communities of a political maturity and moral and social stability capable of exercising political responsibility.

4. We live in an age which offers unprecedented opportunities for the use of ignorance, prejudices and falsehood for the dissemination of political projects and opinions; it is now no longer even necessary to go to the trouble of reading, it is only necessary to turn a knob—or indeed to go to some convenient place where someone else has turned it. It may be true that you cannot deceive all the people all the time; but it is also true that you can to-day so destroy what critical faculty they may possess by the competent use of untruth and emotionalism that they are agreeably ready to deceive themselves under your guidance for an indefinite time. An instructive example before our eyes to-day is afforded by India, where the decay of public administration, security and justice, and the preliminary processes of the general collapse of law and order are being accomplished to the accompaniment of expressions of great satisfaction at the approach of the "Independence" of India, not only in India itself but in the United Kingdom. What is about to happen to India is no doubt as inevitable as what happened to Europe when the Roman Empire collapsed, but it is doubtful if in any other age it would have been widely applauded as admirable. No intelligent student of African affairs supposes India to afford a parallel for Africa, but he may well look with dismay on the general self-deception and untruthfulness with which the business is being carried through, and reflect that the

same disease seems to have taken hold of a great many people concerned with or interested in Africa.

5. Recent developments in contemporary social and economic conditions in East African Colonial territories include the continuous appearance—and collapse—of news sheets, often in the vernacular, which print the most reckless and indeed ridiculous, but also venomous lies, and the organisation of unlawful strikes to demand wages which no Colonial economy conceivable at present could pay. Since, in East Africa, employers even to-day are in the main European or Asiatic—or the Government in one form or another—the vernacular "press" has no difficulty in playing up racial animosities and in inducing idle and incompetent people to believe that they are paid low wages not because they are idle and incompetent but because they are African. This is not to say, of course, either that wage rates in Kenya are always adequate or that all Africans are idle and incompetent; but only that while avoidable idleness and incompetence are the really important economic factor in contemporary social economy it is inadequacy of wage rates alone which is continuously publicised by the local vernacular press, usually combined with charges of racial discrimination, for the misguidance of the ignorant masses. That is to say that in social and economic, as in political questions, neither truth nor realities have much to do with opinion as expressed in such publications.

Another example which is instructive might be quoted. The establishment in this Colony of eating houses on the lines of British Restaurants, Municipal dairies and controlled clothing shops where goods are sold at the lawful price is opposed and denounced in the vernacular press as racial discrimination against African traders, who are thereby hindered from making extortionate profits at the expense of their own people. Or again, a reference by myself to the quite incontestable fact that, to-day, Africans are very ignorant people, is hotly resented in a vernacular newspaper, which goes on to write "And anyhow, if Africans are ignorant, it is because Europeans have not given them the education to which they are entitled"! Self deception could hardly go further; but unhappily almost any issue of any African paper will be found to contain many examples. Perhaps the most instructive was the account of a recent "mass meeting" of Africans in Nairobi which was addressed by the two African Members of the Legislative Council and which, after adopting a number of political resolutions having no bearing on contemporary realities, went on to resolve "that it is time the Government and the Municipal Council *did something* about African housing . . . ".[2] The meeting was held in a new and very fine social hall opened only last year by Mr. Creech Jones which is situated in and part of one of a group of modern housing estates being developed jointly by the Government, the Municipal Council and the Kenya and Uganda Railways, and which provide housing at sub-economic rents and social amenities for many thousands of Africans of a standard which would be creditable anywhere in the world and is far superior to anything any African present can ever have lived in before—or dreamed of living in; but neither the resolution nor the speeches (as far as the published record shows) contained any reference to these solid masonry facts by which the participants were surrounded. Too much must not be made of resolutions passed at meetings of this kind, whether by Africans or anyone else: nevertheless the episode was illuminating.

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[2] Emphasis in Mitchell's original.

6. It is, in such an atmosphere, important to remind ourselves of the historical facts leading up to our present East African problems. For reasons which no one has succeeded in elucidating, the East and Central African people up to about the date of my birth—I am 57—had not only no literature or written records, they had no alphabet and there are no traces of their ever having felt the need of one. From the Amhara in the North to the European Colonists in the South, from the Indian Ocean westwards to an indefinite point—often to the Atlantic—there existed this astonishing human phenomenon right down to our day; a people who not only had no means of writing or figuring but who, with rare exceptions, such as Buganda, Ashanti and the North Nigerian emirates, had no form of government or administration much beyond the limits of the patriarchal, no agricultural implements beyond small hand hoes, axes and digging sticks, no transport other than their own heads and shoulders, no roads, no permanent buildings, no commerce to speak of, and no common tongue. Although their country is the richest in natural fauna in the world they have not domesticated a single animal or bird for themselves; their cattle, sheep and goats came from Asia via the Nile; their dogs from the Portuguese and their few donkeys also from the North, if not from Asia. It is the same with their crops, all of which came from other countries, maize and sweet potatoes as recently as the Portuguese colonisation. Consider all this and then think of the contents, and date, of Tutankhamen's tomb!

Add to this that from time immemorial until the British put an end to it in my lifetime, the slave trade was directed—exclusively, as an organised trade—to Africa, to the capture of Africans for sale all over the world, and you have a picture so fantastic that it is not surprising that ordinary men and women should find it difficult to keep it constantly in mind.

I am not going to take up time here with speculation on these historical facts. I am concerned only to draw attention to them. They are the more puzzling in that we know now that the extraordinary condition of these people fifty years ago was not due to lack of capacity to learn, for a great many have advanced considerably in academic knowledge and some in technical skill, and we have, as far as I know, found none who are unteachable. In many walks in life Africans are to-day employed on tasks demanding skill, dependability and industry and are discharging them well. I know myself personally many hundreds of whom this could be said. There are smaller numbers who have graduated at universities and are engaged successfully in professional activities. But there are many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, who are to-day adrift without self control or purpose, who lack both industry and knowledge, and most of whom seem content to drift aimlessly somewhere on the outer fringes of the limits of starvation and indigence, for no reason which I at least am able to understand. It is understandable that an African should prefer his village life in some out of the way hamlet and should be content with the low standard of living which that affords. It is much less easy to understand why he migrates to a town or other employment area and should then be unwilling to work with a reasonable degree of industry and continuity so as to obtain the benefits which he must have desired with some determination when he decided to leave his village.

Among Africans of this kind, who include the semi-literate, the failures of our at present embryonic system of education, dismissed civil servants and the like, besides a great mass of casual and unskilled labour and vagrants and a truly regrettable

number of young women and girls who live by whoring, thieving, cheating and dishonesty of other kinds must be admitted to have become almost normal conduct; indeed, even the capacity to resist temptation to steal or embezzle when a position of trust provides the opportunity is lamentably rare. These people are in a stage of irresistible desire for goods and money and a condition which can only be described as "amoral"; they know well enough that they are committing crime but crime for them means no more than something for which the Government punishes you, and not at all something which it is wrong to do.

There are of course also a great many Africans of admirable character and honesty, decent people who go about earning their living and are as shocked at the deterioration of morals and conduct of so many of their fellows as any of us; and there is the great ignorant mass of villagers who are only very slowly coming into continuous contact with anything beyond the limits of their narrow village life. In any case, if you consider the short space of time which these people have had to adjust themselves to the change from the extremely primitive to the modern world, there is little cause either for surprise or despair in the present state of affairs; but there is a pressing obligation to know and understand the facts in respect of a great part of the people with whom we are concerned to-day, for they are the decisive factors in the task we have to undertake. It is no doubt largely a matter of historical perspective, and it is not always easy, especially from a distance, to get that right.

7. I referred at the beginning of this Note to strategic questions. Strategic questions which have a bearing on the Colonial problem in Africa are naturally numerous and complex, and I must resist the temptation to expatiate on them. But it is necessary to observe that strategically the African Colonial problem is indivisible and that there can be no realism in an examination of African Colonial questions which does not face that fact. Africa south of a line drawn from the Gambia to Kismayu[3] is faced with the same basic strategic problem as that about which the American Civil war was fought, and later [sic], the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed; it is true that there is not now any political union to be preserved, but there is a strategic unity which is as essential to the safety of all the parts, as the whole is to the survival of the Commonwealth and of the nations of Western Europe who share the responsibility with us. Unless this is understood and made one of the main foundations of policy, initiative must necessarily pass from our hands to those for whom it is beyond question a matter of life and death, notably the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the ancient and mature Portuguese colonies.

8. I said at the beginning of this Note that it seemed to me that we ought to be clear as to the assumptions we made in relation to the Secretary of State's despatch about African local government. I hope I have succeeded in suggesting, in what I have written, what those assumptions appear to me to be. I would summarise them very briefly by saying, first, that it is all-important to be in no doubt about the time-scale; it is not necessary to try to guess how long it may take to achieve this or that stage, but it is necessary to realise that history began for these African people about 1890 and that in the business in which we are engaged the unit of time is at present generations and not years.

It is also necessary to assume the will to exercise authority, for without it nothing

[3] ? Chisimaio, just south of the equator in Somalia.

can be achieved. There are people to-day who use "authoritarian" as a term of abuse; but a Colonial Government is by its nature irremovable and authoritarian, the instrument of the authority of the Government of its metropolitan country, however broadminded, humane and liberal it may be as well; and it cannot function except within the limitations of its nature and constitution. It cannot resign or be forced to resign: it cannot put a major issue to the arbitrament of a general election: it is not autonomous, and, within certain prescribed limits, it must conform to the directions of the Secretary of State. It is often engaged in political controversy, which it can seldom, if ever, resolve by the process of majority voting in its legislature; and it is normally composed of pensionable public servants. It has therefore a direct and continuous responsibility to exercise the authority with which it is invested of a kind differing profoundly from the responsibility of Ministers in an independent self-governing state, since it is not ultimately responsible for policy but for the execution of policy.

It is necessary to assume, also, that whatever may be justifiable elsewhere, there is no place in Africa for the synthetic nationalisms which are being manufactured to-day, largely under the influence of current Hindu politics. There is no "African nation", no purely African history or culture and no African technical or economic development which is capable of standing alone, and never has been, but there is an essential strategic unity which it is necessary to preserve and consolidate and an interdependence within the broad territorial groupings upon which the progress and prosperity of all depend. We are not here to create a succession of Bulgarias—or for that matter Liberias—but to develop and civilise this continent as a part of what I may call Western European civilisation and economics, and to see that the African tribes as they gradually become civilised have a satisfying part and share in that development to the full extent that their natural ability makes possible for them. What that extent is, no man living to-day can say; all that can be said is that although there are many reasons for optimistic estimates of their future capacity, the facts of their past achievement cannot be ignored.

And finally, it is necessary to assume that Colonial responsibilities are not a disreputable inheritance from a not very respectable past, but an honourable task of the greatest import and significance for the future peace of the world in which we have the privilege of succeeding the great men who laid the foundations of our greatness and the obligation to carry on the work with the faith and steadfastness with which they began it. It is a task to inspire the best of our young people to-day, and the best of our young people to-day are the best that we have ever bred in our long history, so that we need have no fear that they will not acquit themselves well. It is a task requiring all our fortitude and tenacity of purpose, all our humanity and long experience; a task which will expose us to much criticism and obloquy, but which is tremendously worth while.

46 CO 847/37/7, [no 8] 29 Oct 1947

[Local government in Uganda]: letter from A B Cohen to Sir J Hall. *Minute* by A B Cohen (CO 847/37/5)

I feel that I have been very remiss in not writing to you before to say how glad I was that you were now in England and that I hoped we should have a chance of meeting and having a long talk when you were in London. I feel guilty also for not having written to thank you for your letter of the 15th September in which you sent me copies of your despatch on local government and your memorandum on constitutional development (in relation to the African Governors' Conference paper No. 2).[1] After I got back from leave I only had a week in the office before going to Paris for talks with the French and I only got back from these two days ago.

I have now read with the very greatest interest both your despatch and the memorandum on the Member system. I hope you will allow me to say how greatly I admire your despatch. Nothing more encouraging or more comprehensive has come out of the correspondence which the Secretary of State's despatch of February started. I may say that no surprise is felt in the Colonial Office about the great progress which is being made in local government in Uganda, particularly in the Eastern Provinces. We have known about this for some time although we have had nothing official on it. Kennedy gave an admirable talk on the Eastern Province system to the Cambridge summer school and I think that people from other territories were greatly impressed by what was being done in Uganda. I cannot think that the Secretary of State when he has seen your despatch will do other than warmly approve the policy described in it.

I have only two observations which I venture to make. In the first place, it is, I must admit, disappointing that you do not think you can build up your African Affairs Division for two or three years. I quite realise, of course, the present staff difficulties and the paramount necessity of having the Provincial Administration properly staffed if local government is to be effectively pushed forward. At the same time, would it not be possible somewhat to strengthen the African Affairs Division in the very near future even if it cannot be built up to full strength? Actual administration in the field no doubt must have priority. But I think our view would be that without somebody concentrating both on African law problems and somebody else on land problems the long term effect on local government as well as economic and other forms of progress in Uganda, as elsewhere, is bound to be serious. I would venture to urge that the filling of these posts is, so to speak, a minimum necessity. I would like to talk the point over with you when we meet.

My only other observation is a very unimportant one. In the second part of paragraph 9 of your despatch you quote: "This lack of information in the Colonial Office is presumably responsible for the views expressed in paragraph 8 of paper AGC.3 for the agenda for the approaching Conference of African Governors". As I have said above, we were not in fact ignorant of what is being done in Uganda. Kennedy gave me a very full description of all this when we were driving round Uganda with him last year. Nor do I think on re-reading the paragraph of AGC.3[2] which you refer to that there is in fact anything in this paragraph which is not a quite

[1] See 59, appendix III.

[2] See 59, appendix IV.

justifiable generalisation about what is going on throughout Africa. I imagine that what is said in the paragraph may apply less to Uganda than to most territories, but certainly the information we got at the summer school bears out that the generalisation is sound. Forgive me for defending the Colonial Office against this charge of ignorance.

I would like also to say one or two things about your memorandum on the Member system. In the early part of this you argue, if I may say so with every justification, that it would not be possible to appoint non-African unofficial members in Uganda. But our paper (AGC.2) never suggested that this should be done; indeed, the suggestion that European unofficial members should be appointed in Uganda never entered our heads. I think that if you will look again at the paper you will agree that there was in fact no suggestion to this effect. Indeed, paragraph 9 of the paper makes it clear, I think, that what we were thinking of primarily was the appointment of Africans as members.

You say in paragraph 10 of your memorandum that it probably would not be possible to do this in Uganda for a generation or more. We, I must confess, had not thought that the interval need be as long as this, although none of us had supposed that the immediate appointment of African members in Uganda was likely to be possible. You, of course, touch upon the essential difficulty in paragraph 11 of your memorandum when you refer to the possibility that the demand for self-government stimulated by outside influences may outpace the process of building up local government from below. That is the crux which we are up against in almost every African territory—of course we meet it in a much more acute form in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. I believe profoundly myself that the rapid building up of local government through the process of devolution which you describe in your despatch is the most important of all the methods by which we must seek to foster political evolution in Africa, in the hope of securing, when self-government eventually comes, a stable political system really representative of the whole body of the people rather than an oligarchy based on a comparatively limited intelligentsia or professional class. That is the basic principle underlying the present interest of the Colonial Office in local government which induced us to hold the summer school at Cambridge and which is, I think, inherent in the papers for the Governors' Conference.

But in spite of the overriding importance of the development of local government I still wonder whether we can in fact succeed in holding the position long enough in face of the growth of nationalist sentiment unless we are prepared to introduce Africans at an early stage into the higher levels of the executive machine of central government. That is really one of the main purposes for suggesting the Member system. I should very much like to discuss with you further whether it is really right even in Uganda to conclude that the Member system is not applicable. I admit, of course, that it is more difficult to apply in Uganda, particularly because of the relationship with the Treaty States[3], than perhaps anywhere else. Nevertheless I should like very much to have a chance of talking the matter over with you, having made it clear that there is no suggestion whatever, and never has been, of introducing European unofficials in Uganda.

I do not want to lengthen this already very long letter with which I am burdening you during your holiday by going into the administrative side at any length. You say

[3] The British made agreements with Buganda (1900), Bunyoro (1900), Toro (1900), and Ankole (1901).

in paragraph 5 of your memorandum that it would have a very bad effect on the other technical departments if the Director of Agriculture, for example, were made Member for rural subjects. Personally I should doubt very much whether even if the Member system were introduced it would be desirable to appoint the Director of Agriculture to this position in a territory like Uganda. It is true that in Tanganyika the man who has hitherto been Director of Agriculture is to become Member of this group of subjects as a purely temporary expedient, but of course he will not remain as Director of Agriculture. Personally I should much rather see a purely administrative appointment to a post of this sort. If you were to introduce the Member system in Uganda I imagine that the Financial Secretary might well be able to cover economic development including agriculture, etc, as well. I am not absolutely convinced, however, that, with the great expansion of economic development which we hope to see and all the positive actions of Government in this field, it can really be effectively dealt with by one member of the Executive Council rather than two. Also would there not be considerable advantage in having a member of the Executive Council in charge of social services generally? May this not make it easier to deal with the highly difficult problems of both health and educational development?

I hope that nothing I have said suggests that we in the Colonial Office believe in the imposition of any sort of rigid pattern on the African territories. Nothing is further from the case. We have got to make the Government machinery fit into local conditions and we all recognise that conditions in Uganda are rather special.

I do not know whether there will be any chance of our having a talk on these matters and also about the education paper and Cullen's[4] comments on it before the Conference. If you would like to do this I should be very glad to have the opportunity.

I do hope that you are having a good holiday in Cornwall. Please remember me to Lady Hall.

P.S. The Secretary of State will, we hope, be back in London at the beginning of next week. I will see that he sees your memorandum and despatch then. I know he will be very greatly interested.

Minute to 46

. . . As a result of my discussion with Sir J. Hall I am now convinced that it will not be desirable to press Uganda to adopt the Member system while Sir J. Hall is Governor. On the official side he undoubtedly prefers the present machine and it would be difficult for us to insist that a Governor should adopt an official machinery which he thought less suitable than the existing. Having regard to Sir J. Hall's temperament I think that he probably works better with heads of Departments than through Members.

As regards the political aspect, Sir J. Hall's policy as laid down in his printed despatch aims at the rapid development of local government with devolution of financial and executive responsibility to Provincial and District Councils at a very rapid rate. He talked to me of the possibility of achieving some measure of self-government in Uganda within a generation, although he admits that this is problematical. He thinks that when devolution to Provincial Councils has gone

[4] See 59, appendix VIII. J R Cullen, director of education, Uganda, since 1945, and formerly in Cyprus.

considerably further the time may come to bring Africans into the higher levels on to the executive machine, possibly as members. At present he maintains that tribal feeling in Uganda is so strong that, for example, a Muganda in such a position would not be accepted or trusted by other tribes. This is undoubtedly a strong point.

I now feel that Sir J. Hall has a consistent and complete policy for Uganda and that we should not press him too far at present in the direction of the Member system. He recognises the merits of the system for application elsewhere and will not, I think, argue against it at the Conference generally.

A.B.C.
6.11.47

47 CO 847/35/6 11 Dec 1947

[Local government]: minute by A B Cohen on response to the circular despatch

I have been discussing with Mr. Cartland and others in the African Division the follow-up to the Cambridge summer school and the Governors' Conference on local government. In reply to the Secretary of State's despatch of the 25th February at No. 15–24[1] we have now had a whole series of despatches of great interest and varying merit, some of them of major importance. We have discussed policy on local government in Africa at the summer school and our conclusions have been endorsed by the Governors' Conference. It is now, I think, necessary for the Secretary of State to set his seal on these numerous discussions by endorsing in his turn the conclusions of the Governors' Conference. It is also necessary to ensure that Governments themselves follow up the various practical points about machinery which are discussed at length in the despatch of the 25th February and the replies.

I should propose, therefore, to send a further despatch in the terms of the attached draft. I recognise, of course, the danger that Governors may be a little allergic to this further rather lengthy document. On the other hand, it is not so long as it looks, as a good deal of it consists of alternative versions to take account of the different points raised in the various despatches. We have also, I feel, got to think of the attitude of officers in the field who will, I think, be very much encouraged if they can be informed, as the draft does, that the summer school, consisting of a large number of working officers, has contributed largely to the formation of policy. I do not think it possible to say what has to be said in briefer compass.

When the despatch has gone we shall have to get on with the preparation of a draft statement of policy on local government as agreed at the Governors' Conference. Mr. Cartland is engaged in preparing a synopsis of such a statement and I hope to have its preparation well under way before I leave for West Africa, although I doubt whether we can get it into final form until I come back. We have got to consider the relation of such a statement to Lord Hailey's report which will be published. I propose to discuss the matter with Lord Hailey myself when he is in London shortly. I mentioned the point to the Secretary of State when I was discussing the subject with

[1] See 44.

him the other day. He agrees as to the necessity of consulting Lord Hailey on the statement of policy, but wants us to be free to incorporate our own ideas as developed at the summer school.

I think that I ought to take the opportunity, without going into detail, to give my impressions of the work now being carried on in the various African Territories on local government as it emerges from the despatches on this file and as I have been able to gather it from discussions with officers at the summer school and elsewhere.

We can be generally satisfied with the progress being made in Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia. The despatches from the three territories at 88, 90 and 96 are documents of first-rate importance which deserve the warm commendation of the Secretary of State. Sir John Hall's policy of vigorous development of local government bodies with devolution of powers on to them is particularly promising. Sir Philip Mitchell proposes[2] to set up an African Affairs Commission which, in the circumstances of Kenya, seems to me a step warmly to be welcomed. The Northern Rhodesia despatch is more pedestrian but the work being carried out in Northern Rhodesia in the field of native administration is, I think, considering the conditions, as good as anything in Africa.

We can also be well satisfied, I think, with the state of affairs in Zanzibar and the Gambia. Sir Vincent Glenday[3] is pushing forward vigorously with the development of local government, long overdue in Zanzibar, and has responded magnificently to the stimulus we gave him on this matter shortly after he took up his appointment. His despatch of the 28th March has been followed up by another despatch with concrete proposals which have now been approved and put into effect. I think also that Mr. A. Wright[4] has the position well in hand in the Gambia.

The position is not as satisfactory in Nyasaland although they fully accept the Secretary of State's views, are going to appoint a Secretary for African Affairs and a Native Courts Adviser, and are obviously reviewing their whole position. Mr. A.H. Cox,[5] who is travelling with Lord Hailey, has written privately to Mr. Cartland to say that things seem to have stood still in Nyasaland for a good number of years. I fear that that was also my impression. I propose to mention the matter again to Mr. Colby[6] as I am sure that some stimulus is needed in the right direction.

Of the three main West African territories I feel much less qualified to judge and I shall, of course, be giving special attention to this field when I am in West Africa. I must say, however, that the despatches from the Gold Coast (84), Sierra Leone (91) and Nigeria (98) are mediocre in quality and do not give the impression that the secretariats who were responsible for writing them are organised on the right basis to deal with local government. As far as the Gold Coast is concerned at any rate, the practical performance is very much better, particularly in Ashanti, and I do not think that we really need be worried about the conduct of local govt affairs in the Gold Coast. There has also been much good work going on in Sierra Leone and in parts of Nigeria. I must say, however, that from all I have heard I am not happy about the state of affairs in Northern Nigeria, where a fog of complacency seems to me to have been spreading, leading to inactivity in local government at the higher levels and

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[2] See 45.

[3] British Resident, 1946–1951.

[4] Gov of Gambia, 1947–1949, gov of Cyprus, 1949–1954.

[5] British Resident, Buganda, 1932–1944; employed in CO, 1947–1949.

[6] G F T Colby, administrative secretary, Nigeria, since 1945; gov of Nyasaland, 1948.

frustration at the lower levels. Perhaps this is a false impression which will be corrected when I go there.

Generally, I feel that the three West African territories have not got down properly to the problem of organising the study and formation of policy on local government. This problem is much more difficult in West Africa than in East Africa, since one has to combine the required degree of co-ordination at the centre with the necessary devolution to Chief Commissioners. I hope to acquire some more ideas on this subject next year. Meanwhile I hope I shall not be laying myself open to the charge of an East African bias in calling attention to the fact that it is from the three territories which have had Secretaries for African Affairs, or the equivalent, for some time that we have received really good despatches on this subject.

I have left Tanganyika to the last because I am really worried about the despatch of the 8th November which Sir William Battershill told me that he wrote largely himself. It can only be described as an extremely defeatist document. In brief it says that the provincial administration is so absorbed with other questions, and particularly with economic questions, that it cannot devote the necessary time to what Sir W. Battershill agrees is its real task of encouraging local government. It also says that the African material available in Tanganyika has not yet been developed to the stage at which it can normally play the kind of part which we should like to see it playing in the sphere of local government. These depressing conclusions, in my view, do less than justice to the developments in local government going forward among the Wachagga and Wasukuma and also in other areas. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly true that the sparsity of population in Tanganyika makes the development of local government in many areas particularly difficult. I should have thought myself that it was no more difficult than, for example, in large parts of Northern Rhodesia, and I am not absolutely clear why the burden of responsibilities on the provincial administration is more pressing in Tanganyika than elsewhere. Admittedly they have the groundnut scheme, which is absorbing more of the energies of Government than is perhaps generally realised. For that reason I am sure that we must not be too exacting. But I am not entirely happy at leaving things as they are described in the Governor's despatch.

I had a longish talk with Sir W. Battershill on this subject on the day before he left London. As diffidently as possible I indicated to him our disappointment at his despatch and our disquiet at the limited extent to which the ideas put forward in the Secretary of State's despatch could apparently be carried into effect in Tanganyika at the present time. I ventured to point out that in the period before the war Tanganyika had always been regarded as leading the way in African administration. Unfortunately, owing to shortage of staff and other reasons, it now seemed that Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia were all making more rapid progress. Sir W. Battershill showed that he was very sympathetic to all our ideas and he said that he had felt bound to paint the picture as it really is and not as both he and we should like it to be. I think that he is very much concerned lest, in the various proposals which we make to Governments, we try to put more on to their plate than the present organisation can carry; and I must say that I have a great deal of sympathy with his point of view. At the same time, particularly in Tanganyika, we have got to push forward. The Governor's despatch does not give us very useful material with which to face the Trusteeship Council. I told Sir W. Battershill that I thought that the Secretary of State when he saw his despatch would be rather disappointed. The

question arises whether the Secretary of State should send a personal letter to the Governor on some of the points which I have made. I must confess that I am undecided on this. I can see the advantage in doing so. On the other hand, Sir W. Battershill has many anxieties at present; he has for example just agreed to a Trusteeship Council visit next year. He has a formidable task in front of him and I am not sure how much good will be done by pressing him on this particular issue. My talk may have done some good and they have a new Secretary for African Affairs. The matter is an important one and the Secretary of State may wish to have a word with us on it. Meanwhile I submit the draft despatches for approval.

48 CO 847/35/9, nos 3 & 3A 29 Dec 1947

[Local government policy]: notes by G B Cartland for a draft statement. *Appendix*: notes by R E Robinson

[In a covering minute Cartland explained of this draft synopsis: 'A most important new feature is a brief review of the history of indirect rule and native administration policy which has been prepared by Mr. Robinson. I asked him to do this so that we could indicate quite clearly how the present policy is related to the past. There are many and nebulous conceptions of what indirect rule and native administration really were and are and I feel it is as important to clear up these conceptions as it is to indicate what policy actually is. Incidentally this section will probably make the policy fully acceptable to even the more conservative African administrators. Mr. Robinson has shown that our present policy is a logical development from that of Sir Donald Cameron and from the Select Committee on Closer Union of 1931 with slight changes of emphasis in various places. I personally attach great importance to this particular section and very much hope that a place will be found for it in the final version of the statement' (29 Dec 1947). R E Robinson was a research officer in the African Studies Branch (see p 115 above), 1947–1949. He left the CO to take up a research fellowship at St John's College, Cambridge, and subsequently became Beit professsor of the history of the British Commonwealth at Oxford, 1971–1987.]

1. *Introduction*

Reference should be made to the work of Lord Hailey and particularly to his 1940 Report. This formed the background to some of the political and constitutional advances of the war years, both in the Central and in the Local Government field. Local Government policy had been developing during this period, as in fact during earlier years, independently in each territory without any general study of the subject which would either result in the formulation of general lines of policy or in the exchange of information between one territory and another. Lord Hailey was the first to study the subject on a Pan African comparative basis.

As a result of the resumed study of the Hailey Report toward the end of the war, the Secretary of State issued his despatch of the 25th February 1947.[1] In this despatch he emphasised the importance which he attached to the development of an efficient and democratic system of Local Government in Africa. He raised the question of the possibility of the formulation of a general statement of policy on the subject and indicated his intention of holding a Summer School of Administrative Officers representative of all the African territories in order to study Local Government problems with a view to determining how far a restatement of Local Government policy was desirable. This School produced a series of reports on various

[1] See 44.

aspects of Local Government, which were subsequently considered by the Colonial Governments and were discussed and endorsed by the Governors at their Conference in November 1947. At that Conference it was agreed that the general statement of policy should be prepared for publication on the basis of the reports of the Summer School.

2. *Historical survey of policy*
This is not yet ready in the form intended but the notes by Mr Robinson indicate the substance.

3. *Present policy*
(a) *General principles*
(i) *New factors*. The development of policy from the indirect rule of Lugard to the indirect administration of Cameron to the present-day principles of local government has been due to the pressure of a number of factors which have increased in importance year by year. These include:—
(1) the growing political consciousness of the people, particularly the new middle classes;
(2) the need to improve local administrative machinery to meet the growing demands for improved social services;
(3) the adjustments required by the progressive weakening in certain areas of the traditional authorities as detribalisation increases;
(4) the use which has been made of local authorities as the basis for the pyramidical [sic] system of election to the central councils with which goes the need to broaden the democratic basis of the local authorities.
In recent years these factors have been accentuated by the effect of the war on the political outlook and economies of the rural peoples and by the policy of more rapid development in the economic and social spheres which require efficient local government machinery for its success.
(ii) *Object of the present policy*. The object of policy is the creation of an efficient democratic system of local government. (It might be appropriate here to quote the despatch). This system should be designed to provide and administer local social services; to associate the local people with the administration of these services and the other functions of local government; and in doing this should be calculated to provide them with some measure of political education.
It is essential that the system developed should be in harmony with the social and economic conditions of the locality and should as far as possible be related to or derived from existing traditional institutions which may be expected to ensure the fullest development of the social and political life of the community.
(b) *Organisation*. This policy will have to be applied to a wide variety of conditions and to peoples own communities at widely different stages of social and political development and differing historical and geographical conditions. The organisation of local government should be adapted to the conditions of each locality and within the general pattern a wide diversity of institutions may be expected.
(i) *Rural areas*. This section should emphasise that the rural areas are the greater part of the problem. Would mention the two patterns of development—the traditional native administration policy and the exotic conciliar policy. It

should then deal with the size of local government units and the composition and method of representation of the people on the lines of AGC No. 12[2] paragraph 5 (a) and (b).

(ii) *Urban areas*. This section should draw the distinction between African and European areas and as far as African urban areas are concerned between areas where traditional authority is sufficiently strong to make the native administration an adequate framework for local government policy and those areas where a council policy on the English model has been adopted. It would then proceed on the lines of the conclusions recorded in CSS (19) paragraphs 3 to 20. . . .

(c) *Functions*. The functions to be performed by local government institutions in Africa are as follows:—

(i) The carrying [out] of the traditional life, ceremonial and social functions.

(ii) The managing of the assets of the community, notably its lands.

(iii) The provision of political leadership and in some cases the provision of a basis of political representation on superior councils.

(iv) The organisation of the collection and control of the community's revenues.

(v) The administration of social and other services and works.

Certain of these functions are clearly associated with the traditional tribal leaders while others are more clearly the function of local government in the modern sense. In areas where the traditional pattern of local government has been adopted the traditional is also the local government authority. In other areas for various reasons this may not be the case and in these areas there is no reason why the different functions should not be exercised by the traditional and the modern authority separately.

As regards the functions of the modern local government authority the points made in AGC. 12 paragraph 7 will be reproduced.

(d) *Finances*. The points made in AGC. No. 12 paragraph 8 will be reproduced in this section.

(e) *Efficiency*. The points concerning the conditions of service, organisation and training of local government staff contained in AGC. No. 12 paragraph 10 will be made here together with the conclusions of the group on urban areas in CSS. (19) paragraphs 21 to 37 dealing with the problems of maintaining high standards of efficiency and integrity in local government service.

(f) *The part to be played by the Central Government in development and planning of local government*. This section will cover the proposal regarding the activities training and conditions of work of field staff and the question of bringing United Kingdom experience to bear on African local government problems. (The points dealt with in AGC. No. 12 paragraph 11 and paragraph 13 (3)).

4. *Conclusions*

A summing up of the policy might be attempted in this section but in any case reference might be made to the urgency of the task of developing local government and to the desirability of Colonial Governments studying the present statement of policy with a view to the issuing of local statements defining their own policy within the general framework of that indicated by the Secretary of State.

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[2] See 62.

Appendix to 48: Development of theories of native administration 1927–47

Two main traditions of Native Administration:—

1. *East African conciliar theory 1927*

(a) Local government through local native councils, *which are artificial institutions*, although their membership may to a greater or less degree be constituted of traditional clan elders or family head;

(b) Applied mainly in detribalised areas or to societies formed on clan basis;

(c) Chief source of theory—Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa Report which formulated aim of progress[ive] devolution of local government functions to the native councils, representative of the people of their localities;

(d) Germ of idea of representation through a pyramid of Councils—district and provincial and up to Legislative Council.

2. *Indirect Rule theory*

(Applied in (i) areas of large autocratic kingship organisations; (ii) smaller Chiefdom areas).

I *Philosophical concepts common to whole tradition (including Cameron)*.

(i) that indigenous societies adapt themselves instinctively of their own volition, to changing conditions—and therefore the task of government is merely to guide, not to create development;

(ii) that African indigenous institutions should be preserved intact from the brunt of Western influences so that they may evolve spontaneously;

(iii) that Government should guide that evolution towards modern standards of civilised government.

The main differences within the tradition have been conflicts between the aim of preserving and sheltering indigenous institutions and of directing their development towards civilised standards.

II *Administrative principles common to whole of Indirect Rule tradition*

(i) Native Authorities must be made a living part of the machinery of government with judicial, fiscal and executive powers;

(ii) These powers should be exercised under statutory authority and that degree of delegation of such powers should vary according to stage of development reached by each particular native authority;

(iii) The exercise of executive and legislative powers by native authorities should be subject to direction and supervision of Administrative Officers;

(iv) Government reserves right to impose direct taxation and legislation;

(v) Each Native Authority should possess a properly constituted Native Treasury financed out of local revenue.

III *Lugard's conservative school within the I[ndirect] R[ule] tradition*

(Political Memoranda 1918, Dual Mandate 1926, Nigeria—and for general application).

Characteristics

(i) Native Authorities conceived as Chiefs or Emirs; no attention paid to the

position of their councils—rule by personalities;

(ii) Function of Native Authorities conceived as primarily and mainly keeping law and order;

(iii) Emphasis on preserving existing indigenous institutions rather than on their adaptation and reform towards democratic local government;

(iv) Stresses, as the real test for the choice of Native Authorities, their basis in tribal tradition rather than their acceptability to the people;

(v) Tended to maintain the authority and prestige of the indigenous N.A.S. at any cost.

These features were the natural result of the circumstance of the first stage of Indirect Rule building;

(vi) Some neo-Lugardians regarded the Chiefs as still retaining some of the attributes of sovereignty.

IV *Cameron's progressive school of Indirect administration*
(Principles of Native Administration, Tanganyika 1931, Nigeria 1934; N[ative] Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika 1937).
Possibility that Cameron may have been influenced by the East African conciliar theory to emphasise the place of the councils as the representative element in the Native Authorities.

Changes of emphasis made in Cameron's reorientation of the Indirect Rule tradition

(i) Posited two criteria for choice of native authorities—not merely basis in indigenous tradition *but also acceptability to the people* i.e. trend towards concept of N.A.S. as representative of the local communities;

(ii) Development from concept of functions of native authorities as negative—maintaining law and order, to the idea of positive instruments towards the economic and social progress of the people, and towards the political and administrative education of Africans towards self government;

(iii) A change of emphasis from the conservation of traditional authorities stereotyped in their customary form as an end in itself, to the adaptation of existing forms of administration towards more democratic institutions of local government—for higher efficiency and better justice;

(iv) Final rejection of claims to semi-autonomy of larger units of native administration—stress on the need to democratise them and to give the village council proper political expression in them;

(v) Statement of Principle that Native Administration[s] should carry out their work under the 'full glare of public opinion'—as against the policy of maintaining prestige of N.A.S. at all costs;

(vi) Emphasis on gradual democratisation of N.A.S. towards British local democratic self government model;

(vii) In general assumed that Bantu institutions were by tradition essentially democratic—thus providing an indigenous basis for development envisaged in (vi) above. (This theory repeated by Hailey 1940–2 Report);

(viii) Stress on the Councils as an essential element in a native authority.

In Cameron the East African conciliar theory and the I.R. tradition are beginning to merge to form the contemporary local government doctrine.
Fusion further achieved by Hailey's Survey setting fashion for considering African problems on a pan-African comparative basis.

V *The local government doctrine summer school and A.G.C. 12. Changes of emphasis*
A. *Philosophy*
(i) In large measure has accepted the fact that native indigenous institutions will not spontaneously evolve of their own initiative to more civilised and efficient forms without a greater measure of direct government action and initiative of Indirect Rule Philosophy (I (i));
(ii) The aim is local self governing democratic institutions of the Western democratic type, whether the native authorities are artificial councils or indigenous chiefs in council.

B. *Principles of development of local government*
(i) Formulates principles on general basis for whole of British Africa—for detribalised, clan-organised, and traditional chief-organised areas;
(ii) Greater emphasis and definition on devolution of local powers to local government bodies;
(iii) Stresses the representative and democratic criterion for the fitness of native authorities, as consideration overriding the criterion of the traditional basis for the native authority;
(iv) Stresses the native authority council as the most important element in a native authority, as against the chief himself;
(v) Transition from local government through personalities to local government through institutions;
(vi) Novel principle of accountability of native authority councillors to the people—and removable by them;
(vii) Emphasises progress towards democratisation to be carried forward at greater speed, and more ruthlessly than envisaged by Cameron;
(viii) Completion of fusion of East African conciliar and Indirect Rule principles.
In general the present Local Government theory defines, emphasises and generalises ideas which were immanent in the Conciliar and I.R. traditions, but not fully clarified as essentials. The change is one of subtle emphasis, except on one or two points.

49 CO 847/38/3, no 1 [nd; 1947]
'Some recent trends in native administration policy in the British African territories': memorandum by R E Robinson [Extract]

I *Methods of policy making*
The contemporary British will not be unaware that the Second World War inaugurated an era of radical and rapid change in their dependent territories. For some time administrators have been engaged on the piecemeal adaptation of administrative policy to the new situations. But much of the nature and many of the

what form it should take. The summer school discussed this point and recorded the conclusion that, while field staffs must look to their Governments for directives on policy, some general statement of policy taking account of the diversity of local conditions would be of value and would be appreciated by officers in the field. This view was accepted by the Governors' Conference and the draft of a general statement of policy based on the conclusions of the summer school will be prepared in the Colonial Office and circulated in draft for the comments of Governors. It is possible that its preparation may take some time. Meanwhile a confidential print of the proceedings of the summer school containing the various papers produced is under preparation and copies will be supplied to Governors early in the New Year for circulation to their officers.

5. I now turn to the questions of organization which formed the main subject matter of my despatch of the 25th February. These are:—

(a) Exchange of Information
(b) Machinery for the Review of Policy, and
(c) District Staffs.

6. *Exchange of information*. General agreement has been expressed by Governors with the suggestions in paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch and these were also fully endorsed by the summer school. The school made certain specific proposals to give effect to these suggestions; I am in general agreement with these and should be grateful if Governments would consider the action to be taken on them. Some apprehension was expressed both by Governors and at the summer school lest these arrangements should lead to an excessive proliferation of paper at a time when staffs are short. It is natural that this point should be made and I am anxious that the arrangements should not lead to unnecessary work. At the same time I think that much can be done without adding to the work of officers either in the secretariats or in the field. In the light of the discussions which have taken place on these proposals, I consider that the arrangements suggested in my despatch should now be put into operation to the extent practicable in each territory, since I am anxious that there should be a much greater knowledge among the officers in the African territories of the work being carried on in other territories. I suggest that documents circulated should either be sent direct by the Governments concerned to the other African Governments, with a copy to the African Studies Branch of the Colonial Office, or sent to that Branch with a request that they may be circulated from London to the other territories. The Branch will give every assistance it can to Governments in the supply and distribution of information and will be glad to discuss any questions connected with this matter with officers on leave. The Branch will also issue a quarterly digest of official and other publications and information on African affairs which will be sent regularly to Governments. As regards the Colonial Service Journal referred to in paragraph 8 of my despatch, some progress has been made, and, while no final decision has yet been taken, it is likely that arrangements will be made shortly for the issue of such a periodical. I will send you a further despatch on this subject.

7. *Machinery for the review of policy*. There is general agreement among the Governors of the East and Central African Territories that an African Affairs Branch performing the functions described in paragraph 9 of my despatch is a necessary part of the machinery of government. The summer school recorded the view, in relation

to East and Central Africa, that the formation of such a branch is a matter of vital importance. All the Governments concerned either already have an officer of Executive Council level dealing with African affairs or are about to appoint one, and it has been generally agreed that a branch on the lines proposed should be set up to assist this officer, where this has not been done already, as soon as the staff position permits.

8. I welcome the proposal in paragraph 6 of your despatch to create an African Affairs Branch under a Secretary for African Affairs; I note that provision for the purpose of appointing this officer is being made in the Estimates for 1948.

9. *The District staffs*. General agreement has been expressed by Governors with the contents of paragraphs 14 and following of my despatch of the 25th February and Governors have provided me with much useful information as to the means which they propose to employ to keep field staffs, both administrative and technical, more closely informed of general policy, etc., and to reduce the amount of routine work falling on administrative and technical officers in the field. The whole subject was discussed in great detail at the summer school and is dealt with in the report of Group V (pages 3 to 7). The concrete recommendations made in this report are, I feel, of very considerable value and I hope that Governments will feel able to give effect to them.

10. I have little to add myself at this stage. I would, however, like to emphasize again the great importance which I attach to freeing field staffs from routine work. I agree, of course, with the view expressed by certain Governors that an administrative officer must in his training period gain experience of routine work at District Headquarters. Nevertheless, once this necessary period of training is over, it is in my view vital that field staffs should be relieved of routine work to the maximum possible extent. As I said in paragraph 16 of my despatch, the development of local government should be the principal function of district staffs and must take precedence as such over routine work. Now that there has been an opportunity for consideration and discussion of the various proposals which I put forward in my despatch both in connexion with the preparation of the replies to that despatch and at the summer school at Cambridge, I am most anxious that energetic steps should be taken by all Governments to provide real relief for field staffs. This is a problem which has existed for many years and a proper solution ought now to be found for it.

11. One of the most promising suggestions which has been made comes from Uganda, where it is proposed to appoint District Accountants who would be responsible for accounting and financial responsibilities in the district not only for the District Commissioner but also for the technical officers serving in the district. The Governor of Uganda's despatch of the 29th August containing this suggestion has already been circulated to some Governments, but in view of the importance of this suggestion I am now sending it to those Governments which have not had it, together with his despatch of the 15th May on the same subject. The suggestion which Sir John Hall has made would have three advantages. It would emphasize the necessary team spirit in the district; it would relieve not only administrative but technical officers; and it might make possible the appointment as District Accountants of officers with higher qualifications than might be feasible if the work was only being undertaken on behalf of the administrative and not the technical staff as well. I believe that this arrangement might be introduced with advantage in all the East and Central African Territories. In West Africa the position is more difficult, but I should

be grateful if the West African Governments would nevertheless consider the proposal. It might be possible by concentrating the duties in the way suggested to afford a higher salary and thus to obtain suitably qualified Africans for this post who would provide a real relief to the administrative and technical officers in the district.

12. I think it desirable that I should be kept regularly informed of the progress made in dealing with the problems relating to field staffs discussed in paragraphs 14–17 of my despatch of the 25th February. I should be grateful, therefore, if Governments would let me have a progress report on the action taken with regard to these problems not later than a year from now, to be followed by further reports at annual intervals.

13. I assume that Governors will wish to make this despatch, like that of the 25th February, available confidentially to administrative and other officers. I am therefore having the despatch printed and when it is ready will sent the same number of copies to Governments as were asked for in the case of the previous despatch.

51 CO 852/1053/1, no 18 19 Aug 1948

'Opening address to the summer conference—Cambridge 1948' by Mr Creech Jones (CSC(48)13)

Introduction

I extend a hearty welcome to this Conference. It is one of a series of Conferences designed to bring the experience of men in the field to bear on the difficult problems which Britain has to handle in the administration of the dependent territories. I am sure that our discussions will benefit those of you who carry onerous responsibilities in the colonies and also assist those of us responsible for general policy and for guiding affairs from London.

Last year a successful Conference was held on African Local Government. The value of the work done by that Conference was such that the reports of its various groups, which are now available in printed form, have been accepted as the basis of our local Government policy in Africa. The present Conference is to consider the problem of initiative in African society and, while the object is not to formulate a new policy of mass education, it is hoped that your discussions will make a very significant contribution to the subject.

Today, we have with us teams of officers from all ten of the Colonial Office territories in Africa, together with representatives from other African territories including South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the Sudan, and the High Commission Territories. Representatives from the U.S.A., France, Belgium and Portugal are also present together with a number of British experts on African Affairs from the Universities and other walks of life. We hope that the visitors will feel free to express their opinions and to participate in all our discussions as full members of the Conference. Last year only two or three Africans were present at the Conference, but they nevertheless made an impressive contribution. On this occasion most territories have included African representatives in their teams, and we expect from them a significant contribution.

The subject of the conference

This Conference meets then to consider certain factors necessary to African progress. It is not an inquest on past administration because the achievements of British policy and initiative are written large on the background of Africa. It is a sign of our desire to shape our policy aright in our efforts to contribute to the purpose which we as a colonial power are committed to. We seek to help the colonial people move to better social living and to responsibility. We are here to discuss how initiative can be encouraged, what incentives will help to make that progress dynamic and what methods can be employed to advance political responsibility.

World criticism of British purpose

In the conditions of the world today, Colonial administration is exposed to much criticism and Colonial Powers are the subject of considerable suspicion. We may discount the denigration resulting from ignorance or from ideological propaganda: we may count many of the misconceptions of policy as due to sentimentalism and lack of realism: we may trace much of the prevailing misunderstanding as arising from deep undercurrents of prejudice and natural dislike of "colonialism". The international field is not an easy place for colonial administrators to work in! Nevertheless, there is a liberal spirit widely manifest in many nations today and our own conscience is uneasy when our practice is exposed through our own shortcomings. We may feel that the doctrine of international accountability is pressed unnecessarily far and that our critics have often little sense of realism in their view of the conditions of our work. But our desire is to stand well in the eyes of the world without betrayal of our trust and to deserve well of the colonial peoples in their advance.

Change initiated from below as well as from above

It is perhaps a fair criticism of British Colonial policy in the past that we have tended to give too much of our thought to the *substance*[1] of the programmes of political, economic and social advance, and too little to means of encouraging the development of communities capable of profiting by, taking part in, and, above all, supplying, the motive power for such advance. I am not saying that we have ignored encouraging people to develop their own capacity to improve themselves—only that we have not emphasised it enough. Looked at by any real standard of values it is less important that a particular African territory should have a progressive constitution with full African participation than that there should exist in the territory a considerable group of people capable of effective political action, by which, of course, is meant not merely criticism of the Government, nor the capacity to make speeches, but the capacity to take part effectively in public life and to shape political development themselves. At the other end of the scale it is less important that there should be a village school than that the people should have the initiative, not only to want a school and ask for a school, but actually to build and run it by their own efforts. It is less important that a productive industry should be created than that the people should acquire the practical knowledge of how to cultivate their own lands efficiently and without ruining the soil.

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[1] Emphasis in original.

The 19th century and early 20th century progressive idea of Colonial policy was that the indigenous peoples should be protected from exploitation by outside influences, whether bad European employers, companies only concerned with mining resources and making a profit or whatever it may have been. This idea developed directly from the original British part in Africa of eliminating the slave trade, and it fitted exactly with the Victorian conception of progress combined with laissez faire. But we all know now that this is not enough. That it is part of the duty of Colonial Governments in Africa to prevent the exploitation of the country and the people is now a commonplace, just as the Summer Conference last year found that in the sphere of local administration indirect rule has become a commonplace in the sense that everyone agrees that local government should be carried on through the institutions of the people themselves. The emphasis is now on the development of an efficient and representative system of local government. Just in the same way the prevention of exploitation is not enough; our primary task in Africa in relation to the people is to stimulate their initiative, to do what can be done by Government officers to encourage people to want change and to equip them with the power themselves to create change.

Progress a problem of African initiative as much as of the colonial power

I would like to say, however, that in international discussion—as often at home—colonial progress is too often discussed as if it were an affair controlled entirely by the administering power. The position of the colonial people is usually assumed to be that they want change, that they eagerly co-operate to achieve progress, that their ills arise from the shortcomings or evil policies of the metropolitan power and that the movement forward is largely a matter for the administration concerned—in terms of the supply of capital, materials and technicians and a will to disinterested service. But we must recognise the conditions of the problem as it exists for our administrators and above all the resistances and difficulties presented by the colonial peoples themselves. They are the human factor with some volition of their own: without their own urges and desires we cannot move towards the purposes which we trust are theirs. It is this fundamental problem of breaking down their resistance and stimulating their desires which we shall be studying in this conference.

I would also add that on the other hand in theoretical discussions on African problems, it is often assumed that colonial development is largely a problem of the chess-board variety or the military operations room. It is thought simply to be a question of disposing our forces and resources in the best possible way, and putting into force plans and programmes of development for the benefit of the people. But this again ignores the human element. Developments in Africa and elsewhere at the moment are showing that, whatever plans we may have, the people are beginning to have their own ideas and their own plans. Theoretical programmes have a habit of ignoring these, and the results are extremely dangerous. We have got to marry the two together. We have got to be ready for a constant flexibility of ideas, to adapt them to local wishes and aspirations. Our conception of African development is based on Western political philosophy, and as far as we can see at present that of the African leaders is based on the same ideas. But the most important part of our objective is the proper handling of human relationships. We must place more emphasis on giving the people the means and the desire to better themselves rather than on actually giving them improvements (important although that is in itself). Mass

education may be defined as an active movement for better living conditions in any community by community effort and with community initiative. Hence its fundamental importance at the present stage of development in Africa.

Our part in making progress possible which is not inevitable

I come now to another aspect of our problem. I am satisfied that progress has to be stimulated by you as well as initiated by the colonial peoples themselves, that you have often to supply the spark to kindle the flame. I have always rejected the notion about the inevitability of progress—that once truth is shown people eagerly seek and grasp it—that mankind evolves to higher stages because of some inherent force working for freedom, responsibility and better forms of social living. This Victorian idea which permeated so many phases of human activity a few generations ago has been rudely shaken by the experience all of us here have had of human affairs in Europe in the past few decades. Africa in past centuries does not encourage any such belief itself. People will move forward only so far as they have the inward compulsions and where they will move—forward or backwards—how they will move and how fast, depends on conditions which we and they can help determine.

We have no less the task of helping to create a faith in progress. I suppose that most educated African leaders already have this faith, but it hardly exists yet in the great rural populations. It has somehow to be stimulated among them, and as far as the leaders are concerned, it has to be directed into practical channels instead of, as it sometimes is, being confined to the pursuit of theoretical ideals. In Western Europe faith in progress was created during the 19th century as one of the results of the Industrial Revolution coupled with scientific discovery. We have to stimulate a corresponding faith in Africa.

Africa cannot be insulated but why should we bother with African progress?

Another basic question arises. Why not attempt to insulate African society and let development take care of itself? Why make development and welfare a special responsibility at all? Why throw additional burdens on the British taxpayer and the colonial administrator, the thanks to whom in the long run may be independence to the territory and its exit from the Commonwealth? The answer is surely that it is clearly impossible to insulate any colonial territory however much one may wish. These territories have been drawn into the modern world through economic and political penetration and they cannot be treated as isolated units or as museum pieces. Undeveloped regions have for long been the occasion of political rivalry and power politics. They are the cause of friction even when economically they appear to have little to offer. Moreover once education has begun its work in an African territory, nothing can stop the disturbance it will cause. That territory can never be the same again. New creative influences begin to work and contacts become necessary. Further, the outside world wants the products these regions can supply. They become essential for the maintenance of the world food supply, for the materials of industry, for the support of the world's living standards. The world needs their rubber, fibres, sugar, cocoa, tin and gold and all the rest. The development of these regions is essential to the people themselves who, saved from internal disorder, tribal wars and famine and disease, increase in population and health and demand more food and social services in health and education and most of what Western civilization can give. Their ill-health is the world's ill-health; they are vital factors in

the peace and stability of the world—better then that they be developed, made flourishing and civilized. The old conception of imperial power and advantage fades as the colonial peoples move to better social living and responsibility. In any case, international criticism tends to keep us up to the mark—our own humanism and liberal spirit rejects the squalor, poverty, misery, disease, ignorance which normally exist in backward societies.

What lines should "progress" take and how [to] create the incentive to want it
But if the colonial regions have to be developed for their own advantage as well as our own and the world's, what is the nature of the progress that we wish to see? The people obviously have to be prepared for the responsibilities of better living, for the kind of society which they seek to create, for the working of its machinery in the common interest. We want them, as the more articulate and educated amongst them seem to want, to move into a society whose values are similar to our own, whose institutions are modelled in the same spirit and for similar purposes as our own. Is this a desirable objective and if so, how can we create the incentive to achieve this end?

The difficulties of progress in native society
In passing, let me say that I am sometimes gloomy about the working out of our policies in the colonial areas. It is so often said that we are trying to telescope a great deal of material progress into a short time; that we are providing for social betterment many things which have not been asked for or struggled for and the significance of which is barely understood or appreciated; that a society in transition cannot be expected either to acquire the services, the social behaviour, the spirit of public service, the mechanics of civilized living in a short period; that traditions and values must evolve and cannot easily be established without experience; that moral and spiritual growth, as well as the reintegration of people after a severe process of disintegration, is a slow process; that training in tolerance, disinterestedness, objectivity, the building up of powers of judgment are in essence a growth which cannot be artificially hastened—in short, are we trying to do the impossible in our hope of producing communities sceptical to emotional appeals, unmoved by hysterical exhortation and guided by sound moral standards? The motive of "nationalism" (call it what you will) is already asserting itself among small articulate and intelligent groups in many African societies: these groups often distrust government and alien rule and I fear sometimes bite at the hand that feeds their people. The emotional fervour attached to nationalism infects and spreads. Unless a serious effort is made to channel it, it may become disruptive and destructive. Our task is to channel this emotion and concept towards constructive courses.

We know also that unsatisfied appetites in an ignorant and illiterate population makes it an easy prey to subversive propaganda of all kinds. This lack of satisfaction expresses itself often in ways which our own liberal spirit often hesitates to restrain!

Comparisons of progress in African society are often made with the alleged changes under Russian imperialism and to the disadvantage of British administration. In much of African society, as I see it, few influences exist which provide the drive for social changes with anything like a revolutionary urge. It is easier to remain in a rut than to get out of it. African society in the past has been peculiarly devoid of initiative and enterprise and has left little mark on the African background or shown

signs of radical movement from within. For us in our work in many areas in Africa, it is no easy thing to disturb the conservatism of ignorance, to break through the crust of custom, magic and superstition, and to revolutionise the whole approach to conduct and convention. Nevertheless something is stirring and new influences are awakening the mind, new appetites are craving for satisfaction, economic penetration is beginning to alter conditions, the pattern of living is undergoing change as society is conditioned in a wholly different way.

For instance, we witness strains and stresses being produced in all directions. We apply better health arrangements only to be faced with a population problem of appalling dimensions. We have to feed that increased population while they employ agricultural methods and ways of living hopelessly inadequate for such numbers. A money economy seeps in and other new economic activities occur. People remain isolated no longer. Roads are cut and new ways of life are introduced. The traditional ways of life begin to weaken, the old authorities to pass, the conventions and customs to crack and old tribal forms no longer do. Men drift to places of new occupation. A demand for schools begins to grow. In all this, the passing of the old tribal disciplines and controls, the weakening of authority and custom, the mobility of men to places beyond—these and other factors tell on the young people who grow up often a menace to public order and undisciplined for the new life about them. It is in these circumstances that it is imperative that we should revalue the needs of to-day when primary education and school training is infinitely too limited and cannot hope for many years to come to cover all the child population and in any case cannot make any contribution to the problem of youth and the adolescent years.

We must expect a troublesome period ahead. We cannot pursue development schemes fast enough to absorb all the rising generation in useful wage-employment. We cannot get for all of them a place on the land and many of them would not wish it. The increasing numbers cannot be supported or fed in the reserves. They cannot on their present economies enjoy all the services which they begin to demand. They clamour for the benefits of civilization without the economic basis to sustain them. They want the services enjoyed in the countries of Western Europe too often without much struggle and effort. Important things in social living are offered to them but they are received without appreciation of the significance and value of them. We cannot for a long time hope to satisfy all the new appetites of the colonial peoples and consequently there must be discomfort and agitation.

There can be no complete remedy for these growing pains. People may receive the apparatus, organisation, services, administration of the modern state, before the revolution of habit and mental capacity and qualification necessary for their working have been brought about; indeed, it is difficult to make the moral and spiritual changes keep pace with the rapid material changes. How are people to be made ready to receive the essential features of modern civilization and made competent to use them? This is one of the fundamental things that we are here to answer—how can we get the individual co-operating for the betterment of his society?

I repeat what I have said, for I cannot emphasise enough that the new order the educated African wants calls for new mental and moral qualities and capacities of the people. For backward peoples the period of transition is one of confusion and mental discomfort. They often resist because of their ignorance and in ignorance put a false value on tools carelessly put in their hands. How is effective progress then to be made possible? We can achieve it in one of a number of ways, either by ruthlessness, or by

compulsion or by education and persuasion, i.e. by encouraging initiative in the individual. Which method should we employ?

I want to say this about this question of method. I am a sceptic about experience outside the tropical and subtropical regions. We have heard much tendentious propaganda about the work accomplished in the fields of education, economic improvement and political institutions by Soviet Russian and other Powers. We have too little reliable information on which to form a sound judgment but in any case such experience is largely irrelevant where the whole social structure and development and the background of living is so different and where ruthless methods can be employed which have no place in British policy and practice. The problem of incentive must be studied in relation to each region and people. I rule out the ruthless imposition on the Colonies of a political and economic system or the enforcement of a code of social conduct in keeping with the ideology of a dominant political power.

There is no easy answer. The dynamic should come from within. I cannot as yet see any prospect of religion providing the new energy though it needs to become an important ingredient in sustaining the order that is pulled into being. The economic motive also plays a part—it gathers in momentum as changes come about and affords a stimulus of great value for society as a whole. The dynamic of revolution is perhaps not so difficult to transplant to Africa but it fails in Africa to consolidate change or give the people the capacity to carry and exercise responsibility or to work the apparatus necessary to secure good social living. Nationalism seems everywhere to offer a potent force but it can, as I have already said, excite and inflame to irresponsibility and destruction with callous indifference to sound social and economic advancement.

Whatever the dynamic may be we have been trying to create some of the material and physical conditions essential to any progress which the individual and small society can only provide for itself collectively or secure by the action of central government. You have probably read the report of the Select Committee on Expenditure in Parliament which challenges the programmes of social and economic change proposed under the 1940 and 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. You know that the appalling conditions in the West Indies and the continued agitation against them conducted in and out of Parliament in the years before the war led to the passing of these Acts—designed to prime the pump in respect of many social services which Colonies could not afford and to stimulate the growth of essential public works and utilities and improve agriculture in the hope that the wealth of the Colonies and revenues could be adequate to give the higher standards of living essential to a people's welfare. The prospects of ten-year programmes have already encouraged most colonial governments to improve certain of their services. At the same time much thought has been given to economic development.

Normal work of government not emphasised enough

It is not for me this evening to anticipate our discussions on how the problem of stimulating initiative and creating a people's movement for social betterment can best be attacked. A great deal has been and is already being done in the field of community education both by government, missions and voluntary associations. Much of it is the normal work of government activity based as it is in accordance with the wishes of the people and conducted through them. Perhaps in some areas our

officials have had too little encouragement in work of this kind—they have not had the money nor been allowed often to take an initiative which might have brought important practical results. There has often not been the staff and sometimes unorthodox methods have been disliked by higher authority. I want, however, to emphasise this aspect of colonial development and to urge that we exploit all means of finding the way of getting people to demand improvement themselves and to be prepared to take part in bringing it about.

The adult education Colonial Office papers

Two remarkable Colonial Office papers have appeared on this subject in the past few years and I am sure that they have been carefully studied by members of the Conference. I refer to the Report on Mass Education in African Society published in the war in 1944 and Education for Citizenship in Africa published last year.[2] The first 17 paragraphs of the first Report will repay study. I do not wish to cover the ground—the problems are well set out in both Reports—the spiritual and economic prerequisites of democracy, the methods and media which might be employed—the part which the schools, youth organisations, voluntary bodies, local government, press and information services and adult and community education can play.

New emphasis from Select Committee

Additional emphasis has been given to this approach to colonial development by the Report of the Select Committee of Parliament to which I referred just now. I find much to disagree with in the Report but they assert that "planning should start with the colonial peoples themselves, their needs and their potentialities. The colonies are poor because the people have not learned how to master their environment . . . . Rapid and effective progress requires the introduction of methods of communal development in water supply, agriculture, hygiene, domestic living, cultural values, self-help and democratic organisation . . . . A large scale advance in agriculture means reaching into every village, forming farmers' groups and agricultural societies, demonstrating new techniques on farmers' holdings, promoting co-operation and providing fertilisers, improved tools and cattle. Individual farmers must become links in a chain reaction that stirs the whole community . . . . Once the leaven is stirred which will release the potentialities of the people themselves, the tasks of individual administrators will become not more but less formidable."

This conception of development is sound enough so far as it goes, but it needs correction in so far as large scale public activity with the employment of machinery, technical skill and capital is no less essential if roads are to be made, soil conserved, marshes drained, disease overcome, railways made and the rest. What the Select Committee did not appreciate when they denied that the ten-year programmes were planning and said that such plans did not propound a complete strategy of development (and none of us regarded them as plans in the way in which the Select Committee uses the word) was that the public works, services and utilities of the community are but another side of the same problem in which progress is possible only when personal initiative is joined with the conditions essential to its expression, which regards community services and public works as interacting with the work of the administrations in stimulating individual and communal initiative in providing

[2] See part 4 of this volume, 363.

for themselves some of the things calculated to improve their lives.

Of course, the co-operation of the people must be actively engaged. The three ways mentioned by the Select Committee are first, through the association with development planning of such organised opinion as may exist; second, by a carefully worked out policy of technical and vocational training related to the needs of a developing country for skilled manpower at all levels; and third, by communal development, or mass education, to induce the bulk of the population to take an active interest in their own progress and betterment. The Committee describes really what we have long been doing but complain that so little of it has been included in the ten-year programmes. "If any measurable impression", they say, "is to be made on the immense tasks which need to be done, there must be an upward movement of the people to meet the downward movement of government-provided services". As I say, this tends to ignore the considerable work which colonial governments have done, through development advisory councils, team units in agriculture, animal health, communal living, health centres, practical agriculture, co-operation, trade unionism, local government, etc. True there has not been enough of it and one of our purposes today is to see what more can be done and how and whether a new emphasis can be put on such work.

In fairness to the Select Committee I should say that they point out "that communal development is not a new thing. For many years administrative and technical officers have been practising its principles . . . " in such matters as soil erosion, local administration, the work done in the Udi,[3] and with agriculture, village improvement and co-operation.

Balance between urban and rural areas

I want to make several further points. Mass Education is of the first importance as a means of reducing the balance [sic] between the backward rural areas and the more developed urban industrial areas. At the centre, we have rapid steps of political advancement and many progressive political ideas. The pace of political progress is unpredictable and there is the obvious danger that when various territories reach the stage of internal self-government they will do so on the basis of a bad lack of balance between the hinterland and the centres of development. Everything which contributes to the creation of political and social initiative in the backward areas will help to redress this balance.

Need for the additional process from below to supplement present effort

Another important point is the necessity of mass education in order to spread economic and social development in the rural areas. The African territories are so large, in most places their population so scattered, and their resources so poor at present and so undeveloped that the social and economic services are still rudimentary. The Ten-Year Development programmes will aim at doubling or even trebling the scope of these services, but cannot go much further. Even after this has been done the number of children in school, the number of hospitals, the number of agricultural extension workers, etc., etc. will be quite inadequate in relation to the needs. Development from above can only ever make limited progress. It must in addition come from below. Hence somehow we have got to find the means of

[3] A plateau in Nigeria, suffering from erosion.

inducing the rural people to take certain sectors in colonial improvement into their own hands.

What is being done

These ideas will be worked out in the Conference. The many ways of making progress are indicated. The collaboration of all departments in team work in the rural areas, the research and practical results from nutrition working parties as in the Gambia, the growth of co-operative practice as in Udi and the cocoa districts, whether on the productive, distributive or credit and marketing side, the growth of trade unionism, with the emergence of the workers' own leaders and beginnings of industrial democracy, the association for self-help in the way of friendly societies and expression of social responsibility, the creation of youth movements, scouts, 4H clubs, and other facilities for the adolescent; the practice of community self-help in the villages in regard to sanitation, public health, pure water; the tribal effort to prevent soil erosion, to stop over-grazing and to prevent land from becoming too exhausted, and the breaking through mass ignorance and illiteracy by all the means now available—all these are but a few of the experimental and substantial pieces of work being done in many regions. I would especially mention, however, the vitally important work among young women both in the professions and education fields and also in the domestic arts. Women occupy positions of basic importance—in the home and elsewhere—and often hold high status in the tribes as well as important places in trade and production. We have given too little thought to the place of the educated girl in African life and her absorption in the tribe and home and how the contribution which she might make can best be received [? reviewed]. And my further emphasis is on the practice of genuine local government and extension of voluntary effort for the creation of a spirit of social responsibility. But this aspect of the problem was dealt with in last year's Conference.

I may now sum up some of my views. We need to take more positive steps by:—

(a) the granting of greater measures of responsibility in local affairs as well as developing responsibility at the centre;
(b) the extension of sound services of health, education, housing, welfare, etc. so as to meet as far as possible legitimate discontents;
(c) the extension of voluntary associations of all kinds such as trade unionism and co-operative societies, both of which have an educational and positive content in removing grievances and building up better standards. In addition, other types of voluntary effort should be encouraged, such as youth organisations, clubs, friendly societies, discussion groups, adult education, local government.
(d) extension of community education and team work by officials and lay people in the directions which I have indicated;
(e) creation of good public relations and information services in their broadest sense, not excluding broadcasting and all other media now available to us;
(f) I would also add that the Colonial Service should be encouraged to make closer contact with the people and be relieved of the paper work which clogs much of their life and contacts to-day;
(g) more consideration should also be given to an extension of the work at training centres such as I saw in East Africa with the ex-askari, so that men can go out into the towns and villages with new crafts and skills, able to take their place in

trade and on the land with knowledge of better methods and be able to teach or introduce simple literacy, etc.

(h) I have also wondered whether a somewhat heterodox view should be tried out. As few youngsters will have had training or schooling in vast areas of Africa and are divorced from their tribal life or at least are without the old tribal disciplines, authority and compulsions, whether they should be brought together under some form of compulsory training. They could live in camps and be taught the simple arts like scouts. They could have drill and physical exercises and their physique be attended to. They could learn new skills. A pilot scheme in a particular district might be tried. I am sure that the thing could be worked out in simple terms with no great cost. Much of the work would save subsequent public expenditure and contribute better citizens and prove better expenditure than much now spent in fact on primary education. This is only an idea and not official policy but, I am convinced, worth examining.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is in order to meet practical doubts of the kind I have discussed that we are trying to get away from the process of forming policy by despatch and White Paper (although these have their uses). Instead we are trying to form it by discussion between the theorists and the practical workers, by exchange of opinion and experience and by comparing notes. There has been a great deal of talk over the past three or four years about mass education, and many people have failed to understand what it means. I hope that this Conference will succeed in making the idea more clearly understood. By that is not meant that the Colonial Office is trying to put something across to the officers from Africa, or that this Conference is a medium for some insidious propaganda. On the contrary, the object of the Conference is to think out the value, the purpose, the means, the organisation and the technique of mass education, and we hope that everyone (including particularly the theoretical people at this end) will go away with their ideas much clearer.

It is fitting that I close with some recognition of the part the Colonial Service plays in this. A new phase in African development has opened and Britain is anxious to make her partnership real. In London we do not seek to impose: on the contrary we want responsibility extended in the Colonies and more and more the people playing their part in shaping the things to come. In the winning of confidence, the removal of suspicion, the acknowledgement of free association, the Colonial Services play a large part in pushing back the black curtains of ignorance and pressing forward the frontiers of civilization. In recent years, we have seen realised in certain of our Colonies our long declared policy of self-government and peoples standing on their own feet with adult stature and able to take hold of their tasks. This then is not the occasion for any dimming of our faith in ourselves and the beneficent work our nation can do in the world. The Colonial Services must be able to meet the new demands on them and our policy must be oriented to meet the facts and conditions of the time and world we live in. I see Africa equipping herself for the contribution that Continent is competent to play in the world. I see Africans shaking off the shackles of ignorance, superstition and cramping custom, becoming aware and self-reliant and marching with other free people down the great highways of the world to keep their rendezvous with destiny. I extend my good wishes for a successful Conference.

52 CAB 129/30, CP(48)237 18 Oct 1948

'The African Conference': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Creech Jones reporting the work of the conference of officials and unofficials at Lancaster House

I think that Ministers will wish to have a brief account of the African Conference held at Lancaster House, which completed its work on 9th October. The Conference was unique of its kind in two ways; no such regional meeting had ever previously been held; nor had the unofficial representatives of so many Colonial territories ever before been gathered in London. Everyone who attended the Conference was agreed as to its outstanding success.

2. The members of the Conference were drawn from the Legislative Councils of all the African territories for which I am responsible. A few of the members were senior officials from the Colonial Service, in most cases one from each territory, and they made a very special contribution to the smooth working of the Conference. The vast majority of the delegates, however, were unofficials, Africans from the West African territories and Africans, Indians, Arabs and Europeans from the East and Central African territories. The total number of delegates from Africa were 66 of whom 12 were officials and 33 were African unofficials.

3. Official observers attended the Conference from France, Belgium, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the Sudan and the South African High Commission Territories. The United States and India also sent observers informally.

4. The delegates were received by The King on 8th October and were deeply appreciative of this honour. They were entertained at dinner by the Government on the same day. Much other hospitality was shown them, including a reception by the Lord Mayor of London on 4th October.

They have seen something of the country and of local government, agricultural and other institutions, and they have this week visited Birmingham or Bristol.

5. The illness of the Prime Minister prevented him from speaking to the Conference and delegates sent their warm wishes for his health. The Conference was opened on 29th September by the Deputy Prime Minister, who spoke on the general aims of our colonial policy. I am indebted to him and other Ministers who attended and made important contributions to the discussion. The Conference was addressed by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on the economic position as it affects the Colonies, by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on the Commonwealth in world affairs, by Lord Montgomery on Africa in relation to world strategy, and by Lord Trefgarne on the work of the Colonial Development Corporation. I also addressed the Conference on problems and policy.

6. The Conference discussed the general economic position and the means of development in plenary sessions on the basis of papers prepared in the Colonial Office which had been circulated in advance. Two points were made in the economic discussions:—

(a) The desire of the Colonies to play their full part in United Kingdom and world economic recovery. The delegates dismissed the idea that the present economic policy of the United Kingdom towards the Colonies was a cloak for exploitation of

the Colonies in the interests of the United Kingdom, and recognised its vital importance to their own development. But there was sometimes a fear lest, when the immediate demand for increased production of certain dollar-earning and dollar-saving commodities became less acute, the local industries would be left to their fate without protection and without adequate markets.

(b) Whether, notwithstanding the critical shortages of capital and consumer goods, the Colonies were really getting their fair share at the present time.

On the first point, it was useful to be able to refer to the recent statement of policy on long-term contracts, and to be able to explain the Colonial Office efforts of the past year or so to build the machinery for coping with economic planning and furthering the economic drive. On the second point, statistics were available to show that, in fact, the Colonies are getting a larger share of United Kingdom exports than before the war. They were also told of new arrangements recently introduced which should be of material assistance in accelerating and increasing the supply of essential requirements next year. These arrangements, even when fully effective, will not, of course, give the Colonies everything that they want: so long as the shortage continues that is impossible. But I am satisfied that it will give them a fair share, provided that the Colonial Office has the full collaboration and support of the other Departments of the United Kingdom Government which, in fact, control the supplies. The opportunity was again taken to impress on the delegates from Africa the necessity of using scarce materials to the best possible advantage.

7. Regional sessions of the West African delegates and the East and Central African delegates respectively were held to discuss agricultural development, public relations, medical policy, educational policy, community initiative, and local government, also on the basis of Colonial Office papers circulated in advance. I need not give an account of these lengthy discussions, but I can say that broadly speaking the present policy of the Government as set out in the Colonial Office papers was acceptable to the delegates from Africa. I should add, however, that on local government the Conference accepted as a basis for policy the lines on which we have been working for some time. The latter have been fortified by the conclusions of the conference on this subject held at Cambridge in August 1947 (when the practical problems of local government in Africa were exhaustively considered by about eighty Colonial Service officers from the field) and the endorsement given to them by the Conference of the Governors of African Territories held last November. We now have the broad basis of a generally accepted policy to work on.

8. The achievement of the Conference was not so much in the conclusions reached in the discussions, useful although these were, as in the friendly relations established between the delegates from the different territories and between the representatives from Africa and Ministers, officials and others in this country. The Colonial Office was able to learn much from the delegates and I believe that the delegates themselves learnt a great deal from all that they heard at the meetings. This was the first time that people from East and West Africa have been brought face to face in discussions and social gatherings of this kind. All the delegates were able to see that, although each region has its own problems, yet there are many vitally important problems which are common to Africa as a whole and must be viewed in a broader perspective. Those delegates who may have been apt in the past to take too parochial a view were able to see their own affairs against the background of the

wider Commonwealth and world picture. Above all, delegates had a striking demonstration of the interest taken by the people of this country in African problems and the friendliness of people here towards the representatives of Colonial Territories. There is no doubt that they were all very deeply impressed by this interest and friendliness and the Conference has certainly done much to increase the goodwill between this country and the African Territories. Eloquent expression was given to these feelings both at the official dinner on 8th October and at the closing of the Conference on 9th October. One of the most gratifying aspects of the Conference was the real evidence it afforded of the trust and confidence, underlying all doubts and differences, felt by the delegates of all races in the Colonial Office and its objectives.

9. The quite admirable arrangements made at Lancaster House and elsewhere for the sessions of the Conference and the reception of delegates contributed very largely to this result, and I am greatly indebted to the Foreign Office Conference Department, the Ministry of Works, the Ministry of Supply official car services pool, and the Government Hospitality Fund for their co-operation.

10. It is obviously too early yet to consider plans for future Colonial Conferences of this kind, but their value was endorsed by everyone taking part in this one.

53 PREM 8/922 25 May 1949

[Proposal for an Official Africa Committee of the Cabinet]: minute by Sir N Brook to Mr Attlee

I have been discussing with officials of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office the interdepartmental organisation for considering questions of African policy. We are in agreement that there is at present no fully effective means of securing a co-ordinated view on major questions which affect not only Colonial territories in Africa but also other British territories and foreign territories; and we suggest that the need for some machinery of this sort is particularly necessary at present for the following reasons—(i) World opinion, through the forum of the United Nations, is taking a very close interest in Africa, and the United Kingdom must be able to present a logical and coherent policy in the face of criticism; (ii) Co-operation between the different Governments interested in Africa is now an important part of both our Colonial and our foreign policy and again demands a unified approach to African problems; and (iii) Conflicts between the South African and United Kingdom approach to the problems of African development demand a single policy on the part of the United Kingdom Government.

We therefore suggest that a Committee of officials should be set up, under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, on the lines of the Africa Committee which operated during the war, to provide this co-ordination.

I submit for your approval a draft paper[1] setting out the composition and terms of reference of such a Committee.

You will note that, in paragraph 3 of the draft, a distinction is drawn between the political and the economic aspects of communications questions and the activities of the new Committee are confined to the political side. I realise that it will not always

[1] Not printed.

be possible to draw this distinction sharply; and there may be occasions when discussion of both the political and economic aspects of a communications problem must take place at the same time. I do not think, however, that it will be possible to provide for such occasions in any formal terms; it must be left to the good sense of those concerned to deal appropriately with each situation as it arises. The fact that the Cabinet Office provide the Secretariat for all these Committees will help to secure that there is no avoidable overlapping or duplication of work.[2]

[2] Mr Attlee minuted (25 May 1949): 'I approve. I should like to know that the other Ministers concerned also approve.'

54 FO 371/80130, no 1 13 Oct 1950

'Notes on Lord Winster's[1] motion': CO brief for Lord Hall[2] about the proposed appointment of a secretary of state for the African colonial empire

The establishment of a Secretary of State for the "Colonial African Empire" would not be beneficial either to the African Territories themselves or to the rest of the Colonial Empire, or to the United Kingdom. Such a change in organisation is not needed to secure effective means of forming policy. Such means already exist and would work less well rather than better with a separate Africa Office.

2. Objections to the proposal are as follows:—

(1) The proposal ignores the present organisation of the Colonial Office, which has been built up in the light of experience so as to secure effective advice for Ministers and Colonial Governments on a large range of specialised subjects while at the same time securing that Ministers are comprehensively advised on the problems and needs of individual territories and regions. At present there are eight geographical departments in the office, three of which deal with Africa, and no less than twenty-one subject departments (not including the Legal Department, the Accounts Department and the Establishments Department). Of these functional departments nine deal with economic questions (including finance, communications and research), five deal with recruitment and Colonial Service questions, two deal with social services, two with the international relations of the Colonial Empire, one with defence and general subjects, one with information and one with the welfare of colonial students. There are in addition seventeen principal advisers to the Secretary of State and twenty-seven Advisory Committees. The geographical departments are responsible for constitutional, political and general administrative questions relating to the territories and regions with which they deal. They also have the most important function of securing that Ministers have co-ordinated advice on the affairs and needs of individual territories and regions.

There are very few subjects on which the geographical departments do not work in close consultation either with one or more of the functional departments or with the advisers. The Ministers when they take decisions are usually advised not simply by

[1] Lord Winster, (Baron, formerly R T H Fletcher), formerly gov of Cyprus, 1946–1949.

[2] Viscount Hall, (formerly G H Hall, S of S for colonies, 1945–1946), first lord of the Admiralty, 1946–1951, and deputy leader of the House of Lords, 1947–1951.

one of the geographical departments or one of the subject departments, but by both working together. It is obvious that if the departments dealing with Africa were separated from the subject departments the advice which the Africa Office could give a Secretary of State for African Affairs on all the technical and specialist subjects now dealt with by functional departments and advisers would be a great deal less authoritative. In all these vitally important subjects some of the benefit of the present experience, knowledge and contacts build [sic] up by the subject departments would be lost.

It may be argued that this difficulty could be met either by having two sets of subject departments and advisers or by sharing them between the Africa Office and the office dealing with the rest of the Colonial Empire. Neither solution would be at all satisfactory. With two sets of subject departments and two lots of advisers it would not be possible to accumulate the same experience or to have officers and advisers of the same standing. Nor would it be possible to secure co-ordination between the two offices dealing with different parts of the Colonial Empire. This would cause particular difficulties in dealing with international bodies, but also in the fields of economic policy, social services and defence.

The alternative arrangement of sharing the functional departments between the divided offices would be almost equally undesirable and would in fact be unworkable. It might be possible to do this in the case of the advisers and advisory committees. But the Economic Departments, Social Service Departments, International Relations Departments, Colonial Service Departments and Defence Department are integral parts of the Colonial Office in continuous daily contact with Ministers and with the geographical departments. If the Colonial Office were divided into two parts, one dealing with Africa and one with the rest of the Colonial Empire, and if the subject departments were common to both, it would follow that they would be a part of neither in the full sense and this intimate daily contact would to some extent be broken. Co-ordination could not possibly be so close as it is at present and the machinery would become much more cumbersome.

(2) Originally the responsibilities of Secretaries of State were divided up on a geographical basis; but for many years now they have been divided on a functional basis. Relations with foreign countries are the responsibility of the Foreign Office; the Commonwealth Relations Office conducts our relations with self-governing countries within the Commonwealth; the Colonial Office deals with the dependent territories of the Colonial Empire. The only exceptions to this rule are the High Commission Territories in South Africa which for special reasons of which Noble Lords are aware, fall within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

If this general plan were completely altered and as a general rule responsibilities were again divided up geographically instead of functionally, then there would at any rate be a logical basis for the appointment of a Secretary of State for Africa; but in that case he would have to deal not only with the colonial territories in Africa but also with our relations with other territories. It is not suggested that this would be a good arrangement, but it would be logical. But that is not what Lord Winster is proposing. He proposes a Secretary of State for the Colonial Territories in Africa. Such an arrangement would be open to the objections already mentioned, without even the advantage of bringing all African questions affecting His Majesty's Government within the purview of one Ministry.

an honourable life and the policy which it was used to describe has conferred immense benefits on the African territories. In the eyes of some the term has acquired a mystical value. Others, West African nationalists among them, dislike the term and what they think it stands for. Indirect rule was first applied by Lord Lugard under conditions which existed in a particular area at a particular time. The system was subsequently widely extended—some of us thought too widely and to areas for which it was unsuitable. Even in the area in which it was first introduced by Lord Lugard conditions have changed in the last half century and the author of indirect rule would, I am certain, if he were still alive be the first to agree that a new emphasis is required. The emphasis is on those three words which I have quoted, efficient, representative and local. No system can be useful unless it is efficient enough to run the services which the people now require. No system can endure unless it is adequately representative of the people. And local government will not be local government unless it is local and close to the people. Efficiency and a representative character are therefore what everybody concerned with local government in Africa must aim at; in many places it must be admitted that there is a very long way to go indeed before a clean bill of health can be given in either of these fields. The term local has special importance in areas like Northern Nigeria, Buganda or Barotseland, where very large native states or native administrations exist, often with extremely rudimentary systems of local government below them. Here indirect rule has not led to the development of a local government system as we understand it. It is ironical that in some other areas where tribal authority has broken down local government is now more advanced than in these areas of superior traditional organisation. These are problems of the greatest interest which I hope that you will discuss fully during your conference.

An effective system of local government is vital to our whole policy in Africa. Neither economic development, social development nor political development can come to effective fruition without it. And I think it is significant that the new Gold Coast Government is now vigorously pressing forward with local government reform as one of its most urgent and important legislative and administrative tasks. Without an efficient local government system educational progress at the primary level is bound to be impeded, since I can see little hope of universal primary education, for which there is a widespread demand among Africans, until a large part of the finance can be found through local government bodies rather than from central revenues. Only where local government flourishes and is vigorous will this large-scale local finance be forthcoming. Equally in economic development efficient and representative local government is vital. The greatest economic problem of Africa at the present time in my judgment is the prevention of soil deterioration and erosion, the proper use of the land and the more efficient organisation of farming. Much good is done in these fields by the Agricultural Departments and the other departments working in co-operation with them. But agricultural, veterinary and forestry officers who have long experience of the field would, I am sure, be the first to admit that by direct orders and direct action they can achieve much, no doubt, but only up to a certain point. Only where there is efficient local government acceptable to the people will it be possible to enforce that degree of community-mindedness and self-discipline among the farmers which is necessary for the proper use of the land and the maintenance of soil fertility.

In political matters the need for a properly developed system of local government

is even more directly evident. Local government is in the first place the field of activity to which Africans can first look for political training. Equally important, local government can protect a country against unbalanced political development. As we have found in our long experience in this country, strong local government has been the safeguard against the exercise of excessive and even dictatorial power at the centre. Local government is indeed part of the essence of the British tradition of life. The organisation of essential activities and the control of essential services on a local basis by the people of a community themselves is one of the strengths of the British system, as it can be of African systems also. Political progress at the centre in colonial territories cannot be organised according to a rigid timetable. It must proceed with the political growth of the people. There is therefore all the more reason that the building up of effective and representative local government institutions should be rapidly pushed forward. I know that in Africa things must necessarily move more slowly than some of us would wish. But just as there is a danger of going too fast, so there is a danger of going too slowly and I do urge upon you all that if the rural and more remote areas of Africa are to play their full part in the future and are to have their interests safeguarded in the progress of the African territories, early action must be taken to develop their local institutions.

In my public speeches I have emphasised the importance of partnership in African affairs. I mean by this both partnership between colonial territories and this country and partnership between the different sections of the community in the territories themselves. In the field of local government there is an immense task of partnership in front of us. In West Africa this takes the form of partnership between local people striving to build up local institutions and British officers and others bringing to West Africa the experience of this country and the outside world. In local government the West African territories are more and more making use of the long experience of this country both through the advice of experts sent out from this country or of Colonial Service officers trained in the theory of United Kingdom local government, or through the training of West Africans by local government bodies in this country. In East and Central Africa this form of partnership in local government also exists. But there is another form of partnership—partnership between the different communities inhabiting the East and Central African territories. In municipal local government considerable progress has been made in some places in partnership between the communities. But very much remains to be done, particularly in the rural areas, and I hope that this conference will give consideration to the way in which the policy of partnership can be forwarded in local government in East and Central Africa. As I said in the House of Commons at the end of last year, "We hope that all persons concerned with the future of these territories will work together towards a goal of true partnership on which, and on which alone, the future prosperity and happiness of all in East Africa must depend."

One of the subjects which you will be discussing is the relationship between local government and community development. These are really two aspects of the same subject. Local government is the building up of institutions through which the people can manage their own affairs and provide the services they need. Community development is the betterment of local conditions through community effort. Many excellent community development schemes are now going forward in different parts of Africa under the guidance or leadership of Government officers. The methods used must differ widely from place to place, but whatever the methods I do not think that

broadly similar suggestions have been made from time to time, [illegible] the moment recall one that was precisely so. For instance, in the debate on the Kinghorn Motion last week (4527/1/51) Mr. Cooper proposed a "debating chamber" limited to colonial affairs and largely, if not wholly, made up of colonial representatives. You[1] did not favour that idea. A somewhat similar, but by no means identical, proposal was made by the Smaller Colonial Territories Committee,[2] but you (see minute of the 26th of March last on 14814/21/E/50) were not impressed with Professor Harlow's[3] reasoning. The scheme which comes closest to that advocated by Lord Winster is, I think, a proposal which Lord Samuel,[4] after putting it to the then Prime Minister, discussed with Colonel Oliver Stanley[5] in 1945. His idea was that there should be a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, but not, as I gathered at the time, necessarily to include any colonial representatives. You may like in this connection to glance at the minute (No. 6 on 9091/44) which Colonel Oliver Stanley then drafted personally and sent to Mr. Winston Churchill; also at the record (No. 17 on the same file) of the discussion which he subsequently had with Lord Samuel and other members of the House of Lords and members of the House of Commons. You will see that Colonel Stanley firmly opposed the idea of the appointment of a Joint Standing Committee. At the time I personally was slightly favourable to some of the ideas underlying Lord Samuel's suggestion—though I felt that his scheme would need substantial modification as shown in my memorandum at No. 5 on 9091/44. But I am clear that constitutional change in these last six years makes it nearly impossible now to adopt even my modified plan. I cannot think of any arrangement which would avoid some degree of infringement on the new and fairly wide responsibilities of some Colonial Legislatures and any such infringement could of course give the impression, and would be likely to arouse the suspicion, that this new central body in London was intended to retard the development of constitutional advance towards self-government and to restore some of the lost authority of Westminster and Whitehall.

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[1] ie Mr Griffiths.

[2] See part 4 of this volume, 410.

[3] Professor V T Harlow, Beit professor of the history of the British Commonwealth and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, 1948–1961.

[4] Liberal leader in the House of Lords, 1944–1945.

[5] S of S for the colonies, 1942–1945.

Sir T Lloyd and Mr Creech Jones on procedure and preparation

Secretary of State

I have now discussed with Sir T. Lloyd, Mr. Caine, Mr. Seel, Mr. Poynton, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Cohen the question of holding a conference in London of non-official representatives of Colonial Territories and, as a result, I should like to submit the following recommendations to you:—

(1) We feel that any such conference should be on a regional basis rather than covering the whole Colonial Empire. Conditions vary so widely between different areas that it is only by proceeding on a regional basis that we can hope to carry the discussions beyond generalities. I therefore confine the recommendations below to the African territories. Of the other main regions, (a) the Caribbean will be having a separate Conference on Federation, (b) the Pacific will be the subject of a Conference at Canberra to establish a Regional Commission analogous to that existing in the Caribbean and (c) the South East Asian territories are at present too heavily pre-occupied in internal reconstruction.

(2) We feel that both the internal situation in the African territories themselves

and the state of international opinion demand a new approach to policy in Africa, without prejudice, of course, to the needs of other Colonial territories. The aim of any conference which is held should therefore be to decide on new principles of policy. Quite apart from the practical effects, this would greatly strengthen the value of the conference from the political and public relations points of view. Two consequences follow from this:—

(a) The conference should consist not only of non-officials but also of Governors and/or senior officials from the Territories. Neither non-officials nor Governors or officials could speak with full authority on behalf of their Territories without the presence of the others.

(b) We should have to be in a position to present the conference with concrete proposals which would have to be carefully worked out in the Colonial Office in advance, in consultation with other departments concerned, e.g. the Treasury, and discussed with Governors.

(3) It appears therefore that the sequence should be as follows: *first*, the working out of proposals in the Colonial Office; *secondly* a preliminary conference with the African Governors and senior officials, and *thirdly* the full conference of non-official representatives and Governors or senior officials from the African Territories.

(4) The next question is the time-table, and this is affected by the fact that the three main West African Governors and the two Central African Governors may be retiring during the next twelve months. Since the conference of Governors will be largely, although not necessarily wholly, in preparation for the subsequent conference with official and non-official representatives, it seems to us necessary that, where there is to be a change of Governors, the preliminary conference should be attended by the Governors designate rather than the retiring Governors. The proposals put forward at the preliminary conference will have to be taken to the Territories by the Governors and discussed with their official and non-official advisers in preparation for the main conference, and the preliminary conference would clearly lose a great deal of its value if some of the principal people attending it were not going back to the Territories at all.

(5) If this is accepted, we do not think that the preliminary conference can be held until November 1947. Even so it would be necessary to make sure that the new Governors were selected during the summer so that arrangements could then be made for them to attend a conference in London towards the end of the year. In cases where there was no change of Governor the existing Governors could be brought over in November.

(6) On this basis we would recommend that the main conference, which would be attended by non-officials as well as Governors, should be held at a suitable date in 1948. An announcement could be made during the late summer of this year, if possible before the next meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, of the intention to hold the conference in 1948 and of the preparatory conference with Governors at the end of this year.

(7) This time-table would make it much easier for the office to handle the two conferences effectively. The staff is so short at present in the departments concerned that it would be most difficult for adequate preparations to be made if both conferences were to be held this year, and we regard it as vital to the success of the two conferences that the ground should be fully prepared.

(8) If you approve these proposals it will be necessary to set up a high level Office committee immediately to draw up recommendations for you to consider and for subsequent discussion with Governors, in preparation for the full conference next year. I do not think that this committee should have any formal terms of reference, but broadly its function should be to consider the possibility of more rapid political, economic and social development in the African territories. This is not the place to discuss the problems involved, but it is clear from our discussions that the following points in particular will have to be considered; in the political sphere how to give the unofficial members of Legislatures a closer responsibility for the executive work of Government and, on the other hand how to develop more effective machinery for African local Government; in the economic sphere how to re-organise the economy of the Territories so as to develop their natural resources more rapidly; in the social sphere whether our educational and medical programmes are adequate and effective; and as regards the machinery of Government, how to achieve a much greater degree of devolution of responsibility on to the African Governments and Legislatures. Broadly we believe that a common policy in these matters is required both in East and West Africa, although the presence of immigrant communities in East Africa may make a somewhat different approach to the political problem necessary. At any rate we think it important that the conferences both of Governors and of unofficials and Governors should be on an African basis rather than be held separately for East and West Africa.[1]

I.T.
18.1.47

I have now read this report[2] and the first five Appendices and have glanced through the remainder, a copy of which I have for further study. I hope that you will feel, as I do, that Mr. Caine and his colleagues on the Committee are to be complimented upon the care and thought which they have given to the preparation of these memoranda and on the originality of some of their proposals. The memoranda cover practically all the points to which, by its directive, the Committee was asked to pay special attention; where there are gaps the preparation of other memoranda to fill them is in hand. The documents contain plenty of material of a kind which will certainly provoke and stimulate discussion at the Governors' Conference.[3]

2. The time has now come, I suggest, for the Secretary of State to tell all African Governors by personal letter of his intention to hold this Conference and the wider one next year.[4] The letter should state the approximate date (late October or early November) for the first Conference and give the headings in the proposed agenda (paragraph 8 of the Report) if the Secretary of State approves it. Governors should be told of the items for which special papers are being prepared and that copies of these will be sent out to them well in advance. They should also be asked whether they have items to suggest for the agenda.[5]

3. The next point for decision is whether the Secretary of State accepts the papers

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[1] Creech Jones minuted underneath: 'I agree with these recommendations. Please go ahead'.
[2] See 59. [3] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'I agree. Excellent piece of work'.
[4] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'Yes. I agree'.
[5] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'Governors may themselves have problems to raise in such a Conference & should be encouraged to do so & if they like submit a paper of their own'.

so far prepared as suitable for their purpose subject of course to interdepartmental consultations which, as suggested in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the report, will be necessary in some cases.[6] The only item arising on the papers which in my view need forthwith be taken up at the ministerial level is the idea, mentioned by Mr. Caine, of creating in London some central body to include political representatives of both the U.K. and some Colonies. As the sole purpose at present is that of confidential discussion with Governors, I doubt whether Cabinet authority need be sought, and I suggest that it should be sufficient to get the Prime Minister's blessing for that discussion. In seeking it copies of the last four paragraphs of Appendix II could be sent to Mr. Attlee.[7]

4. I see no reason why all the other points listed in paragraph 16 of the report should not be accepted as a *basis of discussion* with Governors.[8] The proposed stages of political evolution (paragraph 7 of Appendix III) and the policy of devolution of control (paragraphs 13–17 and 20–28 of Appendix III) are, to my mind, entirely acceptable; in fact in some respects (particularly as regards petitions) I would like to see still further devolution. The proposals for the financing of, and giving of advice to, Polytechnics (paragraphs 18–20 of Appendix VIII) and for an increased provisional allocation from C.D. & W. reserves to higher education are in my view more contentious, and if there are any doubts over immediately increased commitments of this kind it would be well to make that clear when the time comes to send this particular paper to Governors.[9]

5. Many proposals in the paper—for example the ideas for political evolution, for devolution of control (including the rewriting of the Colonial Regulations) and for improving the machinery affecting the Colonial Service—are of considerable interest to Governors outside Africa. It would be a waste of time and effort to consult all non-African Governors, but I should like to be authorised,[10] when the papers are finalised and go out to African Governors, to send a selection of them to a number of other Governors and to ask each of them, if he has any comments which would be useful at the Conference, to let me have them before it takes place. The Governors I have in mind are Sir H. Moore, Sir J. Huggins, Sir A. Grantham, Sir E. Gent and Sir J. Shaw. Between them they cover most of the more important non-African places and their combined experience is wide and varied.[11]

6. Finally, on a point of detail, it would be helpful if, when each memorandum reaches final form, a summary of the questions put forward in each for discussion could be appended to the memorandum as has already been done for Appendix IV.

T.I.K.L.
28.5.47

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[6] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'Yes as suitable basis for discussion'.

[7] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'I would prefer an open [?] discussion on this point. I have doubts about the value of [? or] validity of the idea but it should be debated with the Governors. There is no need to refer to Cabinet or Mr Attlee'.

[8] Emphasis in original.

[9] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'None of these papers represents an official view about anything & each should be offered as a contribution to the discussion of the subject. I think Governors will appreciate that we are issuing ideas on subjects on which we want their reflections'.

[10] Creech Jones minuted here in the margin: 'Yes'.

[11] These were (in order) governors of Ceylon (1944–1949), Jamaica (1943–1951), Fiji (1945–1947), Malaya (1946–1948), and Trinidad (1947–1950).

The Committee have done a fine job of work in a relatively short time, and the forthcoming Conferences may mark a turning point in colonial thought.

I agree with the valuable procedure suggested by Sir T. Lloyd.

On specific points, the only one on which I now wish to say anything is on the great issue of devolution or assimilation. The manner in which the British Empire has stood the shock of the post-war changes justifies the British philosophy, I think, as against the French. Yet there may be small territories, incapable by themselves of independence, and also essential to imperial strategy, such as Gibraltar, whose true destiny may be incorporation in the United Kingdom. The number of Members they would send would not upset the balance. They would have as much influence there as the member for Keighley[12] on foreign policy, defence and finance; and local government would give them self-government in the matters that really touch them.

I.T.
30.5.47

[12] ie, Mr Thomas himself, Labour MP for Keighley, W Yorks, since 1942.

59 CO 847/36/1, no 9 — 22 May 1947

'Report of the [CO Agenda] Committee on the Conference of African Governors' (chairman: S Caine). *Appendixes* I–VIII

[In accordance with Mr Thomas's directive (58), an office Agenda Committee was set up to consider the possibilities of more rapid political, economic and social development in Africa, and to prepare papers for the Conference of African Governors to discuss. Papers were prepared and then discussed at nineteen meetings between 6 Feb and 30 Apr 1947. The report of this Committee was signed on 22 May 1947. It contained appendixes of eight papers: (i) directive, (ii) general political development of colonial territories, (iii) constitutional development in Africa, (iv) local government in Africa, (v) the Colonial Service, (vi) economic development of agricultural production; (vii) marketing policy for colonial export products, (viii) education policy in Africa. The author of (ii) was Caine (and it was revised as 'Colonies in the Commonwealth'); (iii) has always been attributed to Cohen (though his name does not actually appear on any draft—in fact it was by Cohen and K E Robinson); (vii) was by E Melville[1], (viii) by Cohen, W E F Ward[2] and Prof William Adams[3]; (vi) was almost certainly drafted by Caine, and (v) by Jeffries. As to (iv) on local government, this was clearly within Cohen's field of responsibility.]

I. *Preliminary*

The Committee was appointed by the Secretary of State in February 1947, with the following membership:— Mr. S. Caine, C.M.G (Chairman), Sir Charles Jeffries K.C.M.G., O.B.E., Mr. A.B. Cohen, O.B.E., Mr. L.N. Helsby,[4] Mr. K.E. Robinson, Mr. P. Rogers,[5] Mr. J.B. Williams,[6] Mr. G.B. Cartland (Secretary).

[1] CO assistant secretary, 1946, head of Production and Marketing Dept 'A', Agriculture.

[2] CO deputy educational adviser.

[3] Prof W G S Adams, warden of All Souls College, Oxford, 1933–1945.

[4] (Sir) Laurence Helsby, assistant secretary to Treasury, 1946–1947; personal private secretary to PM, 1947–1950; formerly lecturer in economics, university of Durham, 1931–1945; subsequently joint permanent secretary to the Treasury and head of the home civil service, 1963–1968; Baron cr 1968.

[5] CO assistant secretary (establishment officer), 1946.

[6] CO assistant secretary from 1943, head of Finance Dept, 1946.

2. The Committee was directed to formulate detailed proposals as to the matters to be placed on the agenda for the Governors' Conference and subsequently on that of the 1948 Conference. The full text of the Directive to the Committee is contained in Appendix I. In the Directive the Committee is asked to pay particular but not exclusive attention to the following points:—

(a) the possibility of giving unofficial members of Legislative Council a closer association with the executive work of Government;
(b) means of developing more effective machinery for African local government;
(c) means of securing the more efficient organisation of the economy of the territories, so as to enable their natural resources to be developed more rapidly;
(d) means of securing the more rapid and effective development of the social services, with special reference to education and medical services;
(e) means of improving the machinery of Government, and in particular of securing a greater degree of devolution of responsibility to the Governments and Legislative Councils.

3. The Committee has placed a broad interpretation on its terms of reference and has in some cases gone beyond matter[s] specifically mentioned. It has, however, confined itself to policy connected with development in the political economic and social fields and the omission of certain subjects does not imply that the Committee does not consider them sufficiently important for inclusion but merely that it is not necessary to consider them in this context.

4. As the Committee's survey has covered a wide range of subjects they think it may be helpful to state here certain general ideas which have underlain their work.

5. The Committee considered it essential in dealing with the various matters suggested for discussion at the Conference to give some consideration to the fundamental problems underlying colonial policy. They have, therefore, devoted a good deal of attention to an examination of these underlying problems and of the future policies required to meet them. At the same time the Committee wish to make it clear that the various suggestions which they have made in the papers are by no means intended as a fixed blue print of future policy but merely as suggestions for future lines of policy on which the views of the Conferences will be obtained.

6. In the general political field, the Committee felt that three factors which to some extent operate in different directions must be taken into account and as far as possible harmonised. The first is the increasing insistence of the peoples of most of the Colonies, supported indeed by H.M.G.'s own policy, that they be given greater control over their own governments; the second, the increasing range and complexity of the matters in which the State has to take positive action; the third, the increasing extent to which actions of all Governments, including Colonial Governments, are subject to international agreements. To harmonise these factors is by no means easy and the Committee feel that if such harmony is to be achieved, it will be necessary for H.M.G. to devolve an increasing share of authority to Colonial Governments themselves to stimulate the growth of effective organs of government for both central and local purposes. The exercise of H.M.G.'s influence in broad matters of policy will, however, certainly continue to be necessary, but the Committee feel that such influence should in future be exercised as far as possible through consultation and advice rather than formal control.

7. In their surveys of other fields than the political and administrative, for

example, the development of economic production and of the social services, the Committee have taken it for granted that the main objective must be the fullest possible expansion of such production and services and have devoted their attention to examination of the means by which such expansion is best likely to be achieved.

II. *Agenda*

8. The Committee recommends the following agenda for the Governors' Conference:—

Political and Administrative

(1) General political development and the evolution in the character and form of the African Colonial Governments. [Appendix II and Appendix III].
(2) Development in the relationship of the African Governments to H.M.G. with particular reference to devolution and the relaxation of formal controls by the Secretary of State. [Appendix II and Appendix III].
(3) Local Government. [Appendix IV].
(4) Public Relations.
(5) The Colonial Service. [Appendix V and Appendix III].
(6) International organisations and the Colonial Territories.

Economic

(7) The development of agricultural production. [Appendix VI].
(8) Marketing policy. [Appendix VII].
(9) Cooperation.
(10) Mining policy.
(11) Fisheries.
(12) Industrial development.
(13) Colonial Development Corporations.

Social

(14) Education policy. [Appendix VIII].
(15) Medical and health policy.

The African Representative Conference

(16) Selection of representatives and procedure for the 1948 Conference.
(17) Agenda for the 1948 Conference.
(18) The Colonies in the Commonwealth. [Appendix II].

III. *Papers for the Conference*

9. Papers have been prepared by members of the Committee or by the appropriate Department of the Colonial Office on the following subjects on the agenda and are included in the appendices of the Report.

1. *Political (Appendix II)*

(1) *The Colonies in the Commonwealth*. (Items 1, 2 and 18). This paper draws attention to the influence on the relationship between H.M.G. and the Colonial territories of the two trends in the political development of these territories, namely, the progressive approach to self-government and their increased parti-

cipation in international organisations. The paper then deals tentatively with the problem of providing machinery for consultation between the territories and H.M.G. on the broad lines of policy and the need to substitute the links of consultation for the present weakening links of control. Possible solutions are discussed such as overseas representation in Parliament or on an Advisory Council in London. A less ambitious solution may lie in periodical representative conferences on a regional basis of the kind planned for Africa during 1948 together with ad hoc or periodical conferences on particular subjects such as the recent Civil Aviation Conference.

(2) *Constitutional development*. (*Appendix III*) (Items 1 and 2 on the agenda). This paper deals in the first place with the problem of evolving the machinery of Government in African territories to meet the administrative need created by increased business and the expanding sphere of Government activity on the one hand and the political need to associate the people of the territory more closely with Government on the other. In the second place the paper deals with the progressive devolution of political and administrative control from the Secretary of State to the African Governments and their Legislatures. A pattern of development in four stages on these lines is suggested and certain specific recommendations made for an early measure of devolution to be granted in the spheres of finance, staff management and petitions.

(3) *Local government*. (*Appendix IV*) (Item 3). African local government is to be discussed at the Summer School in August. The present paper is therefore confined to a brief indication of the problems involved and will require revision in the light of the work of the Summer School. The principal problems raised are:—

(i) the adjustment of the traditional authorities which form the basis of most African local government to the needs of democratic local government;

(ii) the definition of the relationship between local and central government particularly in regard to functions and finances; and

(iii) the need for increased efficiency.

(5) *The Colonial Service*. (*Appendix V*) (Item 5). This paper reviews the position of the Colonial Service in relation to the Constitutional changes suggested in Appendix III of the Report and secondly deals with the selection of men for higher or specialist posts in the Colonial Service. Constitutional development requires a progressive extension of opportunities for local people together with the devolution of responsibility to local governments. The Secretary of State must ensure that key posts are adequately filled and that the interests of officers recruited by him are adequately protected. It is proposed that certain posts should continue to be filled by the Secretary of State but that the remainder of the posts included in the long scales of the Unified Services, should be filled at the discretion of the local government, although in practice the majority of candidates will normally be recruited by the Secretary of State. It is suggested that all servants of colonial governments should be members of His Majesty's Colonial Service which should be divided into branches consisting of officers holding specified qualifications in scheduled posts. It is further suggested that independent Public Service Commissions should be established in each territory to deal with appointments, promotions from grade to grade, discipline and petitions. Improved machinery for dealing with the service is required including high ranking establishment officers, Whitley Councils and Appeals Tribunals.

The paper goes on to discuss the system of reporting on officers and selection for promotion. Improvements suggested include greater care in reporting, an improved form of report, early selection of officers with special ability or aptitude for special experience and testing. The position and control of regional services is also discussed.

Economic (Appendix VI)

(6) *The development of agricultural production.* (Item 7). The paper deals with the improvement of agricultural organisation in relation to the development of increased production. It examines existing organisation and the role to be played by governments. Non-native agriculture requires government assistance in connection with research, the conditions and efficiency of labour and marketing. Native agriculture requires more direct assistance and in some instances it may receive very useful stimulus by working in conjunction with non-native agriculture. The paper deals with three possible lines of development which should be encouraged: the emergence of a class of individual farmers with larger holdings; the growth of co-operation amongst small-holders; and the grouping of cultivators possibly on the basis of a traditional social group in some form of collective farm. These developments may require some modification in the system of land tenure and will almost certainly require some measure of Government stimulus and assistance. The group system of farming may require prior investigation and the organisation of experimental farms. An outline scheme for such an experiment with tentative estimates is included in the appendix to the paper. Stress is laid on the importance of producing an African class of competent managers. Investigation and bold experimentation on all possible lines of development are recommended.

(7) *Marketing policy for colonial export products. (Appendix VII)* (Item 8). This paper states the objects of marketing policy as (1) the securing of a stable level of prices by international cooperation and (2) the improvement of internal organisation to secure improved markets, equalised prices over a period of years and to encourage increased capital investment in primary production. The first objective is generally accepted internationally but how far its application will be successful remains to be seen. Various suggestions have been made for internal policy including Empire preference and guaranteed prices. The limitations of both proposals are fully set out and the alternative of improved organisation of producers in cooperative or collective marketing institutions is put forward. The object of these institutions would be to improve, and reduce the cost of, the transport of the crop; to improve bargaining power; and introduce price stabilisation. Statutory marketing boards run by the industry and assisted by government should be set up covering the whole production and marketing process including monopoly buying and selling, the fixing of producers' prices, and organisation of price stabilisation funds, the financing of research and other improvements.

Social (Appendix VIII)

(8) *An educational policy for Africa.* (Item 14). This paper states that the objects of education policy should be to create the desire and capacity for progress; to produce Africans for the professions and for higher posts in government, business and other services or movements; and to strengthen the cultural bonds with this

country. The need for a new and vigorous drive arises from the inadequacy of present educational services, the pace of political development and the interest of international opinion. As a short term policy special emphasis is required on the higher levels of education and it is recommended that the main weight of the assistance available for education under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act should be directed to the development of higher technical and secondary education including teacher training. It is suggested that primary education should be developed by local people from local government or territorial funds. Secondary and technical education may require United Kingdom assistance in staff and other ways; and the question of financing polytechnics in particular may have to be examined further. Mass education is now regarded as a movement by the people embracing much more than the restricted syllabus of formal education and, although it may require stimulation, it is not regarded as an expensive adjunct of the education programme. The importance of female education is stressed and reference made to cooperation with the missions and the importance of the extension of the use of English.

10. Papers are already available on the following subjects which will provide the basis for discussion of the relevant items.

Economic

(1) *Mining policy*. (Item 10). The inclusion of this item in the agenda is designed to give an opportunity for discussion with the Governors on various aspects of the memorandum on Colonial Mining Policy published as Colonial No. 206.

(2) *Memorandum on the development of manufacturing industry*. (Item 12). A paper was prepared by the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee and circulated to Governors under cover of the Circular Despatch of the 27th February, 1945.

(3) *Cooperation*. (Item 9). The following three papers, which indicate the Secretary of State's policy on cooperation in some detail, have already been sent to Governors and it is considered desirable to provide an opportunity for discussing the subject.

(a) Mr. Campbell's memorandum on cooperation. — Published as C.M.6.
(b) Circular Despatch of the 20th March, 1946. } Published as
Circular Despatch of the 23rd April, 1946. } Colonial 199.
(c) Circular Despatch of the 6th March, 1947.

Since the basic principles of policy have already been fully set out, it is not necessary to prepare a new paper but will be sufficient if attention is drawn to the existing documents.

11. Papers on certain items have not yet been prepared and it is intended that papers on the following subjects should be prepared by the appropriate Departments in consultation with the advisers and where necessary with the appropriate advisory committees.

Political

(1) *International organisations with special reference to colonial participation*. (Item 6). As the policy in regard to Colonial participation in these organisations is at present being studied, the preparation of a paper on this subject should be deferred until the Colonial Office view has clarified.

(2) *Public relations*. (Item 4). A paper is in course of preparation.

Economic

(3) *Colonial Development Corporations*. (Item 13). Proposals on this subject are now under consideration by Ministers and will require Cabinet approval. If these proposals are approved some public announcement will be made before the Conference but there will be many details for discussion with the Governors.

(4) *Fisheries*. (Item 11). The Fisheries Adviser will be asked to prepare a paper on his return to this country.

Social

(5) *Medical and Health*. (Item 15). The Medical Adviser has been away and is now ill but arrangements will be made for a paper to be prepared on this subject.

The African Representative Conference

(6) The selection of representatives for the 1948 African Conference. A paper on this subject is already in course of preparation. (Item 16).

12. A number of subjects may be raised by Governors on which it is recommended that papers or "briefs" should be prepared but not circulated to Governors beforehand. These include Colonial Development and Welfare procedure and the position of recruitment for the Colonial Service.

IV. *Further action*

13. Certain papers require reference for further consideration and advice to the appropriate permanent advisory committees:—

(a) The paper on agricultural production (Item 7—Appendix VI) and the paper on marketing policy (Item 8—Appendix VII) are being referred to the Standing Committee on Agriculture of the Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry and to the Colonial Economic Development Council for advice;

(b) The paper on educational policy (Item 14—Appendix VIII) has been referred to the Advisory Committee on Education and the Inter-University Council for Higher Education with a suggestion that an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives of these two bodies and of this Committee should be set up to examine the paper.

(c) The paper on medical and health policy when prepared should be referred to the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee.

14. Although a representative of the Treasury has sat on the Committee and has advised on matters affecting His Majesty's Government's financial interests, the Treasury position has been reserved. The following papers will, therefore, have to be submitted to the Treasury for concurrence:—

(1) The paper on Constitutional Development (Appendix III) with special reference to the section on the devolution of financial control from the Secretary of State to the local governments.

(2) The brief which the Committee has recommended should be prepared on Colonial Development and Welfare accounting procedure (see paragraph 12 above).

15. Certain other departments will be interested in the following papers in

connection with which they should be consulted before the papers are sent to the Governors.

(1) The paper on Marketing Policy (Appendix VII) should be referred to the Board of Trade, the Ministries of Food and Supply and to the Treasury.
(2) The paper on the Colonies in the Commonwealth (Appendix II) should be referred to the Foreign and Dominions Offices.
(3) The paper on International Organisation when prepared should be referred to the Foreign Office when prepared [sic].

16. Apart from the general approval of the papers submitted with this Report, the following specific issues of policy will require a decision by the Secretary of State before the Conference:—

(1) Approval to discuss the question of colonial political representation on some suitable central body in London (Appendix II).
(2) The stages of political evolution set out in paragraph 7 of the paper on constitutional development (Appendix III).
(3) The policy of devolution of control from the Secretary of State to Colonial Governments recommended in paragraphs 13–17 of Appendix III; and particular approval of the degree of devolution recommended in respect of finance (paragraphs 20–22), staff management (paragraphs 23–24) and petitions (paragraphs 25–28).
(4) A decision on the question of financing of Polytechnics (Appendix VIII paragraphs 18–19). The question is whether in the case of certain Colonies which may prove unable to meet the capital expenditure from their own resources or from the local or regional allocation of Colonial Development and Welfare monies, the Secretary of State will be willing to agree to assist them from the central Colonial Development and Welfare reserves; and whether in exceptional cases assistance from this source might be made available for recurrent expenditure.
(5) The appointment of a Committee to provide the advice and assistance needed from this country by the new Polytechnics (Appendix VIII paragraph 20).
(6) A decision is required as to whether a further sum may be provisionally earmarked for allocation to Higher Education when required from Colonial Development and Welfare reserve. A total sum of £4,500,000 has so far been allocated to higher education in all colonies whereas it is estimated that between £6,000,000 and £7,000,000 will be required for present plans. Of this sum £3,000,000 will be required in Africa. The money is not required yet but whether or not it will be available when required will determine the scope of present plans and an early decision is necessary.

17. We owe a very real debt of gratitude to Mr. Cartland for his excellent work as Secretary of the Committee. His assistance in the drafting and re-drafting of minutes and memoranda, to say nothing of the mechanical arrangements for rapid circulation of papers, has been invaluable.

[Sgd] S. Caine (*chairman*)

Appendix I to 59: Directive to Committee

(1) In view of the large body of opinion in this country, in Africa and internationally which holds that more rapid political, economic and social development is required in the African Territories, the Secretary of State has decided to hold in London during 1948 a Conference of official and non-official representatives from these Territories to discuss the problems involved. The Secretary of State has also decided that, in preparation for this Conference, there should be a Conference of Governors and Governors-designate of the African Territories in November, 1947, also in London.

(2) The Secretary of State has set up a Colonial Office Committee to formulate detailed proposals as to the matters to be placed on the Agenda of the Governors' Conference and subsequently on that of the 1948 Conference insofar as the discussions with the Governors indicate that this would be appropriate; to advise on the preparation of particular papers to be placed before the Conferences; and, where appropriate, to submit draft recommendations on the issues to be raised.

(3) While the Colonial Office Committee will be primarily concerned with the problems of African development in framing its recommendations it will have to take into account the possible application of these in relation to Territories outside Africa.

(4) In formulating its recommendations, the Committee is asked to pay particular attention to the following points:

(a) The possibility of giving unofficial members of Legislative Councils a closer association with the executive work of Government;

(b) Means of developing more effective machinery for African local government;

(c) Means of securing the more efficient organisation of the economy of the Territories, so as to enable their natural resources to be developed more rapidly;

(d) Means of securing the more rapid and effective development of the social services, with special reference to education and medical services;

(e) Means of improving the machinery of government, and in particular of securing a greater degree of devolution of responsibility to the Governments and Legislative Councils.

This list of subjects is not intended to be exclusive.

(5) The membership of the Committee will be as follows:—

Mr. S. Caine (Chairman)
Mr. A.B. Cohen
Mr. L.N. Helsby (Treasury)
Mr. K.E. Robinson
Mr. P. Rogers
Mr. J.B. Williams
Mr. G.B. Cartland (Secretary)

(6) Until it is possible to announce the decisions mentioned in paragraph (1), the contents of this directive should be regarded as confidential.

Appendix II to 59: General political development of colonial territories

Two important trends are powerfully influencing the future form of government of

our Colonial territories, that is, the tendency towards increased local self-government and the tendency towards increased participation in international organisations and limitation of local governmental powers involved by adherence to international agreements. These two tendencies are in some respects opposed to each other, but in others they stimulate and supplement each other. They are not irreconcilable but their reconciliation requires a great change in the relationship which has existed in the past between His Majesty's Government and Colonial governments.

2. On the one hand it is certain that there will be a rapid development of local self-government in all the principal Colonial territories. Public declarations and actions by members of all political parties in the United Kingdom, coupled with the example of the more advanced countries and the criticisms of international public opinion, have set in motion aspirations of virtually irresistible force. The advance in the war years has been probably greater than most people have realised, with the constitutional changes introduced in Ceylon, Jamaica, Nigeria, Gold Coast, etc. The pace of change is still to some extent under control, but the direction can hardly be altered, and we must assume that perhaps within a generation many of the principal territories of the Colonial Empire will have attained or be within sight of the goal of full responsibility for local affairs.

3. This development holds two important internal consequences. First "government" in the Colonies must cease to appear to Colonial peoples as something imposed from outside, and must be thought of as something stemming out of the Colonial peoples themselves. It must derive its authority not from the Secretary of State but from the Colonial legislature as the organ of Colonial peoples. The Colonial resident must look on it as "his" government. Secondly, there will go with the purely constitutional development an equally rapid increase in the participation of local colonial residents not merely in political life through the local legislatures, but in the machine of government, that is, in Africa particularly, government services will be increasingly Africanised.

4. These tendencies oblige us to look, in the sphere of political relationship between the United Kingdom and the Colonies to the substitution of a relationship of friendly association for that of benevolent domination which has been the keynote of the last generation; and in the administrative sphere to the substitution of counsel for control. It is a substitution of something which will eventually approach the relationship with Dominions proper. Some of the larger Colonial territories may look forward to some day attaining full Dominion status but the small size of many of the Colonies, their comparative poverty and their lack of racial and social homogeneity make it unlikely that a solution can be found in converting all Colonial territories singly or in groups into Dominions. It is almost certain that other techniques of association of analogous but not identical kind will have to be developed also.

5. On the other side there is the growing tendency to international association in the practical management of the affairs of all countries. This is partly a product of technical developments which require a greater integration of power and render it ever less possible for very small units such as those constituted by our smaller Colonies to exercise the full sovereignty of a nation as hitherto conceived. It is also a reflection of the growing international consciousness of the world and of the groping towards an effective world government which the various United Nations and other world organisations constitute.

6. These international developments require both the acceptance by Colonies of obligations, e.g. in respect of air communications, labour and trade policy, and their representation at international gatherings concerned not only with the devising and revision of formal obligations of that kind but also with less formal systems of international co-operation, exchange of information and opinions, etc., such as are found in F.A.O. or U.N.E.S.C.O. The fact that it is His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom which is the formal participant in such international organisations is a very serious complication in the handing over of effective power to local Colonial governments, since it is always necessary until the stage has been reached at which the territories concerned can like the Dominions, become independent members of international organisations, for His Majesty's Government to be in a position to secure that effect is given to international obligations. The reconciliation of local self-government with these international obligations is being sought in practice by the increasing association of representatives from the Colonies themselves at international gatherings where they appear under the wing of His Majesty's Government. By their participation in the discussions such representatives can assure both that the special requirements of the Colonies are taken into account, and that something of the international atmosphere and the need for complying with international requirements is conveyed to the colonies themselves.

7. As already indicated the net result of these developments is a redistribution of power. In effect the power which hitherto rested predominantly in His Majesty's Government is being transferred partly to Colonial governments and legislatures, and partly being subjected in its exercise to the control or supervision, in varying degrees of formality, of international authorities. That does not mean that all power over Colonial territories will be lost to His Majesty's Government. Although there will be an increasing relaxation of the powers of control exercised by the Secretary of State over colonial administrations it will continue to be possible for him to influence the main line of policy and, provided the right new techniques are developed, the extent of that influence may remain very considerable. The future role of the Secretary of State and the Colonial Office will be more and more that of the leader of the group of free associates rather than that of the commander of a band of subordinates.

8. It will be an essential part of these new developments that the colonial resident should come to regard the government of the Colony as his government, not as the instrument of an external power; but he must not therefore come to think that government can behave with complete disregard of everything outside its own territory. He must also learn to regard it as a unit in a wider synthesis. It is especially important that the development of these sentiments does not completely destroy any sense of relationship and loyalty to the British Government. It is unlikely that that sense can be preserved without the development of some kind of direct link between Colonial peoples and His Majesty's Government, which will ensure that what we gain in the friendliness of association is not lost in the closeness [? looseness] of it.

9. Some of the practical problems which are raised by these prospective developments are:—

(1) how should the administrative machinery of Colonial Governments, both central and local, be adapted to provide for the transition to responsible government?

(2) what changes are required and by what stages in the control exercised by the Secretary of State over details of administration?
(3) what changes are required in the organisation of the Colonial Service?
(4) what arrangements should be made for Colonial representation on international bodies?
(5) is it practicable to devise arrangements for the closer association of Colonial peoples in the formulation of the broad lines of policy?

10. Most of these questions are discussed in some detail in separate papers. The last is a matter on which only tentative suggestions can at present be made, although it is in some sense the crucial one for the long term future of the Colonial Empire as a political organisation. Unless machinery can be devised which will substitute links of consultation for the present links of control there is very real danger of the ultimate dissolution of the Colonial part of the British Commonwealth.

11. The French have always leaned towards the solution of directly associating Colonial peoples in the Central Legislature itself. Apart from Algeria which is a part of metropolitan France administered by the Minister of the Interior, the "Vieux Colonies" (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion and Senegal), have for a long time sent deputies to the French Chamber elected by the French citizens of those territories. This technique accompanied by a very much less restrictive franchise has now been extended to Madagascar, Tropical Africa and Indo-China as well as to Tunisia and Morocco. The present French Constitution provides that the National Assembly shall include 30 Deputies from Algeria and 44 from the overseas territories. The second Chamber (Council of the Republic) also will include 51 members elected by the local assemblies in overseas territories in addition to 14 elected by the Algerian local councils. In addition the Constitution makes provision for the creation of two further advisory bodies on Colonial affairs, the Council of the French Union and the Assembly of the French Union. The Council, whose task is to advise the Government on Colonial policy is composed of representatives of the Government of metropolitan France and of each of the associated states of the Union (the associated states are intended to be those territories formerly under protectorate such as Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco). The Assembly of the French Union, which will be automatically consulted on all legislation affecting the overseas territories is to be composed of 240 members, half from metropolitan France and half elected by overseas departments, the overseas territories and the associated states of the Union. This body has not yet met owing to the necessity for first creating the local assemblies in the overseas territories. Thus, in addition to the inclusion of a considerable number of representatives of the overseas territories in both chambers of the French Parliament two special advisory bodies are created in which an attempt is made to combine metropolitan and overseas interest.

12. The American, Dutch and Belgian precedents offered us little guidance. The French method of direct Colonial representation in the central machinery of Government deserves much greater study. Any system of direct Colonial representation in the Parliament of Westminster would be a constitutional revolution but is not therefore wholly impracticable. A possible solution, for instance, might lie in some system of Colonial representation in the House of Lords. The disadvantages of such an arrangement are however very considerable: if the numbers of colonial deputies are proportionate to the size of the electorate, they would, of course, exceed the

number of metropolitan members. If they are not, the combination in one Assembly of something like the Federal principle in relation to the colonies and the ordinary representative principle in relation to the metropolitan territory is illogical and open to the criticism that the colonial members have no real voice, while in fact, as recent French experience suggests, it may well lead to a state of affairs in which the "colonial members" exercise a decisive voice in purely U.K. affairs like the Irish members in the late 19th century. The possibility of creating a special body, composed of representatives of the legislatures of the U.K. on the one hand, and of the colonies on the other, preferably in equal numbers, is more attractive. It is frequently urged that, in spite of the progress already made in many territories in the association of the peoples of the territory with its government, they continue to feel that they have no voice in London, although much effective control of their affairs remains centred there. Even if the more rapid devolution of powers to African governments which is recommended in Appendix III is adopted, this will remain true to some extent and some method of making the people of the territory feel more closely associated with the central authority in London may well be desirable. Any proposals for such a joint body would obviously require most careful and detailed consideration. One point, however, is in our view of the first importance, namely to ensure that any such body did not possess or develop the right to interfere in domestic matters which were properly the concern of the legislatures of the African territories on the one hand, or of the U.K. legislature on the other. A joint body of this kind might be of great value in dealing with matters of joint concern to the U.K. and the colonies, notably, in the sphere of external affairs and defence. It might, in particular, be used as a means of securing satisfactory representation of the U.K. and the colonies in international organisations. Special difficulty would be likely to arise in the case of territories (such as Southern Rhodesia and Ceylon) which possessed complete powers of internal self-government and looked rather to the early achievement of Dominion status or independence than to such a form of association in international affairs. The creation of some kind of full imperial organ, e.g., an Imperial Council in which all the peoples of the Empire and Commonwealth would be represented, would of course raise even greater difficulties, e.g. as to Dominion participation, and it is hardly practical politics to consider it.

13. A less ambitious, but more practical, solution would rely on more informal methods of periodical consultation through Conferences of the type now envisaged, which would afford opportunity for representatives of Colonial peoples both to learn the ideas prevailing in the United Kingdom on broad lines of policy and to express their own views. On that basis the Conference now proposed for 1948, if successful would only be the first of a series of African Conferences, (to be paralleled if necessary by other regional Colonial Conferences). To begin with such conferences would have no kind of formal power. They would be purely consultative; in so far as they made formal recommendations the decision as to their implementations would rest on the one side with His Majesty's Government and on the other with the individual Colonial governments. If, however, the Conferences gave opportunities for the effective voicing of local opinions and the exchange of views with direct representatives of the peoples themselves they might not only provide means of establishing a new direct communication with the central imperial authority, but also come gradually to exercise an effective if informal influence on policy.

14. Alongside such general regional conferences, there might be developed, the

practice of arranging ad hoc—or, if the need develops, periodical conferences on individual subjects. These are particularly valuable on subjects of international concern in which the problem of implementing and adjusting international obligations arises. The Conference on Civil Aviation held this year is an example. Generally, however, and especially where legislative action and financial responsibilities may be entailed for Colonial Governments it will be desirable increasingly in future to associate representatives of the local peoples and legislatures with such gatherings as well as purely technical officers.

15. The forthcoming unofficial African Conference should accordingly be asked to consider not only the desirability of arranging similar conferences periodically, including questions of the frequency of meetings, the provision of a secretariat and the means of selection of representatives, but also the arranging of technical conferences on special subjects. Whether it should also be asked to consider the more ambitious ideas mentioned in paragraph 12 depends upon issues going beyond the scope of the Colonial Office. Clearly ideas of that kind could not properly be ventilated, however tentatively, without a decision by His Majesty's Government as a whole.

Appendix III to 59: Constitutional development in Africa

We are responsible for the political development of some 43,000,000 Africans and of immigrant communities in East and Central Africa consisting of some 60,000 Europeans, 150,000 Indians and 50,000 Arabs. The Africans differ widely in the degree of their political and social progress. Broadly speaking there is little demand yet for self-government among the mass of the rural African population either in West or East Africa, but in West Africa the educated minority and large numbers of people influenced by them through the press and otherwise are asking for more rapid progress towards self-government and this demand will become more insistent as time goes on. In East and Central Africa the European communities are anxious for a greater degree of control over the affairs of their Territories, but realise the difficulties of this in a mixed community, preponderantly African. The non-European communities of these territories would object to any arrangement under which the European unofficials were given a position of domination under any form of internal self-government. In West Africa internal self-government cannot be achieved until territorial unity has become a reality, sufficient numbers of Africans have emerged qualified by their training and character to manage their own affairs on a territorial scale and the political leaders have become representative of and responsible to the people. In East Africa internal self-government can only come when the Africans have developed to a stage at which they can play their full part with the immigrant communities in the government of the territories. On both sides of Africa the development of local government is the key to further progress, since without it real democratic control cannot be secured. This immensely important subject is dealt with in a separate paper.

2. It is clear that in Africa the period before self-government can be granted will be longer than in most other parts of the Colonial Empire. Prophecy as to the length of this period is idle, but it may be said that in the Gold Coast, the territory where Africans are most advanced politically, internal self-government is unlikely to be

achieved in much less than a generation. In the other territories the process is likely to be considerably slower. During this period we shall be working against the background of an international opinion which disapproves of the state of dependence in colonial territories and is prepared if necessary to see efficient government and the ordered development of social and economic services sacrificed to the rapid grant of self-government in whatever form. We cannot expect to be allowed to handle the process of delicate psychological adjustment, which the political progress of dependent peoples demands, without constant criticism and interference from outside opinion.

3. At the same time we shall be faced with constantly increasing internal pressure for self-government on the part of the Africans, and political movements, with very different ideas from our own will certainly make it necessary for the constitutional programmes which we set ourselves to be radically revised from time to time. We must not be deterred by this factor from long-term planning, but the plans which we make must be flexible enough to have some chance of operating successfully not merely for the next five years, but with the adjustments which future circumstances will demand for twenty or thirty years or indeed longer. We must in fact establish a broad framework within which the political development of the African territories can take place with the minimum of friction, the maximum of goodwill for this country and the greatest possible degree of efficiency.

4. The foundations on which self-government will ultimately be built already exist. We have Legislative Councils with increasing local membership; Executive Councils in which unofficials already play a considerable part; an increasing local participation in the higher ranges of the civil service; and the first steps towards the building up of a chain of representation from the people to the Legislative Councils. Out of these elements a framework for political development must be established. We must be able to ensure that the Africans take a constantly increasing share in the executive machinery of government and at the same time that the powers of Legislative Councils are progressively increased, with the executive becoming increasingly responsible to them. This will involve in the first place the building up of Colonial Governments as entities on their own, within which an increasing place can be found for local people and above all for Africans; and in the second place the devolution of authority from the Secretary of State to Colonial Governments and through them to Legislative Councils.

5. The importance of form in the relationship between His Majesty's Government and Colonial Governments cannot be too strongly emphasised. In the process of devolution of authority much progress has already been made in practice, although the powers of control are still retained in full by the Secretary of State. It is sometimes asked why in these circumstances it is necessary to do more than follow past procedure and extend the process of devolution by administrative action as experience requires. The answer is that in the political development of dependent territories the form of the relationship with the metropolitan authorities is as important as the actual substance of power. The Colonial Office at present is believed in most African territories to exercise a far stricter control over Colonial Governments than in fact it does. To the aspiring African politician or the European settler who is impatient in his local patriotism the authority to exercise control is as obnoxious as that control itself. It is not suggested that the time has come when the Secretary of State's authority over the broad policies of the African Governments can

be abrogated; but that authority can be exercised more effectively through consultation on matters of general policy than by detailed formal control over the administrative actions of Colonial Governments. Powers of control should not be retained unless they are required in practice. Only that degree of control which is essential should be kept by the Secretary of State. In all other respects Colonial Governments should become responsible to the Legislative Councils.

6. It is important that, in relinquishing formal control, the Secretary of State should not simply leave power in the hands of an executive machine not effectively responsible to anybody. For this reason it will be necessary for the Secretary of State to retain control over the actions of Colonial Governments so long as and to the extent that they are not responsible to local legislators. There are also matters of external relations, in which the Secretary of State will have to exercise certain powers of control. Obviously it is extremely difficult to draw the line in formal instruments and regulations between those powers which the Secretary of State ought to retain in order to prevent the unchecked exercise of power by the executive organs of Colonial Governments, and those powers which might be regarded, if retained by the Secretary of State, as fettering the exercise of authority in local matters by the local legislature. The point is exemplified in the detailed discussion in the latter paragraphs of this memorandum of the future treatment of petitions, where the conclusion is suggested that the Secretary of State must continue to be willing to receive and consider petitions against the executive acts of Government, except when effective local machinery has been set up to consider appeals against such executive acts. An attempt is made in the latter part of this memorandum to define in detail the extent to which devolution of power by the Secretary of State should take place.

Part II. Evolution of the executive machinery of colonial governments with increasing participation by members of the local communities

Central organisation of governments

7. If Colonial Governments are to be built up as entities of their own this cannot be done on the basis of an executive machine under a Chief Secretary responsible to the Governor for all branches of administration. The emphasis must be on the Government as a corporate body rather than on the Governor personally as in the past, and the machine must be broken up into its component parts. Evolution towards self-government should take place in four stages on the following general lines, although we again wish to emphasise that internal political pressure may radically affect both the pace and the manner of political advance, so that no blue print is possible.

(a) The central organisation of governments should be broken up into a number of branches, each under a Member of the Executive Council, so as to establish the foundation on which a full Cabinet system may ultimately be built. The Chief Secretary or Member should be primus inter pares and should be responsible for a relatively small group of departments and for the co-ordination of general policy. The exact arrangements must of course vary from territory to territory, but in the larger territories there should be a Finance Member, a Law Member, a Member for Economic Development or Natural Resources, a Member for Social Services and perhaps one or more others. In the smaller territories the number of Members would

be less, the essential minimum probably being a Chief Secretary, a Member for Finance and Economics, a Law Member and a Member for Social Services. It is sometimes suggested that under such an arrangement the Governor should cease to be responsible for policy while retaining the functions of King's respresentative. We do not agree that such a change is desirable at this stage of development, and we consider that the Governor should retain final authority for policy within the Territory while delegating executive responsibility to the Members to the maximum degree possible. It is essential that this process of delegation should be made a reality and the Executive Council under the chairmanship of the Governor should more and more be treated as the Government of the Territory responsible for decisions on all major questions rather than, as in the past, as a body purely advisory to the Government. The unofficial Members of the Executive Council not having responsibility for any departments would continue to provide a link between the Council and the Legislature. Each Member would be directly responsible to the Governor for his group of subjects, co-ordination between the Members being maintained by the exchange of information, departmental consultation and discussion in Executive Council. The appointment of a senior officer as Secretary to the Executive Council, on the analogy of the Secretary to the Cabinet in this country, would be essential to the successful working of the system.

(b) In the second stage local people not belonging to the Government service should be brought into the machine as Members of the Executive Council in charge of groups of departments. During this stage such Members would continue to be responsible to the Governor and on assuming office would become temporary officials. The Governor would carry on the process of delegating executive responsibility to Members and it might in due course be laid down, either constitutionally or by custom, that he would accept the majority opinion of the Executive Council on certain specified subjects. The local Members of the Executive Council would progressively increase in numbers, and, since they would be persons commanding the confidence of the Legislative Council, the Executive Council would become increasingly responsible to the Legislature during this period.

(c) In the third stage some of the Members of the Executive Council would become Ministers under a system of Cabinet responsibility. During this stage the Governor would cease to have full responsibility for policy and would rely on the advice of Ministers for those subjects for which they were made responsible. The Governor would in fact be in process of becoming the King's representative as in Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia and the Dominions. The Governor's responsibility could only cease to operate as and when Ministers became fully responsible to the Legislative Council and the people through a system of democratic election whether direct or indirect. This stage can therefore only be reached when elections securing representation for the main body of the people become possible.

(d) During the transition stage not all departments would be controlled by Ministers; some Members would remain responsible to the Governor, but their number would progressively decrease. The fourth stage would be reached when all departments came under the control of Ministers and internal self-government could be granted. It is probable that the fourth stage would follow rapidly on the third.

8. The first step has already been taken in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia where the central machinery of government has broken up by the appointment of a series of Members or Secretaries. The same step is likely to be taken shortly in Tanganyika.

We recommend that it should be laid down that this step should be taken at the earliest possible moment in all other territories. It is urgently required in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The change with its emphasis on the Government rather than the Governor should be signalised by a new system of correspondence between the Colonial Office and Governments. Normally all correspondence should be by official letter between the Under Secretary of State, with the head of the Colonial Office department concerned signing, and the Government of the territory, with the appropriate Member of the Executive Council signing on behalf of that Government. Despatches between the Secretary of State and the Governor would not be ruled out, but should only be used on special occasions.

9. The second step was taken concurrently with the first in Kenya and will also be taken concurrently in Tanganyika. In Northern Rhodesia no unofficials have been appointed as Members of the Executive Council responsible for groups of departments but it has been publicly accepted that they are equally eligible for these posts with officials. No Africans have yet been brought into these positions. It is desirable that the second step should follow as rapidly as possible on the first and, wherever possible, that Africans should be brought in quickly. It is unlikely that this will be practicable in the near future in East and Central Africa, except possibly in Uganda, owing to the shortage of suitably qualified Africans and the necessity for reserving these for the essential work of operating the local government machine. Plans should, however, be made on the assumption that it is the settled policy to appoint Africans to these posts at the earliest possible date. In West Africa and particularly in the Gold Coast early action might well be practicable. Some risks will have to be taken and capacity should grow with experience, particularly where suitable members of the Colonial Service could be appointed as Permanent Secretaries responsible and advisory to the Members themselves. It appears desirable that Governments should start as soon as possible the process of preparing suitable men for these high offices. One method by which this might be done would be by introducing Africans into the offices of the Members as deputies, with executive functions under the Members themselves. Another would be to arrange for unofficial Africans on the Legislative Councils or Executive Councils to be closely associated with the work of particular departments or groups of departments, seeing all their papers and speaking with regard to their affairs in the Legislative Councils. Experience gained in this way would qualify them for subsequent appointment to Members.

10. While the first step should be taken now and the second step should follow as rapidly as possible, the third step is a considerable way off, depending as it does on the building up of an effective system of responsibility to the people. The ministerial stage can in fact only be reached when the local government machine has been developed to a much greater degree of efficiency than it possesses at present. The chain of responsibility from the centre to the people may well be secured by means of the system of indirect election through Provincial and Regional Councils now operating in a number of territories. The method of election will need to be adapted to the circumstances of the particular area. What is essential is that at the lowest level the people should effectively select their representatives and should have the power of changing them at given intervals. Popular election, in whatever form is found most suitable, whether it be direct or indirect, is thus essential to the handing over of ministerial responsibility to members of the local communities.

The Public Service

11. It is an essential part of the general policy described above that increasing numbers of local people and above all Africans should be brought into the higher ranges of the Public Service. Indeed it is manifestly impossible for the stage of Ministerial responsibility or internal self-government to be attained until the higher ranges of the Public Service are to a large degree manned by local people. Just as in the appointment of Members of the Executive Council, it is necessary that certain risks should be taken in the selection of Africans for the higher posts in the Service. Experience of office alone can bring out abilities. Much can be done by friendly guidance on the part of European officers and the system of African deputies to individual European officers (as in the case of deputies to Members) should be widely used.

Consultative machinery

12. One of the weaknesses of the present system of colonial government in Africa is that, whereas the representatives of the people through the Legislative Councils have considerable power to limit the activities of the executive by the refusal of supply or the disapproval of legislation, they have much less opportunity for taking part in the initiation of policy. The progressive steps described above for the introduction of Africans and other members of local communities into the higher executive machine will of course do much to remove this weakness. Other steps must, however, also be taken concurrently. Small consultative groups of local people should be established to work in the closest touch with the Directors and senior staff of the more important departments. Such groups must be small enough to bring the Members into really close contact with the Government officers concerned. They must be able to meet frequently. The need would not be supplied by the larger advisory committees which, although useful, do little more than provide the members with an opportunity of accepting or criticising the policy of the department concerned. All African Governments should be urged to establish such groups both in the working out of policy and in connection with the preparation and review of development programmes. A similar procedure should be adopted at Regional or Provincial headquarters and lower down, in the districts or divisions. Here one, or possibly two, committees should be able to cover all fields of activity and, although some of the members would be primitive, there is everything to be gained by associating them with action and policy in the early stages.

Part III. Devolution of authority by the Secretary of State and increase of responsibility of legislative councils

The relationship between the executive and legislature and the Secretary of State

13. There are already unofficial majorities in the Legislative Councils of Northern Rhodesia, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The Secretary of State has agreed to unofficial majorities for Kenya and Nyasaland. There is no reason to suppose that Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar and Sierra Leone may not follow suit during the course of the next two years. With unofficial majorities Legislative Councils have wide powers. If a sufficient number of unofficial Members vote together they can refuse to vote supply, they can reject legislation and they can defeat resolutions and motions put forward by the Government. They can pass legislation, resolutions and motions put forward

by unofficial members provided that no financial charge is thereby created. The Governor's reserve powers of certification and refusal to assent to bills can only in practice be exercised under the most exceptional circumstances of public necessity.

14. The Secretary of State at the same time in his responsibility to Parliament, has formal control over many of the actions of Colonial Governments and is in a position to intervene in all of them. All legislation is subject to his agreement. No money can be spent without his authority. Actually these formal powers are not exercised to anything like the full extent. They exist nevertheless and, while they exist, the full responsibility of the Executive to the Legislative Council cannot be a reality. There is in fact a wide overlapping of authority between the Secretary of State and the Legislative Councils in finance, legislation and control over administration.

15. It is suggested that the exercise of the full formal control possessed by the Secretary of State is not in accordance with the practical requirements of the present situation and that it does not correctly reflect the present constitutional relationship. The grant of an unofficial majority to a Legislative Council is an important step forward on the road ultimately leading to self-government. Legislative Councils with an unofficial majority have passed from the purely advisory stage, in which the views of the unofficials could always be overridden by the officials and, in the case of a difference of opinion, were only accepted by a deliberate decision of Government not to exercise its superior powers, to a stage where the executive, short of the wholly exceptional expedient of using reserve powers, can only secure the acceptance of its policy by obtaining the agreement of a sufficient number of members on the unofficial side. To mark the change the Secretary of State should no longer attempt to exercise detailed control over the actions of Colonial Governments, although he would retain his ultimate authority over general policy, the symbol of which would be his responsibility for advising the King with regard to the disallowance of legislation, a step which would only be taken in the most exceptional circumstances.

16. If this view is accepted the functions of the Colonial Office in relation to the African Governments will be twofold. In the first place the Colonial Office will continue to play a large part in the conduct of the external relations of these Governments, a function of increasing importance in the spheres of economic, defence and air navigation. By this means for example, the actions of Colonial Governments in import, export and exchange controls will continue in practice to be largely guided by the policy of H.M.G. Even more important will be the part played by the Colonial Office in relation to the international handling of colonial questions. The Office must also continue to deal with matters in which the executive organs of Colonial Governments are, as described in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, not yet effectively responsible to local legislatures and must, therefore, retain a final responsibility to Parliament in the United Kingdom through the Secretary of State. The office will be responsible for providing Governments with the staffs required from abroad, with technical and scientific advice and with all forms of assistance based on the application of the experience of this country to the problems of Colonial Governments. The office will also be responsible for financial relations with Governments based on the assistance provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and will also continue to deal with matters in which the executive organs of Colonial Governments are, as described in paragraph 5 (a) above, not yet effectively responsible to the local legislatures.

17. The second function of the Secretary of State will be in relation to policy in

the broadest sense. He will retain ultimate authority over the general policies of the African Governments but this influence on the development of policy should be exercised increasingly by means of consultation rather than by formal control over the details of administration. Control in matters of detail leads to friction, delay, waste of effort and diversion of attention from the essentials. To far too great an extent at present the staff of the Colonial Office occupies its time with detail. Far too little time is left for thinking out the big problems and for the acquisition of that intimate knowledge of the territories, whether by visiting them or otherwise, without which no real appreciation of the big problems is possible.

18. In the light of what we have said above we examine in the succeeding paragraphs the possibility of devolution. In doing so we propose to deal successively with four fields, legislation, finance, staff management and petitions.

Legislation

19. Under the new Ceylon constitution the power of disallowing bills is devolved by the King onto the Governor as his representative, except in the case of reserved subjects. Under the Southern Rhodesia constitution, however, all legislation requires the King's assent, whether its application has to be reserved for that assent or not. In fact except in the case of certain legislation affecting Africans, the application of which has to be reserved pending the King's assent, the requirement of the King's assent is a pure formality. The question arises whether it would be desirable to devolve the power of disallowance in respect of certain classes of legislation onto the Governors of the African territories. This course has considerable attractions from the psychological point of view vis-à-vis opinion in Africa and internationally. It is suggested, however, that such a step would be premature and that the determination of the classes of legislation in respect of which devolution should take place might lead to so much controversy as to destroy the psychological advantages of the devolution itself. It is recommended that at present there should be no change in the present system under which all legislation is subject to disallowance by the King. The Colonial Office should, however, avoid interfering with the legislative activities of the Legislative Councils to the maximum possible extent. As at present the power of disallowance should be regarded as an extreme safeguard to be used either never or practically never.

Finance

20. The question of devolution in relation to finance is probably the most important of the four mentioned in paragraph 17. What follows will deal in the first instance with territories which are not grant-aided. It is suggested that the Secretary of State's general authority over the broad financial policies of the African Governments must be retained, but the Colonial Office should concern itself with detail only to the extent necessary to secure the Secretary of State's interest in the broad issues of fiscal policy, measures against inflation, loan policy and development finance. The Secretary of State's interest in these broad issues can be secured by means of consultation and discussion between the Colonial Office and the Financial Secretaries or Finance Members, and in the case of development finance through the consultations which take place with regard to the periodical reviews of development programmes. Financial Secretaries or Finance Members should be expected to keep

the Colonial Office fully informed of the financial situation in the territories and they should supply advance information with regard to the financial policies of Governments. The Colonial Office can keep the position under review in this way rather than by detailed control and should communicate its views whenever necessary by correspondence or preferably by personal discussion.

21. In accordance with these principles formal control over the finance of non-grant-aided African territories should be exercised only through the Secretary of State's function of advising the King on the assent to the Appropriation and Supplementary Appropriation Ordinances. Other forms of formal control should be dispensed with, except where these are separately agreed, for example, in connection with United Kingdom subsidies for specific purposes. Estimates whether general or supplementary should not in themselves require the Secretary of State's approval; but both the estimates and supplementary estimates should be sent to the Colonial Office for information as early as possible and equally the Colonial Office should be kept generally informed of the financial policies of Governments in the manner described in the preceding paragraph. Writing off of losses etc. etc., should not require approval; and the other formal references to the Secretary of State laid down in the Colonial Regulations or elsewhere should be dispensed with. Colonial Regulations will require revision and a committee should be set up in the Colonial Office for this purpose. It is important that at the same time adequate local machinery should be established by the Legislative Councils to secure that these formal controls are effectively operated locally; devolution must not be allowed to leave uncontrolled power in the hands of the local executive. Audit should be operated as at present and the position of the Director of Colonial Audit would become even more important than it now is. The Secretary of State in addition to his function of advising the King on the assent to the Appropriation and Supplementary Appropriation Ordinances, would have the power in the last resort of instructing the Governor to exercise his reserve powers under the constitution. This would, however, be a safeguard only to be used in extreme circumstances. Otherwise, the executive would be fully responsible to the Legislative Council on financial matters. A notable political advance would be made without loss of the Secretary of State's influence over general policy, and a great mass of unnecessary routine work would be abolished.

22. It is not proposed here to discuss the extent to which devolution would be possible to the Governments of grant-aided territories. That would be a matter for subsequent negotiation with the Treasury and we are clear that in the case of British Somaliland, when returned to Colonial Office control, only a very limited degree of devolution would be possible. It is sometimes suggested that since His Majesty's Government stands behind all Colonial Governments, and in the case of proved necessity would have to step in with a grant-in-aid, the devolution of financial control must be strictly limited even in the case of territories which are not grant-aided. This argument, if accepted, would be likely to be as detrimental to the conduct of finance as to the political development of the territories. The best way of inculcating financial responsibility is by making the legislatures responsible, and, by giving the territories as great a degree of autonomy as possible in finance so long as they do not require a grant-in-aid, we shall be securing the best safeguard against policies likely to lead to the necessity for a grant-in-aid. This memorandum does not deal with the question of Colonial Development and Welfare finance. Special

arrangements are, of course, necessary to fulfil the requirements of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.

Staff management

23. Devolution in relation to conditions of service and other staff management problems is complicated by the position of the staff recruited by the Secretary of State. Were all staff recruited locally the problem would be a simple one. As it is, however, the staff recruited by the Secretary of State is essential at present to the whole business of colonial government throughout the African territories and they will continue to be needed for many years to come. We must secure the best men and women for these posts and in order to do so the Secretary of State must be in a position to ensure that the conditions of service are adequate to attract the right people into the work and to retain their enthusiasm during their service. Since moreover in accordance with the non-parliamentary paper on the Colonial Service (Colonial 197) the conditions of service of locally recruited staff must be related to those of staff brought in from abroad, the Secretary of State has a large concern in the conditions for the whole Service.

24. If the principles which we have described above are to be implemented effectively and the authority of Colonial Legislatures built up, it is essential that staff brought in from outside when appointed to particular territories should regard themselves first and foremost as belonging to the service of those territories. This is necessary both to satisfy the strong feelings of the local communities and to ensure that there is the closest sympathy and understanding between local civil servants and those brought in from abroad, who must not be regarded or regard themselves as a race apart. We suggest that in order to secure the necessary devolution the following principles should be accepted:—

(a) Conditions of service of staff recruited by the Secretary of State should be settled and periodically reviewed by the Secretary of State in consultation with African Governments, when necessary with the assistance of a specially appointed Commission.

(b) Since these must be related to the condition[s] of service of locally recruited staff this review and consultation should extend also to the locally recruited staff; but in connection with this part of the service the widest possible degree of freedom should be granted to African Governments.

(c) Conditions of service having been settled in the manner described in (a) and (b), the Secretary of State should devolve his powers in relation to staff management in respect of locally recruited officials to Colonial Governments which would set up independent Public Service Commissions and other necessary machinery for the purpose. There would at the same time be as great as possible a devolution of power in respect of staff recruited by the Secretary of State. Public Service Commissions would operate within the framework of conditions of service laid down and periodically reviewed by the Secretary of State in consultation with Governments. Routine correspondence on staff matters would be materially reduced.

(d) For the efficient operation of these greater powers of staff management, all Governments which have not already done so should appoint a really senior officer as Establishment Officer in charge of all staff questions.

(e) Public Service Commissions should be appointed by Governments to deal with all local appointments. These Commissions should include local unofficials who

should not be actively engaged in politics. The functions and operation of Public Service Commissions are dealt with in greater detail in Appendix VI.

(f) As part of the machinery for staff control all Governments should set up appropriate consultative machinery, on Whitley Council lines, to deal with questions relating to the welfare and conditions of service of staff.

(g) Independent appeals tribunals should be established by Government to consider appeals and petitions from individual officers, whether local or recruited from abroad, regarding grievances, except those involving the alteration of existing conditions of service etc. These tribunals should be advisory to the Governor and the Secretary of State: in practice all appeals and petitions to the Governor and to the Secretary of State would be referred to them, and the Governor and the Secretary of State would normally accept the advice tendered by the tribunals. The tribunals could also advise on proposals for changes in conditions of service if these were referred to them by the Government, after the consultative machinery described in paragraph (f) had failed to produce a settlement. The tribunals should include a member with legal experience, possibly being presided over by a Judge. They should also include at least one unofficial member who should be nominated by the Governor and who should not be actively engaged in politics.

Petitions

25. The suggestion has been made that the Secretary of State might lay it down that he would not receive petitions from persons in the African territories on a specified range of subjects within the competence of Governments. This position may well be arrived at eventually, but it would not be advisable to lay down any such general rule at present. In some of the African territories, particularly in West Africa, considerable store is set by Africans on the right to petition the Secretary of State. With progress towards self-government staff recruited by the Secretary of State may attach considerable importance to the right of petitioning him. Petitions to the Secretary of State normally arise from decisions of the executive rather than actions of the Legislative Council, and it is not desirable that the practice of petitioning the Secretary of State should be abrogated until effective and independent local machinery has been established for the hearing of petitions. The immediate aim should therefore be the building up of such local machinery.

26. Steps should be taken by the African Governments to establish, under statute, independent tribunals to consider various classes of petitions in cases where this is appropriate, and, such tribunals having been established, the Secretary of State should, except in most unusual circumstances, refuse to interfere with their findings. The large majority of the petitions received from the African territories come from individual members of the civil service and all these, whether from staff locally recruited or recruited abroad, should automatically be referred in the first instance to the Appeals Tribunals referred to in paragraph 24 (g). The Governor and the Secretary of State should refuse to consider petitions unless they have previously been examined by Appeals Tribunals. The Secretary of State should let it be known by his method of answering petitions appealing against the decisions of Appeals Tribunals that he is not in fact prepared to intervene except in the most unusual circumstances; in this way petitioning the Secretary of State would be discouraged. Similarly the Secretary of State should normally advise the King not to intervene on petitions against the decisions of Appeals Tribunals. Where such petitions are

addressed to the Secretary of State or the King, the Government concerned should merely forward the findings of the Tribunal with such comments as the Secretary of the Tribunal in question desired or was directed by the Tribunal to make.

27. The above procedure would provide a means of dealing with petitions from individual members of the Colonial Service consistent with the constitutional realities. Petitions from associations of civil servants asking for improved conditions of service, like petitions on other questions of policy, must necessarily be considered by the Secretary of State when referred to him, but the Secretary of State would be entitled to require such petitions to be considered in the first instance by the Appeals Tribunals established locally whenever he considered this course appropriate on the advice of Governments. For the purpose of considering petitions on individual grievances not relating to personnel matters the Governments should, whenever appropriate, introduce legislation for the establishment of independent tribunals or boards to consider different classes of petitions, e.g. the issue of trade licences. Such tribunals should be genuinely independent and should be so composed as to command the confidence of the public.

28. In Trust Territories the right is granted under the Trusteeship agreements to petition the Trusteeship Council on any matter and it is likely that the Trusteeship Council will take the duty of considering petitions seriously. Where petitions deal with questions of policy it is inevitable that the Trusteeship Council should go fully into them. Where they deal with individual grievances every effort should be made to convince the Trusteeship Council that it would be inappropriate to intervene in the cases of petitions heard and disposed of by competent independent tribunals in the territory concerned. The attitude of the Council is likely to be influenced by the composition of the tribunals and the extent to which they have African members on them.

Publicity for decisions

29. If it is decided that devolution on the lines described in the above paragraphs is desirable, it is important from every point of view that a full and clear statement by the Secretary of State describing the steps being taken should in due course be made. Devolution is desired not only to increase efficiency, but to give colonial legislatures a greater sense of responsibility. The second object can only be secured if the policy can be given wide publicity. From the international point of view also the advantages of wide publicity would be great. Devolution would necessarily involve a certain limitation in practice on the powers exercised by Parliament with regard to the African territories. It would therefore be necessary to give Parliament an opportunity of discussing any proposals for devolution. The most convenient way of doing this would be to publish as a Command Paper a record of the conclusions of the Conference attended by unofficial representatives of the African Legislative Councils, which would include an account of the conclusions reached on the subject of devolution.

Appendix IV to 59: Local government in Africa

Any system of Government must provide for some form of local government, i.e. for the administration of local units within the territory as a whole; but the distinguishing features of local government in the usual English sense are the decentralisation

of administrative control; the co-ordination of the various activities of government on the local as well as the national plane; and popular control of the local administrative organs. That there must be some system of local administration of justice, of health, of agriculture and of all other governmental activities is obvious enough; but such administration can be carried on through officials nominated by and wholly responsible to central government departments; or by individuals or groups in whom local authority is vested by tradition; or by councils chosen by and solely responsible to the local population or by any one of many other variants and combinations of systems. In British African territories in the past reliance has been placed mainly on the first two types of organisation, i.e. the district officer and the various technical officers acting under the orders of various Government departments at the centre, and the chiefs functioning under the various systems of indirect rule.

2. Neither of these forms of organisation can fully meet the needs of today, when the functions of government go far beyond the basic purpose of maintaining law and order and extend widely into social and economic spheres in which there is need both of much greater local initiative and more effective representation of the people by their own nominees. The machinery of local administration in Africa must therefore be rapidly developed so as to incorporate the essence, although not necessarily the precise forms, of English local government in the sense described above. Such development is of the greatest importance not only for the forging of an instrument of local administration more suited to the needs of the times but also as an essential stage in the growth of true democracy in African communities. At the present stage of political development, with territorial unity nowhere a reality, effective political activity can for the greater part of the people, only take place on the local plane; and for the same reason, effective representation of the people in central political institutions can often only be secured through local government organs.

3. The emphasis on local government is no new conception. The policy of indirect rule has been the main feature of our administration in Africa. It is now an accepted fact which goes without saying that administration can be carried on only through African institutions, whether traditional or not. The fact that administration is indirect therefore largely loses its significance; in future the emphasis must lie on making it efficient.

4. A conference on African administration is being held at Cambridge during August, when all aspects of local government in Africa will be discussed. It is hoped that this conference will produce general recommendations for future policy with regard to local government. Until the conference has been held it would be premature to draw up a final paper for discussion with Governors, especially as the subject is essentially one on which policy must be determined in the light of local experience. The present memorandum, therefore, does no more than put in brief terms the main questions which will have to be discussed. It deals in a few sentences with aspects of local government which are of great importance, the relations between local government bodies and the Central Government, local government finances, the function of local government bodies in relation to land usage and law, the training of local government personnel and the machinery of the Central Government for encouraging the development of local government. It deals at rather greater length, but still very briefly, with the internal political organisation of local government bodies and their place in the political machinery of the territories. These

two subjects have special importance because of their bearing on political development generally in Africa.

5. This memorandum will concentrate on local government in rural areas, not because it is more important in itself than the corresponding process in urban areas, but because the majority of the population of the African territories is rural and the policy in relation to the rural areas is more in need of re-examination. A brief separate section will deal with the urban side of the problem. Local government bodies in rural Africa, apart from maintaining law and order, have the functions of operating local services (including the expansions produced by development programmes), of inducing the people to support these expansions and finally of securing the necessary financial contributions towards development. It must be admitted that in many areas they have little capacity for carrying out these functions at present. Where in this memorandum functions are attributed to Native Administrations, it must be understood that, in respect of many areas at any rate, this represents a long-term aim of policy rather than an immediate possibility. One of the purposes of this memorandum is to look to the more distant rather than the immediate future.

Units of local government

6. The size of the existing units of local government in rural Africa has been determined not so much by design, but by the policy of using the traditional authorities found in operation at the time when the system of indirect rule was established. The system was first tried in areas where the native authorities were well developed, in Uganda and Northern Nigeria. It acquired such immense prestige that it was later extended to most areas of Africa other than Kenya, even to areas where the authority of chiefs had [not] been extended far beyond village groups, or where it had been broken down by tribal warfare or periods of direct rule, for example under the Germans in Tanganyika. In Tanganyika the policy of indirect rule has been successful in the case of some tribes, for example the Wasukuma and the Wachagga, where federations of chiefs covering large numbers of people have now been built up. Over wide areas in Tanganyika, however, as well as in considerable parts of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Eastern Nigeria, little success has been achieved in securing an effective local government machine. It has sometimes been suggested that indirect rule based on traditional institutions represents a liberal policy of itself, as compared for example with the Government-made Local Native Councils in Kenya. In fact there are many grounds for suggesting that the Kenya system has in it greater possibilities for democratic progress. It may be questioned whether it was right to rely on the traditional institutions in the areas mentioned where there was practically nothing to build on. The point which we now have to consider is the question whether a new policy should not be adopted in these areas of limited tribal authority, by the establishment of local government bodies on the Kenya model, covering whatever is considered to be the right unit of local government (probably the district or division) and consisting of members representative of all sections of the population, either nominated by the District Commissioner or by the chiefs or, wherever possible, selected by the people.

7. Conversely, in areas such as Northern Nigeria and Uganda, where highly organised Native Administrations exist and control populations of hundreds of thousands or even millions, the problem of local government lies in building up proper local government institutions under the Native Administrations. To a

considerable extent such institutions do not exist at present, and it is not a sufficient answer to criticism that this process is purely a matter for these larger Native Administrations themselves.

The position of chiefs in relation to the people

8. The next point to be considered is even more important; it is the question whether the position of chiefs as agencies of local government can be regarded as likely to be permanent even in those areas where their authority at present appears to be secure. All over Africa the disintegration of tribal influence is proceeding through the attraction of towns, the growth of a new middle class based on wealth and education, the migration of labour to and from industrial and mining areas and the movement of farmers to areas where new economic crops can be farmed. Hitherto, de-tribalised Africans have tended to be regarded as a class by themselves requiring special treatment, but the process of disintegration does more than create a new class of people; it strikes at the root of tribal organisation itself. Although this stage has so far not been reached except in limited areas, the process may eventually lead to the complete breakdown of the tribal system. Wherever the authority of chiefs is so weak that they can no longer serve as leaders of the people, chiefs can be nothing but a liability to the local government system. In such circumstances they can no longer perform their proper functions of administration and since they represent a vested interest, they are bound under such conditions to exercise what influence they have in a conservative manner. It is essential that local government should not be irrevocably tied up and identified with institutions which may eventually become obsolete and which in the process can only retard progress.

9. It is important to remember in this connection that a chief has two distinct, although related, functions. By tradition he is the leader of the tribe, often fulfilling important religious functions. By the authority of the Governor he is the agent of the Central Government and the agency for local government. The traditional function of the chief can be modified only through the social and political evolution of the people themselves; the Government can hardly interfere, although it may influence this process of evolution. On the other hand, the chief's functions in relation to central and local government are derived from the action of Government and indeed in several territories these powers are vested in the chief as a Native Authority appointed by the Governor. This distinction is one of great importance which must be clearly maintained. It is not suggested that chiefs can be dispensed with as agencies of local government in most areas at the present time. Indeed in most areas chiefs perform an essential function and are likely to do so for many years to come. The point which it is desired to make is that, as a matter of long term policy, chiefs should only be used as local government authorities in so far as, and for so long as, they can make an effective contribution to the development of local government. There is no mystical value in the employment of chiefs as such.

Development of local government bodies

10. The next question, therefore, is whether the long-term aim of policy should be the development, in substitution for purely traditional institutions, of local government bodies, not strictly modelled on the English pattern, but so constituted as to be able to perform the functions of local government as understood in this country, while retaining whatever is of value in the traditional system. The aim

should in fact be to develop bodies fully representative of all the people, rather than, as in most cases at present, representative of a limited section of the people only and owing their position largely to the support of the Central Government. The conception of the chief as a constitutional ruler is well recognised by African tradition and the council system has been widely introduced as part of the Native Administration machine; but the limitations on his freedom of action, imposed by custom, are at present mostly in the direction of extreme conservatism. What now seems to be required is the development of this council system by the increasing introduction of the more progressive elements in the population, the ultimate aim being that the Council shall become the directing authority and the organ through which the people make their wishes felt, while the chief is either converted into the president of the Council or gradually recedes into the position of a ceremonial or religious leader. Alternatively, as suggested in paragraph 5 above, where no real tribal authority exists at present councils on the Kenya model may have to be established. As Councils develop their effectiveness may be increased by the establishment of committees to deal with particular subjects, such as finance, education, health etc. In some cases also the most fruitful line of development may be the setting up of Committees separate from the Native Administrations themselves but working in close touch with them to deal with particular subjects. Both methods have already been tried with success in several areas.

11. If the rift which already exists between the system of Native Administration in the provinces and African political opinion at the centre is not to be deepened, it is important that the educated minority should be able to find a proper place in the system of local government. This must, however, apply not only to the vocal class of African politicians, who supply the demands for progress but not the material on which it can be based, but also to the rising middle class, based on trade, economic production, and the professions, to whom the continuance of stable government is of very real interest. Equally local government must find a place not only for the people of the tribe, but also for African "strangers" coming in from outside, whether for production or labour. The danger must, however, be guarded against of these various classes of people with their more advanced outlook dominating the local government machine to the exclusion of the mass of the people. At first no doubt nomination by the District Commissioner, the chiefs or possibly the various interests concerned will have to be widely resorted to in order to secure proper representation on local government bodies. As the system develops election in one form or another is bound to be used more exclusively, as it already is in Buganda and in some areas of Kenya.

The place of local government in the central political machine

12. We have only a limited control over the pace of political development at the centre. Those Africans whose political consciousness is most highly developed will certainly press for a direct place on the Legislative Councils, whether through the representation of municipalities, as already provided for in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, or in other ways. It will be impossible wholly to resist this pressure and a one-sided development is therefore bound to follow unless the representation of the body of the people can be secured simultaneously. At present the loyalty of the ordinary rural African is at most to his tribal authorities; in no sense does territorial unity exist in any African territory. For this reason it would be quite impossible at present for the representation of the body of the people on the Legislative Councils to

be secured by direct election on the basis of constituencies. The introduction of such a direct electoral system at present could only have the effect of strengthening the position of the professional African politicians at the centre. Direct election can only succeed where the majority of the electors are in a position to take an intelligent interest in the proceedings of the body for which the election takes place, but the interest of the mass of the people does not yet extend beyond their local government bodies. It is for this reason that the chain of representation between the people and the Legislative Councils which is now being built up in a number of African territories is based on the principle of indirect election starting from the Native Administrations. The electoral pyramid so established varies from territory to territory, but broadly speaking the system is that representatives of the Native Administrations or tribes sit on Provincial or Regional Councils, which themselves elect representatives either to the Legislative Council or (in the Central African territories) to an African Representative Council for the whole territory, which is to elect representatives to sit on the Legislative Council. The system of indirect election being built up in this way will have to be kept under close review as it develops to ensure that it continues to represent the most effective method of securing the representation of the people. The fact that direct election is impracticable now does not necessarily mean that it will always remain so.

13. The process of election at the higher levels of this pyramid is a simple one; the problem of securing democratic representation at the lower levels, with which we are here concerned, is much more difficult. Since it is only at the local government level that the intelligent interest of the mass of the people can be expected, the key to the whole process lies in the organisation of local government. If the process of selection of the representatives of the people on local government bodies can be a genuinely democratic one, then the whole system can equally secure democratic representation of the people. It becomes all the more important, however, in that case that the local government bodies should not merely reflect the vested interests of the chiefs and their immediate entourage, but that the common people, the middle class, the educated minority and the so-called "strangers" should have a full voice. It is not suggested that the process of election can be introduced immediately in many places. In most areas this step would be premature and the unsatisfactory experience of election in the West African Coastal towns shows that we shall have to proceed continuously [? cautiously] in the rural areas. It is suggested, however, that the gradual introduction of election into the local government system must be an aim of policy.

Local government in urban areas

14. In the large coastal towns of West Africa municipal government on the English model has been introduced, and there are now African majorities on the municipal councils. In the main towns of the East and Central African territories, municipal or township government on English lines has also everywhere been established, but these local government bodies are controlled by the non-official immigrant communities and it is only recently that a start has been made in introducing African members, while in some of the large towns in Northern Rhodesia there are still no African representatives. Three separate problems arise in connection with local government in urban areas:—

(i) In the East and Central African towns the immediate problem is to devise means of giving Africans proper representation on local government bodies. The problem is broadly similar to that which exists in relation to the Legislative Councils of these territories, where Africans are now securing increasing representation. It is a political problem for which the solution must be found by a process of conciliation between the different communities. It is most important that this particular problem should be solved, since otherwise large bodies of advanced Africans, who can be a tremendous power either for good or evil, will go unrepresented in local government.

(ii) In West Africa, where urban, semi-urban or industrial conditions exist outside the coastal towns, local government is still frequently carried on through traditional institutions not strong enough to deal with the problems arising. Consideration may have to be given to the establishment of something much more like English municipal government in these areas as a matter of special urgency. Provision of this sort has already been made in such areas as Tarkwa and Obuasi in the Gold Coast, but there are other areas of this type still requiring attention. There are also large towns like Ibadan and Kano in Nigeria where the existing system of traditional government may require early examination.

(iii) In general, where municipal government already exists or where it is brought into being, the problem is to secure on the one hand greater efficiency, and on the other hand greater interest on the part of the people. Much can be gained by drawing on English experience and it may be desirable that an officer drawn from local government in this country should be appointed in some territories to advise Government on the development of municipal institutions. It is particularly important that Africans should be encouraged to maintain higher standards of integrity both in municipal and in other forms of local government and it is a primary duty of all European officers to do everything possible by training and sympathetic guidance to help them to achieve these standards. Corruption, while it is at all prevalent, must be a most serious bar to all forms of political development.

Relations between local and central government

15. At one stage of the development of indirect rule, it was held in certain quarters that the Native Administrations should develop into what would virtually be separate states linked together in a form of federation. This theory was current particularly in Northern Nigeria, but has now officially been ruled out. At the other end of the scale, where tribal organisation was undeveloped, indirect rule tended to be regarded as no more than the use of chiefs as minor government agents. The correct theory, it is suggested, must be that the Native Administrations are in the same broad relationship to the Central Government as local government bodies are to the Central Government in this country. This would allow of the Native Administration being regarded for certain purposes as the agents of the Central Government, just as local government bodies are here, but they would be much more than mere agents and would have political responsibility to the local people as well as to the Central Government.

16. Starting from this basis, it is clearly necessary, both for the purposes of ordinary administration and of development, that the division of functions between the central and local governments should be clearly laid down. This should not, it is

suggested, necessarily be determined in the light of present performance. Many Native Administrations are not yet capable of carrying out what are clearly local government functions. The division should rather represent the objective at which policy is aiming, and once central and local government functions have been defined, the objective of the district staffs should be to train Native Administrations up to the level at which they can assume all the functions of local government as so defined. The district staffs would be in the position of advisers and would step inside as and when the local government bodies could stand on their own feet.

17. The division of functions between central and local government has recently been worked out in Nigeria by the Financial Secretary, Mr. S. Phillipson. For purposes of illustration, some of his conclusions, which it is understood have been accepted by the Nigerian Government, may be mentioned. In the sphere of education, the Native Administrations will in general be responsible for all elementary education, while the Education Department will be responsible for secondary and higher education, teacher training centres and all supervisory and inspecting functions. In the case of public works the Department will be responsible for the construction and maintenance of main trunk roads, the construction and part maintenance of minor trunk roads, the part construction of feeder roads and the construction of roads opening up backward areas for administrative purposes, and also for the construction of rural water supplies. Native Administration will be responsible for the part maintenance of minor trunk road[s], the part construction and total maintenance of feeder roads and local roads and tracks, and also for the maintenance of rural water supplies and the assisted construction and maintenance of urban water supplies. In general there will be found to be some purely local matters for which the Native Administrations should obviously be responsible and some departments which must remain entirely within the responsibility of the Central Government. It will be necessary to determine in the case of each territory what the divison of functions should be in the case of those departments and services which fall between the two extremes. It is suggested that an investigation on the lines of that carried out in Nigeria should be undertaken as soon as possible in all territories. Such an investigation would have also to deal with the division of financial responsibilities.

Finance

18. Except in comparatively few cases, Native Administrations and other local government bodies are at present seriously handicapped in their development by the inadequacy of their financial resources. The setting of their finances on a sound basis by increasing their financial resources, would do more than almost any other step to make local government a reality, where it is not that at present.

19. Native Administrations derive their revenue from three sources, local taxation, fees, dues, etc.; a share of the direct taxation; and direct grants from Government. It is suggested that the proper policy is for the proportion of direct taxation retainable by the Native Administrations to be sufficient to cover, with the aid of the purely local revenue, the ordinary expenses of administration with some margin for expansion. Grants from the Central Government should not normally be treated as general grants in aid, but should be given for specific development purposes. There is an urgent need for increased local revenues to contribute towards the cost of expanding local services, and it is believed that there is considerable room

for securing additional tax revenue, particularly in areas where economic crops are produced or in areas adjacent to mines or other projects employing a considerable body of labour. This at present untapped taxable capacity may not easily be available to the Central Government, but might well be secured in various ways by the local authorities. They will, however, need advice and assistance at first in their taxation policies. If the finances of native administrations could be put on a sound basis by allowing them an adequate share of the native tax to cover the ordinary expenses of administration and if at the same time they could be given control over a wider range of local taxation, it is believed that a much surer foundation would thereby be established for the extension of local revenues by increased or more systematic local taxation. Once such a foundation has been provided it is most important that the Native Administrations should be faced squarely with the position that increased services for the benefit of the people depend on an increased financial contribution by the people themselves. This is the only effective way of building up a real sense of financial responsibility, perhaps the most important element in the development of local government.

20. Both subjects, the financial relationship between the Central and local government and the possibilities of expanding local taxation, closely related as they are, require further detailed investigation in each territory. This investigation must go hand in hand with that suggested in paragraph 16 above, dealing with the general division of functions between Central and local government. The investigation already carried out by Mr. Phillipson in Nigeria is an excellent model.

Local government in relation to land usage

21. The proper use of the land is the key to economic development in rural Africa. Not only will modifications of land tenure systems be necessary if large schemes of agricultural reorganisation are to be embarked upon, particularly those involving mechanisation. Changes in land tenure practice will equally be needed even to secure those improvements in the methods of peasant cultivation without which the necessary increase in productivity cannot be obtained. At the same time reactionary or improvident practices in relation to land tenure are more likely to hold up development than any other single factor. The African, like all peasants, is exceptionally sensitive to reforms in connection with the land and his sensitivity is increased by his religious attachment to the land and his not unnatural suspicion of the activities of an alien government.

22. The chiefs and traditional authorities are at present largely responsible for the administration of land, not only in those areas where they themselves are in ultimate control of the land, but also in the areas where the ultimate control rests with the Government. Even in Kenya, where the local government bodies are not chiefs but local native councils, it has recently been found in one district that land usage can most effectively be influenced through the traditional authorities who were responsible for land transactions prior to the establishment of the present system of local native councils. If Government were at the present time to entrust the administration of land usage to any authorities other than the chiefs, it is unlikely that the new bodies would be able to exercise their functions effectively. It is clear, therefore, that with the development of local government bodies on the lines referred to in paragraph 9 above, there is a serious danger of the chiefs ultimately becoming a landed aristocracy with declining functions, representing only a small

proportion of the local community and yet in a position to impede progress by their control over land.

23. Viewed from the long-term aspect, the problem is one of the greatest difficulty on which no clear-cut solution can at present be suggested. It appears important, however, that the Government should seek to enlist the more enlightened public opinion in African communities on its side, while at the same time taking no action which would outrage the existing sentiment of the majority of the people, thus almost certainly leading to serious discontent. As a long range aim of policy, there appears to be little doubt that the administration of land usage must entirely pass from the hands of the chiefs into that of the local government bodies. How quickly and by what means it is likely to happen is a matter for discussion with those who are more familiar with local conditions. One point is certain; all African Governments require machinery for the study of land tenure problems and for the formation of policy. This machinery should be under a special African Lands Officer, who should work on the staff of the Secretary for Native Affairs or the equivalent official. Such an arrangement was suggested to African Governments by the then Secretary of State in a despatch dated 1944, and all Governments have agreed in principle.

African law

24. The Native Administrations are responsible for local legislation and for the organisation and manning of native courts. Policy with regard to African Law therefore has a definite bearing on local government. African legal systems, based on customary law, on local legislation enacted by the Native Administrations themselves and to some extent on case law, are constantly evolving and must have an important effect on social, economic and political development. The process of change is subject to considerable influence by Government and it is necessary, as in the case of land tenure, that Government should be fully informed as to the changes taking place and should be in a position to form a considered policy with regard to the evolution of African law and its relation to European law and as to the proper method of enacting local legislation, a problem which will assume increasing importance with the development of Regional and Provincial Councils standing between the Legislative Councils and the local government bodies. For this purpose the Secretary of State, in 1946, suggested to all African Governments that a Native Courts Adviser should be appointed in each territory, and this has been generally agreed in principle.

Training of personnel

25. The general policy of local government outlined above can have no hope of succeeding unless adequately qualified personnel is available both as members of the local government councils and as staff for local government bodies. A wide variety of administrative and technical staff will be required and it is essential that this staff should be given conditions of service which will attract suitable people. One of the difficulties at present is that most Native Administrations find it impossible to pay their staff adequately; to some extent this will be remedied if the Native Administrations can be put on a sound financial footing as suggested in paragraph 18 above. Secondly, proper training schemes for local government staff must everywhere be established. Special attention should be paid to this at all levels of the educational

structure, particularly in the secondary shools, the Polytechnics and the Higher Colleges. The Higher Colleges in particular can make a substantial contribution, both through their Departments of Social Studies and the Institutes of Social Research associated with them and through their extra-mural activities. At the higher levels it will undoubtedly be found useful for local government officials to visit this country, not only for courses of training, such as are already being provided for a number of West Africans, but also for shorter periods in order to see how local government works here. The visit of six Africans from Kenya to this country last year has already paid ample dividends.

26. Exactly the same problem arises for the men and women who will actually serve on councils under the local government system. At present special steps are taken wherever possible to provide education for the heirs of chiefs and training courses for chiefs themselves are maintained at Jeanes Schools in East Africa. If the policy of local government is to be a success, these training activities will have to be extended much more widely. The subject is one of the first importance, and it is suggested that all Governments should be asked to investigate the training needs as a matter of some urgency.

Machinery of central government for encouraging developments of local government

27. Reference has been made in paragraphs 22 and 23 above to the appointment in all territories of officers to advise Government on questions relating to African land tenure and African law. In his despatch to African Governors of the 28th [? 25th] February, 1947,[7] the Secretary of State has recommended that all Governments, which have not done so already, should establish African affairs branches, including these two officers and under the general direction of a Member of the Executive Council. These branches would be responsible for keeping all activities relating to African local government under review for advising Government on policy and for ensuring that officers in the field were kept fully informed of Government policy and of developments in other districts within the territory and in other territories. A clearing house for information on African local government is being established in the African Division of the Colonial Office. If the policy of African local government is to have the best chance of developing successfully, it must be based on a complete, up to date and expert body of information.

Summary

28. The following is a brief summary of the questions put forward for discussion in this memorandum:—

1. Whether in areas where tribal authority is limited, the existing undeveloped Native Administrations should be replaced by local native councils on the Kenya model (paragraph 5).
2. The question of developing proper local government institutions below the Native Administrations in those areas where there are Native Administrations controlling large populations (paragraph 6).
3. The importance of not irrevocably tying up the local government system with

[7] See 44.

chiefs who are no longer in a position to exercise their authority over the people and cannot therefore make an effective contribution to the development of local government (paragraphs 7–8).

4. The development of local government councils, the ultimate aim being that the councils shall become the directing authorities and the organs through which the people make their wishes felt (paragraph 9).

5. The necessity for ensuring that all classes of people in a given area are represented on local government bodies (paragraph 10).

6. The importance of local government bodies in the political representation of the people through the system of indirect election now being built up (paragraphs 11–12).

7. Problems of municipal government in urban areas; to secure an increased place for Africans on the local government bodies in the East and Central African towns; to establish suitable local government bodies in those urban areas of West Africa where they do not already exist; and generally to improve the efficiency of local government bodies (paragraph 13).

8. The necessity for laying down a clear division of functions in connection with the operation of services as between the central government and local government bodies. For this purpose an investigation should be carried out in each territory on the lines of that recently undertaken in Nigeria (paragraphs 14–16).

9. "The importance of placing local government bodies on a sound financial basis by allowing them an adequate share of the native tax and giving them control over a wider range of local taxation, thus providing a foundation for the extension of local revenue." This amendment corresponds to the amendment made in paragraph 18. Investigations into the financial relationship between the central and local government are suggested on the lines of that recently conducted in Nigeria (paragraphs 17–19).

10. The importance of the control of land usage in African local government and the possibility that ultimately the local government bodies, rather than the chiefs, should be responsible for the administration of local land transactions (paragraphs 20–22).

11. The necessity for a definite policy with regard to the evolution of African law (paragraph 23).

12. The necessity for widely expanding the training facilities both for members of local government bodies and staff working under such bodies (paragraphs 24–25).

13. The necessity for establishing machinery both in the African territories and in London for the collection and interchange of information with regard to African local government (paragraph 26).

Appendix V to 59: Colonial Service

The post-war structure of the Colonial Service was the subject of the broad statement of policy contained in Colonial No. 197. The present paper develops the examination of some aspects of this subject more particularly those treated in paragraph 21 (IX–XI) of Colonial No. 197.

2. The principal requirements in mind have been

(a) the progressive extension of opportunities for local people to serve in higher posts,

(b) better arrangements for getting the best men into the higher posts,
(c) devolution of responsibility to local Governments and elimination of unnecessary reference to the Secretary of State.

3. *Control of appointments*

This is at present governed by Colonial Regulations 23 to 29 which in brief provide that the Secretary of State controls appointments to posts scheduled in the unified services and in other posts the initial emoluments of which are not less than £600 a year.

4. It will be necessary for the Secretary of State to retain some measure of control in so far as

(1) he has a general responsibility for ensuring that the key posts in the Colonial Service are filled by the people best qualified to hold them; and
(2) he has a special obligation to officers whom he recruits to look after their interests and to see that they have adequate opportunities of making a career commensurate with their merits.

On the other hand the requirements mentioned as (a) and (c) in paragraph 2 above involve the limitation of the detailed control exercised by the Secretary of State to a less extensive range of posts than at present.

5. There are no convenient criteria of general application to all Colonies, by which to determine which of the posts in the unified services should be removed from the detailed control of the Secretary of State. For example no single salary limit can be fixed, which would afford a suitable division in all Colonies.

6. The adjustments suggested for consideration in the light of the above are

(i) Colonial Regulations to be revised so that the Secretary of State's formal control is limited to specified posts in each Colony, to be known as reserved posts.
(ii) Generally speaking, super-scale posts would be reserved but in some Colonies it would no doubt be necessary also for some time scale posts to be reserved. The posts to be reserved in any colony would be decided after consultation between the Secretary of State and the Governor.
(iii) Reserved posts would be indicated as in the Secretary of State's control in any schedule of offices of the unified services (or functional branches set up to replace those services) and in the Colony staff lists.
(iv) Vacancies in reserved posts would invariably be referred to the Secretary of State to be filled at his discretion though it would be open to the Governor to recommend local candidates.
(v) In the case of unreserved posts colonial governments should have authority to make local appointments and promotions through the local machinery established for the purpose. Where no suitable local candidate was available, the Secretary of State would be asked to select a candidate from the Colonial Service or from candidates recruited through the Colonial Office Appointments Department; and it is safe to assume that for some time to come a very large proportion of the posts now included in the unified services will be filled in this way. The proportion will decline at first slowly but later on more rapidly as more and more suitably qualified local candidates come forward. The standards of qualification required, which will in practice determine the extent of local recruitment and the extent to

which recourse to outside recruitment will still be necessary in order to maintain the high standard of efficiency of the Colonial Service, will be matters for settlement by consultation between the Colonial Government and the Secretary of State. In order that complete records may be kept at the Colonial Office it will be necessary that all local appointments and promotions to unreserved posts in certain categories of the service to be agreed for Colonies individually should be reported regularly and automatically to the Secretary of State; at the outset these categories might comprise all posts now included in the unified services but they would be subject to review from time to time in the light of the progress of local recruitment.

7. *Standard qualifications and titles*

The transformation of the unified services into functional branches of the Colonial Services open to all without distinction of race or domicile is intended to be applied in a manner which will ensure in the fullest measure possible the maintenance of the standards which have been achieved by the institution of the unified services. Some two-thirds of the members of the unified services are serving in the African Colonies and all but a very small number of the unified service posts in these Colonies are at present filled by officers recruited from the United Kingdom or the Dominions.

8. Under the present system special qualifications are prescribed for first entry into a number of the unified services, e.g. medical officers in the Colonial Medical Service and agricultural officers in the Colonial Agricultural Service; in others, e.g. the Colonial Administrative Service and the Colonial Police Service there are no set qualifications and the standard is maintained by the system of selection by the Secretary of State. Even with the present limited scale of admission of local candidates to unified service posts there is a risk of lowering standards, the main contributory reason being the desire to encourage local appointments. Even where special qualifications are required, other personal qualities looked for in candidates recruited by the Secretary of State may not be present in a similar degree, and where there are no set qualifications (and no established pre-appointment training course) the maintenance of a reasonable uniformity of standards is even more difficult.

9. For these reasons it is considered that uniform conditions of eligibility should continue to be laid down by the Secretary of State both in cases of first appointment and of promotion to normal first entry posts. The special qualifications and other conditions of eligibility at present prescribed for first appointment to unified service posts however may require review in some cases in the light of the policy of making more extended use of local candidates. This in turn will involve the retention of uniform titles throughout the Colonial Service and restricting the use of such titles to posts for which uniform conditions of eligibility have been prescribed.

10. Under this conception the structure of the Colonial Service could perhaps be described as follows:—

"(i) His Majesty's Colonial Service consists of the officers employed in the public services of the territories for the administration of which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is responsible, and includes also officers recruited by the Secretary of State for the Colonies for service in the S.A.H.C. territories or for research or other services connected with the Colonies but not directly under Colonial Governments.

(ii) The Colonial Service includes a number of functional branches (to be detailed

in Schedules but broadly following the division established by the Unified Services).

(iii) Each functional branch consists of the officers who

(a) possess the prescribed qualifications, if any; and

(b) hold for the time being an office in the schedule.

The Secretary of State may rule that an officer who does not hold a scheduled office shall nevertheless rank as a member of a functional branch of the Colonial Service to which he is qualified to belong."

11. *Public Service Commissions*

The establishment of Public Service Commissions in the Colonies is envisaged in paragraph 21 (XI) of Colonial No. 197 with the object of ensuring that the Governor is afforded suitable advice on the selection and appointment of local candidates for Government employment. Indeed the Public Service Commission is an essential feature of the policy of devolution. The functions of the Civil Service Commission in this country are confined to recruitment. Its origin was the movement against patronage appointments in this country in the middle of the last century. While conditions of entry in the Home Civil Service are regulated by the Civil Service Commission, conditions of employment in Government Departments continue to be determined by the Treasury or departmental authority.

12. The functions of the Public Service Commission in Ceylon (the only Colony apart from Malta that has a Public Service Commission; that in Malta having been modelled on that in Ceylon) cover promotions and discipline in addition to recruitment. In New Zealand the Public Service Commission similarly has a wide range of functions and so have those set up in India by the Government of India Act of 1935. In Ceylon the reason for conferring these wider functions on the Public Service Commission was to overcome persistent controversy in the field of appointments and promotions in the Public Service and to ensure that with the assumption of greater powers by local ministers in progressing towards self-government the control of the Public Service was excluded from those powers.

13. The composition and functions of the Ceylon Public Service Commission came under review recently in the Report of the Soulbury Commission. The recommendations in that Report left the functions substantially unchanged but made changes in the composition of the Commission. The original composition was the Chief Secretary as Chairman, with two other members [who] were the Financial Secretary and the Legal Secretary. Under the recent recommendations membership is no longer confined to officials. The Commission is to consist of three members, one of whom is Chairman and all are appointed by the Governor in his discretion. Members of the Legislature are not eligible for membership and one but not more than one of the members is to be either a retired public servant or a public servant whose membership of the Commission will be his last appointment under the Ceylon Government.

14. The establishment of Public Service Commissions in the West African Colonies has recently been recommended in the Report of the Salaries Commission on the West African Civil Services. No steps have yet been taken to implement these recommendations but the proposals were that the functions of these Commissions should extend to appointments and promotions and that the Commission should include one unofficial member of the Legislative Council.

15. In anticipation of the reoccupation of Malaya a directive on the Public Services prescribed the establishment of a Public Service Commission on somewhat similar lines to the Ceylon body. The main difference from the functions of the Ceylon body was that for the Malayan Union and Singapore it was intended that conditions of service for public officers should be prescribed in Public Service Regulations made on the advice of the Public Service Commission. No steps have as yet been taken towards setting up the Public Service Commissions in Malaya.

16. In some Colonies where Public Service Commissions have not been set up appointments boards and promotion boards have been constituted; the former mainly for the purpose of applying examination standards for clerical and subordinate staff on appointment, the latter for co-ordinating promotion arrangements for the staff of a class customarily employed in more than one department of the Government.

17. The two main questions that will confront Governors in setting up a public service commission are settling its composition and functions; and these two questions are to some extent interdependent. Some of the considerations are set out below.

(1) *Functions*

It will be necessary to decide in each Colony with which of the following subjects the Commission should deal, viz. appointments to the public service, promotions, discipline, and conditions of service.

(a) *Appointments*

It is most desirable that all permanent appointments to the public service, other than purely subordinate appointments, should be made through an independent body, which is in a position not only to secure the observance of high and uniform standards throughout the service but also to withstand political pressure or private patronage. It is therefore most important that all Colonies should have a Public Service Commission for this purpose, whatever other functions the Commission may discharge.

(b) *Promotions*

In principle it is possible for a Public Service Commission to deal with all promotions within the public service, either directly or through dependent Committees. It would, however, manifestly be impracticable for a Commission with a small membership to deal direct with large numbers of promotions and if their responsibility were delegated, much of the apparent advantage of entrusting promotions to the Commission would be lost. It is probably advisable also that minor promotions should continue to be dealt with departmentally, though some change in existing machinery may be necessary in order to give the service and the public confidence in the fairness of the system. It seems desirable that Promotions Boards should be set up in all departments (including the Administration) consisting of a number of senior officers of the department concerned who should be vested with a measure of formal authority to make recommendations on promotions up to a prescribed maximum. The details of procedure may vary according to local conditions; but where the Secretary of State devolves his authority for promotion he would wish to be assured that some suitable machinery exists for ensuring that promotions will be dealt with impartially and with full consideration of the claims of all candidates.

It is in any case desirable that the Public Service Commissions should be the authority for promotions from class to class i.e. promotions from one class of the service to a superior class which is normally, or as a regular practice, partly filled by new recruitment. This would mean in effect that such promotions were treated as "appointments" and would ensure the maintenance of a recognised standard.

(c) *Discipline*

Executive Council is at present required by Colonial Regulations to advise the Governor on matters of discipline for the higher grades; in accordance with the new conception of the Executive Council, elaborated in Appendix III this would not normally be a suitable function for the Council though cases may come before it in special circumstances. It is, however, desirable that discipline should remain the responsibility of the normal executive machine, subject to recourse, when necessary, to an independent Appeals Tribunal as recommended in paragraph 24 (g) of Appendix III. The balance of argument would appear to be against the Public Service Commission serving as the appeal tribunal, if only because the two functions call for different qualities.

(d) *Conditions of service*

It is not normally desirable that a Public Service Commission should deal with changes in general conditions of service. Such questions are more properly dealt with by discussions under the Whitley Council procedure, subject to the final authority of the Legislative Council. The point of a Public Service Commission is that it operates independently of pressure from either the Executive or the Legislature. In certain cases however the government may wish to ask the Public Service Commission or Appeals Tribunal for advice on specific points.

(2) *Composition*

All members should be appointed by the Governor. It is desirable that the number who sit at any one time should be kept as small as possible though they might be drawn from a panel according to the business before the Commission. If the functions of the Commission are confined to appointments to the Public Service and class to class promotions, there might well be advantage in having unofficial as well as official members. In that event, however, it is most desirable that the unofficials appointed should not in any way be actively engaged in politics. If the functions of the Commission are, for local reasons, extended to deal with promotions within a class or to disciplinary cases in the first instance it would normally be inappropriate that unofficial members should take part in this work. The Appeal Tribunal dealing with disciplinary cases on appeal could with advantage include at least one unofficial member as suggested in paragraph 24 (g) of Appendix III.

Where possible, it would be advisable to emphasize the independent character of the Commission by the provision of its own separate secretarial staff, and accommodation.

18. *Local machinery for dealing with conditions of service*

The war years have inevitably led to discontent amongst officials over pay and conditions of service. Pay adjustments have frequently lagged behind increases in the cost of living and frequently the consideration of problems which have arisen has either been unduly deferred or superficially treated partly no doubt because of more

pressing business and partly probably because of deficiencies in machinery. Whatever the reasons, lack of confidence on the part of Government employees and Associations of Civil Servants in the capacity of Government to deal satisfactorily with grievances has become a more noticeable feature in a number of Colonies in recent years. Some of the possible methods of securing improvements in the machinery are discussed below.

19. *Establishment officers*

In the past, major problems of conditions of service have in all but a few Colonies been dealt with as part of the many duties of the Chief Secretary or Financial Secretary or one or more other senior Secretariat officers. While for many years in Malaya, the Establishment Officer has been a high ranking officer, in many Colonies the Establishment Officer or other officers whose full time duties have been devoted to Establishment matters has frequently been either a senior clerical officer or comparatively junior Secretariat or administrative officer with insufficient standing for dealing authoritatively with more important aspects of personnel work. In one or two Colonies recently there has been a move towards securing the appointment of a high ranking Establishment Officer. It is normally desirable that he should be equivalent in rank to a Head of Department or Deputy Chief Secretary and that he should in any event be directly responsible to the Chief Secretary. It would not normally be appropriate that he should be a member of the Executive Council (as he is in Palestine for special reasons) or of the Public Service Commission. He might however usefully attend as an adviser, when the Commission considers appointments to the public service on class to class promotions, and he should attend as a co-opted member in the event of the Commission dealing with promotions within a class.

It is important that the Establishment Officer should be particularly selected for his interest in and capacity to deal with, personal problems and problems of organisation and management. In general, however, he should be regarded as an ordinary member of the Administrative Service not as a specialist: he should have had considerable previous experience in normal administrative work and should not be kept so long on establishment work that he gets out of touch and sympathy with normal administrative problems.

20. *Whitley Councils*

There were no Whitley Councils in the Colonies before the war but in the interval a number of Colonial Governments have applied the Whitley system or some development of it with generally satisfactory results. The main features of Whitleyism as developed in this country are that it

(a) establishes a basis for consultation between official representatives and representatives of employees of Government,
(b) provides of [? for] equal representation of official and staff sides of Councils,
(c) admits of discussion by the Council of all matters which affect the efficiency of the public service or the well being of those employed,
(d) provides for agreed decisions of the Council to become operative on being reported, subject to the overriding authority of Parliament and the responsibility of the Head of Department concerned,
(e) provides for arbitration in the event of disagreement by the Council on questions of remuneration.

21. While in many Colonies it is unlikely that all the features of Whitleyism as understood in this country could suitably be adopted in the machinery of negotiation, it is likely that those Colonies which have as yet no such machinery would derive advantage from having settled arrangements for consultation and discussion between representatives of Government and employees.

22. *Petitions*

No restriction on the right of any officers to petition the Secretary of State as at present established and governed by Colonial Regulations would be practicable, but independent appeals tribunals should be established by Government on the lines described in paragraph 23 (g) of the paper on constitutional development (Appendix III), and their advice would normally be accepted.

23. *Promotions to higher appointments*

A reduction in the Secretary of State's control over appointments to a limited number of reserved posts will make it more than ever essential that those posts are filled by officers of the highest quality. It is therefore necessary to consider how far the promotions machinery in the Colonial Office and in the Colonies is geared to achieve this objective.

24. The annual confidential reports supplied by Governors form the basis of the Colonial Office system of "noting". As these reports come in they are carefully scrutinised not only by Colonial Service Department but also by the appropriate geographical department, the appropriate adviser (where there is one) in the case of professional officers, and by higher authority with a view to determining whether any particular officer should be specially noted as suitable for consideration of promotion in the ensuing year. When an officer is so noted there is a procedure for ensuring that his name will be brought forward with the names of other noted officers on the occurrence of appropriate vacancies. The main criterion which determines whether an officer shall be noted is merit as shown by his report; but other factors enter in such as age, length of time in his present post, personal preferences as expressed on the front page of the report, special qualifications etc.

25. The system of confidential reports as a basis of selection has been criticized on several grounds, e.g.:—

(a) that officers cannot fairly be judged and compared on the basis of paper reports. Owing, however, to the size and scope of the Colonial Service and to the fact that the staff dealing with these matters in the Colonial Office is liable to change, it is clear that the system of Confidential reports cannot be entirely dispensed with. Provided that the form of the report is in order and that they are conscientiously compiled by reporting officers they do undoubtedly provide a useful basis for assessing the capabilities of officers. At the worst they provide a rough determination of whether an officer is suitable for promotion. They are however not the only material on which promotions "form" is judged (see paragraph 27 below), though it is more doubtful how far they can make possible reliable comparisons between different officers.

(b) That they give insufficient information about the officers. This criticism may rest on the form of the report or on the way reporting officers do their job. It is felt that the form of the report is basically satisfactory and elicits answers to the most

relevant questions. More space might, however, with advantage be provided under each head to enable fuller report to be entered. It might also be useful to divide the head "Suitability for promotion" into three sub-heads namely: (1) suitability for accelerated promotion; (2) suitability for promotion in turn; and (3) not suitable at present. As regards the manner in which the reporting officers do their job experience shows that they usually do it well and conscientiously but it is sometimes the case that the reports are of the scantiest and there is felt to be room for impressing on "immediate" reporting officers the great importance of reporting as fully and accurately as they can.

(c) That reports are unreliable because of varying standards applied by different reporting officers. This is to some extent unavoidable but even at the distance of the Colonial Office the habits of reporting officers get known. The best safeguard lies in there being more than one reporting officer in each case. The form of reports provides for this but perhaps inevitably the spaces provided for reports by the more senior reporting officers are often left blank. It is of the greatest possible help if "higher authority" e.g. in the person of the Chief Commissioner, Colonial Secretary or Governor is able to express his opinion if possible in some detail.

26. It is very important that in appropriate cases the annual report should be supplemented by special reports to the Colonial Office e.g. in the course of correspondence and discussions with Governors and other senior officers. It is the policy of the Colonial Office to encourage semi-official consultations on these lines to the greatest possible extent and it is considered that it should be placed on a more systematic basis than heretofore and extend to a regular review of all good officers. It is also very desirable that it should deal not only with senior and moderately senior officers but should also aim at bringing to notice any promising officers in the junior ranks.

27. There are also the impressions formed by personal contact between members of the Colonial Office and Colonial Service Officers. Increasing numbers of Colonial Service Officers on leave call at the Colonial Office and are seen by Senior Officers there. Even more valuable, however, from the point of view of promotions work is acquaintance with Colonial Service officers *in situ*. The more that members of the Colonial Office can visit the Colonies, meeting individual officers and obtaining the views of high officials and the "atmosphere" of the place the more rightly will it be possible for confidential reports, etc. to be interpreted.

28. It must always be an important objective of any promotions machinery to spot and "pull out" the "flyers" at an early stage of their careers and provide them with opportunities to show their qualities and, if they fulfil their early promise, enable them to rise to the highest posts in the Service. This is not a new idea but practice sometimes tends to fall behind policy in this regard and there is a special reason for reviewing the system from this angle at the present time when the trend is towards a lower retiring age so that it is of the highest importance that promotion should come early to the ablest officers.

29. The attainment of these aims will depend on the co-operation of the Colonial Office and Governors, in particular:—

(a) Governors should take steps to ensure that the very early noting and reporting to them of the outstanding young men in their territories become the regular practice. (Confidential reports have been received on which it is noted that an

officer "requires further experience" at 40, or "should be watched" at 45!). It seems essential if the best men are to get to the top in time that they should be pulled out much earlier than has been usual in the past.

(b) Governors should do their best to ensure that young outstanding officers get an opportunity to serve in posts where they can fully show their qualities. If in any particular case this should prove impracticable, the attention of the Colonial Office should be drawn to the matter in order that the possibility of trying the officer out elsewhere can be considered.

(c) The Colonial Office should be told by Governors of their young outstanding officers both when their qualities are first noticed and later when they have had an opportunity of proving their worth.

(d) Officers and departments of the Colonial Office concerned with the review of confidential reports and Governors' staff correspondence should be constantly on the alert to note the names of potential "flyers" rather than wait a year or two for a confirmatory report.

30. The onus of "spotting the winner" must devolve mainly on Governors since it is only they and their advisers who can detect early promise. It is suggested that Governors should be asked to review their local arrangements and make any adjustments which they may feel necessary to enable them to play their vital and initiating part in the process by bringing likely officers to the Secretary of State's notice at a very early stage of their careers.

31. It is particularly important that any special qualifications which administrative officers may show should be remarked and brought to notice at an early date. Examples of "specialities" are finance, economics, development, social services, labour, co-operation, etc. In all these cases the filling of vacancies is difficult unless the particulars of officers known to possess such qualifications in these directions are regularly reported to the Colonial Office. As soon as an officer shows special interest or promise in any such direction he should wherever practicable be given an opportunity of developing it with a view to determining whether this should be his "line".

32. Governors should also have in mind the desirability of enriching the Administrative Service by the transfer to it of officers from other Departments who have not only achieved distinction in their own professions but also have displayed a marked flair for administration. Apart from the intrinsic advantage to the Administrative Service itself, the knowledge that such opportunities may occur would add considerably to the attractions of the Professional branches of the Colonial Service.

33. *Regional services*

The idea of developing regional arrangements for the pooling of staff by neighbouring Colonies has been increasingly to the fore recently, but enthusiasm for the idea has not invariably been accompanied by a realisation of the conditions to be observed in putting it into effect. These conditions are mentioned in paragraph 24 of Colonial No. 197, and are repeated in slightly more detail below.

34. There must be some regional executive authority to which are delegated by the Colonial Governments concerned and, where necessary, by the Secretary of State, the powers required to enable the regional service to be operated. The powers may vary according to the type of service but they will include certain powers of

posting, discipline, appointment and promotion. The nature of the authority may vary according to local requirements. It might be a single executive officer, a Board or a Commission.

35. The two main conditions to satisfactory organisation of regional arrangements are:—

(a) that regional authority should manage the service on the spot. Experience has shown that management at a distance, e.g. by the Colonial Office, is not satisfactory and

(b) that the authority, however constituted should have the necessary powers. A delegation of powers on the part of the constituent governments is inherent in any regional scheme, and it is essential that the considerations involved in this aspect should be weighed before any commitment is entered into.

36. A further requirement, not mentioned in Colonial 197 is that the functional regional authority should be subject to some more general regional authority, (such as the Governors' Conference, a High Commissioner or—as in South East Asia—a Governor General) in order that the activities of the service may be properly related to other governmental activities and requirements in the region and, in particular, to provide a court of appeal for the Government of any territory which may feel that its own requirements are not being fairly met by the functional authority.

37. If the territorial units in the region are unequal in size and prosperity, or vary considerably in their state of development, the advantages of a regional service over separate territorial services may be expected to be relatively greater in the smaller or more backward units since there will be available to them the services of more highly qualified staff (and in an emergency a greater number of officers) than they could themselves afford to maintain. The goodwill of the larger units is therefore generally an essential preliminary to any successful development of regional services. Nevertheless, in the case of a service where relatively small but specially qualified staffs are required, especially if the need for their services fluctuates in any particular territory from time to time, even the more prosperous units in a region which includes smaller units, or the units in a region where all the territories are of comparable importance, may be expected to derive substantial benefits from the establishment of a functional regional service.

38. One of the administrative advantages sought in any regional scheme is free interchange of officers within the region. If this advantage is to be realised, salary scales and conditions of service within the region must be reasonably uniform, regard being had to climate, cost of living, etc.

Appendix VI to 59: The economic development of agricultural production in the African colonies

The object of this paper is to discuss the subject of agricultural production in the African Colonies, to draw attention to experiments and developments which have taken place and to suggest lines of advance which might merit investigation and application in the aim to improve and expand agricultural production in Africa, as the principal instrument by which the needs of the indigenous population for a higher standard of living, including the necessary expansion of social services, must be met within measurable time.

2. *The problem*. Sir Frank Engledow[8] in a paper which he read to the Colonial Service Conference in January, 1947, entitled "Agricultural issues facing Colonial peoples" dealt with this problem of the cardinal need of all the Colonies for a greater agricultural output, and in discussing the means of bringing this about divided the problem into several components as follows:—

(1) Non-agricultural resources of food, e.g. fish farming, food yeast, synthetic vitamins, etc.
(2) Better use of existing land.
(a) Organisational improvement involving consideration of size and layout of holdings, land tenure, indebtedness, supply of capital, organisation of marketing and transport facilities.
(b) Biological factors involving consideration of pests and diseases, losses in storage, plant breeding, animal breeding.
(c) Better methods involving drainage, irrigation, use of artificial fertilisers, mechanisation, soil conservation.
(d) Better systems of farming. Substitution of settled husbandry for shifting cultivation.
(e) Increasing of the area of land available for agriculture involving swamp reclamation, provision of water supplies, elimination of tsetse fly, etc.

3. The answers to many (though not all) of the technical problems which arise in increasing the efficiency of agricultural production have already been found by years of agricultural experimentation and research in the fields of agronomy, soil science, crop and animal husbandry, plant breeding, plant pathology, animal health, etc. or what might be termed the biological factors, and if the results of such research were applied generally and universally by the African agriculturist, the increased production of agricultural wealth which would follow would without doubt be spectacular.

But it is in the question of the application of the results of research that the problem largely loses its purely agricultural aspect and strays into the fields of sociology, political economy, and ultimately into the realms of finance and capital investment.

4. In so far as this paper is concerned, it is proposed to confine discussion mainly to the question of *organisational improvement*. Present systems of farming in Africa fall in the main under three heads:—

(a) The non-African plantation and farming industries of East and Central Africa and to a very limited extent in West Africa.

(b) African agriculture, in its varying forms e.g. pastoral cattle raising, pure subsistence agriculture, the production of annual economic crops and finally the exploitation of natural stands or the planting of perennial tree crops. The grafting on to a system of subsistence agriculture of a cash economy through the development of so-called cash crops has in all cases been dependent on the enterprise of the non-African in organising the marketing, processing and disposal in the world's markets of the particular commodity.

The expansion of the old subsistence agriculture, based on the family unit, to provide for the production of cash crops, coupled with the increase in population due

[8] Drapers' professor of agriculture, Cambridge; member of Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture.

in large measure to the effect of curative and preventive medicine, has in many areas led to a pressure of population on the land which has rendered the old system of shifting cultivation with the long period of natural regeneration quite incapable of continuing as the basis of an agricultural economy on which to develop for the African population better standards of living.

In all the foregoing examples of the development of a cash economy through the introduction of economic crops, it is still the rule for the actual production to be carried on with the family holding as the unit worked by a peasant and his family with primitive hand tools, although instances can be quoted where the introduction of the ox-plough or the development of an agricultural labouring class or share-cropper prove the exception to this rule.

(c) Finally, there are examples in Africa (not all within the Colonies) of agricultural production in which public enterprise plays a part. The circumstances differ in individual instances, but, if a generic term is sought, "development corporations" might be conveniently applied to the cases in mind. The best known example, the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan, is so frequently quoted that it deserves mention in this paper. It represented in effect a partnership of effort between the cultivator, the Government of the Sudan, and commercial enterprise in the shape of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. Perhaps its chief interest, in so far as this discussion is concerned, is that it gives an example of capital investment in African agriculture, without which the people would have continued on a subsistence basis, ekeing out a bare existence with an inadequate diet for themselves and their livestock, and incapable of producing any appreciable marketable surplus of agricultural produce wherewith to improve their standard of life. The organisation evolved introduced drastic alterations in the system of land tenure, systems of agriculture, and methods of farming, and in organisational development whereunder compact holdings of 30 acres per family were made possible, the tenant had security of tenure in exchange for certain responsibilities, and was enabled to produce a greater and more varied food supply for himself and his livestock, and in addition to produce a marketable crop of cotton of high quality. Under the arrangements laid down, the Government and the African cultivator shared in the proceeds of sale of the crop as to 40% each, the balance of 20% being taken by the Syndicate as some return for the capital invested in minor canals, processing units, buildings and machinery, and for their services in supervising the allocation of land to, and its cultivation by, the tenants, and the collection, processing and disposal of the crop.

As an example of capital investment in African agricultural production, it is of interest to record that the Government invested about £14,000,000 in capital works such as the Sennar dam and the main canals, and the registered share capital of the Syndicate was £2,775,000. In 1945–46 with the average holding of the tenants about 30 acres, of which about one quarter was under cotton, a total area of 204,000 acres was planted to cotton and produced 180,000 bales.

While in this particular instance rigid control of cultivation methods and the production of a cash crop were necessary in order to meet the capital charges in the scheme and are not necessarily a precise model for agricultural organisation in all circumstances, it does provide an outstanding example of the organisational improvement in African agricultural production which large-scale capital investment and modernisation of production can bring about, and contains many features which may be of value in their application to Colonial conditions. In Colonial territories the

chief examples of "development corporations" are the East African groundnut scheme and the Cameroons Development Corporation, both of very recent inception. From the point of view of this paper they are of interest chiefly because of the declared intention that through the application of "plantation" methods under public control there will eventually emerge some form of control by the people of the areas in question which would preserve the full benefits of large-scale and scientific production.

5. *Relations of African and non-African agriculture*. The raising of productivity in Africa is not solely a question of African or of non-African agriculture. Both types of enterprise can within their respective spheres add to the national income of the territories in which they find themselves. There are however substantial differences in the part which Colonial Governments play in the process in respect of each of them.

In so far as non-African agriculture is concerned, it does not appear to call for much alteration of the policy already pursued by Government. The actual increase of productivity can be left to the enterprises themselves. Government's main contribution to the task is the maintenance and extension of research work and the necessary advisory services, and this work has already been put in hand with the proposals for the development of regional research organisations, including commodity research stations. Another contribution (though more indirect) is the provision of the necessary legal sanction for the centralised marketing of any particular crop or commodity, which, by securing a better level of return to the producer, allows him to maintain and improve his standards of production. The African Governments should also secure the co-operation of agriculturists in measures designed to secure the more economical use of labour. This will involve not only providing better conditions of service for labour, but also studying methods of inducing increased efficiency, including possibly modifications in the methods of payment of labour. There is, of course, no doubt that additional capital investment would contribute to the greater efficiency of production, and this in turn is very much dependent on the assurance of remunerative prices. (This question, however forms the subject of a separate paper).

6. Before turning to discuss the increased productivity of the African peasant producer, it would be convenient to refer to a type of development which may have possibilities in territories where circumstances such as the institution of Native Trust Lands, prohibit the development of non-African agriculture by private interests except where it is done in the interests of the Africans. In such territories there appears scope for investigation into the possibilities which would allow of an arrangement of the non-African agriculturist displaying his initiative and enterprise in ventures which, developed on a co-operative basis with the African producers and with proper safeguards, could be used as important agents in development of agricultural production. Examples which serve to illustrate this possibility are the development of Tung production in the Vipya in Nyasaland as also the limited development of flue-cured tobacco production in Kenya in co-operation with the British American Tobacco Company.

7. *African agriculture*. There is today general agreement that African agriculture can not secure the improvements in productivity which are necessary by continued dependence on the efforts of the individual family working with primitive tools and that radical changes in the system of agriculture are required in order to permit operations on a larger scale, with increased use of mechanical assistance and with

the basic object of increased productivity.

8. These ideas have not, so far, been reduced to any precise detail and it is immediately obvious that no single scheme of re-organisation can be universally applicable to all crops in all parts of Africa. Quite apart from the marked variations in social conditions, the strength of tradition and similar factors the technical conditions of different crops are markedly different and the system of [organisation differs][9] from one to another.

9. Looking only to the technical factors, experience and practice both in Africa and in other parts of the world suggest that the form of organisation most conducive to efficiency and cheapness of production must vary with the characteristics of individual crops. In the case of tree crops there are many indications that cultivation and harvesting can be most efficiently performed by small family groups. West African cocoa is a good example. On the other hand where quality of output is of major importance and special care is needed to maintain high quality or where complicated or novel techniques are required, it has hitherto been found that, in general, operations on the estate scale are more efficient even with tree crops, e.g. coffee and palm oil.

10. It is no more possible to generalise as regards the scale of operations most appropriate for annual crops. African experience and practice show a wide range of variations, e.g. sugar in Africa is normally almost entirely grown on an Estate basis, while ground nuts have hitherto been grown almost entirely on a peasant or small-holding basis. Elsewhere in the world, however, there is extensive sugar cultivation by small holders selling their cane to central factories, while the latest entrant into the field of ground nut production is the new United Kingdom corporation which proposes to undertake an estate development on a scale probably larger than has ever been attempted before for a single crop by one organisation.

11. It is necessary, therefore, to examine all cases individually and to be prepared to experiment in a variety of different forms of organisation, in order to discover that which is most suitable in particular conditions. As already indicated the technical needs are for greater variety and flexibility of cultural practices, including the adoption of systems of mixed farming; increased use of mechanical appliances; increased use of fertilizers and generally increased application of scientific knowledge. Most of these changes would necessitate increased capital resources and many of them, particularly the use of mechanical appliances, involve organisation on a scale larger than that of the family small holding since many such appliances cannot economically be used on so small a scale. They demand also more individual specialisation and more complex division of labour, e.g. the maintaining power-driven machinery.

12. It is necessary to ensure that the community can protect its long term interest in the land by vesting in it the general control of land usage together with the power to require specific operations or measures to protect the land. It would not now be disputed that land utilisation in its widest sense must be related to the long-term needs of the community as a whole and not to the immediate advantage of individual owners or occupiers. This is obviously the case in such matters as soil conservation. Similar considerations arise also in the organisation of measures to

[9] The text is broken at this point in the original.

prevent or control diseases and pests. It does not, however, necessarily follow that individual ownership or management of the land is impossible and that the effective unit of detailed control must be a communal one. It may be that the measures necessary in the communal interest can be enforced by a system of regulations or conditions attached to the ownership or occupation of land. In the case of particular measures for dealing with diseases of pests, e.g. the spraying of crops, it may also be found that the actual carrying out of the operations is best done communally but that is a matter for examination in individual cases.

13. The primary desiderata on the side of organisation which may be inferred from these technical needs are therefore larger-scale organisation giving scope for division of labour and individual specialisation; a basis of operation which will encourage the investment of capital resources; and the adoption of systems of operation and/or control which will ensure the paying of due regard to the interests of the community in such matters as soil conservation and prevention of spread of disease and pests.

14. The securing of these desiderata in practice is inevitably affected by the prevailing system of land tenure and the general social structure of the agricultural communities concerned. The traditional conception of land tenure amongst African tribes is one of tribal ownership under which, as Hailey sums up, "rights to land have the character of a privilege based on membership of a community, entitling every member to beneficial use of the community lands rather than a specific right over specific areas identified with the holder". In general, individual rights of usufruct are confined to cultivable land (including resting land), but permanent grazing areas and woodland remain unallocated and are available for the beneficial use of the community as a whole. The normal unit of agricultural production is, moreover, that of the single family directing the greater part of its efforts to production for its own use, and only a minor part to production for exchange. This is not to say that there are not many exceptions to the form nor that changes in the social structure and the system of land tenure are not taking place. Governments are, however, in a position to influence the direction of such changes and it is therefore important to review against the background of the desiderata set out above from the economic standpoint the possible directions of change.

15. *Three lines of development for producing larger scale farming.* Experience both in Africa and the world at large suggests three possible main lines of organisation and development which could meet the general needs outlined in paragraph 18: that is the emergence of a class of larger farmers holding substantially greater areas than the present small holdings on tenures which would enable them to raise capital on the security of their lands; the grouping together of smallholders in co-operatives which would enable them to make joint use of mechanical appliances and secure finance for other necessary technical changes; and a more integrated grouping of a number of cultivators in a particular area in some form of collective farm.

16. (1) *Large scale individual farming.* There is no doubt that it is by the first course that changes and technical improvements have normally taken place in the countries of Western Europe and America and there are examples of the growth of and the beginning of farmers operating on a larger scale and employing labour even in those parts of Africa in which the plantation system has not been introduced and which are thought of as exclusively African. Developments of that kind must, of

course, carry with them social consequences of wide significance and in some respects undesirable, particularly the parallel emergence of a class of landless agricultural labourers. At the same time it must not be forgotten that such a development gives play to the enterprise and initiative of individual Africans and it would not be automatically ruled out because of the possible social evils carried in its train. There should be some weighing of the advantages by way of rapid economic development and increased productivity against such social evils and study of the steps which can be taken to check or offset the undesirable developments while retaining the incentive to individual effort which such a development obtains. In particular areas and especially where a movement of that kind has already made some progress, it is therefore for very serious consideration whether it may not be best for Government to recognise its inevitability and attempt a policy of simultaneously removing the obstacles which traditional custom and law, particularly in the matter of land tenure, may oppose to it and taking due measures to mitigate the consequential social evils.

17. A system of organisation dependent on larger individual holdings would itself encourage individual stabilisation and division of labour and, in the sense that certain individuals could from the economic point of view best cease to be cultivators of the land and become specialised mechanics or salesmen or book-keepers, the emergence of a landless class would not be wholly disadvantageous. Such a system is also compatible with the exercise of control in the communal interest by regulations or conditions imposed on the occupancy of land, although it is perhaps likely that the communal interest will be less well served than by systems of occupation and cultivation more directly under communal control. It would again be possible, as is done commonly enough in other parts of the world, for . . . services connected with the eradication of disease and pests, to be undertaken on a communal basis even in a community in which the basic system was one of individual farming.

18. (2) *Co-operative organisation*. The second obvious line of development is that of co-operation. There have already been successful developments of co-operative societies in Africa, particularly dealing with tree crops, e.g. the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, and the Bugishu coffee scheme in Uganda. Such organisations have paid particular attention to co-operation in marketing and processing, but it is worth recording that the Kilimanjaro experiment had its genesis in an Association formed for the purpose of purchasing spraying equipment and chemicals for communal use.

19. It must, however, be recognised that in the present state of African society the successful founding of such co-operative organisations cannot safely be left to the efforts of the Africans themselves. They need encouragement and guidance from Government Co-operative Departments and have hitherto needed the service of European commercial assistance on the marketing side of their work. Indeed, the extent of the assistance given in these ways in the examples already quoted is such that it is difficult to regard them as yet being established as fully-fledged co-operative organisations. It is legitimate to have great hopes of the ultimate future of co-operation as a form of economic organisation in Africa, but in its true form of voluntary association it is a plant of slow growth and, although it is clearly essential that governments should take all possible steps to encourage its development, it would be wrongly optimistic to hold out hopes that this method alone is likely within a short space of time to achieve the economic re-organisation which is needed to

secure the necessary technical improvements essential for increased African productivity.

20. (3) *Grouping of cultivators in traditional social groups*. There remains therefore for consideration the third possibility of a more integrated and controlled grouping of cultivators. It is possible that in the immediate future the most important means of increasing agricultural productivity amongst the indigenous cultivators of Africa is to evolve a system of group farming which, while taking full regard of the social organisation and conception of land tenure of the African, would permit of the employment of modern methods of production, including mechanisation, and would encourage and develop division of labour and specialisation within a rural community. Such a system might be organised on co-operative lines. In fact co-operation itself may well be found to flourish best where it is identified with a traditional social unit though it may be expected to be appropriate for other conditions as well.

21. It is by no means suggested that a common basis for group cultivation could be established in all areas and much investigation of socio-economic character would be needed to determine the social organisation which peculiar tribal or local considerations suggest as the basis in different areas. In Northern Nigeria it might be the village unit; in part of East and Central Africa it might be the kinship group. In some cases where the old conception of tribal ownership of land has largely disintegrated, the newly created group might approximate much more to the status of a co-operative society.

22. *Need to adapt system of land tenure*. In connection with the establishment of such integrated units it should be possible to secure adaptations of the system of land tenure by the grant to the unit of some form of long leasehold or even of formal freehold subject to specified restrictions which would give the necessary security for beneficial occupation and improvement and for the raising of capital and would encourage the undertaking of capital works such as soil conservation works, water supplies and public buildings, including schools, dispensaries, etc. by establishing a firm sense of the ownership of the land. The change would also provide a unit of operation large enough to make it possible to undertake mechanisation on an economic basis and to encourage direct transition from hand cultivation with primitive hand tools to cultivation with tractor units, avoiding the intermediate stage of ox cultivation, and leaving the livestock of the unit to fill the role of producers of milk, meat and manure. The minimum economic size of the unit would need to be established after trial, but such investigations would be greatly assisted by the existence of a number of units of group cultivation of the kind under discussion. Finally, such units would assist in the development of individual specialisation and division of labour. It they were properly integrated with the general social management of the community concerned it should be possible to ensure for example that an individual trained in the use of power driven machinery for agricultural purposes could also be in charge of other mechanical requirements of the community. Innumerable other examples in which the joint use of specialised personnel would be economic could be found.

23. *Part to be played by the government*. The development of a system of integrated groups of this kind requires even more conscious effort by Government than the development of co-operative organisations. It would be foreign to our system of democratic development to attempt to follow Russian examples and create

by compulsion a system of state collective farms in the manner of the Russians, but it is none the less possible for Government to-day to do a great deal by investigating possibilities, demonstrating the results and by offering inducements. It is suggested therefore that the possibilities of this line of development, the potentialities of which are so great, should be the subject of large-scale investigations and experiments. Detailed suggestions are contained in an appendix showing tentatively the financial costs of such experiments.

24. Indeed the general approach to this whole question of the reorganisation of African agriculture must be a combination of deliberate conscious investigation and of less closely organised trial and error. In those cases in which it may be thought to the best advantage to permit a development of larger individual holdings, the main role of Government must be that of removing the legal and customary obstacles while retaining or adding to the necessary controls in the community interest and then leaving the processes or [? of] trial and error by individuals to work out the right solutions. If reliance is placed on co-operative or group organisations, the role of Government is more positive. In the first case there is an apparent wastefulness in that many individual efforts may be found to be abortive or mistaken but on the other hand the greater scope given to the display of energy and initiative may result in the mobilisation of a greater net volume of energy. In group organisations closer co-ordination may lead to less wastefulness of effort (although wrong decisions are still possible by group organisations as well as by individuals), but it may be more difficult to engender the same degree of individual energy. It cannot in any event be too often repeated that the fundamental approach must be one of widespread and bold experimentation.

25. A fundamental problem in developing African agricultural production on the basis of larger farms run on modern lines is the lack, at present, of Africans capable of exercising managerial functions. There is no sign as yet of any native genius in this direction among Africans and there is a very real need to attempt the training of men who must ultimately run these farms. It will clearly not be economic to provide permanent European management as the cost of this would very much restrict and ultimately cripple any development which might take place. It will almost certainly be necessary to provide some form of European managerial direction in the beginning possibly even to the extent of the detailed running of a number of experimental farm units. This should, however, be restricted to as short a time as possible and European participation should be reduced as quickly as possible to supervision and later to inspection and advice. Although it is possible that something may be done to train Africans for this work in educational institutions, it is more than likely that any success which may be achieved will result from practical training. One of the principal functions, therefore, of the initial experimental African group farms would be to train carefully chosen and promising men to take over the management of the old farms and the inauguration of new farms at the earliest possible time.

26. *Conclusion*. This paper has been concerned with the possibility of improving African agricultural production by changes in traditional agricultural organisation. A very wide variety of conditions exist in Africa both as regards crops, sociological and agricultural conditions and clearly a similarly wide variety of solutions may be suitable to given sets of conditions. It is essential, therefore, that no possible line of development should be neglected. Experimentation should go on in several direc-

tions at once including co-operation among small holders and between them and non-native farmers; and the granting of facilities and assistance by the Governments to encourage the development of holdings of more economic size either by private initiative or by co-operative or group enterprise. Government should undertake without delay such investigation into land tenure or sociological or economic conditions as may be found necessary for the purpose of these experiments. Reorganised agriculture must increase production materially and be run on an economic basis. European managers and technicians are therefore too expensive for general use and if found necessary in initial experiments must be replaced by Africans who should be trained for the purpose as quickly as possible. Finally it is urgently necessary that steps should be taken to increase production as quickly as possible, as only in this way can the African territories achieve real material progress. Moreover funds are available at present for precisely this type of development work and the fullest advantage should be taken of present circumstances by making an early start.

APPENDIX

1. The proposed investigations would involve experiments in communal development of selected areas by a group of administrative and technical officers working with an African population of say 1000 families. They would consist in the establishment of a centre of joint experimentation on the problems of development and an extension area covering say 60 to 70 square miles.

2. It would obviously be difficult and unwise to attempt to define rigidly the scope of the subjects to be considered, but they should include:—

Basic agricultural systems.

Breeding, feeding and management of livestock.

Types and economic scope of stationary and mobile power units and field and barn implements and machinery, and transport.

African diet and any measures for incorporation in the economy of the rural population.

Rural building and road construction.

Local political and social structure and the modification or adaptation necessary to fit it for its function of stimulating and guiding development.

Marketing organisation and its development, including co-operation and the development of producer, consumer and thrift societies and the development of credit societies based on collective security.

3. The functions of the centre could be defined as:—

(a) Investigation of existing political, social and economic conditions in the whole area.

(b) Experimentation on the problems involved in rural development.

(c) Training of technicians and others required in a developing community, e.g. tractor drivers, artisans such as builders, soil conservationists, stockmen, dairymen, market masters, clerks, health workers, brewers, etc.

(d) Simple survey of the whole area and its apportionment for optimum land usage.

(e) The gradual reorganisation of the whole area by the application of results obtained in the joint investigation carried out at the centre.

4. While it is anticipated that the first phase would be largely concerned with investigations into existing conditions, much experimental work would also be possible concurrently with such investigational work. For example, on the assumption that on *a priori* grounds a case exists for the introduction of tractor units and implements, trials would be required to establish the most suitable type of units and their economic possibilities under conditions obtaining in the area. Similarly experiments on local structural materials and their use in rural building and road construction could be made. Experiments could also be carried out on crop and animal products, e.g. milk, ghee, butter, hides and skins, mechanical processing of food, storage of food, etc.

5. It is suggested that the work of the centre should be planned on the assumption that:—

(a) Some form of group organisation for purposes of social and economic development is possible and desirable.
(b) Mechanisation and modernisation of agricultural production, including the use of artificial fertilisers, is desirable.
(c) Division of labour and specialisation inside the community are inevitable.
(d) The agricultural produce of the community will be disposed of collectively after meeting the needs of the community.
(e) Capital investment will be required to improve and increase production.
(f) Such capital investment must be related to the production of the community and the charges met from the proceeds from the disposal of this production.

6. On this basis a considerable capital sum would be required for the development of the extension area, including provision for mechanical transport and mechanised equipment and for the building of dams, roads, etc. The interest and sinking fund on this capital, together with the recurrent costs of cultivation etc., should be provided from the proceeds of the surplus marketable production, any surplus receipts over and above that requested to meet expenditure being distributed to the African peasants. Purely for the purposes of illustration a table is attached showing the possible cost of agricultural development of an experiment comprising 70 square miles with 1000 families, together with the possible return from surplus produce. Provision would also be required for housing, clearing, the reorganisation of peasant holdings and other activities which might be developed. To the greatest extent possible the cost of this should be reduced by securing the support of the inhabitants for voluntary communal effort in the construction and maintenance of these works.

7. A considerable Government staff would be required for the operation of these projects. The whole area should be under the control of a senior Administrative Officer, who would require the assistance of at least one Agricultural Officer, a Medical Officer and a Surveyor, with the part or whole-time services of a Sociologist, a Veterinary Officer, a Forestry Officer, a Nutrition Officer and an Agricultural Engineer. Considerable subordinate staff, both African and European, would also be needed. The cost of this staff would have to be a charge against Government or development revenue, at any rate in the first instance. It might amount to £25,000 per annum, including other charges, together with an initial capital expenditure of £100,000 on housing etc.

TABLE

Population 4000 = 1000 families.
Area 70 sq. miles
% cultivable land 50% of which one-third either fallow or under grass ley.
Arable cultivation per family per annum 15 acres = 15,000 acres.
Area of cultivation per tractor unit per annum 300 acres = 50 tractor units.
Cost per tractor unit plus motor lorry £800

Capital investment required, say	
Tractors, lorries, implements and machinery	£45,000
Roads, dams, etc.	5,000
Total	£50,000
Surplus marketable production	
(apart from livestock products)	
growing cotton, groundnuts, grain crop.	
Cotton 5,000,000 lbs. @ 14/– per 100 lbs.	£35,000
Groundnuts 700 tons @ £15	10,500
Grain 10,000 bags @ 10/– per bag	5,000
	£50,500
Interest and depreciation charges on capital, say,	
(Machinery and implements 15%	
Other capital 5%)	£7,000

A cess in kind of, say, 20% on surplus produce would meet capital charges and provide for betterment also, leaving for distribution to peasants say £40 per family less operating costs of fuel, wages, fertilisers.

Appendix VII to 59: Memorandum on marketing policy for colonial export products

Objectives

Upon the improved marketing of primary exports depends, to a large extent, the possibility of increasing the real wealth of Colonial peoples and hence of improving social standards and promoting political advancement. Improvement can be sought along two main lines:—

(a) by international cooperation designed to secure a stable level of prices for all primary products on world markets, and

(b) by action in the Colonies themselves designed to strengthen and improve the organisation of producers; to secure for them the maximum possible share of the realisation of overseas sales of their products; to equalise their returns over years of good and bad export prices; to encourage particular lines of production or promote diversification, where appropriate; and generally to provide incentives to accumulate capital and increase investment in primary production.

Attainment of objectives

(a) *International action*

2. It is well known that primary producers suffered most from the extreme and often rapid fluctuations in world market prices which characterised the period between the two world wars and which forced many primary industries to adopt restrictive measures designed to reduce output to correspond with the level of demand at acceptable prices. That fact has been recognised in all international trade discussions since the Hot Springs Conference of 1943; and there is wide agreement that national economic policies should aim at eliminating at least the more violent changes in international values of primary products.

3. It is generally accepted doctrine that the policy of maintaining high and steadily rising levels of effective demand, employment and economic activity, which is now being embodied in the draft Charter for an International Trade Organisation, is basic to the improvement of market conditions for primary producers who depend upon international demand. But as a further safeguard provision is also being included in the same Charter for international consultation and for cooperative action to meet special difficulties which may arise in particular primary industries. That action may involve the regulation of production by mutual agreement of producers and consumers, the creation of buffer stocks or the establishment of an agreed international price range for the primary products concerned; but the circumstances in which a limitation of production may be adopted will be closely defined.

4. It is too early yet to predict how these various international devices for stabilising prices of primary products and for protecting the incomes of primary producers will affect the major Colonial export industries. But it is important to recognise this new approach to the problem of maintaining, by international action taken jointly by producers and consumers in their joint interests, a stable and prosperous international trade in primary products; and Colonial producers should be willing, and indeed anxious, to participate in cooperative efforts on an international scale towards the attainment of this objective.

(b) *Territorial action*

5. It would, however, be imprudent for Colonial producers to rely entirely on international action to ensure the future prosperity of their industries. It is essential that they should take the opportunity offered by the present period of high prices for their products to set their own houses in order. Immediate and direct action can be taken, and has indeed already been taken in some territories, towards improving the marketing organisation for primary products and towards introducing some stability of domestic price. Before outlining this action, however, it is necessary to discuss two suggestions which have received some support as possible means of improving the return to Colonial producers on export sales of primary commodities.

6. The first is an increase in Empire Preference. This suggestion has not been widely canvassed, as it is generally appreciated that international trade policy is now firmly directed against increasing trade barriers; but there has been considerable comment from Colonial producers on the possibility that, in the course of the current international trade discussions, an agreement might be reached to remove, or substantially to modify, existing preferences. This memorandum need not

examine in detail the advantage of Empire Preference to Colonial primary producers; nor need it attempt to forecast the results of the international trade discussions at which the subject of preferences will certainly be raised. It is sufficient to say that, with a few important exceptions, Colonial primary products have to be sold at least partly in foreign markets and their prices cannot normally be increased above the international level by preferential arrangements in the limited Empire market.

7. The second suggestion, which has been more consistently canvassed and has received a much more intelligent body of support from Colonial producers, is that there should be instituted, for the major primary products of the Colonies, a complete system of guaranteed prices which would assure, for a period of years in advance, a fixed return to producers for a specified quantity, preferably the total, of their output. Some system of agreed bulk sales at pre-determined prices may form a very valuable element in policies of collective marketing arriving at greater assurance of stable prices for particular Colonial products; but the following considerations constitute very substantial limitations to the practical extension of any system of fully guaranteed prices.

8. First there is the difficulty of forecasting the money values of Colonial export commodities for the considerable number of years ahead which would be required to make price guarantees of any real worth to Colonial producers. Many Colonial crops require long periods between planting and full bearing and in some cases guarantees, to be practically significant, would have to run for periods of up to fifteen or twenty years. The possibility of changes in relative values of various products, and in the value of sterling or of money, generally, over such a long period is obviously substantial.

9. Secondly, assuming that guaranteed prices has regard, as would no doubt be the case, to the circumstances of each Colonial territory, and in particular to the competitive demands made on capital and labour by other forms of production, varying levels of guaranteed prices would come to be established for the same product in different Colonies, and this would certainly lead to complaints of discrimination as between the groups of producers concerned.

10. Thirdly, any general system of guaranteed prices would raise international complications, in that it would require direct State intervention in the primary industries concerned, and consequently State control over the amounts produced and the prices at which these amounts were offered for sale in international markets. Although the precedent of "support" or "parity" prices is well established within certain territorial boundaries, its extension by His Majesty's Government to Colonial territories might be held to be contrary to the basic principles of international trade which are to be embodied in the Charter of an International Trade Organisation.

11. Fourthly (and this consideration is in itself conclusive), it is impossible to see any source of finance for any general system of guaranteed prices. It could not in most cases be provided by local Governments, whose own finances would be adversely affected just at the times of depression when the guarantees would be called upon. No international source of finance exists for this form of assistance to primary producers. In the economic situation in which the United Kingdom has been left by its all-out war effort, His Majesty's Government simply could not afford to undertake such a general commitment, whatever help they might give in special cases. They certainly could not be expected to guarantee prices for the substantial part of Colonial primary production which is normally sold to foreign countries. The

only circumstances in which the United Kingdom might be willing to enter into a future commitment with Colonial producers would be where there was a prospect by that means of obtaining cheaper supplies for her own consumption; or where United Kingdom buying prices, again for domestic consumption, could thus be equalised over a short period of up and down years. The length of the commitment would probably, in any case, not exceed three to four years, which, as already explained, would be of little value to most Colonial producers.

12. It can, therefore, be taken that there is no practical possibility of instituting any guaranteed system of uniform and fixed prices for Colonial primary products. It would, indeed, be dangerous and unwise for Colonial producers to look for their support to any such system of guaranteed prices underwritten by government.

13. There may well, however, be opportunities of securing price assurances on a more restricted basis. No attempt is made in this memorandum to deal with prices of produce intended for internal consumption, in respect of which it may be found desirable, in the public interest, to give local guarantees. But in the case of export crops, there may also be instances in which consuming interests in this country or elsewhere may be willing to give assurances in order to promote new production of commodities which are in especially short supply. Finally, it may well be possible and advantageous for groups of producers to make bulk contracts with large consumers (whether organised on a Government or on an industry basis) for the sale of the whole, or a substantial part, of their output over a period of years. Such bulk contracts would be regarded not as a species of assistance extended to Colonial producers by the purchasing Government or other consuming interests, but as bargains entered into for the mutual advantage of both sides. Their terms must, therefore, in all cases be subject to individual negotiation. They might be for a shorter or longer period, with prices fixed in advance or varying in accordance with an agreed formula.

14. What then is the policy to be pursued in practice? It appears to be the improved organisation of producers through co-operatives and quantitative marketing institutions for the following essential purposes:—

(1) To improve the physical organisation of marketing and reduce marketing and transport costs;
(2) to improve the bargaining power of producers who have in the past been handicapped by facing as individuals highly concentrated organisations of buyers;
(3) to enable the producers to enter into long-term bulk contracts with consumer interests, of whom the most important are likely to be Departments of His Majesty's Government, for the whole or part of the output concerned for such periods and on the basis of such fixed or variable prices as can be arranged in negotiation with such purchasers; and
(4) Insofar as long-term contracts of the kind referred to in paragraph 3 are not concluded in respect of the whole of the output concerned, to even out world market fluctuations by price stabilisation arrangements.

It should be emphasised that the procedures envisaged in 3 and 4 above are not mutually exclusive but complementary. It would, for instance, be quite possible for an organised group of producers to sell a part of its output to the United Kingdom on an agreed price basis for a period of years, and the remainder to other countries (or indeed as supplementary sales to the United Kingdom itself) at prices varying with

market fluctuations; and to average out the total proceeds on a seasonal or other convenient basis.

15. The lines of development which might be followed in the African Territories to achieve these objectives are sketched below; but it should first be explained, that, in connection with objective (4) it is essential that the direct link between the price received by the producer and the current world market price should be broken, so that, although over a period of years he should receive the same average price as if he had followed every variation of world prices, the producer's actual price will vary much less from the average; i.e. will be above world levels in bad times and below it in good. Various devices are possible to achieve this. For example, Government might impose an export levy when prices are high and pay out a bonus when prices are low. But in most cases the objective will be best achieved by the method of a statutory marketing organisation. It is important to note that, although such an organisation would have to be the sole buyer and seller of the product in the area it covers, there is no need for it to sell in bulk to consuming countries. It can operate perfectly well by selling entirely through commercial channels on a free market or partly through such channels and partly in bulk to Governments or associations of consumers or processors. It is also important to remark that the present time of high prices for Colonial primary products is almost uniquely opportune for creating the reserve funds from which such marketing organisations can be financed and the price stabilisation mechanism brought into operation.

Recommendations

(a) *European industries*

16. The object should be to create, by majority consent of the main European-operated industries, statutory marketing boards covering the whole production of each primary product for a territory, or possibly in some cases for a group of territories, and run by the producers themselves with the advice and assistance of Colonial Governments. Each board should be constituted the sole buyer and seller of the product it covers, should fix prices to growers, should arrange overseas sales through appropriate channels and should create price stabilisation funds and make such other financial arrangements (e.g. for research, rehabilitation of equipment etc.) as it may consider to be in the interests of the industry. Government's function should in the main be limited to providing the statutory framework within which the boards can operate; but in the initial stages, at least, Government would have to play some part in framing the general policy of the boards as regards domestic price levels, fair standards of wages etc., and in ensuring that their selling policy conformed to accepted international trade arrangements.

17. The legislation required to provide for collective marketing of European crops on the lines suggested in the preceding paragraph would have to be drawn up to meet the requirements of each industry. The Kenya Pyrethrum Ordinance, 1938, does, however, indicate the general form which such legislation might follow; and the relevant extract from the Ordinance will be found in Appendix I.*

(b) *Peasant industries*

18. Here a similar procedure might generally be followed except that, in the first

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instance and until such time as the producers can so organise themselves as to be able to run their own affairs, the boards to be set up might have to be controlled by a majority of Government or Government nominated members and Colonial Governments would have to play a larger part in the control of price and selling policy and in the executive work of the collective marketing schemes. As a model for legislation establishing a collective marketing scheme for a peasant industry, the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board Bill, which is appended as Appendix II*, may be quoted.

19. It should be emphasised that these proposals for the organisation of collective marketing on a territorial or area basis and for the introduction of domestic price stabilisation policies are not incompatible with international action on the lines described earlier in this memorandum. Territorial action may indeed be a prerequisite of successful co-operation in the international field.

20. To implement the territorial proposals, considerable planning both by Colonial Governments, and where possible by Colonial industries themselves, will be needed; and it may be desirable in some Colonies to set up an ad hoc Commission for the purpose of drawing up collective marketing schemes. In general, however, organised industries should be encouraged themselves to submit marketing schemes. When a scheme has been approved and the required legislation introduced, it should be the aim to run it as an executive unit, co-ordination of policy between various schemes in the same area being affected through a central produce board or through a Government chairman or Government nominees sitting on a number of territorial boards dealing with similar commodities.

21. The provision of funds for new marketing ventures will require careful consideration. They may be provided out of accumulated reserves (where surpluses have accrued during the war years or during the subsequent price boom) or from Government advances or Government guaranteed overdrafts with the banks. The amounts required and the most convenient method of raising these amounts would, however, fall to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the industry concerned.

22. As has been said, collective marketing schemes have already been devised for a number of important African primary industries and more are now in course of preparation. Details of organisation can be worked out only by close study of the conditions of each industry. For convenience a statement of the current position with regard to marketing arrangements for the principal African export crops is attached as Appendix III*.

Appendix VIII to 59: Education policy in Africa

Part I. General policy

The purpose of this memorandum is to consider the means of securing a more rapid and effective development of the education services in Africa. This involves an examination of the manner in which our limited financial resources may most effectively be used to ensure that education may play its full part in the social, economic and political development of the African territories. Political development will go forward with an increasing strong impetus irrespective of Government action, and if educational development can not keep pace with it, the results may well be

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disastrous. This is already apparent in Nigeria, where the Zik press is exercising a highly dangerous influence on a partly literate but at the same time uneducated public and is threatening to distort the whole political development of the country. The people of the African Territories are demanding more education. International opinion at U.N.E.S.C.O. is jealously watching our actions in the educational field. A vigorous effort in education is needed throughout Africa and it must be aimed not only at increasing the numbers receiving education but at raising the quality of the education given.

2. *Objectives*. The three objectives of education in the African Territories must be:—

(a) To spread education as widely as possible among the people in order to give them both the desire and the capacity for social, economic and political progress;
(b) To train as many African men and women as possible for higher posts in the Government service, the professions, missionary work and business and as leaders in politics, local Government, trade unions and the co-operative movement;
(c) To strengthen and develop the cultural and other links between this country and the African territories.

These objectives are not intended to be placed in any order of priority.

3. *Present state of the education services*. As far as numbers of children receiving education at present is concerned, the position cannot be described as satisfactory. The numbers in primary schools represent only a relatively small part of the child population, and the situation will become more serious as population rapidly increases. Secondary education is quite inadequate and the facilities for it are insufficient even in relation to the numbers in primary schools; the educational pyramid is in fact too narrow towards the top. A start only has been made with higher education. The facilities for higher technical and vocational training are quite insufficient and technical training at a lower level is also inadequate.

4. The position will be greatly improved when the development programmes of the African territories have been carried into effect. The planning of these programmes has, however, been hampered in the field of education by the relatively high cost of educational expansion as compared with other services, a factor which is due to the heavy cost of expanding the numbers of elementary teachers. In the three mainland East African territories for example the education programmes have had to be reduced, owing to inadequate financial resources, to levels which cannot be regarded as satisfactory. In Zanzibar on the other hand a sufficient level of educational expansion has been obtained only by means of devoting to education well over a third of the total finance available for development.

5. Educational facilities are not only inadequate in quantity; in many areas they are also deficient in quality. To too great an extent each level of education is providing the teaching which ought to be provided in the level below. The higher colleges have to give sixth form teaching. Their students coming from the secondary schools have often read little or nothing beyond the handful of text books used in their class work, have not learned to use libraries, indexes and books of reference and have concentrated far too much on learning facts and conventional opinions without learning to think for themselves. The secondary schools are under-staffed and under-equipped and are driven to concentrate on cramming pupils for examinations not only through their own shortages of staff and equipment but also owing to the

unsatisfactory nature of the pupils whom they draw from the primary schools. The primary school is often of poor quality partly through isolation, the malnutrition of the people and irregular attendance owing to the too early employment of children, but mainly through the inadequate numbers of teachers, leading to too large classes and too wide an age range in the pupils.

6. These deficiencies are not due to incapacity or lack of energy on the part of teachers and education departments. They are due largely to lack of financial resources. The assistance now available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act will much improve future prospects, but even with this assistance the African territories cannot yet afford the full financial provision for education which is needed to enable development to be sufficiently rapid and effective. It is all the more necessary that the resources which we have should be laid out to the best possible advantage and that the people themselves should be induced to contribute to the expansion of schools on a much greater scale than they have done in the past.

7. *The immediate aim of policy*. The question is often asked whether education policy should concentrate in the first place on expanding the education system so as to provide primary schooling for the maximum number of people or whether we should aim at giving a full education up to the University level to a limited elite. The distinction is not by any means an absolute one, since all parts of the educational structure depend on each other. Higher education provides the teachers for secondary education. Without secondary education there will be no pupils for the higher colleges or teachers for the primary schools. The secondary schools depend on the intake of properly qualified pupils from the primary level. No African Government can afford to neglect either higher education, including higher technical and vocational training, or secondary education, or primary education. Above all a sufficient number of properly qualified teachers must be produced both for the secondary and for the primary schools. Teachers are the key to the whole problem of educational advancement.

8. While, however, the various levels of education are each of them essential to the whole structure, a genuine choice does exist with regard to the point in this structure at which the immediate Government effort and the weight of United Kingdom assistance should be thrown in. The decision is a most important one, since the Secretary of State is in a position through the monies available under the C.D. and W. Act to exercise a predominant influence on the development of education in Africa.

9. There can be little doubt that, in so far as assistance under the C.D. and W. Act is concerned, the main immediate effort should be directed to the higher levels of education, to higher colleges, technical and vocational institutes, secondary schools and teacher training colleges. An increase in the numbers and an improvement of the quality of secondary schools and teacher training colleges is necessary, as we have already said, both to provide teachers for the primary schools and pupils for the higher colleges. The development of higher colleges and of higher vocational and technical institutes must not be postponed until there is a widely established system of secondary schooling. Africa cannot afford to waste the abilities of those who are fit for higher education; and where higher education is so scarce, each African who has received it will have an influence in the community far beyond that to which the education he has received would entitle him where education is more widely spread.

10. By concentrating our main effort on the higher ranges of education we shall

best be fulfilling the three objectives mentioned in paragraph 2 above. In the first place the higher ranges of education will provide the men and women to fill the higher posts both inside and outside the Government. They will produce independent citizens qualified to lead the people and with a sense of balance and reality which is too seldom available at present. They will train the technical and professional men who will be needed to develop the natural resources of the territories.

11. Secondly the higher colleges, and also the technical institutes and secondary schools of high standard, will provide a constant link with this country through the close and friendly understanding which will be developed between the future leaders of African society and the lecturers and teachers drawn from Universities and schools in this country. The channels through which British ideas can flow into Africa will at the same time be diversified—a most important consideration in countries which have necessarily had to rely in the past on the official channel only. Moreover with the gradual loosening of political control over the African territories, as they proceed towards self-government, the development of colleges and schools in the British tradition, with advice and assistance from academic institutions in this country, will provide a valuable point of contact between this country not dependent on any constitutional relationship.

12. Finally the initial emphasis on the higher ranges of education will be best calculated to promote the third objective of securing the effective and ultimately the rapid development of primary education. The higher colleges will not only contribute directly to the education of the people through their extra-mural departments. By raising the level of the secondary schools through the supply of adequately qualified teachers, higher education will also enable the secondary schools to discharge their responsibility more adequately both to the primary schools and to the community at large. The secondary schools moreover, once they are able to send into the primary schools and into the general life of the country people with a better education than that at present given in the primary schools, will promote a general rise in the intellectual level of the country, which will be reflected in the standard of the primary schools themselves.

13. The development of higher and secondary education to a better standard of quality will in fact have the direct result of improving the quality of the whole educational system, stimulating the development of African culture and indeed raising the intellectual level of the countries concerned. We have no greater contribution to make to African education at the present time than to raise its quality. Our first efforts must be directed to this end and by raising the quality of education generally we shall be making a far greater and more enduring contribution to the development of the African territories than by concentrating on a quantitative expansion of primary education. The provision of first class higher and secondary education should moreover, help to raise the enthusiasm of the people for education generally to a sufficient pitch to induce them to make the contributions which will be needed for an adequate expansion of the primary school system.

14. There is one final argument for the course proposed. For higher education, both academic and technical, and for secondary schools and teacher training colleges the necessary staff and expert knowledge are at present available in the Territories themselves only to a very limited extent. It is only with the skilled personnel and the experience of the Universities and teaching profession of this country to support

them, that the African territories can hope to establish higher, technical and secondary institutes of the necessary quality. It is all the more appropriate that the higher ranges of education should be supported by the substantial financial help from this country which is needed equally with staff and advice. The primary schools on the other hand, which are situated in the villages and towns, must rely on local staff and can best function under local management, and it is appropriate that they should be supported to the maximum possible degree by local finance. The teacher training colleges must be responsible for providing them with sufficient qualified teachers, but, these teachers having been supplied, the local communities ought themselves to provide a large part of the funds needed to construct the necessary schoolbuildings, to pay the teachers and to run the schools.

15. *Aims of policy*. The aims of our education policy must therefore be to secure the full support and co-operation of the people in each area for the necessary expansion of primary schools, while to the maximum degree possible outside assistance should be concentrated on the higher levels of education. The manner in which this policy shall be carried into effect is suggested in the following paragraphs.

Part II. Programme of action

16. *Higher education*. The necessary financial provision should be made under the C.D. and W. Act to ensure that, with such financial provision as can be made by the territories themselves, higher colleges of sufficient quality may be established on a sufficient scale. University Colleges are to be built up in East Africa, Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The people of the Gold Coast, through their representatives, have made it clear that they are determined to have a University College in their territory and a Committee, with strong African membership, which reported last year, has indicated that the necessary funds can be provided locally. A limited provision only will therefore be required from C.D. and W. monies for the Gold Coast University College, but large assistance from the C.D. and W. Vote will be needed both for Nigeria and the East African University College. It is provisionally estimated that a total sum of £3,000,000 will be required from the higher education allocation under the C.D. and W. Vote for University Colleges in the African territories. Assistance with regard to staff and advice with regard to buildings, constitutions, syllabuses etc., will presumably continue to be provided as at present by the Inter-University Council.

17. *Technical education*. The development of technical education has been neglected in the past in most British African territories. The lack of it is a most serious gap in the educational structure and is having a most damaging effect on the development of the territories, particularly in the economic sphere. There is great room for the increased employment of Africans in higher technical posts in Government, commerce and industry and great need for increasing the skill of African tradesmen and artisans. The French and Belgian territories have made considerably more progress than we have in the development of technical education. A major effort should now be made to put technical education on a proper footing.

18. The lower levels of technical and commercial training must form part of the ordinary development plans of the territories. Considerable provision is already made for this purpose in development programmes and Governments have received every encouragement from the Secretary of State to provide more and better technical schools and technical training. It is believed, nevertheless, that expanded provision will be needed and we recommend that Governments should again be asked to

examine their development programmes from this point of view. In its more advanced stages, technical and vocational training extends into the sphere of higher education. The Inter-University Council has recommended that the West African Governments should establish Polytechnics, which would not be university institutions, in that they would not provide degree courses (or even parts thereof, such as the intermediate), but would be post-secondary institutions providing vocational training combined with general education up to at least the Higher School Certificate standard. The functions of these Polytechnics would include the training of secondary school teachers, youth leaders and welfare workers; advanced technical and vocational courses, some of which are now provided separately by Government departments; training in commerce; and adult education. In East Africa similar ideas have gained currency and although all forms of vocational training might not fall within their scope there is a great opportunity for establishing Polytechnics on the foundations laid in the excellent training schemes now being provided for Africans demobilised from the services.

19. The Polytechnic would fill the gap in the education structure which so badly needs to be filled and the maximum degree of encouragement and assistance should be given to African Governments to enable them to establish institutions of this kind. Provision for Polytechnics on the lines described above has not been made in the Development Programme of any of the African territories and there may be difficulties about providing the whole of the finance required for these institutions from local resources or from the territorial or regional allocations under the C.D. and W. Act. The possibility of using central monies under the Act to finance the capital sums required will therefore have to be considered. Recurrent expenditure should normally be provided either from local funds or from territorial allocations under the Act, although in the special case of Sierra Leone some recurrent assistance from central sources is likely to be required at first. It is unlikely that more than five institutions of this kind can be set up before 1956 but it is probable that nine will eventually be required. Three will probably be needed in Nigeria, one in the Gold Coast, one in Sierra Leone, three in East Africa and one in Central Africa.

20. The new Polytechnics will need much assistance from this country in the form of staff and advice. This assistance can not strictly be provided through the machinery of the Inter-University Council, seeing that it will be from the Technical Institutes and Polytechnics of this country that the staff and advice must come and not from the Universities themselves. It is understood that the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies has not recently given special study to the subject of technical education. It is recommended that the Advisory Committee should be invited to set up an ad hoc committee on this subject, on which one or more representatives of the Inter-University Council might be invited to serve, with the object of recommending the machinery required to secure that the advice and assistance needed by the new Polytechnics in Africa and elsewhere can be provided by the proper sources in this country.

21. *Secondary education and teacher training*. Secondary education (including teacher training at the secondary level) must form part of the ordinary development programmes of the territories and must be financed from local resources with assistance from the territorial allocations under C.D. and W. Act. In view, however, of its key position in the educational structure, it is essential that secondary education should be given first priority in the allocation of territorial C.D. and W.

assistance. It is important also that the C.D. and W. grants should be made in such a way as to ensure that the quality of secondary education is raised. This can normally best be achieved by aiming at the building up of a relatively small number of secondary schools and teacher training institutes, thus making it easier to ensure that really high standards are attained. This concentration of effort may admittedly sometimes cause denominational difficulties for the missionary societies, but these difficulties can be overcome and should not be allowed to interfere with the attainment of higher standards of quality. The extreme importance of providing good secondary education and teacher training for all the African territories cannot be emphasized too strongly. Neither higher education nor primary education can succeed without them.

22. Particularly at first large numbers of teachers will be required from this country for the secondary schools. Negotiations have been proceeding for some time with the Ministry of Education and the local Education Authorities in this country and have now reached a point at which it is possible to say that in the near future teachers are likely to be available in some quantity from the United Kingdom on a system of secondment for periods not exceeding five years. Much interest is being shown by United Kingdom teachers in the possibility of such short-term service in Colonial territories and there is every reason to hope that when the final arrangements are made and we are open to receive applications we shall receive as many as we need. The European staff at all levels of the educational structure, but particularly in secondary schools, have a special task to perform in relation to their African colleagues. At the present stage of development the European staff must largely supply the momentum for expansion and the raising of standards. They also have an important part to play in encouraging the African staff to higher professional standards and a greater professional solidarity. For this purpose closer social and intellectual contacts between the European and African staff should be encouraged. Selected African teachers, both men and women, should be sent to this country for advanced training, but the main work of raising the level of the African teaching profession must take place in Africa itself. It may be desirable to encourage the formation of unions of teachers on a local and territorial basis wherever these do not exist already.

23. *Primary education*. The finance required for primary education should be provided to the maximum possible extent from the funds of each territory, whether central or local. In the case of some of the poorer territories C.D. and W. assistance may be needed for primary education, but this should as far as possible be confined to the capital costs, although again there may be cases in which some help towards recurrent expenditure is unavoidable. Internally it is suggested that the long term aim of the African Governments should be to secure the major part of the funds needed for primary education from the local communities concerned through their local government bodies whether native authorities, local native councils, municipalities or township authorities. Grants from Central Government funds would then be used to assist their budgets much as C.D. and W. assistance is used to assist budgets of Colonial Governments. Admittedly the local government bodies will not be able to shoulder the burden at present in many cases to anything like the full extent, but if primary education is to be expanded on the scale which is desirable, it is only through increased financial support from the local communities concerned that this will be possible.

24. *Co-operation of the people.* If the people themselves through their local government bodies are to be asked to make a greatly increased contribution towards the establishment and maintenance of primary schools in their areas, their interest and indeed their enthusiasm for this expansion of education must be aroused. This enthusiasm already exists in many areas and local rates for education have been imposed by native authorities on their own initiative. The movement for raising local funds for the purpose, whether by rates or fees, must, however be widely extended. The co-operation of the people can be secured in the first place by establishing local education committees which would be responsible for the management of the schools and in the second place by setting up central, provincial and district education advisory committees, which would be concerned with the framing of policy and on which there should be strong African representation. There is now a real appreciation in the Gold Coast of the problems involved in the expansion of education, and to a great degree this can be attributed to the work of the Committee on Education which sat for four years from 1937 to 1941, and of the Advisory Committee subsequently established as a standing body.

25. *Mass education.* Mass education can also play an important part in arousing the enthusiasm of the people for practical steps towards the expansion of education. Mass education may be described as the process of inducing the people to help themselves. It is concerned not only with educational activities such as mass literacy and adult education; it may also be used as one of the means of encouraging the people to participate in campaigns for better hygiene, better housing, social welfare, etc. Mass education cannot, in effect, succeed unless the people understand the reasons for the measures being taken and are prepared to co-operate closely in them. Mass education is not an expensive adjunct to the rest of the education programme. On the contrary it is a means by which the people themselves may be persuaded to give their free effort and financial support for ordinary educational work. It may ultimately be found to be the only effective means of securing the enthusiastic support of the people for a financial effort great enough to achieve anything approaching universal literacy. Mass education must therefore take its place as an essential part of our educational policy in Africa. Other forms of education would not be complete without it.

26. Mass education may help to secure a possible substantial saving in the cost of primary education. If the people could be induced to co-operate, schools could make much greater use of home-made materials for furniture, school equipment etc., and in many cases locally made equipment could be substituted for the more expensive articles imported from the United Kingdom. School buildings could be put up more cheaply, and sometimes even by the free and willing labours of the people of the village or town concerned. Expensive buildings must everywhere be avoided, since it is on the teachers and not on the buildings that the quality of the schools will depend. At some stage the use of pupil teachers will have to be considered as a further economy, but this is not possible at present in most areas, since the quality of primary school teachers is too low to permit of dilution. Pupil teachers can be made use of only when the teacher training institutes have improved both their standards and their output; this is indeed an additional argument for directing special attention to the higher ranges of education, including teacher training at the secondary level.

Part III. Certain other problems

27. *Education for women and girls*. There are three other problems which are dealt with in this part of the memorandum not because they are of less importance, but because they can most conveniently be discussed separately from the main subject discussed in Part I and Part II. The first problem relates to the education of girls and women, which is exceedingly backward, far more so than boys' education, in most parts of British Tropical Africa. It is important that all Governments should make adequate plans for a large expansion of the education facilities for girls and women. In many countries it has been found that it is ultimately the women who are the strongest progressive element in the community. At present most women in Africa are backward and illiterate, but in many areas women occupy a socially strong position. They are capable of becoming a powerful progressive force in the community, but it is a force which can only be harnessed if girls and women can be provided with adequate and appropriate schooling.

28. *Co-operation with missionary societies*. The second problem relates to the place of the missionary societies in African education. At one time education in Africa was practically the monopoly of the missions. Now the Governments and native authorities have entered the field to a lesser or greater degree, and, with the large sums being made available by Governments either from their own resources or from the assistance provided under the C.D. and W. Act, the part which the Government will play will become progressively more important, although the missions are of course eligible for and are in fact receiving the benefit of the C.D. and W. assistance. In some areas Africans are showing a desire to assume control of their schools rather than to leave them in the hands of the missionary societies. This is a natural tendency as education spreads and political consciousness develops. It is quite certain nevertheless that the missionary societies will continue to play a very important part in African education for many years to come. It is settled policy that there should be the closest co-operation between the Education departments and missionary education workers. The missionary societies themselves have shown some signs recently of feeling that, in certain areas at any rate, they may no longer be required to play the large part which they have played in the past. Some encouragement to the missions in their educational work may be required at the present time and this might be done by means of a personal message from the Secretary of State to missionary education workers. If this suggestion is thought to be a good one, the best step would probably be for the Secretary of State or the Colonial Office to consult with leading missionaries in this country as to the best means of conveying such a message.

29. *Language of instruction*. The third problem concerns the language of instruction, whether English or the indigenous African languages. Experience in other primitive countries has shown that in the early and middle stages of development the tendency is towards the greater use of the language in which the Government of the country is carried on, but that, when the stage of self-government is reached, feelings of nationalism are likely to lead to a marked swing back to the indigenous language or languages. In Africa while certain of the African languages may ultimately become dominant, with English in secondary use, the tendency in the immediate future will certainly be towards the much wider spread of English, a tendency which is bound to be greatly strengthened in many of the African territories by the diversity of indigenous languages and dialects. It seems that this tendency

ought to be reflected even to a greater extent than it is at present in the educational curriculum. It may well be that we should aim at using English as the main language of instruction even at the lowest levels of education and the increased use of Basic English, or other comparable systems, may be desirable. The use of Basic English in mass education campaigns may also have to be attempted, although in the rural areas mass literacy work may for the present have to be conducted in the indigenous languages.

60 PREM 8/732 11 June 1947

[Proposed African Governors' Conference]: minute by Mr Creech Jones to Mr Attlee

For some time I have been aware how useful a Conference in London of Colonial Governors from the African territories would be, and how valuable a conference of unofficial representatives of the Legislative Councils with Governors and senior officials could prove if one could be arranged in 1948. Many administrative problems are over-ripe for fresh consideration, and there are many major issues of African policy which ought to be discussed with London.

I am therefore having prepared a series of papers for the Governors Conference (which, I would hope, could be held in late October or November) reviewing such questions as the development of local government for Africans and more rapid and effective political evolution, economic development, and the greater use of the natural resources of the Territories, the expansion of the social services (i.e. health and education). There are also to be considered certain international aspects of colonial policy as it affects Africa, and the part which the African Territories are to play in the various international organisations. A Colonial Office Committee with Treasury representation has been engaged on the preliminary work for such conferences.

Because of the great importance of these steps in the colonial field, your approval is asked.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.[1]

[1] Mr Attlee minuted (11 June 1947): 'I approve'.

61 CO 847/36/3, no 9 [Nov 1947]

'Public relations in the colonies': African Governors' Conference paper AGC 8. *Appendix*: extract from *An Australian in India* by R G Casey[1]

(This paper is to be circulated to all Governors under cover of a circular despatch which the Secretary of State hopes to send in the near future.)

The purpose of this memorandum is to define the objectives of public relations work

[1] Gov of Bengal, 1944–1946; federal president, Liberal Party of Australia, 1947–1949.

in the Colonies, and to outline the duties of colonial public relations departments and of the Information Department in the Colonial Office. Before discussing these matters, however, certain misunderstandings as to the meaning of public relations should first be cleared up.

The meaning of public relations

2. The term "public relations" was coined in recent years in an attempt to dissociate genuine public relations work from the stigma attached to "propaganda" and "publicity". Consequently public relations work is now frequently interpreted as the art of publicity—the technique of presenting the activities of a government or business organisation in a favourable light; and public relations work in the Colonies is sometimes thought to begin and end with the Public Relations Officer. In fact, the art of public relations is as old as history. It can perhaps be described as the art of establishing and maintaining within a community a spirit of fellowship and co-operation based on mutual understanding and trust. Public relations may in fact be said to be the whole art of politics. In any discussion of public relations in the Colonies it is important to remember that it has these wide implications, and that the work of a Public Relations Officer and a Public Relations Department cover only a small part of the subject.

The aim of public relations in the colonies

3. The general objective of public relations in the Colonies is to develop mutual understanding and trust among all sections of the community in each Colony, and the particular objective of the Colonial Government in the sphere of public relations is to develop a closer association between the people of the Colony and the local Government, so as to make the people accept the Government as "their" Government. Much can be done, and much is being done, by the grant of broader constitutions, by development of local government, and by the appointment of local officers to senior posts in the government service. But these measures alone are not enough. The people of each Colony have to be brought to realise that the grant of a new constitution, the development of a new system of local government, and the appointment of local officers to senior posts do in fact mean that they are becoming increasingly responsible for their own affairs and that the Colonial Government is "their" government. It is here that a positive public relations policy is needed, and such a policy can only be introduced if *every*[2] senior government officer realises that he has a responsibility in the execution of this policy—that he is in fact a public relations officer for his government.

4. Many officers have been brought up in the fine tradition of "benevolent autocracy" and it is not unnatural that many of them should feel that no real progress would be possible without some degree of autocratic control. But the times have changed. An active political consciousness has appeared among the people. And a real spirit of co-operation must permeate the government service. Every government officer, whatever his standing or his race, must accept and act upon the idea of consultation with the people among whom he works, and must bring reality to such consultation by associating the people in the discussion of measures before they are

[2] Emphasis throughout in original.

taken and in their execution when they have been decided upon. The public must be brought to realise that the initiative does not rest solely with the Colonial Government, and that they too have their part to play.

5. If then a Colonial Government wishes to carry out a positive public relations policy, it should ensure that every senior government officer keeps the public fully informed of every aspect of government action which affects them, consults the public before initiating new action, and, whenever possible, acts on the advice given by the public. Every government officer, whatever his standing, has a further responsibility in the public relations field. The administrative officer, the technician, the clerk, and the messenger are all civil servants; and they must be in word and action true servants of the public among whom they work. These ideas are not new, but they are repeated here to show ways in which a Colonial Government can follow a public relations policy designed with the all-important aim of developing a closer association between the public and the government.

6. There are two factors which complicate the issue in some Colonies, particularly in the African Colonies—race relations, and the clash between the traditional forms of government and the modern ideas adopted by the intelligentsia who have received a European type of education and are unwilling to accept the traditional rule of their fathers. The latter problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is mentioned here as one of the main questions which must be solved if both the more backward and older people and also the educated and younger people are to accept the colonial governments as "their" governments. The question of race relations is, however, of major importance in the sphere of public relations. It is fruitless for a government whose senior officers are of European descent to accept as an aim of policy the development of a closer association between the people and the government unless steps are taken to break down the barriers caused by racial misunderstanding. It is fruitless for the Secretary of State to declare that the policy of "partnership" is replacing the policy of "trusteeship" unless government officials in the Colonies are prepared to accept the Colonial peoples as partners in fact as well as in name. The difficulties are immense. No man readily makes a friend of another with an entirely different upbringing and background, but the Colonial Governments should continue to ensure, as part of their policy of public relations, that no chance is lost of breaking down racial barriers in deed as well as in word.

7. The breaking down of racial barriers will not, however, in itself be enough. If public relations policy is to succeed fully it must go further than that and secure the mutual confidence between the Government and the public which can only exist where the public are not merely passive co-operators in or critics of the Government's policy, but active partners taking a positive share in the formation of policy. To secure this confidence it will not be sufficient to bring the people into consultation; means must also be found of arousing their initiative and evoking their enthusiasm for measures which the Government is taking. This process is, in fact, the essence of mass education as described in the report on that subject. Although the circumstances are very different, it is worth considering the manner in which the Russians have handled this problem in their relations with the more backward peoples of Siberia. The Russians make use of dictatorial methods which would be repugnant to British traditions and they are dealing with people who are less primitive than the bulk of the people of the African territories and less racially different from themselves. The technique which they have used is to associate the

more energetic and progressive elements of the community with their own administration and their programmes of social and economic advance by bringing these people into the local Communist party, and in this way they have secured an identification of interest between these elements of the local population and the central government. It is this identification which is important and, by our own methods, very different from those of the Russians, we must aim at securing it in our relationship with colonial peoples and, above all, the peoples of the African territories. Without it there is bound to be continual friction with nationalist movements and in such circumstances we cannot hope for a smooth progress towards self-government. Some of the means of securing this identification of interest have been referred to in the preceding paragraphs; but it may be that the most promising method of arousing the enthusiasm of the people and obtaining their active co-operation will be found to be the much greater use of voluntary societies, such as youth clubs, improvement societies, etc. These bodies, if not successfully handled, might well become disruptive forces and obstacles to the promotion of good race relations; if wisely handled, on the other hand, they may provide the stimulus which will gain for us the active support and initiative of the people. The task of encouraging them and guiding them is primarily for the district administration, welfare departments, and other agencies. The public relations departments can no doubt give material assistance in a number of ways; but they will not be directly concerned in these activities. The point which it is desired to emphasise here, however, is that the encouragement of voluntary societies is one of the most important aspects of public relations policy.

Functions of public relations departments

8. The role to be played by Public Relations or Information Departments in the Colonies must be considered in the light of what has been said above. Even though every government officer, from the Governor downwards, is a public relations officer, there is need for a specialised branch of the government which will be responsible for ensuring that every opportunity is taken of informing the public of the work and policy of their government and for providing the necessary machinery. The views of a former Governor of Bengal (The Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey) in his book "An Australian in India" are of such interest in this connection that they are reproduced in an appendix to this memorandum.

9. As important as conveying information to the public about the work and policy of the government is the need for informing the government of trends in public opinion. Although every government officer has a general responsibility in this connection, the public relations department should have access to sources of information which are not always open to e.g. the police officer and the district officer.

10. The role of the Public Relations Department in each Colony is then to provide the administration with the advice and machinery which will serve to keep the public informed of the aims and achievements of their government, and to advise the government on the state of public opinion. If every senior government officer carries out his duty as a public relations officer for his government, it will to a large extent be unnecessary for the Public Relations Department to act as the government spokesman. Indeed it is preferable that in the educational field for example the Director of Education should himself explain by lectures, by broadcasts or by

pamphlets any important developments in the educational field, and that the Public Relations Officer should limit his activities to drawing the attention of the government to the need for constant explanation of its plan, to advising how such explanation can best be given, and to providing the necessary machinery. If it is to provide this machinery, the Public Relations Department should have the staff necessary for it to maintain close contact with the Press, and it should be provided with funds to enable it to use all publicity media—broadcasting, films, film strips, photographs, reading rooms, and publications. The Department should assist in the provision of the "mechanical" services for mass education—cinema vans, posters, etc., and it should provide other government departments with publicity services for special objects e.g. the supply and showing of films on public health or on agricultural methods. The Department should not, however, take the initiative in planning work covered by other departments. Except in so far as it has to draw the attention of the government to the need for explaining government policy and action to the public, its work should be limited to the organisation of the means for providing such explanation.

Qualifications of a public relations officer

11. The head of the Public Relations Department must be of sufficient standing to enable him to have a ready approach to the Governor, the Chief Secretary and Heads of Departments. He need not himself be concerned in the formulation of government policy, though he should whenever possible be present when important issues of policy are being discussed. He should also be free to present to the government his views on the need for government action if he sees that some omission or some act on the part of government may lead to a rift between the people and the government. It follows that the Public Relations Officer should be an officer of standing. The technical side of publicity work can readily be mastered by anyone who has a flair for such work, and administrative ability is a more important qualification for a Public Relations Officer than experience of publicity. He should if possible have a knowledge of life and work in the Colonies. Above all he must have the right outlook—he must have a sympathetic approach to the public, he must have a feeling for colonial peoples, and he must believe in the future of the Colony in which he is working. The ideal Public Relations Officer will, therefore, be an officer of some seniority, with administrative ability, with a flair for publicity, and with a sincere and sympathetic approach to his work; and, if he is to understand colonial conditions, it will usually be desirable to second him from another branch of the Colonial Service.

The colonial press

12. The subject of the colonial press is of such complexity and of such importance that it cannot adequately be discussed in this general memorandum. It is mentioned here only as one of the most important matters to be takcled by the Public Relations Officer. In some Colonies the Press is the main channel of information to the public, and in all large Colonies it exercises a great influence on public opinion. Unfortunately that influence is often harmful to the development of a closer relationship between the people and the Colonial Government. One of the most important duties of the Public Relations Officer is to assist the Press to improve its standards, and so to guide it towards constructive work. He should arrange frequent press conferences and he should see that those conferences provide an opportunity for full and frank

discussion and are not merely used for "handouts" of official information. In this way the Press can be fully informed of the issues involved and can be given every opportunity of taking an objective view. The Public Relations Officer should as far as possible confine his duties to advising the Colonial Government or the department concerned when a press conference is needed and to arranging the conference. When important matters are involved, he should avoid being regarded as a government spokesman—partly because he can never handle a press discussion on some special issue of policy as well as the government officer responsible for carrying out that policy, and partly because his usefulness is curtailed if he comes to be regarded as a professional salesman for the government's wares. For the latter reason the Public Relations Officer should also exercise caution in replying to criticisms of government policy published in the Press. Little useful purpose is in any event served by official replies to Press criticisms. The refutation can never undo the harm done by the criticism, however mistaken or malicious the criticism may be—and the critic can always have the last word in a debate conducted in the correspondence columns of a newspaper. The main object of the Public Relations Officer in his dealings with the Press is then to gain the position of a friend and adviser, and to avoid being placed in the position of a government spokesman. There are of course many other ways in which a Public Relations Officer can assist the Press and in so doing gain their confidence and act as an influence for their good, but space does not permit of a longer discussion of this extensive subject.

Objectives of His Majesty's Government in relation to information work in the colonies

13. This memorandum would not be complete without reference to the work of His Majesty's Government in the sphere of information. (The word "information" is used in this context instead of the term "public relations", as the latter can perhaps more properly be confined to work conducted within the community of a Colony.)

14. The Colonial Office, as the appropriate agency of His Majesty's Government, is charged with the task of fostering a closer association between the people of the Colonies, the people of the United Kingdom, and the people in other parts of the British Commonwealth. This task must be carried out if the Colonies, as they reach the stage of self-government, are to *want* to remain within the British Commonwealth. Voluntary ties, both within and outside the official machine, must be built up to supplement and replace the existing political and administrative links; and in this relationship friendly association must take the place of control, however benevolent. The key to friendship is understanding, and the key to understanding is knowledge, and so the policy of His Majesty's Government is to develop this knowledge by maintaining a three-way flow of information—information about the Colonies to the people of the United Kingdom and of other parts of the Commonwealth, information about the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth to the people of the Colonies, and information about each Colony to the people of other Colonies.

Work of Information Department in the Colonial Office

15. The Information Department of the Colonial Office is the agency primarily responsible for maintaining this flow, and steps are now being taken to re-organise the Department so as to enable it to carry out these responsibilities adequately. Valuable help can also be given by the British Council in its special cultural and

educational field, and close co-operation must be maintained between the Council and the Information Department in this country (and also between the Council's representatives and Public Relations Officers in the Colonies).

16. In order to maintain this flow of information, the Information Department has to look for assistance to Colonial public relations departments. It can spread knowledge about the Colonies among the people of the United Kingdom, but it cannot do so effectively unless it is supplied with material from the Colonies; it can send material about the United Kingdom to the Colonies, but it cannot distribute such material among the colonial peoples, nor can it decide what form this material should take without constant help from colonial public relations departments.

Work of regional information offices

17. It is partly to fill this gap that Regional Information Offices have been established in East and West Africa, and that it is hoped to set up a similar Office in the West Indies. These Offices are financed by the Imperial Exchequer and are in fact off-shoots of the Information Department in the Colonial Office. Their main function is to collect photographic and written material about the Colonies for use in the United Kingdom and in other parts of the world, but they can also assist in other ways—by stimulating the flow of information among the Colonies in each region, by advising on the suitability of material sent from this country for use in the Colonies, by facilitating the distribution of such material, and by providing services (on repayment) for the Colonial Governments which they could not readily afford to do individually, e.g. photographic services.

Relationship of colonial public relations departments to work of the Information Department

18. But the assistance which can be offered by the Regional Information Officer is naturally limited, and the co-operation of the Colonial Governments must be enlisted if adequate information services are to be built up throughout the British Commonwealth. The difficulty which immediately arises in this connection is the extent to which the Colonies can properly be asked to assist in this information work. Colonial public relations departments are financed exclusively from local revenues and are an integral part of the Colonial Governments. If a fundamental aim of policy is to encourage the people of each Colony to regard the Colonial Government as "their" Government, it might be held to be wrong in principle to expect colonial public relations departments to devote their attention to the development of a closer association between the colonial peoples and the people of the United Kingdom save in so far as the colonial peoples themselves are willing for this association to be developed.

19. It is not, however, possible to be entirely dogmatic in regard to the exclusion of colonial public relations departments from the general task of maintaining and developing friendly association between the peoples of the Colonies and the people of Britain. Unless and until a Colony achieves Dominion status or the equivalent, His Majesty's Government remain responsible for its administration, and the Colonial Government is the agency by which the policy of His Majesty's Government is carried out. It is, therefore, a proper function of the Colonial Government to interpret the policy and aims of His Majesty's Government to the people of the Colony, and to help the people to see their local affairs against the background of general Commonwealth

and international events and tendencies. The value of the British connection will in the long run no doubt be best attested by the pursuit of an enlightened and beneficial policy on the part of the local government and its officials (more particularly the British officials who in most Colonies occupy the most influential posts). Unless, however, active steps are taken to keep the British "case" positively presented to the Colonial peoples, there is a real risk that the anti-British propaganda put about by certain political leaders engaged in what they represent as a struggle for "liberty" will lead unsophisticated and uncritical audiences to regard the Commonwealth connection as an evil thing.

20. For these reasons there need be no real conflict in principle between the duty of colonial public relations departments to concentrate upon the improvement of the relationship between Colonial Governments and their peoples, and the participation of those departments in what is known as "the projection of Britain to the Colonies". From the practical point of view it is clearly necessary that the available machinery should be used for both purposes. Duplication of machinery and of effort would not only be uneconomical, it would be intolerably confusing to the public. If, therefore, the services of reading rooms, broadcasting or radio rediffusion stations, cinema vans, and contacts with the local press are developed by colonial public relations departments with the primary aim of fostering a closer association between the Colonial Government and the people, there is no reason why these services should not be used to handle material supplied from the United Kingdom—provided that such material is acceptable to local audiences. This machinery can also be used, subject to the same proviso, for developing closer links between the Colonies themselves, so that the people of each Colony, being informed of the work, way of life and achievements of other Colonies, may realise that all the colonial peoples have much in common and so come to appreciate their position as partners in the British Commonwealth. Thus although the Information Department in [the] Colonial Office is primarily responsible for "the projection of Britain and the British Commonwealth to the Colonies" by supplying written material and films, by encouraging visitors to the Colonies, by broadcasts originated in this country, and by stimulating the exchange of news and information between the Colonies, colonial public relations departments can play their part without departing from their responsibility to the colonial peoples by advising on the suitability of these media for local audiences, and by distributing material supplied to them by the Information Department. Colonial governments should not, however, be expected to pay any other part of the cost of the campaign for the "projection of Britain".

21. Colonial public relations departments have a further responsibility in relation to the outside world—the supply of material about their colonies which will rouse the interest of the people of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and foreign countries. In so doing they will be of service to the colonial peoples. This interest in the Colonies is essential as in the modern world the colonies cannot live in isolation and must depend on inspiration and material help from more advanced nations. In this respect they will also be assisting in the main work of the Information Department in the Colonial Office—the development of a friendly association between the people of the colonies and the people of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Colonial public relations departments and the Information Department in the Colonial Office should, therefore, co-operate in the supply of information about the Cōlonies to the world; and the cost of any such work should be borne in

part by the colonial governments and in part by the Imperial Exchequer. The responsibility of His Majesty's Government in this connection has in fact already been recognised in the African Colonies by the establishment of the Regional Information Offices in Accra and Nairobi, at the expense of the Imperial Exchequer.

Appendix to 61

Another aspect of the Government of Bengal that at first surprised me—until I got to know its ways—was the lack of any publicity sense. Most of the officials seemed oblivious to the fact that it makes a world of difference to the success of their work how it is put across to the public. They would carry out an interesting and useful job and describe it—if they deigned to describe it at all—in Press notes of unimaginable tedium. Consequently the Government used to lose the credit for a lot of solid achievement, and they were seldom within miles of catching up on their many and not too scrupulous critics. The villagers were usually ignorant of the efforts being made on their behalf, because they were seldom told in intelligible terms what the Government was trying to do for them. So a department in which I took pains to meddle was the Publicity Department, and we expanded and livened it up considerably. I believe that in due course I won my officials round to the view that if they didn't tell people what they were doing, no one else would; and in a series of broadcasts and Press conferences I endeavoured to put across, in simple terms, the principal lines of development in the Province.

Closer contact between the administration and the public was essential in Bengal for a number of reasons that do not apply elsewhere: the non-co-operative attitude towards the Government fostered by the Press, the distrust of Government officials by the public, and the general ignorance and illiteracy of a large section of the population. The task was not an easy one by reason of the difficulty of taking the public into the confidence of the administration in the face of a Press that was very largely hostile, and went to great lengths to distort any public statement into a stick with which to beat the Government or the British.

At first, I believe, there were many pained and cynical head-shakings amongst the senior British and Indian public servants about the Governor's publicity drive, but before I left I had made my point that there was a real need to bring the people more into touch with the activities of the Government. Eventually some of my senior officials were holding Press conferences themselves, a little shyly at first, but with a growing taste for them, and with useful effect from the point of view of public relations. I believe that public relations in India—at any rate in Bengal—should be greatly expanded. The more badly-educated a country, the greater the need for adequate publicity and public information on matters having a bearing on the people's welfare.

62 CO 847/36/3, no 13 [Nov 1947]

'Local government in Africa: conclusions of summer school at Cambridge': African Governors' Conference paper AGC 12

In paper A.G.C. No. 3[1] some of the main points affecting local government policy in Africa were briefly discussed and it was stated that a further paper would be prepared in the light of the results of the summer school held in August. The conclusions of the summer school have already been circulated to Governments. The school was divided into six Groups dealing with the following subjects:—

(I) the political aspects of local government;
(II) the functions and finances of local government;
(III) local government and land usage;
(IV) local government in urban areas;
(V) central government organisation for the development of local government, with special reference to the work of field staffs;
(VI) race relations.

The reports of the six Groups were discussed by the whole school and generally accepted with a number of amendments in each case.

2. The present paper is concerned with the reports of Groups I, II, IV and V. The report of Group III dealing with local government and land usage is directly relevant to the paper on "Economic Development and Agricultural Production in the African Colonies" (A.G.C. No. 5)[2] and a separate note, very briefly summarising the conclusions of the school on this subject is being circulated separately as paper A.G.C. No. 13 for use in the discussion of this paper. Race relations forms a subject of its own and the report of Group VI on this subject, together the Colonial Office memorandum referred to in the report, is being circulated to the Conference under cover of a very brief summary (A.G.C. No. 14)[3] for separate discussion.

3. The present paper deals with the political development of local government bodies both in rural and urban areas; the division of functions between local government bodies and the central government; the finances of local government; measures for improved efficiency; the better organisation and more effective training of local government staffs; the machinery of government required to deal with local government problems; and the work of government field staffs. The conclusions of the various groups of the summer school which discussed these subjects were, as stated above, generally accepted by the school as a whole after discussion, and the recommendations made provide a concrete basis for discussion by the Governors' Conference. They represent the logical development of existing practice and it is suggested that, if endorsed by the Governors' Conference, they would provide a useful basis for future policy.

4. The purpose of the present paper is to summarise the conclusions reached by the summer school on the points mentioned above. This summary is contained in the following paragraphs.

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[1] See 59, appendix IV. [2] See 59, appendix VI. [3] See 63.

5. *The political aspects of local government*

This part of the subject is dealt with in paragraphs 1–27 of the report of Group I. The recommendations deal with

(1) the size of local government units;
(2) their composition and the method of representation of the people;
(3) their place in the central political machine of the territories.

On these points the following recommendations are made:—

(a) *Size of local government units*

(i) The view is expressed that in areas where there is no traditional authority extending over large numbers of people, the aim of policy must be to develop units of local government of a sufficient size to be financially strong and thus capable of maintaining efficient staffs for the operation of social and other services. Experience in a number of territories suggests that the most suitable area to be covered may be the administrative district or division (paragraphs 7–9).

(ii) The point is made that, in the policy of forming district councils by the amalgamation or federation of smaller units, there should be no suggestion that the lowest units of local government, i.e. the village councils, should not be given the maximum encouragement; these are to be regarded as the foundation of all local government in Africa (paragraph 10).

(iii) In regard to large units of native administration covering hundreds of thousands, or millions, of people, the aim of policy must be to build up an effective and representative system of local government within the framework of the native administrations themselves, on the basis of the smallest village units, with a chain of responsibility through district councils to the central native administration (paragraphs 11 to 13).

(b) *Composition of local government bodies and the method of representation of the people*

(i) It is recommended that the aim of policy should be to build up institutions of local government fully representative of all the people of the area, through the development of the council system and by the increasing introduction of the more progressive elements in the population, the ultimate aim being that the council should become the directing local authority and the organ through which the people make their wishes felt (paragraphs 14 and 15).

(ii) It is recognised that in all areas the traditional elements have a most important part to play, but it is suggested that in order to secure proper representation of all other elements of the people, including the middle class, other methods of appointment to the councils must be resorted to (paragraphs 16 and 17).

(iii) It is suggested that ultimately the method of appointing representatives of these new elements can only be through election, although this does not necessarily mean election by means of the ballot box which may be quite inappropriate to present conditions (paragraph 18).

(iv) It is suggested that experience in a number of territories has shown the system of indirect election, through grades of councils serving as electoral colleges, to be the right method for present conditions in rural Africa. This need

not exclude direct election by the people for district councils where this is appropriate (paragraph 19).

(v) Where election by whatever method is appropriate cannot yet be introduced, nomination must be resorted to as an interim measure, either for some or all the representatives. In such circumstances nomination may have to take the form of appointing representatives of particular classes of the community; but, once election in any form is adopted, this should be on the basis of the general choice of the people and should not involve selection by specialised groups (paragraph 20).

(vi) It is recommended that representatives of the people brought on to councils either by election or by nomination must not only be chosen by the people, but also accountable to the people in the sense that they are removable by them. For this purpose they should be elected, or in the interim period appointed, for definite and limited periods only (paragraph 21).

(vii) In some areas chiefs and traditional members of councils are already accountable to public opinion in the sense that they are removable if they forfeit public confidence; but this does not apply in most areas, the respect in which chiefs are held being so strong that they are not readily removable in this way. In these circumstances it is suggested that the process of political development is likely to lie in the increasing acquisition of executive power by the representative elements of the councils, without any change necessarily taking place in the formal constitutional position of chiefs. The establishment of committees of councils to deal with particular branches of work is likely to help in this process (paragraphs 21 to 23).

(c) *The place of local government bodies in the central political machine of the territories*

(i) The school strongly endorses the system of indirect election to Legislative Councils now being built up in most territories through district, provincial and in some cases regional councils. The school supports the view that this system, which is at present proving acceptable to the majority of the people, is much more likely in the present stage of development of Africa to secure effective representation of the rural areas than a system of direct election to Legislative Councils by means of the franchise (paragraphs 24 to 26).

(ii) It is pointed out at the same time that to make this system of indirect election completely representative the method of appointment of members to the lowest councils must be democratic. This is regarded as a strong additional reason for rapidly increasing the representative character on local government bodies at all levels (paragraph 27).

6. *Local government in urban areas*

This part of the subject is dealt with in paragraphs 4 to 20 of the Report of Group IV. The following recommendations are made:—

(a) The aim of policy should be to achieve an efficient and acceptable form of local government in urban areas by working towards the English system; the traditional native institutions should be made use of and progressively moulded to meet this aim (paragraph 4).

(b) To achieve this object policy should aim at:—

(i) establishing town councils in all areas.
(ii) avoiding duality of control in urban areas.
(iii) achieving adequate representation of all classes of the urban community (paragraph 7).

(c) Except where there are strong native traditional authorities, these aims should be achieved by forming fully representative town councils on the English model, in no way subordinate to the native authorities of the areas concerned (paragraph 7).

(d) Where strong traditional native authorities already exist and can efficiently administer townships as a part of their areas, the aim of policy should be realised either by the native authority absorbing onto its council representatives of the town community or by the establishment of an urban council subordinate to the native authority and consisting of representatives of the native authority itself and the town community. In such cases the traditional native authority should be encouraged to develop its African urban government on English town council lines (paragraph 8).

(e) In the East and Central African towns, at present controlled by primarily non-African councils, the importance of adequate African representation on local government bodies is fully appreciated, but the difficulty of forcing the pace is recognised. The steps already taken or being taken to bring Africans on to the Councils are mentioned and the need to secure acceptance by the non-African communities to increased African membership by means of education and persuasion is emphasised. The establishment of representative African urban advisory councils is recommended both during the interim period before adequate African membership on their local government bodies can be secured, and thereafter to serve as electoral colleges for the African side of the local government councils (paragraphs 10 to 13).

(f) Detailed recommendations are made with regard to local government in mining areas, the administration of African law in urban areas with many tribes and the problems of mushroom villages and suburban areas. These are contained in paragraphs 14 to 20 of the report of Group IV and need not be repeated here, although special mention should be made of the proposal for the appointment of a high level investigating body to examine the problems of urban housing in the light of experience in all parts of Africa.

7. *The functions of local government bodies*

This part of the subject is dealt with in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the Report of Group II. The following recommendations are made:—

(a) The process of developing local responsibility in Africa is one of assigning authority from the central to the local government. The conclusion is reached that, while this process must never result in the abandonment of ultimate control by the central government, which must retain final responsibility for the welfare of the citizen, the responsibilities of local government bodies must expand with their capabilities until the central government exercises little more than general legislative, judicial and directive control over local government activities (paragraphs 2 to 5).

(b) On the basis of Mr. S. Phillipson's report on the Financial Relations between

the Government of Nigeria and the Native Administrations[4], the recommendation is made that the following services should be shared between the central government and local government bodies when fully developed:— agriculture, education, forests, game, lands, medical, mines, police, prisons, public works, social welfare, tsetse control and veterinary. This list of services was compiled from the Uganda Estimates (paragraphs 6 to 8).

(c) Detailed recommendations are then made regarding the manner in which responsibility for these services should be divided when local government in any area has reached the full development attainable in the foreseeable future. These recommendations are drawn up on the basis of the principle of "competence, consent and cash." Except in the case of prisons, mines and lands, the Group agreement was reached as to the division of functions. In the case of prisons agreement is not reached; in the case of lands and mines no uniform division can be recommended in the light of the varying conditions of different territories (paragraphs 10 and 11).

8. *The finances of local government bodies*

This part of the subject is dealt with in paragraphs 12 to 15 of the report of Group II. Four types of local government revenue are distinguished: direct taxation, whether assessed by the central government as direct tax or levied by the local government under rating powers; revenue derived from the performance by local government bodies of services within their own areas and from rents from their own properties; grants-in-aid paid by the central government; and grants by the central government in reimbursement for services performed by the local government bodies on an agency basis. The group considered the question of the development of local taxation and of the increasing introduction of the principle of income tax in all systems of native taxation. Time was too short to permit of detailed recommendations being made and the group confined itself to emphasising the importance of placing local government bodies in such a position that they have power to increase local taxation to provide services and works of the standard demanded by their people. It is relevant in this connection to recall the main suggestions put forward in the paper on local government already circulated (A.G.C. No. 3 paragraphs 18 to 20). These are:—

(a) the proportion of direct taxation retainable by the native administrations should be sufficient to cover, with the aid of purely local revenue, the ordinary expenses of administration with some margin for expansion;

(b) grants from the central government should normally be treated not as general grants-in-aid but should be given for specific development purposes. There must be exceptions to this rule in undeveloped areas particularly where local governments bodies are competent to operate particular services but too poor to do so;

(c) every possible encouragement should be given by the central government to local government bodies to develop systems of local taxation in order to secure additional revenue for development purposes;

(d) once a sure financial foundation has been provided, it is important that local governments should be faced squarely with the position that increased services for the benefit of the people depend on an increased financial contribution by the

[4] See 50, para 3, and 59, appendix IV, para 17.

people themselves. This is the only effective way of building up a real sense of financial responsibility, perhaps the most important element in the development of local government.

(e) When this has not been done, an investigation might be carried out on the lines of Mr. Phillipson's enquiry in Nigeria, into the financial relationship between the central government and local government bodies and the possibilities of expanding local taxation.

9. *Increased efficiency in local government bodies*

This part of the subject is dealt with in paragraph 19 of the report of Group II, and paragraphs 21 to 33 of the report of Group IV. The following recommendations are made:—

(a) Group IV having received detailed information as to the system of local government audit operating in this country, with an auditor appointed by the Ministry of Health but independent of control by that Ministry, recommends that in African conditions the functions of audit and inspection can most suitably be entrusted to a local government inspectorate, either specially appointed for the purpose or, where this is not possible, provided by the Colonial Audit Department.

(b) Both Group II and Group IV recommend the introduction of standardized and simplified accounting methods. The Group also recommended more adequate office buildings and equipment and, in order to secure more efficient tax collection, an adequate list of taxpayers, with provision for the establishment of identity by some visible documentary means.

(c) Group IV considered the question of the payment of councillors in urban local government bodies. The group did not recommend the payment of salaries, but noted the recommendation of a recent departmental committee of the Ministry of Health which proposed that councillors in receipt of wages (rather than salaries) should receive reimbursement for actual direct loss in attending council meetings. The group considered that this principle should also be adopted in Africa.

(d) Group IV recommended that the central government should in the last resort have power to suspend members of local government bodies in cases where there is gross neglect or mismanagement of their functions, and also to appoint a commission to carry on the work of the council during suspension.

10. *The better organisation and more effective training of local government staffs*

This part of the subject is dealt with by all four Groups, by Group I in paragraphs 28 to 32, by Group II in paragraphs 17 and 18, by Group IV in paragraphs 29 and 30 and by Group V in paragraph 16 (1). The following recommendations are made:—

With regard to organisation

(a) In order to attract the best men into the local government service it has been shown necessary by experience that local government personnel should be paid at the same rates as government rates for similar work. In many areas native administrations have hitherto been unable to offer such terms owing to lack of funds; hence the necessity of putting local government bodies onto a sound financial basis. (Group I, paragraph 29; Group II, paragraph 18).

(b) A local government service on a territorial basis should be established, ensuring reasonable remuneration, superannuation benefits and opportunities for promotion and transfer and for a career, and thus encouraging attainment of a higher standard of efficiency. Provision should be made for interchange between local and central government staffs. (Group II, paragraph 18; Group IV paragraph 7).
(c) Local government bodies should be encouraged to make the best possible use of the services of any suitable persons possessing the necessary qualifications of education, technical training, experience and character. Although in most cases the people concerned would doubtless wish to see their local government staffs drawn from their own area, eligibility for appointment to local government bodies should not be rigidly restricted by any purely parochial considerations. (Group V, paragraph 23(1)).

With regard to training

(d) The higher colleges now being developed should give the maximum possible attention to the needs of local government. At present men trained at Makerere and Achimota and other higher technical and vocational colleges are proving of great worth, but their numbers are far too small. (Group I, paragraph 30).
(e) In the interim period before adequate provision can be made at the higher colleges, and thereafter, shorter or longer courses for local government staff, including refresher courses and vacation schools should be provided by the higher colleges and other institutions. These should not be confined simply to technical training, but should lay emphasis on training for citizenship. The expansion of training facilities for local government at such institutions as Jeanes Schools, etc. should be encouraged and the extra-mural courses to be provided by the higher colleges should include courses in local government. (Group I, paragraphs 30 and 31).
(f) Local government staff should be admitted to central government training establishments when they wish. (Group II, paragraph 18).
(g) Visits to this country and other parts of Africa by local government staffs for training purposes should be made possible. (Group I, paragraph 32).
(h) Governments should secure the services of experienced local government personnel from this country for the purpose of training local personnel. (Group I, paragraph 32; Group IV, paragraph 29).

11. *The machinery of government required to deal with local government problems; and the work of field staffs*

This part of the subject refers not to local government bodies themselves, but to the central government organisation and the field officers of the central government concerned with the development of local government. It is dealt with in the report of Group V. The group takes as a basis for discussion the Secretary of State's confidential despatch to the African Governors of the 25th February, 1947,[5] and, broadly speaking, the group and the school as a whole endorses the proposals in the despatch. The recommendations made may be summarised as follows:—

[5] See 44.

(a) *Exchange of information*. The group fully endorses the Secretary of State's observations on this subject contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch, and makes detailed recommendations in paragraph 6 of their report to secure the desired objective, while emphasising the necessity of providing abridged editions of documents wherever possible, in order to reduce the amount of reading matter for field staffs. The group also recommends the appointment of an officer with liaison duties to work under the head of the African affairs branch in each territory for the purpose of maintaining close contact and securing interchange of information with other British territories and foreign territories in Africa.

(b) *Machinery for the review of policy*. The representatives on the group of the East and Central African Territories consider the formation of African affairs branches in each Territory on the lines suggested by the Secretary of State in paragraph 9 of his despatch, to be a matter of vital importance. They recommend that these branches should include the liaison officer mentioned in (a) above, the specialists in land tenure and law recommended by the Secretary of State and the officers dealing with information services, co-operation and social welfare. The representatives on the group of the West African Territories did not feel able to make any recommendations on this point, as the matter had been suggested by the Secretary of State for consideration by the West African Governments; but they express the view that whatever machinery is set up should come within the framework of the existing organisation at regional and territorial headquarters. It is hoped that the machinery for the review of policy as regards African local government in the West African territories may be further discussed at the Governors' Conference with a view to more definite conclusions being reached.

The group warmly welcome the creation of an African Studies Branch in the Colonial Office on the general lines suggested in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Secretary of State's despatch. This branch has now been set up and is in operation and its functions are briefly described in paragraph 10 of the group's report.

(c) *Government field staffs*. The group makes the following recommendations:—

(i) *Continuity*. It is suggested that governments should consider again the possibility of shorter tours with more frequent but shorter periods of leave, in order to avoid the need for constant transfers of staff between districts.

(ii) *Providing field staffs with fuller information on government policy*. On the basis of paragraph 15 of the Secretary of State's despatch the group makes a number of recommendations for securing closer contact between the field staffs and the central or regional government by personal meetings, inter-team discussion, circulation of government publications etc. and the establishment of increased library facilities, both centrally and in the provinces and districts.

(iii) *Training of field staff*. The group recommend increased provision in the courses in this country for the joint training of administrative and technical officers to inculcate the importance of teamwork. They suggest the possibility of the attachment of technical officers to the administration for a period at the beginning of their first tour. They propose that, in order to avoid objections by probationers to too lengthy periods of training in this country, officers should be taken onto the establishment of their future territories for purposes of pay and pension as from the start of their period of postgraduate training. They recommend the issue to all newly joined field officers of some form of field service guide.

(iv) *Improvement of working conditions in the field*. The group make a series of recommendations on the basis of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Secretary of State's despatch; for central office accommodation to provide together for whole teams, both district and provincial; for greater provision for the employment of stenographers; for the modernisation of office equipment; for facilities for the proper training of African clerks and executive staff, and for relieving administrative officers of work connected with the supervision of public works, of routine township duties and of judicial functions not connected with native courts.

The group fully endorses the Secretary of State's views as to the need for relieving officers in the field from their present heavy burden of routine work in order to enable them to devote more time and attention to their all-important task of the development of local government. The representatives on the group of the East and Central African territories recommend that for this purpose European or Asian office superintendents should as an interim measure be appointed with full responsibility as sub-accountants and as licensing officers and registrars, unless suitable Africans are available to undertake these duties. The representatives of the West African territories point out that such action would not be possible under West African conditions, and that the solution lies in increased devolution to local government bodies and increased training of Africans for appointment as office superintendents, and where these steps are not yet fully effective, increased employment of administrative officers in the districts.

(v) *Teamwork and devolution*. Finally the group emphasise the extreme importance which they attach to the spirit of teamwork in the field and the closest co-operation with each other on the part of all administrative and technical officers, both European and African, working in district or division. They also emphasise the importance of devolution of responsibility by the central government to the provinces and districts or divisions and the need to make co-ordinated plans of campaign to ensure continuity both in the framing of local policy and in its implementation.

13[12?]. There are three general points arising from the work of the school and the reports of the groups which it is desirable to discuss:—

(1) *The urgency of the task of developing local government*

This point is discussed in paragraphs 2, and 33 and 34 of the report of Group I. In paragraph 34 the Group states:—

"We regard it as urgent that African local authorities should be stimulated to introduce as great a measure as possible of democratic representation into their system, while retaining their good traditional elements. We recommend that governments should consider issuing a directive instructing all officers concerned that this objective is to be maintained in the forefront of policy. We suggest that governments should extend and accelerate the training of staff by all methods which may be practicable and that recognition should be given to any advance made by the native administrations by progressively entrusting to them wider responsibilities, even if in some cases this involves a relaxation of the existing financial safeguards."

In paragraph 33 the Group recommends the deliberate use of central government funds, where local government revenue is insufficient, to stimulate local interest and support for local government bodies, particularly through minor schemes will [?well] within the capacity of the local organisation.

(2) *The question of issuing a general statement of policy*

This point is discussed in paragraph 22 of the report of Group V on the basis of the observations made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 25th February. The group reached the conclusion, which was accepted by the school as a whole, that field staffs must look to their governments for directives on policy, but that, in so far as this is practicable within the limits prescribed by diversity of local conditions, some general statement would be of value. The group went on to say that such a statement would be appreciated by officers in the field in that it would give them a picture of general policy as applied to the African territories as a whole. The question of the preparation and issue of such a general statement is a matter which the Governors' Conference will no doubt wish to consider.

(3) *The application of United Kingdom experience to the problems of local government in Africa*

The school provided striking examples of the relevance of United Kingdom experience in local government to African problems. An expert with long experience of English local government addressed the School on the details of local government practice in this country. He also attended several of the meetings of Group IV on local government in urban areas and the discussion of the school as a whole on the report of this group. The assistance which he was able to give was generally recognised. Two of the groups referred in their report to the need for bringing United Kingdom experience to bear on African problems. The suggestion has been made that a panel of persons with practical experience of local government in this country might be formed for the purpose of advising on specific questions referred to them by the African governments, assisting officers on leave in the study of local government methods in this country and visiting African territories individually to give such advice and assistance as might be asked for by governments. The question of forming such a panel is a matter on which the advice of the Conference would be appreciated.

63 CO 847/36/3, no 15 [Nov 1947]

'Race relations: conclusions of the summer school at Cambridge': African Governors' Conference paper AGC 14

The work of the Cambridge Summer School has been briefly described in Paper A.G.C. No. 12.[1] In paragraph 2 of that paper reference is made to the report of Group VI of the school (C.S.S. 27) which deals with race relations. A copy of this report together with a copy of a note on the subject (C.S.S. 11) prepared in the Colonial Office for the school and already sent to the African Governments are now circulated with the present paper. Both the note and the report are summarised below.

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[1] See 62.

2. The subject of race relations has been included in the agenda for the Governors' Conference and it is proposed that the two attached papers should form the basis for discussions. If they are endorsed by the Conference it is suggested that they might be treated as the basis of policy on the subject.

3. The principal points made in the Colonial Office note on race relations are as follows:—

(1) The problem of race relations is the adjustment of conflicting cultures and arises acutely in mixed communities with minorities. (Paragraph 1).
(2) A ruling minority cannot remain permanently acceptable to a majority of a different race. In Africa the solution lies in the adjustment of the political and general relationship of the races. (Paragraph 2).
(3) Africans have a history of inferior status which affects the outlook of the new middle class. (Paragraphs 2 and 3).
(4) Apart from the various types of Africans and Europeans involved in this problem there are other immigrant communities. It is the function of Government to do what it can to encourage good relations between all concerned. (Paragraphs 4 and 5).
(5) The relations of Government with rural communities are generally satisfactory. Detribalised elements present a more pressing problem which must be tackled if race friction is to be avoided. (Paragraph 6).
(6) Race relations can be measured by the general political tone. Mutual understanding and toleration is required together with an appreciation by the European of the African's psychological background of the African [sic]. Personal relations between the races are of primary importance. (Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10).
(7) A satisfactory outlet for African political aspirations is necessary, with which must go political training and experience aimed at creating an active democratic way of life in African society. (Paragraphs 11 and 12).
(8) Governments must not appear remote to Africans and must take Africans into consultation both in making and implementing policy. (Paragraphs 13 and 14).
(9) Africans must be trained for and included in higher Governments posts. (Paragraph 16).
(10) Local government is of great importance in maintaining satisfactory relations between the central government and the rural populations. (Paragraph 17).
(11) Education for citizenship is of great importance as an influence towards good race relations. (Paragraph 18).
(12) All Government officers and not only the specialised Public Relations Departments must be active in the field of Public Relations. (Paragraphs 19 and 20).
(13) Discrimination and the colour bar in work, commerce and social matters are mentioned as the most serious obstacles to good race relations. (Paragraphs 21 and 22).
(14) Good race relations are the key to the future of Europeans in Africa and of the African Territories in the Empire. (Paragraph 23).

4. The principal conclusions in the report of the Summer School are as follows:—

General

(1) Government depends on the goodwill of the governed and in Africa at present the problem of race relations is to a large extent one between governments and governed. (Paragraph 3).

(2) The problem is very wide and affects almost all activities. (Paragraph 4).

(3) Personal relations are important but insufficient if political or economic divisions are acute. (Paragraph 5).

(4) The problem in East and Central Africa will require some difference in handling from the West African problem owing to the relative backwardness of Africans in most parts of East and Central Africa and the presence of permanent European and Asian Committies [?communities] there. (Paragraph 6).

Economic race relations

(5) As long as basic economic problems remain unsolved no more than superficial progress can be made with good relations in the political field. (Paragraph 8).

(6) Examples of such basic problems quoted are the attitude of the European workers in Northern Rhodesia and the feeling towards European big business in West Africa. (Paragraphs 8 and 9).

(7) A further example quoted is the inequality of African and European salaries and wages. This can be partly met by a policy of training an increasing number of Africans for higher posts. (Paragraph 10).

(8) A general sense of inequality on the part of the African against a background of poverty is an obstacle to the equality of opportunity essential to inter-racial confidence. (Paragraph 11).

Political race relations

(9) Although primitive communities present an easier problem, social relations in rural areas will become more important. (Paragraph 12).

(10) The educated politically conscious Africans present the real problem and their energies should be harnessed for the benefit of their country. Some can be absorbed into local and central Government; all should be encouraged to take an informed interest in public affairs. This is the best way of drawing away from the irreconcilable minority of the audiences whom they might otherwise corrupt. (Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14).

(11) The educated class will take the lead in African nationalism, which if not sympathetically understood and handled may destroy good race relations. Constructive efforts of local patriotism and good citizenship should be encouraged. (Paragraph 15).

(12) Every government officer should be public relations minded. (Paragraph 16).

(13) The training of Africans and their increasing admission to the higher civil service is a very important element in promoting good race relations. (Paragraphs 17 and 18).

(14) Vacancies should be advertised locally as well as in the United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 17 and 18).

(15) Laws which discriminate between races might be examined to ascertain whether amendment is desirable. (Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21).

Personal race relations

(16) Racial understanding is based on subconscious impulses and steady education of the individual in good social relations is needed. (Paragraphs 24 and 25).

(17) A sentimental or patronising attitude towards Africans should be avoided. (Paragraph 26).

(18) A European sociologist might collaborate with an African in writing a pamphlet explaining the British to the Africans. (Paragraph 27).

(19) The important place of race relations in the work of government servants should be given its due emphasis in the training of officers before they go out to Africa. (Paragraphs 25 and 28).

(20) The importance of continuity of service so as to develop individual friendship and understanding is emphasised. (Paragraph 28).

(21) Discrimination in clubs, hotels, etc. based on race alone causes offence to Africans. The situation varies between West and East Africa and practical measures must be adapted to local circumstances. It is recognised that social custom cannot be changed by legislation and that care must be taken not to exacerbate relations in attempting to improve them. (Paragraph 30).

(22) The report proposes for West Africa:—

(i) the public announcement of a non-discriminatory policy;

(ii) consideration of legislation against discrimination in hotels;

(iii) it is not proposed that Governments should attempt to exercise absolute control in this matter over private clubs, although the position is difficult when Government has given financial assistance to a club. The value of inter-racial clubs is emphasised; the establishment of these should be encouraged in suitable ways. (Paragraph 30).

(23) As regards East Africa the real need is the education of public opinion both in the schools and among the adult population. Governments should have a settled policy in race relations, although the publication of a formal statement is not recommended. Government servants should carry out this policy to set an example to the general public and to reassure Africans of the sincerity of government policy. The Public Relations Officer has an important part to play in this connection and the co-operation of the European press might be sought. (Paragraph 31).

(24) The need for education on this subject applies to all races.

64 CO 847/36/4, no 18 [Nov 1947]

'The colonies and international organisations': African Governors' Conference paper AGC 17

Introduction

Since the United Nations Organisation came into being world attention has been focused on colonial questions to perhaps a greater degree than ever before. Unfortunately many members of the United Nations have shown more of a desire to interfere in political and constitutional development in colonial territories than an interest in the economic and social purposes embodied in Chapter XI of the Charter (the Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories). But the fact is that the United

Nations have come to represent an organised pressure group in regard to colonial territories with which we are obliged to reckon.

2. The development of the relationship between the United Kingdom and its colonial territories is a highly delicate process which outside interference is bound to make infinitely more difficult. The influence of the United Nations in their present stage of development, at any rate so far as it is applied to the political sphere of Colonial problems, cannot be regarded as likely to promote a smooth passage towards our declared aim of self-government. We must therefore resist such interference but we must nevertheless look ahead to a time when the United Nations may have attained a quality of organisation and an influence which may enable them to make a more effective contribution to the political, social and economic welfare of our colonial peoples. Our policy should aim at making use of all that is constructive and beneficial in the United Nations organisation; at the same time we must lose no chance of demonstrating clearly that we are in practice successfully carrying out the aims of the Colonial Sections of the United Nations Charter, which are indeed modelled on long established British Colonial policy.

3. The object of this paper is to analyse the nature of the present international pressure, and to present certain specific matters for discussion. Sections I and II deal specifically with this question, Section III discusses the participation of colonial territories in international organisations; Section IV certain aspects of Anglo-French-Belgian collaboration.

I. *The international pressure group on colonial questions*

4. The Congo Basin Treaties of 1887 were the first international recognition of the humanitarian obligations of colonial powers towards the peoples of their colonial territories and of their dual mandate to administer them for the benefit of the world as a whole. The League of Nations introduced the concept of international supervision of colonial administration in the Mandates System. The territories placed under mandate were, however, selected simply because they were ex-enemy Colonies, not because the interests of the inhabitants were different from those of their neighbours in "ordinary" Colonies. There was nothing in the League Covenant nor in the application of the Mandates System to suggest that international supervision of colonial administrations should extend beyond the mandated territories.

5. The United Nations Charter carries the concept of international accountability one step further, to the extent that it provides that the territories to which the International Trusteeship System may apply may be not only former mandated territories and territories detached from ex-enemy countries as a result of the Second World War, but such other territories as members responsible for their administration may voluntarily place under the system (Article 77 of the Charter). It contains in addition the declaration on non-self-governing territories embodied in Chapter XI. This was a purely voluntary declaration to which we and other colonial powers subscribed in adhering to the Charter. In no sense does it imply any recognition on our part of any degree of international accountability for colonial territories not under trusteeship. Similarly the whole of Article 77 is purely permissive, and in no sense creates any legal obligation to place any territories under trusteeship. Nor is it our intention to take the voluntary step of placing British Colonies or Protectorates under Trusteeship; the Secretary of State has made it clear that such action will not

be welcomed by the inhabitants and it must be evident to any impartial observer that to say the least, the placing of Colonial territories under trusteeship could be of exceedingly doubtful benefit to them.

6. Nevertheless, a large number of the members of the United Nations, taking their stand on what they call "the spirit of the Charter", interpret both Chapter XI and the two Trusteeship Chapters (Chapters XII and XIII) in a manner which carries the theory of "Colonial accountability" very far indeed. This tendency has always been well in evidence, but the recent proceedings of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (i.e. the Committee dealing with trusteeship matters and problems arising out of the interpretation of Chapter XI) have shown how powerfully it is developing. The Committee has adopted resolutions which, if agreed to by the Assembly, will make demands on the colonial powers far beyond the provisions or intention of the Charter, and will have the effect of creating permanent supervisory machinery for all non-self-governing territories. The motives of the anti-colonial bloc are not entirely identical. Very briefly there are two main elements. There is first of all Russia, with her satellites. It is obvious that they are not genuinely concerned with the welfare of colonial peoples, and that they use the colonial issue as a weapon in their general campaign of undermining the Western Powers. Of much greater significance from our point of view is the attitude of mind which leads China, India, the Philippines, and the Arab and Latin American States to oppose us on colonial issues. These countries have all in fairly recent history emerged from various forms of tutelage or subjection, and their feeling about Colonial status is coloured by a self-conscious and emotional attitude towards what they regard as subject peoples. It leads them to prescribe sovereign status as a sovereign remedy for all colonial ills. Thus India and the Philippines in particular have been the most persistent framers of resolutions designed to place the United Nations between metropolitan powers and their colonial territories in order that political development should not be left exclusively to the judgment of the colonial powers. Other factors have of course swayed the votes of Arab, and Latin American and other States, as well as India which has local axes to grind in several Colonial territories, but that just enumerated is the one of permanent and deepest significance to us.

7. It is the submission of information about social, economic and educational matters in colonial territories under Article 73(e) of the Charter that has given the anti-colonial bloc the pretext for seeking to create the permanent supervisory machinery mentioned in the previous paragraph. The Article in question provides that the information is transmitted "for information purposes only." But by an Assembly Resolution of February, 1946, the Secretary-General was authorised to summarise and analyse the information in his annual report to the Assembly on the working of the United Nations. The procedure for the Assembly's dealing with this summary and analysis was discussed in the Assembly in November and December of last year, and against our wishes and that of the other Colonial Powers including the United States an Ad Hoc Committee was set up to examine it and make recommendations about future procedure. This Committee met shortly before the present Assembly and made a report, which has been examined and amended in the Fourth Committee during the past few weeks. If the report in its amended form is adopted by the Assembly, the colonial powers will be under recommendation, by Assembly resolution, to include in future years information about the participation of local populations in the administration of their non-self-governing territories. This we

regard as "political" information, which is not called for by the Charter. A second resolution seeks to create a permanent Committee of the Assembly, consisting of the administering powers and an equal number of non-administering powers elected for two years at a time, to meet before the opening of each Assembly Session for the purpose of examining the information transmitted and reporting on it, with recommendations to the Assembly. The combined effect of these two resolutions would be to permit the United Nations to interfere in those constitutional matters which we are determined shall remain under our own exclusive control. The Secretary of State himself opposed these resolutions in the Fourth Committee with the utmost vigour, making the point in particular that our colonial peoples would not tolerate the intervention of the United Nations in their internal affairs.

8. The complete objective of the anti-colonial bloc is the fusion of Chapter XI, XII and XIII of the Charter. The permanent body suggested to deal with Chapter XI is in reality designed to become a second Trusteeship Council, to exercise as far as possible the same supervision over all non-self-governing territories as the Trusteeship Council legitimately exercises over Trust Territories. At the same time the anti-colonial powers develop their attack from another flank by seeking to expand, again beyond the intentions of the Charter, the authority of the Trusteeship Council. Thus the Indian Delegation has carried in Fourth Committee a resolution urging colonial powers voluntarily to place under trusteeship all or some of their non-self governing territories not yet ready for immediate independence or self-government.

9. It is not yet known whether these resolutions will be passed by this year's Assembly, but whether they are or not, the United Kingdom's attitude has already been made clear. We intend to fulfil conscientiously and to the letter our proper obligations under the Charter both as regards Chapter XI and in our participation in the trusteeship system; but we are *not* prepared to go beyond these obligations by acting in accordance with what the anti-colonial powers call "the spirit of the Charter" (as interpreted by them), nor to permit any interference by the United Nations in our relationship with our Colonial territories, beyond what is expressly provided for in the Charter in respect of Trust territories only.

II. *Effects of this international pressure, and suggested methods of meeting it*

10. To a greater or lesser extent, then, this international pressure may be described as aiming at the liquidation of the colonial relationship in the shortest possible time, coupled with a strong demand for active intervention by the United Nations in all non-self-governing territories to achieve this objective with the minimum of delay. It is not within the scope of this paper to attempt to assess what the effect of this pressure may be within our colonial territories. But it is safe to assume that the publicity achieved by the very vocal anti-colonial bloc will find some support in many colonial territories, leading to increased demands by nationalist movements for an accelerated tempo of political advancement.

11. Internationally, these developments mean that we shall come under ever-increasing fire to quicken the process of "emancipation". In this connection it is important to remember that, in all international bodies, the United Kingdom speaks on behalf of the Colonial Empire as well as on its own behalf, and that the line taken by United Kingdom representatives on international bodies has to take full account of the needs and interests of colonial territories. As a result, when it is a question of drawing up international conventions on general social and economic problems,

such as human rights, the United Kingdom are often obliged to adopt a rather less forthcoming attitude than would be the case if they were speaking solely on their own behalf and to a large extent to regulate their pace by considerations of what is practicable and politic in respect of our colonial territories. Even though as a result we expose ourselves to attacks from States which have no colonial responsibilities, it is of course beyond question that we must at all times continue to regard what we conceive to be the interests of our colonial territories as paramount, and not allow international pressure to cause us to adopt policies which we judge to be wrong. At the same time we shall eliminate possible areas of attack if we ensure that, within these limits, colonial legislation and practice secure what the United Nations term human rights, freedom of information, etc. to the maximum extent possible, and that restrictive powers on colonial statute books which are rarely, if ever, invoked are discarded spontaneously before we are obliged to consider doing so as the result of international pressure.

12. But this is mainly defensive, and if we are to make a positive impression on international opinion we must be prepared to take every suitable opportunity of describing our Colonial policy internationally in clear and bold terms. Although they only represent a very specialised aspect of the presentation of our case, a word might be said here about the many questionnaires on, for example, status of women, freedom of information, etc. which issue periodically from the various Commissions of the United Nations. These questionnaires are often ill-conceived, they tend to be overlapping and they are often largely unsuited to conditions in colonial territories. The compilation of satisfactory answers further involves much time and energy that can ill be spared. Nevertheless, if we refused to comply with such legitimate requests for information in respect of our colonial territories, thus enabling the anti-colonial powers to claim that we have something to hide in those territories, it is we ourselves who would be the losers in the long run. The United Kingdom continues to carry great weight and influence in international meetings. At present we are obliged to rely more than ever before on experience, efficiency, and moral leadership. But in the emotional attitude of mind encountered in the United Nations, the fact of our being the leading colonial power is regarded to a large extent, and however unjustifiably, as almost a stigma. If therefore we appear to be shirking, in respect of any of our colonial territories, any of our legitimate obligations towards the United Nations, we may expect to see our present influence in international gatherings correspondingly diminished at a time when we most need it. Equally, what the United Nations would undoubtedly regard as a highly suspect reticence on the part of colonial administrations about conditions in their territories would reinforce them in their determination to secure a right of intervention in colonial affairs. For these reasons it is definitely in the interests of both the United Kingdom and colonial governments that we should satisfy all legitimate requests on the part of international organisations for information about conditions in colonial territories, however troublesome and irksome the process may be.

13. Similarly it would be helpful if Colonial Governments would send to the Library of the United Nations a generous supply of copies of all official documents which they publish about conditions in their territories. Not only may this help to educate United Nations opinion about the true facts of our colonial administration, but it will form a useful pendant to our attitude in the recent Fourth Committee debates. In that Committee we made it clear that, while we refuse to recognise any

obligation to transmit political and constitutional information except in respect of Trust Territories to the United Nations in a manner in which they could discuss it officially and pass recommendations on it, the reason for our refusal was simply that we can not recognise any degree of international accountability in respect of those territories, and not in any sense a desire to suppress this information. It may therefore be a substantial advantage if we can secure that the United Nations Library is better stocked with material on British colonial territories than on any other Colonial Empire, or for that matter on many sovereign states as well.

14. Reference has already been made in paragraph 6 above to the anti-colonial attitude of countries which have emerged from the colonial status in the not too distant past. The history of the United States has undoubtedly coloured the American attitude to Colonial questions. More recently, however, there has grown up in the United States of America a sounder understanding of colonial problems and of British policy. This is a significant and important development. The fact that America is a colonial power, and as such has to face the anti-colonial bias of the United Nations, has induced a greater sense of responsibility on colonial matters among officials in the State Department who, generally speaking, have shown themselves recently increasingly helpful and sympathetic. But public opinion in the United States is still to a large extent antagonistic on colonial questions and this is obviously a fact which must influence official United States circles, with the result that, although a colonial power, the United States of America are still a not wholly certain factor in international discussion of colonial affairs. There are nevertheless many signs that with increasing knowledge of the facts certain informed sections of opinion in America are becoming more sympathetic to our attitude. For example American missionaries who have experience of our colonial administration have done much to combat anti-British colonial propaganda in America founded on prejudice and coloured by ignorance. It is therefore of the utmost importance that every assistance should be given to responsible Americans to acquire the maximum amount of information, a commodity so valued by them, about British Colonial Territories. The appointment of the Colonial Attaché to the British Embassy in Washington can contribute greatly to this end. But there are many other ways in which the real facts can be made known in the United States. It is suggested indeed that we should welcome interest in our African colonial territories by reputable and influential American institutes, and that we should actively stimulate such interest by, for example, encouraging visits of reputable American journalists, publicists and scientists working in fields concerned with Colonial Territories. We may also have occasion to make use, for example of American sociologists in research work under the aegis of University Colleges and research institutes in Africa.

15. The core of the problem is to attempt to convince responsible international opinion that, in spite of the fact that we refuse to consider ourselves internationally accountable for our colonial territories other than those under trusteeship, we are nevertheless able to achieve by our own methods the advancement of colonial peoples in all fields. The problem is not new, but it has now emerged as a much more pressing one than ever before and will demand a very great deal of serious thought and attention in the future. Meanwhile two obvious ways in which we can demonstrate internationally the realities of constitutional and political advance in our colonial territories are:—

(a) by bringing Colonial Governments and peoples more and more into active participation in the work of international organisations;
(b) by insisting on the inclusion of a Colonial Application Clause in all international agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party.

16. The first of these matters is discussed in the following section of this paper. As regards the second, it is our established practice to ensure that the application of international agreements to our colonial territories is not regarded by other powers as being purely automatic. The concept that we are always at pains to put across is that, although the United Kingdom as the metropolitan power responsible for the external relations of colonial territories must continue to accede to international conventions on their behalf, before such conventions can be applied to colonial territories there must be proper consultation with the Colonial Governments on whom the burden of implementing the conventions will fall and within whose powers the matters dealt with in the conventions often lie. We maintain that, since there is seldom opportunity for such consultation before international (and particularly multilateral) agreements have to be negotiated the device of the Colonial Application Clause is the most convenient constitutional arrangement. It is worth noting here that the true constitutional position is not always appreciated, and particularly that many of our critics who are loudest in condemning us for slowness in effecting the emancipation of colonial peoples are the most impatient of our insistence on the Colonial Application Clause and represent it, deliberately or otherwise, as a device for evading international responsibilities. A recent instance occurred in the debate in the General Assembly on the proposal to transfer to the United Nations from the League of Nations responsibility for the Conventions on Traffic in Women and Children. Russia, supported by India, succeeded in defeating a move by the United Kingdom representative to restore in the General Assembly the Colonial Application Clause in those Conventions which had already been deleted in Committee. In moving this resolution the United Kingdom representative made it clear that, as all our Colonies had already applied the Conventions in their territories, the inclusion of the Colonial Application Clause was desirable simply to safeguard for the future the principle that international conventions cannot properly be acceded to by the United Kingdom on behalf of its colonial territories without prior consultation with those territories. Nevertheless Russia was able to mobilise sufficient support to defeat this measure, on the score that our object was to permit traffic in women and children in our colonial territories. That she could do so on such manifestly false and slanderous grounds not only shows how many countries still fail to appreciate the reality of the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and her colonies but also the suspicion to which the United Kingdom is subjected as a leading colonial power.

17. There is one other point which needs to be mentioned in this section. Although the Trusteeship Council is still in its infancy, the wide powers that it possesses in the supervision of Trust Territories, and in particular its power of making periodical visits and examining petitions invest it with special importance. It is essential to recognise that, by virtue of these powers, the scrutiny of the administration of our Trust Territories will be detailed, and that many members of the Council which scrutinise it have practical knowledge and experience of colonial administration. It is likely therefore that international opinion will largely judge the quality of our African administration by our Trust Territories.

III. *Participation of colonial territories in international organisations*

18. There are many advantages to be gained by bringing Colonial Governments, and wherever possible representatives of the local inhabitants, into direct and active participation in the work of international organisations. In the first place, there is the obvious point that the presence in their own right of colonial delegations at international conferences is an effective demonstration to international opinion of the reality of constitutional and political progress in our colonial territories. The presence in colonial delegations of local inhabitants not only strengthens this impression, but also affords striking proof of the reality of social and educational advancement in our colonies.

19. It will also be of great value to colonial peoples themselves for their representatives to gain first-hand experience of international organisations. It is the soundest way of educating colonial peoples to the international responsibilities that will fall upon their shoulders more and more as they progress towards self-government. But it has a deeper significance. Although colonial representatives attending international conferences will be brought into direct contact with vocal anti-colonialism, they will at the same time witness British Commonwealth co-operation at international gatherings, and experience at first-hand the advantages which membership of the Commonwealth confers on such occasions. This can play an important part in bringing them to regard Dominion status as independence plus, and not independence minus: in a word, it may help to secure more Ceylons and fewer Burmas.

20. As to the form that colonial participation in international organisations should take, in the past it has usually been the practice for colonial representatives to be attached as advisers to the United Kingdom delegation. Recently, however, we have been concerned to establish the concept of associate membership of international organisations for colonial territories. This has been strongly opposed by members who saw in it not a legitimate mile-stone in the development of self-government, but a device to secure for the United Kingdom an adjunct in debate to its own power and influence. In fact, however, we have succeeded on one organisation—the International Meteorological Organisation—in securing restricted voting rights for colonial territories, and on a few other bodies—for example the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the World Health Organisation, the International Telecommunications Union—the principle that colonial territories should be admitted as associate members, i.e. to full participation less the right to vote. This latter limitation results not only from the type of opposition referred to above but also from constitutional objections arising from either the Charter of the United Nations or from the basic instruments of the international organisations concerned and from political considerations which might make amendment of these basic instruments undesirable. These factors can most conveniently be dealt with in relation to the types of international organisation in which colonial participation can be sought.

21. Such organisations fall into two categories:—

(a) *Regional organisations* of the United Nations; and
(b) *Specialised agencies* established by inter-governmental agreement.

So far as (a) is concerned, the Charter makes a fundamental distinction between sovereign states and non-self-governing territories, and provides that full mem-

bership of the Organisation can only be conferred on the former. It is highly unlikely that the United Nations would agree to the right of vote being enjoyed by any but full members of the Organisation. But as indicated above, we have succeeded in securing for colonial territories the right to participate, in everything except the vote, in the work of the first of the regional commissions set up by the United Nations in which the question of colonial participation presented itself as a practical issue, i.e. the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Such participation cannot, however, arise with the *functional* commissions, set up under the Economic and Social Council (see chart in Annexe I)[1] such as those on Human Rights, Status of Women, Narcotic Drugs, etc. These Commissions have a severely restricted membership, and if all full United Nations members cannot participate in the vote on *regional* bodies of these specialised agencies. [sic] The Russian aspect, however, imposes a distinction based on the nature of the functions performed by the regional body; where those functions are advisory to the central body, we feel that associate members should have the vote, but where those functions are executive we would not feel able to press for the right of vote for associate members. It is apparent that the number of organisations on which this distinction can be drawn is limited.

23. A point for discussion is the extent to which it may be desirable and feasible to restrict the practical application of the doctrine of associate membership. It is fairly obvious that, if we attempted to apply it without distinction alike to advanced and backward colonial territories, we should soon find that the former would quickly become dissatisfied with the concept, since they would find themselves placed on the same level internationally as the less advanced territories. It seems therefore desirable that, in so far as this may be possible, the decision whether associate membership should be sought for a colonial territory should be taken in the first instance in relation to the territory's social and educational advancement and its ability to make a useful contribution as an associate member. In some cases two or more territories could combine to form a single associate member group (as the Malayan and Borneo Governments have done in the case of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East). But it should be borne in mind that, where there existed any serious desire in a colonial territory to seek associate membership of an international organisation, it would be extremely embarrassing internationally for His Majesty's Government to refuse to sponsor the application from that territory. It is, in fact, only with the greatest difficulty, and against the most determined and persistent opposition on the part of, principally, Russia and India, that we have succeeded in establishing the principle that applications for associate membership should be sponsored only by the metropolitan power responsible for the applicant territory's external relations. Were we to refuse to sponsor any application, there is no doubt that the associate membership articles of international organisations would be revised so as to eliminate the necessity of sponsorship by the responsible metropolitan power. The potential constitutional embarrassment of such a move is self-evident.

24. Our associate membership proposals have not yet been finally worked out in the Colonial Office, nor submitted for Ministerial approval. It has, however, already been decided on Ministerial authority that associate membership of an international

[1] Not printed.

regional organisation for a colonial territory should *not*[2] be made conditional upon the United Kingdom itself deciding to seek full membership of that particular organisation.

25. Wherever associate membership is either impossible to secure, or not desired by a colonial territory, the interests of that territory can of course, as in the past, continue to be represented by the United Kingdom delegation, with the attachment, if necessary, of an adviser from that territory. In any case, it is suggested that a very useful method of giving Africans training in, and experience of, international organisations would be to attach them as advisers to the United Kingdom delegations to, for example, the General Assembly or the various Commissions and Sub-Commissions of the United Nations. (A representative of Ceylon formed part of the United Kingdom delegation to the General Assembly in 1946.) A difficulty at present is the necessity on exchange grounds of limiting United Kingdom delegations to international organisations to the minimum. The importance of associating the Colonies with the United Kingdom in international discussions affecting colonial questions is referred to in paper A.G.C.1 (The Colonies in the Commonwealth).[3]

26. There is a further point which might usefully be discussed under this section. If colonial participation in international organisations is to contribute to the process of educating colonial peoples to some of the responsibilities of self-government, the question arises whether enough information about the activities of international organisations is available to the Colonies themselves. It is suggested that the following might be discussed:—

(a) whether there is a case for instituting in colonial secretariats some organisation responsible for coordinating the international relations aspects of the work performed by the various departments of the secretariat; and for disseminating information about international affairs and organisations amongst the officers of the administration; and
(b) whether an extension of the existing brief training courses for officers on leave so as to include International Relations would be welcomed.

IV. *The programme of Anglo-French-Belgian colonial collaboration*

27. Governors are already aware of the course of events which culminated in the adoption last spring of an agreed programme of collaboration in technical colonial questions between the French, Belgians and ourselves. They are also aware of the very special importance which His Majesty's Government attach to this collaboration both on account of its extreme value as a factor in relations between the Western Powers, and also because of the important practical benefits which such co-operation may bring to Africa as a whole.

28. On grounds of the highest policy, it is now His Majesty's Government's policy to proceed to a closer collaboration with France. The emphasis in this closer collaboration is to a large extent economic, and the French are anxious for the maximum degree of co-operation in the colonial sphere. It is possible that they may propose the establishment of a more formal type of machinery for colonial economic co-operation than has been evolved for other colonial spheres, namely the appointment of some kind of formal Joint Colonial Commission for the exchange of

[2] Emphasis in original.

[3] See 59, appendix II.

information and the examination of practical projects of mutually advantageous co-operation. The Colonial Office view expressed on this is that, while co-operation in the economic field is a highly desirable development, it should take place through the existing arrangments for technical collaboration with the French, Belgians and other countries concerned with Africa. The programme already agreed does not include any purely economic subjects, but does cover such matters as rural economy and soil conservation. There seems to be no reason why economic conferences could not be fitted into the existing programme, if necessary by deferring other items to make way for them.

29. It is inevitable that this paper should emphasise the foreign policy aspect of international colonial technical collaboration. Great as its importance from this point of view undoubtedly is, the real and ultimate justification for the policy must of course lie in the benefits which it is hoped it will bring to African peoples. On the material side, the aim of the collaboration is obvious, namely to secure in handling the problems of health, of economics and of scientific research a common approach which is not hampered by international frontiers, and indeed to ensure that all available experience and resources are brought to bear on the solution of these problems. There is, however, a longer term and more important object to be pursued in this policy of co-operation in Africa. It must be the aim of our policy that when the African territories reach the stage of self-government they form part of western and above all of European civilisation. It is obvious that our chances of securing this essential aim will be far greater if, in spite of their many differences as to aims and methods, the Western colonial powers manage to hand on to their colonial peoples a legacy which, in many fields at least, may be termed a common Western European one. This will demand as political development proceeds in Africa a much closer understanding of each other's political aims than has so far been attempted by the Colonial Powers concerned in Africa. To achieve this will not be an easy task. But it is one which will have eventually to be faced.

Summary

The following is a brief summary of the main points put forward in this paper:—

(1) Paragraphs 1 to 9 analyse the aims and methods of the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations, in relation both to Chapter XI and Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, and describe the firm attitude that the United Kingdom have taken towards these activities.

(2) Paragraphs 10 to 13 suggest that the United Kingdom will be in a better position to resist this pressure if colonial legislation conforms to the greatest extent practicable with the highest standards in such matters as human rights, freedom of information, etc. (paragraph 11); if every effort is made to ensure that full information about conditions in our colonial territories is supplied to the United Nations in response to legitimate requests from them for such information (paragraph 12); and if the United Nations Library is generously supplied with official publications about conditions in colonial territories (paragraph 13).

(3) A policy of deliberately encouraging American non-official interest in colonial territories is suggested for discussion (paragraph 14).

(4) Two ways of demonstrating internationally the realities of constitutional and political advance in our colonial territories are:—

(a) by insisting on the inclusion of a Colonial Application Clause in all international agreements (paragraph 16);
(b) by bringing Colonial Governments and peoples into active participation in the work of international organisations. This is discussed in paragraphs 18 to 25. Suggested points for discussion are:—
(i) What criteria should be applied to determine the eligibility of Colonies for associate membership (paragraph 23).
(ii) Whether Colonial Secretariats might institute international relations schedules (paragraph 26).
(iii) Whether training courses in international relations for officers on leave would be welcome (paragraph 26).

(5) Paragraph 28 discusses a development in connection with the policy of international colonial collaboration, and paragraph 29 sets out the fundamental aims of this policy.

65 CO 847/37/1, no 21 [Nov 1947]
'Education policy': African Governors' Conference draft minute 29

The Conference had before it a memorandum A.G.C. No.7 (Revise 1) on Education Policy in Africa.[1]

Mr. Ward[2] referred to the opening sentence of the memorandum which said that it was not its purpose to attempt a restatement of general educational policy in Africa. It was only possible and, indeed, desirable to lay down certain aims of development in the educational field.

He thought that the important features in the memorandum were the following:—

(a) That the educational system should be a balanced system at all stages of development. This held good even though the total number of pupils catered for was but a small proportion of the child population of the territory.
(b) The point at which United Kingdom financial assistance could most effectively be given. It was felt that assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act could most profitably and properly be directed to the higher levels of education from secondary upwards.
(c) Technical and vocational training and the establishment of regional colleges. It was suggested that more technical education was required at all stages. The conception of regional colleges was a new and important one.
(d) Mass education was not merely a matter of mass literacy and adult education, but included inducing the people to take the initiative themselves in campaigns for better hygiene, better housing, social welfare etc.
(e) Co-operation with the churches. It had been the policy of His Majesty's Government since the end of the 1914–1918 war to encourage co-operation between the Government and the churches, and to regard the latter's work as of equal importance with that of Government institutions.

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[1] See 59, appendix VIII for the first draft.

[2] See note 2 on p 190.

(f) The connection between educational and economic planning. This raised the question of the content of education and the problem of curbing the desire of all Africans leaving school for black-coated employment. The general development of Africa needed the closest co-operation between those who planned education and those concerned with other aspects of Government policy. There must be the closest possible co-operation between educational and economic development.

Sir Gilbert Rennie[3] fully agreed that the educational system should be a balanced one, but felt that too much attention had been paid in the memorandum to secondary and higher education. Speaking generally, he thought it should be left to each territory to review its own position, but if we were to get the right type of pupil to the secondary stage of education we had to pay greater attention to his primary education than was contemplated in the paper.

Sir John Hathorn Hall agreed that, at any rate so far as Uganda was concerned more effort should be devoted to an expansion of primary education. This would bring with it an improvement in quality which was so badly needed. He agreed with the paper in regard to the point at which U.K. assistance should be applied. Higher education was largely beyond the scope of the local government to finance. Too little emphasis had been placed on female education: it was impossible to develop wealth in a territory unless you educated the women. As to technical education this was wanted in Uganda at the lower rather than at the higher levels of education. He did not think that a personal message from the Secretary of State to missionary education workers would achieve its purpose. What was wanted rather by these workers was material assistance in the shape of improvement in conditions of retirement and adequate salaries. He would be very sorry to see missions divorced from education in the Colonies.

Mr. Cullen, Director of Education, Uganda agreed that in Uganda the immediate effort should be applied at the bottom. The way to raise the standards of secondary institutions was a great increase in the volume of primary schools which would thus widen the basis of selection to the secondary schools.

Mr. Cohen said that the memorandum did not suggest that a concentration of effort should be made on forms of education other than primary. What it did seek to establish was that local government bodies and local people should pay for primary education to the maximum possible extent. He hoped that it would be possible for local government bodies to provide more money for the expansion and improvement of primary education. Unless this were possible there would be a heavy drain on Colonial Development and Welfare funds which could he felt, more usefully be devoted to higher education. As regards the question of an expansion of primary education he thought that it was not possible to concentrate on one side of education alone: one had to attack the problem from every angle. No African Government could afford to neglect either higher education or secondary education or primary education.

Sir John Hall agreed that the effort must be towards attaining a balanced system of education. In Uganda that balance was lacking and he therefore re-iterated his view that a very large expansion of primary education was required in the Protectorate. He agreed, also, that the local government bodies should pay for primary education.

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[3] Chief secretary of Kenya, 1939–1947; gov of Northern Rhodesia, 1948.

To-day it was the policy of the Uganda Government to stimulate a devolution of responsibility in this direction.

Sir Philip Mitchell thought that it was to the ghastly wastage that we should turn our attention. In Kenya of 114,000 children enrolled in primary standard 1 in 1941 80,000 dropped out at the end of the first year and 2,300 were all that were left at the end of the 6th year. It was nonsense to talk of an expansion of education when that appalling waste was going on. One solution might be to charge a small fee and to collect the first three years fees in advance at the same time.

Mr. Cullen, who had no figures with him, did not think that the wastage in Uganda was anything comparable to that in Kenya.

Sir William Battershill said that the wastage in Tanganyika was serious, but not in the case of the Chagga tribe who paid an education rate as part of their poll tax.

Mr. Brown[4] welcomed the emphasis placed on a balanced educational system. He thought that the Nyasaland education system erred perhaps in being too thinly spread. As regards the proposed message to missions there was a feeling in Nyasaland that missions were getting considerable financial assistance from governments but were not delivering the educational goods.

Mr. Cohen said that the proposal that the Secretary of State should send a message to missions was now, he thought, out-of-date. Missionary bodies in the U.K. had recently raised with the Secretary of State the question of increased financial assistance to mission bodies owing to rising costs of living and the need for increased salaries for missionary education workers. This he felt raised the whole basis of Government's relationship with missions and it would be difficult to send such a message while this was being discussed.

Sir Hubert Stevenson[5] agreed generally with the paper. Finance was an important factor in the expansion of education and the whole emphasis must not be laid on education at the expense of the other social services. He agreed that primary education should be financed locally. In Sierra Leone they were not yet ready for advanced technical education and technical education was required on a lower level. There was a danger in too liberal a use of the term "mass education". As in Kenya so in Sierra Leone in regard to the problem of wastage. It could, however, be put right to some extent by the influence of the Chiefs.

Mr. Colby[6] asked about the place of missions in the expansion of primary education; should Government, local government bodies or missions be responsible for new schools.

Mr. Ward, in reply, suggested that it was not possible to provide any answer of general application to this question, since it would be necessary to consider the matter in the light of local circumstances in each case.

The Secretary of State said that he thought the aim of educational policy must be to establish in time a public education system, but due recognition must be given to the part which the missions could play in primary education. Clearly the resources of the mission societies were inadequate to cope entirely with a problem of such magnitude as that of primary education in colonial territories if extended to the school which we hope to see. It would, in his view, be a mistake to lay down as a

[4] F L Brown, chief secretary of Nyasaland.
[5] Gov of Sierra Leone, 1941–1948.
[6] Administrative secretary of Nigeria, 1945–1948.

matter of policy that primary education should be the sole responsibility of the missions or that the responsibility of the Education Department in this field should be confined to supervisory activities. A public education system should enable a suitable compromise to be worked out between the responsibilities of the missions, of local government bodies and of the Central Government.

Mr. Colby said that one of the main disadvantages of leaving primary education in the hands of the missions was that the teachers in mission schools, in Nigeria at least, were all too often discontented and subversive elements in the local society.

Mr. Stooke[7] said that, as far as Nigeria was concerned, he agreed generally with the statement of policy contained in the paper and that this statement did in fact reflect fairly closely the policy at present being followed in Nigeria. But the Nigerian Government had grave apprehensions on financial grounds as to the effect of educational developments on these lines. There was a real danger that commitments for education might get out of proportion to the capacity of the Colony to provide finance. The paper suggested that local communities should contribute towards educational development, but in Nigeria they might not be prepared to do so, because the wages of even uncertificated teachers had now become so much higher than the general economic level of the peasantry that there was no incentive among the latter to contribute to what they would regard as merely further improving the conditions of service for teachers. There was also a danger that, unless the whole economy of the peasant people could be raised, it would not be possible to absorb satisfactorily the product of the present and proposed educational institutions into the economic structure of the territory. In Nigeria there was a marked trend from the rural areas towards the towns. The reason for this was not merely the greater amenities and attractions of town life, but also the fact that the peasant people made every effort to educate one of their children whose duty, on completing his education, was to obtain a comparatively highly paid urban job, and then to contribute towards the maintenance of his relatives.

On the question of the part which missions should play in primary education, recent legislation in Nigeria enabled the Government to limit the establishment of new schools according to the needs of the area to be served and having regard to existing facilities. This should make it possible to restrict mission activities in any particular area, if considered necessary.

Sir Philip Mitchell referred to the complication which resulted from the attitude of the Catholic Church in regard to the education of Catholic children. In East Africa they had sometimes used the argument that there would be objections on the grounds of conscience to any Catholic child attending a non-Catholic school and that they were therefore within their rights in insisting on the establishment of a Catholic school wherever there were Catholic children requiring education.

The Secretary of State said that he believed the position in this country to be that the Catholics did not apply any rule of conscience in regard to the attendance of Catholic children at non-Catholic schools. He understood that Archbishop Mathew had said that he would be prepared to co-operate in existing arrangements in East Africa for children's education, whatever those arrangements might be.

Turning to the general issues before the Conference, the *Secretary of State* said

[7] G Beresford Stooke, chief secretary of Nigeria, 1945–1948; gov of Sierra Leone, 1948.

that he felt sure the Conference would appreciate that in the future a fierce searchlight of international opinion would play over the whole subject of education in our Colonial Territories. Bearing in mind that education was one of the matters specifically mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation and was a subject on which we had accepted an obligation to report to the United Nations, the whole question of education in the Colonies was clearly one requiring a very special measure of attention.

Like others who had spoken during this discussion, he was himself impressed and disturbed at the magnitude of the expenditure involved in carrying out educational developments in the Colonies. The demands for funds for the provision of educational facilities were alarmingly high and it was all too easy for education to get out of step with other, no less important services. It was for consideration whether we were not at fault in attempting to impose on colonial territories, whose resources were undeveloped and whose apparatus of Government was simple and unequal to the strain of providing all the complex machinery of the modern state, a type of educational service which it had taken centuries to establish in this country and which even here, after so many years, was still inadequate. We seemed to be attempting to establish a type of social service such as would bear scrutiny in comparison with those of the United Kingdom. There were serious dangers inherent in this attempt; it tended to divorce the educated few in the Colonies from the uneducated mass of the people; moreover, there was little evidence that all the money being spent on educational services was being spent to very good purpose. Possibly a more fundamental approach to the whole problem was required in which we should ask ourselves whether we were right in attempting to transplant an educational system of the kind to which we were accustomed in Europe to the African Colonies, where the whole environment and background was entirely different. We appeared to be working on the simple assumption that education, as we knew it, was in itself a desirable object without asking what the effect might be on the people of the Colonial territories. In making this assumption we tended to ignore the serious wastage which occurred when those who had received, at a comparatively high cost, some scraps of education were resubmerged in their traditional background. In the disintegrating society and economy of the African territories was it not probable that the result of such education would merely be to uproot those who attended the schools from their traditional environment and to make them discontented misfits in their own society? The unsettling effect of education was particularly serious in the case of women and girls.

We should also ask ourselves whether we were satisfied with the content of the education which we were attempting to provide in Africa. It was important to bear in mind not merely the few who passed through the institutions of higher education, but also the mass of children who attended the intermediate educational institutions and who, on a broad view, were really of greater importance to the society and economy of their country than the few who benefited from the education of a university standard. It was for consideration whether training of a general and practical kind, such as had been provided during the war for soldiers in East Africa, was not in fact as valuable as any form of education which Colonial Governments had provided. Might it not be possible to treat the problem of primary education area by area and to put the young people in each area through a period of compulsory training of generally similar quality to that given to African soldiers during the war?

This might prove to be the type of "mass education" most appropriate for African conditions and in considering schemes for mass education we certainly should think not only in terms simply of mass literacy, but rather in terms of good community living. It might be possible at comparatively small cost to form team units drawn from the existing services of the Central Government and to entrust to such organisations educational development of a type distinct from the formal education provided in schools. The psychological importance of providing higher educational facilities should not of course be underestimated. In this connection particular attention should be paid to the necessity of establishing high standards of scholarship in any institutions of higher education which might be set up. It was of the first importance to develop such higher colleges in Africa, so that Africans would naturally turn to those institutions rather than to universities and colleges overseas.

Sir Ralph Furse outlined the position in regard to the recruitment of education staff for the Colonies at the present time. Demands were very heavy and were somewhat outrunning recruitment. The market for educational staff in this country was at present difficult and there seemed to be little prospect of meeting existing demands from the Colonies and no prospect of effecting any real improvement in the supply position unless—

(a) Colonial Governments were prepared to carry out a thorough overhaul of the salaries and conditions of service of education staff in their territories, and
(b) a general and widespread campaign were launched in this country designed to bring home to possible candidates, not only the improved conditions of service which Colonial Governments might be prepared to offer, but also the scope and interest of educational work in the Colonies. Such a campaign might be directed particularly towards attracting candidates who were not drawn to educational work in this country.

Sir Philip Mitchell suggested that secondment from this country might provide the answer to most of the difficulties in the way of securing educational staff for the Colonies. Apart from relieving the immediate shortage, secondment might also prove valuable in itself in importing fresh ideas into colonial education development. He would be prepared to press the Kenya Legislative Council to provide very favourable secondment conditions for educational staff.

Mr. Ward, with reference to (b) in Sir Ralph Furse's remarks, explained that, in co-operation with Ministry of Education and the Association of Directors of Education in this country, a memorandum had been prepared setting out the structure and scope of the Colonial Education Service and also providing for just the kind of secondment which had been mentioned. This memorandum had received the approval of the Minister of Education and the Secretary of State for Scotland. However, it had had to be delayed to consult the Local Education Authorities and the Teachers' Associations and there was every reason to expect that it would not shortly issue. The Headmasters Conference had also been approached and had welcomed the idea of issuing such a memorandum and had actually proceeded independently to send the document out to their members. The main difficulty in the way of secondment had lain not so much in providing adequate inducements to attract teachers to Colonial service, but rather in providing satisfactory arrangements for their reabsorption into the Educational Service of this country on their return. The agreement of the Ministry of Education had already been obtained to give candidates

for secondment to the Colonies an assurance that they would be reabsorbed on their return to this country in a post at least equivalent to that which they occupied before accepting appointment overseas, but the process of securing general acceptance of this assurance among possible candidates would necessarily be gradual. In general, he agreed with Sir Philip Mitchell that secondment might provide the best solution to existing difficulties in regard to the supply of education staff for the Colonies.

Sir Gilbert Rennie asked whether an assurance could be given that the paper did not contemplate entirely ruling out the possibility of making Colonial Development and Welfare assistance available for developments in elementary education.

Mr. Cohen said that this was so and suggested that this point was sufficiently met by paragraph 24 of the paper.

Conclusion:—
The Conference endorsed the paper as a broad statement of policy, subject to the various points which had been raised during the discussion. The Conference considered, however, that greater emphasis must be placed than the paper did on the importance of expanding elementary education.
The Conference adjourned at 5.0 p.m.

66 CO 847/36/4, no 24 12 Nov 1947

[Economic development in Africa]: speech by Sir S Cripps (minister for economic affairs) to the African Governors' Conference (paper AGC 22)

I make no profession to be able to assist you in your deliberations as to the lines of economic development that are most appropriate in the various Colonial territories in Africa. On that subject you have the specialised knowledge, but what I would like to do for a few minutes is to give you a summary review of our present economic position as a Commonwealth and Empire and of our prospects—not so much over the short term—as over the medium and long term.

You will, I have no doubt, have read and studied the recent statements made in the House of Commons and elsewhere which have given the details of our present situation; I need therefore only recapitulate them very shortly.

The sterling area—and indeed the rest of the non-dollar world—has got itself completely out of balance with the dollar countries, and with the United States of America in particular.

This is partly due to an acceleration of the tendency towards unbalance which was in evidence even before the first world war, and which was much more obvious between the two wars. The rapid rise in productive capacity of the American Continent was already in those days making it difficult to balance its contribution to the rest of the world against what it took from the rest of the world.

Partly too, of course, it is due to the very great upset caused by the two world wars and the consequent setback to European productive capacity.

This lessened European productive capacity meant in effect a slower development of all those areas in Africa that are primarily dependent upon European capital goods manufactured for their capital development.

To some extent all the European countries were obliged to neglect capital development both at home and in their Colonies in their attempt to balance their overseas payments. That tendency is unfortunately accentuated by the present much higher degree of unbalance.

This unbalance is not merely or primarily in the manufactured products of the U.S.A. but also, and more importantly, in the food stuffs and raw materials that members of the sterling group are compelled to obtain from the U.S.A., Canada or S. America (all of which must be considered as dollar countries) simply because they are not obtainable anywhere else. The degree of unbalance has risen to extraordinary levels.

The dollar unbalance in the U.S.A. has been running at over 10 billion dollars a year, and this has been balanced by every kind of artificial device such as UNRRA gifts for rehabilitation, loans and credits which have up to date enabled the flow of exports from the Western Hemisphere to be continued.

The direct trade of Great Britain with the U.S.A. has always shown a great excess of exports from over imports to the U.S.A., but before the war this was precariously balanced by the dollars we received from third parties, particularly members of the Commonwealth and Empire.

This enabled the sterling area as a whole to maintain a balance and so preserve the convertibility of sterling, thus permitting a very wide area of multilateral trade throughout the world.

Our own set-back in production consequent upon war devastation and our inability to buy foodstuffs and raw materials from the sterling area or non-dollar countries, coupled to the need of other sterling countries to buy manufactured goods from the USA, has resulted in the very heavy adverse balance of dollars running at the rate of between £600 and £700 millions a year for the sterling area.

It is the problem of righting this tremendous unbalance which now confronts us. In this regard I might mention the great importance of having prompt returns as to dollar expenditure so as to follow how the position is developing in order that immediate steps may be taken to rectify any particularly dangerous condition that is disclosed. We ourselves have laid on elaborate machinery to secure that we know from week to week how our dollar expenditure is moving and why. We want to supplement this with corresponding information from the Colonies, and you will be hearing about this through "the usual channels". I know you will all want to help in this matter but it is still vitally important that the great gravity of the common danger should be realised and the need for every unit in the sterling area to make the greatest possible contribution to overcoming it. In facing that problem we must have it quite clearly in our minds that this is not merely a short term difficulty: it is one that, unless tackled fundamentally and on a long term basis will never be solved at all. We believe that provided we can sell our goods abroad there is no insuperable difficulty in our manufacturing in this country enough goods for export to enable us to pay for all the imports that we need by the end of next year. That is within our capacity. But there remains the proviso that we can sell our goods abroad and sell them—if we want to balance our overseas payments—in the right markets.

The right markets must obviously be those from which we can get an immediate return in the form of essential foodstuffs and raw materials. This same principle of course applies to all the countries in the sterling area since we desire to make the sterling area as little dependent as possible upon supplies from the dollar area.

We must therefore not only expand our exports but at the same time we must cut down our dollar imports. This means a reduction in our total volume of imports for the simple reason that we cannot at present buy elsewhere the goods we must stop purchasing for dollars. It is only however because they come from a dollar source that we must do without them; if we could get them for sterling we could still afford to have them, because as I have said we can make enough goods to export to balance our total imports.

Our trouble is that the U.S.A. cannot take enough either raw materials or manufactured goods from the Sterling Area to anything like balance her capacity to export to that area. We must therefore, while doing all we can to increase imports into [the] U.S.A. from the sterling area, at the same time reduce our imports from the U.S.A. If we are to maintain even the present standard of living for our people in Great Britain, we must be able to find other sources of those kinds of foodstuffs and raw materials or their equivalents, the importation of which from the Western Hemisphere we want to cut off.

We have for a long time talked about the development of Africa but I do not believe that we have realised how from the point of view of [the] world economy that development is absolutely vital.

The economies of Western Europe and Tropical Africa are so closely interlocked, in mutual trade, in the supply of capital and in currency systems that their problems of overseas balance are essentially one. Tropical Africa is already contributing much, both in physical supplies of food and raw materials and in quite substantial net earnings of dollars for the sterling area pool. The further development of African resources is of the same crucial importance to the rehabilitation and strengthening of Western Europe as the restoration of European productive power is to the future progress and prosperity of Africa. Each needs and is needed by the other. In Africa indeed is to be found a great potential for new strength and vigour in the Western European economy and the stronger that economy becomes the better of course Africa itself will fare.

It is the urgency of the present situation and the need for the Sterling Group and Western Europe both of them to maintain their economic independence that makes it so essential that we should increase out of all recognition the tempo of African economic development. We must be prepared to change our outlook and our habits of colonial development and force the pace so that within the next 2–5 years we can get a really marked increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, raw materials of all kinds and foodstuffs and anything else that will save dollars or will sell in a dollar market.

But here we come up against what is a very great difficulty. All such development required [sic] the provision of large quantities of capital goods which—because of the dollar shortage—can only be obtained from Western Europe and, so far as our colonies are concerned, from Great Britain. Yet, as I have already pointed out, if we are to balance our overseas payments we must not export to countries other than those giving us an immediate return in essential goods.

These very capital goods that we shall require for colonial expansion, rails, locomotives, wagons, port facilities, bulldozers, tractors and so on are just the very goods that we require for our own rehabilitation and that are demanded by every country from whom we get foodstuffs and raw materials.

There is a very definite and sharp limit to our capacity to manufacture these

capital goods in the volume of steel and of special steels that we can ourselves manufacture. That limit is today round about 14 million tons a year provided we can get enough scrap and pig iron and coal and coke. But even with 14 million tons we are some 2–3 million tons short of our requirements, bearing in mind the export task we have to carry out, some 60% of which is in steel.

It is however quite probable that we shall find—indeed we expect to find—that the useful markets will not be able to absorb all the manufactured steel goods—as against the semi-finished steel—that we shall make. There will then be a surplus of exports which we should have to sell either for no return at all, or to wipe off past indebtedness, or else for a return in semi-luxury goods which it is not essential for us to import.

It is in this area that we shall hope to be able to find goods which can be more profitably devoted to Colonial development than to exchange for some unwanted imports.

You will however observe that there is a great uncertainty about this source of supply, which makes it extremely difficult to plan ahead.

You will be also very much concerned with the supply of consumer goods to your territories, particularly textiles of which they have been so short and which are required to reward the hard work of your producers.

We are as you know doing our utmost to increase textile production but here your people and the people at home are in competition and we can only share out between them the short supplies that exist until we can get better results from our textile industries.

Here I would like to mention the fact which may or may not be known to you that the Planning Section of the Cabinet Secretariat for which I am now responsible has had added to its terms of reference the whole subject matter of Colonial Development. This has been done because we must fit in with our own domestic investment programme that for the Colonies as well since it should really be part and parcel of the same thing.

Now that development under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act is under way and the Colonial Development Corporation has been or is about to be launched on an adequate scale it becomes essential for us to make provision for the Colonies in our programme for the manufacture of capital goods.

One of the difficulties will undoubtedly be the decision as to priorities of development. Where there are so many prospects it is difficult to choose. That matter is now under consideration and clearly we shall have to consider first those prospects which make the smallest demands upon new capital investment, and here you can most certainly help us to arrive at a wise decision. What I think is most important is that we should get right ahead with as many large scale experimental schemes as possible. These can as a rule be carried through with improvised methods which do not make great demands upon capital goods and they are essential preliminaries to any large scale development. This applies particularly to new products not hitherto used as important raw materials or foodstuffs which can be substituted for some of these materials now bought for dollars.

The development of these is bound to take time but with energetic action the time can be greatly cut down.

You may conclude from what I have said that the Government is only interested in large scale operations like the ground nut scheme in central Africa. This is not at all

the case. We are interested in every method and device that will yield a few thousand tons more of any valuable crop or material. We want the small things followed up as well as the big prospects and we want the spirit of improvisation, invention and adventure to permeate the whole of our colonial economic policy. In the course of this work if it is carried through energetically we shall expect failures as well as successes. An occasional failure is the necessary price of adventurous development and we must not allow safety first to be the keynote of our work.

The situation is far too urgent for that, for the whole future of the sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my view upon a quick and extensive development of our African resources.

I have rather concentrated upon the general economic position of the sterling group because that is fundamental to our survival, but I would not have you think that I looked upon the Colonial territories as a mere adjunct to feed Britain.

It is because the future prosperity of the Colonies themselves depends upon the future strength and stability of the Commonwealth and Empire that I am convinced that their future and the happiness of their peoples can only be made secure along the lines that I have mentioned.

You will I understand be considering the question of the development of manufactures and industries in the Colonies. Though I take the view that such development is highly desirable so long as it is not pushed too far or too quickly, yet it must be obvious that with the present world shortage of capital goods it is not possible to contemplate much in the way of industrial development in the Colonies. The available steel will be better used both from a world point of view as well as from the point of view of the Colonies themselves in doing our utmost to increase the supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials.

I believe that in your hands lies the ultimate solution of our present difficulties; it is to your contribution to the righting of the world unbalance that we must look, and in order to give you the chance of success we must put behind you all that we can in the way of capital goods supplies. Time is of the essence of this solution. We hope to improvise by means of the Marshall plan or in some other way for the next 3 or 4 years but after that we must have worked out a solution of our own for the sterling area. Three or four years is a desperately short time for major developments in your areas so that there is not a moment to be lost. Our desperate need in that period is first to find ways of increasing our capital resources available for investment and secondly to invest that capital in the most profitable way so as to bring in quick results. The Colonies can make their contribution to the first need by reducing demands for unnecessary current consumption and devoting some of their own earnings to capital purposes. They can contribute to the second by pushing ahead with all vigour with individual projects of development.

67 CO 847/37/7, no 9 [Nov 1947]
'Constitutional development in Africa': African Governors' Conference draft minute 5 (2nd session)

The Conference had before it a memorandum prepared in the Colonial Office (A.C.G. No. 2)[1] containing in parts I and II suggestions for the general political development and the evolution in the character and form of the African Government.

Mr. Cohen said that the paper raised three problems:—

(i) Whether there was need for a general policy in regard to constitutional development in Africa.
(ii) The definition of the immediate objectives.
(iii) The methods to achieve these objectives.

The difficulty of having a common policy for East and West Africa in these matters was admitted, but the Colonial Office suggested, however, that there were certain general principles to be borne in mind:—

(a) All the African Governments should be developed as entities on their own and as prototypes of self-governing Governments.
(b) There should be a rapid move towards greater participation by the local population in the executive government of the territory.
(c) There should be a greater degree of devolution from Whitehall.

There was a close connection between these three principles. Unless Colonial Governments could develop as separate entities devolution would be more difficult. The paper made the suggestion that early action should be taken and announced.

Sir Philip Mitchell referred to the social, economic and technical vacuum that had existed in East Africa before European government. Into that vacuum had been projected a powerful, and mostly beneficial European and Asian influence. With the introduction of this influence disappeared any possibility of the creation of a black African state. He had been surprised by the capacity of the average East African to learn but he was perturbed by his widespread lack of moral fibre. It was against this background that the proposals in the paper before the Conference should be viewed.

He thought the membership system had great benefits. The main difficulty in the traditional secretariat system as it had grown up in our Colonies was its rigidity. The membership system accelerated business. It gave the heads of the Departments greater access to the Executive Council level. As to the future he felt that the official members of the Executive Council would have to meet more and more as a cabinet leaving the Executive Council to the exercise of what he termed Privy Council functions.

He agreed with the suggested reform of the method of correspondence between the Colonial Office and the colonies and expressed the hope that when the Secretary of State himself gave directions to Governors and when important questions of policy were dealt with he would do so by signed despatch.

With regard to the closer association of Africans in the higher executive posts of

[1] See 59, appendix III.

government there was nothing to be gained by appointing them simply because of their race. Their participation in the government must be earned by merit.

He agreed with the suggestions regarding consultative machinery. Though Committees and Boards might slow up executive business they served to associate different races in the administration of a territory.

Sir William Battershill said that in so far as the paper was an exposition of general policy on constitutional development he did not dissent from it. In Tanganyika, as in Kenya, there had been a movement along the general lines set out in the Paper. It was intended to introduce the membership system with effect from 1st January 1948 and unofficials were already playing a constructive part in the formation of Government policy.

Sir John Hall pointed out that the position of Uganda differed from that of Kenya and Tanganyika. There was no problem of white settlement. The Indian community worked in well with the government. It was easier in Uganda to envisage an African state. The introduction of Africans into positions of executive responsibility in the central government was impossible both now and in the immediate future, not only because of their general lack of character (and he regretted the total absence of any reference to this important matter in the papers before the Conference) but also because of the complete lack of unity and common purpose that existed at present in the Protectorate. Unless he was so instructed he did not propose to introduce the membership system into Uganda but rapidly to develop local government. He agreed that it was essential to give Africans executive and financial responsibility and was already associating them at all stages with the government machine. He described the method of representation starting with the parish council and terminating with the provincial council. In answer to a question, he added that problems concerning immigrant peoples would be dealt with by the Legislative Council and not by the local government bodies.

Sir Gilbert Rennie in comparing the membership system with the traditional secretariat system said that in Kenya the former was infinitely better, but it depended on finding suitable unofficials to fill the various posts. There was no doubt that business was accelerated and more efficient under the membership system.

On the subject of correspondence between members and the Under Secretary of State he urged that there should be caution in the initial stages and emphasised the importance of providing the member with a good permanent secretary.

He disagreed with the view expressed in the paper that a senior officer should be appointed as secretary to the Executive Council, if this meant actually dealing with the preparation of papers etc., dealt with by the Council.

Mr. Brown saw difficulty in the introduction of the membership system into Nyasaland if it meant the filling of members' posts by unofficials in whom he doubted if the African would have sufficient faith.

Sir Vincent Glenday did not consider the membership system suitable to Zanzibar, where the aim should be to build up a central government of the Sultans' [sic] subjects by gradually replacing the European official by the local inhabitants.

Sir George Sandford[2] said that the High Commission proposals in East Africa had been framed on the assumption that the membership system would be applied and

[2] Chief secretary, East Africa High Commission.

the general intention fully conformed with the suggestion in Paragraph 12 of the paper. *Lord Milverton*[3] expressed his disagreement with much of what had been said by the Governors from the East and Central African territories. Unlike East Africa the object in West Africa was to create an African state. On the west coast the representatives of the people would be chosen because they were Africans. The policy was to devise a system which would produce Africans of adequate capacity. He foresaw inefficiency and embarrassment in any attempt to introduce the membership system into Nigeria. He preferred the increased use of Committees of Legislative Councils and for the Governor to pay increasing deference to what he called the shadow cabinet in Legislative Council. The association of unofficial Africans with Government must spring from below and not be imposed from above. It would be a mistake to introduce Europeans as members and there was not sufficient Africans capable of assuming posts of ministerial responsibility. (It was explained on behalf of the Colonial Office that the introduction of European unofficials as Members in West Africa was not what was intended by the Memorandum).

Nigeria was not a unified whole: the great problem was to create an administrative entity. What was now needed following the not inconsiderable constitutional and administrative changes of recent years was a period of rest. The Legislative and not the Executive Council shall be regarded as the pivot of development.

Sir Hubert Stevenson, agreeing with Lord Milverton, did not see how the membership system was at present feasible in Sierra Leone. There had been considerable constitutional changes in recent years and the protectorate must now be given a chance to settle down. He urged caution in giving any hope that self-government could come in a generation. As in Nigeria, there had been established a number of Boards and Committees which enabled the fullest possible consultation with African unofficial public opinion to take place.

Sir Gerald Creasy,[4] while in agreement with most of what Lord Milverton had said emphasised that the first step must be the development of local government. As regards ministerial development the most responsible men who could be considered as members were chiefs who held their positions at the will of the people. Some were extremely capable but were already fully occupied with their existing work. Furthermore their appointment would keep them from the work of their states which would put them in danger of deposition. He would have to consider these points in relation to the proposals on the paper. He went on to say that by the development of local government in the Gold Coast and by the federation of small units, there was ample opportunity for training the African for a full part in public life. He felt that there was room at the lower levels of the administration for greater consultation with unofficial public opinion and he thought that there might be some point in the suggestion of a greater use of Legislative Council committees.

Mr. Wright[5] agreed generally with what had been said but pointed out that the Gambia was only now starting on its constitutional and administrative development and there would be some danger in announcing future constitutional intentions now.

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[3] Formerly Sir Arthur Richards, gov of Nigeria, 1943–1947.

[4] Chief secretary, West African Council, 1945; gov of Gold Coast, 1948.

[5] (Sir) Andrew Wright, gov of Gambia, 1947; formerly colonial secretary of Trinidad.

Sir Philip Mitchell reminded the Conference that the membership system was well established and not something new and untried. He referred to its use in India and the Sudan.

Mr. Beresford Stooke stressed the lack of territorial unity in Nigeria. It would be impossible to find any one African who would be acceptable as a member to all parts of the territory.

Sir John Macpherson[6] thought that until Africans were capable of becoming members the only criterion in judging the system was administrative efficiency.

Sir Philip Mitchell supported what had been said in regard to giving the African territories time to digest progress hitherto made.

The Secretary of State said that there were two points which concerned him. Firstly the time factor. We knew how raw and ignorant were the peoples in an African territory but time was knocking at the door and the art of government had to be learnt. Secondly, there was the desire of the people to govern themselves and to shoulder their responsibilities. At the moment the demand for sharing in the responsibilities of government came only from a few who were said not really to be representative of the great mass of the people. He was certain, however, that the demand for sharing that responsibility was going to be made with increasing emphasis. He did not attach as much importance as some speakers had done to experience of government or educational attainment; we could not wait to find people of the standard of competence and responsibility that we should like. We had to satisfy the demand; whether we liked it or not we could not afford to wait.

Mr. Cohen suggested that the views expressed by Lord Milverton coincided largely with those put forward in the paper before the Conference except in regard to membership. The paper had pre-supposed that it would be a long time before any of the African Governments would be ready for self-government. The question was what was to be the interim policy. He agreed with Sir John Macpherson that the criterion was whether the introduction of the membership system would lead to greater administrative efficiency and whether it was acceptable to local opinion.

He felt however that the question of members required further discussion. He was not convinced that the devolution of power to regional governments in Nigeria was an argument for not dividing up the central government among members.

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[6] Gov of Nigeria, 1948; formerly comptroller of development and welfare, British West Indies.

68 CAB 124/1007, no 62 17 Aug 1946

'Projection of Britain overseas': proposed statement as revised by Mr Morrison for Committee on Overseas Information Services (OI(46)10)

[The Committee on Overseas Information Services approved this statement, as it appears here, as suitable for use by the overseas departments, the Central Office of Information, the British Council, and for distribution to overseas posts.]

1. *Britain as a political and social democracy*

(a) Britain is democratic; not merely in a formal sense. British democracy is active and vital. Not only is Government, both central and local, responsible to an electorate based on universal suffrage, and responsive to public opinion but

democracy is at the core of the life of the people. It is not merely a matter of voting. From trade unions and working men's clubs to cultural societies and parish councils, and from town and county councils to Parliament itself, the democratic institutions of Britain are innumerable, and there are few, if any, other countries in which the opportunities for direct participation by the ordinary citizen in democratic activities are as great.

(b) Britain is free. One of her main contributions to civilisation has been its emphasis on personal freedom, and we have succeeded—where some others have failed—in reconciling liberty and order. Freedom in Britain means something positive—freedom of thought, expression of opinion, religious belief, freedom to organise in political parties, trade unions, etc., and perhaps above all, freedom to criticise authority. We wish to see this concept of individual liberty adopted throughout the world.

(c) Britain aims at building up a comprehensive system of social services and industrial welfare second to none. We have already become the leading Great Power in their progressive development with legislation providing among other things: (a) a unified system of national insurance for all "from the cradle to the grave", covering maternity benefits, sickness benefits, unemployment assistance, industrial injuries, retirement pensions, widows' benefits and funeral grants; (b) family allowances; (c) a national health service designed to improve health as well as to prevent, diagnose and treat illness; (d) a system of grant-aided primary and secondary education without payment of fees, with milk, meals and medical attention at school, and liberal State and local authority scholarships to the universities; (e) the next step forward will be provision for a system of national assistance to round off this social legislation, fill the gaps and finally remove traces of the old Poor Law. Thus every child or citizen of Britain, whatever the circumstances of his birth and whatever risks of personal fortune he may suffer, will be assured freedom from insecurity, anxiety and want, and equal opportunities whatever the means of his parents, in regard to health, education and employment, by a comprehensive system of social services the aim of which is to secure the general well-being and happiness of the country's citizens.

(d) Britain has embarked on the greatest experiment in a planned economy in a free society that the world has ever known. She is determined, as far as lies within her power, that the under-employment and the recurrent slumps of the past shall be avoided and that the British people shall be assured employment and a decent and rising standard of life. But it is the aim of our economic planning—still of course in its early stages—to secure these objects without prejudicing the essential liberties of every British citizen, including the right to choose his own job. In these plans, both socialised and private enterprise industry have their part to play, and the approach to nationalisation is not doctrinaire but practical. The principal aim of policy is, with the aid of modern science and a highly trained and educated body of workers, to increase the goods and services which make up the national income, in the interests of the whole community.

(e) Britain is tackling economic and social reconstruction with the same determination as she tackled the problems of the war. The figures show how successfully British industry and trade are already re-establishing themselves. These achievements, rather than our sacrifices in the war, are the standards by which our position in the world will be judged.

(f) British culture is as alive as ever. The world has owed much to Britain's cultural exports, and British ideas, institutions, literature, sports, etc., have exerted a major influence on modern civilisation.

2. *Britain as a world power*

(a) Britain is the centre of a world-wide association of peoples. By virtue of this association, Britain is one of the major world powers, and is particularly fitted to take a leading part in international affairs. Britain has both the strength and purpose to carry out her policies.

(b) The principal aims of British foreign policy are that world peace should be secured through the success of the United Nations and its associated bodies, that world prosperity should be attained and maintained, that food should become plentiful, that the standard of living in the poorer countries should be raised, and that the benefits of the system of social and political democracy which we have developed should be spread abroad. These are the aims of British policy just as truly as it is our aim to increase our export trade and improve our own standard of living. The one contributes to the other.

3. *Britain and world trade*

(a) Britain's economic life depends upon international trade. Our market is essential to other countries and their markets are essential to us. The rest of the world cannot be prosperous unless we are prosperous and vice versa. We have lost much of our pre-war shipping and other sources of invisible exports, and have incurred heavy indebtedness overseas. Britain must increase the volume of her exports by 50% to 75% if she is to get back her former high level of imports. The world is interested in the success of our drive to increase exports because:—

(i) we are the world's best customer, and the more we sell the more we shall buy;
(ii) our exports are equal to any in quality, workmanship and design; and
(iii) we remain a pioneer in the development of new scientific methods and production techniques.

Any delay in this programme of exports is due to shortage of labour and raw materials, and to the expenditure of man-power and financial resources in fulfilling Britain's international obligations.

(b) Britain has committed herself unreservedly to an expansionist economic policy at home and a multilateral system of trading abroad, believing that together these two policies form one in relation to the need for developing the world's economic resources for the benefit of mankind. We have pledged ourselves to work out, together with all nations willing to co-operate, a code for the conduct of international trade and monetary affairs, thus linking our prosperity with that of the world in general. National self-sufficiency is the hand-maiden of restrictionist economics and forms no part of our economic thinking or policy. We stand for the greatest possible freeing of world trade from artificial restrictions, and for the development of the world financial system through the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of Reconstruction.

(c) Britain's policy is that world food supplies should be distributed in such a way as to combat under-nourishment everywhere. We have, by our policy of rationing at home, led the way in securing an equitable distribution of the world's food supply.

4. *The British Commonwealth and empire*

(a) Britain is the centre of a world-wide community of peoples associated for mutual benefit and not for the exploitation of one by another. The Dominions are sovereign states, and the Commonwealth is an example of co-operation between states, formulating their foreign and economic policies independently, but none the less pursuing common ideals. The existence of the Commonwealth is a contribution to peace and security, and the flexibility of its structure makes possible the full co-operation of all its members with wider international organisations.

(b) British "Imperialism" is dead, in so far as it ever existed, except as a slogan used by our critics. One illustration of this is our policy in India.

(c) The British approach to the complex human and physical problems presented by the administration of backward tropical territories which comprise the greater part of the Colonial Empire is both liberal and dynamic. The comparatively recent date at which British administration became effective in most territories makes more impressive the success with which the first problems of establishing law and order and opening up communications have been tackled. On the sound foundations now established, Britain pushes forward with schemes for the enlightenment and welfare of the Colonial peoples and for giving them an ever-increasing measure of self-government. At the same time she tackles with vigour and vision the problems presented by difficult physical conditions.

69 CO 877/31/5, no 1 9 Nov 1947

[Colonial Service]: memorandum on post-war recruitment and training by Sir R Furse [Extract]. *Minute* by Sir S Caine [nd]

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Part I

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6. *The Administrative Service*

For the *Administrative Service 732* recruits, *equivalent to 9 years intake* were obtained on permanent terms, or, if we add 144 taken on contract, *876 = 11 years intake*.[1]

The preceding paragraph shows that, with the arrival at the end of the year of the cadets now taking the First Course, Colonies will have received 11 years average supply. Some administrations should also have had additional help from among the 156 Development Officers selected. In spite of this, our earlier calculations have been upset by an unexpected and continuing demand for more officers for 'immediate' duty, coupled with a record indent for men to take the next Course.

The position at the moment is this:—

Number asked for to take the First Course 1947/8	= 147
Number selected by 31.5.1947	= 63
a figure since increased to	145

[1] ie, by the end of the first two years of post-war recruitment which began on 1 June 1945. Emphasis throughout in original.

Vacancies outstanding on 31.5.1947 for *immediate duty in 1947 without taking Course*	= 76
since increased to	126
Number selected since 31.5.1947	= 35

There remain therefore 91 vacancies, of which we have been asked to fill 35 with experienced officers from the Indian Civil Service or Indian Political Service.

The drying up of supply referred to above has slowed down the rate of recruitment in recent months. We have been fortunate in obtaining all the candidates required to take the First Course, except for an additional two requested at the very last moment. We should have little difficulty in securing 50–60 more for the non-I.C.S./I.P.S. immediate appointments by the end of this year, but it is doubtful whether sufficient numbers of I.C.S./I.P.S. officers will accept offers of appointment to the other vacancies.

It is difficult to compare the quality of ex-Service candidates with those recruited in peace at a younger age and immediately after graduation. This is particularly so in respect of intellectual attainments. We have certainly secured a proportion of absolutely first class men, but not so many as I had originally hoped. This is due, I think, to the fact that the terms offered, while good enough to attract the potential 'flier' on graduation in peace time, were not—even with the allowances for war service—good enough to secure the older ex-Service men who had proved to themselves and others that they were of first class calibre, and therefore felt confident of securing well paid positions in other walks of life. And being many of them already married and with families, they felt bound to do better for themselves materially. There were several instances of such men reluctantly refusing our actual offer of appointment though at their previous interviews they had shown much interest in the work of the Colonial Service.

On the other hand, so far as we can tell from reports so far received from Colonial Governors, etc., and from the Universities regarding the cadets taking their First Course, the general all round standard has been good.

A very interesting test analysis of the first 600 or so candidates selected for permanent appointments was made by Mr. Pedler, and circulated in his Tenth Progress Bulletin of 30.12.1946. It has since been revised and corrected and is attached as Annexe No. 1.[2]

Colonial administrations have shown considerable interest in the possibility of securing officers from the I.C.S. and the Indian Political Service. Members of these services who are interested are being interviewed as they arrive in this country and, if found suitable, those born after 1909 are being offered permanent and pensionable appointments; and the others contract employment. By the end of September only 8 had accepted appointments out of twenty-nine offers, but only 12 had definitely refused. There are about 120 more to be interviewed as they reach this country during the next few months. The majority after their Indian experiences, are found to be 'selective' over both climates and conditions of service. But those who accept offers should provide a valuable influx of trained personnel at the levels where, owing to reduced recruitment and training during the war, they are most required. These applications (and those expected from returning officers of the Indian Army) may

[2] Not printed.

help considerably to bridge the lean period of recruitment; but it is too early to be sure of this, since many of the former at least are also competing for the Home and Foreign Services, and may prefer them if successful, and others may not in the end be prepared to sacrifice the substantial 'compensation' which they forfeit if they accept further government employment.

7. Turning now to the *professional* services, our difficulties may be briefly summarised. We have had to meet unprecedented demands. *We are competing in markets where there is, for the most part, an over-all shortage of potential candidates with the professional equipment we need. We are up against more intense competition, or against other adverse factors not previously experienced. We have only been able to offer salaries and so on which have even yet not been generally adjusted to meet a higher cost of living and other post-war conditions . . . .*

Part II

In the critical period which the Colonial Service is now facing the importance of securing recruits of high quality, and then of using them to the best advantage, needs—I imagine—no argument. This applies equally to local and to European recruits. But in what follows I am thinking mainly of the latter, since we have most experience of them, and the factors affecting recruitment outlined in Part I apply mainly to them.

It is a commonplace that in the long run any Service gets the recruits it deserves. A good system of recruitment can, indeed, by providing potential candidates with good and clear information, by knowledge of the various markets, and by maintaining close and cordial relations with those who influence those markets—the advisers of youth, schoolmasters, tutors, Deans of Medical Schools, and the like—see to it that the best use is made of the inherent attractions of the Service. Clever propaganda can sometimes even attract better recruits than the service deserves—for a short time. But only for a short time; and retribution follows. The only policy that pays is to be perfectly honest and, in presenting your case to the public, to eschew official language and make your statements in plain English easily understood by the ordinary man. Equally important is it to rely as little as possible on 'legalities'—for example, the point that, though the Secretary of State 'selects', 'appointment' is in the hands of Governors. Such fine points, however sound in law, are likely to be regarded by the public as quibbles. They breed suspicion; and unless you are trusted by potential candidates and their advisers, you will not attract the recruits you want.

A good selection system, too, will ensure that the maximum use is made of the field that is attracted. But no system of selection can secure recruits who do not apply. This obvious truism I have quite frequently known to be forgotten in certain quarters.

2. In the long run, then, the Colonial Service must rely for good recruitment on its inherent attractions. And if its attractions are adequate you will probably also ensure that good use is made of your recruits. For the Colonial Service, to be attractive to the right sort of men and women, must be a contented Service with a high prestige. For this it must be adequately staffed and properly trained. Its material conditions of service must be good. It must be well organised. It must be led and treated with human understanding. It must have confidence in itself and its mission.

It must feel that its work is of vital importance, and that this is recognised at home. Its officers must feel that they have security of tenure and a reasonable chance of realising the ideals for which they work. Down to the humblest each must feel that he is trusted; that he has full scope for initiative and responsibility, and is expected to exercise both without too frequent reference to higher authority; that he will be supported from above in all possible ways; and that, provided he acts with sense and decision in accordance with general principles of policy which have been clearly laid down and communicated to him, he can count on being backed up and seen through, his superiors taking the blame for his mistakes whatever they may say to him about them . . . .

6. As regards material conditions generally, and salaries in particular, I think that Part I will have shown that in respect of many important professional services we are faced with three alternatives:

(a) a slowing down of the programme under the C.D. & W. Act;
(b) the replacement of European by locally recruited staff on a much larger scale;
(c) a radical improvement of salaries.

The first will be unpopular. I doubt if at the present stage of Colonial education it is feasible to do the second sufficiently quickly. We may therefore be driven to the third. If we are, I submit that we should not be unduly deterred by the fear that an improvement in professional salaries may imply a corresponding improvement in those for Administrative Officers. This may to some extent be forced upon us anyhow by the rise in the cost of living. Apart from this, I think it is true to say that the better men recruited for the Administrative Service annually during the last decade before the war were—having regard to their quality—obtained distinctly cheap.

For purposes of recruitment the adequacy of salary scales depends on their relation both to cost of living and to the remuneration which potential recruits of the kind required can command in other fields which are open, and attractive, to them. Broadly speaking we were only concerned with the type of man of general rather than specialist qualifications who wanted to go abroad. Our salaries therefore need comparing with services like the I.C.S. and Sudan, and with those offered by business firms in the Far and Middle East, etc., not with the Home Civil or other openings at home. The following extracts from a table made out at the opening of the decade I am speaking of give a sufficient idea of how our standard scales compared with those of India and the Sudan.

I am aware that the Colonial Service offered other attractions like free quarters, etc., but the average candidate, and his advisers if they have not lived abroad, look mainly to salary and often pay too little attention to such 'hidden' emoluments. The Sudan relied mainly on the prestige of a small, carefully hand-picked service of high quality, and—in particular—on the attractiveness of its system of annual leave in this country. As against India it will be seen that our salaries were nowhere in the picture. The remuneration offered by big firms operating abroad was also far better than ours, especially in respect of the ultimate rewards open to successful men. In the circumstances we were distinctly lucky in that a number of men who could have entered the I.C.S., or got good jobs in business, preferred the C.A.S.

7. What were the reasons for our success? I think I can assess these as the result of a large number of interviews with candidates which I had myself during those years. As against business there was the very genuine desire for public service and an

Comparative salary table

	Colonial Service			Indian Civil Service		Sudan
Year of Service	East Africa	West Africa	Malaya	Junior	Senior	
	£	£	£	£	£	£E
5th year	525	540	630 x	775	1080	660
10th year	660	690	805 x	1200	1447½	780
15th year	810	960 y	1050 x	1585	1890	996
20th year Ø	920	Ø 960 y	1225 x	1585	2250	1080

x A temporary allowance of 10% in the case of single and 20% of married officers was payable at the time on all salaries.

y A seniority allowance (non-Pensionable) of £72 per annum was payable whilst on duty in West Africa.

Ø If not promoted to a superscale post.

"unselfish" career; and the interest and value of the work to be done; it was a time, too, when there was less uncertainty about our colonial mission. There was also the appeal of a safe pensionable career common to all government service, but this weighed less than the other attractions with the better men. As against the I.C.S. the number of Governorships and Colonial Secretaryships open to the most successful was a distinct attraction; and so, when unification was introduced, was the feeling that they were entering a great service organised on broad lines, and giving scope, if they were lucky, for travel and for breadth and variety of experience. This appealed to the imagination of many of the best candidates. The fear of 'Indianisation' was also a powerful factor in a number of cases, whereas with regard to the Colonial Service, except in the case of candidates for Ceylon, there was a general sense of security.

8. Some of these advantages remain, but others are in danger of slipping out of our grasp. India is no longer a competitor. But 'Indianisation'—and now, nearer the bone, 'Ceylonisation'—have cast their shadow over recruitment. We must remove it, and quickly, or the boot will be on the other leg and candidates will be driven away from the Colonial Service by the same bogey that formerly directed them from the I.C.S. into our lap.

I think it is essential that we should try to arrive at some arrangement by which prospects of expatriate officers are guaranteed by the S. of S. when the colony in which they serve nears the stage of self-government. A public statement unequivocally setting out the responsibility of the S. of S. and the Colonial Service towards such officers would have a most valuable effect in establishing confidence both in the Service itself and in the recruitment market.

It is already becoming clear to candidates and their advisers that other Colonies in their turn will go the way of Ceylon and with the example of Ceylon and—now of Palestine—before their eyes it will be important to take early steps to remove all fear that officers in the Colonial Service may find themselves in the position certain technical officers in Burma, e.g. the younger Forest Officers, are now placed. Officers appointed to that Service since 1929, when Burma was separated from India,

received contracts of service with the Government of Burma only, and not with the S. of S. for India as formerly. The result to-day, I understand, is that such officers have been told that their future prospects are entirely dependent on decisions which the Government of Burma may make, and without any right of appeal. The officers concerned feel that they have no security as regards compensation for loss of career and will have to accept whatever terms the Government of Burma chooses to offer them.

9. Then there is the question of how the Colonial Service needs to be organised. The whittling down of the proposals of Sir Charles Jeffries' earlier Committee until all that was left was the pale ghost wrapped up in Col. 197, was to my mind a major disaster so far as the Colonial Service goes. But the question has now been reopened and as I am a member of Sir Charles' new Committee, I will only touch here on one or two points.

The adoption of the principle of unification put a powerful weapon into our hands. But it has never been fully used, especially to promote the effectiveness of the professional services where it could have been of the greatest value. Take the Forest Service as an example. Now that the India and Burma Forest Services have disappeared from the scene, the Colonial Forest Service is, potentially, the best—I should say—in the British Commonwealth. But its efficiency has so far been largely hamstrung because unification has not been made a reality and transfers necessary to efficiency have been impossible to carry out.

10. As regards recruitment, we are in danger of losing the advantages we have hitherto enjoyed. People are beginning to doubt if unification really exists. It does in fact function to a greater extent than some suppose but, for the efficiency of the Service, it needs to function far more effectively and, for good recruitment, we must be able to show that it does so function. Unfortunately it appears to conflict with the right and inevitable modern tendency towards devolution in the control of the Service. This conflict, which I believe to be more apparent than real, must somehow be resolved. Appointments Department have just sent forward a memo which I hope may help to a successful solution. I won't say more now except to emphasise as strongly as I can that more, and not less, unification is needed in practice if we are to get good recruits in the future and make the best use of them when they have been secured.

11. In other ways, too, I believe that, by improved organisation, better use could be made of the material already in the Service. Our main recruitment difficulty at the moment—and one of the chief obstacles to progress under the C.D. & W. Act—is lack of candidates with the professional attainments needed for the technical services. Are we certain that the work of those we do obtain is so organised that they can all apply the bulk of their time and energy to duties which really require the professional attainments they possess? From what I saw in Africa 11 years ago, and from what I have recently heard, I doubt it. Too often, I fear, a technically qualified officer spends too much of his time on duties where his professional knowledge does not come into play. It seems to me important that before continuing to pour in indents for professional staff, which are far in excess of our capacity to produce with sufficient speed, every Colonial Government should make sure that everything possible has been done to relieve such officers of all duties which can be carried out by less specialised and often less expensive staff, so that they can concentrate all their energies on tasks for which their professional knowledge is essential. At this juncture

the Service just cannot afford an uneconomical use of the technical staff at its disposal . . . .

13. I would like, if I may, to make one other suggestion. The point was discussed by Sir George Gater with Sir Charles Jeffries and myself during the war, but so far as I know was never gone into very thoroughly, and I have seen nothing about it in writing. Sir George was questioning the rightness of the system under which officers who have proved their suitability for Secretariat duties at a comparatively early stage tend to remain at headquarters for the rest of their career. For my own part I have long felt—and my impression is that Sir George was tending to the same opinion—that we should be wise to follow the well tried system of the army where alternation between staff duty and command in the field is carried on to a much later stage in the officer's service. Our present practice tends, I feel, to breed too much of a secretariat type and to favour that divorce between secretariat and district which has many disadvantages. The alternative would do much to promote a better understanding between secretariat and district staff and that closer liaison which, in view of the modern emphasis on team work is eminently desirable in the interest of efficiency, contentment, and esprit de corps.

There is also another point. In East Africa, at any rate, organisation has been increasingly based on the Province, and the office of Provincial Commissioner has become correspondingly important. I don't know if things have changed since, but when I toured East and Central Africa I met many P.Cs; I don't think I met one who did not feel he had reached a dead end. This state of things is inherently unsound. Men holding such important posts should normally feel that good work in them can lead to further advancement. I believe we should be on much sounder ground, if, far more often than is now the case, a successful period as Provincial Commissioner was the natural precursor to promotion to a Colonial Secretaryship: and, if they had had more secretariat experience in their previous service, P.Cs would be better fitted for such promotion.

Having watched the Service and its recruitment for over thirty years, I believe that the present system is largely an unconscious hangover from the days when far fewer men with the intelligence for secretariat work were recruited into the Administrative Service than has been the case since 1929. Since that date the average of intelligence and brains in the Administrative Service—especially in Africa—has markedly risen. There is a much bigger available supply of potential secretariat officers, and correspondingly less need to hang on continuously to officers who have proved their aptitude for it. A reform on the lines I have suggested would, I believe, not only make for a better balanced machine, with a better mutual understanding between its components, but would help us to give chances to a greater number of promising men earlier in their Service. The great improvement in the average level of recruitment since 1929 has been considerably neutralised by the fact that too many keen blades have had the edge taken off them by having been held back too long—and often under seniors less intelligent than they were . . . .

17. Not having been abroad for some time I speak with a good deal of diffidence. But over recent years I have been accumulating, through correspondence and personal contact with serving officers, and from the reports of colleagues in my own department who have at various times visited a large number of colonies, a volume of evidence which all points the same way. Conditions undoubtedly vary in different territories, even between parts of the same territory. But, speaking broadly, I cannot

help feeling that there is a similarity between the state of the Colonial Service and that of the Eighth Army a few weeks before the battle of El Ruweisat, as revealed in General de Guingand's recent book. Thirty odd years experience of recruitment enables me to speak with some confidence about the human material that composes the Colonial Service. I am certain that it can deal triumphantly with the critical and exacting tasks ahead of it if, as happened to the Eighth Army at the crisis of its fortunes, it can be given complete confidence in its power to deal with those tasks; the conviction that what it is doing is generally regarded as of the first importance; and the sense that no trouble will be spared to support and see it through at all levels, material or otherwise. On the other hand, I feel that there is a definite risk of morale deteriorating unless adequate measures are taken soon. And, if that happened to any serious extent, I have had enough experience of the sensitiveness of the recruiting market to know that we should have to say goodbye to all chance of high quality recruitment for a considerable time to come.

Part III: Training [omitted]

Conclusion

1. This review covers a good deal of ground and in Part I I have taken the opportunity to put forward a number of suggestions. It may help if I try to establish certain priorities:—

(a) I would put first the need for a public and authoritative statement unequivocally setting out the responsibility of the Secretary of State and of the Colonial Service in guaranteeing the prospects of expatriate officers when the territory in which they are serving approaches the stage of self-government (Part II, para. 8). The position in Ceylon and Palestine makes this a matter of urgency.

It should be coupled with as much authoritative reassurance as can be given to the effect that expatriate officers serving in all except the more advanced territories can count on there being scope for their services in those territories over a longish period, unless, of course, they should in the meanwhile be transferred on normal grounds (see Part II, para. 14).

(b) Next, in my view, comes the need for harmonising the sound and inevitable tendency towards devolution in the control of the service with the need for greater unification in practice. The paper on the Colonial Service submitted to the African Governors' Conference[3] deals admirably with devolution, but does not bring out the importance of unification both to efficiency and for the attraction of the best candidates. I think it important that the Conference should clearly realise this aspect of the question, and, if possible, should express an opinion on the suggestions recently put forward to Sir Charles Jeffries' Committee for resolving the apparent contradiction between what I may call its political and the practical aspects (see Part II, para. 10).

(c) The raising of salaries to meet increased cost of living (Part II, para. 4) and the provision of good quarters, especially for married officers (Part II, para. 5), should be effected as soon as possible.

[3] See 59, appendix V.

Beyond this—a radical improvement in the material conditions offered in respect of at any rate several important branches of the Service seems essential if we are to be able to meet their heavy demands for staff—unless either development programmes are materially slowed down or efficient local recruits can replace expatriate officers quickly and in large numbers (Part II, para. 6, and Part I, paras. 8, 9, and 10).

(d) Concurrently with (c), I would again emphasise the need to ensure that the Service is so organised that the fullest and most effective use is made of the existing staff, especially those chosen for their professional knowledge and qualifications.

2. It has taken some considerable time to get out the statistics on which this review is based, to analyse them, and to draw the correct inferences from them. In any case I was unwilling to draft certain sections of this report until I could check several of my impressions by personal contact with the more senior officers present at the Summer School on African Administration in August, and with officers of up to 10 years' service drawn from much wider areas who attended the Oxford School in September. It may, therefore, be as well to bring certain figures right up to date, especially for the benefit of the African Governors' Conference:—

The *total* of appointments made has risen from 2985 on May 31st to 3435 on October 31st; those for the Administrative Service have risen from 876 to 972; for Education from 359 to 430; for Engineering from 264 to 335; for Medical from 321 to 376.

But the tide of demand continues and in spite of the 450 vacancies filled since May the total number of unfilled vacancies has risen from 961 on May 31st to 1137 on October 31st. While we may hope to pull square in respect of Administrative recruitment before long, I see no prospect—as things are going—of doing so in regard to Education, Engineering and Medicine, for some years. Nor can I see at the moment any likelihood of the general pressure on Appointments Department being materially reduced for a considerable time.

3. Part III will have shown that there is much activity over training. Four hundred and seventy five officers are doing training at the moment, and their numbers are likely to increase as the staffing position in the Colonies gets easier. The post-war system of training is very flexible and can be adjusted and expanded to meet fresh demands for specialised study, and to assist in training for team work. The Cambridge Summer School strongly emphasised the need for the latter (see report of Group V, paragraphs 15 and 16). During the next few years much can, I believe, be done by post-service training to remedy defects in the equipment of officers who had to be sent out during and after the war without preliminary courses, and in some cases, owing to the urgent need of staff, were selected with lower professional standards than are normally insisted on in peace.

The modern training system can also help materially in direct ways. If Colonial Service Department can be staffed and organised so that they can function as a fully equipped labour exchange, the presence of serving officers on the Second Course and during Sabbatical and Study Leave will give them, working in conjunction with the Advisers, greatly improved chances of getting to know the capabilities of individual officers and their special aptitudes. This knowledge, combined with a fuller use of transfers, both for educational purposes and to place officers where their experience

and special [sic] knowledge can be of most value, should greatly assist in using the material available in the service to the best advantage as well as in the early "spotting of winners".

The development of Colonial Service training in the Universities is already leading to a quickening of interest in Colonial problems, and in the Colonial aspect of existing honours subjects such as Economics. It has already resulted in the creation of new lectureships and in the reinforcement of academic staffs by persons with practical experience of Colonial Administration. In the long run it is bound to enlarge the sum total of knowledge on Colonial affairs, make for a better educated public opinion in this country, and, we may hope, favourably influence future recruitment. We owe a great debt of gratitude to the Universities for the co-operative spirit they have shown, and for their willingness to accept additional burdens at a time when there is anyhow an exceptional demand upon their working time and their available accommodation.

4. In this review I have felt bound to refrain from expressing my thanks to many individual members of my staff who have given service of particular value. The list would have been too long, and it seemed better to leave the facts to speak for themselves. But I cannot close without referring to the masterly piece of improvisation by which Mr. Pedler, during the period of greatest pressure, reaped so much from the ground which had been so thoroughly prepared by Captain Newbolt, Mr. Renison and Mr. Scrivenor. To all my colleagues, of all grades, past and present, I owe a deep debt of gratitude for their unflagging zeal and energy under exacting and harassing conditions. Their achievements should be judged against the background of the handicaps under which they have worked. As I have said above, our approved cadre was only completed nine months after an overwhelming tide both of vacancies and applications had descended upon us. Even so, we could only get the men and women we needed by, for the most part, taking on persons who after a few months had to leave us again for more permanent employment. This meant incessant changes of staff and therefore a staff which was largely untrained. On a cadre averaging a little over 30 Administrative Officers no less than 75 such officers have served in the department in the last 2¼ years. In common with other departments we suffered from inadequate equipment at the clerical and typing levels. What all this has cost in delays, and in the loss of candidates who might otherwise have been secured, does not bear thinking about.

We are also greatly indebted to the Chairman and members of the Colonial Service Appointments Board, who have devoted much time to the interests of the Colonial Service, and have throughout co-operated with Appointments Department in the most wholehearted manner.

Before I finish, I must say a word about our messengers. It used to be said in the Army that an Inspecting Officer could judge of the state of a battalion by the sentry at the gate, before he even entered barracks. It is a high tribute to Mr. Holland and his men that, over a period when callers must be numbered in thousands, I have not had a single complaint of dilatoriness, inattention, or lack of courtesy, on the part of the messengers, doorkeepers or liftmen at 15 Victoria Street.

Minute on 69

Sir Ralph Furse's note raises two fundamental problems. First that of maintaining the inspiration of the Colonial Service, and secondly that of the degree of priority

which His Majesty's Government as a whole ought to give to Colonial development in its widest sense, and, therefore, to the recruitment of the staff necessary to carry it out.

The first problem touches upon very difficult issues which were to some extent discussed in the African Governors' Conference. On the one side, we have the declared policy of developing local self-government and increasing the proportion of local people in the services of individual Colonies. On the other, we have the equally emphasised policy of rapid social and economic development, the implementation of which requires in the immediate future the services of many more officers from outside the individual Colonies. The problem is how to kindle and maintain the zeal of officers recruited from outside for those immediate purposes when the logical conclusion of the political policy is that the Service which they are joining is a dying Service. On the political side, the test of success is how quickly the local people can be trained to take over the running of the whole Government machine. It is asking a lot from ordinary human beings that they should put their whole hearts in effect into digging their own graves.

The discussion in the Governors' Conference did not seem to me to get us any nearer a conclusion on this issue. There were some Governors who seemed to think that whatever the success of our political policies, the time when European officers could be dispensed with was so far distant that we need not think about it yet. There were others who appeared inclined to accept the fact that in a measurable space of time there would be African nations virtually running the whole of their own affairs. On neither side was there much inclination to consider the possibility of developing new kinds of relationships which would ensure that there was still a place for European guidance for a very long time to come.

I think that this essentially political problem will remain a most serious obstacle in the recruitment of the kind of people we need in the short term in the Colonial Service. I do not believe that there is any real solution in assurances with regard to compensation, or pension or future career in the monetary sense as suggested by Sir Ralph Furse. There are three troubles about that kind of thing. In the first place, the mere giving of such an assurance at once emphasises the fact that we are expecting the eventuality to arise as it has done in Ceylon and India. Secondly there is a substantial class of people who are constitutionally disposed to distrust such assurances. (It may not be so extreme a case, but it is common form that the best way to arouse distrust of your currency is to announce very firmly that you have no intention of de-valuing it.) Thirdly, I do not think the best type of officers are really so very much concerned about their future pensions etc.. What they want to feel is that they have a life work before them and with whatever assurances we may give about not leaving them stranded in a monetary sense half way through life I do not think we should tempt the best people into a job which we ourselves have advertised as likely to come to an end in a decade or two.

The second major problem is that of the priority to be given in staff as well as in other matters of Colonial development in its widest sense. There runs through Sir Ralph Furse's memorandum the constant burden that in order to attract people into the Colonial Service we must offer better pay, better conditions of service etc.. That means that we must set out to entice people away from other jobs in this country. It may be that that is right and that at present the balance is tilted in the wrong direction, but we must consider the danger of government in its broadest sense, that

is His Majesty's Government together with all Colonial Governments, competing with itself. We do not want to get into the position in which we are offering higher salaries to doctors in order to persuade them to go to the Colonies instead of the Home health service, and then the Ministry of Health put up their bid in order to keep them at home. I do not pretend to know what the solution to this is, but, at any rate ideally, we ought to have some agreement with the other authorities concerned as to the real scale of priorities we are attempting to establish through the money mechanism.

One other point about development is that I believe myself that there is a very great danger on a long view in our talking too much about the possibilities and prospects of Colonial development. I believe that what is really going to happen is going to be much smaller than most public discussion suggests, and, although fine talk at the moment may attract a certain number of enthusiastic people, I think we shall later on reap considerable fruits in frustration when they find out how slowly things actually go. I believe, therefore, that a sober appreciation of the real possibilities in the development field will be a better basis for a contented Service than an enthusiastic, but over-optimistic, assessment of this kind.

One or two other points worth mentioning are:—

(a) I am very disappointed that in all the discussion of the recruitment of personnel, there is no mention of the possibility of the recruitment of other than British citizens. I cannot sufficiently often repeat that if we really mean what we say about developing the Colonies for their own good, we ought to be willing to call on technical skill from any part of the world which may be available to help in the process. Otherwise we are in grave danger of it being thought that our enthusiasm arises only from the prospect of more jobs for British people.

(b) I very much agree with the suggestion in paragraph 11 that Colonial Governments ought to be urged to survey their own methods of using the technical staff available to them and ensuring that technical qualifications are not being wasted by the employment of individual officers on non-technical work. It is quite apparent that recruitment has met with less difficulty in filling administrative vacancies, and administrative and other non-technical staff ought, therefore, to be used to the maximum extent possible in replacement of technical people.

(c) I agree with the proposals with regard to annual leave wherever possible, although I confess that the actual scale of leave provided by the Sudan arrangements seems to me excessive.

S.C.

70 CO 866/49, no 1, COOC/1 10 May 1948

'Reflections on Colonial Office organisation': note by H T Bourdillon for CO Organisation Committee [Extract]

I have been in charge of the Malayan Department for just under a year. During that period certain impressions, relevant to the present structure of the Colonial Office, have struck me very forcibly, and I feel that I should commit these impressions to paper before leaving my present post and with it the "Geographical" field.

2. The Malayan Department is unique among Geographical Departments in that

it deals, essentially, with only one territory (the separation of Singapore is artificial and, I hope, temporary). Moreover, this unique arrangement is of recent origin and is not, I understand, destined to last much longer; so the running of this one-territory Department has been all the more in the nature of a freak experience. I have been wondering, however, whether the freak of today ought not to become the normal specimen of tomorrow, and in the following paragraphs I give my reasons for this belief.

3. The fascination of working in a Geographical as opposed to a subject Department must always lie in the clear sense of intimate personal contact with a particular, localised nexus of problems and individuals which is engendered. In the Malayan Department we have had this fascination, so to speak, potted and concentrated, since there has not even been the distraction of constantly having to turn ones attention from one territory to another and then back again. The spotlight has been fixed on Malaya and has never moved. This has presented us with certain opportunities which, to the best of our ability, we have tried to follow up. First, the fact of concentration on a single object has made it easier for us, within the Malayan Department, to regard ourselves as a team. Secondly it has encouraged us to try and take a constructive and consecutive interest in the various problems affecting Malaya—e.g. financial and economic problems—with which the different subject departments are concerned. Thirdly, it has caused us to try to foster in the Malayan Administrations themselves a feeling that the Colonial Office is not just a large, insensitive featureless jelly, but, is rather, from their point of view, a small group of individuals, from the Secretary of State downwards, who are seen clearly in focus and who endeavour to respond to requests and proposals with speed, sympathy and understanding. Our efforts have undoubtedly been most imperfect, and I am sure we have not completely succeeded in our object. I know of instances in which we have only succeeded, for sufficient or insufficient reasons, in causing irritation amongst some or all of the high authorities at the other end. On the whole, though, I think we can claim that the sense of *personal*[1] contact with the Colonial Office and the confidence which springs from that contact, are being maintained and strengthened both in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur. I have personal friends in both Administrations, and what I hear from them unofficially encourages me to believe that this is the case.

4. Now it is precisely this sense of personal contact, by which I mean an intimate and sympathetic approach on the part of the Colonial Office towards the tangle of problems in each territory or group of territories—which in my view will become more and more important as time goes on. I would go further, and would say that the whole success or failure of the gigantic experiment on which we are now engaged may depend on our ability to recognise this fact. For it is a gigantic experiment, surpassing in importance any of the much publicised political experiments indulged in by the Soviet Russians or by anybody else. Hitherto, and perhaps even today, we have been conducting this experiment in a state of mind bordering on unconsciousness. We have acknowledged the conceptions of increasing political responsibility for Colonial territories and of ultimate self-government (there has always been comfortable stress on the word "ultimate"!), but we have never, I think, really planned on the basis of these conceptions. We have never really looked ahead. We have worked from

[1] Emphasis throughout in original.

day to day, coping with problems, usually in a great hurry, when they have become so urgent that to cope with them has been the line of least resistance. Political development has been conceded rather than encouraged. As might be expected in these circumstances, the experiment hitherto has partly succeeded and partly failed. Ceylon has remained within the Commonwealth. Burma (never, of course, the concern of the Colonial Office) has gone outside. The fact that the measure of success has been so considerable has been an immense tribute to the British genius for doing, on the whole, the right thing without knowing what we are doing or why we are doing it.

5. The time has now come, however, when we can no longer continue in ignorance of our own intentions. I am convinced that we must now formulate the experiment we are conducting and set to work on it in a fully conscious manner. Having said this, I had better start by trying to formulate it myself. Subject to a reservation regarding small isolated territories (to which I shall return later), we are endeavouring, as I see it, to lead Colonial territories, or in some cases groups of Colonial territories, as rapidly as possible towards self-government, and at the same time we are endeavouring to maintain and consolidate their links of friendship with Great Britain, in the hope that when self-government is reached they will elect, of their own free will, to remain within the British Commonwealth. (I would add that we are also endeavouring, or ought to be endeavouring, to bind ever more closely together by links of common interest and frank mutual consultations the countries of the Commonwealth which are already self-governing. That, however, though of fundamental importance, is not of direct concern to the Colonial Office, and I therefore do no more than mention it in parenthesis). I make no apology for describing the process so formulated as a gigantic experiment. In this conception of the evolving Commonwealth I see the boldest stroke of political idealism which the world has yet witnessed, and on by far the grandest scale.

6. In the preceding paragraph I have made two statements which obviously need justification. First I have said that we need to formulate what we are doing, and secondly I have said that we are encouraging Colonial territories to reach self-government *as rapidly as possible*. The underlying reasons for these two statements are in fact the same. During and since the war there have been world developments to which we must pay the most profound attention. Generally speaking, there has been a tide of conscious, militant nationalism—a tide which has run strongest in Asia but has by no means been confined to that continent. If we turn from the general to the particular, we have the historic fact that Ceylon, along with India and Burma, has actually achieved independence. I take Ceylon as my example because of its previous relationship with the Colonial Office. This, in my view, has given a totally new impetus to the process of evolution within the Colonial Empire. Previously it was only the "white" territories in the Empire—that is to say, the territories where white settlers of immigrant origin had become the dominant if not the most numerous section of the population—which had reached the stage of complete self-government. Dominion status for coloured colonial peoples, however sincerely professed as an objective, remained a castle in the air. It has now come down to earth. All British colonial territories have before their eyes the concrete example of one of their number which has "emerged". Side by side with these developments amongst those who are, so to speak, participating in the great experiment, there have been hardly less important developments amongst the spectators. First, there has

been the enormous increase of "international" interest in colonial questions, as displayed in the meetings of U.N.O. Secondly, there has been the launching from Moscow of the world-wide Communist attack on Western democracy—an attack which, we may be certain, will be ruthlessly prosecuted in the colonial sphere. I do not suggest that in the face of these developments we should adopt an attitude in anyway akin to that of surrender. On the contrary, I think we must adhere more faithfully than ever before to the principles of our colonial policy, which has always been fundamentally right. But we cannot afford any longer to muddle along from day to day. We cannot afford to let countries like Burma drift out of the Commonwealth, simply because they have never been taught the true meaning of Dominion status. We cannot afford to be regarded by Colonial peoples in the future as seeking at every turn to obstruct their aspirations, and as only yielding in this attitude in the face of sheer necessity. We are now endeavouring to keep a systematic check on Communist activities in the Colonies. This is clearly necessary, but no amount of check-keeping, no amount of precautionary activity against Communist ringleaders themselves will achieve our purpose so long as we allow world Communism to pose, as it has always posed in the past, as the champion of dependent peoples against their cynical and self-seeking oppressors. We shall simply be shutting the stable door after the horse has got out—or rather holding the stable door open with one hand and then trying to shut it with the other when the horse is half way through. The battle against Communism is not a battle against ring-leaders, but a battle against ideas. If we can reveal ourselves to colonial peoples as the staunch friend and not the treacherous enemy of their political dreams, if we can lead them forward in the ripeness of our own experience and moreover convince them that we are doing so, we need have no doubt of the victory over Communism in the colonies. We can look forward, I believe, to a Commonwealth, impartial in matters of race, creed and colour, in which the evolving independence of the members may be accompanied by an increasing and not diminishing solidarity of the whole. I can think of nothing more inspiring than this.

7. I must now hasten to make clear one or two things which I do not mean. I do not mean, for example, that we should grant independence to the Colonies as fast as the most irresponsible elements in their populations would wish. There is no keeping pace with these elements, and it would indeed be a policy of surrender if we were to try. Nor do I mean that plans for political advance in various territories should be drawn up in Whitehall and then imposed on the territories in question. The role of Whitehall will be much more humble than that. The colonies must, in the truest sense, go their own way. It will be the task of the men on the spot to watch and foster political developments in the individual territories, and it will be for the Colonial Office to understand, respond, stimulate (if necessary) and guide. For this task, our great task of the future, we must be properly equipped.

8. This brings me back, after a long digression, to the real subject of the present memorandum—the structure of the Colonial Office. It will be obvious from what I have already said that I am advocating a return to the "geographical" structure which obtained until (I understand) the early 1930's. But it would be a geographical structure with a difference. There is no question of the chicken going back into the egg. The previous geographical set-up, under which the bulk of the work of the Office was done by Geographical Departments and the General Department was responsible for a miscellaneous remainder, only survived because vast Empire-wide problems,

mainly on the economic side, remained unrecognised and untackled. As soon as these problems really obtruded themselves on the notice of the Colonial Office, subject departments made haste to appear with an insistence reminiscent of the oysters in "the Walrus and the Carpenter", till we have now reached the stage in which it appears to some that the Geographical Departments are in danger of being swamped altogether. If I express the view that this process has gone too far, this does not mean that I think we should forget the vast problems, economic and other, which we have discovered. To take the economic as an example, what I am really proposing is the third stage in a continuous process. First, we had the stage in which the "political" reigned supreme, because the "economic" had not, so to speak, been born. Then we had the stage in which the "economic" came into existence and grew up, very rapidly and lustily, side by side with the "political". That is the stage in which we still find ourselves, but we must now move forward into the third stage, in which the "economic" will continue to thrive and increase but will be integrated with that all-important political background on which its own future prosperity depends. For the economic does depend on the political (indeed, it could more properly be described as an important element *within* the political), and I dare to prophesy that this fact will become rapidly more apparent during the next few years. Present economic plans for the development of the Colonial Empire are doubtless of the greatest importance and value both to the Colonies and the United Kingdom, but the existence of these plans merely emphasises my point. Irrespective of their actual merits and intentions, they are obviously subject to wholesale misrepresentation on the grounds that they are merely an attempt by the United Kingdom to suck the colonies dry. I understand that these charges are already being levelled in not very responsible quarters, but the important thing is that they should not "catch on". It is therefore essential that they should come to be regarded in the colonies not as impositions from outside but as contributions from the colonies themselves towards a common cause. In other words the economic and the political must be constantly seen as part of a single whole. Otherwise the economic plans will achieve the worst of all possible worlds—they will be economically barren and politically disastrous. In point of fact, I would not expect any such clear cut catastrophe as this. I would rather expect, if the economic and political are not properly integrated, a continuous conflict between those, both in London and in the Colonies, whose business it is to watch the political side and those who, in the pursuit of purely economic aims, fail to perceive the colonies as territories with varying degrees of *independence* and merely regard them as "places which can be made to do what they are told".

9. It must not be thought that I regard the present organisation of the Colonial Office as thoroughly bad, or that I have any criticisms of the way in which particular parts of the Office, as at present constituted, do their work. I do not think the organisation is bad, and I do think that the co-operation between departments and the sense of common purpose are very highly developed. I feel, however, that when we are embarking on this new, exciting and perilous stage of colonial history, we have an obligation to see that our dispositions are the very best that could be devised for the purpose in hand. Everything will turn on the speed, courage and forethought with which the situations are handled. I have no fear that we shall do what is essentially wrong. I do fear, however, that we may fail to do what is essentially right, and it is these failures which pave the road to hell.

10. To descend at last to details, I advocate first and foremost an increase in the

number of Geographical Departments, each of which would deal with a smaller area than at present, but in a more intensive manner. Except in the case of one or two very large territories, it would obviously not be feasible to have departments watching over the interests of one territory only, but the groups should as far as possible be small and closely knit. In the "cock shy" grouping which follows, I omit reference to a number of small, isolated territories, which I shall reserve for special mention later. In the Far Eastern area there would be a Malayan Department, a Borneo and Sarawak Department and a Western Pacific Department. In the East African area there would be either two Departments or three. One of these would deal with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and with the close relations enjoyed by these two territories with Southern Rhodesia). As regards the rest of the area, I should almost have considered that Tanganyika on the one hand and Kenya and Uganda on the other would require separate Departments; but it might well be considered that the intimate relations between these territories and the existence of the East African High Commission make it essential that they, together with Zanzibar (and Somaliland?) should be covered by a single Department. If so, it would be an outsize Department, but close uniformity of size between Departments is clearly unattainable. In the West African area I think there is no doubt that there should be two Departments, one for Nigeria and one for the rest. There remains the West Indian Area which should, I suggest, be split into three Departments, though I would not venture to hazard an actual distribution. Now these individual territories or small groups, as will be seen from the above classification, fall conveniently into larger groups or regions, and this brings me on to the second major suggestion which I have to make. It is that the Assistant Under Secretaries in control of the above-mentioned Geographical Departments should each be in charge of a region and should thus have a "diocese" with definite boundaries and inter-related problems. In some cases—e.g. in the Caribbean area—there would be the definite prospect that the whole region might move towards self-government as a single political unit. Even where this was not the case, each region would have a distinct entity of its own, a community of problems and a broad uniformity of character. This, I feel, would give Assistant Under Secretaries a much more logical and constructive place in the organisation of the Office than the present structure permits them to occupy. Except in the case of the African Division (which I regard as something of a model in this and in other respects), the scattered and heterogeneous field which Assistant Under Secretaries are required to cover tends to preclude them, I think, from exercising more than a supervisory function—a kind of cross-check to prevent things from going seriously wrong. Here let me say at once that while I have divided the African territories into two regions, I am no means convinced that these territories should not continue, as at present, to be under the charge of one Assistant Under Secretary. Given the homogeneity of Africa as compared with the rest of the Colonial Empire, the advantages of maintaining the present African dispensation are obvious. It would only be a question whether or not, having regard to the extra burden which would be thrown on Geographical Departments, one Assistant Under Secretary in charge of the whole of Africa would not be hopelessly over-worked. If there had to be two, it would be clear that Africa as a whole must become the special province of one of the two Deputies.

11. At this point I must refer to one other respect in which I regard the African Division as a model for future development. I mean the organisation under the

charge of Mr. Cartland, which is free from day to day work and which carries out research and "long-term thinking" over the entire African field. I would suggest that the Assistant Under Secretary in charge of each region, as well as being in command of his several Geographical Departments, should have at his disposal an organisation of this kind, which might or might not constitute an additional department under an Assistant Secretary.

12. The structure which I envisaged is now beginning to take shape. It is, as it were, a pyramid of pyramids, and I think it has this undoubted advantage, that while it in no way debases the post of Assistant Secretary—on the contrary, Assistant Secretaries would be very much "the cat's whiskers" in their own sphere—it gives a new meaning and purpose to the immediately superior rank of Assistant Under Secretary. Reverting to Assistant Secretaries, I have, it will be seen, rather more than doubled the number of Geographical Departments. Clearly we could not do this while maintaining at the same time the present number of subject departments, first because this would mean a large increase of staff (which is neither possible nor, in my view, desirable), and secondly because the Geographical Departments would not have anything like enough work to do. No, it will already have become clear that this is not at all my intention. I propose, in fact, that a great deal of the work which is now conducted by subject departments should in future be the responsibility of the Geographical Departments, and that the Heads of the latter should in a very real sense answer for everything which is going on in their territories. The difference from the previous "geographical age" would be, of course, that those vast new problems which we have since discovered would not be ignored but would be tackled with more energy than ever, though on a geographical basis . . .[2].

[2] Sir T Lloyd agreed with Bourdillon that everything that could be dealt with in the geographical departments should be (see COOC/10 on the same file, and discussion on p xxxii of the editor's introduction).

71 CO 875/24, no 8 Mar 1949

'Notes on British colonial policy': CO circular memorandum no 28. *Annex*: CO Information Dept circular outline (CO 857/24, no 22, nd)

[On 7 Jan 1949 Gordon Walker suggested to Rees-Williams that it would be helpful to have a brief and concise public statement on colonial policy, particularly to help MPs with their speeches. Four drafts were considered. Draft 'A' was a paper prepared by Sir W H McLean[1] in January 1947, 'The political, economic and social development of the British colonies', but Rees-Williams was not satisfied with this, and wanted incorporated into it bits of Creech Jones's Commons speech (22 July 1948), and his own speech (19 Nov 1948) on economic and financial policy. The result was Draft 'B', 'An outline of British colonial policy' (see Annex), by K W Blackburne[2], based on 'A'. Poynton and Lloyd made amendments. It was thought this could be distributed to Foreign Office and Commonwealth information posts for use in articles for foreign magazines, but it was too short and general for MPs. So a complementary Draft 'D' was written by McLean, 'Notes on British colonial policy'; Creech Jones picked up several omissions, which were then worked in, and this memorandum (as printed here) was sent to all MPs (over a hundred in number) who had asked to receive Colonial Office information memoranda, and to all

[1] Gov, Imperial College of Science, 1943–1949; adviser to CO on economic and social development and public relations since 1931.
[2] Director, CO Information Service, 1947–1950.

ministers. Draft 'C' was expressly for Labour MPs, and was an article published by Rees-Williams for the Labour Party Magazine, as amended by Blackburne.]

For the purpose of these notes the words "Colonies" and "Colonial Territories" are used in the sense of the term which has now become common parlance in the United Nations—"non-self-governing territories"; they include, therefore, Colonies proper, protectorates, protected states and territories under United Kingdom trusteeship.

General policy

The Secretary of State, Mr. Creech Jones, in his Report on "The Colonial Empire 1947–48" (Cmd. No. 7433, page 1 paragraph 3) wrote:—

"The Central purpose of British Colonial Policy is simple. It is to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter. But though the policy is clear enough, the problems to be overcome in carrying it out are numerous and complex."

Constitutional policy

(A) *Central government policy*

From a constitutional point of view the Dependencies may be divided into three main classes:—

(i) those which are potentially capable of attaining responsible government under the conditions stated above;
(ii) those which are not in themselves so capable, but which could under those conditions by combining with other adjoining or neighbouring units become so capable in some form of federal government; and
(iii) those which through their geographical situation or their size or other characteristics do not fall into either of the above categories, but which may be expected at least to develop the machinery for self-government in their domestic affairs.

At present the Colonies are administered locally by over 40 separate Governments in all stages of advancement from the simple paternal Government suitable for primitive tribal communities up to dyarchy as in Malta. They are held and administered on the principle of trusteeship, which means, briefly, that, mainly through education in its widest sense, Colonial peoples are helped along the road of social and economic development with the ultimate object of attaining the highest possible standard of living for the people at large and the greatest possible measure of self-government for the communities to which they belong; and it is hoped that this trusteeship will develop into partnership with Great Britain within the Commonwealth and in a common loyalty to the Crown.

(B) *Local government policy*

Organs of local and municipal governments are being developed, so that the Colonial peoples may have that training in responsible handling of their local affairs which, apart from all its other advantages, helps so much in developing the capacity for

effective participation in the work of the central government. The old policy of "indirect rule" followed in many of our territories was democratic in the sense that it left the local or provincial affairs of the colonial peoples to be managed to a very great extent by the traditional authorities, the chiefs and rulers, recognized by the people themselves. For some time, however, the aim has been, while recognizing the structure of native society, to adapt this policy to modern conceptions by evolving towards more flexible forms of native administration which give room for the progressive and often younger elements in colonial societies to play their part, and which will come more and more closely to resemble genuine representative powers. That evolution is strengthening among the people a sense of social obligation and social responsibility, and providing the experience and opportunities which will fit them to work the institutions at the centre.

(C) *Plural societies*
A number of territories are faced, through historic developments, with the problem of plural societies, that is societies comprising separate communities made up of different racial and religious groups, frequently having different standards of living, which have not hitherto coagulated. In these cases the objectives are common citizenship for all, and the achievement of a solution of the problem of creating political machinery which will, at the same time, advance the conception of common citizenship and obtain the full co-operation of each Community.

(D) *Racial discrimination*
The aim of British Colonial Policy is that there should be no discrimination on the grounds of race, colour or religion.

Economic policy

Economic development of the Colonies is of prime importance, for it is only on a secure economic foundation that schemes of social advance can be planned and carried out continuously.

Economic policy has four objectives:—

(i) to improve the capital equipment of the territories so as to provide a firm basis for future development;
(ii) to promote those types of economic activity, whether primary or industrial production, in which the territories are best fitted to engage, having regard to the balance of their economies and the advantages of their external trade;
(iii) to raise the living standards of the Colonial peoples as rapidly as the level of their productivity permits; and
(iv) to secure the mutual advantage of the United Kingdom and the Colonial territories, as well as the world at large, having regard to the finance, equipment and skill which the former may be able to provide.

(A) *Financial policy*
Financial policy, which is linked with the Economic policy aims at providing the necessary finance through the following mechanisms:—

(i) under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the spending of £120 million

between 1946 and 1956 has been approved by Parliament for the purpose of providing those services which have no direct commercial return, including such services as roads, water supplies, and the like;

(ii) by the setting up of two corporations, the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation, the former with a capital of £100 million and the latter with a capital of £50 million. The object of the former is to provide funds and skilled assistance—either in conjunction with Colonial Governments and private enterprise or on its own—to ensure those developments which have a commercial basis. The object of the Overseas Food Corporation is the production, or the promotion of production, of agricultural products outside the United Kingdom. It can operate in the Colonial Empire, but is not, like the Colonial Development Corporation, restricted to the Colonial Empire.

(B) *Development policy*

The application of the policy of a planned development which is being followed and the basic need for much preliminary survey and research are well illustrated in the debate on "African Territories Transport" (Hansard 24th January, 1949, Col. 714). The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Rees-Williams, gave an account of the systems or policy of priorities which would operate. The following are extracts from his speech:—

"There are, as we see it, three main problems in the development of East and Central Africa—first, the eradication of the tsetse fly; second, the construction of communications; and third, the provision of water. Tonight we are dealing with the second of these great problems."

"We have considered this matter most carefully in the Colonial Office, and we have decided that our object should be, in the first instance, to get an outlet from Central Africa and part of East Africa to the Coast at Mikindani, and to join up the Central African Railway with the East African system."

"My Right Honourable Friend (Mr. Creech Jones) decided it was essential to have a survey made from the east side of Lake Nyasa to Mikindani. That would develop the whole of Northern Nyasaland and give access to the coal and other deposits in southern Tanganyika." It was also intended to have a survey of a railway link between the Central African and East African systems.

(C) *Agricultural policy*

Agriculture, including in this term both the production of crops and the raising of livestock, is by far the most important industry in the Colonies. To promote the social welfare and advancement of the peoples it is essential that the basic natural resources of the country be preserved and improved, and that the land and labour be put to the best economic use. To that end greatly increased attention has been paid in recent years to soil conservation. To this end we are moving towards group farming and mixed farming.

The studies in nutrition which have been made throughout the Colonies are focussing attention on the need for more varied foodstuffs. Local industries have also been encouraged and new industries developed so that the volume of internal trade may be increased. Attention is also being given to the improvement of methods of marketing as well as the means of local transport.

(D) *Co-operation*
The form which co-operation has taken in the past in the Colonies has been the Co-operative Credit Society among Agricultural producers. It is the best line of attack against the evil of rural indebtedness, and it is our policy to promote its development. But now encouragement is also being given to the formation of consumers Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Marketing Organisations.

(E) *Land*
It is laid down in the agreements which govern the administration of the territories under United Kingdom trusteeship, that "in framing laws relating to the holding or transfer of land, the Administering Authority shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and shall respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the native population".

(F) *Forestry*
The policy in forestry is (1) to ensure that the climatic and physical conditions of the country are preserved by control and maintenance or rehabilitation of vegetation and water supplies, (2) to supply in perpetuity all forms of forest produce and (3) to ensure that enough forest trees are available to provide shade for certain crops, such as Cocoa, which must have shade in order to survive.

All the Colonies are taking steps to ensure that their forest policy is designed to meet these considerations and most of them have adopted systematic block felling of trees instead of selective felling.

Social service policy

It has been shown that social advance must go hand in hand with economic development which provides the means, and that the plans and priorities of the schemes of education, health and other social measures are drawn up accordingly.

The social services of the Colonies are mainly in the hands of the Medical and Education Departments of the Colonial Governments, while in most cases there is a separate Labour Department which looks after the conditions of labour. All these co-operate in planning and carrying out schemes of social progress.

(A) *Educational policy* (including mass education)
In education an attempt is made to preserve the balance between higher and lower standards of education in the Schools and the local educational and employment needs.

Efforts are being made to extend primary education as much as possible. The two chief problems in this direction are to find the money to pay adequate salaries to the large number of teachers required, and to devise a system of primary education whose pupils will wish not to isolate themselves from their community but to work for the improvement of the community from within.

Mass education is a movement towards community betterment, carried on with the active participation, and if possible, the spontaneous initiative, of the community. It works towards all forms of betterment in the agricultural sphere by proper soil conservation, better farming methods, and better care of livestock; in the health sphere by better sanitation, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity

welfare; in the education sphere by adult education as well as the improvement and extension of schools for children. The essence of mass education is the stimulation of initiative.

(B) *Medical policy*
Medical work in the Colonies embraces two aspects, separate, but interdependent, curative and preventive. Good hospitals often exist, but provision for increases on a large scale are being made, especially for rural areas. The greatest advances will take place on the preventive side and it is here the co-operation of the indigenous peoples is so necessary. It is realised that the great majority of adults suffer from the parasitic diseases and it is hoped, by strict attention to health rules from birth, to build a stronger, healthier race. An equally important step towards the same aim is the provision of adequate water supplies and steady improvements in housing and in environmental sanitation.

(C) *Labour policy*
Labour Departments have been set up in almost all Colonies and Labour Officers have been appointed. To-day there are very few British Colonies without a Trade Union Law. Trade Unionists from many Colonies have taken places in Regional Labour Conferences. Labour Advisory Boards have been set up in most Colonies with members representing the Government, employers and employees. Permanent Labour Exchanges for Africans have also been set up.

(D) *Welfare policy*
The Departments of Health and Education are assisted by Social Welfare Committees now being set up in all Colonies. They co-operate with these Departments and, at the same time, promote schemes of social welfare now normally covered by the Departments. Modern methods of social welfare are being adapted and applied to, or substituted for, traditional customs of indigenous populations, so that the people may be helped to help themselves towards a better way and higher standard of living.

Annex to 71

Introduction
British colonial policy is often misrepresented and attacked both in this country and in foreign countries. Britain's critics accuse her of "selfish exploitation" of the colonial peoples; they give her no credit for past achievement; and they pay no regard to the fact that what we are trying to do in the Colonial Empire, namely to produce adequate conditions of life for mankind, is a task which others have been attempting in their own countries, often with indifferent success, for hundreds of years. This note attempts to summarise the facts of British colonial policy.

What is the colonial empire?
The British Colonial Empire consists of those territories within the British Commonwealth which (unlike the self-governing Dominions) are still administered by Great Britain. Not all are Colonies in the strict sense of being British possessions: some are Protectorates or Protected States, three have the status of trust territories.

They comprise forty separate territories, islands, and groups of islands, each with its own administration. There are about 65,000,000 people in the Colonies, of many races, colours and creeds. They range from Europeans in Malta to unsophisticated tribesmen in tropical lands; and the local administrations of the Colonies vary from complete control of internal affairs (as in Malta) to direct rule by a British Governor (as in Somaliland). Many of the territories are lands where the natural conditions, of jungle, swamp, or desert, make the lives of the people difficult and burdensome.

Why is Britain responsible for the colonial empire?
The territories that comprise the Colonial Empire came under the administration of the United Kingdom in various ways—by settlement, e.g. Barbados; by voluntary cession on the part of local rulers, e.g. Fiji; by peaceful penetration of missionaries and traders, e.g. Nigeria, Uganda; by conquest from other European powers, e.g. Jamaica, Mauritius. Certain of the territories taken from Germany in World War I, formerly administered under League of Nations Mandate, are now administered under United Nations trusteeship: these are Tanganyika, British Cameroons and British Togoland. In all cases Great Britain accepted responsibility for governing the Colonial territories in the interests of their inhabitants.

How does Great Britain exercise these responsibilities?
The Secretary of State for the Colonies is responsible to Parliament (and through Parliament to the British people) for the administration of the Colonial Empire. He carries out through the Colonial Office the policy of His Majesty's Government. He is assisted by a staff of Advisers and by a number of Advisory Committees, consisting of distinguished experts on such subjects as health, education, welfare, economic affairs, agriculture, animal health, fisheries, forestry and public health.

What are the aims of British colonial policy?
The fundamental aim is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the British Commonwealth, in conditions that ensure to their peoples fair standards of living and freedom of oppression from any quarter.

How is this colonial policy applied in practice?
Political development, and the grant of responsible government to the colonial territories are meaningless unless they are accompanied by economic development. A territory which cannot support itself economically can have no true self-government. Moreover economic development is necessary to enable the colonial territories to pay for the expanded social services needed to raise the standard of living of the colonial peoples. Britain is, therefore, applying her colonial policy simultaneously in three fields—the political, the economic and the social.

Political development
The colonial peoples must gain administrative experience if they are to govern their territories wisely. This experience is being provided by the fostering of local government institutions, and by the appointment of local officers to posts of every kind, including the most senior, in the colonial civil services. 96% of the civil services are recruited in the Colonies. Parallel with this, constitutional changes are being made as rapidly as circumstances justify in each Colony, with the ultimate

object of creating wherever possible a legislature which is fully representative of the people and an executive which (like the British Cabinet) is solely responsible to the legislature in all local affairs.

From the constitutional point of view the Colonial territories can be divided into three main classes:—

First, those which are potentially capable of attaining responsible government under the conditions described above, *Secondly*, those which are not in themselves so capable, but which could under those conditions by combining with other adjoining or neighbouring units become so capable in some form of federal government, and *Thirdly*, those which through their geographical situation or their size or other characteristics do not fall into either of the above categories but which may be expected at least to develop to self government in their Domestic Affairs.

Even at the present moment with in most cases primary products demanding [? commanding] a high price, some being 6 to 8 times the value they had pre-war, no less than eleven territories are Treasury controlled, that is to say, they cannot without assistance from the British taxpayer balance their budgets. For all these reasons the conditions relating to self-government are of vital significance.

Social development

In the past the development of social services are limited by the inability of some colonial governments to finance all the public health, educational, and other projects which were needed. The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 (which made available from the British Treasury over £145,000,000 between 1940 and 1956) have now made it possible for colonial governments to embark on ten-year plans of development; these are financed partly out of the British grants, partly from the territories' own resources and partly out of loans.

Economic development

In order to make political development realistic and to help in the financing of social development on the vast scale which is needed, the British Government have started on a drive to develop the economic resources of the Colonial Empire. On the one hand the £120,000,000 provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 will partly be spent on basic economic services. On the other, the Colonial Development Corporation (with powers to raise up to £110,000,000) has been established, while work in the Colonies is also being undertaken by the Overseas Food Corporation. Private enterprise—British, Colonial, and foreign—is also being encouraged to launch new projects in the Colonies.

This drive is of vital interest both to the Colonies themselves and to the world as a whole. The world needs raw materials and food; and that need is the opportunity for the colonial territories which can supply some of these requirements. These territories themselves need capital equipment and other manufactured goods without which there cannot take place that economic development so necessary if they are to attain real responsibility for their own affairs; and the world can supply these goods in exchange for colonial products.

How does Britain collaborate with other nations in the colonial field?

Britain, in common with other colonial powers, is anxious to secure for her colonial

territories all the help which can be offered by other nations. International collaboration in the colonial field is being rapidly developed by means of such bodies as the Caribbean Commission and the South Pacific Commission, and by regular conferences and exchange of information with all countries interested in the development of colonial peoples.

72 CO 537/5698, no 69 [May 1950]

'The colonial empire today: summary of our main problems and policies': CO International Relations Dept paper. *Annex*: some facts illustrating progress to date

[This major survey was prepared for the Anglo-American talks in 1950, and designed in particular to get American support at the United Nations, especially against the introduction of accountability to the UN. This, it was feared, would weaken the attractions of the Commonwealth, devalue the Crown link, and encourage appeal to the UN over the head of HMG (CO 537/5698, no 63). The main sections were: (i) the end in view, (ii) the size of the job, (iii) the main problems: reviewed in five regions, (iv) Britain's position and difficulties as a colonial power in the United Nations. Sections (i) and (ii) were prepared by S H Evans, head of the administrative branch and deputy director of information services, CO Information Dept. The aim throughout was to impress the Americans with British policy and achievements; this task the CO decided to take upon itself because one of its oldest problems was the reluctance of the FO to tackle what was perceived to be American ignorance of British policy. Discussion would concentrate on Africa, because that was where the Americans were most interested, and British policies were most easily explained (minute by J M Martin, 13 June 1950). The talks in July went well, with a real measure of mutual understanding successfully established. Martin even went so far as to say: 'we could not have hoped for more from these talks. They were an example of ideal negotiations, where each party contributes something and takes something away and agreement is reached without either party feeling that he has been over-persuaded' (CO 537/5699, minute, 26 July 1950). The footnotes to the text are part of the original document.]

I. *The end in view*

There is no ambiguity in the official statement of our colonial policy. The central purpose, it declares, "is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter."[1]

2. We are engaged on a world-wide experiment in nation-building.[2] Our aim is to create independence—independence within the Commonwealth—not to suppress it. No virtue is seen in permanent dependence. A vigorous, adult and willing partner is clearly more to be desired than one dependent, adolescent and unwilling.

[1] Cmd. 7433 *The Colonial Empire 1947–1948*.

[2] There are 35 separate administrative units for which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is answerable to Parliament. Their total population is nearly 70,000,000 and they cover an area of over 2,000,000 square miles. They fall into six major groups—West Indies, West Africa, East and Central Africa, South-East Asia, South-West Pacific and Mediterranean. The two African groups are in area and population much the biggest.

3. But there is no intention to abandon responsibilities prematurely.[3] Self-government must be effective and democratic self-government. No colonial territory will be expected to fend for itself until it is in a position to do so, and to build up and maintain a satisfactory standard of living. Nor will responsibility be relinquished without satisfactory assurances for the liberty and well-being of the individual; it is intended that government shall be based on representative institutions.

4. The basic requirements for effective self-government can be reduced to five:—

(1) The people must be healthy and vigorous.
(2) They must have education, and technical knowledge and skill.
(3) They must be able to produce all they possibly can for their own needs.
(4) They must have something to sell to the outside world in exchange for the things they need but cannot produce themselves.
(5) They must be able to govern and administer their affairs with reasonable honesty and efficiency.

5. Largely by the accident of a tropical environment most of the colonial peoples have still to achieve these five basic requirements. As late as 1900 the great majority of the people of Tropical Africa were living in conditions more backward than those in pre-Roman Britain or pre-Columbus America. In its essence, therefore, the task we have undertaken at the side of the colonial peoples is a battle against hostile natural conditions. It is a task calling for a major contribution of resources of finance, knowledge and technical skill.

6. Development of areas at present under-developed, and higher standards of living in those areas, means additions to the world's resources and new markets for the products of Europe and America. "In Africa we have a dual mandate. First, to promote the moral and material welfare of African peoples, and secondly to develop the natural resources of Africa, not only for its peoples, but for all mandkind." (Lord Lugard). These same arguments had, indeed, been advanced throughout the 19th century by those pleading that the British Government should undertake administrative responsibilities in Africa, Malaya and the Pacific.[4]

7. We also aim, in our colonial policy, at strengthening the Commonwealth. We believe that when our colonies achieve self-government most, if not all, will choose to follow the recent example of Ceylon and remain in the Commonwealth as full and equal partners. In this way there will be an ever-widening circle of democratic nations exerting a powerful stabilising influence in the world.

[3] "We have no intention of jeopardising the security, well-being and liberty of these peoples, for whom Britain has responsibilities, by a premature withdrawal"—The Prime Minister in a statement in the House of Commons on the 15th April, 1949, with reference to Malaya.

[4] Sir Stamford Raffles, for example, the founder of Singapore in 1819, urged that Britain should "stretch a protecting hand over the Eastern Archipelago and establish the amelioration and prosperity of its inhabitants." Macgregor Laird, who believed that the Niger might be developed as a great commercial highway, said in the 1830's that the project should appeal to two groups of people—those desiring to create new and extensive markets and fresh sources of supplies, "and those who, conceiving mankind as one great family, consider it their duty to raise their fellow creatures from their present degraded, denationalised and demoralised state."

II. *The size of the job*

8. It is little more than 50 years ago since we assumed responsibilities for three-quarters of our present dependencies. The fact that as a seafaring and trading nation we had long been a "collector of islands and peninsulas" to protect trade and the sea routes,[5] coupled with the early settlements in the West Indies, has created the impression that the Colonial Empire is an ancient institution.

9. In fact the territories now known as Nigeria and the Gold Coast did not take their present corporate existence until after 1900: in East and Central Africa it was not until the 1890's that responsibility was assumed. In Africa indeed, it was only under the compulsion of international rivalry that the Government of the day could be persuaded to undertake the trouble and expense of administering territory distant from the sea.[6] The policy of establishing settled conditions in the Malay peninsula by treaties with the Malay States and the appointment of British Advisers was adopted only in 1873 and was not completed until 1914. The voluntary cession of Fiji was accepted in 1874 only at the second time of offering.

10. Thus it is within living memory that we have come to grips with what are admittedly some of the world's most difficult and challenging problems. Africa was still "The Dark Continent", and West Africa the "White man's Grave", at the turn of the century. In his book "The Martyrdom of Man" Winwood Reade declared that the triumph of the Negro had been to survive his environment. Excessive heat, excessive rain, excessive drought: jungle, swamp and desert: poverty of soil: worm-infested water: pests such as the mosquito, the tsetse and the locust, destroying man, beast and plant—these were the conditions waiting to be conquered in 1900.

11. Of the people of East Africa it has been said that at the time of the arrival of the British: "They had no wheeled transport and (apart from the camels and donkeys of the pastoral nomads) no animal transport; they had no roads and towns; no tools except small hand hoes, axes, wooden digging sticks, and the like; no manufactures, and no industrial products except the simple domestic handiwork; no commerce as we understand it and no currency, although in some places barter of produce was facilitated by the use of small shells. They had never heard of working for wages. They went stark naked or clad in the bark of trees, and they had no means of writing, even by hieroglyphics, or of numbering except by their fingers or making notches on a stick or knots in a piece of grass or fibre; they had no weights and measures of general use. Perhaps most astonishing of all to the modern European mind, they had no calendar or notation of time, and reckoned by the moons and seasons and the rising and setting of the sun . . . . They are a people who in 1890 were in a more primitive condition than anything of which there is any record in pre-Roman Britain".[7]

[5] Some examples of "islands and peninsulas": Gibraltar (1704), Malta (1814), Singapore (1819) and Hong King (1842).

[6] As late as 1865, when the Acting Chief Secretary of the Gold Coast establishments wished to claim for the Crown territory within cannon shot of the forts, he was told by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: "Whatever influence you may be able to exercise in discouraging or repressing barbarous actions leading to loss of life, will be very proper, and I shall be happy to approve your exercise of it: but the extension of British territory is another matter, and cannot receive my sanction".

[7] Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya [see 45].

12. In a large part this statement was no less applicable to West Africa in the 1890's. It is true that in the coastal towns many Africans had achieved a high degree of education, but it was as late as 1899 that the horrors of Benin, with its orgies of human sacrifice, were revealed to the world.

13. Two other factors are also to be noted. First, the countries now known to the world as Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Kenya, etc. were in 1900 no more than names given to tracts of territory inhabited by many different tribes, speaking as many different languages, often in conflict with each other, and with no conception of a common interest. Secondly, these last 50 years have not been years in which we have been able to give undivided attention to the problems of our tropical dependencies: during that period we have ourselves had to fight two exhausting struggles for survival, and to face serious economic problems as the result.

14. A statement of some of the more significant facts and figures illustrating the progress made in the development of the Colonial Empire is attached to this Memorandum.

III. *The main problems of the colonial empire: brief review by regions*

A. *The African territories*

West Africa

15. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast there are strong and growing nationalist movements which have developed partly as a result of our own policy of educational and political advancement in the Territories, partly through the influence of world opinion on colonial questions and partly through the determination of the negro races to establish themselves in the world. The nationalist movements exist mainly in the towns of the coastal and southern areas, but they are beginning to make their influence felt in some of the rural areas. Politically the people of the two Territories fall into three categories; the nationalists, drawn mainly from the educated and partly educated classes, who want immediate self-government; the moderates drawn from the professional and business classes and the more enlightened of the chiefs, who realise that constitutional advance must be gradual and are prepared to co-operate with Government provided that Government policy is progressive; and the rural populations so far not politically-minded but living under tribal conditions with the traditional chiefs as their representatives. The third class is by far the most numerous, but it is from the first two that the pressure for political advance is coming. To be successful policy must satisfy the second class while safeguarding the interests of the third and going far enough to meet the aspirations of the first to secure some co-operation at any rate from all but the more extreme nationalists. Policy must be so framed as to ensure the efficient and orderly administration of the Territories, but it must at the same time be based on three principles; the representatives of the people must play a major part in the working out of constitutional reforms; the executive side of government must be so remodelled as to give the representatives of the people a full share in the formulation and carrying out of policy; the legislatures must be extended and made fully representative of all parts of the country and not merely of the urban and more developed areas. It is in fact this policy which is being pursued in the constitutional reforms recently agreed for the Gold Coast and those now in process of being agreed for Nigeria. The new Gold Coast

constitution is to be based largely on the recommendations of the Coussey Committee and in Nigeria a nation-wide process of consultation with the people on the constitution has just been completed. In both Territories African Ministers are to be appointed and given responsibility for groups of Government departments, subject to the Governor's ultimate responsibility for the administration of the Territory. The legislatures are to be increased in numbers and composed almost entirely of elected representatives of the people. The interests of the rural areas will be safeguarded by the development of Regional Councils, by a system of indirect election which will make it easier for candidates drawn from each area to be elected and by the strengthening of the local government systems on a more modern and representative basis.

16. But political institutions by themselves are not enough; the two Territories need the men to operate these institutions and the economic resources to support them. For these purposes the whole structure of education is being expanded and improved; University Colleges have been set up in both Territories; and Colleges of Arts, Science and Technology are to be established. The preventive and curative medical services are being improved, African agriculture is being developed, communications expanded, new sources of power provided, mineral resources explored, marketing systems set up and co-operative movements encouraged. But these measures take time and meanwhile the Territories need help from the United Kingdom in personnel, technical experience and finance; this need will continue even after the stage of responsible government is reached. It is for this reason that the system of government now being established represents a transition between the old official and paternalistic system and full responsible government. The publicly stated objective of policy, which is generally accepted in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, is responsible government within the British Commonwealth rather than complete severance from the Commonwealth and the creation of a dangerous vacuum. The successful achievement of this objective will depend on the wisdom and skill with which relations between the Governments and the people are conducted on both sides during the transitional period. We believe that we have a policy which is at the same time progressive and thus consistent with world ideas and adapted to the needs of the situation. In carrying out that policy every encouragement will be given to the forces of moderation and stability and the unreasonable demands of extremists will be resisted. World opinion, and above all United States opinion, can exercise a great influence on this process and we believe that we are entitled to ask for the support of that opinion if our basic policy is accepted to be sound.

East and Central Africa

17. In East and Central Africa the problem is more complex and the ultimate form of government less evident and less near; but the objectives of policy are essentially the same. We aim at developing the Territories towards responsible government inside the Commonwealth, at giving increasing executive responsibility to the representatives of the people of all races and at extending the legislatures so as to make them increasingly representative of all sections of the community. This policy does not, except in Uganda, mean, as it does in West Africa, merely the safeguarding of the interests of the rural Africans in relation to their more advanced urban brothers. It involves at present safeguarding the Africans as a whole in relation to the Europeans and Indians. As the Africans develop in the future, it may involve

rather safeguarding the Europeans and Indians in relation to the Africans, because the Europeans and Indians through their stake in the Territories have every right to regard themselves as inhabitants and not merely residents.

18. The Europeans in East and Central Africa and the Indians in East Africa have already played a large part in the economic and political development of the Territories and will continue to do so. The Africans are more backward than in West Africa and for that reason executive power cannot be transferred to the representatives of the people until the Africans can play their full part in the political life of the Territories on terms approaching somewhere near equality with the Europeans and Indians. The main need therefore is to reduce and eventually to remove the disparity by building up the Africans economically, politically and socially. For this purpose Africans have been brought on to Legislative Councils and advisory boards and are gaining political experience, while, still more important at this stage, local government bodies are being modernised and made more representative. Education systems and health services are being expanded and a University College has been established. Economic development is proceeding with special emphasis on agricultural improvement.

19. The East and Central African Territories also have the difficult and delicate task of evolving a plural society, with each section of the community playing its part on equal terms, from a society which is at present stratified in practice, although not in law, with the Europeans and Indians as employers, managers and professional men and the Africans as workers and subsistence farmers. This problem arises in its most acute form on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia where, profiting by the wartime need for all-out production, the European mineworkers secured a closed shop, although neither the Northern Rhodesia nor the United Kingdom Governments recognise this industrial colour bar. This is not the place to discuss the methods for dealing with the problem, but it is the function of Government to take every step which is possible to improve the status of Africans, although experience has shown that direct action by Government in this field sometimes defeats its own ends. The solution is most likely to lie in the development of African trade unions, which are being actively encouraged by Governments.

20. Measures for the advancement of the African people of the Territories have so far had the support of the European and Indian communities. If this support is to continue to be freely given, it may be necessary, as the African advances towards the level of the other communities, to devise some arrangement which will satisfy each of them that their future is safeguarded. What form this arrangement should take and what system of government should finally be adopted in these Territories cannot yet be clear. What is clear is the general objective—a system in which all communities would participate on an equal basis. In the long and difficult advance towards this goal the support and co-operation of the moderates in all communities must be secured and pressure from extremists of any race must be resisted. Here again world opinion can give us most valuable support.

B. *South East Asian territories*

Malaya

21. Malaya consists of two territories, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. Singapore itself is a Crown Colony with a Governor, and Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The latter has an unofficial majority; 9 of the 13 Unofficials are

elected, 6 directly by universal suffrage of all British subjects over 21 and 3 elected by the Chamber of Commerce. The numbers of directly elected representatives may be increased to 9 in the near future.

22. The Federation of Malaya consists of the two British Settlements of Penang and Malacca and 9 Malay States. The Malay States are ruled over by Sultans who govern under written constitutions with the advice of a State Executive Council and a Council of State. The Malay Sultans are in treaty relationships with His Majesty and under his protection and the British Government has no jurisdiction in the States other than in matters of defence and foreign affairs; British Advisers are attached to each Sultan and under the terms of the treaty the Sultan is obliged to follow any formal advice that may be tendered to him, but this power of advice has not in practice been exercised since the reoccupation.

23. The plans drawn up for the future of Malaya during the war and put into effect on the resumption of civil government in 1946 (the Malayan Union) provided for a strong central government with wide executive and legislative authority, while the Malay States and British Settlements were shorn of a great deal of their former responsibilities. Malay political pressure forced us to abandon the Malayan Union policy and, after protracted negotiation, the Federation Agreement between His Majesty and the Malay Rulers was signed on 21st January, 1948. This Agreement, while reserving to His Majesty complete control of the defence and external affairs in the Federation, and setting up a Federal Government with specified legislative powers, restored a measure of legislative and an even greater measure of executive responsibility and authority to the States and Settlements. Education, health, land matters, agriculture, etc. and the whole District Administration are now matters for the State Governments and although there are Federal Departments dealing with all these questions they are not entitled to intervene except where it is essential to secure uniformity of policy throughout the country.

24. The central government consists of a High Commissioner, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The latter consists of 75 members, 9 of whom are the Malay Chief Ministers of the individual States and 50 are Unofficials. At present all the Unofficials are nominated but plans are in train for introducing the elective principle as soon as possible; in implementation of this policy, legislation is being prepared for the introduction of municipal elections early in 1951; elective systems will next be introduced into the States and Settlements; and finally federal elections will be held. Remarks in the succeeding paragraphs will show some of the difficulties involved in introducing the elective system.

25. One of the main difficulties in the way of further constitutional progress is the relationship of the Malay and the Chinese communities. Of a total population in the Peninsula of just over 5,000,000, 2½ million are Malays and just under 2,000,000 Chinese; the balance are mainly Indians. Of the 900,000 inhabitants of the Colony of Singapore, some 700,000 are Chinese. Thus if the two territories are taken together, the Chinese slightly predominate.

26. The Chinese population of Malaya has assumed significant proportions only during the last few years; immigrants were attracted from Southern China by the prospects of work and prosperity in the tin mines and in commerce, and the Chinese claim, not without reason, that the economic development of the country could never have been brought to its present pitch but for their ruthless industry. The Malays, on the other hand, are in general easy going and until before the last war

were content to share in the prosperity which the Chinese and Europeans had brought to their country. Both Malay and Chinese nationalisms were aroused during the Japanese occupation and the Malay is no longer content to see the economic life of his country in the virtual control of what he regards as an alien community; he is afraid of the country coming increasingly under the domination of the dynamic Chinese and is not unnaturally reluctant to accord the Chinese full political rights or to surrender the "special position" of the Malays which is guaranteed by the terms of the Federation Agreement. The Chinese on the other hand regard the present arrangements, under which no more than one-third of their number qualify for citizenship rights and they are not admitted to the higher ranks of the administration, as inequitable, particularly as the majority of them have been born in the Federation and have no intention of ever returning to China.

27. The major problem confronting the administration is the creation of a frame of mind in the various communities in which Malays may be brought to agree to give increased political and civil rights to the Chinese and Indians, the Chinese may be brought to renounce their political ties with their Chinese homeland and accept an undivided loyalty to Malaya; and the Malays may be given the opportunity to take a fuller part in the economic life of their country.

28. There are here the makings of a highly dangerous situation, but it is noteworthy that the present Emergency, which is almost exclusively directed by Chinese communist bandits, has so far not brought about any serious communal troubles. In fact the Emergency may prove a blessing in disguise if it can be used to bring the communities together and to make them see that in undivided loyalty to Malaya and co-operation with each other lies the only hope for the future. It is significant that the community leaders—Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese and European—have spontaneously come together in an unofficial body, known as the Communities Liaison Committee, with the United Kingdom Commissioner General acting as "Liaison Officer". This committee has made most encouraging progress and recently published unanimously agreed proposals for the admission of larger numbers of non-Malays to federal citizenship, and making suggestions for ways of assisting the Malays to greater participation in the economic life of the country. These proposals are now under consideration by the Governments of the Malay States and the High Commissioner. Again, although the Emergency has placed the gravest strain on the loyalty of the Chinese, who are being subjected to the strongest possible intimidation by the bandits and who at the same time have natural links with Southern China, the High Commissioner has reported that the Chinese leaders have come increasingly into the open during the last few months on the side of Government and can, he is confident, bring the majority of their community into active support for Government, if fear of communist China can be removed. In fact the Chinese community, with few exceptions, detest communism and wish to become good Malayans.

29. The fear of communist China is not only short term but long term. It is known to be our policy that Malaya should, by orderly steps, progress towards self-government within the Commonwealth. The whole outlook of the Malayan Chinese is to some extent conditioned by the fear that self-government may involve the withdrawal of protection against communist China. In order to allay these fears a statement was made by the Prime Minister on 13th April, 1949, in the following terms:—

"The purpose of our policy is simple. We are working, in co-operation with the citizens of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, to guide them to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth. We have no intention of jeopardising the security, well-being and liberty of these peoples, for whom Britain has responsibilities, by a premature withdrawal".

The Prime Minister made a further statement on 28th March, 1950, as follows:

"I gave a clear statement of His Majesty's Government's policy to the House on 13th April last, and it is our firm intention to implement the policy which I then formed of steady democratic progress towards self-government within the Commonwealth. We shall not be diverted from that policy and have no intention of relinquishing our responsibility for the defence of Malaya and the protection of its law-abiding people by all means at our disposal".

30. It was decided after the war that, for the time being at least, Singapore should remain separate from the rest of Malaya, but it was recognised that there were close ties between the two territories and it was stated that it was no part of the policy of H.M.G. to preclude or prejudice in any way the fusion of the two at a later date. The initiative for any closer union must come from the two territories. Clearly the Malays are not going lightly to accept the accretion of some 700,000 Chinese, while in present circumstances Singapore is not anxious to assume the burden of a Federation whose budget is seriously unbalanced by the Emergency.

The Emergency

31. A state of Emergency has existed in the Federation of Malaya since June 1948 and the restoration of law and order there is the most pressing problem which the British authorities face in South East Asia.

32. It must be recognised that the disturbances caused by the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) are part of the Kremlin's world-wide campaign against the Western powers. A few facts make this obvious.

33. During the war the M.C.P. formed and led the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (M.P.A.J.A.) which, like other resistance movements, was provided with arms against the Japanese. At the end of the war the re-occupation of Malaya by British troops prevented the M.P.A.J.A. from using its arms to impose a communist-controlled network of governments in the Malay States. The M.P.A.J.A. was therefore disbanded by the M.C.P. and its arms were secretly buried throughout Malaya. The M.C.P. then set to work to forge a new weapon, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. In February, 1948, at a Youth Conference in Calcutta, a call was issued on behalf of the Kremlin for revolutionary action in South East Asia. The M.C.P. responded to this call in June, 1948. The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions was immediately suppressed and the Malayan Communist Party was banned by the Governments of Malaya and Singapore. The M.C.P. promptly set to work to recover its hidden arms and to re-form its Anti-Japanese Army, this time under the name of Malayan People's Anti-British Army (M.P.A.B.A.). More recently this name has been changed to Malayan Races Liberation Army (M.R.L.A.)

34. All available evidence shows that the M.C.P. though small, is a well organised and orthodox communist party implementing an impeccably intransigent Stalinist policy. Evidence of direct links with Moscow or Peking is, not surprisingly, lacking; but un-named delegates from Malaya attended the Conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions held in Peking last November. These delegates un-

doubtedly brought back to Malaya advice and instructions based on the war experience of the People's Liberation Army of China. The M.C.P. must thus be recognised as a dangerous and capable enemy which can be overcome only by the methodical destruction of its army and the up-rooting of its organisational grip among the workers and peasants of Malaya.

35. The M.C.P. is led by Chinese and is composed almost entirely of Chinese. It is in no sense a popular nationalist rising, and indeed the Malays as a whole have rallied to join the Police and the Malay Regiment and Trade Union leaders of all communities have condemned the bandits in the soundest terms. It is only fear that prevents the great mass of Chinese from giving active assistance to the forces of law and order. Since the Emergency began in June, 1948, it has been unable to make head-way among the town workers but has been busily extending its influence in rural areas close to the jungle by terrorising the Chinese. These rural areas are mostly areas which are not, and never have been, brought under close administration by the Government of Malaya. The large numbers of Chinese who have settled in them (squatters) during and immediately following the last world war are very easily intimidated and exploited by the M.C.P. One of the main problems of the Malayan Government is therefore to strengthen its administration in the squatter areas (with their 300–500,000 inhabitants) or transfer squatters to fully administered areas.

36. Unless the squatters' areas are fully administered and properly defended, the M.R.L.A. will continue to draw supplies and intelligence from them (and conversely the intelligence requirements of the security forces will not be adequately met). It is this which makes the campaign against the M.C.P. and its army a police, rather than a military, operation, although, of course, military forces are required to hunt the M.R.L.A. in the jungle and to prevent them from establishing a firm base anywhere in the Federation.

37. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party has emboldened the M.C.P. and their sympathisers. Almost none of these latter are Malays: a few are Indians but nearly all are Chinese. Only strong and sustained Government measures can be expected to inspire sufficient confidence in the majority of the Chinese community to bring them out openly in support of Government, and to push them "off the fence".

38. The Malayan Government has therefore undertaken a large programme of squatter resettlement that involves the transfer of squatters to administered areas and the introduction of administrative services into existing squatter villages. This programme is being implemented with the help of the voluntary bodies such as the Malayan Chinese Association. As a complement to these measures the Malayan Government needs to deport several thousand undesirable Chinese. This was done until the time when the whole of China became conquered; for the moment deportation to China is impossible.

39. While this very large administrative problem is being vigorously tackled the offensive campaign against the M.R.L.A. is being intensified. Additional troops and aircraft are in process of being moved to Malaya and the recent appointment of Lt. General Briggs as Director of Operations is expected to increase the effectiveness of the campaign against the bandits.

40. In both the short and the long term Malaya's economy is dangerously dependent on the two industries of rubber and tin. These provide not only the main wealth of the Territory and the largest fields of employment, but are also a major

factor in providing Government revenues. As the major consumer, the policy of the United States in regard to these commodities, is therefore vital. Tin production is already in excess of commercial consumption. U.S. stockpiling may for a time redress the disequilibrium but the programme is uncertain in quantity and duration and operates intermittently at the discretion of the U.S. Government. It is essential to avoid the consequences which this state of affairs must be expected to produce by the negotiation of a Commodity Control Agreement. It is hoped that the U.S. will review their attitude as reflected at the recent Tin Study Group. Everything possible is being done to diversify the economy of Malaya.

41. Despite the considerable financial assistance which has been and is being given by His Majesty's Government towards the rehabilitation of the territory, and its economic and social developments, and in meeting the costs of the present Emergency, the finances of Malaya are strained to the utmost. The pre-war surplus balances have been almost entirely used on basic rehabilitation for which purpose public loans amounting to some £18 million have also been floated. The Government is still faced with the task of finding money to meet the cost of the expanded education programme and social services which are essential, for developing further rice areas and for expansion of basic services and communications which are a necessary preliminary to further economic development of any significance.

42. Singapore is in a more fortunate financial situation than the Federation and has taken advantage of this to press ahead with an extensive programme of social measures. In particular a ten-year educational programme has been recently supplemented by an "emergency school programme" which provides for 18 new temporary schools to be built in 1950. The social services programme in the Federation, modest though it is and drawn up with the financial situation very much in mind, will cost £6.4 million in capital expenditure over the next six years and will entail additional recurrent expenditure rising to £2 million a year. Even with the present disturbances, considerable progress has been made, e.g. in June, 1941, there were 263,000 pupils in schools whereas in January, 1949, the number in the Federation was 566,000. Considerable assistance has been given by His Majesty's Government to the Malayan Governments, both to finance the rehabilitation of war damaged industries and services; and His Majesty's Government has already contributed £8 million to the internal security costs incurred during the present emergency, and is also bearing the full cost of the British forces in Malaya.

The Borneo territories

43. The Borneo territories comprise North Borneo and Sarawak, which became Crown Colonies in 1946, and the Sultanate of Brunei, which is a Protected State. The population of Sarawak is rather over ½ million, of whom more than ½ are Dyak or other "native" peoples, some 130,000 Malaysians and nearly 150,000 Chinese. The population of North Borneo is approximately 330,000 of which the majority are "native" tribes and approximately 70,000 Chinese. The Governors in both territories are assisted by Councils with Legislative and advisory powers. Although no direct election of members is yet possible. steps are being taken in Sarawak to evolve a system of indirect election to the Council Negri.

44. It is our policy that the three territories should be more closely integrated and that eventually there should be one Governor for the two Colonies who would also be High Commissioner for Brunei. But this is a process which cannot be unduly

hastened and the pace must largely be determined by the state of public feeling in Sarawak. Until 1946 Sarawak had been for 100 years under the rule of the "White Rajahs" whose policy had been to preserve the inhabitants in a state of patriarchal felicity by isolating them from contact with the outside world, discouraging economic development which involved European and Chinese "exploitation", and favouring the Malaysians in matters such as education, and government service. The Policy at present is to develop the resources of the Colony, although it is realised that progress must be carefully regulated so as not to introduce too rapid a change and that the wind must be tempered to the shorn lamb, while equality of treatment and opportunity must be given to all the inhabitants. This has led to some dissatisfaction among the Malaysians, which is expressed in the "anti-cession" movement, purporting to stand for the return of the Brooke (White Rajah) Regime, but a few of whose more violent members undoubtedly look to union with Indonesia as a means of restoring the privileged position of the Malaysians. There is here a danger of communal tension, and it was with some difficulty that the Dyaks were restrained, after the murder of the late Governor in December, 1949, from venting their indignation in forcible fashion on the Malay community which they considered responsible for the outrage. Apart from this all three territories are at present relatively undisturbed and backward politically, though the danger of the development of communism among the considerable Chinese community is being carefully watched. The possibility of the Borneo territories, Malaya and Singapore, eventually forming a self-governing unit within the Commonwealth in South East Asia is of course being borne in mind; but it is difficult for the initiative for any closer union of this kind to come from London. In any case the difficulties are considerable, since though there would be advantages from the Malay point of view in closer union with territories which also contain a Malaysian element, such a union would, at least at the present, cause great disquiet among the Dyaks and other native communities; and care must also be exercised in bringing together territories which have reached such widely different levels of development as Singapore, the Federation and Borneo. But every effort is made to eliminate duplication of staffs and services and to coordinate the activities of the territories.

45. Since their liberation from the Japanese in 1945, the main aim in these territories has been to repair the ravages of war by carrying out the heavy tasks of re-establishing efficient administration, bringing law and order out of chaos, resuscitating public utilities, fostering primary production and eliminating causes of social unrest. This rehabilitation and the future social and economic development of the territories are essential to the task of progressively associating the native peoples more closely with the government of the territories. The main objectives in this task are therefore—to raise the standard of education and of health, by carrying out development plans for education, public utilities and health facilities, to discover and exploit the extent and value of the territories' natural resources; to correct an excessive dependence on a single productive industry, i.e. rubber, which is the principal source of income for both individuals and Government, by diversifying the economy as much as possible; and to make the territories self-sufficient in the supply of the principal foodstuff—rice, and if possible create an export trade in this commodity by the encouragement of mechanisation both on a large scale and by small-holders.

46. The basic necessity for future progress is the development of an educated,

politically experienced and healthy population. With this object in view the expansion of education and health facilities is being given an important place in the development programmes of these territories, and the development of local government is being energetically pursued with the intention of introducing the native population as a whole to political responsibility, and paving the way to democratic participation in the central organs of Government. The other main tasks are to develop the economies of the territories to provide the necessary financial resources, and to recruit the specialised staff and the suitable labour, required to carry out these various development schemes.

Hong Kong

47. The prosperity of Hong Kong has been built up largely on the colony's reputation for British justice and fairdealing, and on the security which it has offered in contrast with internal turmoil in China. Clearly the most important desideratum at the present time is that we should maintain our position there. By doing so we feel that we are serving not only the best interests of the inhabitants of Hong Kong, but also those of the free nations of South East Asia, and of the democratic peoples generally, as well as protecting the important commerce and trade of the colony, and our own financial stake in it.

48. As the nearest outpost of the democratic peoples of South East Asia to Communist China Hong Kong is not only of strategic value in the defence of the whole area against Communist aggression, but also constitutes a valuable listening post and window on events in China. Situated, as it is, on the doorstep of Communist dominated China, whose intention ultimately to regain possession of it can scarce be doubted, many of its inhabitants are afraid openly to express their views. But there is no reason to doubt that it is to their general advantage that the British connection should be maintained, and that the prospect of a British withdrawal from Kong Kong would be viewed with the gravest concern by many of its inhabitants, rich and poor alike. Our commercial and financial stake in Hong Kong, as well as that of numerous Chinese manufacturers and exporters, is very considerable. To protect these interests, and the valuable international trade of the colony, the maintenance of the British administration is essential. At the same time we desire to see the inhabitants of Hong Kong playing a greater part in the conduct of their own affairs and we are at present examining the possibility of amending the constitution with that objective in view.

49. The problems of Hong Kong are manifold, and have been largely increased by a very considerable influx of population who have left China to escape from Communist control, and to enjoy the security of British rule. This factor has not only given rise to serious difficulties in maintaining adequate supplies of certain necessaries of life (food, water, etc) but has led to very grave conditions of overcrowding, already serious enough before the influx began on a large scale.

50. Despite every effort it has not been possible to expand hospital accommodation, education and other facilities sufficiently rapidly to meet in full the need for these services. Indeed since its recapture from the Japanese, the Colony had not been able to restore its pre-war standard of social services at a rate adequate to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding post war population. The recent influx of refugees from China is straining these facilities to breaking point, and the time has now come when steps must be taken in the interests of all concerned strictly to limit any further

ingress of Chinese into Hong Kong. To relieve housing congestion and overcrowding, wholesale replanning of Hong Kong City and Kowloon has been recommended, but although considerable new building has been undertaken by private enterprise, war time losses have not yet been fully made good. Further, the rapid progress of events in China, the need for wholesale replanning, and a very heavy postwar increase in the capital cost of building, have led to hesitation in embarking on large scale housing schemes for the working classes. To do so would, in fact, only have provided an added inducement to immigration into Hong Kong from China where conditions of overcrowding in large cities are far worse. A sum of £1,000,000 has been allocated to Hong Kong from funds available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to assist in building and other development projects. Of this sum, £500,000 is being devoted to schemes for the improvement of the agricultural and fishery industries and for the betterment of the conditions of the workers engaged in them. These schemes relate mainly to the New Territories[8] and it is proposed to use the remaining £500,000 on schemes for urban development which can however not proceed until decisions have been taken as regards the major replanning of Victoria and Kowloon. In addition a loan of over £9,000,000 is being raised by the Colony for financing rehabilitation, and a scheme for the expansion of the local water supplies, estimated to cost £6,000,000 has been approved in principle. The cost will be borne by the Hong Kong Government and provision of the necessary finance is now under consideration. In the field of education we have promised a grant of £250,000 towards the rehabilitation of Hong Kong University, final plans for which are now being worked out. We have also promised Hong Kong an interest free loan of £3,000,000 towards the cost of a new airport (the site for which is at present being surveyed in the New Territories) which will be capable of taking large commercial aircraft of all types. It is very badly needed. Every effort is also being made to expand the growing and marketing of local food supplies, including fish; but the bulk of Hong Kong's food supplies, especially rice, eggs and port [sic, ? pork], will continue to have to be imported. With famine rampant in China, and a largely increased population in Hong Kong a serious problem in this matter is confronting the Hong Kong Government. So long as British naval forces continue to control the Colony's seaward approaches there is no reason to think that its population will starve.

51. Apart from those already referred to above, the most important difficulty which has to be faced is that of Hong Kong's future relations with her nearest neighbour, Communist China. These relations are, in turn, largely dependent on Great Britain's relations with the Chinese People's Government. Given sufficient forces on the spot, Hong Kong can, no doubt, be defended against any external attack which the Chinese Communist Government, unaided by any major power, could launch against the Colony. But in the case of any prolonged attack the procurement of certain essential food supplies might well become increasingly difficult and the Colony's entrepot trade, on which its economic well-being depends, would be seriously handicapped, and might eventually be brought to a complete standstill. Such difficulties would be seriously augmented by internal unrest, which would undoubtedly be fomented in Hong Kong by an antagonistic Chinese Government, by

[8] While the island of Hong Kong and a small part of the Kowloon peninsula were ceded by China to Great Britain, the New Territories on the Chinese mainland were only leased to Great Britain for 99 years in 1898 to meet the colony's defence needs.

all the means in its power. Recourse may well be had to such action at any time to embarrass the British administration and to bring pressure to bear on us to leave Hong Kong at the mercy of the Chinese People's Government.

C. *South West Pacific*

Fiji

52. In Fiji our aim is the steady constitutional and general development of the territory in the interests of the several sections of the community, Fijian, Indian and European, along lines which will enable its people to assume increasing responsibility for the conduct of their affairs. Such development must be accompanied and achieved through steady educational and social advancement, and must at the same time be in conformity with the provisions of the deed of cession under which at the request of the Fijian chiefs we assumed responsibility for Fiji.

53. One of the major difficulties facing the administration is the fact that the political progress of the Indian section of the community has been more rapid than that of the Fijians themselves, who still continue to live under their original tribal system and are not yet fitted, nor do they desire, to enter a political system on a freely elected basis. There is little doubt that the Indian population of the Colony, left to itself, is content to become a homogeneous part of the Fijian population. But since the introduction of Indians for work in the cane fields the Indian population has grown steadily in numbers and is now actually in excess of the Fijian population. In addition its leaders are for the most part Indian politicians influenced by the aspirations of India herself, who take every opportunity of fanning discontent and demanding an ever increasing share of Fijian lands for the use of the Indian population. Under existing constitutional arrangements Fijian and Indian representation in the legislature is on a numerically equal basis, but for the reasons explained above no satisfactory solution has yet been found to meet the Indian demand for the elected representation of all members of the community, nor, for these reasons, is it considered practicable to concede in Fiji an unofficial majority in the Legislature. The recent conclusions of a representative local committee on Constitutional Reform appointed by the Governor have endorsed the view that no major change is at present desirable.

54. Much remains to be done in Fiji to improve education, provide better medical facilities and to continue the economic development of the Colony. An allocation to Fiji of £1,000,000 from funds available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act has been made and a 10-year plan of development has recently been approved at a total cost of £3,864,000, towards which the Government of Fiji is proposing to contribute from its own resources £2,864,000. This includes the following major developmental projects:— a hydro-electric scheme; the development of feeder roads to open up new land; an agricultural and industrial credit organisation; the establishment of an enlarged medical centre for the training of native medical practitioners and nurses for service in the British Pacific Territories; and the establishment of a Teachers' Training College. In addition, the Government of Fiji has, since the war, established an admirably equipped tuberculosis hospital and facilities for training medical practitioners for work in the South Pacific area generally have already been expanded. Jointly with the Government of New Zealand it operates the South Pacific Health Service of which the Director of Medical Service

Fiji is Director General and it maintains important Leprosaria with substantial support from the New Zealand Leprosy Board.

55. The financial resources of the Colony are not large. Its principal export commodities are sugar, cocoanut [sic] products and gold. Difficulty has also been experienced in securing technically qualified staff in engineering and other fields. A geological survey is being undertaken to ascertain whether further mineral deposits in economic workable quantities exist.

Western Pacific High Commission Territories

56. These island communities already have in most cases their own system of community organisation: the objective is to develop these systems so that they may be better able to progress economically and politically. In the Gilbert and Ellice and Solomon Islands it is first necessary to complete the repair of the damage caused during the war and we are giving special financial assistance for this purpose. Education in these territories is being developed by sending selected students to the Medical Training Centre and Teachers' Training College in Fiji. The island councils and native courts of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands are being given greater responsibilities and native councils and courts have also been set up in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. Native production of copra is being organised where possible on a co-operative basis and loans and shipping have been made available.

57. The enormous distances involved impede economic development, especially as many of the Australian ships operating in this area before the war have been withdrawn. Apart from copra and phosphates in Ocean Island, these territories lack natural resources. To meet these difficulties medical, administrative and trade vessels have been built; and copra production and the retail distribution of trade goods has been organised, in some cases on a co-operative basis.

58. In the Solomon Islands the mountainous country and the multiplicity of languages intensify the difficulties of teaching backward communities to think in terms beyond their particular village. The bewilderment engendered by the war has given rise in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate to a subversive and terrorist movement (known as Marching Rule). Though, as a result of steps taken recently, there has been a marked improvement, the need for restoring internal confidence and security has to some extent slowed down the social and political development of the area. Allocations totalling £800,000 for these areas have been made from funds available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and this sum will be supplemented from local resources as and when possible.

South Pacific Commission

59. The economic and social advancement of the South Pacific region is, in general, hampered by the fact that its inhabitants are dispersed over a multitude of small islands widely scattered geographically, with poor communications; each dependent (in the main) on a self-contained subsistence economy. Six Governments—Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States—administer territories in the region and the social and economic problems facing them in the territories under their control are broadly similar. We are co-operating closely in the work of the South Pacific Commission, which was established by the six Governments in 1947, and which provides a permanent and useful means for mutual consultation and the exchange of information regarding the

social and economic problems encountered, the measures taken to tackle them and the results obtained. Such consultation can provide a valuable stimulus to development, and we readily support the activities of the Commission, which are likely to produce useful practical results—e.g. the work of its Research Council, which is responsible for the co-ordination and supplementation of research being carried out by the individual Governments.

D. *The West Indies*

60. The object of the early settlement of the West Indies was to obtain valuable tropical products such as spices, sugar and logwood. The sugar industry soon became of predominant importance and in the 18th century it achieved a position of great political significance. In the 19th century, however, it suffered a series of adversities. By the end of the century its position, and that of the numerous communities dependent on it, was critical. The past fifty years have seen a long and exceptionally difficult struggle by Governments and peoples alike to find a solution for the complex legacy of problems inherited from the past.

61. It was inevitable that the sugar industry should continue to occupy a predominant position in the West Indies. The abolition of the system of beet-sugar bounties by the Brussels Convention of 1903, and the First World War, did much to restore its prosperity. But, after that War, the industry shared the fate of other primary producers and, in spite of the grant of special tariff protection in Commonwealth markets, it suffered in the Thirties a period of grave depression, which was vividly reflected in the general economic conditions of the West Indian Colonies.

62. By the end of the 19th century, it had become obvious that the dependence of these Colonies on a single industry was a grave source of weakness; and it has since been the accepted policy that every effort must be made to develop (i) alternative crops, (ii) secondary industries, and (iii) schemes of land settlement. Much was in fact done to diversify the economies of these Colonies; in some, such as Jamaica and Trinidad, sugar declined to a secondary role and in others it disappeared altogether. In its place, cotton, coconuts, citrus, limes, bananas, coffee, rice and nutmegs were grown. Unfortunately, in the years of depression, these products suffered more even than sugar from the disastrous slump in the prices of primary products, and before 1939 a movement back to sugar production was already evident. Some progress had been made in developing secondary industries, but this could not go far towards relieving the situation in predominantly agricultural communities.

63. The economic difficulties encountered between the wars by the West Indies in common with all other primary producers were greatly exacerbated by the growth of population. In all the Colonies the population is increasing with great rapidity. This is mainly due to the decline in the death rate resulting from the various health and social welfare measures adopted by Governments during the past century: in part it is due to the gradual closure of emigration outlets. But it is now a major source of political tension and economic distress.

64. In the years immediately preceding the last war, this distress found expression in a series of disorders, which led to the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate social and economic conditions in the West Indies. Their report[9] gives an exhaustive account of West Indian conditions, and their recom-

[9] Cmd. 6607 [*Report of the West India Royal Commission, 1945* (deferred publication)].

mendations provide the basis of present policy. Their central conclusion was that there was a pressing need for large expenditure on social services and development which these Colonies could not hope to undertake from their own resources; and they recommended that funds should be provided for this purpose by His Majesty's Government and administered by a Comptroller for Development and Welfare. The new organisation proposed would be set up within the West Indies but independent of the local Governments. The first Comptroller was appointed in 1940, and his expert staff shortly afterwards. Funds are provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 1940–5, on the basis of which long-term plans have been drawn up by each Government in association with the Comptroller and his staff. Since 1940, grants amounting to £19 million have been made under this procedure; His Majesty's Government have contributed in this way to a great variety of projects covering a wide field of development and welfare, and have made it possible for West Indies Governments to secure the best available technical help for the carrying out of their schemes.

65. The implementation of this policy has been much hampered by the war and its after-effects. On the other hand, the war stimulated the demand for West Indian products and thus secured [sic] these Colonies from the economic depression into which they had fallen in the Thirties. Moreover, since 1945, they have benefited from the continuance of the seller's market. But the memory of pre-war conditions is still fresh, and we have recognised the strength of this fear by offering the West Indies (along with other Commonwealth producers) a long-term contract under which they will receive, until 1957, a guaranteed market for their sugar exports up to a total which should effectively protect the industry, and in consequence the communities dependent on it, from the more serious consequences of a drastic fall in world prices. Negotiations on this offer are still proceeding. In addition, similar long-term contracts have been made by the United Kingdom Government for the purchase of other West Indian products, such as citrus concentrates and bananas.

66. The work of the Royal Commission gave fresh impetus and direction to Government policy in the West Indies. Much has already been achieved along the lines they laid down. As a result of the War, and of post-war world economic conditions, the greater prosperity of the local communities has enabled them to contribute towards the double task of social betterment and economic welfare on a scale which the Royal Commission could not foresee. Nevertheless, the fundamental problems remain. As the Royal Commission pointed out, the West Indian Colonies are essentially agricultural and the basic task is to develop conditions which will protect them from the consequences of violent fluctuations in the demand for their exports—partly by methods applicable to primary producers generally, partly by the diversification of the local economies. Diversification is inevitably a slow and difficult process; it must often be preceded by careful research, and experience has shown that it is not necessarily an effective safeguard in an economic depression. All the time, the population is pressing on the means of subsistence, so that, in spite of the increased production of recent years, under-employment and malnutrition are chronic features of all West Indian societies.

67. The West Indian Colonies are well known in the United States. All the Governments concerned have made great efforts to develop the tourist facilities of their Colonies, and many American tourists visit them each year. The establishment of the United States Bases brought some West Indies Governments into close

association with the United States Government. And, since 1946, the United States Government has collaborated, with the other three Governments (French, Dutch and British) responsible for dependencies in the Caribbean region, in the work of the Caribbean Commission. The purpose of this body is to promote international co-operation in bettering economic and social conditions in this area, and in the promotion of research into related problems. The Commission is advised by a Research Council, which has done much useful work in investigating problems in the breeding of livestock, in soil conservation and in health conditions.

68. Such is the background against which the political and constitutional problems of the West Indies must be considered. The object of policy is the attainment of self-government within the Commonwealth, and this has, in fact, been pursued for many years. But there were major obstacles first to be surmounted. Many of these Colonies were small and remote, most were poor and some barely viable. Increasingly it became obvious that economic viability was an essential foundation for political independence, and that the second objective should not be allowed to divert attention from the first. There was pressing need, too, for preliminary measures of social regeneration. In the 19th century, little attention had been given to the need for creating a new structure of social life for those whose traditions, customs and spiritual foundations had been shattered by slavery. To-day, the consequences of that destruction and of that indifference are obvious, and it has been one of the main tasks of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare to explore ways and means of dealing with this problem. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that substantial progress has been made towards the ultimate objective. In all these Colonies it has been the consistent policy increasingly to associate the elected representatives of the people with the work of Government, and in recent years the pace of constitutional reform has markedly quickened. Jamaica and Trinidad, the two most important of this group of Colonies, have gone far on the road towards responsible self-government as a result of recent constitutional changes. In the smaller territories, the elected members of the Legislature are now able to exercise a powerful, and sometimes decisive, influence on the framing and implementation of policy. Public opinion generally is keenly interested in constitutional reform.

69. It has, however, been increasingly felt that for most, if not all, of the West Indian Colonies the best hope of attaining responsible self-government rests in the achievement of political association with the other units of the Caribbean group. This view has found emphatic expression in the recent report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee (Col. No. 255). The Committee state as follows—

> "We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose of our task is to seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples of the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth . . . . While we reaffirm the view . . . that the political development of the existing units must be pursued as an aim in itself, we are satisfied that the sheer force of circumstances of the modern world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage. Independence or self-government as a federation is, however, a practical possibility, and we have framed our proposals with this specific objective in view".

Later in the same chapter (paragraph 17) the Committee state—

> "We may place on record our considered and emphatic view that Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of achieving economic stability and

through it that political independence which is our constant object. We have chosen these words with care. We do not claim that Federation will immediately and automatically solve the economic and fiscal problems of the region, or that it cannot fail. We do claim that it will put in the hands of men responsible to the region as a whole, powers and opportunities, particularly with respect to the place of the region in world trade, which do not exist at present, and which these men according to their abilities and inclinations can use for the betterment of the region. Federation as such will not solve our problems, but will provide the conditions in which they can be dealt with".

70. The Committee's report was published in March, and it is now to be debated by the Legislatures of all the West Indian Colonies. Some time must necessarily elapse before it is known how far the individual Colonies are prepared to collaborate in carrying out a scheme of federation on the basis of the detailed recommendations made by the Committee. We have not attempted to influence either the people of the West Indies or their representatives in favour of acceptance of the Committee's proposals, since it was understood that this might well prejudice local consideration of the report. But, if predominant opinion in the West Indies is found to be in favour of federation at this stage, we will give all possible help in the preparation of a detailed scheme. In our view the best hope for the British West Indies in both the political and economic fields lies in a scheme of federation.

E. *The Mediterranean colonies*

71. The three Mediterranean colonies of Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus were occupied successively, starting in the 18th century, for strategic reasons. Their populations are European in civilization and outlook; but they are too small to stand alone as independent countries. Because of these basic facts, the general colonial policy of the United Kingdom has been modified in respect of these three territories. This is not the place to elaborate on their continuing value as naval and air bases or the ways in which their strategic facilities fit into the picture of Atlantic and Mediterranean defence. But on the civil side, it is clear that the problem is to reconcile our exercise of strategic facilities with the desire and capabilities of European communities to share fully in their own government.

72. The reconciliation is most advanced in Malta, where since 1947 full responsibility in internal affairs has been enjoyed by an elected Assembly and a Cabinet of Maltese Ministers, subject to foreign affairs, defence, and a number of allied subjects such as civil aviation being reserved to the control of the Governor. Malta had a similar constitution for 10 years after the First World War, but it broke down owing to the growth of a pro-Italian irredentist movement; the latter ceased to be a problem after the disappearance of Mussolini, and the constitution was restored in view of Malta's war record. The Maltese are Western in outlook and, being strong Catholics, are firmly anti-communist. Relations with Malta have however recently been somewhat clouded by economic and financial difficulties. The population is growing rapidly, while employment provided by the British Armed Forces, always the major industry of Malta, has necessarily declined since the war. His Majesty's Government have given Malta £30,000,000 for reconstruction and various other forms of aid as well, but there is a considerable feeling in Malta that we should do more. An expert economic and fiscal survey is at present being held in the Island. One of the requests made by the Malta Government in 1949 was for a direct share in

the Marshall Aid received by the United Kingdom. This request had to be rejected in the form in which it was made, but the United Kingdom is at present sponsoring to E.C.A. an application for aid to Malta from the E.C.A. Overseas Development Pool.

73. Gibraltar consists simply of the fortress and town area, a total of less than 2 square miles, with a civil population of less than 25,000. Spain has never relinquished in principle her claim to Gibraltar but it is not at present an active problem, and the civil population of Gibraltar have no wish to become Spanish. Gibraltar has hitherto been governed as a Crown Colony, the Governor also being Commander-in-Chief of the garrison. In order to give more representation to civil interests a Legislative Council with limited powers is now being set up. The chief current problem is the provision of housing for the growing population.

74. In Cyprus, political development on lines comparable to Malta or Gibraltar has been inhibited by the existence of the movement for union with Greece ("Enosis"), supported actively or passively by most of the Greek-speaking population who are four-fifths of the total; most of the remainder are Turks. Since the pro-Greek riots of 1931 Cyprus has had to be governed solely by British officials. An attempt was made in 1948 to set up an elected Legislative Council, reserving sufficient power to the Governor to ensure our free use of strategic facilities; but this offer was rejected by the Greek Cypriots as insufficient, though it was accepted by the Turkish minority. The Greek Cypriots are sharply divided internally between an extreme Right party led by the Archbishop, and AKEL, a well organised communist-led party which also enjoys some non-communist Left support. Both are now competing for leadership of the movement for union with Greece. It has been necessary to put pressure on the present Greek Government to prevent them encouraging the Enosis movement; but this has naturally given the Communists both in Cyprus and Greece an opportunity to pose as the only true Greek patriots. So long as the present regime in Cyprus continues it may be necessary to maintain an authoritarian system of government if internal order is to be preserved. Nevertheless considerable progress has been made in the last 15 years in the economic and social development of the Island, the latest feat being the complete eradication of malaria. The Island is at present prosperous and its technical achievements and facilities are being put to some use as a training and demonstration centre for Middle Eastern countries.

IV. *Our position and difficulties as a colonial power in the United Nations*

75. The policies described in the preceding paragraphs have resulted in, and our colonial policy now rests upon, a growing consciousness among the colonial peoples that they are moving steadily to a stage where they can stand by themselves. This realisation is fundamentally a political concept, and in the colonial peoples, no less than in the Europe and America of the 18th and 19th Centuries, nationalism is an emotion requiring to be harnessed for constructive purposes if it is not to become extremist, destructive and the instrument of Communist incitement. Whether in fact it is to become a constructive force is now one of the major issues at stake. Generally speaking the Colonial Empire has now reached an extremely important stage in its development. The next few years are likely to be critical for the success or failure of our colonial policy; and at this stage more than any other in the history of the Colonial Empire ignorant or prejudiced outside interference would do incalculable harm. It is for this reason that we could not accept United Nations supervision over

the affairs of the Colonial Empire (save in the limited field of trusteeship). Such supervision is, however, the aim of many members of the United Nations; and the principle that Metropolitan Powers should, in their conduct of colonial affairs, be accountable to the United Nations is implicit in an increasing number of Assembly Resolutions. The actual position under the Charter is, however, as follows.

Background

76. We are accountable to the United Nations for the administration of our trust territories, and the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly have the clear right to exercise supervision over the manner in which we discharge our trusteeship obligations. Responsibility for the administration of a trust territory rests firmly with the Administering Authority. Except where the United Nations itself is the Administering Authority, its function is purely supervisory. In the case of the three United Kingdom trust territories, full powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction are vested in His Majesty's Government by the terms of the Trusteeship Agreements.

77. In respect of territories not under trusteeship, the Charter does not give the United Nations any right of supervision. Chapter XI contains a general declaration of colonial policy, and, in Article 73(e), an obligation on the Colonial Powers to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in their colonial territories other than trust territories. This is the only specific obligation which the Colonial Powers have to the United Nations under the Charter.

78. The information transmitted is stated to be for information purposes, but the Charter does not say what is to be done with it. At the first part of the First Session the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to submit summaries and analyses of the information transmitted. At the second part it set up an *ad hoc* Committee to examine the summaries with a view to aiding the General Assembly in its consideration of the information and making recommendations regarding the procedure to be followed in future. In 1947, however, the Assembly went a step further and sent up a Special Committee composed equally of administering powers and non-administering countries to report to the Assembly with such procedural recommendations as it might deem fit and such substantive recommendations as it might deem desirable relating to functional fields generally, but not with respect to individual territories. This Special Committee was established on an annual basis for 1948 and 1949, but has now been re-established for a period of three years. The intention of the anti-colonial countries is clearly to make it into a parallel body to the Trusteeship Council which exercises supervision over the administration of trust territories.

The attitude of the anti-colonial powers

79. The anti-colonial countries, as opposed to the Soviet bloc, are normally led by India, the Philippines, Egypt and Cuba. They appear to feel that the Colonial Powers cannot be trusted by themselves to adopt progressive policies in the interests of the inhabitants of colonies, or to ensure their evolution to self-government at the earliest possible moment. Constant pressure must, in their view, be exercised by the Assembly. They have therefore attempted to have political and constitutional

questions included among the subjects on which the Colonial Powers transmit information, to establish the principle that by virtue of Chapter XI of the Charter Colonial Powers are accountable to the United Nations for their colonies, and to set up for the supervision of colonies machinery parallel to the Trusteeship Council.

Reasons why we cannot accept United Nations supervision over territories not under trusteeship

80. The three territories which we now administer under trusteeship (Tanganyika, the British Cameroons and Togoland) were originally entrusted to the United Kingdom to administer on condition that we would be accountable for them to the League of Nations. After the termination of the League, we deemed it necessary to continue to recognise the principle of international accountability for these territories by placing them under trusteeship. The other territories of the Colonial Empire have never at any time in their history been administered under international supervision. Whilst years ago there might have been something to be said for placing them under the supervision of some international body of experts, in these days it would be quite inappropriate and impracticable, having regard to the steady advance of the territories of the Colonial Empire towards self-government, to place them under the authority of a political assembly of governments. The justification for international supervision over the administration of dependent territories is obviously strongest when the control is most exclusively in the hands of the Metropolitan Power. With continuing local political and constitutional development in the Colonial Empire, as time goes on effective control is passing over an ever-increasing sphere of public affairs to the local legislatures and executives. If, therefore, it were decided to accept United Nations supervision at this stage in the history of the Colonial Empire, the effect would be more and more to bring under international supervision the policies and actions of the local Colonial Governments. In short, we would be slackening the control from Whitehall only to substitute, not local control, but control from Lake Success. Such a policy would be markedly contrary to local sentiment. There is in pretty nearly every territory of the Colonial Empire a developing sense of local nationalism, and responsible local political leaders in the Colonies would not be prepared to submit their domestic affairs to any greater degree of international supervision or interference than sovereign states are prepared to accept for themselves. We have repeatedly emphasised, and did so at the last session of the General Assembly, that this would engender that very sense of inferiority among colonial peoples which any enlightened colonial policy should aim to remove.

81. In any sphere of public administration in which some form of internationalism is functionally appropriate, this should be secured by international arrangements of general, and not exclusively colonial, application. There is every advantage in bringing such problems as illiteracy, malnutrition, soil conservation and labour conditions before an international body; in these and similar spheres of human endeavour or technical activity no individual administration is so good that it cannot be improved. But the international study of such problems is properly the duty of expert technical bodies such as the specialised agencies, or of the various functional bodies or committees of the United Nations, where, without regard to considerations based on political or constitutional status, standards of achievement can be compared on a world wide or regional basis. The Fourth Committee of the United

Nations, however, where the affairs of non-self-governing territories are singled out for special discussion in a body of political representatives, is neither equipped nor competent to deal with such matters in a practical or constructive manner. In it the problems of non-self-governing territories are dealt with in isolation from similar problems in sovereign states in comparable geographical, climatic and other circumstances and are judged not, as they should be, in relation to general standards of achievement, but against hypothetical standards of perfection in an atmosphere of political prejudice and suspicion. The right approach is, of course, a strictly functional one. Whatever international measures are necessary in respect of a particular field of administration, should be adopted wherever the problem arises, and every legitimate constitutional and diplomatic step should be taken to persuade all Governments concerned (Colonial and sovereign) to come into line.

82. The acceptance of a right of the United Nations to interfere in the affairs of the Colonial Empire would also have serious and dangerous consequences from the point of view of the attainment of the objective of our colonial policy, namely the development of self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions of assured political and economic stability. This task can only be accomplished if the colonial peoples are encouraged to regard themselves as destined for full partnership in a Commonwealth in which the members, themselves severally independent, are united by principles held in common with each other, and symbolised by the personal position of His Majesty as Head of this comity of peoples. The introduction of accountability to the United Nations would inevitably, in the eyes of the colonial peoples, devalue the Crown as the symbol of ultimate authority to which allegiance is owing and from which protection flows, and thereby undermine the present and potential contribution of the Commonwealth to world stability. It would encourage disgruntled elements in the colonies to appeal to the United Nations over the heads of His Majesty's Government, and if the colonial peoples were encouraged to look all the time to an external Court of Appeal in the shape of the United Nations it would be incomparably more difficult to encourage in them loyalty to their own local governments, a proper sense of responsibility and, in multi-racial communities, that sense of local cohesion which is a necessary pre-requisite to ultimate nationhood. Experience shows that misinformed criticism of us in the United Nations on colonial matters plays straight into the hands of extremists and communists. For example, in the minds of his followers in Uganda anti-colonialism in the Fourth Committee is identified with the activities of Semakula Mulumba,[10] and is regarded as international support for those activities.

83. Only 8 Member States of the United Nations are regarded as having colonial responsibilities. Consequently the overwhelming majority can cast their votes on colonial questions in the knowledge that they themselves will in no way be affected by the results of their voting: in other words, on colonial and trusteeship questions the United Nations affords a striking instance of "power" without responsibility. The majority of members of the United Nations have little knowledge or understanding of conditions in the colonies or of the colonial peoples themselves. They have shown

[10] Semakula Mulumba is a Uganda African living in London and is in frequent contact with the British Communist Party. Sir Donald Kingdon, in his Report on the Uganda Disturbances in April, 1949, says "Cesario Semakula Mulumba, more than any other individual, was responsible for the disturbances." In 1948 he petitioned the Trusteeship Council, via Mr. Gromyko, about East African affairs.

little disposition to grasp the formidable nature of the task of advancing backward peoples through the stages of social and political evolution which in Europe took many centuries. They tend to consider the problems of colonial administration in abstract and general terms, and the solutions they propose are usually superficial and facile. Generally speaking, they consider complete political emancipation as the first and principal objective that must be reached with the least possible delay, and show little regard to the ability of a colonial territory to survive as an independent and stable entity. In this they frequently confuse national independence with individual freedom. The Slav countries are, of course, purely out to stir up trouble for their own ends. The proceedings over the disposal of the former Italian colonies showed clearly that it would be contrary to the interests of the peoples of the Colonial Empire to allow their affairs to be regulated in such a body.

84. It is essential that we continue to resist pressure to include political and constitutional information in the information which we transmit to the United Nations each year under Article 73(e) of the Charter. We are on sound legal ground since at San Francisco it was deliberately excluded from Article 73(e). Experience has shown that if we did transmit political and constitutional information, the effect would be to bring within the field of debate and recommendation in the United Nations our political relationship with the territories of the Colonial Empire. This is the most delicate aspect of the relationship of any Metropolitan Power with its dependent territories, and the one which it is therefore most important to keep out of the international forum. It needs considerable mutual understanding to negotiate constitutional advancement, and particularly the later stage of advance to responsible government or dominion status. On the one side, the colonial power has to adapt itself to the idea that the transfer of power is not a sign of weakness or of liquidation of the Empire, but is, in fact, a sign and source of strength. On the other side, the colonial peoples themselves have to adjust themselves in the earlier stages to the necessity of gradual progress and in the later stages to the idea that they will in future have to bear the full responsibility for their own decisions and that in the event of a purely local dispute each party will no longer be able to sit on the fence and blame the ultimate decisions on colonial exploitation. But such negotiations can be conducted smoothly and amicably provided that they are conducted between the two parties concerned without external interference. India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malta are all recent examples of this. Had these negotiations had to be conducted in the forum of the United Nations and with all the misrepresentations and emotional publicity of that body, the results would certainly not have been anything like so successful. No conceivable advantage could be gained by making the internal structure of the British Commonwealth a legitimate subject for debate in the United Nations. Such a course could breed nothing but mutual ill-will between us and our Colonial peoples, to the disadvantage of both and of world political and economic stability.

Future tactics in the United Nations

85. It is unfortunate that each year in the Fourth Committee conditions in dependent territories are judged *in vacuo*, and not, as they should be, in relation to world standards and achievement. It is, however, evident that the Fourth Committee will devote considerable time each year to debating the affairs of dependent territories, whatever its lack of competence (in the technical sense) for so doing. Our

aim must be to call off, or at least damp down as far as possible, attacks such as those made against the Colonial Powers at the last session.

86. For this purpose it is important that we should secure from the U.S. more sympathetic understanding of our difficulties as a Colonial Power in the U.N., and gain their general support. U.S. representatives had repeatedly stated that they are fundamentally sympathetic to us in our difficulties over colonial questions. But the U.S. attitude in the U.N. is conditioned, first, by their reluctance to go against the will of the majority and their desire to find compromises acceptable to the greatest possible number; and, second, by their desire to show themselves sympathetic to what they (as we think, sometimes erroneously) judge to be the aspirations of colonial peoples, largely for fear that otherwise these peoples will turn to Communism. The U.S. therefore will never support us when we, as they put it, "go negative", and are likely always to urge compromises on us on the grounds that otherwise something worse will result. If, however, we can avoid a negative line and certain of the other members of the U.N. can be persuaded that our attitude is a reasonable one, we have a better chance of securing the support of the U.S. and moderate members of the U.N.

87. The solution we suggest is as follows. In the past we have voted against resolutions concerning trust territories when they contained certain paragraphs which we could not accept. We have also voted against resolutions concerning territories not under trusteeship when they implied accountability, even though in other respects they were more or less acceptable to us or at all events relatively harmless. Whilst this policy has been consistent, it resulted at the last Assembly in our finding ourselves in a small minority, and on three occasions alone. We now suggest that we might experiment with more flexible tactics. In the case of trusteeship resolutions which are not wholly satisfactory to us, provided no substantial point of principle is involved on which we could not afford to compromise, we think that we should either vote for such resolutions, making suitable reservations on certain points, or abstain on them, according to the circumstances obtaining at the time. In the case of resolutions concerning dependent territories not under trusteeship, unless they pose the principle of accountability in such a way that it cannot be ignored (e.g. by calling upon the Colonial Powers to report on what steps they have taken to give effect to recommendations or resolutions of the Assembly), and provided their substance is not such as to be unacceptable to us for other reasons, we think that we need no longer oppose them simply on the ground that they can be held to imply accountability. We suggest that as a general rule we should abstain in the voting on such resolutions, coupled, however, with a deliberate policy of stating forcefully and positively our aims and achievements in the particular fields or subjects under discussion. If on occasions we particularly wished to be associated with the aims of a resolution, we could vote in favour of it provided that we explained each time that our vote did not mean that we accepted the principle of accountability. By modifying our tactics in this way, we could take a more positive line and instead of explaining why we had to oppose resolutions in principle could get maximum publicity in a positive and vigorous way for our colonial aims and achievements. By adopting as a general rule neutral voting tactics we would give ourselves the greatest possible freedom for putting our case across as forcefully as we wished without having to argue about matters of drafting or other detailed points, and without risking compromising our position as regards accountability—as might

happen if we attempted to vote on each resolution strictly according to its merits and were thus forced into argument about matters of detail.

88. By the adoption of the tactics outlined above, we may hope to gain the sympathy of the more reasonable and moderate members of the U.N., and in particular, of the U.S. (who have urged us to adopt a more flexible line), and to secure their support on matters of major importance. We may also hope at least to improve the atmosphere when colonial questions are debated each year in the Fourth Committee. The key to the situation lies, however, in securing the sympathy and support of the U.S. At the last session of the Assembly, we and the U.S. were out of step in the Fourth Committee. We know that they regarded us as being far too inflexible and intractable. On the other hand, it seemed to us that their main anxiety was to avoid having to stand out against the anti-colonial countries on any issue. They seemed to be thinking largely in terms of the immediate situation in the Fourth Committee, and to pay insufficient regard to either the impracticability of some of the resolutions for which they voted or the effects on our position as a Colonial Power of their support for the anti-colonial line. To quote an actual instance. There have been several moves in the Trusteeship Council and in the Assembly to force the Administering Authorities of trust territories to consult the Trusteeship Council before adopting certain policies or measures in the trust territory. So far these requests have been confined to the question of "administrative unions" between trust territories and territories not under trusteeship but the principle is obviously of general application. In our view such requests cannot be justified by reference to the Charter or the Trusteeship Agreements, confuse the role of the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority, and would, if we accepted them, land us in most serious political and administrative difficulties. We have made it clear, therefore, that the principle of "prior consultation" with the Trusteeship Council is one that we cannot accept. When a draft resolution calling upon Administering Authorities to consult with the Trusteeship Council before introducing an Administrative Union was tabled at the Third Session of the General Assembly in Paris, the U.S. voted with us and the other Administering Authorities against the paragraph proving [sic] for "prior consultation". As a result the paragraph failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority and was dropped. At last year's Assembly, however, the U.S. voted for a similar paragraph in a resolution on Administrative unions, which was carried against us. It is somewhat ironical to think that the Fourth Committee was the place where the U.S. and U.S.S.R. usually found themselves voting together—against us, the French and the Belgians—in favour of resolutions which we sincerely believed to have no practical value whatsoever from the point of view of our colonial peoples, but which could, in the long run, very well have the effect of undermining our position in the colonies. We believe that, by and large, the U.S. authorities agree with the broad lines of our colonial policies, and regard them as enlightened and progressive. If we are wrong in this assumption, then clearly we must review most carefully our policies with them. But if we are both agreed on fundamentals in the sphere of colonial questions (as we believe we are) then we do feel that we are entitled to ask the U.S. to give us a measure of support in the U.N., instead of increasing our very real difficulties by lending their support to the anti-colonial groups. We for our part must make it possible for the U.S. to support us by ourselves adopting more flexible tactics. As indicated above, we are ready to go a good way to meet the U.S.,—in fact as far as we can without compromising our position on matters of

principle (especially accountability). The question now is: If we adopt these revised tactics, will the U.S. for their part be willing to come some of the way to meet us, so that we shall in future be able to look to the U.S. to support us on at least major matters in our resistance to encroachments by the U.N. on our position and responsibilities as a Colonial Power?

Annex to 72

I. *Economic development*

(a) A railway was usually the first instrument of development.[11] In the ten British colonial territories in West, East and Central Africa there are some 7,000 miles of railway in operation (compared with 32 in 1900) and some 16,500 miles of trunk roads and 71,500 miles of secondary roads.

(b) With the spread of communications and the establishment of law and order productivity and trade developed. By 1936 about £420 millions had been invested in our African Colonies. In 1900 the only important export from the African territories was palm oil. To-day Africa provides over half the world's cocoa and 40 per cent of the world's hard hemp: Northern Rhodesia is one of the world's most important producers of copper (production in 1948 was over 213,000 tons compared with 6,000 tons in 1928), and is responsible for about 13 per cent of world supplies of cobalt: the Gold Coast accounted for 15 per cent of the world output of manganese in 1948: and Nigeria is one of the world's largest producers of oil-bearing nuts and seeds (mainly palms and groundnuts). In the dependencies outside Africa Malaya grows half the world's natural rubber (rubber was introduced into Malaya by the British administration in the 1880's: exports in 1905 totalled only 104 tons: in 1948 they totalled nearly 700,000 tons). British Guiana in 1948 produced 22 per cent of world supplies of bauxite—1,873,000 tons compared with 165,000 tons in 1928.

(c) All these are primary commodities of which production has been built to world significance since 1900.[12] During the same period a great variety of other production has been introduced and developed on a scale important in the local economies: to mention but a few, coffee, tobacco, cotton, bananas, tin in Nigeria, diamonds, petroleum, rice, pineapple, hides and skins, lead and iron ore. In addition, there has been expansion of commodities already produced significantly before 1900 (e.g. sugar, tin in Malaya, and gold). Mention should also be made of the transformations effected in Singapore and Hong Kong—once barren and virtually uninhabited islands—by the institution of just, stable and efficient government: the two colonies are to-day among the world's busiest and most prosperous commercial centres, having made a phenomenally rapid recovery from the effects of the Japanese occupation.

(d) In 1900 the total revenue of the present Colonial Empire was £6 million: in 1950

[11] Mr. Winston Churchill, writing in 1908 of the then recently completed railway from the East African coast to Lake Victoria, described it as "one of the most romantic and wonderful railways in the world. The two iron streaks of rail that wind their way among the hills and foliage of Mombasa Island do not break their smooth monotony until, after piercing Equatorial forests, stretching across immense prairies, and climbing almost to the level of the European snow-line, they pause—and that only for a time—upon the edges of the Great Lake".

[12] It is to be noted that many of these primary products result from peasant production and not from plantation cultivation. This is true in particular of cocoa and West African Overseers, while some 40 per cent of Malayan rubber is produced by small-holdings.

it is of the order of £150 million. To take the particular instance of Nigeria (the biggest of our colonial territories with a population larger than that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined), the total revenue of the Nigerian Government grew in the same period from a few hundred thousand pounds to £5.8 million in 1938 and £30 million in 1949. Additionally the marketing boards instituted in Nigeria during recent years to safeguard the interests of primary producers had accumulated funds totalling over £35 million by 1950 which, in the words of the Governor, "represents a strong buttress supporting the financial and economic stability of the country."

(e) In the past we gave financial aid to the colonies only in really necessitous cases though the total grants-in-aid since 1900 to the end of 1949 totalled a very considerable figure.[13] In 1929 a Colonial Development Act established a fund into which £1 million a year was voted by Parliament for schemes of economic development in the colonies "to promote commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom." This was clearly only nibbling at the problem, but in 1940 came the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act, providing a sum of £56 million over a period of ten years "for any purpose likely to promote the development of the resources of any colony or the welfare of its people." Because of the diversion of manpower and materials caused by the war it was possible in fact, to spend little more than £10 million of this sum by 1945. In any event, the view was then being taken that an even more imaginative and generous policy was required. So in 1945 Parliament passed a second Colonial Development and Welfare Act, this time allocating a sum of £120 million over a period of ten years: of this sum over £85 million has been divided between the territories to provide the nucleus of 10-Year Plans,[14] while the remainder is being spent on schemes designed to benefit the territories as a whole (e.g. research, surveys, higher education).

(f) To complete the pattern of British aid, the Overseas Resources Act in 1948 set up a Colonial Development Corporation and an Overseas Food Corporation. The former had the power to borrow up to £110 million from the Treasury for schemes of a specifically economic nature, i.e. schemes which over a period of years can reasonably be expected to pay their way but which for various reasons are not attractive to private capital (possibly a smaller margin of profit, a greater risk or a longer period to mature).[15] The Overseas Food Corporation has borrowing powers up to £55 million for schemes of food production anywhere in the world. In the colonies it has so far undertaken the groundnut scheme in East Africa, a scheme from which not the least benefit is the data it is accumulating about almost every aspect of development in Africa.[16]

[13] It is perhaps appropriate to draw attention at this point to the misconception common in foreign countries that the Colonies pay taxes to Britain. No revenue of any kind is paid by Colonial Governments to the Imperial Exchequer.

[14] The Ten-Year Plans of 23 territories had been approved by the end of March, 1950: they provide for a total expenditure of almost £200 million, divided almost equally between Colonial Development and Welfare grants, new loans and allocations from local revenue.

[15] By the end of 1949 the Corporation had 28 schemes in hand, involving a capit[al] commitment of £14.5 million: they include projects as diverse as poultry farming in the Gambia, timber extraction in British Guiana, cement manufacture in Northern Rhodesia, tung production in Nyasaland, and sealing in the South Atlantic.

[16] By March, 1950, over £30 million had been spent on the scheme.

(g) In addition to the capital provided in these ways and by private enterprise a number of Colonial Governments are raising loans for special projects. Perhaps the most spectacular of these is the hydro-electric scheme in Uganda, on which work has already begun. The scheme will take power from the Nile at the point where it leaves Lake Victoria on its 3,800-mile journey to the Mediterranean, and will transform Lake Victoria, next to Lake Superior the largest lake in the world, into a vast reservoir, whose waters, stored and regulated by the dams now to be built, will release the Sudan and Egypt from their age-old fear of drought and famine due to the failure of the flow of the Nile. The cost of the scheme is over £13 million.[17] The possibilities of other large-scale hydro-electric schemes are being investigated in the Gold Coast and North Borneo, the Rhodesias and the Federation of Malaya: at present the industrial potentialities of most territories are seriously limited by the lack of a source of cheap power.[18]
(h) A summary of the Colonial investment thus planned was given in the 33rd report of the Commonwealth Economic Committee[19] which came to the conclusion that "current plans of one kind or another envisage a total expenditure during the next few years, say up to 1956, of some £500 million".

II. *The contribution of research*
(a) The importance of research into the special problems of the tropics needs no emphasis. Since 1940 some 400 schemes have been approved for assistance from Development and Welfare funds, and the grants thus made total £7¼ million.
(b) Earlier research had, of course, long been carried on at institutions financed by philanthropic endowments, by commercial firms and associations, by government grants, or by a combination of the three. It had gained outstanding successes against the mosquito and the locust. Following the discoveries of Ross and their successful practical application in Malaya by Watson, the menace of malaria had already been greatly reduced and with the addition of D.D.T. to the armoury of weapons in use against the mosquito, the prospects of eradicating malaria from selected areas have greatly increased, as recent spectacular campaigns have demonstrated in Cyprus,[20] British Guiana and Mauritius. No less spectacular has been the control imposed on the locust in Africa and the Middle East as a result of the International campaign directed from the Anti-Locust Research Centre in London: the last swarm of any appreciable size occurred in 1944.
(c) Among other research successes of particular significance in the tropics have been the development of effective immunising agents against human sleeping sickness and yellow fever: the British discovery of sulphetrone, which has brought new hope to lepers, and the American discovery of Chloromycetin, which so greatly reduces the risk of scrub typhus and typhoid fever:[21] and in East Africa the

[17] The scheme was the subject of an agreement signed between the British and Egyptian Governments in May, 1949.
[18] Only Nigeria and Malaya produce coal.
[19] *A Review of Commonwealth Trade.*
[20] The complete eradication of the malaria-carrying mosquito from the island was announced in January 1950, after a 3 year campaign. Pre-war Cyprus had 18,000 cases of malaria annually: in 1949 there were 100 and not one of these was a new infection.
[21] Extensive field experiments were carried out in Malaya in co-operation with the Institute for Medical Research at Kuala Lumpur.

development of effective measures against the worm disease called onchocerciasis, which causes blindness.

(d) In the field of plant disease, the scientists have found cures for diseases of tea in Nyasaland, bananas in Jamaica, coconuts in the South Seas, and cotton in East Africa: their efforts are now directed in particular against "Swollen Shoot" which threatens to destroy the cocoa industry in West Africa and "sudden death" which similarly menaces the clove industry in Zanzibar.

(e) One battle still far from being won is that against the tsetse, carrier of disease which makes it impossible to keep cattle in an area of Africa estimated at 4,000,000 square miles. Lack of cattle means that the people are deprived, not only of meat and dairy products and of valuable hides and skins, but also of the manure they so badly need for the poverty-stricken African soil. Yet at least research has identified the tsetse as the enemy, while the work of Swynnerton in East Africa in devising methods of eradicating the tsetse from selected areas has laid the foundation for a number of successful clearance schemes in both East and West Africa.[22] Here again D.D.T. promises to be a powerful ally and there have been encouraging results from experiments in clearing the fly with insecticide smoke from aircraft.

III. *Health improvements*

(a) All this work of research, coupled with greater prosperity, expansion of medical and welfare facilities, and the persistent efforts of health propaganda, is now bearing fruit in the greatly improved health of the people. Vital statistics do not exist for most territories during the early decades of the century, and even now they are impossible to compile accurately in some territories, but all available statistics show striking improvements, particularly during the last decade. To quote a few examples: Singapore's death rate in 1949 was as low as that of the United Kingdom, while its infant mortality rate stood at 73 compared with 130 in 1939; Cyprus in 1949 had one of the lowest death rates in the world and an infant mortality rate of 70 compared with 180 seven years earlier; in Jamaica, Trinidad and British Guiana it is estimated that the average length of life has increased by 15 years since 1921.

(b) Figures of attendance at hospitals and dispensaries, and at ante-natal clinics tell an equally encouraging tale of expanding facilities and growing confidence among the people. In Kenya for example, hospital in-patients in 1948 numbered 176,000 compared with 49,000 in 1937, while out-patients numbered 831,000 compared with 460,000. In Uganda, ante-natal attendances during 1948 were 91,000 compared with 38,000 in 1938. In Hong Kong 97.7 per cent of the 47,475 births recorded during 1948 were attended by registered midwives, either in hospitals or at home, and the mortality rate was 1.5.

IV. *Advances in education*

(a) Similarly in education all statistics point to notable advances, particularly in recent years. In the African territories there are now not less than 2,000,000 children at school. There are many more than this number for whom schools do not yet exist: but the important point is that some 50 years ago the numbers of African children

[22] A new scheme for the eradication of the tsetse in an area of 9,500 square miles is just commencing in Nigeria, with the aid of a Colonial Development and Welfare Grant.

attending school were negligible. In Malaya 581,000 children were at school in 1949 compared with 262,000 in 1941; teachers numbered over 17,000 compared with 7,000; and schools 3,950 compared with 2,520.

(b) In the provision of facilities for higher education there have been outstanding developments since 1947. With the aid of grants totalling several million pounds from Colonial Development and Welfare funds one new university (Malaya) and four university colleges (West Indies, Nigeria, Gold Coast and East Africa) have been brought into existence (there already existed universities at Malta and Hong Kong). At the same time the number of colonial students at British Universities and Colleges has risen from less than 2,000 in 1946 to 4,000 in 1950.

(c) The territories need skilled technicians and craftsmen of all kinds, though the need is less, of course, than in the industrial countries of Europe and America. In general Colonial Governments have met their own requirements by setting up training sections in the various departments of government, e.g. railways, public works, agriculture, but in addition technical schools exist in all the larger territories. One good arising out of evil was the technical training provided to tens of thousands of Africans who served with the armed forces during the last war. It is now felt, however, that the provision of technical training facilities needs to be tackled in a more comprehensive and systematic manner and £1,250,000 has been allocated from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for the purpose. As a result it is hoped that two new colleges will be set up in West Africa in the immediate future. To assist in this development the Secretary of State has appointed a special Advisory Committee of experts.

(d) But perhaps the best evidence of educational advance is to be found in the constantly increasing number of locally-born men and women who are rising to distinction in politics, in the professions, in business and in the civil service of their own countries. No single piece of evidence could more graphically illustrate this trend than the composition of the committee appointed by the Governor of the Gold Coast in 1949 to recommend advances in the Constitution: each of the 39 members was an African, distinguished in some aspect of Gold Coast affairs, and the committee's chairman, Mr. Justice H. Coussey, was an African Judge of the Supreme Court.

V. *The political pattern*

(a) Since 1945 full self-government has been achieved by Ceylon, and self-government in internal affairs by Malta, while few other territories have not had major constitutional revisions, designed to give increased responsibility to local opinion.[23] In some instances, as in the Gold Coast, a second revision is imminent. This is also the position in Nigeria where a new Constitution was introduced in 1947 but is now likely to be further revised as the result of discussions begun at the village

[23] All but a few territories have a Legislative Council, or House of Assembly, which corresponds roughly to Parliament in Britain. The Council at first comprises officials only: a number of prominent local persons are then appointed as unofficial members: next the "unofficials" are given a majority and some are elected: finally the whole Council is elected and a ministerial system is introduced as the prelude to complete self-government. There are now unofficial majorities in the legislatures of Malta, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Jamaica, Gibraltar, British Guiana, British Honduras, Gambia, Gold Coast, Kenya, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, Mauritius, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Singapore, Trinidad, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent.

level and continued through provincial and regional conferences to a nation-wide conference early in 1950.

(b) In the West Indies and Malaya, where for geographical and other reasons federation would seem to offer the best prospect of effective self-government, we have advocated this solution. In Malaya, there is already a federal government which is standing up well to the strains and stresses imposed by the outbreak of Communist banditry. In the West Indies the principle of federation has been accepted and detailed recommendations made by a representative conference are now being discussed by the legislatures of the various Colonies.

(c) At the same time as political power is being increasingly transferred steps are being taken to ensure that the civil service in each territory is as far as possible locally manned. Over 96 per cent of the Colonial Service is already locally recruited, but many of the top administrative technical posts must be filled from outside, because of the high qualifications required. To enable more colonial-born people to obtain the necessary qualifications a sum of £1 million has been earmarked from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. In addition the Governments of Nigeria and the Gold Coast have embarked upon a planned policy of "Africanisation".[24] In the West Indies more than 11,000 of some 11,300 posts carrying a salary of £600 or over are already held by West Indians.

VI. *The Colonial Service*

(a) Despite the rapidly increasing colonial element in the higher ranks of Colonial Civil Services described above, recruitment from Britain must continue at a higher rate if development plans are to be carried out. In some branches, indeed, the demand for highly qualified and technical staff from Britain outstrips supply. Since 1945 nearly 6,000 appointments have been made, to the various branches of the Colonial Service, but there were over 1,100 vacancies at the end of 1949.

(b) There is one other aspect of British aid on which no cash value can be placed but which constitutes an indispensable factor in colonial development. The Colonial Office List, in recording the functions of the Colonial Office, says of the Office, inter alia, that: "Through the co-operation of 300 men and women, eminent in every field of science, public affairs and administration, who sit on its Advisory Committees, it ensures that colonial problems are tackled with the fullest possible background of experience and knowledge."[25] In addition, the Secretary of State has a staff of Advisers on all principal subjects calling for technical knowledge. It is also the practice to send technical missions to colonial territories to advise on troublesome problems.

[24] In 1938 there were 26 Nigerians in the Senior Service: in 1948 172: and in 1950 278 (out of 2,200). Of 1,350 filled senior posts in the Gold Coast early in 1950 219 were held by Africans.

[25] Early in 1950 there were 27 such committees dealing with subjects as diverse as Education; Insecticides; Geology and Mineral Resources; Land Tenure; Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis; Social Welfare; Agriculture; Animal Health and Forestry; and various forms of Research.

73 CO 967/147 7 Aug 1951

[CO organisation]: memorandum by Sir C Jeffries on need to improve co-ordination of colonial policy and inter-governmental communication

One of the most important problems to be solved in the Colonial Office during the next year or two is that of associating Colonial peoples not only in the management of their own affairs but in the general affairs of the Commonwealth and the democratic world. Apart from any other consideration, it is obviously essential to British interests that the Colonial peoples should remain contented members of our family, and that Britain should retain their support and sympathy in conducting her external affairs. It is not inconsistent with this assertion to hold the sincere belief that the best interests of the Colonial peoples themselves are also served by the maintenance of the British connection.

2. There is a real risk that preoccupation with constitutional and economic development may obscure recognition of the fact that money and effort expended on these objects will be wasted from every point of view unless the Colonies remain on the democratic side and more particularly on the side of Britain and the Commonwealth. It is not enough, in these days, to assume that this will be so, that gratitude for material help and appreciation of constitutional concessions will of themselves secure the desired result. Such an assumption involves an altogether too optimistic view of human nature and gravely underestimates the strength of propaganda—not necessarily only from actively hostile sources—directed against the maintenance of the British connection.

3. The requisites are two:— first, to put the "British case" to the Colonial peoples in order to enlist their support; secondly, to dispel the idea that there is a whole range of matters of deep concern to them, which are dealt with over their heads, without their being given any opportunity to express their views or being listened to if they do express them. This idea is already being voiced in several Colonial quarters. At the moment, it is a novelty, and there are relatively few peoples in the Colonies who have any genuine interests outside their own parochial affairs. But the idea is there and will undoubtedly gain force—and being on the whole justified it will give a lot of trouble if not taken [sic] in time.

4. In the past, the essential key point in meeting both requisites has been the Governor. But in the field of internal affairs, the Governor is becoming daily less an agent of the British Government and more a constitutional ruler acting on the advice of local popular representatives. To-day, in all but the most backward Colonies, government is conducted on the principle that legislative and financial power is vested in the unofficial members of the legislature. Barring the exceptional use of reserved powers, if a Governor wishes to secure acceptance of a policy of which he is personally in favour, or which His Majesty's Government considers desirable, he has to do it not by putting formal machinery into motion but by persuasion and influence. In fact, Governors to-day spend much more time presenting the case of their Colonies to His Majesty's Government than vice versa; and this must clearly be a growing tendency. The Governor cannot be spokesman for both sides. If he is to continue to be a spokesman at all, he must speak for the Colony which pays him and the people appointed to advise him.

5. If this is true in the case of a Colony's internal affairs, and its individual relationship with His Majesty's Government in regard to those affairs, it is surely unrealistic to suppose that the Governor can be expected at the same time to be the sole channel for expounding to the Colonial people British policies and interests in international affairs and persuading the Colonial people to accept and support the British line. The difficulty becomes most acute when there is an apparent or real conflict between the immediate interests of the Colony and the broader interests of Britain and her associates.

6. I do not suggest that the Governor has ceased or should cease to be in a key position. What I mean to suggest is that he should be enabled to play his part as mediator and counsellor more effectively by being enabled to do it behind the scenes, instead of being thrust, as is the tendency at present in many Colonies, into the political limelight. This means that new methods of consultation and communication have to be worked out. Some are in fact already being tried; some are discussed in the report of the Smaller Territories Committee.[1] Before, however, coming to discuss such methods in detail, I wish to place a general consideration in the foreground.

7. For tactical purposes, the work of the Colonial Office is necessarily broken down into a number of separate functions. Part of the organisation is concerned with administrative and constitutional questions; part with financial and economic matters; part with staffing of the Colonial Service; part with the dissemination of information about and to the Colonies; part with the development of social services; part with defence questions; part with the welfare of Colonial students etc. in this country; part with international relations; and so on. Within the Office all these parts are or should be working together in pursuance of a general strategy, the main objective which may be defined as the conduct of our relationship with the Colonies along such lines as will secure that the Colonial peoples, as they become mature, will not only stand on their own feet in reasonable conditions, but will continue to co-operate with Britain and the Commonwealth.

8. Within the Office, the allocation of man-power to these various tactical functions is within the discretion of the authorities, and is governed by their broad estimate of the relative priority of different kinds of work from time to time. But it is far otherwise when one comes to consider the sinews of the campaign. Many of these activities to-day involve the spending of United Kingdom Government money, but the money has to be fought for in a number of unrelated bits and pieces. It is true that expenditure under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts is centrally controlled and in theory can be allocated in accordance with the considered plan; though even here, in practice, inroads have to be made on the funds to meet some *ad hoc* situation (the provisions for broadcasting expansion and for student hostels are cases in point) without the opportunity of very full consideration of the relative value of the schemes thus selected and of others to which the money might otherwise have been devoted.

9. Outside the Colonial Development and Welfare sphere, however, present arrangements do not allow of even the pretence of co-ordination. Expenditure on broadcasting, British Council and information services is determined not by the relative place of these activities in the Colonial strategic plan but by the amount that

[1] See part 4 of this volume, 410.

can be squeezed out of what the Treasury are prepared to allocate to "overseas information" generally. The amount spent on publications depends upon what share the Colonial Office is able to obtain of the Stationery Office and Central Office of Information votes. The amount available for the entertainment of visitors depends upon what can be secured from the Government Hospitality vote; and so on. To organise a conference such as the recent gathering of unofficials, and to get full value from it by publicising the visit, means obtaining funds not only from the Colonial Office vote itself but from the Government Hospitality, Central Office of Information, Ministry of Works votes (and probably some others) as well as indirectly from the funds allocated to British Council, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, British Broadcasting Corporation, and what not.

10. And yet all these activities, financed from so many different sources, are directed towards the same objective and should be considered as a whole. As a matter of mere common sense, the Government should decide how much it is prepared to spend upon that objective, and a reasoned plan should be drawn up for allocating the available money to the various tactical operations according to current requirements. It should be possible to rearrange the expenditure from time to time to meet changing conditions—for example, to cut down broadcasting and use the saving to increase the number of Colonial visitors, or to send out more people from the Colonial Office and fewer magazines. But under the present system this is not possible. A cut in one vote is not accepted as an argument for a higher allocation from another.

11. The application of new tactical methods would clearly be facilitated if some such reform could be brought about. Any new methods are certain to involve new expenditure, but this might to some extent be offset by savings (not necessarily on the same votes) realised by discarding methods which have lost value. (It is, of course, a well-known weakness of the existing system of Government finance that nothing once started ever stops, even though it may long have outlived its usefulness; and therefore Government expenditure continually increases. We might at least strike a blow for getting away from this pernicious system in the Colonial Office field).

12. I may now return to the question of new methods, including the development of those existing methods which are most suited to the present phase of United Kingdom—Colonial relationships. I should place in the forefront the establishment of closer and more frequent personal contact between United Kingdom Ministers and officials on the one hand and Colonial legislators and prominent unofficials (as distinct from Governors and officials) on the other. This means that more provision is needed for (amongst other things):

(a) travelling overseas by Colonial Office staff;
(b) additional administrative staff to allow of more people being abroad at any given time;
(c) higher allowances to enable officers on tour to be more independent of official hospitality and able to offer entertainment to local unofficials, etc.;
(d) assistance towards passages and expenses of Colonial unofficials invited to visit this country;
(e) official entertainment of such visitors;
(f) reimbursement of entertainment given privately by members of staff;

(g) increased grants to British Council, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and other bodies for providing such visitors with instructional tours and courses;
(h) establishment of a Conference Department and Visitors' Department in the Colonial Office (as to which see further below);
(i) increased provision by Ministry of Works, etc. for conferences.

13. It will be convenient here to amplify the case for a Conference Department and Visitors' Department. The experience of this year has clearly shown that conferences of one kind or another, whether general, regional or specialist, have become a permanent and increasing factor in United Kingdom—Colonial relationships. This tendency must develop, whether or not any formal Council or Councils may be set up as a result of the Smaller Territories Committee's report. At present every conference has to be improvised and places a strain upon some department. Preparation tends to be inadequate, and there is no proper machinery for organising the secretarial arrangements, recording of minutes, rapid circulation of papers and the innumerable details which arise in practice. Nor is there any central organisation for seeing that conferences are spaced throughout the year on a considered plan. A special department to deal with these matters is badly needed. If its work included the conduct of "summer schools" and week-end courses, it would have a full-time job. In addition, it should to some extent be a mobile unit, capable of being transplanted overseas to handle conferences held in the Colonies, where the strain of improving arrangements must be an even greater tax upon the local secretariats than it is upon this Office.

14. The work of looking after visitors might, at any rate in the first instance, be combined with that of the Conference Department, since part of the work of the latter would be concerned with the booking of accommodation, arrangement of entertainment and tours, etc. The need for dealing with these matters in a regular and organised way is apparent. At present, such co-ordination as there is is done as a side-line by a Principal in Information Department. Much of the work admittedly consists of seeing that other bodies (British Council, Government Hospitality, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, etc.) do their stuff and giving them guidance, but if the reception of visitors both individually or in small or large parties is to be stepped up, as I think is necessary, and if contacts between the Office and the visitors are to be made full and genuine, the Office itself must take a leading part in the arrangements. Moreover, the work of the Office in all branches and at all levels will have to be adjusted so that staff have time to devote to meeting the visitors both officially and socially.

15. The next matter for discussion is the question of methods to create and develop an informed and friendly public opinion in the Colonies. This is to a large extent already planned and dealt with as a co-ordinated operation by the Information Department. It is, however, complicated by the difficulty already mentioned, namely, that the funds for doing the work come from a variety of sources. Moreover, there is no recognised source of funds for some kinds of very desirable activity. Money for broadcasting development has been secured only by a raid on the Colonial Development and Welfare reserve. Everyone is agreed about the urgent need for setting up an organisation for the distribution of literature in Colonies, but there is no machinery for obtaining the necessary initial finance. The establishment of

overseas agencies of the Information Department is essential to the success of its work, but there is no certainty that the Office will be allowed to take on the extra staff required for the purpose. There is need for a closer integration of all aspects of overseas information work with the campaigns for adult education and community development, but this again would mean extra staff.

16. Finally, there is the matter of inter-Government communication. The adoption of some kind of modified "High Commissioner" system seems inevitable if the larger and more advanced Colonies are to be kept content with their status, and if, as suggested above, the Governor is to be relieved of the duty of openly acting as spokesman for both the United Kingdom and the Colonial Government. This means that the Colonial Governments will have to be allowed to appoint London representatives, who will be in constant touch with the Office and doubtless add considerably to its work. The definition of the scope and functions of these representatives will be a difficult and delicate business. But it also means that the Office will have to have its representatives in the Colonial capitals, and that a large part of the less important correspondence will be conducted through these representatives or liaison officers. To provide and to service the necessary experienced staff to fill these posts will involve a considerable and increasing addition to the Office establishment.

17. In the above paragraphs I have indicated a number of developments in Office organisation which seem to me to be essential during the next year or two if what I have termed the strategy is to be carried on effectively. The list is by no means exhaustive; we must for instance envisage increased work in the field of student welfare, and it cannot be assumed that no further expansion of the economic side of the Office will be needed. There are also several demands already on record for early increases in the advisory staff. Moreover, it must be remembered that all additions to higher staff involve increases in the supporting grades and also the provision of more accommodation.

18. It may be taken for granted that there will be pressure upon us to economise even upon our present establishment and expenditure. If the above analysis is anything like correct, it is clear that any idea of reductions is fantastic. We need a new deal, based on the recognition that we have entered a new phase in the political sphere comparable with the new phase in the economic sphere which was opened by the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.

19. At the same time, it would be improper to propose considerable expansions without examining the possibility of setting them off by at least some discarding of existing commitments. I think that it can fairly be argued that we should review the whole range of free services which the Office renders to the Colonies. Their cost is in fact a substantial hidden supplement to the aid given under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, but we get little public credit for it, which is a pity.

20. The services in question are broadly those which, if the recommendations of the Smaller Territories Committee were adopted, would be organised as a separate Commonwealth Services Office. Since the Committee's recommendations will in any event have to be examined, it would not be a waste of time or effort to work out what staff would have to be allocated to the new Office and what provision would have to be made in the vote for that Office on the basis of existing commitments. We should then have a basis on which to consider whether the services in question should be continued, expanded or reduced, and whether they should still be rendered free or on some system of reimbursement. It would moreover be possible to work out a logical

division between the Colonial Development and Welfare and other votes. There is, indeed, much to be said for charging to Colonial Development and Welfare the cost of all services which can be held to fall properly within its scope, provided that additional funds are made available to cover such expenditure as is transferred from other votes. Such a change should, in fact, be of advantage to the Colonies, since it is easier to obtain Parliamentary and public support for increasing the Colonial Development and Welfare vote than for adding to the staff or expenses of the Colonial Office as such. It is the whole basis of my argument that the obligations of His Majesty's Government in respect of the Colonies cannot be discharged more cheaply than to-day without risking very serious political consequences, and that indeed substantial additional expenditure is essential in certain fields. It is unlikely that any substantial reduction in other fields will be possible. Some relief may be obtainable by charging the Colonies for services rendered, but when all allowances have been made it is practically certain that His Majesty's Government will have to spend more rather than less if our political objectives are to be realised. On the other hand, it should be possible to rearrange the financial provisions so as to present the picture in a more realistic and palatable light, and to secure the maximum public credit for our contribution.