The Culture of Dis/simulation
in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe

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I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

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Abstract

This dissertation examines early modern perceptions of the twin notions of simulation and dissimulation – which I refer to jointly as ‘dis/simulation’ – in various literary, social and semantic contexts and from a pan-European perspective. I look at how this thorny and controversial moral issue was addressed and discussed in a wide range of genres and texts and how it was disseminated to a broader readership.

The introduction explains my approach to the subject, provides an overview of previous scholarship and includes a short excursus on three literary genres not discussed in detail in the dissertation. In the first chapter, I analyse the varied treatment of dis/simulation in emblem books. In the following chapter I explore the link between the problem of dis/simulation and early modern reform plans for poor relief, focusing on debates in Spain. Chapter 3 looks at texts from other European countries and establishes the connection between, on the one hand, learned and scholarly discussions of the problem of mendicancy and, on the other, popular literature in which the deceptions and disguises of beggars, rogues and tricksters were a recurrent theme. The next chapter deals with the contemporary perceptions of courtesans and analyses the nexus between love, passions and dis/simulation.

The last two chapters show that the problem of feigning and disguise became increasingly important in medical and physiognomical literature. I investigate how both genres addressed a cluster of relevant intellectual contexts, including the possibility of reading the human countenance, the limits of dis/simulation and the morality of employing deception in the interest of healing. I conclude by considering the main contexts, themes and implications of early modern debates on dis/simulation and their gradual decline in the seventeenth century.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, whose love has always been boundless.
Introduction

Shortly before the deadline of my research proposal at the Warburg Institute, my supervisor Jill Kraye handed me a recently published book on the culture of dissimulation and secrecy in the early modern period: Jon R. Snyder’s *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe*.¹ It turned out to be a defining moment for my dissertation. I hastily devoured the book with a nagging presentiment. At first, my worries seemed to be justified: it not only discussed most of the primary sources I had arduously collected for my proposal, but also surpassed by far my initial research. Considering that the book was the result of many years of research by an experienced scholar, this was hardly surprising. I was at a loss as to what I should do. Drafting up an entirely new proposal in less than two weeks was not an option, especially since I was very keen to delve deeper into my chosen subject. Discouraged, I consulted Guido Giglioni and Jill Kraye, who both advised me to continue my initial research, focusing on other sources, themes and questions related to the subject. Snyder’s book, thus, became my starting-point and a recurrent point of reference. It induced me to reconsider the outline of my entire thesis and to pursue an exhaustive hunt for new sources.²

Before I present the general aim of my study, it is necessary to explain briefly the notions of simulation and dissimulation. Simulation denotes pretending and feigning of something which does not exists, while dissimulation refers to forms of disguise and concealment of something which does exist.³ Both notions can apply to virtually

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¹ See Jon R. Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe*, Berkeley, 2009, p. 95.

² The other pivotal point of reference was Jean-Pierre Cavaillé’s seminal study which includes a vast bibliography of primary texts from the Middle Ages until the Enlightenment: Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle*, Paris, 2002; see also Cavaillé’s research project at [http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/261](http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/261), which features an impressive number of articles on the subject.

anything, for example, knowledge, religious beliefs, feelings and so on. In my understanding, they represent fundamental forms of individual (false) self-presentation and are important parameters and tools of social interaction and communication. According to Jean-Pierre Cavaillé and Perez Zagorin, who have made substantial contributions to this subject, simulation and dissimulation cannot be consistently separated.\(^4\) I have followed Cavaillé in adapting his neologism ‘dis/simulation’, which suggests the intrinsic epistemological connection between the two notions. Snyder challenged this assumption, arguing that early modern authors clearly distinguished between them.\(^5\) An extensive study of the source material shows that most early modern authors did indeed tend to distinguish painstakingly between the two notions, for instance, praising concealment as a form of prudential (and, therefore, licit) behaviour, while condemning simulation as a form of deceit and imposture. Yet although this was the broad consensus, it was by no means always the case for all relevant contemporary texts. It would be simplifying a complex situation to assume that all authors maintained this somewhat technical distinction. The sources I have studied show that early modern perceptions, understandings and evaluations of dis/simulation were not monolithic and uniform but, in fact, much more multifaceted and diverse than hitherto presented in the scholarship.\(^6\)

\(^4\) Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations*, pp. 13–15; see also Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, ‘Simulatio/dissimulatio: notes sur feinte et occultation, XVII\(^{\text{e}}\) et XVIII\(^{\text{e}}\) siècles’, in *Il vocabulario della République des lettres: terminologia filosofica e storia della filosofia: problemi di metodo: atti del convegno internazionale in memoriam di Paul Dibon, Napoli, 17–18 maggio 1996*, ed. by Marta Fattori, Florence, 1997, pp. 115–132, at pp. 118–119, who argued that authors such as Pontano, Lipsius, Montaigne and Charron questioned the seperability of dis/simulation. Perez Zagorin, *Ways of Lying, Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge MA, 1990, p. 3: ‘Although the term dissimulation occurs somewhat more commonly in the literature than simulation, the two are simply different sides of the same coin… The two words might be therefore be used interchangeably.’

\(^5\) Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. XVII.

\(^6\) The heterogeneous character of opinions on this subject was already noted by an early modern author; see Johann Dietrich von Güllich, *Larva iuridico-politica detecta. Sive discursus iuridico-historico-politicus de simulatione et dissimulatione*, Osterode, 1688, pp. 24–25.
As I have indicated, not all authors consistently followed and reinforced the clear-cut division between feigning and disguise. While some simply seem to have been unaware of this distinction or merely confused both terms, others rashly condemned or, on the contrary, praised both of them. What is more, the terms simulation and dissimulation (in Latin and in various vernaculars) were often – purposefully or not – used interchangeably, at times becoming rather blurred and ambiguous. Important as this point may be, I have decided not to mention it at every instance, but instead to limit myself to addressing it here in the ‘Introduction’. I would like to emphasise again that opinions on this tricky subject were far from coherent and consistent: constituting a grey area, the flexible notions of simulation and dissimulation were re-evaluated and re-negotiated in various contexts and from different perspectives. As I shall argue in the Conclusion, this was very much a question of power.

The issue of (false) self-presentation, deception and dis/simulation has enjoyed increasing attention in modern scholarship, which has mainly focused on five major contexts: politics, court culture, religion, heterodoxy and dissidence, and the notion of prudence. Since all these contexts are vast and multifaceted, I can only give a very brief

7 This tendency goes back to a locus classicus of European literature, in which the distinction between both notions had been questioned; see Quintilian, Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim, ed. by Michael Winterbottom, Oxford, 1970, p. 352: ‘Plurimus autem circa simulationem (et dissimulationem) risus est, quae sunt vicina et prope eadem, sed simulatio est certam opinionem animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se parum intelligere finges.’

8 There were countless radical rejections of both simulation and dissimulation; justifications of both notions are much less frequent but can, nonetheless, be found: see, e.g., Panfilo Persico’s endorsement of dis/simulation in his portrait of the perfect secretary, discussed below in the Appendix to this chapter.

overview of them, starting with the intellectual history of prudence, which dates back to Aristotle and occupied an important role in early Christian moral philosophy and medieval thought. In the early modern era, more specifically, above all with Giovanni Pontano’s important treatise De prudentia (written c. 1490 and first published 1508), the ideal of worldly wisdom enjoyed unprecedented popularity and, more importantly for our purposes, was closely linked to strategies and uses of disguise and, to a lesser extent, feigning. In the course of the sixteenth century, prudence developed into the ‘political’ virtue par excellence of the early modern individual; as the all-important decision-making faculty of the mind, it governed all other virtues. A large number of authors discussed prudence, in all its variations and sub-categories, in an uninterrupted stream of political, philosophical and jurisprudential treatises well into the eighteenth century.

During the upheavals and conflicts of the sixteenth century, political and religious authorities tried to enforce doctrinal conformity, which led to an increasing interest in and awareness of dis/simulation. The problem of feigning and disguise in religious conflicts has been extensively studied and is a highly complex subject, to


13 Zedler’s famous encyclopedia, e.g., listed sixteen sub-categories of prudentia; see Johann Heinrich Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste, XXIX, Leipzig and Halle, 1741, p. 1023.
which I cannot make any substantial contribution here.\(^{14}\) It cropped up, for instance, in relation to Nicodemism,\(^{15}\) Moriscos, Maranos and crypto-Judaists in the Iberian peninsula,\(^{16}\) as well as in the context of early modern moral casuistry, especially the doctrines of mental reservation and equivocation, which were widely associated with the Jesuits.\(^{17}\) The problem of dis/simulation in religious contexts in the early modern era

\(^{14}\) The best overview of the subjects linked to the nexus of dis/simulation and religion is Zagorin, *Ways of Lying*. For recent studies of, and theoretical approaches to, the problem of dis/simulation in religion, see Andreas Pietsch and Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (eds), *Konfessionelle Ambiguität: Uneindeutigkeit und Verstellung als religiöse Praxis in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Tübingen, 2012. This is the first publication of the research project, based at the University of Münster, Germany, ‘Politisches Amt und religiöse Dissimulation. Konfessionelle Zweideutigkeit an Europäischen Fürstenhöfen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts’, which finished in 2012.


\(^{16}\) The scholarly literature on this subject is vast, so I shall limit myself to citing one study which lays emphasis on the problem of dis/simulation: Areeg Ibrahim, ‘Literature of the Converts in Early Modern Spain: Nationalism and Religious Dissimulation of Minorities’, *Comparative Literary Studies*, 45, 2008, pp. 210–227.

\(^{17}\) On Jesuits and dis/simulation, see Johann R. Sommerville, ‘The New Art of Lying: Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry’, in *Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Edmund
was, of course, closely linked to the broader issues of heterodoxy, libertinism and intellectual dissidence. More often than not, heterodox philosophical views, controversial scholarly opinions and scientific discoveries which threatened to destabilise established views and beliefs required prudent concealment. Giordano Bruno, Tommaso Campanella and Galileo Galilei are perhaps the most prominent examples of scholars and intellectuals who, with different consequences and outcomes, faced persecution for their views and beliefs.

The most extensively studied aspects of early modern society and thought in connection with dis/simulation are court culture and political theory. In a flood of manuals, advice books and treatises, Renaissance and early modern authors discussed the aesthetics of courtly dis/simulation as part of polite, playful and gracious comportment, establishing the parameters of accepted and morally justified pretence and disguise. The microcosm of the early modern courts was intrinsically linked to


19 For a short overview of scientific practice in early modern Italy and its relation to the problem of dis/simulation, see Emanuele Zinato, La scienza dissimulata nel Seicento, Naples, 2005; for a case study on Galileo in this context, see Mauro Pesce, ‘L’indisciplinabilità del metodo e la necessità politica della simulazione e della dissimulazione in Galilei dal 1609 al 1642’, in Disciplina dell’anima, disciplina del corpo e disciplina della società tra medioevo ed età moderna, ed. by Paolo Prodi and Carla Penuti, Bologna, 1994, pp. 161–184.


21 This subject obviously has various connections with the notion of prudence. For a comprehensive study
dis/simulation, and many contemporary authors passionately denounced the pervasive moral corruption of courtiers, as manifested in their malicious flatteries and opportunistic deceptions. European courts were the main stage for early modern Realpolitik, which, in an age of the revival of Tacitism, the widespread idea of the arcana imperii and the consolidation of the doctrine of reason of state was centred on secrecy, disguise and feigning. Political treatises frequently addressed this complicated subject and justified such means in the interest of the stability of the state, while worldly rulers were expected to make prudent use of concealment and even simulation whenever necessary.


22 For a wide-ranging study of this recurrent theme in early modern literature, see Helmuth Kiesel, Bei Hof, bei Höll. Untersuchungen zur literarischen Hofkritik von Sebastian Brant bis Friedrich Schiller, Tübingen, 1979.


24 Even those Spanish political treatises and manuals which commonly attacked Machiavelli’s alleged amorality and his subordination of religion to the state and which portrayed an ideal Christian ruler who shunned all lying and deception nevertheless subtly endorsed dis/simulation in the interest of the state; see Donald W. Bleznick, ‘Spanish Reaction to Machiavelli in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 19, 1958, pp. 542–550.
The aim of this dissertation is to examine early modern perceptions of dis/simulation beyond these previously studied contexts and to look at a number of other areas and closely related themes which have received little attention in recent scholarship. Snyder, following Cavaillé and Zagorin, identifies the early modern era as an ‘age of dissimulation’; and Eliav-Feldon speaks of an ‘age of impostors’. Although they have largely side-stepped the problematic historiographical notion of a coherent Zeitgeist, I have taken their claims seriously. My intention is not to offer a bold revision of established views on the subject and its implications with regard to early modern moral, political and social thought and culture; instead, I shall attempt to analyse further the problem of feigning and disguise in early modern culture and the specific contexts in which it was particularly important. If we are genuinely dealing with an age of dis/simulation, in which people were increasingly aware of and concerned with false identities and imposture, then it is my contention that these issues were also relevant in a number of contexts which have not yet been discussed in modern scholarship. And I have, indeed, been able to find a large number of highly interesting early modern texts, most of which have not been studied in connection with this subject.

My approach encompasses intellectual debates, technical treatises and (semi-) fictional literary texts, as well as many texts which loosely fall into the category of popular literature, for example, beggar and rogue pamphlets, carnival songs, satires and

25 The spectrum and semantic range of closely related themes is very broad and includes terms such as disguise/secrecy/taciturnity/occultatio and deceit/fraud/astutia/cunning. For a collection of studies covering several aspects of this subject, see Toon van Houdt (ed.), On the Edge of Truth and Honesty. Principles and Strategies of Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period, Leiden, 2002. For a somewhat eclectic study touching on various contexts linked to deception and dis/simulation but which adds little to earlier studies, see Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Renaissance Impostors and Proofs of Identity, London, 2012. For a collection of essays on aspects of deceit in early modern culture, see Mark Crane, Richard Raiswell, and Margaret Reeves (eds), Shell Games. Studies in Scams, Frauds, and Deceits, Toronto, 2004. A complementary side to the discourse on dis/simulation which I largely leave out from my discussion is the theme of sincerity; on the notion of sincerity and candour in German Baroque culture and literature, see Claudia Benthien and Steffen Martus (eds), Die Kunst der Aufrichtigkeit im 17. Jahrhundert, Tübingen, 2006, and Roland Galle, ‘Honnêteté und sincerité’, in Französische Klassik. Theorie, Literatur, Malerei, ed. by Fritz Nies and Karlheinz Stierle, Munich, 1985, pp. 33–60.

26 Snyder, Dissimulations, p. 1.

27 Eliav-Feldon, Renaissance Impostors, pp. 13 and 15.
emblem books.\textsuperscript{28} It is necessary to make clear, however, that the majority of the sources which I discuss give us, above all, an idea about the discourse on dis/simulation among the educated and upper social strata of early modern society and not – or, at least, to a much lower degree – about the lower social types they describe.\textsuperscript{29} As we descend down the social scale, the paucity of sources impedes us from gaining a substantial insight into the lives and perceptions of members of the lower echelons of society, who, to a large extent, are deprived of a voice, like those subordinate historical agents on whom modern post-colonial studies are focused.

By placing the sources in a very broad historical framework, I may not always do equal justice to all of them, since some might deserve to be examined in a regional or a national context. This was not always possible, however, since the scope of my investigation is pan-European, and my selection of sources is not limited to a particular country or language. I believe that this viewpoint gives us a better picture of the wider perceptions of this subject. As I hope to show, dis/simulation was a subject which was intensively debated in numerous European countries and, moreover, was significant in important cultural centres and urban agglomerations, as well as in the peripheries of the social and cultural landscape of early modern Europe. In focusing on the dissemination of the discourse beyond the areas previously discussed in the scholarly literature, I have, furthermore, tried to include both canonical and non-canonical authors, widely read writers and largely obscure ones. They all displayed awareness of the problem of dis/simulation, although often from very different vantage-points. Finally, it will be obvious that, rather than adopting the quantitative approach of social history, I explore this material from the qualitative perspective of cultural and intellectual history.

The dissertation is divided into six chapters, each of which focuses on a particular genre. The arrangement of my investigation is, therefore, thematic and not chronological. I wanted to cover particularly rich literary genres and to analyse social

\textsuperscript{28} It is worth noting that texts classified as popular literature were also consumed by members of the upper social classes; for a discussion of the intersections between popular culture (or ‘little tradition’) and high culture (‘great tradition’), see Peter Burke, \textit{Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe}, 3rd ed., Aldershot, 2009, pp. 49–101.

\textsuperscript{29} I have no intention of getting involved in theoretical debates about the concept of discourse, which I understand as the totality of contemporary opinions, commentaries on and perceptions and discussions of a particular subject.
and semantic contexts which had remained largely unnoticed in connection with the subject and which I felt deserved further study. The six chapters will, I hope, offer new insights into the early modern discourse on dis/simulation. I have also identified several themes which reappear throughout the dissertation, in an attempt to demonstrate that interest in dis/simulation transcended literary genres, intellectual contexts and language borders. The large corpus of sources which I have assembled, when analysed from a comparative perspective and examined from different angles, shows that the discourse on this notion was far more multi-dimensional and complex than has previously been suggested.

I shall now provide a short summary of each chapter. In the first chapter, I analyse emblem books – a rich corpus of texts which has not been studied in connection with the subject of dis/simulation. Widely read and highly popular throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, this genre gives us a good idea of the general consensus on the elusive and knotty problem of feigning and disguise in the early modern period. It also illustrates how the subject was disseminated to a broad and diffuse readership. As we shall see, emblem books touched on a variety of relevant issues and questions, including the simulation of poverty, human passions and love.

One of my main arguments is that feigning and disguise were not only deployed by and relevant to the upper echelons of society, that is, the world of court culture and politics, but that other social strata were equally – if not more – associated with these strategies. This premise underlies Chapters 2, 3 and the first half of Chapter 4. Chapter 2 deals with the nexus between illicit dis/simulation and marginalised social groups, concentrating on the debates about poor relief in the Iberian Peninsula, which serve as a good example of the broader European discussions of this subject. For early modern authorities and, more generally, for upper social groups, beggary and vagrancy posed

30 I have included only printed material in my investigation, for two main reasons. Firstly, printed books usually reached a wider readership than manuscripts and, consequently, give us a better idea about the dissemination of the debates on, and general perception of, this subject. Secondly, the amount of printed material turned out to be so huge that I had neither the time nor the space to explore manuscripts.

severe threats to society. Although one of the earliest concerns connected to poor relief was the need to distinguish between the deserving (that is, genuinely poor) and undeserving (that is, simulating and idle) paupers, it was not before the fifteenth century, with a few exceptions, that false begging was generally regarded as a significant social and moral problem. Feigning and dissembling, as I argue, were a crucial part of the debates and reform plans to deal with mass poverty and, as such, became a matter of state concern. I also try to show that dis/simulation fostered a crisis in charity, challenging the centuries-old Christian doctrine of indiscriminate alms-giving.

As anxieties regarding disguise and pretence at the fringes of society increased, the sixteenth century witnessed the emergence and dissemination of taxonomies of false beggars, rogue pamphlets and picaresque novels, which I discuss in Chapter 3. Following and, at the same time, reinforcing prevailing literary fashions and satisfying the tastes and interests of a broad middle-class urban readership, the authors of these texts placed the alleged use of dis/simulations among lowly and criminal individuals at the very heart of their narratives. The early modern urban space (but also the countryside) was believed to be infiltrated by numerous agents of pretence and disguise such as beggars, rogues, conny-catchers, charlatans, jugglers and their likes. These texts – whether theoretical and scholarly treatises or entertaining and (semi-)fictional – give us a view from outside of the social groups in question, while the voices of marginalised and stigmatised individuals remain largely silent. My aim, however, is not to establish the extent to which early modern beggars and other lowly types actually resorted to dis/simulation but rather to describe and analyse how this problem was discussed in contemporary literature.

Chapter 4 expands on the previous two chapters and argues that early modern perceptions of dis/simulation at the fringes of society also betray a pervasive gender dimension. The first part of this chapter shows that strategies of feigning and pretending were not only commonly linked to male rogues and impostors but also to female cunning. The courtesan’s art was, in fact, considered to be superior to male deceptions because it was based on erotic charms which ensnared men of all types and captivated their passions. I maintain, however, that early modern society distinguished between the pretences of the plain meretrix and those of the sophisticated cortegiana. The second part of the chapter shows that dis/simulation was also discussed and – what is more – legitimised in the context of the early modern household and ordinary marriage life. Early modern authors by no means condemned it across the board; instead, they
discussed it as a licit means which could be employed in honourable private relationships. In the last section of this chapter, I return to the nexus between dis/simulation and love, in particular, to early modern discussions on how far amorous feelings could impede and challenge human strategies of feigning and concealment.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rich medical and medico-legal debates of the early modern period. I demonstrate that, towards the end of the sixteenth century, dis/simulation developed into a major point of discussion for physicians which was perceived and evaluated in very different terms depending on the context. First of all, orthodox practitioners justified their own use of feigning and lying in the interest of curing patients. The new ideal of the physician of the early modern era was the medicus prudens who knew how to deceive patients ingeniously if he regarded it as necessary. While establishing and vigilantly guarding their monopoly over benevolent deceptions and useful lies, licensed physicians attacked and ridiculed any similar strategies among their unlicensed and itinerant counterparts, whom they stigmatised as charlatans, that is, impostors and pretenders to medical skill. Furthermore, early modern physicians became increasingly concerned with disguises and pretences associated with particular diseases and physiological conditions. As I demonstrate, this problem was not limited to specific groups such as beggars, prisoners and soldiers, but became a universal phenomenon which could pertain to patients of any age, gender or social standing. These concerns triggered intense and unprecedented discussions on the limits of physiological inference and the natural limitations of human disguises and pretences.

Chapter 6 shows that dis/simulation not only developed into a significant technical problem for early modern medicine but also – and, it is worth stressing, roughly at the same time – for physiognomy. Calling into question the fundamental premises of this discipline, that is, the hermeneutic potential of corporal signifiers and the assumption that facial expressions refer directly and unambiguously to a corresponding mental condition, the phenomenon of simulation and dissimulation gave rise to long-lasting discussions among physiognomists all over Europe. Some authors, and most famously Lavater in the late eighteenth century, evaded this problem by resorting to reductive and simplifying explanations and by limiting their physiognomical inference to fixed bodily and facial features. Others, in search of clues for identifying dis/simulation, embraced this challenge and delved into the core questions of semiotics and hermeneutics, incorporating pathognomical observation – together with a prudent consideration of various external factors such as apparel and the social and
communicative context – into their ‘art of knowing men’. These debates had wider philosophical implications and fostered a new type of socio-anthropological knowledge which went beyond the discipline of physiognomy.

The epilogue looks at late seventeenth-century academic dissertations – a genre in which considerable attention was devoted to the problem of dis/simulation. Despite restricting my analysis to a few examples from this almost completely unstudied corpus of texts, I try to offer a new explanation as to why the widespread interest in and pervasive concern with this subject faded away towards the end of the early modern period. While these dissertations do not fully account for this development, they nevertheless offer a new perspective on the decline of the discourse on dis/simulation at the end of the seventeenth century.

Dis/simulation is a potentially ubiquitous subject and a classical problem which transcends and, at the same time, links epochs, cultures and languages. Why, one might therefore ask, is it particularly important in connection with the early modern era? Despite its universal relevance, dis/simulation apparently had never been more worrying and troubling, on the one hand, and intriguing and appealing, on the other, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Countless contemporary authors deplored the plethora of pretenders and dissemblers and attested to the epidemic spread of simulation in all walks of life and all social strata. Moreover, the semantically charged and controversial notion of dis/simulation often served as a powerful accusation; and, as an effective way of denouncing others, it was at the heart of the endless polemics and invectives incessantly hurled by various groups and individuals against each other – a point which has not yet been studied in detail in recent scholarship on early modern Streitkultur. Whether genuinely omnipresent or merely a collective projection of anxieties and stereotypes, the incessant discussion of and reference to dis/simulation, in both the written and spoken word, was ubiquitous in the minds of early modern society.


33 In a society in which power relations were intrinsically connected to the ideal of honour, these attacks followed a specific social logic in targeting the honour and trustworthiness of a person, which was particularly endangered by accusations of deception and dis/simulation. Lower social groups, however, which were generally considered to lack honour, were also commonly linked to dis/simulation, as I show in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this context, dis/simulation was not a question of honour but was understood to be an illicit and threatening agent of social destabilisation and moral disorder.
Appendix

A subject such as dis/simulation, which appeared in an almost limitless variety of contexts, cannot, of course, be discussed exhaustively in the restricted scope of a dissertation. I therefore had to exclude a number of questions and texts which might have been interesting and germane. In this appendix, I would like to present three bodies of literature which, while not substantial enough to merit an entire chapter, nonetheless seemed to me worth at least a brief mention.

Contemporary collections of proverbs, adages and aphorisms enjoyed continuous popularity in the early modern era and were closely linked to the genre of emblem books, which I discuss in Chapter 1. Rather than providing a comprehensive list of relevant early modern proverbs, I simply want to point out that these texts addressed the theme of dis/simulation and circulated it to a broad pan-European learned readership. The Lutheran theologian Georg Major (1502–1574) included numerous maxims on the subject, including one on the problem of love as a natural limitation to strategies of disguise,\(^\text{34}\) which, as we shall see, was a central topos in emblem books on love and in texts such as Giuseppe Betussi’s dialogue on love.\(^\text{35}\) In his popular and often reprinted Sprichwortsammlung, the theologian, Reformer and versatile author Sebastian Franck (1499–1543) commented on a number of proverbs and adages which referred to feigning, disguise and prudence, including the famous dictum: ‘A person who does not know how to dissimulate does not know how to rule.’\(^\text{36}\) We also find references to dis/simulation in the immensely popular and widely disseminated collections of adages by Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1466–1536) and Conrad Lycothenes (1518–1561).\(^\text{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) See Chapter 4 below, section 4.6.

\(^{36}\) Sebastian Franck, Erste namenlose Sprichwortsammlung vom Jahre 1532 mit Erläuterungen und cultur- und literaturgeschichtlichen Beilagen, ed. by Friedrich Latendorf, Hildesheim, 1970, p. 93, gave a slightly modified version of this maxim and attributed it to Emperor Friedrich: ‘Keyser Fridrich, Maximiliani vatter hat ein sprichwort gehabt, Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit imperare.’

\(^{37}\) See, e.g., Desiderius Erasmus, Adagiorum epitome, Lyon, 1544, p. 482: ‘Diu dissimulatum aperientis’, and Conrad Lycothenes’s list of proverbs in his Apophthegmatum sive responsorum memorabilium, ex probatissimis quibusque tam graecis quam latinis auctoribus priscis parter atque recentioribus,
Many contemporary dictionaries and encyclopedias, too, featured entries on the subject. Again, I limit myself to a few examples from a vast corpus of similar texts. Johann Micraelius (1597–1658), a German humanist and poet, gave a very short but interesting definition of the notions of simulation and dissimulation in his Latin philosophical dictionary. The appendix to the main entry on lying (*mendacium*) postulated that both ‘to dissimulate and to simulate is sometimes licit and does not pertain to lying but to prudence’.

Jan Gruter (1560–1627), a prominent humanist from Antwerp who was head of the Bibliotheca Palatina in Heidelberg for twenty years, wrote several monumental scholarly compilations such as the *Florilegii magni, seu Polyantheae* (1624) and the *Florilegium ethico-politicum* (1610–12). In his voluminous gnomonology *Bibliotheca exulum* (1624), Gruterus filled three pages with aphorisms and proverbs on simulation and dissimulation.

The Swiss humanist Theodor Zwinger collected many sentences and aphorisms on simulation and dissimulation in his *Loci communes ad ordinem alphabeticum redacti*, Basel, 1561, pp. 1006–1008: ‘De simulacione et dissimulacione’.

38 Johann Micraelius, *Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum*, Jena, 1661, p. 637: ‘Dissimulare et simulare aliquando licet, sed hoc non est mendacii, sed prudentiae.’ This maxim illustrates the fact that early modern authors did always strictly distinguish between simulation and dissimulation, condemning the former, while generally condoning the latter; see also Micraelius’s entry on simulation in *ibid.*, p. 1005: ‘Simulatio si fit cum dolo, est vitium veracitati oppositum. Si vero sine dolo ob certam et laudabilem causam fit, est species prudentiae.’ Another positive view of the delicate and complex notion of simulation can be found in a voluminous, alphabetically arranged, compendium on prudence and contemporary morals, in which the author, Pio Rossi (1581–1667) legitimised the use of feigning in social interaction with superiors; see Pio Rossi, *Convito morale per gli etici, economici, politici*, Venice, 1657, p. 440: ‘ha bisogno d’una coperta simulazione con superiori’. For a similar endorsement, see Girolamo Cardano’s concise discussion of dis/simulation in his *Proxeneta seu de prudentia civili liber*, Geneva, 1630, pp. 172–178, at p. 172: ‘Necessaria est valde simulatio, praecipue cum potiorioribus, ideo in aula maxime in usu est.’

39 The first page of the entry gives a good idea of the variety of sentences and aphorisms compiled by Jan Gruter in his *Bibliotheca exulum seu enchiridion humanae divinaeque prudentiae*, Frankfurt am Main, 1624, pp. 778–780, at p. 778: ‘Principi oris atque cordis semper est concordia. / Qui simulat rex dissimulatque multa peior est bono. / Quidquid ore promit, istud corde sentiat rex probus. / Regis haud est, imo vix est ingenui simultas. / Rex Leo est, quod fronte magna corda aperta gestitet. / Turpe quid fari regem mente quod sentit minus. / Unicum tiara fronti duplici breve est nimis. / A virili pectore omnis segregata est simulatio. / Absque mente polypi, amicus nemini manes diu. / Ambidexter versipellem se facit quando libet. / Artifex doli profatur unum, sentit alterum. / Aut similare aut dissimulare nescit aetas iunior. / Aut simulet quis dissimuletve, ne pericula incidat. / Ah? homo quantum bilinguis saepe concinnit...
(1533–1588) also devoted considerable attention to dis/simulation in his seminal encyclopedia *Theatrum vitae humanae* of 1565. Despite his extraordinarily detailed treatment of the subject, which featured elaborate synoptic tables, Zwinger focused almost exclusively on the context of political theory and prudent warfare (*prudentia bellica*).\(^{40}\) These and other early modern collections of proverbs, *florilegia* and encyclopedias frequently wrestled with the issue of dis/simulation, which, in this way, became part of the commonly shared and generally known body of knowledge of the epoch.

I next want to consider jurisprudential literature. Although there was no coherent theory of simulation in Roman law,\(^{41}\) feigning and fraud constituted an integral aspect of late medieval and early modern jurisprudence until the second half of the seventeenth century and beyond.\(^{42}\) Among the most important contributions to this subject were Albericus de Rosciate’s *Dictionarium juris* (written after 1338) and Bartholomaeus Caepolla’s works, above all, his influential *De simulatione contractuum* (1481), the *Libellus de contractibus emptionum et locationum cum pacto de retrovendendo simulatis* (written around 1460) and his influential *Tractatus cautelarum, tam in schola quam in foro apprime utilis* (1470).\(^{43}\) These works were widely disseminated and available in many editions throughout the early modern period and even later (the

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\(^{40}\) Theodor Zwinger, *Theatrum vitae humanae*, Basel, 1565, p. 280; and for a discussion of strategic use of dissimulation in warfare, see p. 290: ‘Inopiam suam suorumque dissimulare’.


Tractatus cautelarum, for example, was reprinted up to the eighteenth century).\textsuperscript{44}

Humanist scholars made hardly any significant contributions to earlier jurisprudential literature on simulated transactions and related questions, though the subject continued to be written about throughout the early modern era.\textsuperscript{45} The most impressive example is Prospero Farinacci’s Variarum quaestionum et communium opinionum criminalium liber quintus: De falsitate et simulatione (1621). Farinacci (1544–1618), one of the most important canonists and criminal lawyers of his day, though somewhat neglected by modern scholarship,\textsuperscript{46} devoted more than 270 pages to the subject.

Jurisprudential discussions of dis/simulation dealt, above all, with simulated contracts and questions related to fraudulent mercantile and business activities. Deception and disguise were also a key concern for merchants in the early modern era.\textsuperscript{47} Nonetheless, merchant treatises and manuals are suspiciously silent on this subject. Like physicians, who will be discussed in Chapter 5, merchants were traditionally under suspicion of indulging in fraudulent practices; so, it is perhaps not surprising that they did not want to bring their profession into greater disrepute. In addition, unlike

\begin{itemize}
\item[44] The Dictionarium juris was printed in Lyon in 1539 and in Venice in 1573. Johannes Bertachinus’s Repertorium juris, written between 1471 and 1481, was published several times throughout the sixteenth century, e.g., in Venice 1488 and 1499 and in Basel 1570 and 1573; see also John Nider, Compendiosus tractatus de contractibus mercatorum, Paris, 1505 (reprinted 1599) and Petrus Nicolaus Mozzius, Tractatus de contractibus, Venice, 1584 (reprinted four times by 1614). For references to early modern jurisprudential discussions of simulation by later authors such as Franciscus Duarenus, Hugo Donellus, Hugo Grotius and Johannes Brunnenmann, see Wesener, ‘Das Scheingeschäft’, pp. 340–347.
\item[46] For one of the few studies on Farinacci’s life and work, see Niccolò Del Re’s monograph Prospero Farinacci, giureconsulto romano (1544–1618), Rome, 1999.
\end{itemize}
physicians, they were not able to legitimise their ruses as a necessary and licit part of their professional code and to explain their usefulness. Instead, early modern merchants emphasised the dignity and honourable nature of the *ars mercatoria*, which they tried to clear of any suspicion of illicit dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{48}

Voices from outside the profession told a different story. Diatribes against and complaints about the impostures of merchants were common currency.\textsuperscript{49} The encyclopedist and versatile author Tomaso Garzoni (1549–1589), who will crop up from time to time in this dissertation, included a chapter on merchants in his widely read *La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo* of 1585. After a brief praise of merchants, Garzoni denounced them as deceivers and dissemblers.\textsuperscript{50} The sixteenth-century English rogue pamphleteer Gilbert Walker, to whom I shall return in Chapter 3, posed the rhetorical question: ‘Could merchants, without lies, false making their wares, and selling them by a crooked light, to deceive the chapman in the thread or colour, grow so soon rich …?’\textsuperscript{51}

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\textsuperscript{48} The subtitle of Benedetto Cotrugli’s *Della mercatura e del mercante perfecto*, Brescia, 1602, e.g., reads: ‘Dove si tratta il modo di lecitamente negotiare in qual si voglia honesto contratto, et de tutte le moralita ad un real negotiante spetanti.’ Cotrugli (1416–1469), a merchant, diplomat and humanist, complained that this highly useful and necessary profession (‘questa arte tanta necessaria, di tanto bisogno, si oportuna et utile’) had fallen into the hands of vile and ignorant men who had corrupted it; see ibid., f. 6r.

\textsuperscript{49} Georg Draud’s *Prudentia simplex et innoxie jocosa*, Frankfurt am Main, 1605, pp. 292–293, which he published under the pseudonym Regius Goraddivus, e.g., included a lengthy moralising chapter on lies, deceptions and dis/simulations, including those of merchants (‘De mendacibus, iactoribus, dissimulatoribus, fallacibus… mercatoribus’). See also Francisco Thamara, *Los apotegmas y dichos graciosos y notables*, Antwerp, 1549, sig. K5r: ‘No sabeys vosotros que el buen mercader se dissimula quando alguna cosa quiere comprar.’

\textsuperscript{50} Tomaso Garzoni, *La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo*, ed. by Paolo Cherchi and Beatrice Collina, II, Turin, 1996, pp. 874–886, at p. 878: ‘Rimirando poi piú a dentro e discutendo ben la forza di questa professione, io la veggo tutta stracciosa d’ogni banda e ruinata, conciosia che mille vizi e diffetti si comprendino in lei. Prima, non è mercante che con belle e melliflue paroline non cerchi d’attaccartela, e con mille giuramenti e simulati scongiuri farti credere quel che non è della sua robba e mercanzia.’

In contrast to merchants, the disguises and pretences of secretaries enjoyed widespread acceptance. The sixteenth century has been described as the era of the secretary. A flood of tracts for secretaries was published, many of which were technical manuals on letter-writing and works on rhetoric. Some treatises depicted the secretary as a scrivener and functionary who merely deals with the correspondence of his master (*secretarius domesticus*), while others portrayed him as a counsellor with wider and more important functions (*secretarius intimus*). These texts formulated a range of prescriptive rules involving prudence, secrecy and taciturnity. Reflecting the broader socio-cultural and intellectual tendencies of the time such as Tacitism and the doctrine of the *arcana imperii*, the ideal secretary was envisioned, above all, as a disillusioned

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54 Tobia Zanon, ‘Campi semantici e usi letterari del termine segretario: dalle origini al primo Barocco’, in Rosanna Gorris Camos (ed.), *Il segretario è come un angelo: trattati, raccolte epistolari, vite paradigmatiche, ovvero come essere un buon segretario nel Rinascimento*, Fasano, 2006, pp. 31–44, at p. 44. A good example of an slightly idealised *secretarius intimus* is Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza, *El Secretario del Rey*, Madrid, 1620, which stressed of the ‘Grandeza del officio del Secretario del Rey’; ibid., sig. B1’. Despite the ambiguous role of the secretary, it served many humanists as a ladder to success: e.g., Pietro Bembo, who embodied the secretary-intellectual in service of Leo X and who was immortalised in Castiglione’s treatise.
and prudent keeper of secrets.\textsuperscript{55} The third chapter of Angelo Ingegneri’s \textit{Del buon segretario} of 1594, for instance, deals with the importance of secrecy, on which the secretary’s success depended.\textsuperscript{56} And keeping secrets, as Ingegneri, who was himself an experienced secretary subtly suggested, requires the occasional use of dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{57} Gabriel Perez del Barrio Angulo’s \textit{Dirección de secretarios de señores} of 1613, a popular treatise which went through several reprints, was similar in tone. Having first included a lengthy condemnation of any kind of deceitful feigning, which seems almost to be a mere rhetorical exercise and a repetition of commonplace moral precepts,\textsuperscript{58} Perez del Barrio Angulo, at a later stage and somewhat in passing, advised the use dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{59}

Another contemporary author was much more straightforward and confident in endorsing simulation. Panfilo Persico (first half of the seventeenth century) began by establishing, in his popular \textit{Del segretario} of 1620, that dissimulating one’s knowledge

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\textsuperscript{55} The paramount importance of secrecy for this profession is evident in the etymology of the term secretary: it derives from the Latin \textit{secretum}, which referred to a place for writing and for storing secret things; see Salvatore Nigro, ‘The Secretary’, in \textit{Baroque Personae}, ed. by Rosario Villari, transl. by Lydia G. Cochrane, Chicago, 1995, p. 91. To give one typical example, Andrea Nati stressed, in his \textit{Trattato del segretario}, Florence, 1588, sig. A8r, that the secretary must always be silent and never reveal a thing. Torquato Tasso, in \textit{Il segretario}, Venice, 1588, p. 6, defined the secretary as a ‘fedelissimo guardar de’ secreti’, and the entire profession as ‘a science of the things which should be kept secret’ (l’\textit{arte de la Secretaria non sarà altro, ch’una scienza delle cose, che deono essere tenute secrete}); see also Bermúdez de Pedraza’s chapter on silence in his \textit{El Secretario}, sigs P2v–R2v. Saavedra Fajardo, to whom I shall return in Chapter 1, emphasised the importance of dissembling and hiding secrets for the secretary in his emblem book; see Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, \textit{Empresas políticas}, ed. by Francisco Javier Diez de Revenga, Barcelona, 1988, pp. 381–384.

\textsuperscript{56} Angelo Ingegneri, \textit{Del buon segretario libri tre}, Rome, 1594, pp. 13–15.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 14: ‘non pure à saper tener segretto quello, che conviene, ma à ciò fare in manera, che, mentre, l’huomo niega, ò dissimula la notitia d’una cosa’.

\textsuperscript{58} Gabriel Perez del Barrio Angulo, \textit{Dirección de secretarios}, Madrid, 1613, ff. 16v–20v: ‘Contra la simulacion e hipocresia’.

\textsuperscript{59} Barrio Angulo, \textit{Dirección} f. 48v: ‘Por industria se adquire con la dissimulacion, y fingiendo una cosa por otra, ignorando lo que sabe, dexando de preguntarlo que otro puede saber’. 
is essential for the success of the secretary. Yet, Persico did not stop at this, adding that ‘sometimes it is necessary to diverge partly from virtue, either simulating or adulating’. Rather than treating dis/simulation as a necessary evil, however, he maintained that ‘feigning is not always a vice and can often be used beneficially.’ Not only concealment but also simulation could be virtuous and was, in fact, ‘considered by many to be a virtue’ (‘la simulatione da molti è tenuta virtù’). What is more, Persico went beyond the narrow field of secretarial duties and praised dis/simulation as a habit ‘necessary in civil life’ (‘necessaria alla vita civile’), thus placing this notion in a much wider social context. Disguise and feigning, in all their fleeting and elusive forms and controversial uses, were fully incorporated in the professional ethics of the early modern secretary.


61 Ibid.: ‘Che se alcuna volta è necessario scortarsi in parte dalla virtù ò simulando ò adulando, ò compatendo in altro modo all’altrui imperfettioni, et errori, ciò fà l’huomo virtuoso per esser più utile all’amico, e cavarne frutto di correttione, e di carità.’

62 Ibid.: ‘Concio sia che la simulatione non sia sempre vitio, e si possa molte volte usar fruttuosamente, e si soglia dire, che, chi non sà simular, non sà vivere.’

63 Ibid.: ‘Anzi il poter passar con indifferenza d’animo certe molestie, e difficoltà, in fingersi di non veder, di non udire, dissimulare le passioni, i disgusti, che si ricevono nelle corti tutto dì, non è piccola parte di virtù. E se l’uso dell’adular è tanto trascorso, che non se ne puo quasi far dimeno, v’è anche modo di farlo gentilmente, e con laude, come si mostra al’essemplio di quei pittori, che havendo a far il retratto d’un Principe, che haveva un’occhio meno, e volendo fuggir amendo di representar quella bruttezza, uno lo dipinge giovane, com’era prima, che perdesse l’occhio, s’altro lo ritrasse in iscurzo in modo, che veniva a coprir quella parte, che fu tenuta gentil adulatione.’ See also p. 294: ‘La simulatione da molti è tenuta virtù poiche aiutando l’huomo a coprir i suoi difetti, e dissimular gli altrui trattiente gli animi in una benevola dispositione.’

64 Ibid.

65 Nigro, The Secretary, p. 97.
Chapter 1

"Est simulare meum – Ie ne le puis celer"

Aspects of Dis/simulation in Early Modern Emblem Books

1.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to offer a contribution to our understanding of the early modern debates on dis/simulation by examining contemporary emblem books – a choice which requires a brief explanation. This peculiar amalgam of word and image was not a minor literary phenomenon.¹ It was a rich repository of information for cultural historians of the early modern era, which has been for the most part neglected in studies on dis/simulation. Snyder did include a few mottoes and images from Saavedra Fajardo’s well-known *Idea de un príncipe perfecto* (1640) and briefly touched on Andrea Alciato’s extensively studied *Liber emblematorum* (firstly published in 1531).² I shall attempt to show, however, that many other emblem books featured a variety of short and scattered,³ but nonetheless interesting and multifaceted, discussions of this subject, which are worthy of scholarly attention.

To the modern, that is, post-Romantic, reader imbued with the ideal of originality, the vast corpus of European emblem books might appear somewhat monotonous and tedious.⁴ The Renaissance ideal of *imitatio* and the habitual practice of reworking, freely copying and plagiarising among authors of emblem books corroborates this impression. Not only the standard tripartite structure of emblems – motto-image-epigram, usually

¹ The bibliography in Mario Praz, *Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery*, 2nd edition, 2 vols, Rome, 1964–74, II, pp. 1–201, contains more than 900 works, and further titles have been added throughout the past decades.


³ I have not found an emblem book wholly devoted to the subject of dis/simulation; however, this was also the case with the great majority of the sources I have examined in the dissertation. Even influential and particularly noteworthy discussions usually formed only one part or section within a larger (con)text; e.g., Francis Bacon’s *Essays*, London, 1625, and Justus Lipius’s *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex*, Leiden, 1589.

⁴ Praz, *Studies*, I, p. 39: ‘The greater part of the history of emblems result in a mere bibliography. Themes and pictures repeat themselves, pleasing the eye, if not the mind.’
referred to as *inscriptio, pictura* and *subscriptions* (which was often followed by a commentary) – but also most of the content remained largely unchanged throughout the early modern period.\(^5\)

Yet what could easily be dismissed as an uninspiring succession of similar or identical images, mottoes and epigrams, in fact, constitutes a valuable corpus of sources for the subject under investigation. The maxims and precepts presented in emblem books appealed to a wide and heterogeneous audience, opening a window – and this is one of the central points of this chapter – onto the contemporary consensus on moral and social issues. Many emblem books were best-sellers with a long publication history. If they had advocated overly polemical and controversial stances and moral views, they would not have enjoyed such wide dissemination and popularity for more than two centuries. Written both in Latin and in vernacular languages (above all, French, German, Spanish, Dutch and Italian, with some featuring a polyglot organisation), emblem books usually aimed at a learned, wide and transnational readership.\(^6\) Inventories of early modern libraries bear witness to their distribution within the entire republic of letters and even beyond. In order to do justice to the pan-European character of this literary genre, I shall not limit my analysis to one particular country but rather sketch a broad picture, including emblem books from various countries.\(^7\)

\(^5\) A crucial change in the layout of emblem books was the introduction of full-page engravings instead of small-scale woodcuts; with regard to content, the most important development was the rise of emblem books which were specialised on one particular topic as opposed to general and miscellaneous collections.


\(^7\) In this context, the paucity of Italian emblem books is worth mentioning. A preliminary explanation might be that Italian authors dealing with emblems were heavily engaged in composing collections of *imprese* and treatises discussing their theory. Compared to the numerous theoretical works written by Italians, they produced few general and miscellaneous collections of emblems, apart from Alciato’s *Emblemata*, Achille Bocchi’s *Symbolicarum quaestionum de universo genere, quas serio ludebat*, Bologna, 1555, and Paolo Maccio’s *Emblemata*, Bologna, 1628. Modern scholarship has not given much attention to this question; see, e.g., Donato Mansueto and Elena Laura Calogero (eds), *The Italian Emblem. A Collection of Essays*, Glasgow, 2007, pp. v–xi.
Emblem books by no means form a uniform or coherent corpus of texts; and some sub-genres did not address the question of dis/simulation at all. Firstly, collections of *imprese* and devices had nothing to say about the subject. Since the purpose of these works was to illustrate the heroic and noble mottoes of illustrious individuals, their authors were not inclined to delve into these figures’ inclinations towards, and skills in, the controversial art of dis/simulation – although, for example, Descartes’s family motto ‘Larvatus prodeo’ was closely linked to this notion. Secondly, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there is no relevant material in collections of *emblemata sacra*. In an era of religious upheaval, Nicodemism was a matter of increasing contention. Various theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, engaged in debates on problems of conformity, clandestine religious practices and concealment of faith. Collections of religious emblems, however, merely repeated rigid injunctions to express one’s faith openly, since their authors were attempting to provide religious instruction facilitating spiritual contemplation and devotional exercises, rather than engaging in theological polemics. Many of the authors of religious emblems were Jesuits who recognised the didactic qualities of this genre. Although very familiar with the idea of dis/simulation and related concepts such as equivocation and mental reservation, Jesuits authors remained silent about these issues in their numerous emblem books. Dissembling and

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8 Alison Saunders, ‘Emblem Books for a Popular Audience? Gilles Corrozet’s *Hecatomgraphie* and *Emblemes*, *Australian Journal of French Studies*, 17, 1980, pp. 5–29, uses the work of Gilles Corrozet to show that emblem books should not always be regarded as a sophisticated humanist genre; some were cheaply produced and aimed at a popular audience rather than an intellectual élite.

9 I refer here above all to the category of *devises héroiques* (e.g., collected in Claude Paradin’s *Symbola heroica*, Antwerp, 1562) and not to *devises morales*, which usually embraced a wider literary and semantic context; see Alison Saunders, *The Seventeenth-Century Emblem: A Study in Diversity*, Geneva, 2000, pp. 21–23.

10 Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. xiii.


feigning were regarded as technical requirements and skills for the specific purposes of Jesuit confessors and missionaries. The enormous emblematic production of the Jesuit Order, however, was aimed at a wide lay readership, in particular, their students. Thus, the agenda of the Jesuit ratio studiorum formed, along with devotional and spiritual exercises, an integral part of the order’s emblematic writing. These examples illustrate that the genre was a crucial factor which determined the thematic disposition and general character of an emblem book. Nevertheless, a number of other emblem books and even, as I shall show, whole sub-genres addressed a wide range of themes linked to the subject of dis/simulation.

1.2. The courtly world and the fringes of society
As I have noted in the ‘Introduction’ to this dissertation, secrecy, dissembling and pretence were among the most vexing topics associated with the political theory of the time. It was considered vital for the worldly ruler to be well versed in the art of skilful dissembling and even deception, a convention trenchantly condensed in the popular proverb: ‘The person who does not know how to dissimulate does not know how to rule.’ Commonly attributed to Louis XI, this proverb circulated throughout the early modern period in different languages and was modified in various forms, most notably acquiring a universal meaning through the substitution of the word vivere for regnare. The term dissimulare was also occasionally interchanged with simulare. For a study of this maxim (which I shall return to in Chapter 5) with regard to the theory of reason of state in early seventeenth-century France, see Adrianna E. Bakos, “Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare”. Louis XI and Raison d’état during the Reign of Louis XIII’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 52, 1991, pp. 399–416. Bakos, however, does not discuss the problem of dis/simulation in depth and seems to be unaware of the wider early modern discourse on this twin notion. See also Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle, Paris, 2002, pp. 116–117.


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15 The production of emblem books was linked in various ways to worldly rulers and courts, as can be seen, e.g., in the numerous dedications to and exaltations of sovereigns. Saunders, The Seventeenth-
politics and what Snyder has called the ‘social technology of secrecy’ linked to the doctrine of the *arcana imperii*. Various emblems postulated that the ministerial responsibilities of the sovereign entitled him to resort to dis/simulation and, at the same time, conveyed a negative image of the court as a locus of adulation, flattery and opportunistic deceit.

Yet emblem books not only echoed conventional associations of court culture with dis/simulation, either in its positive and praiseworthy form (based on the ruler’s prudence) or in connection with questionable forms of false and deceptive self-presentation among courtiers. Feigning and disguise were also relevant in connection with those who were situated at the other end of the social scale and who stood in the sharpest contrast to the lofty spheres of the court: beggars, rogues and vagabonds. Several emblems from a work of the obscure Dutch writer Bernardus Furmerius (1542–1616) addressed this problem. First published in 1575, *De rerum usu et abusu* went

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through a complex publishing history, in the course of which it was translated into Dutch ten years after the first Latin edition. In contrast to earlier sixteenth-century emblem books, which were usually miscellaneous collections covering a variety of subjects, Furmerius’s work focused on a specific topic. It also differed from previous emblem books in its layout: instead of relatively small woodcuts in the tradition of Alciato, *De rerum usu et abusu* featured elaborate and large-scale engravings.

Furmerius’s collection comprised twenty-five images, each with a short motto followed by a biblical quotation, a four-line epigram and a Latin commentary in hexameters. One of the engravings showed a healthy and well-built man; his torn clothing and wicker basket identify him as a mendicant. In contrast to the unfortunate and genuinely destitute *veri pauperes* in the background of the image, he is begging despite his physical well-being. Standing next to an old and gaunt figure which represents the vice of impudence, the greedy impostor epitomises abuse of the alms system. The epigram admonished readers not to support him:

Do not give gifts to the impudent beggars. Give them to the destitute, who are prevented by their modesty from going on the streets. The ambition of powerful people usually satiates the former. The latter, instead, lies on the ground until, in the end, he dies of shame.

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18 On Furmerius’s emblem book and its publishing history, see Helga Puhlmann, *Ethik in Wort und Bild. Dirck Volckertszoon Coonhert und das moralisierende Emblembuch ‘De rerum usu et abusu’*, Munich, 2007. Puhlmann argues that Furmerius was not the original author, but instead Dirck Volckertszoon Coonhert (1522–1590), as the images are much more closely related to Coonhert’s Dutch text (published in 1585) than to Furmerius’s Latin one. The title-page of the vernacular edition has the name Coonhert, a famous writer and engraver of his days and omits Furmerius. Since I discuss the first Latin edition, I shall nonetheless refer to Furmerius as the author.

19 In terms of their size and quality, the only close formal precedent is Benito Arias Montano’s *Humanae vitae monumenta*, Antwerp, 1571, which emerged from Christophe Plantin’s prestigious printing press four years before it issued the first edition of *De rerum usu et abusu*.

20 See Bernardo Furmerius, *De rerum usu et abusu*, Antwerp, 1575, sigs B2v–B3r.

This was explained in the Latin commentary:

The destitute man mostly suffers from the vice of idleness, and he is nourished by the abundant compassion of gullible people. ... He is given more bread than he could ever eat. His attire is profitably covered with rags, so that he is not compelled to take care of his way of life or appearance. In this way, the avaricious mendicant collects great riches.\(^{22}\)

Casting aside social inequalities and the living situation of marginalised social groups, Furmerius moralised against morally corrupt beggars and complained that their deceptions undermined the system of alms-giving. While the truly destitute remained in misery, idle and cunning rogues assembled considerable wealth. Furmerius’s commentary, however, also shows that this injustice was, to some extent, considered to result from the gullibility of alms-givers who were too easily taken in by deceptive appearances.\(^{23}\) I shall return to this point in Chapters 2 and 3.

*De rerum usu et abusu* reflected a concern which gained considerable importance in the early modern era. Mass poverty posed an increasingly serious challenge to the organisation of urban societies of the time. Early modern authorities and moralists felt themselves under siege from mendicants and vagrants, many of whom were believed to be cunning simulators. As I shall argue in Chapter 2, an integral part of contemporary reform plans and attempts to tackle the problem of mass impoverishment was to separate the truly needy from their alleged impostors. Fumerius, a well-educated scholar, is likely to have been familiar with the ongoing debates on beggarly impostures. His work shows that discussions of the problem of feigned poverty were not limited to

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22 Ibid., sig. B3\(^{v}\): ‘Pigritiae vitio plerumque laborat egenus / Quem praelarga fovet stolidi miseratio vulgi. / Hinc piger aut spernit verecundae frontis honorem, / Aut animo elato scelera et malefacta frequentat… nam populus largitur plura petenti / Quam possit rapido quisquam consumere ventre… plus donatur ei panis quam devorat unquam. Lucrosa illius pannis est obsita vestis, ut non cogatur victum cultumque parare… Sic magnas corradit opes mendicus avarus.’

23 Furmerius’s text also depicted another simulating beggar who exploited the compassionate willingness of his fellowmen to help the less fortunate. Again, abuse of the system is rooted in a profligate lifestyle, which the beggar supports by practising deception; see ibid., sig. D1\(^{v}\): ‘Qui supra citrave modum convivia tractant, / Vel temere arripiant omnia, egere solent. / Prodigus et stulte temerarius omnia perdunt: / Sponte sua, condens plurima, avarus eget.’
treatises which attracted the attention of only a small and specialised readership but also appeared in the popular and widely disseminated genre of the emblem book. While the vernacular version of the De rerum usu et abusu aimed at a wider Dutch audience, the Latin text targeted an educated pan-European readership. As we shall see in Chapter 3, a number of other early modern texts with broad appeal treated the problem of dis/simulation at the fringes of society.

1.3. Disciplining the tongue
Innumerable emblems dealt with what we might call ‘disciplining the tongue’. Even works which in other respects had very little to say about dis/simulation did not miss the opportunity to include moral lessons on the virtue of silence and prudent concealment. This was, of course, a classical topos of European literature permeating other contemporary literary genres. Alciato, the pater et princeps of the emblem book, highlighted the virtue and usefulness of silence; and a bi-lingual German-Latin edition of Alciato’s emblem book published in 1562 stated that:

A fool who keeps silent is considered witty, and he reveals himself as soon as he chatters with a wise man … . Therefore, keep your mouth closed with your finger and do not speak very much, as the god Harpocrates, who wants to teach you virtues, was depicted.

24 See, e.g., Joannes Fungerus’s emblem ‘Vacat periculo silentii decus’, in his Symbolorum variorum liber unus, Franeker, 1598, sig. G5v, which depicts garrulity as an epidemic disease; see also Justus Reifenberg, Emblemata politica, Amsterdam, 1632, sig. D2v.


26 Alciato, Emblemata, p. 17: ‘In Silentium’.

27 Andrea Alciato, Emblematum libellus, Darmstadt, 1967, sigs B3r–B4v: ‘In silentium. Fur witzig einen narn man schetzt / Der schweygt, und er verredt sich bald / So er bey einem weysen schwetzet, / Gleich als ein haff der ubel hald: / Darumb deinn mund beschlossen halt / Mit dem finger, und red nit vil, / Wie der
Keeping silent therefore levelled and blurred the distinction between the wise and the fool: by preserving silence, even the fool can appear wise. Once more, feigning and dissembling are closely intertwined, with dissimulation functioning as a tool for simulation.\textsuperscript{28}

Various emblem books increased readers’ awareness of the power and the vices of the tongue.\textsuperscript{29} Together with the omnipresent pleas for self-control and self-restraint,

\begin{quotation}
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got Harpocras gemalt, / Der dich solch tugent leren wil.’ Another contemporary German translation, published by Sigmund Feyerabend in 1566, praised silence even more expansively; see Andrea Alciato, \textit{Liber emblematum, Frankfurt-am-Main 1556}, ed. by Peter M. Daly, London, 2007, sig. E2\textsuperscript{v}: ‘Lob des Schweigens’. The epigram reads: ‘So zu gleich schweigt der Weiss und Thor / Kein underschied man hat bevor / Wann sie reden aber all beid / So macht die red ein underscheid / Darumb ein jeder kluger Mann / Sein lefftzen halten thue im zaum / Und leg den finger auff den Mund / Werd gleich Harpocrati zu stund.’

The seventeenth-century German scholar Aegidius Albertinus (1560–1620) opened his collection of emblems with a passionate eulogy of virtuous and prudent silence entitled ‘In laudem silentii’; Aegidius Albertinus, \textit{Emblematata hieropolitica}, Munich, 1647, sigs A3\textsuperscript{v}–A4\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{28} Precisely on account of his inability to act wisely, however, the fool is unlikely to obey prudence and withdraw into silence; see the motto in Johannes Sambucus, \textit{Emblemata}, Hildesheim, 2002, sig. P1\textsuperscript{v}: ‘Stultitiam celare difficile’, followed by the explanation: ‘Quod fors an inveni si non mens tota rediret, Saltem cum vellet dissimulare quaeat. Difficile est stulto semper celare furorem, Nullus at omnino qui resipiscat erit.’ Interestingly, the prudence of fools runs counter to the general consensus on the virtue of silence; Gerta Callmann noted in her article ‘The Picture of Nobody. An iconographical Study’, \textit{Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes}, 23, 1960, pp. 60–104, at p. 65, that, in popular culture the person who could not speak was a fool.


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the notion of ‘disciplining the tongue’ was an essential prerequisite of worldly wise behaviour. In his emblem book published by Christophe Plantin in 1565, the prolific author Hadrianus Junius (1511–1575) included the maxim: ‘Listen to many things, don’t say too much.’ In light of the pitfalls of verbal communication, the most secure harbour was considered to be prudent silence, or, to use a motto from Otto Vaenius’s (1556–1629) Emblemata Horatiana of 1607: ‘Nothing is more useful than silence.’

in his Emblemata politica et Orationes, Amsterdam, 1635, pp. 49–71.


32 See also Guillaume de la Perrière, The Theater of Fine Devices, ed. by Mary V. Silcox, Aldershott, 1990, sig. G3v: ‘A worde once spoken though in vaine, / It cannot be recalld againe.’ Some emblem books, however, challenged the concept of silence as an impenetrable refugium of one’s inner thoughts; see, e.g., Johann Kreiing’s emblem ‘Vultus animi in dex’, which I shall discuss in section 1.7 below.

The Spanish scholar Juan de Horozco y Covarrubias (1550–c.1608) suggested that by withdrawing into silence one could maintain an aura of wisdom:

Those who are wise keep silent … sometimes one says nothing because one knows little – and that is not the worst thing to do, since one who does not know dissimulates by keeping silent; to speak instead without knowing what one is saying will be discovered after a while, because one cannot deceive people.34

In this context silence was more than an individual refuge and a guardian of one’s inner secrets and thoughts; it could also function as a tool which created an impression of intellectual superiority and which therefore, to some degree, served as an instrument of simulation. The use of taciturnity to obfuscate, in part, the boundaries between the wise and the ignorant was not, however, perceived as feigning.

1.4. Entangled in Cupid’s trap
Drawing heavily on Ovidian and Petrarchan topoi,35 collections of love emblems were exclusively devoted to Cupid’s realm. With their characteristic blend of delicate urbanity and light-heartedness, collections of love emblems quickly became very popular at the beginning of the seventeenth century.36 Although one might not expect discussions of the ability to keep silent with worldly wisdom; see, e.g., de Borja, Empresas, pp. 210–211: ‘Res est magna tacere’; see also de Borja’s comment on the emblem ‘Cor fatu’: ‘En lo mas se hecha de ver la discrecion del prudente, es, en saber, guardar su secreto, sin publicar lo que tiene en su coraçon’: I was unable to find these emblems in Mahiques’s modern edition of de Borja’s emblem book and therefore refer instead to Vistarini, Enciclopedia, p. 800. For an emphatic remark on the power of the tongue, see Antonius a Burgundia’s emblem: ‘In manu eius vita, et mors’, in his Linguae vitia, p. 148.

34 Vistarini, Enciclopedia, p. 696: ‘los que son sabios son callados… algunas vezes se calla de saber poco, y no es lo peor, pues antes el que no sabe se dissimula callando, mas el hablar alguno sin saber lo que se dize, es descubrirse con tiempo por tiempo porque no se engañen con el’.

35 Petrarch, e.g., opened one of his poems with the words ‘Tacer non posso’, recalling the lover’s inability to restrain his or her words: Petrarch, Canzoniere, ed. by Marco Santagata, Milan, 1996, p. 12–47, at p. 12. For a case study on the links between Dutch love emblem books and European poetical traditions, see Marcin Pollowski, Images for a Lover’s Eye: Sonnets from Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft’s Emblemata amatoria and their European Poetic Lineage, Lublin, 2009.

36 For an overview of Dutch erotic emblem books, see the first part of Els Stronks and Peter Boot (eds),
dis/simulation in this sub-genre of emblem books, we, in fact, find several intriguing treatments of the subject. My analysis will focus on three examples from the dominant Dutch tradition of this sub-genre.

With no indication of the author’s name and no imprint, the Emblemata amatoria (1608) appeared as a revision of an earlier, also anonymous, emblem book entitled Quaeris quid sit amor, quid amare, cupidinis et quid Castra sequi? (1601), which is usually ascribed to the renowned Dutch scholar Daniel Heinsius (1580–1655). In this the first emblem book entirely devoted to the subject of love, readers were reminded that human nature revealed itself in amorous matters. The French motto: ‘I cannot conceal it’, introduced the epigrammatic sentence: ‘You dissimulate in vain. Who could hide a fire? Light is constantly revealed by its signs.’ Heinsius was neither the first nor the last author of emblem books to include this maxim in his collection: some fifty years earlier, Gilles Corrozet (1510–1568) reminded the readers of his didactic emblem book Hecatongraphie of 1540 that ‘Love cannot be concealed’; and, as we shall see, later authors borrowed and – one might say plagiarised – this maxim from Heinsius.

Otto van Veen, or Vaenius (1556–1629), was a learned artist, the teacher of Peter Paul Rubens and a friend of Justus Lipsius. His polyglot collection of love emblems incorporated several discussions of simulation and dissimulation in connection with love. In fact, his Amorum emblemata of 1608 had more to say about the topic than his seemingly more relevant Emblemata Horatiana, which was published a year earlier.
The emblem ‘With unshaken trust’ opens with a commonplace notion. It depicts Cupid triumphantly stepping on a mask with his foot and holding a ring in one hand. Vaenius quoted Cicero’s dictum ‘In love nothing is feigned, nothing simulated, and all that is in it is true and voluntary’ and, thus, portrayed love as a simulation-free zone. A few years later, the German poet and humanist Gabriel Rollenhagen (1583–1619) echoed this moral imperative in his popular collection of emblems entitled Nucleus emblematum of 1611. The emblem ‘Both of them are inflamed’ recalled the close connection between love and feigning, explaining that ‘when both are burning with true passion, with an equal flame, this deserved to be called a love which is not simulated’.

Vaenius’s book, however, also featured another, less straightforward, emblem with the motto ‘To simulate is what I do’. The image shows Cupid taking off a mask. Yet the emblem remains ambiguous, since Cupid smiles somewhat slyly at the spectator, which seems to suggest pretence or ironic distance.


Ibid.: ‘In Amore nihil fictum, nihil simulatum, et quidquid in eo est, idem verum et voluntarium est.’ It is followed by the Italian epigram ‘Sincero: Non si maschera Amor, ne in fatti, ò in detti, / Non va invisibil come Gygi fea, / In virtù d’un’ anel, che quelli havea, / Non finge, et è nel cor qual nei concetti.’ The quotation from Cicero comes from De amicitia (VII.24–25) and refers to friendship, not love. Vaenius’s plea for complete transparency and honesty in amorous matters was, of course, not entirely new. We find, e.g., a rigorous condemnation of simulation in connection with love in Stefano Guazzo’s La civil conversazione of 1574, which also justified the use of dis/simulation in other contexts; see Stefano Guazzo, La civil conversazione, ed. by Amedeo Quondam, I, Modena, 1993, p. 60, where Annibale Magnocavalli, one of the interlocutors in the dialogue, states unequivocally: ‘Confesso bene che colui che finge d’amare alcuno con intenzione d’ingannarlo o fargli danno è oltremodo vizioso, e che ’l filosofo lo chiama peggiore di quello che fabrica false monete, a tale che non può esser amicizia dove è simulazione.’

Gabriel Rollenhagen, Sinn-Bilder. Ein Tugendspiegel, Paris, 1989, p. 34: ‘Flammescit uterque Vero ardore pari facie cum flammescit uterque / Is dici meruit non simulatus Amor.’ The motto of this emblem is also included in Vaenius, Amorum emblemata, p. 134. For another emblem which conveyed the image of inner flame, see Rollenhagen, Sinn-Bilder, p. 15: ‘Consumor miserum, flammas dum nutrio, lignum, officium damno est nil bene facta juvant.’

Vaenius, Amorum emblemata, p. 220: ‘Est simulare meum.’ This motto can still be found in the late
seem to be deliberately cryptic. The epigram, however, supplies an explanation: ‘Although I appear masked, covered … deceit is not what you should be frightened of, my dear girl. I am sincere with you, deceptive with the multitude. Let not garrulous tongues reveal our love.’ The commentary in Italian adds: ‘Simulated and concealed. The lover should hide the fire of his jealousy. He should only reveal to his beloved a discreet heart; the love which is concealed is safer, since it does not give occasion for blame and jealousy.’ Here, prudent concealment is contrasted and juxtaposed with feigning and deception. In the Italian commentary, however, Vaenius apparently mistakes simulation for dissimulation – the confusion between the two notions was a recurring phenomenon in early modern literature, as I have indicated. Nevertheless, it is rather puzzling that Vaenius failed to appreciate the difference between two well-known concepts to which he gave considerable importance. Given that he was well versed in literature and familiar with contemporary debates, it is doubtful whether his use of the term simulation instead of dissimulation was accidental.

In isolation from the epigram, the image and motto could, in fact, subtly refer to simulation. Is Cupid merely pretending to take off his mask, or is he in the midst of putting it on, masking rather than unmasking himself? The image of Cupid standing on a mask was not Vaenius’s invention: it was the most common iconography for a refusal to feign and deceive. Was it Vaenius’s intention to convey a somewhat evasive

45 Emblem books were supposed to trigger an interpretative process and encourage readers to infer their meaning from the interplay of the three interacting components of the emblem; while the image was often deliberately cryptic and eluded a definitive interpretation, the epigram and the commentary usually provided further explanation.

46 Vaenius, Amorum emblemata, p. 220: ‘Larvatus licet incedo, copertus… / Non est quod metuas, cara puella, dolos. / Sum tibi sincerus, populo fucatus; Amoris / Garrula ne nostrum lingua revelet opus.’


48 See, e.g., the description of ‘contrizione’ in Cesare Ripa, Iconologia, II, Perugia, 1767, p. 59: ‘Donna
message in the image and the motto of the emblem? In its tripartite structure, however, the main moral lesson of the emblem seems to be rather conventional, as it condemns cunning and feigning in love and extols prudent concealment. The lover wears a mask, which may or may not display a false face, but which, at the same time, serves as a means of disguise. Thus, the semantic flexibility and interpretative openness of the mask, which alternated and oscillated between the notions of simulation and dissimulation, is encapsulated and fully expressed in this image. As he smiles at the reader, Cupid encourages us to see through the act of taking off his mask, which seems to maintain an impenetrable countenance disconnected from any inner life.

The *Amorum emblemata* featured two other interesting emblems which addressed an issue rarely discussed in contemporary treatises on prudence or dis/simulation – the natural limits of human dissembling, in this case, one’s amorous feelings and emotions. This was, as we shall see, a central theme of the early modern discourse on feigning and disguise, to which I shall return later on in the dissertation. The self-explanatory motto of the first emblem was: ‘The face reveals secrets of the heart’, to which the Italian and French commentaries added: ‘the mouth may reveal the secrets of the heart’; so that, driven by ardent desires, the emblem unequivocally

49 The same image of Cupid holding a mask was also used some years later in a German collection of emblems with a different motto: ‘Seu Dea, seu Deus est, est mihi ficta Venus’. The epigram, too, differed from the one in Vaenius’s emblem book. See Georg Camerarius, *Emblemata amatoria*, Venice, 1627, p. 82: ‘Deme puer faciem facie, vel deme pharetram. / Nam produnt vultum posteriora tuum: / Haec est illa rudes facies quae ludit amantes: / Dira Venus, formae forma nefanda tuae. / Pictus Amor pictum mihi sic depingit Amorem, / Ut dubitem verum ubicui vivat Amor. / Anterioria cups? mendacem amplectere vultum. / Posterioria? vetant tela tremenda Dei. / Terga ferunt pharetram, facies fert improba larvam. / Pone, negat prolem, deficit anteia fides.’

50 Vaenius, *Amorum emblemata*, p. 68.

51 Ibid.: ‘La lingua corre dove il dente duole: Ponsi la man là dove duole, ò cuoce, / Di quel che s’ama si ragiona ogn’hora; / Parlando assai scuopresi Amor anchora. / Alleggia il cor quel ch’à l’amante noce… / Don’t le coeur est plein, la bouche parle… Le parler assi du decouvre les amours. / Et souvent tout
proclaimed, we are unable to govern our tongue and persistently turn to the object of our amorous yearnings. Entangled in Cupid’s trap, we dis/simulate in vain.

The motto of the second emblem had previously appeared in Heinsius’s book: ‘Dissembled love reveals itself. You dissimulate in vain. Who could hide a fire? Light is constantly revealed by its signs.’\textsuperscript{52} The Italian epigram corroborated this lesson:

One hides oneself to no avail. Ardent love cannot be hidden and always shows itself openly in one part or another. It is very difficult for the lover to keep the passion of his miserable heart secret.\textsuperscript{53}

In the image, one Cupid lifts up an empty barrel, while another holds a burning torch underneath, so that the light of the fire reveals itself through a hole in the barrel. The tone of these emblems was not, however, moralising. Heinsius motto ‘Ie ne puis celer’ and Vaenius’s ‘Dissimulas frustra’ did not, in fact, endorse the moral imperative that lovers should never dissimulate; rather than decrying the misuse of dis/simulation, they referred to the natural limitations and the intricate subtleties of this art in amorous matters. In doing so, they ultimately contributed to the reader’s disillusioned self-knowledge with regard to his or her strategies of feigning and disguise – a self-knowledge which was generally considered to be an essential prerequisite for prudential comportment.

As we have seen, Vaenius exhorted readers not to reveal their love, since opening one’s heart was often not only delicate but also risky. Dissimulation was supposed to be applied outside the inner core of the lovers’ bond in order to protect oneself as well as one’s partner. Recalling the vital importance of prudent reservation, Vaenius closed the

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., pp. 144–145: ‘Dissimulas frustra: quis enim celaverit ignem? Lumen ab indicio proditur usque suo.’ The same words can also be found in a popular late seventeenth-century English emblem book introduced by the lemma ‘Apparet dissimulatus amor’: Philip Ayres, \textit{Emblemata amatoria}, London, 1683, sigs C3’–C4’. For Heinsius’s emblem, see n. 38 above.

discussion with the commonplace precept: ‘It is harmful to be loquacious.’ The image depicted Cupid showing the *signum harpocraticum* and, in the background, a goose with a pebble in its beak; and it was accompanied by an apology for silence: ‘Loyal and discreet. This is the image of love’s silence. Silence is sweet, while the sonorous voice generates bitter envy, which is harmful to us …’ Vaenius, however – and this is an important point – not only advised readers to make use of an elaborate veil of secrecy to conceal their feelings but also reminded them that this was a difficult, if not impossible, task for lovers due to their lack of self-control and composure.

Other authors of emblem books also confronted this issue. Three years later Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft (1581–1647), a well-known Dutch poet, playwright and historian, adopted the tone established by his predecessors. In his *Emblemata amatoria* (1611), Hooft included an emblem with the motto: ‘Love does not conceal itself.’ The image depicted the goddess Minerva hiding herself from Cupid and using a large mask as a shield, while the epigrammatic commentary recalled Vaenius’s precepts: ‘In vain Minerva covers with a disdainful face the fires which the little archer discerns through her eyes.’

1.5. Dissimulating in vain

The ineradicable qualities of human nature which condition and limit individual strategies of dis/simulation were not only discussed in the sub-genre of love emblem

54 Ibid., p. 70: ‘Nocet esse locutum.’

55 I shall return to the meaning of this emblematic image in n. 76 below.


57 For a study of the literary context of Hooft’s emblem book, see Pollowski, *Images for a Lover’s Eye*.


59 Ibid. p. 80: ‘Minerve couvre en vain d’une dispette face, / Les feux que l’Archerot void au travers sa glace.’

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books. Emblem LIII in Guillaume de la Perrière’s *Le Theatre des bons engins* of 1533, the first French emblem book, reminded readers that the human face reveals our true nature; and a contemporary English translation of this emblem from 1593 warned: ‘Each little spot appears more in the face, / Than any blemish in the corps beside: The face is plainly seen in every place, / When clothes the carkasse secretly do hide.’ De la Perrière (1499–1565), who also wrote several other emblem books, referred this maxim specifically to a prince, though it could have been universally applicable and relevant to members of all social strata. The German Jesuit and versatile author Johann Kreihing (1595–1670) remarked in his *Emblemata ethico-politica* of 1661 on a similar point:

The face is an indicator of the mind. Hearts are revealed by the face. No one should think that thoughts which are kept silent in the mind remain hidden. There are those who express these secrets with unequivocal signs. While their tongues remain silent, their faces and countenances speak. The eyes will make known the secrets of the heart.

Kreihing’s emblem touched on fundamental questions such as the legibility and the semiotics of the human countenance and of facial expressions. I shall discuss this in

60 Guillaume de la Perrière, *Le Theatre des bons engins*, ed. by Greta Dexter, Gainsville, 1964, p. 117: ‘Petite tache, ou macule en la face, / On vois plus tost, que grande sur le corps: / Le visage est ouvert en toute place. / le corps caché n’est veu que par dehors.’


62 He also wrote *Cent considerations d’Amour* (1543) and *Les considerations des quatre mondes* (1552), both published in Lyon.

more detail in Chapter 6 below; but at this point it is worth noting that while early modern political theory and precepts on courtly comportment, for example, frequently advised and endorsed the prudent use of dis/simulation, they rarely explored the human limits of these strategies. It was therefore authors of emblem books such as Kreihing who increased awareness of the revealing nature of the human face and the eyes – a matter of great importance to anyone resorting to feigning and concealment.

Eleven years earlier, Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648), an experienced diplomat and man of letters, had published his *Idea de un príncipe cristiano* (1640), in which he gave advice to the virtuous Christian prince. Discussing the best ways of concealing one’s intentions and plans, he warned readers of ‘the danger of dissimulation which is easily discovered’.  

Juan de Borja (1533–1606), another important figure on the Spanish political stage (he was an ambassador for Philip II and member of the Councils of State and War under Philip III), also paid attention to this problem in his *Empresas morales* of 1581. Having established the importance of the art of dissembling, he noted in his commentary on the emblem ‘I am being burned without a flame’: ‘To be able to conceal and dissimulate what they do and feel is a sign of prudent and honourable men.’ De Borja continued by comparing the branch of the ebony, which was depicted in the emblematic image, with the self-control and dis/simulative skills of a worldly wise man. The branch, when thrown into a fire, burns without becoming inflamed or producing smoke, just as the prudent man should be able to endure his inner fire without revealing his suffering. Yet de Borja also displayed his awareness of the natural limits of such strategies of (false) self-presentation and

64 Saavedra Fajardo, *Empresas*, pp. 287–288: ‘el peligro de la disimulacion que se facilmente descubre’.


66 I was unable to find this emblem in Mahíques’s modern edition of de Borja’s emblem book and therefore refer instead to Vistarini, *Enciclopedia*, p. 289: ‘Uror sine incendio … El saber encubrir, y dissimular, lo que tratan, y sienten, es señal de hombres prudentes, y del valor’.

67 Ibid.: ‘puedese ayudar desta Empresa del ramo del Ebano, del qual dizen los naturales, que si le hechan en el fuego, se quema, pero sin encenderse, ni hacer llama… . Porque de la misma manera el hombre cuerdo, y recatado no descubre el fuego, que en su pecho trae, sino quando piensa, que ha de tener remedio su mal.’
disguise. In another emblem, he used the image of an erupting volcano in order to depict our inability to close off our interior life to others. In the commentary, he expanded on the message encapsulated in the succinct lemma ‘I cannot hide it’ (‘retinere nequeo’):

It is a very difficult enterprise to hide and dissimulate whatever great affection or emotion might be deep-rooted in the soul without the senses discovering and revealing it …. The nobler a soul is, the more it struggles to feign or dissimulate what it feels.68

De Borja, thus, suggested that individual nobility of character and the human soul determine the practice of dis/simulation. In this context, we should bear in mind that, according to the logic of the prudentia gubernatoria, worldly rulers were generally expected to have the capacity to resort to disguise and even pretence. If possessed of a truly noble soul and guided by complete moral rectitude, a sovereign would therefore find himself in a constant inner struggle and be unable to dissemble or simulate for the sake of his state. De Borja, unfortunately, did not comment on this paradox.

Sebastian de Covarrubias (1539–1613) – not to be mistaken for his brother Juan de Horozco y Covarrubias, mentioned above – was a prolific author of the Siglo de Oro who is today best known for his monumental Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española of 1611. One year later, he published another voluminous work entitled Emblemas morales of 1612. As in Dutch love emblem books, the Petrarchan motto ‘From outside one can read how I am burning inside’ – the only motto from the collection in Italian – underlined the limits of dis/simulation.69 We have already encountered the image of the inner fire which, revealing itself on the exterior, defies self-control and concealment in one of Vaenius’s emblems. In the Emblemas morales, however, it did not refer solely to amorous matters, but was applicable to a wider context. Strong emotions of any kind could eventually – as, for instance, in de Borja’s vivid image – erupt like a volcano. As an illustration for the maxim Covarrubias chose a pit filled with coal from which smoke

68 De Borja, Empresas, p. 80: ‘Es tan dificultosa cosa encubrir, y dissimular quaquier grande aficion, o passion, que estuviere muy arraygada en el animo, sin que los sentidos lo descubran, y publiquen… Quanto el animo es mas noble, tanto mayor trabajo padece en fingir, o dissimular lo que siente.’

69 Sebastian de Covarrubias, Emblemas, f. 104*: ‘Di fuor, si legge com’io dentro avampi’. For the original passage, see Petrarch, Canzioniere, p. 189.
is escaping,\textsuperscript{70} to which he added this comment: ‘It is very difficult to conceal any emotion, whether of content or of sorrow, since it manifests itself in one’s face, on which the events of happiness or sadness are imprinted.’\textsuperscript{71} Covarrubias recalled the limited capacity of human beings to obscure their inner lives with another emblem entitled ‘He simulates hope with his face.’\textsuperscript{72} The epigram further expanded on this theme and discussed the struggle to hide a ‘wounded heart’ with ‘a serene face’.

1.6. Hieroglyphica

The Renaissance craze for anything ancient and enigmatic sparked a new interest in Egyptian culture and in hieroglyphics, which were regarded as closely associated with emblems.\textsuperscript{74} Pierio Valeriano Bolzani’s highly influential and erudite compendium of hieroglyphs, the \textit{Hieroglyphica} of 1556, shows that dis/simulation also played an important part in Renaissance interpretations of ancient Egyptian culture. Valeriano (1477–1558), who was a prominent Italian humanist and poet favoured by the Medici,\textsuperscript{75}

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\textsuperscript{70} The epigram further expanded on the meaning of the image; see Sebastian de Covarrubias, \textit{Emblemas}, f. 104:\textsuperscript{r} ‘El carbon en la hoya, aunque tapado / Con la tierra, descubre por el techo, / Quanto sea el fuego, en que se esta abrasando / Por el humo que del va evaporando.’ The commentary, on f. 104:\textsuperscript{v}, reads: ‘El cuerpo del emblema es una hoya de carbon cubierta, la qual se esta quemando, y echa de si humo.’

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., f. 104:\textsuperscript{v}: ‘Muy mala es de encubrir qualquiera passion, ora sea de contento, ora de pesar, porque ella misma se manifiesta en el semblante, donde se estampan los accidentes de alegria, o la tristeza.’

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., f. 167:\textsuperscript{r}: ‘Spem vultu simulat.’ This motto was taken from Vergil’s \textit{Aeneid} (I.207–9) and reads: ‘Talia voce refert curisque ingentibus aeger, / spem vultu simulat premit altum corde dolorem’.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., f. 167:\textsuperscript{v}, reads: ‘El coraçon herido, y lastimado; / Reprime con valor, y fortaleza. / Su grave pena, y su mortal cuy dado; / Refrenando el dolor, y la tristeza; / Y con rostro sereno, y agracido / Descubre el verde, en hojas, y corteça, / Encubriendo su mal, y siendo en esto / Semejante, al cipres triste y funesto.’ The commentary further stressed the difficulties of hiding one’s feelings by evoking a dramatic image, in which blood (as a metaphor for tears) pours out of one’s eyes: ‘Mucha fuerça se ha de hazer asi mesmo, el que lastimado y herido en su coraçon, no le brota la sangre por los ojos, y ocupa su rostro la tristeza, y tanto mayor es su dolor, quanto mas encerrado le tiene en sus entrañas.’


\textsuperscript{75} For his biography and an extensive bibliography, see Julia Haig Gaisser: \textit{Pierio Valeriano on the Ill
dealt with the themes of dissimulation, silence and secrecy – often linked with the notion of prudence – on several occasions. Valeriano’s interpretation of these hieroglyphs gives us an invaluable insight into how the early modern world projected its own collective cultural and intellectual perceptions on another civilisation.

According to Valeriano, the theme of dis/simulation was expressed by several pictorial representations. Among these were a urinating monkey symbolising a ‘dissimulator of vices’, who, ashamed of its vulgar action, hides its urine in the soil; and a ‘Woman dissimulating pregnancy’, portrayed as a donkey, because it was said to retire to a quiet place in order to give birth. His discussion of the ‘Cuttlefish and the

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76 See, e.g., Pierio Valeriano, *Hieroglyphica*, Basel, 1575, f. 276v and f. 397v. See also f. 174v: ‘Silentium opportunum’. The image shows a goose with a pebble in their beak. In this way the geese were able to cross Mount Tauro, an area with many eagles, silently and unscathed. For an adaption of this image, see Soto, *Emblemas*, f. 22v: ‘Mors et vita lingua’. Valeriano also identified the fish as another hieroglyphic expression of silence and secrecy; see *Hieroglyphica*, f. 219v; for a similar emblem, see Pierre L’Anglois: *Discours des Hieroglyphes Ægyptiens, emblemes, devises, et armoiries*, Paris, 1584, f. 105v.

77 *Hieroglyphica*, ff. 49v–50r: ‘Vitiorum dissimulator. Ad haec, hominem sua dissimulantem vitia, turpitudinemque domesticam occultantem, notare si vellent Aegyptii, Simiam mictu rientem faciebant: ipsa enim est ea verecundia praedita, ut quotiescunque lotium fecerit, excrementum illud, quod etiam in faeces reliqua feles faciunt, effossa obruat terra, aut alia quam re super ingesta omnino occultat.’ This hieroglyph did not, however, refer to something morally dubious or infamous, but rather to politeness and civility. See also the passage ‘Dissimulator of disgrace’ (‘Dissimulator turpitudinis’), ibid., f. 101v, which was echoed in Antonius Ricciardus, *Commentariurum symbolicorum… tomus secundus*, Venice, 1561, f. 117v. The panther epitomised the theme of disguising one’s depraved nature or character; see Valeriano, *Hieroglyphica*, ff. 83r–84v: ‘Dissimulator ingenii. Praeterea hominem Aegyptii suorum vitiorum dissimulatorem, quisque pravum, quo preditus esset, ingenium ita occultaret, ne vela a domesticis reprehendi posset, panthere simulachro notabant.’ Another symbol included in a later collection of hieroglyphics was the ‘Dissimulatio malitiae’ in Book VII of Nicolas Caussin’s *De symbolica Aegyptiorum sapientia*, Paris, 1618, p. 423.

78 Valeriano, *Hieroglyphica*, f. 90r: ‘Pregnantiae dissimulatrix’, explained as: ‘Mulierem ad haec praegnantiam occultantem notare cum volunt, parientem asinam pingunt. Observatum enim est, id eam impedio cavere, ne vel in conspectu hominem, vel in luce pariat: quare ducenda est in tenebras, cum excludendi tempus adverterit.’ As we shall see in Chapter 5 below, section 5.5.1, dissembling of pregnancy played a role in early modern medical literature.
one who covers himself with layers of simulation’ is particularly interesting. Valeriano linked this mollusc with people who frequently feign. Even the goddess Thetis, he explained, made use of the wily techniques of the cuttlefish, not only in avoiding danger, but also as a form of personal amusement:

In order to represent this type of concealment, it is my belief that the Greeks imagined that Thetis used to change herself into a cuttlefish, while she was either teasing or earnestly fleeing from Peleas, who was chasing her. And a certain promontory in Iolcos where they say this happened was called Sepia. Therefore, they indicated a man who was covered with many layers of simulation and was of a hidden and changeable nature with the image of a cuttlefish.

The cuttlefish was a symbol of flexibility and prudent dis/simulation. This association seems to have persisted throughout the early modern era, since some 150 years later, Baltasar Gracián also referred to the cuttlefish in his famous compendium of worldly wisdom. As Charles Schmitt has shown, one of the most persistent and frequently used


79 Ibid., f. 203v: ‘Thetis, et simulationum involucris obtectus’.

80 Valeriano, Hieroglyphica, f. 203r–v: ‘Huusmodi vero occultationis causa confictum a Graecis crediderim, Thetim in Sepiam commutari solitam, dum vel eluderet, vel serio fugitaret Pelea illam insequentem. Nam et promontorio cuidam in Iolco Sepiadi nomen inditum, ubi factum hoc perhibent. Ita denique hominem qui multis simulationum involucris tegeretur, essetque occultae multiplicisique naturae, per pictam Sepiam notabant.’

81 Interestingly, another closely related sea creature, the octopus, was regarded, in ancient Greek mythology, as the marine counterpart of the fox and embodied the concept of metis, which is related to the notion of prudentia. On the fox and the octopus as figures of wiliness and cunning in ancient Greek myth and thought, see Debra Hawhee, Bodily Arts. Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, Austin, 2004, pp. 48–57. Hawhee notes that the techniques of the two animals differ: ‘while the fox finds a way out, the octopus blends in.’ Thus, the octopus is a polymorph and changeable figure: see ibid., p. 56. Metis is ‘not an explicit set of precepts but rather a tacit style of movement running through most kinds of action, including thought’ and ‘the mode of negotiating agonistic forces, the ability to cunningly and effectively maneuver’: ibid., p. 47. The importance of this concept is highlighted by the fact that metis was also the name of the goddess of cunning.

82 Gracián advised readers to oppose the ‘linces del discurso’ with ‘xibias de interioridad’, referring to the ink as a dissembling strategy used by the cuttlefish to conceal itself in darkened water: see Baltasar Gracián, Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia, ed. by Migel Romera-Navarro, Madrid, 1954, p. 195.
rhetorical arguments in humanist anti-Aristotelian polemic was the comparison with a cuttlefish.\textsuperscript{83} Aristotle, who, ironically, was the first to describe the habits of this animal,\textsuperscript{84} was repeatedly attacked for his lack of clarity which Renaissance humanists associated with the cuttlefish’s technique of ejecting ink.\textsuperscript{85}

1.7. Conclusion

In his \textit{Emblematorum liber} of 1593, Jean Jacques Boissard (1528–1602) covered a wide range of moral, political and social topics. For the emblem ‘With prudence according to time and place’,\textsuperscript{86} the image is a female personification of prudence, holding a snake in

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84 Ibid., p. 64.

85 Valeriano’s exegesis of hieroglyphs opens up a new point of discussion, which, I think, merits further investigating but which is beyond the scope of this dissertation: the link between animals and dis/simulation. It would be interesting to study descriptions of humanised animals (and animalised humans) in early modern compilations of natural history, bestiaries and fables in relation to the issues I have been examining. See, e.g., Franciscus Koehnen, \textit{Disputatio politica de simulatione}, Wittenberg, 1671, p. 4: ‘Etiem bruta animalia sub illius umbone ab insidiatorum malitia non modo se suaque consilia tuta servasse, sed et alia hac arte elusa curiosi naturalium rerum exploratores observarunt. Ut enim lupos, vulpes, pantheras, sepias, aliqua missa faciam, Crocodylum referunt, de omnibus, sive hominibus sive feris animalibus, facilem victoriam reportare, eo quod celatis exquisitissima arte consiliis, citius sanguineos corpori morsus, quam oculis suam imprimat praesentiam.’ See also p. 7: ‘Quare ad Tertiam et genuinam simulationis significationem proproer, quando accipitur pro indicatione alterius rei, quam corde volvitur, per externa signa facta, arcanorum occultandorum gratia. … Proinde, si quid imo volutant pectore, quod abscondi illorum maximopere intersit, experimur aliam ea prae se faciem, unde vel nihil certi, vel aliquid falsi colligere adversarii possint. Exemplo nobis fiet Panthera. … Similiter de Polypo memoriae proditum est, quod saepius suum mutet colorum, et quandoque chamaeleontis … de sepia narrat Camerarius’; for Koehnen’s references, see Joachim Camerarius, \textit{Symbola et emblemata centuria II}, ed. by Wolfgang Harms and Ulla-Brita Kuechen, Graz, 1986, p. 45: ‘Allicit ut perimatum’, and p. 98: ‘Nil solidi’; I was unable to identify his reference to the octopus. The theme of dis/simulation among animals persisted beyond the early modern era and was disseminated in widely read and authoritative texts; see, e.g., \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, Edinburgh, 1797, p. 195, in which cats were described as ‘full of cunning and dissimulation’.

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one hand and giving a mask to an armoured man with the other. Here the mask is not a symbol of deceitful dissembling, but represents instead an individual’s flexibility of appearance and composure and thus pertains to worldly wisdom. 87 The epigram corroborates the positive connotation of the mask: ‘That she holds a mask is not to deceive: with it she adapts according to different circumstances and places. She is merry and sad, as often as the situation demands.’ 88 The metaphorical meaning of the mask subtly alludes to dis/simulation, leaving aside any moral reservations and objections.

We encounter an unambiguously positive notion of feigning and disguise – likewise symbolised by a mask – in de la Perrière Le Theatre des bons engins. This text, which was heavily influenced by Alciato’s collection of emblems, went through fourteen editions and was translated into several languages. The motto of Emblem VI, in the English translation of 1593, is: ‘Most men do use some colour’d shift. / For to conceal their craftie drift.’ 89 The commentary expands on this point:

Masks will be more hereafter in request, / And grow more deare than they did heretofore: / They serv’d then onely but in play and iest, / For merriment, and to no purpose more: / Now they are used in earnest of the best, / And of such Maskers there abound such store, / That you shall finde but few in any place, / That carries not sometimes a double face. 90

De la Perrière did not, like many of his contemporaries, moralise against feigning and disguise but instead suggested their social relevance through the symbol of the mask,

87 See Leuschner, Persona, pp. 317–333.

88 Boissard, Emblematorum liber, sig. H2r: ‘Quod gerit haec larvam, non est ut fallat: at illa / Aptat personam casibus atque locis. / Laeta est et tristis, quoties occasio poscit: / Temporibus vultus commodat illa suos.’

89 La Perrière, The Theatre, sig. B1r. The French original does not have a lemma.

90 The French original, in de la Perrière, Le Theatre, p. 23, reads: ‘Masques seront cy apres de requeste, / Autant ou plus qu’elles furent iamais, / Quand l’on souloit faire banquet ou feste / L’on en usoit par forme d’entre metz, / Cheres seront par force formais: / Car à present n’est homme qui n’en use, / Chascun veult faindre et colorer sa ruze, / Trahyson gist souzh beau et doux langaige: / Merveille n’est s’y tout le monde abuze: / Car chascun tend à faulcer son visage.’
which, as indicated in the epigram, was used ‘in earnest’ and among the best men. Having stressed the playful nature of the ‘double face’ applied only for ‘merriment’, he established a positive connotation of dis/simulation.\(^\text{91}\) This is quite remarkable if we take into consideration that emblem books reflected and supported the bourgeois and upper class culture which produced them and were firmly grounded in the contemporary moral consensus, in other words, lacked polemical and controversial maxims and views.\(^\text{92}\)

Marcus Zuierius van Boxhorn (1612–1653), a Dutch scholar and professor at Leiden, offered another interesting reference to the subject in his \textit{Emblemata politica} of 1635. Boxhorn, too, justified pretending, yet in a completely different context. The motto of the emblem ‘Fronti nulla fides’ was an important maxim of worldly wisdom, which, as we shall see, played a central part in early modern physiognomical debates.\(^\text{93}\) The corresponding image in Boxhorn’s text depicted a stage in an urban setting on which four actors, one of them masked, engage in a theatrical performance in front of a large and lively audience. In his commentary, however, Boxhorn did not expand on the lemma or produce physiognomical reflections on the legibility of the human

\(^{91}\) We should bear in mind, however, that many authors of emblem books reprimanded any type of dis/simulation as hypocrisy and deceit, while praising absolute sincerity and honesty; see, e.g., Aegidius, \textit{Emblemata}, sigs A7\(^\text{v}\)–A8\(^\text{r}\): ‘In fictos et duplices’ and sigs A8\(^\text{r}\)–A9\(^\text{v}\): ‘In eos qui videri volunt quod non sunt’; and Boissard, \textit{Emblematum liber}, sig. L3\(^\text{v}\), who criticised the immoral use of masks: ‘Nulla est justitiae pestis capitalior illis / Larvata apparent qui piate boni’, adding in his commentary: ‘Totius justiciae nulla est capitalior pestis, quam eorum, qui cum, dum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni videantur. Hypocrisy teterium est vitium.’ Apart from love, true friendship was widely idealised as a sphere free of simulation; see Boissard, \textit{Emblematum liber}, sig. I3\(^\text{v}\): ‘Quisquis amicitiae sub nomine decipit, illi / Per similis corvus moribus esse potest. / Sed melior corvus: Defunctor lacinat iste: / Infestis vivos morsibus ille vorat.’ The rejection of any lying or deceit among friends, a topos dating back to Cicero’s \textit{De amicitia}, was recurrent in early modern moral literature, but remains largely unnoticed in modern scholarship; see, e.g., Johann Altensteig, \textit{Opusculum de amicitia continens quid amicitia vera et perfecta: et quomodo comparetur et conservetur: quid fucata vel victa aut simulata amicitia}, Hagenau, 1519, and Hermann Lather, \textit{Oratio de amicitia tum vera, tum simulata}, Wittenberg, 1601.

\(^{92}\) As has been noted, emblem books tended to reflect the dominant culture rather than advocate the need for change; see Peter M. Daly, ‘Sixteenth-Century Emblems and Imprese as Indicators of Cultural Change’, in \textit{Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period}, ed. by Jon Whitman, Leiden, 2000, pp. 383–420, at p. 383.

\(^{93}\) See Chapter 6 below, section 6.9.
countenance; instead, he grappled with two other significant issues. First, he turned readers’ attention towards the problem of false appearances in society – in itself, a commonplace precept, entirely lacking in originality.\(^{94}\) Yet rather than moralising against impostors and pretenders, Boxhorn stressed that not all dis/simulations were malicious. He not only referred to the necessity of dissembling in politics,\(^ {95}\) but also to the tricks used by parents in dealing with their children and, more importantly for our purposes, to the deceptions of physicians in the interest of healing.\(^ {96}\)

We have seen in this chapter that emblem books featured multifaceted discussions of dis/simulation and related themes such as prudent self-disclosure and secrecy. The problem of feigning and disguise was re-evaluated and re-negotiated in a number of different contexts. While some authors such as Boissard and de la Perrière justified the playful and good-natured employment of dis/simulation or, like Boxhorn, useful and beneficial forms of deceit, others – such as Furmerius, in connection with ruses among rogues and false beggars, and Boissard, in connection with friendship – harshly condemned any form of feigning and disguise. Among the most intriguing issues which emblem books addressed were, I think, the nexus between love and dis/simulation, on the one hand, and the natural limits of feigning and disguise, on the other. Both points will come up again later on in the dissertation.\(^ {97}\)

I have not been able to identify a clear or distinct development in the perception of dis/simulation within the genre of emblem books over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, some emblem books took a light-hearted approach to this difficult subject; but this tone was not necessarily picked up by later authors. As far as I have been able to determine, later emblem books did not display either a more neutral or a more favourable view of dis/simulation.\(^ {98}\)

\(^{94}\) Boxhorn, *Emblemata*, p. 118: ‘Scenam hic pingo, in qua personam quisque et accipit, et deponit, atque alius est, quam videtur. … Et fingitur quod non est, ut sit, quod esse debeat.’

\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 119.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 118: ‘Quippe ita cum populo est comparatum, ut speciosis nominibus inescatus falso credat, quod non crederet, si verum audiret. Sic a nutritibus suis infantes, a medicis aegri falluntur. Et qui sic agit, peccare non dicitur, quia peccare necesse est.’ The deceptions of physicians will be discussed in Chapter 5 below.

\(^{97}\) See Chapter 4, section 4.6 below, and Chapter 6, sections 6.3–4.

\(^{98}\) This, however, seems to have been the case more generally with this subject, as I shall argue in the
the early modern era progressed, however, authors did address new themes and new contexts connected to it.

Certainly, many of the emblem books I have examined included rather basic and simplified reflections which may be not be as elaborate or intellectually inspiring as the discussions of dis/simulation by authors such as Francis Bacon, Baltasar Gracián or Torquato Accetto. Nonetheless, I think that emblems books have a historical value for my investigation, since they – unlike Accetto’s treatise, to cite the most extreme case⁹⁹ – belonged to a very popular and widely disseminated genre, which can give us an idea of the general view of dis/simulation held at this time. As we shall see in the following chapters, emblem books echoed and incorporated a number of important themes and semantic contexts (for instance, the prudent use of secrecy and concealment, the problem of false mendicants, the natural limits of human disguise and the legibility of the human face) which were further discussed and elaborated in other contemporary genres.

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Epilogue.

⁹⁹ Torquato Accetto’s apology of dissimulation is rightly considered the most emblematic work of Baroque literature on this subject; but it is worth recalling that, soon after its publication, this text fell into oblivion.
Chapter 2

*pia fraudes* – ‘Pious frauds’

Discussions of Dis/simulation among Beggars and Vagabonds in Sixteenth-Century Spanish Tracts on Poor Relief

2.1. Introduction

R. H. Tawney famously remarked that ‘the sixteenth century lived in terror of the tramp’.¹ This was by no means a solitary historical diagnosis.² There can be little doubt about the precarious political and economical developments in the sixteenth century which resulted in mass poverty of previously unknown dimensions.³ Innumerable passionate pleas, both in spoken and written form, relentlessly urged the populace to help the destitute. It was not only genuine compassion and Christian *caritas*, however, which governed the hearts of the wealthy and powerful: the downtrodden, impoverished and socially marginalised were also the target of deep-rooted anxieties, fear and sometimes even resentment.

Contemporary literature abounded with accounts of professional beggars, idle vagabonds, cunning rogues and other shady figures, which not only reflected, but also actively shaped prevailing attitudes towards lower social groupings.⁴ Rogue pamphlets, beggar literature and picaresque novels, to which I shall return in Chapter 3, placed dis/simulation at the very heart of their narratives. Oscillating between fearful suspicion,

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² Bronislaw Geremek, *Poverty: A History*, Oxford, 1994, p.190, noted that mendicancy ‘was perceived as the chief evil of the age’.


⁴ On the impact of English rogue pamphlets on contemporary perceptions of beggars and vagabonds, see Linda Woodbridge, *Vagrancy, Homelessness, and English Renaissance Literature*, Urbana, 2001, esp. p. 4, where she argues that, by generating myths about vagrants, rogue literature had considerable influence on contemporary statutes.
stern moralisation and gloomy fascination, these genres drew a colourful picture of the survival strategies among the lower social ranks, who were thought to inhabit a threatening realm of disguise, deceit and fraud. We should not rashly dismiss these expressions of disquiet as literary fabrications which merely satisfied popular demand and predilections, given that the collectively shared concern with cunning and deceit became manifest in a wide and disparate range of sources which go well beyond the fictitious.

The impact which anxieties about simulated mendicancy and vagrancy had on the living realities of lower social groupings is apparent, for instance, in contemporary legislation. The sixteenth century witnessed a veritable flood of harsh anti-mendicant and anti-vagrant laws. Before the first enactments were issued in the 1520s in the rapidly growing urban centres of Flanders and southern Germany, the efforts to suppress vagrancy, mendicancy and other forms of deviant behaviour believed to be causing moral and civil disorder were few and moderate. By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, increasingly repressive municipal and national statutes were passed on a regular basis. This legislation gives the impression that the European states were suddenly besieged by mendicants and vagabonds. There is, however, no reason to believe that this problem did not exist before the sixteenth century; nor should we entirely trust contemporary voices, since historical evidence that idle vagrants and professional beggars really represented a major public threat is lacking. Instead, one might argue that vagrancy was called into existence, in a circular process of marginalisation and criminalisation, by the legislation which sought to stem the

5 On poverty in early modern England and on Tudor and Stuart vagrancy laws, see Beier, Masterless Men, pp. 8–12; Spanish laws usually differed little and were similarly structured; see, e.g., Linda Martz, Poverty and Welfare in Habsburg Spain, Cambridge, 1993, p. 30.

6 The punishment for the first instance of illicit mendicancy and vagrancy mainly consisted of whipping; a second offence resulted in the cutting off one ear; and a third sentence was punished by death. Frank Aydelotte, Elizabethan Rogues and Vagabonds, Oxford, 1913, pp. 56–73, points out that the English laws from the 1530s differed little in essence from the statutes of the second half of the sixteenth century, though they were even more severe.

7 Beier, Masterless Men, p. 12.

8 Ibid., p. 124: ‘The results of the investigation suggest that the extent of organized, professional crime among vagrants has been exaggerated.’
It is not, however, my intention to discuss these complex socio-political and historiographical questions. More important for the purposes of this dissertation is that these early modern statutes rigidly distinguished between ‘true’ and ‘false’, that is, deserving and undeserving paupers. In the inner logic of this dichotomy, the former were genuinely in need, while the latter merely resorted to deceptive simulation. As with the issue of poverty in general, the phenomenon of false beggars and vagabonds was not new to the early modern era. The Codex Justinianus (529–534), later known as the Corpus iuris civilis, shows that it can be traced back as far as late antiquity. Yet, although the phenomenon might not have been a novelty, the ways of perceiving, as well as dealing with, it certainly were. Unwilling to take into account structural socio-economic factors as an explanation for increasing mendicancy and vagrancy, the authorities and dominant groups of early modern society stigmatised able-bodied beggars as lowly criminals, who had to be punished or, at least, re-educated through disciplinary measures. Dis/simulation at the fringes of society, as the main instrument of those pursuing a wicked lifestyle, therefore became an acute problem for the Christian commonwealth – regardless of whether it really existed to the extent imagined by the upper echelons of early modern society.

9 Rheinheimer, Arme, pp. 135–137; Woodbridge, Vagrancy, p. 4.

10 Deserving paupers were principally those unable to provide for themselves by labour; undeserving ones were those who were physically able but preferred not to work; see Jon Arrizabalaga, ‘Poor Relief in Counter-Reformation Castile’, in Health Care and Poor Relief in Counter-Reformation Europe, ed. by Ole Peter Grell, Andrew Cunningham and Jon Arrizabalaga, London, 2007, pp. 151–176, at p. 154.

11 Piero Camporesi, Il libro dei vagabondi. Lo ‘Speculum ceretanorum’ di Teseo Pini, ‘Il Vagabondo’ di Raffaele Frianoro e altri testi di ‘furfanteria’, Turin, 1973, lists many examples of medieval texts dealing with simulated mendicancy. The so-called Augsburger Achtbuch from 1343 and the Basler Betrügisse from the city council of Basel (dating back to the fifteenth century), to cite only the best-known examples from the Middle Ages, comprise lists of false beggars; for other medieval German sources on false mendicants and their simulations, see F. Irsigler and Arnold Lassotta, Bettler und Gaukler, Dirnen und Henker. Außenseiter in einer mittelalterlichen Stadt. Köln 1300–1600, Munich, 1996, pp. 44–58.

12 Examinations of mendicants designed to unmask simulators play a central role in the Corpus iuris civilis, liber undecimus codicis, 25, De mendicantibus validis: ‘Cunctis adfatim, quos in publicum quaestum incerta mendicitas vocabit, inspectis exploretur in singulis et integritas corporum et robur annorum, atque inertibus et absque ulla debilitate miserandis necessitas inferatur.’
Despite certain unique features, the Spanish debates on poor relief are representative of the wider European context. Obviously, the problem of mendicancy was not limited to the Iberian peninsula; but, to the best of my knowledge, in perhaps no other Western European country were a similarly rich and continuous succession of tracts on this subject published. Although efforts have been made in recent scholarship to shed more light on debates concerning poor relief in Spain, the subject deserves further study in connection with the problem of dis/simulation.

Early modern Spain was – in some respects perhaps more than other European countries – shaken by the social and political upheavals of the era. Behind the bright façade of Spanish imperial grandeur, nagging poverty encumbered large parts of the population, especially in the countryside. A number of Spanish intellectuals, mainly theologians, set out to ease the plight of the poor. In what follows I shall analyse some of the most significant contributions to this debate, focusing on their treatment of the problem of dis/simulation. These texts demonstrate that figures such as professional beggars and cunning rogues were not only a recurring theme in popular literature, but also shaped scholarly debates. They, furthermore, bear witness to the fact that the


14 For an overview of the historiographical debates on the causes of widespread impoverishment in Spain, see Cruz, Discourses, pp. 39–74.

15 For a discussion of the unity and variety of popular culture and the intersections between popular and high culture, see Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, 3rd ed., Aldershot, 2009, pp. 49–81.
abolition of beggarly ruses was seen as fundamentally important to, and even a prerequisite for, solving the problem of mass poverty.

2.2. The emergence of a secularised system of poor relief
The foundations of the Spanish debates on mendicancy were laid down by a Spaniard living for years outside of the Iberian peninsula. Fearful of persecution by the Inquisition, which had treated his family, charged with Judaizing, mercilessly in Spain, the Valencian humanist, theologian and philosopher Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) spent most of his life in foreign lands. In Bruges, he wrote *De subventione pauperum* (1525), which he dedicated to the magistrates of the city. This highly influential tract, though never translated into Spanish, paved the way for the ensuing debate in Spain. Arguing for a secular and rationalised governmental assistance of the poor, Vives devised a practical and astonishingly modern reform programme.16 Two passages are of particular interest. In the first book, which is often overlooked by scholars,17 Vives reproved false beggars who abuse people’s pity:

… many have learned how to create or increase their ulcers with certain medicaments to elicit more pity from the onlookers. Not only do they disfigure their own bodies in this way out of their avidity to make money but also the bodies of their children, whom they sometimes borrow and carry around with them for this purpose … . Some simulate various diseases although they are healthy and physically sound … . Other idle persons through the enticement of gain turn necessity into art.18

16 The scholarship on Vives’s tract is extensive; for a good study of the text and further literature, see Constantinus Matheeussen’s ‘Introduction’ to Juan Luis Vives, *De subventione pauperum, libri II*, ed. and transl. by Constantinus Matheeussen and Charles Fantazzi, Leiden, 2002, pp. ix–xi.


18 Vives, *De subventione pauperum*, ed. by Matheeussen and Fantazzi, p. 29: ‘Quin et ulcera multi comperti sunt ipsos sibi certis medicamentis et facere et augere, ut miserabiliiores sint intuentibus. Nec solum sua ipsorum corpora aviditate quaestus sic deformant, sed et liberorum quos nonnumquam circumferunt accomodatos… . Sic alii varios morbos simulant sani et integri; si soli sint aut necesitas subito ingruant, ostendunt quam non sunt infirmi… . Alii otiosi lucru dulcedine quod necessitatis est vertunt in artem.’
The passage speaks for itself: Vives did not indulge in moralisations, but succinctly stated that simulators ‘should be obliged to work’.\textsuperscript{19} One major problem for him was that these miscreants made people increasingly reluctant to give alms, for ‘nothing discourages us more from giving than the fear that our good deed is misplaced’\textsuperscript{20} And how could alms possibly be more misplaced than putting them in the hands of an impostor? Since charity continued to play a central role in his rationalised reform structure, Vives returned to this problem in the second part of his treatise:

\ldots in order that they do not deceive us by a pretence of sickness or infirmity (which is not a rare occurrence), the judgement of doctors will be solicited and the one who has feigned illness should be punished.\textsuperscript{21}

We are not, however, given any further details, and his remarks on dis/simulation are not only brief but also lack any depth or urgency. A great intellectual and scholar, Vives would unquestionably have included constructive and well-considered thoughts on this issue had it been of significance for him. We may therefore assume that it was not. Later Spanish authors, however, paid increasing attention to the problem of simulated poverty.

2.3. The debate between de Soto and de Robles

The \textit{Deliberación en la causa de los pobres} of 1545, written by Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), was the next significant contribution to the debate in Spain. De Soto, a Dominican, was one of the most eminent theologians of his day and a leading figure in the famous School of Salamanca.\textsuperscript{22} Among his writings, which cover a wide range of

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\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 102: ‘Tum cogatur ibi laborare, ut fructus operis sit communis.’

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 26: ‘Neque aliud quicquam magis a dando nos deterret quam cum metuimus ne male beneficium collocemus.’

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 100: ‘sic tamen ne simulatione morbi aut infirmitatis imponant (quod non fit raro), adhibebitur medicorum iudicium et qui fefellerit puniatur’.

\textsuperscript{22} For general overviews, see Quentin Skinner, \textit{The Foundations of Modern Political Thought}, II, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 135–73, and José Barrientos García, \textit{Un siglo de moral económica en Salamanca}. 62
topics including theology, jurisprudence and philosophy, his magnum opus was *De iustitia et iure libri decem* of 1553. The *Deliberación*, simultaneously published in Spanish and Latin to reach a wider readership, is one of his lesser known works. It, nevertheless, offers a thoughtful and critical analysis of the new poor laws in the Spanish city of Zamora.

De Soto’s position is condensed in the statement: ‘the poor always have the right, in whatever state of necessity, even if it is not grave, to ask for alms.’ Throughout the tract, which reads like a manifesto of the human rights of the deprived and marginalised, he rigorously defended the traditional doctrine of voluntary alms-giving and the individual right to beg freely. De Soto, however, stressed at the very beginning of his


24 The law prohibited public begging and established a type of public almonry to aid those considered deserving beggars and to support poor travellers for a short period of time. Compared to the legislation enacted in other European cities, the new poor laws from the 1540s were relatively mild; see Martz, *Poverty*, pp. 21–22.

25 Domingo de Soto, *Deliberación en la causa de los pobres* (1545), in *El gran debate sobre los pobres en el siglo XVI, Domingo de Soto y Juan de Robles 1545*, ed. by Félix Santolaria Sierra, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 47–113, at p. 64: ‘los pobres tienen siempre derecho, en cualquier necesidad, aunque no sea grave, a pedir limosna’. In line with de Soto, Gabriel de Toro, a Franciscan court preacher under Charles V and a famous mystic, wrote in his *Tesoro de misericordia Divina y humana*, Valencia, 1548, f. 43: ‘No se puede prohibir el mendigar a los pobres.’

26 De Soto’s position on poor laws and the individual rights of mendicants is part of what might be called a general defensio innocentium, which is also manifest in his views on the famous disputation of Valladolid (1550–1551) between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda concerning the question of how the Spanish Empire should deal with the indigenous population of the newly discovered lands in the West. De Soto generally agreed with las Casas’s pleas for humane treatment of the indios. For a detailed discussion of de Soto’s role in the disputation, see Vicente Beltran de Heredia, ‘El maestro Domingo de Soto en la controversia de Las Casas con Sepúlveda’, *Ciencia Tomista*, 45, 1932, pp. 176–193.
treatise that discriminating between undeserving and genuinely needy beggars was of crucial importance, and he accepted the necessity of unmasking impostors. His critique was primarily aimed at the new distinction between naturales, that is, ‘local’, and extranjeros, that is, ‘foreign’, beggars. 27 According to the ius peregrinandi, he argued, ‘beggars should be free to go wherever they want looking for remedy’. 28 ‘Idle and unproductive vagabonds who, without being poor, simulate poverty and walk about asking for alms’ were the real problem and not those who ‘are legitimately poor and wander outside of their lands through the entire kingdom’. 29

De Soto directed his criticism at the powerful and wealthy, who often lack genuine compassion for the destitute and accuse the poor of imposture, thus legitimising their harsh legislative regulations. Holding a mirror up to higher social ranks, he remarked that fraud and deceit existed at all levels of society, 30 and, in fact, were more virulent in the upper than the lower echelons. 31 ‘If they [the poor] were in charge’, de Soto concluded, ‘they would find just as much to punish in us as we do in them.’ 32

27 Soto, Deliberación, pp. 63–75.

28 Ibid., p. 65: ‘libres para ir donde quisiesen a buscar su remedio’.

29 Ibid., p. 57: ‘vagabundos baldios y holgazanes que no siendo pobres, fingiendo pobreza andan pidiendo limosnas’, in contrast to ‘los que siendo legítimamente pobres, andan fuera de sus naturales a pedir por todo reino’. For Soto, p. 57, a vagabond was by definition not only a person of no fixed abode but also someone who was idle by nature: ‘la propriedad de este nombre añade que anden por el mundo sin necesidad ni utilidad’; vagrancy ‘significa ociosidad’. Idleness was not to be tolerated and, consequently, all vagrancy should be annihilated; see p. 60: ‘Conforme a estas leyes divinas y naturales, todos los sabios que escribieron de républica y todos los príncipes que la gobernaron tuvieron gran cuidado de escardar los ociosos y quitarlos de la républica.’

30 Ibid., p. 87: ‘Cuántos habrá en la républica, artífices y oficiales públicos que viven de derechos públicos, los cuales por fraude y engaño llevan sin comparación mucha mayor hacienda ajena que todos cuantos falsos pobres y vagabundos hay en el reino.’

31 Ibid., pp. 86–87: ‘En todos los estados, entre los oficiales, entre los letrados y ministros públicos de justicia, entre los clérigos y entre los frailes, y entre grandes y entre los prelados, en cada uno en su grado hay flaquezas, y pecados, y maldades.’ Soto, p. 87, added: ‘Cuántos habrá en la républica, artífices y oficiales públicos que viven de derechos públicos, los cuales por fraude y engaño llevan sin comparación mucha mayor hacienda ajena que todos cuantos falsos pobres y vagabundos hay en el reino.’

32 Ibid., p. 78: ‘Que si ellos tuviesen poder tanto hallarían que castigar en nosotros como nosotros en
of the exploitative mechanisms of contemporary society, ‘there are many whom the rich made poor. For that reason, it would not be too much if, compensating for the injustices suffered by some of the poor, we were to cover up some of the injustices committed by other paupers.’\textsuperscript{33} De Soto did not close his eyes to the frauds of some beggars; yet by placing their dis/simulations in a larger socio-economical context, he adopted a new critical perspective.

Evoking the powerful image of ‘a man simulating poverty [who] takes from you one miserable coin, with no other deceit than walking naked and hungry, shivering or feigning some disease’, de Soto questioned how dangerous false mendicants really were.\textsuperscript{34} Their degrading forms of disguise and simulation originated in genuine necessity and despair rather than fraudulent schemes. ‘Give me a single man in all of Spain’, he demanded, ‘who has suffered scarcity in his own household from all the frauds by all the vagabonds in the kingdom.’\textsuperscript{35} De Soto not only refuted popular beliefs that sturdy beggars pose a real threat to society, but also exposed the frauds within higher social strata. He was one of the very few early modern authors to place the problem of dis/simulation in a larger macro-sociological context; and his suggestion that the use of such means was a privilege of the socially and economically empowered identified a central characteristic of the entire early modern discourse on feigning and disguise, as I shall argue in the Conclusion. De Soto, furthermore, coined the oxymoron ‘pia fraude’ once more calling into question the immorality of beggarly simulations:

I admit that among them [i.e., beggars] there could be some impostors. But apart from that, the real needs are much greater than the simulated ones and, if there is something which we could call pious frauds, then it is this.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 87: ‘hay muchos a quien los ricos hicieron pobres … Por lo cual, no seria mucho que en recompensa de las injurias que unos pobres padecen, disimulasemos algunos de las que otros hacen.’

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.: ‘un miserable de un hombre fingiendo pobreza os saque una miserable moneda, no con otro engaño, sino andando desnudo y hambriento, temblando o fingiendo alguna enfermedad’.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.: ‘Denme un solo hombre en toda España que por todos los engaños de todos los vagabundos del reino haya sentido … mella en su hacienda.’

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 102: ‘Confieso que puede haber entre estos algunos engañadores, empero allende que las
This passage opposed, or rather, transcended commonplace moralisations on feigned mendicancy, stressing the precarious individual economical circumstances from which beggarly ruses originated. In the context of de Soto’s ethical imperative of social justice, the moral meaning of dis/simulation was not reduced to purely fraudulent opportunism but instead represented a vital instrument in the daily struggle for survival at the fringes of society. Being poor was sometimes not enough: a beggar’s performance and appearance had to be striking in order set him or her apart from the anonymous crowd of mendicants. De Soto, we might say, conceived the existence of marginalised social groups in terms of the popular early modern proverb ‘qui nescit (dis)simulare, nescit vivere’. He noted that ‘for the miserable pauper … who fights for food and life, it does not suffice simply to ask – he has to importune and even soften the heart from which he can squeeze out one coin.’ Although rooted in medieval theological and scholastic traditions, de Soto’s reflections departed from the consensus of his day and were in many ways ahead of their time.

De Soto relativised and reconsidered the ruses of beggars, without denying the indispensable importance of discriminating between ‘false’ and ‘true’ beggars. What practical solution, then, did he offer to this problem? Having written a sharply worded plea for the rights of the needy, de Soto proposed to carry out so-called pruebas, that is, tests of beggars. Measuring the level of poverty and the habits of every beggar, these examinations were supposed to detect impostors. Plausible as his suggestion might be in theory, the time-consuming pruebas would have been unrealistic in practice.

verdaderas necesidades son muchas mas que las fingidas, si algunas con razon se pueden llamar pias fraudes, son éstas.’

37 We find a reference to this dictum in Robert Greene, The Defence of Conny Catching, London, 1592, sig. A4’, when the rogue Cuthbert remarks: ‘He that cannot dissemble cannot live’: I shall return to the genre of rogue pamphlets in Chapter 3 below, sections 3.5–6.

38 Soto, Deliberación, p. 102: ‘Los ricos que por manera de autoridad y honra andan a pedir para los pobres, como dejan en casa la comida segura, paréceles que hacen harto en demandar, y no se matan mucho aunque no les den. Empero el miserable del pobre, que le va la comida y la vida, no le basta pedir, sino importunar hasta ablandar el corazón de donde pueda exprimir una blanca.’

39 Ibid., p. 83: ‘la una [i.e, the examination] de la pobreza, si son verdaderos o fingidos pobres … y otra, de su vida y constumbres’.
Considering the limited resources usually provided by authorities for poor relief, de Soto’s vision was doomed to fail in its implementation. Tellingly, he did not discuss any further how these individual pruebas could be put into practice.\textsuperscript{40} On the contrary, not attempting to conceal his scepticism, he openly expressed doubts as to the efficiency of such inspections:

I am afraid that even with all this diligence and carefulness in examining legitimate paupers, this goal will not be achieved … that there will be no thieves and rogues in the kingdom.\textsuperscript{41}

De Soto’s polemical treatise induced Juan de Robles (c. 1492–1572), also known as Juan de Medina, to compose a swift answer in favour of the new poor laws. De Robles was the Benedictine abbot of San Vicente in Salamanca and a famous preacher. Like de Soto, he was one of the outstanding theologians of his day.\textsuperscript{42} His treatise \textit{De la orden que en algunos pueblos de España se ha puesto en la limosna para remedio de los verdaderos pobres} was published some two months after de Soto’s treatise by the same printing press in Salamanca. Actively involved in the development of the poor laws in Zamora, de Robles promoted large-scale programmes which would establish full employment and self-provision as a universal solution to poverty.

Deeply concerned with the deplorable conditions of paupers, de Robles demanded a radical reform of the traditional haphazard system of voluntary alms-

\textsuperscript{40} As we shall see in sections 2.4 and 2.5 below, even practically minded reformers like de Giginta and Peréz de Herrera failed to establish a functional and cost-effective system which would discriminate between genuine paupers and morally corrupt imitators.

\textsuperscript{41} Soto, \textit{Deliberación}, p. 88: ‘tengo miedo que ni con toda esta diligencia y cuidado de examinar los légitimos pobres, se consiga del todo este fin … que no haya ladrones y malos en el reino.’

\textsuperscript{42} For a thorough study of de Robles and his tract, see José Antonio Maravall, ‘De la misericordia a la justicia social en la economía del trabajo: La obra del Fray Juan de Robles’, in \textit{Utopía y reformismo en España de los Austrias}, ed. by José Antonio Maravall, Madrid, 1982, pp. 207–246.
giving. His priority was to establish a centralised and secular system of poor relief, adjusted to the new challenges of the modern world. At the centre of his reform plans were work-houses in which paupers would receive assistance, employment and education. Vives’s influence is evident; but in contrast to Vives’s tract, the phenomenon of beggarly dis/simulation was of crucial importance for de Robles. His view reflected the consensus of the time that there was an epidemic of idleness. In line with early modern political theory, de Robles was primarily concerned with the well-being and stability of the state. In his decidedly macro-economic point of view, the individual remained in the background. According to de Robles:

… although some people do right in giving alms to everyone asking for them in the name of God …, nevertheless, for the good government of the republic, it should be guaranteed that the people who ask for alms are those who really are in need and thus have the right to beg.

Here, false poverty was not only a moral problem but also formed part of the agenda of the early modern state. De Robles vehemently censured any form of beggarly ruses – out of genuine compassion for the deserving poor. ‘Jugar los pobres’ – playing the part of the poor – represented for him an existential threat to the truly needy, who are forced to compete with cunning rogues for alms which are vital for their existence. Since the medieval charity system had failed to come up with a remedy for paupers, it was the responsibility of the government to put an end to this injustice and to guarantee a fair distribution of alms. Referring to de Soto’s treatise, he also warned against the

43 Juan de Robles, De la orden que en algunos pueblos de España se ha puesto en la limosna para remedio de los verdaderos pobres, in El gran debate sobre los pobres en el siglo XVI, 1545, ed. by Félix Santolaria Sierra, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 115–197, at p. 129.

44 See ibid., p. 179, for de Robles’s subordination of the individual rights of the poor to the greater good: ‘la causa mas legitima que hay para quitar estas libertades es el bien publico’.

45 Ibid., pp. 122–123: ‘Y aunque las personas particulares hagan bien en dar a todos los que en el nombre de Dios les piden … pero a buena gobernación de republica pertenece proveer que no pida limosna sino quien tiene necesidad y razon de la pedir.’

46 Ibid., p. 130.
It is not good under any circumstances, but instead bad, that we obtain other people’s possessions by means of deception, even if the person possesses these things at the cost of his conscience …; nor is it good to give concessions to false paupers to do bad on the ground that the wealthy deserve to give them something in return for their own frauds and importunities.47

For de Robles, injustice should never be redressed by injustice. Regardless of the frauds within higher echelons of society, deception among vagabonds and idle beggars should not be tolerated. Apart from mentioning badges, licences and other forms of identification, de Robles did not, however, provide any constructive and detailed counter-strategies to resolve the problem.

2.4. Miguel de Giginta
Despite leading a somewhat peripheral existence in a small community in Cataluña, Miguel de Giginta (c. 1534–1588), a canon of Cathedral in Elma, acquired a reputation throughout the Hispanic kingdom with his *Tratado de remedio de pobres* of 1579. De Giginta tirelessly campaigned for the establishment of hospitals for paupers in Spanish cities such as Toledo, Madrid and Barcelona.48 He discussed the subject in the popular literary form of the dialogue, in which three interlocutors (one of whom was the spokesman of de Giginta’s project) consider the problem of begging. At the centre of his reform programme was the so-called *memorial*, a centrally organised work-house institution, with financially self-sustainable facilities which were generally in line with the recommendations of Vives and de Robles.49

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47 Ibid., p. 166: ‘en ningun caso es bien, sino mal, que con engaños saquemos a otros su hacienda, aunque el que la posea con daño de su conciencia … ni es bien que se de licencia que los falsos pobres hagan mal porque los ricos merezcan en darles por engaños o importunidades’.


49 See Santolaria Sierra’s ‘Introduction’ to Giginta, *Tractado*, pp. 17–18. Soto’s influence can also be
De Giginta’s proposals, however, appear somewhat removed from reality, if not utopian: he repeatedly stressed the practical value of his system which would abolish dis/simulation entirely. The accomplishment of his idealistic plan was connected to an even larger goal: the complete eradication of poverty and the establishment of a regimented system of mendicancy. His main argument was that when a network of memorials, in which all paupers received assistance and work, was established throughout the entire monarchy, there would be no false beggars. This vision was based on what de Giginta considered to be a simple, yet crucial, feature of his system: respecting the human rights and liberties of paupers by granting everyone – simulator or not – entry into the memorial, so that ‘each one will find there everything needed’.\(^50\)

Exit from the house would be given as freely as entry, with no one detained against their will (here de Soto’s influence becomes apparent).\(^51\)

How could this generous system extirpate all simulation at the fringes of society? According to de Giginta, the only choice left for those supported by the system was labour. Anyone refusing to participate and work was free to go, but ‘the idle ones will not be able to maintain their existence without working or serving where these houses are built’.\(^52\) Idleness, as the putative origin of beggarly frauds, was therefore rendered impossible.\(^53\) Paupers living in the memorial, were not deprived of their human right to beg; but in de Giginta’s system begging was restricted to specified days and prescribed

discerned, e.g., in his reflections on social inequalities and in his efforts to provide efficient assistance for the poor, while keeping intact their individual rights; Santolaria Sierra stresses, at p. 16, that de Giginta’s system of poor relief represents a point of equilibrium and a synthesis between the approaches of de Soto and de Robles; see also Cruz, Discourses, p. 54.

50 Giginta, Tractado, p. 67: ‘todos tendran alli lo necessario’.

51 Ibid., p. 68.

52 Ibid., p. 110: ‘no podran entreterese los baldios sin trabajar o servir, donde hubiere estas casas’; see also p. 67: ‘Y los que de aquesta comodidad no quiseren gozar, se vayan o tomen otro arbitrio de vivir, pues teniendo en ella lo necesario, no podran pedir limosna sin indicio de fingidos.’

53 See, e.g., ibid., p. 118: ‘Quitar el ocio de tantos fingidos como hay …. Se quitaran tantas y tan grandes disoluciones, como muchos de estos fingidos hacen con la desorden presente …. Veremos a muchos que parecen incurables, curar de si mismos, porque cesando la causa de la granjeria, querran mas ser sanos.’
In this way, all beggars were to be assisted, while alms-givers would be able to pursue their Christian duty of charity without worrying about imposture. Only in the utopian vision of a universal and all-encompassing system of poor relief could beggarly and roguish frauds be brought to an end. In de Giginta’s system, complete provision and full employment were the weapons against the alleged plethora of simulation.

2.5. Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera

Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera’s *Amparo de los legítimos pobres, y reducción de los fingidos* of 1598 was the last and most extensive work on poor relief in sixteenth-century Spain, composed at a time of economic crisis and political disillusion. Pérez de Herrera (1558–1620) was a successful physician; he assisted Diego de Olivares, court physician to Philip II, and from 1577 occupied the important post of the crown *protomédico* of the Spanish galleys. His responsibilities, however, went beyond those of a physician, and he also served as a strategic and military advisor. Pérez de Herrera was primarily concerned with the practical implementation of his reform plans. Although very detailed and comprehensive, his treatise was hardly innovative and was mainly based on Vives, de Robles and de Giginta. His work, however, included an aspect which had not previously been mentioned by other Spanish authors in this context. He was concerned with foreign spies, heretics and other dangerous individuals, who, disguised as pilgrims or mendicants, roamed the Spanish kingdom and endangered the political and social stability of the monarchy. This xenophobia imparted a new dimension to the problem of dis/simulation.

Pérez de Herrera’s aim was to help the genuinely destitute and sick, while simultaneously removing from Spain ‘the simulating, false, deceitful and the vagabonds, 

54 Ibid., p. 67.

55 Cavillac ‘Introduction’ to Pérez de Herrera, *Amparo*, pp. XX–XXI; this introductory essay is the most comprehensive study on Pérez de Herrera and his work. For concise discussions of the *Amparo* in English, see Cruz, *Discourses*, pp. 64–68, and Arrizabalaga, *Poor Relief*, pp. 162–173.

56 See Pérez de Herrera, *Amparo*, f. 13v: ‘que en este habito fingido han andado, y debe de andar por los reynos de V.M. algunos hereges de diferentes sectas, y espías suyas, y de Moros y Turcos, y otras gentes de leyes perniciosas y malditas’.
usurpers of the alms of the others [i.e., the deserving poor].\textsuperscript{57} He did not, however, fulfil second half of the agenda expressed in his programmatic title \textit{Amparo de los legítimos pobres, y reducción de los fingidos} (‘The Assistance of True Paupers and Subjugation of False Ones’), that is, the ‘reducción de los fingidos’. Apart from referring to well-known tactics such as individual examinations of beggars and the use of licences and badges, the treatise had only one additional method to offer, which was of doubtful efficacy: to ask suspicious individuals to recite the ‘Ave Maria’ and the ‘Pater Noster’.\textsuperscript{58} Describing how he had unmasked numerous simulators in this way, Pérez de Herrera explained that ‘it is an easy thing to examine and to cause shame in them using Christian doctrine’.\textsuperscript{59} Failing to recite his prayers, the suspect revealed his deceitful scheme. This method had two obvious flaws: firstly, the interrogation applied only to simulators dressed as pilgrims or mendicants from religious orders. Secondly, it did not take into account the likelihood that all vagrants and beggars, including fake ones, would have been able to recollect these prayers, which were part of every Christian child’s education.

2.6. Virtuous disguises
The recurrent problem of \textit{pobres vergonzantes}, or the shame-faced poor, is another interesting nexus between mendicancy and dis/simulation. It was generally agreed that they deserved special treatment and a privileged position among paupers.\textsuperscript{60} The otherwise controversial notion of dissembling acquired a positive connotation when applied to them. The habitual disguises of shame-faced paupers were widely tolerated and were even praised as signs of moral rectitude. Too proud to beg, too virtuous to feign and too law-abiding to steal, the \textit{pobres vergonzantes} were thought to deserve

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., f. 7': ‘quitar de España los fingidos, falsos, engañosos, y vagabundos, usurpadores de la limosina de los otros’.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., f. 4'.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.: ‘Y en lo de la dotrina cristiana, es facil cosa examinarlos y averiguarlos.’

\textsuperscript{60} The figure of the \textit{envergonzante} was especially typical of Catholic countries; see Arrizabalaga, \textit{Poor Relief}, p. 154.
special assistance. De Soto also took the situation of shame-faced paupers very seriously and warned that they should be treated with great discretion, since they ‘would prefer to suffer hunger rather than reveal it [their poverty]’. And, indeed, we encounter precisely this situation in the original picaresque novel Lazarillo del Tormes (1554), in which Lazarillo’s master is an impoverished hidalgo and a colourful example of a pobre vergonzante. Hunger is the leitmotif of the narrative, in which Lazarillo has to navigate his way through the hardships of life, quickly and painfully acquiring practical wisdom in order to survive. Serving his new master in Toledo does not fill his empty stomach. The hidalgo lives in an empty house and struggles to cope with nagging hunger on a daily basis. Unwilling to work – an occupation he considers unworthy of his social standing – he orders Lazarillo to procure food, in any way possible, however devious. Meanwhile, he strolls up and down the crowded plazas of Toledo with an assumed air of civility and elegance.

The unknown author of Lazarillo produced an ironic depiction of the tragi-comic figure of the impoverished hidalgo, guided by vanity and hypocrisy, and stripped of the ideal of honourable and virtuous dissimulation. Crudely realistic in tone, the novel exposed the intrinsic contradictions between the master’s outright poverty and his deplorable attempts to maintain a public aura of nobility. Lazarillo’s master refuses to beg or steal; but he does not disapprove of such methods if they turn out to be beneficial for him. In fact, he constantly tricks the inexperienced Lazarillo in order not to have to share food with him.

2.7. The end of innocent misericordia?

Early modern discussions of beggarly dis/simulation focused one-sidedly on the recipients of alms and their abuse of the charity system. Yet, practical guidance for alms-

61 Pérez de Herrera, Amparo, ff. 30r–36r, discusses the problem of shame-faced paupers in detail.

62 Soto, Deliberación, p. 35: ‘… que prefieran padecer hambre antes que publicarla’.

63 See Chapter 3 below, section 3.7.

givers also seemed indispensable, so that they would not fall into the traps set by simulators. Spanish authors agreed on the crucial importance of the virtue of *misericordia* as a pillar of Christian doctrine. The principal question was whether dubious individuals should profit from charity. Supporting a wicked beggar meant abetting the devil himself, as well as impairing the stability of the state. De Robles admonished his readers that incautious generosity was detrimental to the social order since it encouraged idle impostors.\(^6^5\) Sharp observational skills and individual prudence were therefore the new prerequisites for voluntary alms-giving.\(^6^6\) In doubtful cases, however, readers were generally advised to give alms, as we see in this recommendation of the Franciscan court preacher Gabriel de Toro:

Some healthy vagabonds come and desire to seize the support for the poor. Not content with little, they simulate … in order to obtain more; and you should not trust them too easily, neither leaving them empty-handed, nor allowing them to snatch away the support for the poor. Act so that you treat those [who simulate] humanely, without letting the needy lack necessities.\(^6^7\)

De Toro concluded: ‘See how St Ambrose wants even simulators to receive something out of humility.’\(^6^8\) The bottom line was not to withhold charity from anyone asking for help in the name of God. Nevertheless, deserving beggars should always be the principal beneficiaries of charity; so, in order to guarantee a fair distribution of resources, alms-

\(^{65}\) De Robles, *De la orden*, p. 123: ‘a buena gobernación de república pertenece proveer que no pida limosna sino quien tiene necesidad y razón de la pedir’.

\(^{66}\) Jütte, *Poverty*, p. 32, quotes from a German tract of 1533 in which alms-givers are exhorted to be attentive and prudent: ‘Wiltu almusen geben / so solt u acht nemen / wem daß gebest.’ See also Chapter 3 below, section 3.4.1.

\(^{67}\) De Toro, *Tesoro*, f. 78v: ‘Vienen algunos vagabundos sanos, y quieren evacuarse el socorro de los pobres: y no contentos con poco, fingen … por sacar mas, y no los deves creer de ligero: por de tal modo, que no vayan vazios, ni tampoco lleven despojada la sustentacion de los verdaderos pobres. De manera que uses de humanidad con estos, y no hagas falta a los necessitados.’

\(^{68}\) Ibid.: ‘Veyes como sant Ambrosio [*De officiis ministrorum*, II. 16] aun a los fingidos quiere que se les de algo por humildad.’

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givers had to evaluate prudently each new encounter with beggars.\textsuperscript{69}

Dis/simulation, however, was also linked to poor relief on another level. De Soto complained that the amount of alms distributed in the Spanish kingdom was not equivalent to the duty of a truly Christian people.\textsuperscript{70} Alms were not an outward expression of genuine concern for the poor, but instead ostentatious gestures performed in public. He argued that if all Christians had genuinely altruistic intentions, then sufficient alms for the needy would be collected; simulated and hypocritical acts of misericordia, however, brought no substantial remedy to the impoverished. De Soto was not the only one to speak out against the powerful and wealthy. In his defence of paupers, Valerio (one of the interlocutors in de Giginta’s dialogue and his spokesman) remarks on ‘the dissembling excuses’ which the rich use to avoid giving help to the needy; alms, he stresses, should be given according to ‘the precept of charity which is not simulated’.\textsuperscript{71}

2.8. One step away from utopia

Although opinions on poor relief were divided, the common denominator was a genuine preoccupation with paupers. Trying to increase the general awareness of the pressing socio-economic inequalities of their time, Spanish authors issued emphatic pleas for compassion towards the needy and, more importantly for our purposes, they gave considerable importance to the problem of dis/simulation. Distinguishing between false and genuine beggars was regarded as a key to solving the entire problem of mass poverty and, as such, became a central point in the various agendas for social reform.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{69} It would be worthwhile to compare the idea of an increasingly prudent form of alms-giving with the thesis of the rationalisation and secularisation of charity in the early modern period; for a discussion of this historiographical concept, see Safley, \textit{The Reformation of Charity}, pp. 1–14.

\textsuperscript{70} Soto, \textit{Deliberación}, p. 77: ‘es cosa cierta y averiguada que todas cuantas limosnas se hacen en cualquier lugar del reino a verdaderos y falsos pobres no igualan con mucho a lo que son obligados a hacer los cristianos’.

\textsuperscript{71} Giginta, \textit{Tractado}, p. 192: ‘las excusas dobladas’; ‘con del precepto de la caridad no fingida’.

\textsuperscript{72} See, e.g., Peréz de Herrera, \textit{Amparo}, f. 30\textsuperscript{r}: ‘espero en Dios que ha de resultar un gran efecto, porque estos verdaderos pobres, asi por ser su numero menor, pues por esta razon han de juntar limosna en abundancia’; and ff. 35\textsuperscript{r}–36\textsuperscript{r}.
Once the impostors were identified and excluded from the charity system, the remaining paupers could fully profit from the assistance. The social benefits, however, would not stop at this point: knowing that all beggars were truly deserving, the populace would assist the needy with ever greater zeal.\textsuperscript{73} A poverty-free utopia, it seems, was just around the corner. What stood between this vision and reality was illicit dis/simulation.

Official controls, individual examinations, badges and licences were supposed to pierce right to the core of the problem.\textsuperscript{74} Yet badges were easily counterfeited and even extensive individual controls were not sufficient. The proposals were completely inadequate to deal with the challenge of dis/simulation: for instance, De Giginta’s plan, which was based on the utopian vision of a countrywide network of \textit{memorials} harbouring all paupers, which would automatically render all deceptions ineffective. Apart from Pérez de Herrera, none of the Spanish authors gave precise descriptions of the different ruses adopted by beggars. This is a fundamental difference from the detailed accounts which featured in sixteenth-century beggar literature and rogue pamphlets. These (semi-) fictional texts not only entertained their readers but were also intended to instruct readers and help them to cope with beggarly dis/simulation at the margins of society.

We should not, however, assume that the absence of descriptions of the ruses practised by beggars in Spanish tracts implies that they took a superficial approach to the problem. Rather, it was because such instructions were not required: Spanish reformers placed the problem of dis/simulation at the centre of their debates, but they viewed it from a strictly governmental perspective. Impostors were to be detected by deputies or other officials of the state, not by individual citizens. This helps to explain why Spanish writers provided very limited practical guidance for readers on how to deal with beggars. Discussing the importance of the individual human rights of beggars, Pérez de Herrera stresses that only designated local authorities should examine paupers and that no chance person ‘occupies himself with examining paupers ... since it is not his responsibility’.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., f. 152\textsuperscript{v}.


\textsuperscript{75} Pérez de Herrera, \textit{Amparo}, sig. K4: ‘que es bien que ninguna persona particular se entretema en
Precisely because it was elevated to a matter of state concern in sixteenth-century Spain, beggarly dis/simulation had to be eliminated by officially administered means. Frustrated by the continuing economic decadence of the Spanish empire, Pérez de Herrera discussed the issue in one of his last works, which he addressed directly to Philip III and not to a wider readership, as, for example, Martin Luther did in his famous edition and German translation of the Liber vagatorum. Yet the few practical counter-strategies spelled out by Pérez de Herrera and other Spanish writers could not resolve the problem. De Soto did not hesitate to reveal his scepticism about the efficacy of governmental programmes aimed at eliminating false mendicancy. And he perhaps gave the most adequate answer to the intricate dilemma of simulated poverty. Rather than adding his voice to the chorus of anti-mendicant polemics, he tried to challenge established views on beggars and to shed light on the socio-economic conditions in which these cunning survival strategies were embedded. And instead of putting forward debatable reform plans, he reconsidered the whole issue, concluding that it amounted to committing pias fraudes – ‘pious frauds’.

examinar los pobres … pues no les toca’.

76 On the Liber vagatorum, see Chapter 3 below, section 3.4.1. In this later tract, the problem of dis/simulation was still at the centre of his reform agenda; however, in addition to simulated mendicancy, he identified the lavish courtly apparatus as the second key problem to the financial collapse of the kingdom: see Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera, Al Catolico y poderosíssimo Rey de las Españas, y del Nuevo Mundo, don Felipe III ... epílogo y suma de los discursos que escríuió el amparo y redución de los pobres mendigantes, y los demás destos reynos, y de la fundacion delos albergues y casas de reclusion y galera para las mugeres vagabundas y delinquentes dellos, Madrid, 1608, sig. C1r: ‘Porque este daño ha nacido principalmente de dos cosas. La una de la gran ociosidad de mucha gente ordinaria, assi de la mendiguez fingida … . La otra, de los muchos y extraordinarios gastos, en trages, comidas, superfluas, criados y otras cosas.’
Chapter 3

*Delle astutie de’ mendicanti, pitocchi e forfanti* – ‘On the Scams of Mendicants, Rogues and Scoundrels’:
The Ubiquity of Dis/simulation at the Fringes of Early Modern Society

3.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way in which different early modern works depicted the lower strata of contemporary society as a breeding ground of illicit dis/simulation and culturally stereotyped members of the lower social strata as disreputable impostors and lowly criminals.\(^1\) While in the previous chapter I discussed the nexus between mendicancy and dis/simulation with regard to debates on poor relief in Spain, in this one I shall examine a broader European context.

Due to the contemporary political landscape of Western Europe, the ties between Spain and the Catholic parts of the Low Countries were particularly strong. A highly urbanised and economically advanced region in the sixteenth century, the Low Countries not only witnessed the accumulation of wealth by an élite, but also became a site of severe poverty and social inequality.\(^2\) Controversies over mendicancy and social welfare were the natural outcome of these socio-economical discrepancies. Christianus Cellarius (d. 1554), a little-known professor of Greek at the University of Louvain,\(^3\) held views on this issue which were hardly ground-breaking; yet his contribution to the debate is nonetheless worth considering. His first publication on the subject was a short piece entitled *Oratio pro pauperibus, ut eis liceat mendicare* of 1530, in which he adamantly

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1 For a concise overview of the perception of lower and marginalised social groups in the early modern period, see Peter Burke, *The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication*, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 63–75.

2 The same applied to southern German cities such as Strasbourg, Nuremberg and Augsburg. Along with Flanders, these were the first European cities to introduce new poor laws in the first half of the sixteenth century. The famous *Basler Betrügnisse der Gyler*, which described dis/simulations of false beggars and rogues, dating back to as early as the first half of the fifteenth century, should also be mentioned here. Despite its title, this historical document was originally commissioned by the council of Strasbourg, and not in Basel; the city of Strasbourg passed the material on to the magistrates of Basel and Berne.

rejected the new laws which established the secularisation and centralisation of poor relief in Ypres. Only a year later, however, he unexpectedly performed a volte-face and wrote a second tract, with the telling title *Oratio contra mendicitatem pro nova pauperum subventione*, in support of the new mendicant laws. Since we know almost nothing about the circumstances of his life, we remain in the dark as to why Cellarius retracted his earlier stance.⁴

Yet, even though the two tracts represented entirely opposing positions, they both took a similar approach towards the problem of simulated poverty: whether preaching about the right of paupers to beg freely or supporting reforms to secularise the outdated medieval system, Cellarius consistently condemned able-bodied beggars who deceive the populace. Dis/simulation, in his opinion, was an illicit instrument for the pursuit of an idle and parasitical existence, which, regardless of the institutionalised form of poor relief, should be abolished. This was not simple to achieve, however, as Cellarius himself admitted, noting that impostors ‘lead people around by the nose’ with ‘a thousand ruses’,⁵ including magistrates and other officials: ‘Isn’t it’, he asked, ‘very difficult for the dispensers, even though they have long experience in this art, to detect someone who simulates and feigns?’⁶ Cellarius, seemingly bereft of ideas as to how solve this problem, added that even when ‘a magistrate is vigilant and diligent in restraining and punishing crimes’, these frauds may ‘overwhelm his efforts’.⁷

The treatises of Gilles Wyts and of Lorenzo de Villavicencio were reactions to new legislation in Bruges some thirty years later. In 1562, Wyts, a pensionary of the city, wrote *De continendis et alendis domi pauperibus et in ordine redigendis validis mendicantibus* (‘On Maintaining and Nourishing Paupers at Home and Keeping Beggars

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⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Christianus Cellarius, *Oratio contra mendicitatem pro nova pauperum subventione*, Antwerp, 1531, sig. C1: ‘Nam cutem visco et farina incrustatam, cruore pingere, morbum ac debilitatem membrorum fingere, miserabiles tabellas ab aliquo impostore conscriptas circumferre, mille prestigiis homines simplices, quid dixi, simplices? Imo etiam vafros circumtondere tantum lusu est.’

⁶ Ibid., sig. B4: ‘An tam difficile dispensatoribus in hac arte exercitatissimis deprehendere quid quisque simulet quod fingat?’

⁷ Ibid.: ‘Audi nunc iam, vigilat quidem magistratus, in cohercendis et puniendis flagitiis diligens est, sed imposturae istae vincunt studia illius.’
Able to Work in Order’), in which he defended the new secularised systems of poor relief. Radicalising the comparatively mild reformist ideas of Vives, on which his own tract was heavily based, Wyts argued that welfare should be restricted to local poorhouses maintained by secular institutions. More importantly for this dissertation, however, is the fact that he took the problem of feigned poverty very seriously and also displayed his awareness of the famous Liber vagatorum. Wyt’s reference to this treatise is an example of the intersections between what can roughly be divided into high and popular literature.

Lorenzo de Villavicencio (d. 1583), a Spanish Augustinian friar who lived for many years in the Low Countries and later became court preacher to Philip II, issued a radical invective against Vives, whose reform ideas he dismissed as heretical, and, even more strongly, against Wyts, whom he accused of collusion with the municipal authorities. His De oeconomia sacra circa pauperum curam a Christo instituta (‘On the Sacred Economy Instituted by Christ concerning the Care of the Poor’) of 1564, was marked by Counter-Reformation zeal and strong anti-Protestant sentiments. With regard to the social problem of poverty, de Villavicencio categorically rejected any secularised governmental reforms, which, in his eyes, were an unacceptable infringement of the ecclesiastical right to supervise the assistance of paupers. He stressed the dignity of paupers as followers of Christ and argued that examinations of paupers were illegitimate; pious charity should always govern the deeds of men. He, nonetheless, found it necessary to distinguish between deserving and undeserving paupers,

8 See, e.g., Gilles Wyts, De continendis et alendis domi pauperibus et in ordine redigendis validis mendicantibus, Antwerp, 1562, f. 61v.

9 Ibid., f. 53v: ‘Extat in eam sententiam libellus Germanicus de flagitiis et imposturis mendicorum, cuius autor se dicit expertum in trufis’; see also f. 36r. For the Liber vagatorum, see section 3.4.1 below.

10 Villavicencio’s extensive discussion of the tracts of Vives and Wyts takes up a third of his treatise.

11 For the Augustinian Lorenzo de Villavicencio, this was just the beginning of a larger and more alarming campaign in which the worldly powers – in this case the city council of Bruges – would try to seize ecclesiastical possessions; see his De oeconomia sacra circa pauperum curam a Christo instituta, Antwerp, 1564, p. 145: ‘Cuperent senatores in suam potestatem rerum ecclesiasticarum dominium et possessionem redigere.’

12 E.g., ibid., pp. 105–107.
condemning ‘idle and roaming vagrants … who hang about the whole city all day long’. Thus, both Wyts and Villavicencio, whose views were otherwise diametrically opposed, acknowledged the relevance of the problem of dis/simulation, although they did not discuss this issue in detail. As theologians engaged in a confessional debate, rather than practically minded reformers, they did not attempt to tackle the problem or try to resolve it. Yet, as we have seen, reformers like Perez de Herrera failed, however, to make a substantial contribution to solving this problem.

3.2. European voices
The problem of dis/simulation at the fringes of society not only transcended confessional boundaries but was also widely discussed in different literary genres in all of Western Europe. The sources discussed in the previous chapter and in the first part of this one were learned treatises (mainly theological), whereas we now move on to satirical and didactic works. Yet the perception of false mendicants remained largely unchanged whatever the genre. Literary depictions of beggarly and roguish dis/simulation tended to be generic and repetitive. Stereotypical as they tended to be, however, it seems plausible to assume that these texts had a considerable impact on the general perception of marginalised social groups and reinforced established perceptions among a large readership.

13 Ibid., p. 187: ‘otiosos ac vagos errone … qui in civitate tota die otiosi stetissent’.

14 For a detailed discussion of Wyts and Villavicencio, see Michele Fatica, Il problema della mendacità nell’Europa moderna, Naples, 1992, pp. 119–160.


16 A good example is Sebastian Brant’s commentary on Aesop’s fables; see Sebastian Brant, Fabeln, ed. and transl. by Bernd Schneider, Stuttgart, 1999, p 189, in which he addressed the problem of feigned poverty: ‘De eo qui liberavit hospitale a sordidis mendicantibus. / Egroti plures se fingunt, quo magis illis
Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1483–1535) devoted a chapter of his *De incertitudine et vanitate omnium scientiarum* of 1527 to false beggars, in his eyes, the ‘moste wicked kinde of beggars, [which is] not to be pitied’. He linked false mendicants to a number of felonies and crimes. Other authors, as we shall see, also adopted similar uncompromising stances, for example, Ambrosius Pape (1553–1612), a pastor from a small town near Magdeburg, who portrayed beggars as the devil’s minions in his *Bettel- und Garteteuffel* of 1586. In his opinion, vagrants, beggars and roaming mercenaries (*Landsknechte*) imposed a great ‘burden and hardship on the poor peasantry’. Pape wanted not only to free local communities from vagrants and beggars, but also to open naïve almsgivers’ eyes to beggarly frauds and dis/simulations, so that they ‘may realise that giving alms indiscriminately to any beggar does not mean earning...

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/ \text{Prestetur tenius absque labore cibus. / Sepius infirmus petit hospitale dolosus / Prerpienis miseris pauperibusque cibum. / Mendicant validi plures, qui prorsus ab urbe / Pellendi et digni verbere iure forent. Crura ligant, baculis graduintur et ulcerà multi / Unguine conficiunt. Quam cruce digna cohors!} \]


God’s reward’. Nevertheless, he advised his readers that ‘it is better to be deceived than to deceive . . . . So whenever someone asks you for alms and you do not know what to think of him, whether he is pious or sinful, . . . give him [alms].’

Although he insisted on the general obligation to give alms even in doubtful cases, Pape emphasised the importance of distinguishing between true and false mendicants. As we have seen, most of the suggestions offered by contemporaries were ineffective, and Pape’s were no exception. In a suggestion which was reminiscent of Perez de Herrera’s advice to make suspicious individuals recite prayers, he advised that itinerant students should be asked which lectiones they attended and who their praeceptor was. Rather than putting forward any further concrete and constructive strategies for unmasking pretenders, Pape appealed passionately to local authorities, urging them to take action against this evil. For him, illicit disguises and pretences at the fringes of society went beyond the problem of beggars trying to lure coins out of almsgivers’ pockets; for him, they were instruments of nefarious plots used by strolling

20 Ibid., p. 30: ‘Das fromme und einfeltige hertzen / ja insbesonderheit die bloeden / furchtsamen und verzagten… verstehen muegen / das es nicht ein Gotts lohn verdienen heisse / eim jedern und allen Bettlern ohn unterschied seine Allmosen spenden.’

21 Ibid., pp. 240–241: ‘Melius est decipi quam decipere… . So jemand dich umb ein Almosen anspricht / und du weist nicht / was du von im halten solt / ob er ein frommer / oder boeser Mensch sey / weil ers so kleglich machen kan / so gib ihm / denn es ist dir nuetzer / das du unwissen / das er ein Droch ist / ihm mittheilest / als du ihm das Almosen versagest in meinung / er wer ein Luegner und betriger.’

22 Ibid., p. 246.

23 Pape admitted, ibid., pp. 111–112, that he was taken in by the deception of a false vagrant preacher. This could be an allusion to Luther’s admission, in the preface to his edition of the Liber vagatorum, that he had been deceived by beggarly ruses: ‘Ich bin selbs diese iar her also beschissen und versucht von solchen landstreichern und zungendresschern, mehr denn ich bekennen wil’: see Martin Luther, Von der falschen Bettler und Büberei, in his Gesammelte Werke, XXVI, Weimar, 1909, pp. 634–654, at p. 639.

24 See Chapter 2 above, section 2.5.


26 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 213 and 219–221.
South of the Alps, the issue was depicted with a somewhat lighter touch. Tomaso Garzoni, in his popular *La piazza universale* of 1585, rather than portraying simulating beggars as a social threat, stated that they ‘more worthy of being laughed at and derided than pitied’. Similarly, the discussion of feigned poverty in the voluminous *Discorsi morali contra il dispiacer del morire, detto Athanatophilia*, by the physician and scholar Fabio Glissenti (c. 1542– c. 1615), was not particularly harsh in tone. In this humanist treatise of 1596 on the *ars moriendi*, a courtier and a philosopher search for a prudent man who will scorn life and seek death. As they look among different professions in contemporary Venice, they encounter a beggar, whom the philosopher considers to be a truly wise man because he assumes him to despise his miserable earthly existence. The worldly wise courtier, however, sees through the pretence of the beggar and announces: ‘I can tell you about these types, who are mostly liars, pretenders, hypocrites, insidious and fraudulent.’ The beggar happily reveals his
true identity and the well-known secrets of his craft, to which Glissenti devotes a separate chapter.32

3.3. Unveiling *arcana* at the fringes of society
The authors discussed so far dealt with dis/simulation on what might be called a meta-level, and few of them claimed to offer first-hand accounts. They positioned themselves at a distance from the subject and remained outside the *Lebenswelt* of the marginalised groups. Some contemporary authors, however, tried to bridge this epistemological gap or, rather, tried to give the impression of doing so. A number of authors presented themselves as reliable sources by stating that they had gained exclusive information about clandestine communities.33 The rogue pamphleteers Thomas Harman (second half of the sixteenth-century), to whom I shall return later on in this chapter,34 claimed to have elicited secrets from rogues and vagabonds who passed by his house, ‘not without faithful promise made unto them never to discover their names or anything they showed me’.35 Here, breaking an oath and disclosing secret information becomes an honourable act of betrayal done in the service of the society. The popular chapbook, *La vie genereuse des Mercelots, Gueuz et Boesmiens* (published in 1596 under the pseudonym Pechon de Ruby) also purported to unveil secrets from the underground.36 The author

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32 Ibid., f. 81v: ‘Delle astutie de’ Mendicanti, Pitocchi, e Forfanti, e come sono scaltriti nel l’essercitio loro, e come simulando vanno inganando il mondo’. The chapter does not, however, merit further discussion since it lacks any originality or depth.

33 For one of the earliest examples (first published in 1512), see Thomas Murner’s satirical and didactic poem *Schelmenzunft*, Augsburg, 1926, sigs A3v–A4v: ‘das ich dich yetz kan leeren schon / Vor den schelmen dich bewaren / das dir nichts laid moecht widerfaren … Volg meiner leer / und acht mein schreiben’.

34 See section 3.5 below.


36 See Pechon de Ruby, *La vie genereuse des Mercelots, Gueuz, et Boesmiens, contenans leur façon de
gives a lively account of his roguish life in the form of a supposedly reliable first-hand account and emphasises that he had to take an oath ‘never to reveal the secret to a living soul’.\textsuperscript{37}

In his \textit{Des monstres et prodiges} of 1573, Ambrose Paré (1510–1590) assumed the role of a ‘detective-physician’. One might not expect this curious technical treatise, combining medicine, demonology, scientific knowledge, storytelling and moralising, to contain a discussion of dis/simulation. Yet, among Paré’s accounts of birth defects, anomalies and disorders, supernatural occurrences and monstrosities, we encounter several chapters on able-bodied and simulating beggars. Paré, chief surgeon to Charles IX and a member of the royal council, was an empiricist and a practical man, who attempted to penetrate the hidden causes of phenomena; but, in contrast to other cases for which he provided medical and physiological explanations, Paré linked the simulated physical deformations of mendicants to ‘the artifice of wicked spital beggars.’\textsuperscript{38} In crudely realistic and coarse prose, he told a story about a false mendicant who feigned that the rotten arm of a hanged man was his own.\textsuperscript{39} We also learn about Paré’s brother, a surgeon from Vitré (Brittany), who detected the ‘imposture of a woman beggar who pretended to have a cancer on her breast’.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} De Ruby, \textit{La vie genereuse}, p. 63: ‘sur la vie de ne declarer le secret à homme vivant’.


\textsuperscript{39} Paré, \textit{Des monstres}, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{40} Paré, \textit{On Monsters}, p. 75; Paré, \textit{Des monstres}, p. 70: ‘L’imposture d’une belitresse feignant avoir un chancre en la mammelle’. Other scams included hiding a small pump which excreted liquid under one’s arm pit or placing various layers of frog skin on one’s body in order to appear ill; see pp. 70–73.
Unlike rogue pamphleteers, however, Paré did not exaggerate the deceptive powers of beggars and rogues but instead described how he had exposed one crafty scam after another. Specific medical knowledge and sharp observational skills were of crucial importance in unveiling cunning dis/simulations which might otherwise remain unnoticed. The robust physique of a woman was, for Paré, the key indication that her pretence to physical infirmity was false. In another case, a person’s healthy facial colour revealed the fraud. Paré examined physical appearances without being deceived by bodily deformations or incapacities which might have aroused the pity of others. The fight against unlawful dis/simulation did not stop here, however. Paré reported how he, his brother and various colleagues assisted the authorities who had brought in suspicious-looking beggars for examination. As we have seen in Chapter 2, physicians played an important part in contemporary reform plans to abolish false mendicancy; and some reformers such as Vives argued that paupers should only be examined by authorities with the assistance of trained physicians. Paré seems to have taken this assignment very seriously. As we shall see in Chapter 5, he was by no means the only physician to be concerned with the problem of simulated illness.

3.4. Taxonomies of dis/simulation
In a time of largely ineffective anti-mendicant and anti-vagrancy legislation, one of the most comprehensive ways of fighting impostors on the margins of society seems to have been to compile taxonomies of these types and thus to equip the populace with useful guidance. Apart from earlier, rather rudimentary, attempts by the magistrates of southern German cities to make written reports of the frauds of beggars, the most famous of which are the Basler Betrügnisse, which have already been mentioned, the first full-

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41 See section 3.5 below.

42 Paré, Des monstres, p. 76.

43 Ibid., p. 72, described the collaboration between his brother and the local authorities: ‘Parquoy s’en alla vers le Magistrat, le priant luy vouloir tenir la main pour en sçavoir la verité: ce que volontiers luy accorda, commandant qu’il fust mené en sa maison pour esprouver s’il estoit ladre.’ See also p. 74: ‘par la priere de monsieur le Baillif des pauvres, j’allay ausdites prisons pour visiter ledit maraut avec compagnie, et feismes rapport à messieurs du Bureau des pauvres de Paris’.

44 See, e.g., ibid., p. 71.
fledged taxonomy of this kind was produced by an Italian. This was the *Speculum cerretanorum*, compiled around 1584 by Teseo Pini, of whom we know very little, except that he was a doctor of canon law and a vicar in Urbino. Pini produced an extensive catalogue of the cunning disguises which he believed to exist ‘in manifold, various and diverse kinds’ (‘in plures, varias, et diversas species’) and ‘in growing numbers’ ('crescente numero').

The majority of the forty categories in Pini’s catalogue are religious impostors such as false pilgrims, holy men, prophets, relics-sellers and their likes. Other impostors included people claiming to have been held in captivity by the Turks, simulating muteness, or faking paralysis. Another noteworthy group are the false protomedici, ‘who are said to be, as it were, the princes of physicians’ and who ‘through simulated zeal and love of mankind pretend to feel compassion for people’s frailties’. Pini, furthermore, devoted considerable attention to shame-faced paupers in his taxonomy. He held the conventional view that there are ‘many noble and great men’ (‘plures nobiles et magnos viros’) who have fallen undeservedly into poverty and, embarrassed to beg, are forced to resort to disguises.

It is problematic to establish the circulation of Pini’s pamphlet in the sixteenth century, since it did not get into print until the twentieth century; but it most certainly reached a wider audience in the form of *Il Vagabondo ovvero sferza de’ bianti e vagabondi* of 1621, written by the Dominican friar Giacinto di Nobili under the pseudonym Rafaele Frianoro. This work was an almost verbatim translation of Pini’s *Speculum* and enjoyed several reprints throughout the seventeenth century. Di Nobili

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48 Ibid., p. 37. Furthermore, Pini wrote of the falpatores (falsi palpatores), who pretend to be wandering scholars, see ibid., pp. 45–47.

49 Ibid., p. 66: ‘Prothomedici, dicti sunt quasi medicorum principes. Isto simulato zelo et amore humani generis prae se ferunt condolere infirmitatibus hominum.’

50 Ibid., pp. 63–64. Pini discussed shame-faced beggars at greater length than the other types in his catalogue.
stressed that, when dealing with the practical problem of the manifold forms of dis/simulation, ‘a speculative approach is worth little’.\textsuperscript{51} Detecting impostors did not require theoretical and abstract knowledge but, above all, prudence.\textsuperscript{52}

3.4.1. The German ‘expertus in truffis’

The \textit{Liber vagatorum}, the first printed beggar pamphlet (the \textit{editio princeps} appeared in 1510), was the most widely read work of its kind.\textsuperscript{53} The author, styling himself an ‘expert in deceptions’ (‘expertus in truffis’),\textsuperscript{54} illuminated the shady world of roguish and beggarly dis/simulations for Northern European readers.\textsuperscript{55} Apart from descriptions of almost thirty types of beggars (many of which could already be found in Pini’s tract),\textsuperscript{56} the pamphlet contained a lexicon of Rotwelsch, a thieves’ argot.\textsuperscript{57}

The treatment of the subject in the \textit{Liber vagatorum} was more practical than in its Italian predecessor.\textsuperscript{58} Martin Luther translated the pamphlet into German and reprinted it in 1528 under the title \textit{Von der falschen Betler büeberey}. In his view, the main function of this slim volume was to sharpen the practical wisdom and observational skills of readers. He concluded the account of each category of simulator with a recommendation

\textsuperscript{51} Friaroro, \textit{Il Vagabondo}, p. 93: ‘poco vale la speculativa, essendo in loro maggiore la pratica’.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 165.


\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Liber vagatorum}, Nuremberg, 1510, sig. A1\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{55} Apart from the Latin and German editions, the pamphlet was also translated into Dutch.

\textsuperscript{56} For a complete list of all the beggarly types from the \textit{Liber}, see Jütte, \textit{Abbild}, pp. 67–69 and 73–105.

\textsuperscript{57} Dictionaries of the Rotwelsch were also printed separately and were published well into the nineteenth century. The Italian equivalent of such German argot vocabularies was, e.g., the popular \textit{Nuovo modo de intendere la lingua zerga, cioe parlare forbescho}, Ferrara, 1545 which is sometimes attributed to Antonio Brocardo (d. 1531).

\textsuperscript{58} The \textit{Liber}, e.g., lacks the etymological and historical commentaries found in the \textit{Speculum} and does not feature the lengthy anecdotes included by Pini.
for appropriate alms-giving. In some cases, readers were also left to assess the situation according to their own judgement.

Anxiety about the roguish and beggarly dis/simulations continued in the seventeenth century. In 1659 Ahasverus Fritsch, an important jurist of his day, wrote the *Tractatus theologico-nomico-politicus de mendicantibus validis*, in which he discussed the subject. Fritsch argued that, in doubtful cases, suspects should be examined by magistrates and other officials; in contrast to Pérez de Herrera, however, he thought that ‘the individual citizen’ (‘privatus’) could also examine beggars and might even ‘touch the supposed swellings and empty eye-sockets of the [mendicant’s] body [to establish] whether they are real and natural or feigned and superficial.’ Concerns about these issues remained alive well into the age of Enlightenment and even beyond.

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63 Among later taxonomies of rogues and beggars was the anonymous *Der Alten und Neuen Spitzbuben und Betrieger Bößhafte Gewissenlose Practiquen und anderer vielen List- und Lustigen Welt-Händeln* Hamburg, 1700, which was partly based on an earlier German translation of François de Calvi’s (possibly a pseudonym) collection of stories and accounts of criminals and villains, which was published under the title *Beutelschneider, oder neue warhaffte und eigentliche Beschreibung der Diebs Historien*, Frankfurt am Main, 1627. Another example is Johann Ulrich Schöll, *Abriß des Jauner und Bettelwesens*, Stuttgart, 1793. For the nineteenth century, see, e.g., Friedrich Avé-Lallement’s voluminous *Das deutsche Gaunertum in seiner sozialpolitischen, literarischen und linguistischen Ausbildung zu seinem heutigen Bestande*, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1858.
3.5. The industry of ‘deep dissimulation’

English rogue pamphlets shared many characteristics with Continental European literature on beggars. The term rogue literature denotes, rather loosely, a number of popular vernacular pamphlets and chapbooks which flourished in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England. Oscillating between moralising and entertainment, these texts recounted innumerable, often clearly imaginary, dis/simulations and deceptions. Sensationalist writers like Robert Greene (1558–1592) and Thomas Dekker (1572–1632) understood their audience’s predilections and satisfied popular taste with supposedly new stories from the underworld.

Like many Continental authors, English rogue pamphleteers claimed to have infiltrated the twilight world of underground communities, carrying out what might be described as ethnological and scientific field work. It is impossible to determine to the

64 For this phrase, see Harman, A Caveat, in The Elizabethan Underworld, ed. Judges, p. 62.

65 The additions and augmentations in John Awdeley’s The Fraternity of Vagabonds, London, 1561, e.g., only outwardly veiled its close links to the Liber vagatorum. Using the same structure and listing many similar types of able-bodied miscreant who practised simulation, Awdeley, a London printer and writer of miscellaneous texts, produced a work strikingly reminiscent of the Liber. The extent to which the English pamphleteers were familiar with Continental European books on beggars, however, remains unclear. Apart from the widely disseminated Liber vagatorum, these works were unlikely to have circulated on the English book market. English rogue pamphlets have received increasing scholarly attention in recent years; for a collection of various theoretical and critical approaches to this genre, see Craig Dionne and Steve Mentz (eds), Rogues and Early Modern English Culture, Ann Arbor MI, 2004. Linda Woodbridge, Vagrancy, Homelessness, and English Renaissance, Urbana IL, 2001, discusses rogue literature in several socio-cultural and literary contexts.

66 The genre of rogue pamphlets, often treated as a homogeneous corpus of texts, should be divided into beggar books and conny-catching pamphlets. Pugliatti, Beggary and Theatre, p. 126, argues – not entirely convincingly – that the two subgenres do not belong to the same literary tradition; it is more important for our purposes, however, that dis/simulation is a significant topos uniting the narratives of both types of text.

67 A text characterised by a stern and moralising tone is O per se O, London, 1612, attributed to Thomas Dekker (1570–1632), while Robert Greene’s rogue pamphlets, especially his A Disputation Between a He-Conny-Catcher and a She-Conny-Catcher, London, 1592, are more light-hearted.

68 According to Gilbert Walker, A Manifest Detection of Dice-Play, in The Elizabethan Underworld, ed. Judges, pp. 26–50, at p. 35, the secrets of the craft of conny-catchers and rogues were still ‘not commonly
extent to which these authors drew on empirical observation and first-hand information; but we should take into consideration that we are dealing with narratives which blurred the boundaries between reporting, fictionalising and exaggerating. In any case, these texts should not be regarded as socio-historical sources which present history from below. Yet, even so, they represent interesting works which, despite – or perhaps precisely because of – their sweeping generalisations and culturally stereotyped characters, can tell us a great deal about contemporary perceptions of marginal social groups in the urban space.

Leaving aside the question of whether these texts featured information which was, purposefully or not, deficient and distorted, I would like to stress that the English pamphleteers tried to create an effect of realism, employing the language of empiricism in their accounts. The impact they might have had on their readership could well have been just as strong as actual first-hand reports, for even well-educated readers might have been taken in by the illusion of realism (as were, in fact, modern scholars until not long ago). I have excluded dramatic texts from my analysis, many of which placed dis/simulation centre stage, often featuring scenes with false mendicants and other impostors resembling those described in rogue pamphlets. A fundamental difference known’; see also p. 36. We encounter similar claims in later conny-catching pamphlets, e.g., Harman, A Caveat, pp. 134 and 143.

As the genre became increasingly conventionalised and stylised, some late pamphlets were clearly fictional: William Fennor’s The Counter’s Commonwealth, or a Voyage Made to an Infernal Island, London, 1617; and Thomas Dekker’s pamphlets, e.g., his Bellman of London, London, 1607, and his Lanthorne or Candle-Light, London, 1608. In addition, later rogue pamphleteers often reworked and mined earlier texts: e.g., Mihil Munchance, London, 1597, was basically a copy of Gilbert Walker’s A Manifest Detection of Dice-Play, London, 1552, written as a report rather than in the form of a dialogue, and introduced with a few new opening remarks; while The Groundworke of Conny-Catching, London, 1592, was heavily based on Harman’s pamphlet. Another noteworthy example is Dekker, who in his Bellman and Lanthorne heavily plagiarised earlier rogue pamphleteers, above all, Harman.

This has been done, however, by earlier (and even recent) historians, who tended to treat rogue pamphlets as credible historical documents.


Carroll, Fat King, pp. 127–207, discusses these similarities at length; Woodbridge, Vagrancy, pp. 206–
between the two genres, however, is that while plays do not try to appear as something other than theatrical performances and are, correspondingly, perceived by the audience as such, rogue pamphlets, lacking this meta-level of theatrical disposition, radiate, to use Pugliatti’s phrase, the ‘odour of authenticity’ and realism.73

English pamphleteers exaggerated the threat posed by false beggars, rogues and conny-catchers, bestowing a new relevance and urgency on their texts. Oscillating between detached admiration and lofty disdain, Gilbert Walker declared that feigning and disguise had ‘in a few years grown to the body of an art … [which] augmented little by little, at last grew to perfection’.74 Thomas Harman, in his influential A Caveat or Warening for Common Cursitors Vulgarly Called Vagabones of 1566, described roguish ruses and deceptions as ‘marvellous subtle and crafty’.75 Harman was a wealthy gentleman who, forced to stay at home for health reasons, occupied himself by observing and interviewing ‘many of these wily wanderers’ who passed by his estate.76 The result was the Caveat, a lengthy anatomy of roguary. Although structurally similar to previous works of this kind, Harman’s pamphlet distinguished itself by an air of contemporaneity, featuring lively short stories and anecdotes, as well as an alphabetical


73 See Pugliatti, Beggary and Theatre, p. 141.


75 Harman, A Caveat, in The Elizabethan Underworld, ed. Judges, p. 62. Modern scholars consider this text to be the ‘authentic’ example of the subgenre; arguing that Harman’s pamphlet is ‘a singularly remarkable cultural document’, Pugliatti Beggary and Theatre, pp. 135 and 141–142, maintains that Harman stands out among the other rogue pamphleteers by uniting the narrator and the narrated persona into a single figure. He was, furthermore, the only English rogue pamphleteer who was not a professional writer. For a detailed and recent discussion of A Caveat, see A. L. Beier, ‘New Historicism, Historical Context, and the Literature of Roguery: The Case of Thomas Harman Reopened’, in Rogues and Early Modern English Culture, ed. by Craig Dionne and Steve Mentz, Ann Arbor MI, 2004. pp. 98–113.

list of the names of some of ‘the most notorious and wickedest’ dissemblers.  

3.6. The art of conny-catching
In Robert Copland’s *The Highway to the Spital-House* (c. 1535–36), a fictitious dialogue written in verse, the author and a hospital porter converse about simulating beggars. They are portrayed as protean masters,

who call themselves sapient.
These ride about in many sundry wise,
And in strange array do themselves disguise,
Sometimes in manner of physician,
And another time as a heathen man,
Counterfeiting their own tongue and speech …
Then will he feign marvellous gravity.  

Evoking a rather unlikely scenario in which mendicants counterfeit almost any profession or social standing, Copland blurred the distinction between false mendicants, rogues and conny-catchers. They usually occupied different locations: beggars sat on the doorsteps of churches, while conny-catchers, that is, urban tricksters, frequented ‘places where gentlemen and other worshipful citizens do resort’, as well as inns and taverns. The most important difference between them was, however, the rationale of

77 Ibid., p. 109.
78 The porter represents the disillusioned and prudent Christian layman who is able to discern simulators among the legions of paupers, offering support only to the deserving poor. His social and anthropological knowledge is precisely what authors of taxonomies of rogues tried to impart to their readers.
their deceptions. Beggarly ruses were grounded in counterfeiting either pitiful misery or physical disability, by utilising props such as rotten cloths, crutches, bandages and so on. The rationale was to appear ‘ugly and irksome’ and to perform under ‘the pretence of great misery, diseases, and other innumerable calamities’. While some of the lowly types appeared ‘faintly and look[ed] piteously’, others applied more sophisticated dis/simulations, which demanded complete body control. The ‘Counterfeit Crank[s]’, as Awdeley put it, ‘deeply dissemble the falling sickness’ (epilepsy) and ‘marvellously for a time torment themselves’.

Seeking to increase their alms, beggars tried to exaggerate their misery by creating a sharp distinction between themselves and established members of society. Conny-catchers, by contrast, were believed to appropriate modes of behaviour and appearance reserved for members of the higher social classes, which remained inaccessible to mendicants. Since conny-catching facilitated and even enabled social mobility under false premises, it became an agent of semiotic and societal destabilisation.

*The Black Book’s Messenger*, which is usually attributed to Robert Greene, tells how a notorious impostor appeared as a respectable member of the commonwealth: ‘in outward shew a gentlemanlike companion, attired very brave’. This kind of

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dis/simulation was not only based on elegant apparel and other material signifiers of elevated social identity. The impression of ‘honesty and uprightness’ and a humble ‘outward show of simplicity’, as Walker described it in his pamphlet, was of crucial importance for replicating the mechanisms and conventions of familiar social relationships. By evoking the impression of familiarity, conny-catchers presented themselves as trustworthy and honourable people. They had to stand out, while, simultaneously, blending into their social surroundings, so as not to raise suspicion. In order to counterfeit this form of social intimacy and carry off this complex deception, a high degree of dexterity and psychological insight was indispensable.

Rhetorical skill also formed an integral part of the art of conny-catching. A passage in The Black Book’s Messenger gave an inflated account of the linguistic prowess of some conny-catchers, who were said to deceive ‘with such a grace that a very wise man he should be that did not swallow the Gudgeon [i.e., bait] at his hands’. Walker explained that the particularly gifted impostor had a ‘hundred reasons to insinuate himself into a man’s acquaintance’ at his disposal and was able to converse ingeniously on any given subject matter. Whether or not conny-catchers were really able to deploy these highly complex and sophisticated forms of false self-presentation, numerous popular pamphlets portrayed the urban space of sixteenth-century London as

87 Walker, A Manifest Deception, in The Elizabethan Underworld, ed. Judges, p. 2, portrays such an impostor as ‘fair dressed in silk, gold, and jewels, with three of four servants’; this grossly exaggerated description undercut, right from the start, the realistic dimension of his account.

88 Ibid., p. 36; see also van Elk, ‘Urban Misidentification’, p. 330. As we shall see in Chapter 4 below, courtesans used their deceptions and dis/simulations to achieve the same effect and were believed to surpass male tricksters in doing so.

89 Rhetorical dexterity did not play such an integral role in the performance of beggars, which was mainly based on visual signals. The imposture of the so-called ‘Dummerer’, e.g., was grounded on silence; see Harman, A Caveat, in The Elizabethan Underworld, ed. Judges, p. 91: ‘These dummerers are lewd and most subtle people … [who] will never speak … but will gape, and with a marvellous force will hold down their tongues doubled, groaning for your charity.’


91 Walker, A Manifest Deception, p. 47. Some rogues also supposedly resorted to casuistic strategies, using certain expressions ‘affirmatively’, while they ‘mean always directly the contrary’: p. 40.
a locus of deceitful dis/simulation and, by doing so, increased awareness of this alleged threat among their readers.

3.7 Picaresque dissemblers

Scholarship on the literary and historical aspects of the picaresque novel is vast, and this is not the place to discuss specific questions about the genre such as the reasons for its emergence and success in Spain in the sixteenth century and, later on, beyond the Iberian Peninsula. I shall therefore limit my analysis to some of the main characteristics of the semi-fictional literary character of the picar. In contrast to the noble-minded, but neither prudent nor astute hero of medieval courtly novels, the picar survived chiefly by living on his wits. Spending most of his time on the border between the lawful and the lawless, he was an accomplished master of wily and ingenious survival. Lazarillo del Tormes, the first and most famous of all Spanish picars, endured every possible hardship before eventually transcending his destitute circumstances. At the end of the original version of the novel, he secured employment as a town crier, married and gained some intellectual maturity.


93 Portrayals of the picar were not, of course, consistent, changing from one text to another; see Claudio Gullien, *Literature as a System: Essay towards the Theory of Literary History*, Princeton NJ, 1971, p. 73.


95 The hugely popular story of Lazarillo was subsequently taken over and continued by other Spanish authors, e.g., in the anonymously published *Segundo Lazarillo* of 1555; see William H. Hinrichs, *The Invention of the Sequel: Expanding Prose Fiction in Early Modern Spain*, Woodbridge, 2011.

The picar’s natural inclination to cunning and trickery was only one side of the coin; the other was the necesidad of his life. His everyday activities and daily dealings involved dis/simulation because he was born into an existence of scarcity and indigence. The picaresque hero originated from the same socio-historical context as other marginalised types; yet, while beggars and vagabonds generally appeared in the extant sources as a mass of anonymous and silent individuals who constituted the ambiguous ‘other’ within early modern society, the picaresque genre gave a voice to social outsiders such as rogues, tricksters and menial workers. Among these lowly types, the picar stood out as an everyday hero who, exposed to a harsh environment, instantly adapted to new circumstances. Acquiring new skills and knowledge, he managed to outsmart his opponents, enemies and peers.

Guzmán de Alfarache, the protagonist of Mateo Aleman’s famous picaresque novel La vida de Guzmán de Alfarache (published in Madrid in two parts, in 1599 and 1604) was a master of self-transformation, whose incarnations included a professional beggar, a nobleman and a merchant. The same can be said of the swindler Don Pablos, the protagonist of Francisco de Quevedo’s stylised picaresque novel El Buscón las cosas al oficio tocantes pasan por mi mano.’

97 See Maiorino, At the Margins, p. 99.

98 See Cruz, Discourses, p. 13. Closely linked to the picar was the cunning servant, a character who was not only popular in early modern plays, but dated back to antiquity, above all, in the writings of Plautus and Terence. In a number of early modern comedies, the wily servant was one of the lightweight characters who typically got involved in ludicrous situations, which served as the background for deceit. On the theme of dis/simulation and imposture in Renaissance comedies, see Martin Fleisher, ‘Trust and Deceits in Machiavelli’s Comedies’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 27, 1966, pp. 365–380. The cunning servant was not only a fictional character but also, of course, existed in some early modern households; on domestic servants in the early modern period from the perspective of social history, see Cissie C. Fairchilds, Domestic Enemies: Servants and Their Masters in Old Regime France, Baltimore MD, 1984 and Ann Kussmaul, Servants in Husbrandry in Early Modern England, Cambridge, 1981.

99 According to Maiorino, At the Margins, p. 22, ‘outsmarting’ was the picaresque counterpart of the humanist topos of ‘outdoing’.

100 Guzman, e.g., works as a professional beggar on several occasions; see Mateo Alemán, Guzmán de Alfarache, ed. by Benito Brancaforte, Madrid, 1996, p. 170: ‘Viendome perdido, comencé a tratar el oficio de la florida picardía’; see also chapters 2 to 5 in Book III, pp. 245–260.
Yet, despite his cunning ruses, the picaresque hero did not come across as repugnant or ruthless. The positive connotations of the *picar*, of course, depended on the literary genre in which he appeared: generally humorous and entertaining, the picaresque novel did not present the dis/simulations of the *picar* as a threat to the social and moral order, but rather as an instrument of survival and a form of defiance used by a youth struggling to stay afloat.102

3.8. Conclusion
The heterogeneous sources I have discussed in this chapter show that the early modern period was preoccupied with dis/simulation, which was thought to penetrate and invade wide swaths of society. In the collective perception of the upper social echelons, imposters were believed to be lurking, hidden under various guises, on the lower rungs of the social ladder. In satisfying the taste of a broad lay readership, a larger number of texts fuelled already existing fears. The main types, often blending into one another, were the false mendicant, the vagabond, the urban trickster or conny-catcher and other less threatening delinquents like the *picar* as social-climbing parvenu.103

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103 Two other groups can also be mentioned in this context. Firstly, according to Pugliatti, *Beggary and Theatre*, pp. 3, 7–10, strolling actors and street players were equated with beggars and rogues on account of their lack of fixed abode and their unstable and feigned identities. Secondly, Catholic exorcists and missionaries in England were perceived to have similar characteristics: e.g., Samuel Harsnett, an important figure in the Anglican Church, in his *A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures*, in Frank W. Brownlow, *Shakespeare, Harsnett and the Devils of Denham*, London, 1993, pp. 192–335, at p. 203, not only echoed contemporary diatribes against illicit beggary and roguish behaviour and warned against a number of deceptive tricks and props employed by beggars and rogues, but also repeatedly referred to the ‘cloaked dissimulation’ of exorcists; see also pp. 211 and 239, in which exorcists are described as masters of cunning concealment, who employ elaborate strategies of deception to infiltrate English society. Similar polemics can also be found in contemporary English pamphlets directed against Jesuit missionaries. As with beggars and rogues, the art of dis/simulation was perceived as a powerful tool, which, in the wrong hands, could lead to social and moral destabilisation.
It is striking that these collective anxieties and concerns about illicit dis/simulation pervaded so many different literary genres, including scholarly debates and humanist didactic-satirical literature, on the one hand, and vernacular chapbooks, popular pamphlets and fictional narratives, on the other. They by large re-enforced stereotypes and tended to simplify complex socio-economical realities, conveying the impression of the alleged ubiquity of dis/simulation and an ‘industry’ of deception at the fringes of society. The porter in Copland’s *Highwayman* claimed that simulators ‘loiter in every way and street / in towns and churches, whereas people meet’.

Walker stated in his pamphlet, *A Manifest Deception*, that ‘sleight and crafty deceit … is now common in every corner’ and that ‘the contagion of cheating is now so universal that they [rogues etc.] swarm in every quarter, and therefore ye cannot be in safety from deceit’. In this context, the issue of dis/simulation extended well beyond poor relief. It was a vexing matter in connection with social and moral stability, as well involving fundamental problems of (mis)identification.

Erasmus’s colloquy ‘The Well-To-Do Beggars’ raised a fundamental question which all the works examined in this chapter touched on to some degree. An inn-keeper is reluctant to provide shelter for two mendicant friars; this leads to a discussion about how to discriminate ‘the good sort [of mendicant monks] among so many bad ones’. One of the friars reveals to the inn-keeper the secret of how to identify dissemblers. The reader, however, is not let in on the secret. This may have been Erasmus’s way of acknowledging, like Domingo de Soto some twenty years later, the difficulties of detecting simulators. Beggar and rogues pamphlets, nonetheless, purported to be based on first-hand observation; their authors presented themselves as *experti in truffis* who brought to light hidden secrets related to illicit dis/simulations.


107 See Chapter 2 above, section 2.3

108 Taking into account the elements of fiction, mystification and imitation, if not outright plagiarism,
At the same time, the dissemination of this information was regarded as an effective counter-strategy against illicit disguises and pretences at the margins of society, since informed readers would cease to be easily deceived by imposters. Pini stressed that he wrote his *Speculum cerretanorum* ‘so that honest and good people may be able to defend themselves from the deceptions and pretence of the dishonest’. Likewise, Luther stated in the preface to his edition and translation of the *Liber vagatorum* that he ‘deemed it good to … disseminate this book almost everywhere’. He considered the pamphlet a ‘reliable warning … so that princes, lords, city counsellors and everyone else may be prudent and notice beggars’.

Illicit dis/simulation was, finally, not only an urban phenomenon: the countryside was also thought to be beleaguered by beggars and vagrants. Dis/simulation was as widespread geographically as it was socially. Dekker opened his *Bellman of London* with praise for country life; yet, soon afterwards, his fictitious speaker discovers a ‘beggars’ banquet’ in a secluded house in the bucolic countryside, which has become, at least in the semi-fictional world of rogue literature, the preferred retreat for false beggars, who ‘scorn to live in cities’. Authors writing in a more serious vein expressed similar views of the countryside. Ludwig Milichius (1509–1578), a Lutheran theologian and pastor who wrote moralising treatises, noted that false beggars and tramps harass people ‘most often in villages and secluded places’.

which characterised many of these texts, we might question the extent to which they would have genuinely helped readers to avoid being tricked by dis/simulations.


110 Luther, *Von der falschen Bettler*, p. 638: ‘Ich habs aber fur gut angesehen, das solch buechlin nicht alleine am tage bliebe, sondern auch fast uberall gemein wurde.’

111 Ibid., p. 639, where Luther explains that the book is a ‘trewe warnung … dass Fursten, Herrn, Rethe inn Stedten und iderman solle klug sein und auff die bettler sehen’.


113 Ludwig Milichius, *Schrap Teuffel*, in *Teufelbücher in Auswahl*, ed. by Ria Stambaugh, 5 vols,
As I have noted, the early modern period has been described as an ‘age of dissimulation’ and ‘of imposture’ in recent scholarship, a diagnosis based, above all, on studies of court literature and works concerning contemporary morals, politics and confessional debates. In light of the sources analysed in this chapter, it is clear that the problem of feigning and disguise attracted as much, if not more, attention in connection with members of the lower social strata.

Chapter 4

Farsi natural il simulare – ‘To Make Simulation Natural’

Dis/simulation in Early Modern Discussions of Courtesans, Marriage and Love

4.1. The battle of the sexes

Skilled as male urban tricksters were thought to be at emptying the pockets of their gullible victims, they, too, were portrayed in contemporary literature as prone to the deceptions and impostures of their female counterparts. Robert Greene, whom we encountered in the previous chapter, testified to the supremacy of female dis/simulation in A Disputation Between a He-Cony-Catcher and a She-Cony-Catcher of 1592, in which he affirmed that ‘the crocodile hath not more tears, Proteus more shape, Janus more faces, the Hieria more sundry tunes to entrap the passengers, than our English courtezans’. Written as a dialogue between a male and a female conny-catcher, the treatise listed the deceptive arts of both and concluded that female tricksters ‘are more subtle [and] more dangerous’. In the gender-based contest of dis/simulation, the superior criminal abilities of female conny-catching invariably neutralised and surpassed any example of male cunning: while male conny-catchers ‘dissemble in show’ and ‘go so neat in apparel, so orderly in outward appearance’, female tricksters apply a ‘simple holiness to entrap’, which outstripped any male feigning.

Greene’s catalogue of frauds was neither compelling nor original; yet it added an interesting dimension to the contemporary perception of dis/simulation in connection with lowly social types. Like male rogues, the female conny-catcher operated within the urban space. Her indisputable female mastery, however, was not based on simple scams: more subtle and, at the same time, more powerful mechanisms were at play. The female conny-catcher relied on her physical attractiveness and erotic allure. She created an illusion of genuinely amorous emotions – without necessarily offering her body. In order

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1 See Chapter 3 above, section 3.6.
4 Ibid., p. 207.
to accomplish this, a highly complex system of dis/simulation was indispensable. Attire and other visual signs were part of these schemes, but they were merely props. For Greene, the sophisticated art of deception consisted primarily of ‘fair words, sweet kisses, feigned sighs’, and therefore included signals which were acoustic and rhetorical (sighs and words), visual (glances and smiles) and tactile (touches and kisses). As she uttered ‘words to inveigle’ and ‘flatteries … to bewitch’, the cunning female conny-catcher launched her attack primarily on an emotional level – a point to which I shall return later on in this chapter.

Greene’s fictional encounter between two masters of dis/simulation was a playful battle of wits between professional tricksters. The male conny-catcher left the arena of urban frauds as a looser, but not as a victim. That situation might change dramatically, however, when a man became entangled in an amorous relationship with a female conny-catcher or a courtesan. Once ‘caught in the net’ or ‘fallen into the trap’ of simulated love, the deceived male lost all his trickery, prudence and self-control. As Greene’s female protagonist triumphantly exclaimed: ‘what the smiles of a strumpet will drive a man to act, into what jeopardy a man will thrust himself for her that he loves’, adding: ‘Examine beggars that lie lame by the highway, and they say they came to that misery by whores … . Of what wickedness comes from whores!’ Beggars and vagabonds, who haunted the collective imagination of the upper social echelons, were thus themselves plunged into a miserable state by female cunning and dis/simulation. Greene also vividly portrayed superior female cunning in his Alcida: Greene’s Metamorphosis (c. 1588), a work of fiction based on Giovanni Boccaccio’s Filocolo (1337–39) and Ovid’s Metamorphoses. In this text, dis/simulation was, above all a question of gender:

Are not women Arch-practitioners of flattery and dissimulation? Lay they not their looks to intrap when they meane to keepe their fowle for tame fooles? … [E]very looke that women lend, is not love; every smile in their face is not a pricke in their

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5 Ibid., p. 221.

6 Ibid., p. 212.

7 Ibid., p. 224.

bosom … thine all is wanton dissimulation … 9

4.2. *Under the veil of good and true love*10 – the courtesan’s art

The female cony-catcher, *picara*, or picaresque heroine,11 and the courtesan cannot be clearly separated from one another. Picaresque novelas cortesanas, oscillating between a jesting and a coarse style, offered amusing and humorous accounts of crafty female manoeuvres.12 There was, we might say, ‘safety in fiction’. Indignant moral philosophers, concerned authorities and other guardians of social and moral order, however, took a different view and perceived courtesans as a serious threat precisely because of their reliance on dis/simulation. Providing an historical account of courtesanship in his popular miscellaneous compendium *La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo* of 1585, Tomaso Garzoni assured readers that ‘all the great evils


10 Antonio Francesco Grazzini, *Canto de’ puttanieri*, in his *Tutti i trionfi carri, maschere o canti carnascialeschi*, Florence, 1559, p. 278: ‘sott’ ombra di buono, e vero amore’. Grazzini also included the ‘Canto de simulatori’ in his collection, pp. 292–293; it mainly evokes the difference between the inside and outside of simulators, using the metaphor of light and darkness, e.g., at p. 292: ‘Che chi come costoro, occulta il vero / Di fuor par tutto blanco, e drento è nero.’

11 The female picaresque heroine was not the exact feminine counterpart of the male rogue or *picar*; see Peter N. Dunn, ‘The Picara: The Rogue Female’, in *Upstarts, Wanderers or Swindlers: Anatomy of the Picaro. A Critical Anthology*, ed. by Gustavo Pellon and Julio Rodriguez-Luis, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 245–248. She neither permanently suffers from hunger nor is she a ‘servant of many masters’ (‘mozo de muchos amos’). On the contrary, the female picaresque heroine aspires to become the master of men, usually by making use of her allure and attraction, e.g. in the *Libro de entremiento de la picara Justina*, Medina del Campo, 1605, a somewhat uninspired sequel to Aleman’s *Guzman de Alfarche* which is usually attributed to Francisco López de Úbeda. Justina mastered various crafty forms of dis/simulation, in particular the art of feigning female virtues such as modesty and chastity (‘la dissimulación como doncella modesta’); see Francisco López de Úbeda, *La Picara Justina*, in *La novela picaresca española*, ed. by Angel Valbuena Prat, I, Madrid, 1978, pp. 877–1109, at p. 987.

12 Cunning female picaresque heroines started to appear in Spanish novels (and other vernacular literature) in large numbers during the seventeenth century, entering this hitherto exclusively masculine world. Alonso de Castillo Solórzano’s *Las Harpías en Madrid y coche de las estafas*, Barcelona, 1631, e.g., was a literary monument to the ability of female knavery and cunning to subjugate the will of any man. On the literary type of the *picara-prostituta*, see Enriqueta Zafra, *Prostituidas por el texto: Discursos postribulario en la picaresca femenina*, West Lafayette IN, 2009.
have appeared because of courtesans’. According to him, the courtesan’s art was highly dangerous because of the ‘simulations … frauds … and illusions’ (‘simulazioni … fraudi e finzioni’) of which incautious lovers were unaware. Cesare Vecellio (c. 1530–c. 1601), in his popular Habiti antichi et moderni di diverse parti del mondo of 1590, explained that courtesans commonly feigned respectability, going around dressed as widows or married women. This statement is emblematic of the widespread anxieties about the false appearances and disguises employed by courtesans at that time.

Similar views were frequently expressed and even formed a literary sub-genre sometimes referred to as poesia puttanesca. In his Canto de’ puttanieri from the collection of carnival songs entitled Tutti i trionfi carri, mascherate o canti carnascialeschi of 1559, Antonio Francesco Grazzini (1503–1584) emphatically warned against the traps of simulating courtesans. Especially vulnerable, in his view, were young men, who, when deceived by ‘simulated deceptions, … still regard themselves as loved’. In the Ragionamento del Zoppino of 1534, a short dialogue on courtesans usually ascribed either to Pietro Aretino or to Francisco Delicado, the Roman pimp Zoppino says to his interlocutor Lodovico: ‘I do not want you to believe their words, 


14 Ibid., p. 959: ‘l’arte meretricia si palesa e si publica per mezi infiniti che dagli incauti amatori sovente avvertiti non sono’.

15 Cesare Vecellio, Habiti antichi, et moderni di diverse parti del mondo, libri due, Venice, 1590, f. 138: ‘S’è detto fin qui, che quelle meretrici, che vogliono acquistar credito col mezo della finta honestà si servono dell’ Habito vedovile, et quelle anchora delle maritate.’

16 Grazzini, Canto de’ puttanieri, in his Tutti i trionfi, pp. 277–278. A fellow poet and contemporary, Giovambattista dell’Ottonaio, wrote the Canzona de’ puttanieri in a very similar vein, describing the devastating consequences of a courtesan’s company; see Siena, Sins of Flesh, p. 198.

17 Grazzini, Canto de’ puttanieri, in his Tutti i trionfi, p. 278: ‘E da costor, con simulati inganni; / Giovini ancor pensando essere amati.’
and, while they promise to love you, believe instead that they hate you. The enticing sighs of certain women, he continued, are never to be trusted, for courtesans ‘put a mask of truth over the lie’.

While courtesans were believed to be able to plunge any man into ruin, contemporary moralists could ease their concerns by recalling the message of texts such as La vita et miseranda fine della puttana (c. 1650), a Venetian emblem book, which predicted the moral and physical decay of the meretrix, who was destined to become incurably diseased and a social outcast: the last emblem in the book depicted a destitute meretrix next to a crippled beggar. Diatribes against courtesans usually portrayed men, especially young and naïve ones, as the innocent and pathetic victims of female cunning. It is hardly surprising that the female view of this matter, as far as we can make any assumptions about it, differed considerably. In the famous Ragionamenti (also known as the Sei giornate) of Pietro Aretino (1492–1556), published between 1534 and 1536, the retired courtesan Nanna cynically advises her daughter never to be sincere with men because they ‘want to be deceived’. The old procuress in Ferrante Pallavicino’s treatise, which I shall discuss in the next section, legitimises female deceptions by arguing that men constantly deceive women with simulations and lying.

18 Ragionamento del Zoppino, in La prima (seconda) parte de’ ragionamenti di M. Pietro Aretino, Bengodi (i.e., London), 1584, pp. 485–522, at p. 509: ‘Non voglio che tu creda a te lor parole, e mentre elle promettono più d’amarti, all’hora più credi che loro ti odiano.’

19 Ibid.: ‘mettono una maschera di veritate a la menzogna, la qual poi travestita por vera … le bugie vanno in maschera’. See also p. 491, where Zoppino warns of courtesans who easily move men’s hearts by simulating distress or sadness.

20 La vita et miseranda fine della puttana, in Riproduzione di XII rarissime stampe popolari veneziane della prima metà del secolo XVII, Venice, 1922, p. 11. Grazzini, Canto de meretrici, in his Tutti i trionfi, p. 294, had a courtesan exclaim: ‘Noi sappiam ben, che’l fin della nostr’Arte, / È vecchia mendicare.’ Some fictitious literary courtesans such as Aretino’s Nanna and Lozana in Francisco Delicado’s Retrato de la lozana andaluzca (first published in Valencia in 1528), however, were able to save themselves from illness and misery.

21 Pietro Aretino, Sei giornate, ed. by Giovanni Aquilecchia, Bari, 1980, p. 168: ‘Gli uomini vogliono essere ingannati e ancora che si avveghino che si gli dia la baia e che, partita da loro, gli dileggi vantandotene fin con le fanti, hanno più caro le carezze finte che le vere senza ciance.’

22 Ferrante Pallavicino, La rettorica delle puttane, Paese (Treviso), 1991, p. 77: ‘Realmente nulla creda
Greene not only described female deceptions but also commented on the dis/simulations used by men to deceive (good-hearted or naïve) women, warning female readers that some men ‘feign, lie and dissemble … [and] cunningly counterfeit’ to ensnare women. From this perspective, the courtesan was merely partaking in the reciprocal battle of the sexes, in which both sides employed fraud and disguise to obtain victory.

4.3. *Con più dissimulazione, che di simplicità*

Ferrante Pallavicino’s last work, the notorious *Retorica delle puttane* of 1642, is an intriguing text which can legitimately be called a manual of dis/simulation for courtesans. This highly polemical text should, first of all, be interpreted in light of the

23 See Robert Greene’s treatise *The Anatomy of Lovers’ Flatteries*, London, 1584: [http://www.oxford-shakespeare.com/Greene/Anatomy_Lovers.pdf](http://www.oxford-shakespeare.com/Greene/Anatomy_Lovers.pdf), p. 5. This text also features one of the few early modern references to the *Ars amatoria*: Greene complains, ibid., that Ovid taught ‘a most monstrous method to all men whereby they may learn to allure simple women to the fulfilling of their lust and the losing of their own honour’; he then depicts men as a ‘dissembling troop which rightly may be termed masquers, some hypocrites…’, who ‘under the colour of courtesy … change themselves into the likeness of every object which a lady might desire’; his warning that men ‘carry in outward show the shadow of love’ is reminiscent of contemporary attacks on courtesans, although the driving force behind the dis/simulations practised by men is not financial gain but ‘the substance of lust’; while courtesans may leave a man bankrupt, these male ‘hypocritical flatterers… seek with sugared words and filed speech’ to defame and corrupt young women. A few years earlier, Garzoni, *La piazza*, II, p. 1119, briefly remarked on a similar point in a chapter entitled ‘De’ galanti o innamorati o penitenti, e de’ puttanieri’, in which he mocked the relentless efforts of male lovers to win their object of desire by resorting to simulations and tricks: ‘Che parole non dice? Che sospiri non getta? E che servigi non soffre? Che ricchezze non promette? Che rammarichi non finge? Che bugie non trova? Che trovate non simula per introdursi pur nell’amore dell’amica?’ Juan Alonso de los Ruyzes de Fontecha (1560–1620), a professor of medicine at Alcalá, when discussing whether a physician could, in good conscience, assist a woman to deceive her bridegroom that she is a virgin, stated that ‘it is not right for men to deceive women either, as for instance, to seduce women’; quoted by Winfried Schleiner, *Medical Ethics in the Renaissance*, Washington DC, 1995, p. 33; see Juan Alonso de los Ruyzes de Fontecha, *Medicorum incipientium medicina, sive medicinae Christianae speculum*, Alcalá, 1598, p. 612: ‘fallere autem mulieres homines non decet: sicuti nec homines seducere mulieres: esse vero illud dolum, insinuant omnes summistae’.

24 Although feigning and disguise are central themes in this work, it has not been studied in relation to the subject of this dissertation. Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVII*
uncompromising and almost obsessive attacks on Jesuits which permeate the oeuvre of Pallavicino (1615–1644), an Italian libertine who was beheaded by papal agents. The work was intended as a satirical tract against the Society of Jesus, not an objective account of the lives and habits of courtesans. Pallavicino’s aim was not to discredit courtesans, whose company he frequently enjoyed in Venice, but to hold the Jesuits and their educational system up to ridicule. He claimed to have written the text ‘in conformity with the precepts of Cyprian’, 25 that is, the famous Jesuit rhetorician Cyprian Soarez (1524–1593), author of the influential manual _De arte rhetorica_ of 1562. 26 By adopting Soarez’s teachings and linking the ancient art of rhetoric to a profession universally regarded as demeaning and vile, Pallavicino tried to discredit the Jesuit order. Rhetoric, he insinuated, is an art worthy only of Jesuits or of whores. Pallavicino’s familiarity with the Jesuit educational system and the programmatic precision with which he modelled his _Retorica_ on Soarez’s rhetorical treatise made his work a _tour de force_.

Regardless of this specific literary context, Pallavicino’s _Retorica_ offers an interesting insight into the contemporary perception of courtesans and addresses the nexus between dis/simulation and the art of simulating love and passions. This is also apparent in a contemporary English adaption of the _Retorica_, which left aside entirely Pallavicino’s polemics against the Jesuits. Presenting the original Italian text in the tone of sixteenth-century English rogue pamphlets, _The Whores Rhetorike_ (1683) transported the plot to contemporary London and gave readers a detailed account of the manifold deceptive arts of courtesans.

Pallavicino’s _Retorica_ consists of a sequence of fifteen lessons, in which an old procuress, or _ruffiana_, teaches a poor and unhappy young woman how to become a

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25 Pallavicino, _La rettorica_, p. 5: ‘La tessitura di questo libro porta nome di Rettorica per essere in aggiustata conformità delli precetti che s’assegnano nella Rettorica di Cipriano Suario Giesuita, la quale stimasi la migliore.’

successful courtesan. Her lessons go beyond the rhetorical instructions in *De arte rhetorica* in complexity and draw on the subtle intricacies of moral casuistry which the Jesuits elaborated in the second half of the sixteenth century and which correspond to the techniques presented in contemporary manuals on courtly comportment. Soarez’s manual was specifically intended for beginners; and so, too, were the lessons given by the procuress. Yet, while Soarez limited his aim to acquainting his readers with the rudimentary concepts of rhetoric, Pallavicino unfolded a dense system of dis/simulation and (false) self-presentation. Even his initial definition of a courtesan’s *retorica* as ‘nothing but an art of multiplying unnatural words and solicited pretexts, in order to persuade and affect the soul of those miserable people who, falling into their [i.e., the courtesans] trap, witness their triumphs’, does not fully convey the complexity of this cunning art.

The faculty of prudence determined the success of a courtesan. In a profession involving false appearances and deception, concealment functioned as an essential prerequisite for the courtesan’s feigning. The inexperienced apprentice harlot was warned at the beginning of her lessons to disguise herself; yet these disguises should always remain unnoticed. Keeping a tight reign on her speech, facial expressions and – difficult as it might be – her emotions, the prudent courtesan should take pains never to lose control of the ‘government of herself’. This precept corresponded in many ways to the ideal of the worldly wise man, formulated, for example, by Baltasar Gracián at

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27 The persuasive language of the old procuress indicates her intricate deceptive skills. She uses language not only to educate, but also as a powerful manipulative tool; see Pallavicino, *La rettorica*, p. 9: ‘In bellisimi termini palliati con decoro la persuase di porsi nel mestiere della Puttana.’ Celestina, in Fernando de Rojas’s *La Celestina*, published in Basel in 1499, the archetypal manipulative procuress, to whom Pallavicino’s old woman owes a great deal, was also a cunning master of persuasion.

28 Pallavicino, *La rettorica*, pp. 17–18: ‘Altro non è la retorica delle puttane che un’arte di moltiplicare artificiose parole e mendicati pretesti, con fine di persuadere e muovere gli animi di quell’infelici ch’incappando nelle loro reti assistono alle sue vittorie.’

29 Ibid., p. 30: ‘occultando il vero fine dell’interesse … dando a credere che da solo affetto procedano le carezze, gli abbracciamenti, e i bacci, onde adescato chi ama dal credito d’una pura affezione’; see also p. 74: ‘Chi espone l’anima e il corpo per lo guadagno follemente si stima guardinga.’

30 Ibid., p. 106: ‘el governo di se medesime’.
roughly the same time.\textsuperscript{31}

Comprising a number of communicative and cognitive strategies, Pallavicino’s concept of the courtesan’s art transcended mere rhetoric. The skilful courtesan had to be able to counterfeit ‘words of joy, pain, and any other sentiment’ and to act out ‘all the simulated expressions of love’.\textsuperscript{32} To appear as a ‘lady of high reputation’,\textsuperscript{33} by evoking an air of solemnity and respectability, was an obvious tactic, which, as we have seen, was also popular among urban tricksters. The courtesan, nevertheless, had to be flexible in her simulations, since sometimes it was more effective to appear to be in a state of ‘pitiful poverty’ (‘compassionevole povertà’) or to be devout, chaste and humble.\textsuperscript{34} By playing the pious widow, the procuress assured her young protégé, the cunning meretrix will even be able to lure money out of virtuous and devout men.\textsuperscript{35} The courtesan’s success was determined by the extent of her adaptive skills.\textsuperscript{36} Regardless of how well suited one deception might be to a particular situation, another social constellation could

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\textsuperscript{31} Gracián, however, omitted women entirely from his intellectual programme of worldly wisdom. The readership he targeted was unambiguously male, and he would certainly have condemned the schemes of courtesans as illicit and malicious. This is a further indication that the concept of dis/simulation could, to some extent, be regarded as the exclusive privilege of certain social groups (i.e., the economically and socially empowered), professions and, in this case, the male gender. I shall return to this point below in the Conclusion to this dissertation.


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 36: ‘Il fine deve esser d’accreditarsi come Dama di gran riputazione’; see also p. 37: ‘Osservi la gravità per non rendersi sprezzabile.’ Vecellio, among other contemporary authors, referred to this popular act of disguise in the passage quoted in n. 15 above. \textit{Gravità}, a quality and mode of self-presentation usually characteristic of courtiers or statesmen, indicates the courtesan’s efforts to suggest her high social standing.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 50; see also p. 31: ‘Fingendo talvolta necessità d’esigere cose.’

\textsuperscript{35} See, e.g., ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 17: ‘È però necessario il variare i motivi delle persuasioni, e il moltiplicar li artifici.’ This becomes a crucial aspect which is repeatedly stressed by the procuress, e.g., p. 18: ‘quella Rettorica da cui si richiede la diversità de’ termini, e la variazione de’ pretesti’; and p. 22: ‘il guadagno dimostra la necessità di piegarsi in tutte le forme, e aggiustarsi in tutti quei gradi, onde può trarsi riguardevole avanzo’.
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render it completely ineffective. The dis/simulations of a successful courtesan therefore had to be more flexible and elastic than, for example, those of non-conformist religious dissidents or statesmen attempting to conceal vital information. Regardless of the specific type and form of deception, the courtesan’s art was grounded in a complex ‘corporal eloquence’ (‘eloquenza corporale’) in which ‘all the parts of the body gesticulate in conformity, manifesting signs of love’.37

The *ruffiana* admonished her young student to be very careful with her pretences and simulations.38 If she maintained a relationship with more than one male companion at the same time, her strategies would need to become even more intricate.39 Here, dis/simulation expands into a system which is based on the art of memory. One unguarded word might cause the house of cards she has constructed to collapse instantly. A good memory was therefore essential, not only to avoid repetition, as with the rhetorician, but also to ensure that she did not unwittingly reveal the deception.40 The courtesan’s art culminated in the recommendation ‘to make simulation natural’ (‘farsi natural il simulare’).41 ‘Everything [intended to deceive] should be introduced as if in casual reasoning.’42 Dis/simulation as a natural condition rendered the courtesan’s art artless, echoing an ideal most famously encapsulated in Baldassare Castiglione’s concept of *sprezzatura*. In order to appear genuinely natural, the courtesan needed to disguise her art of seduction and erotic excitement at all times, since revealing herself as an experienced courtesan might destroy the entire illusion. Consequently, she should

37 Ibid., pp. 111 and 118–119: ‘Gesticano conformemente tutte le membra, unitamente manifestando segni d’amore.’ This corporeal eloquence also comes into play during intercourse; see, e.g., pp. 81 and 119. For a study on the simulation of sexual pleasure from a literary and psychoanalytical point of view, see Marjorie Garber, ‘The Inscrutability of Women’, in *Desire in the Renaissance: Psychoanalysis and Literature*, ed. by Valeria Finucci and Regina Schwartz, Princeton NJ, 1994, pp. 19–38.


39 Ibid., p. 91: ‘è più difficile l’ingannare molti, che uno’.

40 Ibid., p. 18.

41 Ibid., p. 120.

42 Ibid., p. 50: ‘s’introduca però il tutto quasi in casuali ragionamenti’; see also p. 35: ‘Consideri la Puttana qualmente la sua professione è di persuadere dolcemente non di sforzare quasi con violenza.’
always try to appear as if she had just embarked on this profession (‘darsi a creder venuta di fresco alla professione’).\textsuperscript{43}

The tricks and disguises of a courtesan were manifold and functioned at an emotional level. Her simulation was not grounded in brief and superficial social encounters but rather was aimed at creating an intimate emotional dependency over a longer period of time. Counterfeiting genuine emotions and passions, the courtesan did not resort to short-lived and simple ruses, as did the beggar, but instead practised the ‘art of a mental discourse’.\textsuperscript{44} Unlike the other practitioners of deception I have discussed up to now, the courtesan tried to become ‘the empress of men’s minds’.\textsuperscript{45} The final consequence of the courtesan’s dis/simulation is the servitude of the male, who becomes entangled in the trap of false love – a perversion of the \textit{servitium amoris} metaphor found in Roman and medieval love poetry, in which the poet becomes enslaved to his mistress.

4.4. The onestà of the courtesan

‘Leave the courtesans alone / If you don’t want to lose all you’ve got / They’re prostitutes like the rest / But they cost more, for you know what’ – this is a warning given in an early sixteenth-century pasquinade entitled ‘Most Useful Advice Given by the Excellent Doctor, Maestro Pasquino, to All Gentleman… Lately Come to Rome’.\textsuperscript{46} According to the anonymous author of this satirical squib, all women engaged in this profession were driven by the same economic motives, regardless of the pretensions of some. This passage drew on, and at the same time dismissed, the contemporary two-fold perception of courtesans: on the one hand, common prostitutes, who were increasingly stigmatised as a vulgar and abject \textit{puttana}; on the other, an élite class of sophisticated courtesans. The first category, lacking both the support of wealthy clients and cultural accomplishments, became the object not only of harsh moralisations and invectives but

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 96.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 7: ‘un’arte di discorso mentale’.

\textsuperscript{45} I have adapted this phrase from Wayne A. Rebhorn, \textit{The Emperor of Men’s Minds. Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric}, Ithaca NY and London, 1995.

\textsuperscript{46} The original reads: ‘Lassa andar le cortesane / se non voi disfarte del tutto, / come l’altre son puttane / ma piu caro vendon lor frutto’; both the original and the translation are taken from Georgina Mason, \textit{Courtesans of the Italian Renaissance}, London, 1975, p. 141.
\end{flushleft}
also of legislative regulations and social disciplining.  

For example, Cristobál Pérez de Herrera, who has been discussed above, included prostitutes in a treatise on female vagabonds and delinquents.

Although courtesans were frequently associated with dis/simulation, some women involved in this profession occupied an accepted position in the upper echelons of society. Contemporaries must have been well aware of the pretences and dissembling of courtesans, which were described in the endless warnings, whether spoken and written. Yet such knowledge did not seem to call into question the notion of the cortigiana onesta, the respectable courtesan. These women were generally acclaimed as accomplished beauties, with graceful manners, whose company was much sought after; moving freely among the upper social strata, they often enjoyed an elegant lifestyle.

Courtesans certainly did not resort to dis/simulation any less than common prostitutes. A prostitute would not have normally concealed that she was a sexual entrepreneur and therefore was not necessarily obliged to adopt elaborate forms of feigning and disguise, unlike the cortigiana onesta, who was supposed to maintain an

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47 As with beggars and vagabonds, though to a lesser extent, authorities tried to segregate prostitutes in special work houses. All over Italy facilities for the rehabilitation and support of penitent, needy and sick fallen women were established; see Sherill Cohen, The Evolution of Women’s Asylums since 1500, Oxford, 1992. The Florentine Onestà, one of the most famous of such institutions, was set up to control the movements of registered prostitutes by issuing licences and special signs: see John K. Brackett, ‘The Florentine Onestà and the Control of Prostitution’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 24, 1993, pp. 273–300, at p. 285. That this institution was designed more to produce financial revenue – or, in Brackett’s words, p. 275, as ‘a flexible instrument of exploitation’ – than to protect public morality is another story.

48 Cristobál Pérez de Herrera, Discurso de la reclusión y castigo de las mugeres vagabundas y deliquentes destos reynos, Madrid, 1608. See Chapter 2, section 2.5 above.

49 The term cortigiana, although it referred to an established and socially distinct group of women, was often used euphemistically, ironically and satirically, creating somewhat unclear boundaries between the two categories of courtesan. The notion of the cortigiana onesta was rooted in existing social and economical conditions and was not based on the bona meretrix of Graeco-Roman plays, an unconventional literary character who was primarily concerned with her client’s well-being and welfare rather than with accumulating wealth.

illusion of gaiety and jocular entertainment. Although courtesans avoided any association with common prostitutes, artfully creating an aura of glamour and exclusivity, they were, to some extent, merely glossing over the nature of their profession, since the provision of sexual gratification remained the crucial element of their relationship with clients. Regardless of how elaborate and natural the illusion and disguise might have been, the men enjoying their company would nonetheless have seen through it. Although the patrons and clients of a cortegiana onesta would hardly have remained ignorant of her metier and her pretences, they still granted her a degree of respectability.

Courtesans were, after all, objects of male desire; seeking their company had somehow to be legitimised – hence, the label of onestà. This collective construction of a specific class of respectable courtesans suggests once more that social factors influenced the perception and understanding of the notion of dis/simulation. This leaves us with a provisional conclusion. Elevated social standing and cultural refinement seem to have legitimised, at least to some degree, the use of dis/simulations and rendered it respectable.51 As onestà was not so much an ethical virtue as an indicator of wealth and social status, dis/simulation once more became a question of social privilege which was detached from morality. For obvious reasons, contemporary writers who discussed licit forms and uses of simulation and dissimulation did not refer to the art of honourable courtesans. Yet, the pretences and disguises employed by such women seem to have been tolerated or even accepted by those members of the upper social classes who enjoyed their favours. The dis/simulation of an honourable courtesan was, we might say, covered by a veil of respectability.52

4.5. Prudent husbands and feigning wives
As I shall attempt to show in this section, feigning and disguise were not only commonly linked to shrewd meretrices and courtesans but were also, to some degree, expected from chaste and married women and even from husbands – a point which, as far as I am aware, has not yet been made in the scholarly literature. The rediscovery of

51 As Mason, Courtesans, p. 9, pointed out in her study: ‘it was money that raised a woman out of the ranks of mere prostitutes to the status of a meretrix honesta or courtesan’.

52 This analysis of the courtesan’s art, furthermore, demonstrates that the concepts of dissimulation and simulation cannot be neatly separated from one another, especially when applied in practice.
secular classical ideas and the major intellectual movements of the Renaissance did very little to change the firmly rooted subordinate role of women in early modern society. Although some humanist writers reassessed the role of women and, more specifically, the responsibilities of housewives, granting them a more emancipated role, the established ideal of the silent and obedient woman persisted. Yet authors in this period did not stop at extolling female silence: women were also frequently advised to be cheerful and gracious in their obedience, demonstrating in this way their willingness to follow God’s plan. The wife was expected to maintain harmony and unity within the family – a task which, without the occasional use of dis/simulation, would no doubt have been extremely difficult to fulfil.

53 Interestingly, in a popular contemporary manual, first published in 1583 in Salamanca, the ideal of the prudent housewife intersected with the problem of dis/simulation among beggars and vagabonds. The Franciscan theologian and poet Luis de León (1527–1591) noted that the prudent wife ‘should take great care with regard to the people … she grants entrance to her house’ and spot those who appear ‘under the name of poverty and covering themselves in piety’; see Luis de León, La perfecta casada, Madrid, 1930, p. 116: ‘una de las virtudes de la buena casada y mujer es el tener grande recato acerca de las personas que admite a su conversación y a quien da entrada en su casa; porque, debajo del nombre de pobreza, y cubriéndose con piedad, a las veces entran a las casas algunas personas arrugadas y canas’. At p. 112, furthermore, de León displayed his awareness of the problem of dis/simulation and discussed, among other things, the reasons behind and individual motives for such strategies: ‘Tanto es dissimulado el mal, o tanto procura dissimularse para nuestro daño, o por mejor decir, tanta la fuerza y excelencia del bien, y tan general su provecho, que aun el mal, para poder vivir y valer, se le allega y se viste dél, y desea tomar su color. Así vemos que el prudente y recatado huye de algunos peligros, y que el temeroso y cobarde huye también. Adonde, aunque las causas sean diversas, es uno y semejante el huir.’

54 For an overview of early modern marriage tracts, see Erika Kartschoke (ed.), Repertorium deutschsprachiger Ehelehren der frühen Neuzeit, Berlin, 1996.

55 Axel Erdmann, My Gracious Silence. Women in the Mirror of Sixteenth-Century Printing in Western Europe, Lucerne, 1999, p. xii. This can be, e.g., seen in Erasmus's colloquy ‘Conjugium’ (1523), in which two wives discuss their duties towards their husbands, coming to the conclusion that occasional feigning should be employed by the docile wife in the interest of matrimonial harmony and that it is the wife’s task ‘to show herself wholly complaisant and agreeable to him [the husband]’; see Desiderius Erasmus, ‘Marriage’, in his Colloquies, ed. and transl. by Craig R. Thompson, Toronto, 1997, pp. 114–127, at p. 124; for the original, see Desiderius Erasmus, ‘Conjugium’, in his Opera omnia, I.3, Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 300–313, at p. 309: ‘Atqui tametsi semper est cavendum uxorui, ne qua re molesta sit viro, tamen id maxime studere debet, ut in eo congressu se viro praebeat modis omnibus commodam et iucundam.’
In The Flower of Friendship (1568), a treatise on marital duties, Edmund Tilney (1536–1610), a courtier and Master of the Revels under both Elizabeth and James, stressed that ‘in nothing can a wyfe shewe greater wisedome, than in dissembling with an importunate husbande’, adding a few pages later that ‘in things of small importance, the best wil be for hir to dissemble, noting diligently the tyme, the place, and the matter in doing’. He then, however, shifted his focus to husbands, pointing out that they, too, should sometimes resort to dis/simulation: ‘The seventh herbe of marvellous vertue is to bee sufferable in the ymportunities of thy wyfe, sometimes dissembling.’ He concluded with the precept that ‘for the quietnesse sake, and for the increase of amity, the married man must sometimes dissemble’.

We encounter similar advice in an obscure Spanish tract, the Vida política de todos los estados de mujeres (written in 1501 and published in 1599) by Fray Juan de Cerda from Toledo. On more than 600 folios, de Cerda covered the various different statuses of honourable women: unmarried and married women, nuns and widows. He did not, however, address a female readership but instead husbands, as indicated by the chapter title: ‘On how it is good for the husband to dissimulate some of his wife’s flaws, being mindful of her honour and of his’. De Cerda left no doubt that dis/simulation played an integral part in marriage. The question was not whether but, rather, in what contexts and situations it should be used. First of all, he advised couples never to disclose their secrets in front of others – a piece of advice which we have already seen in emblem books on love. Husbands should, moreover, refrain from reproaching their

57 Ibid., p. 140.
58 Ibid., p. 121.
59 Ibid., p. 122.
60 The National Library in Madrid holds a manuscript of this text from 1501; for a digital version, see http://catalogo.bne.es/uhtbin/cgisirsi/5K8L3OTILx/BNMADRID/239050037/9
61 Juan de Cerda, Vida política de todos los estados de mugeres, Alcalá, 1599, f. 385r: ‘De como le esta bien al marido, dissimular algunas faltas de su muger: y mirar por su honra, como por la propria suya.’
62 See Chapter 1 above, section 1.4.
wives in public.\textsuperscript{63} ‘The best thing’, de Cerda concluded, ‘is to have trust in one’s wife and to dissimulate along with her.’\textsuperscript{64}

Yet de Cerda did not stop here. He not only discussed the prudent and therefore licit use of disguise by husbands, but also included a chapter on ‘dissimulation and feigning, and the ease and promptness which women have in this’, where he indulged in moralisations against alleged female tricks and deceptions.\textsuperscript{65} He warned men ‘not always to believe the tears and … sadness which some [women] make a show of having in their hearts’,\textsuperscript{66} and he complained about deceptive women who ‘in all their dealings aim for nothing but dissimulating what they are and feigning what they are not’.\textsuperscript{67} It was not only shrewd courtesans which de Cerda had in mind. His juxtaposition of positive and negative types of dis/simulation reveals an obvious gender dimension, associating the former type with the malevolent deception practised by women, and the latter with the praiseworthy and prudent tolerance of men.\textsuperscript{68}

A largely forgotten philosophical treatise of 1676, \textit{Fisionomia de la virtud y del

\textsuperscript{63} De Cerda, \textit{Vida politica}, f. 418:\textsuperscript{v} ‘El ensenarla y reprehenderla… no ha de ser delante de nade.’ He also advises, f. 385\textsuperscript{v}, that husbands should not pay too much attention to the accusations made against their wives by neighbours or by other men but should, instead, tolerate some of their flaws.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., f. 386:\textsuperscript{r} ‘Lo mejor es, hazer confiança de la muger, y dissimular con ella”; see also f. 387\textsuperscript{r}, where de Cerda adressed husbands: ‘podrias tu mejor dissimular quando el mal es secreto, y remediarlo entre ti y ella”; see also f. 412:\textsuperscript{r} ‘la discrecion y prudencia de los maridos, las [flaquezas] pueden ligeramente… dissimular, y enmendar’.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., ff. 456–460, at f. 456:\textsuperscript{r} ‘de la dissimulacion y fingimiento: y de la facilidad y presteza que en esto tienen las mugeres’. In this chapter, de Cerda reinforced misogynist stereotypes, noting, f. 458\textsuperscript{r}, that due to their humoral disposition: ‘Para qualquiera genero de ficcion, es muy mas presta y aparejada la muger.’

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., f. 458\textsuperscript{r}: ‘no hay de creer todas vezes, a las lagrimas y estremada tristeza que algunas muestran tener en sus coraçones’.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., f. 459:\textsuperscript{r} ‘y en todos sus tratos no buscan sino como dissimular lo que son, y fingir lo que no son’.

\textsuperscript{68} This gender-specific dimension of dis/simulation is an example of what I regard as one of the most important characteristics of the early modern debates on this subject: the power struggle underlying the justification of using disguise and feigning by some social groups and professions, while, at the same time, condemning and marginalising in others. I shall return to this point below in the ‘Conclusion’ to the dissertation.
vicio al natural sin colores ni artificios, written by the obscure Jesuit Antonio de Castro (second half of the seventeenth-century) is another interesting text in this context. As we shall discover later on in this dissertation,\textsuperscript{69} de Castro’s approach to dis/simulation differed considerably from that of other seventeenth-century physiognomists.\textsuperscript{70} He urged his readers not to devote too much effort to the ‘art of reading men’ with the aim of disclosing the hidden thoughts and emotions of dissemblers, but instead to follow the more prudent course of ignoring or tolerating the dis/simulations of others. It was in this context that he advised husbands sometimes to use prudent circumspection in concealing the secrets of their heart from their wives.\textsuperscript{71} Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, de Castro raised the question of ‘how a wife will repose and sleep by a heart which hides itself from her, which cannot be seen and which dissimulates’.\textsuperscript{72} Regrettably, he did not expand on this objection, but unequivocally concluded that ‘peace in marriage requires dis/simulation’.\textsuperscript{73} De Castro clarified that this should not be confused with a lack of love,\textsuperscript{74} but rather thought of as a form of discretion and sensitivity with regard to ‘the secrets which properly touch the heart’ (‘los secretos, que con propiedad tocan al corazón’), since some hearts took offence when their secrets were disclosed.\textsuperscript{75} Although honesty and sincerity should prevail, certain things should be left unspoken, with

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\textsuperscript{69} See Chapter 6 below, section 6.8.

\textsuperscript{70} De Castro used only the term \emph{disimulacio}, which, however, also implied simulation, as is clear from the context. This is yet another example of the often ambiguous and inconsistent use of the terms simulation and dissimulation by early modern authors.

\textsuperscript{71} See Antonio de Castro, \textit{Fisionomia de la virtud y del vicio al natural sin colores ni artificios}, Valladolid, 1676, p. 129: ‘y el motivo que se dà a esta reserva de el corazón suele ser, prevenir el inconveniente’; see also p. 125.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 129: ‘como descansará, y dormirá la esposa en un corazón, que se le esconde, que no le vê, y que se le disimula?’

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 130: ‘Paz en el matrimonio pide disimulacion’; here, as so often, the term ‘disimulacion’ refers both to dissimulation and simulation.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. p. 130: ‘Aun para la paz del matrimonio entre los que unos conviene, que el corazón se quiera, pero que no se entienda’; see also ibid.: ‘Aun la esposa, aviendo de gozar de quietud en el corazón de su esposo, ha le de admitir para el cariño, pero no le ha de registrar lo que guarde y disimula.’

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 129: ‘Ay coraçones, que se offenden, de que aya quien se precie, de que les sabe su interior.’
prudence governing the relations between married couples.

As we have seen, a number of early modern authors were aware of the problem of feigning and disguise in connection to married life. Some justified the occasional use of concealment and even feigning as a necessary means to maintain domestic harmony and the God-given marital order. Importantly, they entrusted this task to the prudent husband rather than to the wife, who, in her submissive and obedient role, was expected to remain passive. Women were largely excluded from such licit uses of di/simulation.

4.6. Dis/simulation and love
The moralising descriptions of the courtesan’s art treated love only in its perverted form as a deceptive illusion; and the pragmatic precepts on wifely duties and married life did not address love as a powerful affection or as romantic desire. Marriages in the early modern era were, above all, economic arrangements; love was something else altogether. As a means of examining the nexus between love and dis/simulation, which I have already considered in relation to Dutch emblem books,76 I shall begin by considering the treatment of this topic in Ovid’s Ars amatoria, a didactic poem which placed the dialectics of truth and falsehood, concealment and transparency, sincerity and simulation at the very core of its amatory discourse.77 The work was widely available in numerous Latin editions and vernacular translations throughout the early modern era and is therefore worth a brief discussion, even though there are only scattered references...

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76 See Chapter 1 above, section 1.4. As with the problem of dis/simulation in the early modern household, this subject has not received attention in modern scholarship; it is absent, e.g., from Albrecht Classen (ed.), Discourses on Love, Marriage, and Transgression in Medieval and Early Modern Literature, Tempe AZ, 2004.

77 The problem of dis/simulation is also explored in Ovid’s Amores, an earlier collection of his love poems; see, with regard to the recurrent theme of the revealing nature of passionate love, e.g., Ovid, Amores, ed. and transl. by E. J. Kenney, Oxford, 1994, p. 12. In addition, dis/simulation played a role in Ovid’s Remedia amoris, which comprised the second part of Ars amandi. The most obvious example is that of disguising one’s love sickness and hurt feelings after having been abandoned by a lover. For an overview of Ovid’s amatory works, see Alison Sharrock, ‘Ovid and the Discourses of Love. The Amatory Works’, in The Cambridge Companion to Ovid, ed. by Philip Hardie, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 150–162.
to it in texts from the period on dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{78}

According to Ovid, a good lover needed to know when and how to dis/simulate.\textsuperscript{79} ‘You must play the lover’ was one of the central points in his amatory philosophy.\textsuperscript{80} Drawing on numerous examples from a variety of different contexts, the poem taught readers that feigning was crucial in matters of love and that careful disguise was the key to the success of any amorous conquest.\textsuperscript{81} Ovid admonished lovers to take care not to reveal the pretence when issuing false compliments or feigning emotional involvement, since ‘art, if hidden, prevails; if detected, it brings shame’.\textsuperscript{82} This is strikingly reminiscent of Gracián’s precepts of worldly wisdom and demonstrates the proximity of the art of prudence and of dis/simulation to the \textit{ars amandi}. When recommending that women should use make-up to cover over their external imperfections, Ovid, for example, warned them to be discreet and to conceal the artifice: a double dissimulation,

\textsuperscript{78} See, e.g., n. 23 above for Robert Greene’s criticism of the poem and Chapter 6 below, section 6.5, for Scipione Chiaramonti’s reference to it in his physiognomical treatise.

\textsuperscript{79} In Ovid’s treatment of the art of love, simulation and dissimulation cannot, as usual, be easily separated from one another. This is perhaps best exemplified in his advice to resort to concealment by pretending, for the sake of a relationship, not to have discovered the feigning of one’s lover; see Ovid, \textit{The Art of Love, and Other Poems}, transl. by J. H. Mozley, London, 1929, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{80} Ovid, \textit{The Art of Love}, p. 54: ‘Es tibi agendus amans.’ Ovid also recommended, pp. 52–53, that a lover should ‘deceive under the name of a friend’, which was ‘a safe and oft-trodden path’ (‘Tuta frequensque via est, per amici fallere nomen: / Tuta frequensque licet sit via, crimen habet’). His advice, pp. 60–61, to ‘let love find entrance veiled in a friendship’s name’ (‘Entret amicitiae nomine tectus amor’) is another instance of dis/simulation. At the very end of the poem, pp. 174–175, Ovid even suggests that lovers should occasionally employ simulation during sexual intercourse: ‘You to whom nature has denied the sensation of love, counterfeit the sweet bliss with lying sounds’ (‘Tu quoque, cui veneris sensum natura negavit, / Dulcia mendaci gaudia finge sono’).

\textsuperscript{81} Ovid claimed, ibid., pp. 33–34, that ‘the man dissembles badly’, while ‘she conceals desire better’ (‘Vir male dissimulat: tectius illa cupit’).

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., pp. 86–87: ‘Tantum, ne pateas verbis simulator in illis, / Effice, nec vultu destruere dicta tuo. / Si latet ars, prodest: adfert deprensa pudorem, / Atque admit merito tempus in omne fidel.’
in which one disguise concealed another.\textsuperscript{83}

In promoting simulated love, Ovid did not address moral concerns about the contamination of human love.\textsuperscript{84} The advice ‘you must play the lover’ was merely the first part of the amorous agenda, since love could eventually be transformed into sincerity in what might be called a metamorphosis of dis/simulation:

Yet often the pretender begins to love truly after all, and often becomes what he has feigned to be. Wherefore, you women, be more compliant to the pretenders: one day will the love be true which but now was false.\textsuperscript{85}

Here, dissembling is not an immoral means. Inherently linked to the nature of human love, it plays a crucial role in the process of conquering one’s love object and establishing a relationship. It is practised and used in the service of amor.

Returning, now, to the early modern period, Giuseppe Betussi (c. 1512–c.1573), a typical sixteenth-century Venetian poligrafo, best known for publishing and translating Boccaccio’s Latin works, wrote an Italian treatise, for the most part neglected by modern scholarship, which offers an in-depth exploration of the nature of human love and its connection to dis/simulation. In this work of 1544, entitled \textit{Il Raverta: dialogo nel quale si ragiona d’amore e degli effetti suoi}, a female interlocutor, Baffa, opens the discussion by asking: ‘what poses the greater difficulty: to feign love without loving, or to be in love, dissimulating not to be?’\textsuperscript{86} Raverta, who is Betussi’s spokesman, responds

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., pp. 132–133: ‘Yet let no lover find the boxes set out upon the table; your looks are aided by dissembled art’ (‘Non tamen expositas mensa deprendat amator / Pyxidas: ars faciem dissimulata iuvat’); for further advice on dissimulation and concealment, see, e.g., ibid., pp. 134 and 136.

\textsuperscript{84} See ibid., pp. 14–15, where Ovid, while showing awareness of possible moral objections, nevertheless rejects them: ‘of safe love-making do I sing and permitted secrecy, and in my verse shall be no wrongdoing’ (‘Nos venerem tutam concessaque furta canemus, / Inque meo nullum carmine crimen erit’).

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, pp. 54–55: ‘Saepe tamen vere coept simulador amare, / Saepe quod incipiens finixerat esse, fuit. / Quod magis, o faciles imitantibus este, puellae: / Fiet amor verus, qui modo falsus erat.’

\textsuperscript{86} Giuseppe Betussi, \textit{Il Raverta: dialogo ... nel quale si ragiona d’amore e degli effetti suoi}, in \textit{Trattati d’amore del Cinquecento}, ed. by Giuseppe Zonta, II, Bari, 1913, pp. 1–150, at p. 60: ‘Qual sia maggior difficoltà: fingere amore non amando, o amando dissimulare di non amare?’ Betussi recycled some of the material from \textit{Il Raverta} in his last vernacular treatise, \textit{Dialogo amoroso}, Venice 1543, which is also
by first stating that he considers both to be ‘extremely difficult’ (‘difficilissimo’) and adds that displaying an emotion which is ‘not inside us requires great skill’ (‘bisogna grandissimo artificio’).  

As he goes through some examples of the simulation of love, Raverta concludes that it is impossible to feign amorous emotions convincingly, displaying them in the same way that a genuine lover would do.  

Challenging this view, Baffa counters:

Don’t say this, because in my day I have met those who feigned, and then one learned that their simulation produces things which transcend nature: weeping, sighing, turning pale and blushing in a way that not only simple folk, but any woman, regardless of how shrewd she might be, would have been deceived by.

Both, however, agree that simulating love not only requires extraordinary effort and entirely devoted to the subject of love. At f. 25v, one of the interlocutors poses the exact same question: ‘Et qual sia maggior difficoltà fingere amore, o amando dissimulare’; but Betussi does not say anything further here on this question. The issue of dis/simulation in connection with love was also addressed in an earlier Italian didactic dialogue containing precepts for the comportment of young women; see Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Dialogo nel quale si ragiona della bella creanza delle donne, Venice, 1562, e.g., f. 39v, where two female interlocutors speak about the dis/simulation of a young man: ‘Credi a me … che egli ha simulato qualche volta di amar alcune donne, non gia per ingannarle, ma per coprire meglio questa via l’amore ch’egli ha portato e porta a te.’ This passage is interesting because feigning and disguise are deployed in the service of love and not for harmful purposes and deceit.

87 Betussi, Il Raverta, p. 60: ‘Dirovvi, rispondendo, in questa ed altre simili cose, naturalmente, non però senza ragione. L’uno e l’altro ho per difficilissimo’; and ibid: ‘volere mostrare quello che non è in noi, bisogna grandissimo artificio usare’.

88 Ibid.: ‘se si vorrá fingere amante non essendo, se sarà uomo, portà ben col passaggiare; se donna, col far copia di sè, nel lasciarsi spesso vedere; e l’uno e l’altro col mandar lettere, ambasciate, col mover sospiri, se gli sarà concesso d’essere alla presenza della donna, non rimanersi dallo spendere, continuare l’impresa, per giungere non al desiato, ma all’ostinato fine. Ma sarà impossibile, impossibile dico (perciòché ciò non è di nostro volere, anzi viene dai movimenti dell’animo) che al conspeto dell’amata, se non è vero amante, si possa a voglia sua arrossare, impallidire, restare attoniti, fisar gli occhi nella cosa amata, con quella pietà ch’amore imprime in noi.’

89 Ibid., p. 61: ‘Non dite così, perché, a’ miei giorni, ho conosciuto di quei che finge vano, onde si ha poi conosciuto la loro simulazione far cose sopra l’uso naturale: piangere, sospirare, impallidire ed arrossare di maniera che non ogni semplice, ma ciascuna donna, per accorta che fosse, sarebbe rimasta ingannata.’
skill, but also, as often as not, ends badly. Ravert them addresses the problem of dissimulation, which he deems ‘not only difficult, but impossible, since, when in love, we are not in control of ourselves’. This was a commonly held view which, as we have seen, was echoed and elaborated in early seventeenth-century emblem books devoted to love. Baffà, however, disagrees. She argues that ‘it can be done’ (‘si possa fare’) by staying away from the object of one’s desire and, in this way, prudently avoiding any situation which might lead to an uncontrolled expression of one’s true emotions. Having analysed the emotional condition caused by ardent love, Raverta points out that voluntarily restraining oneself from the proximity of one’s beloved is impossible. He then lists a number of ancient figures who failed to conceal their love. At this point, a third interlocutor named Domenichi joins the discussion and confirms that ‘it is more difficult to dissimulate love than to simulate it’. Betussi’s concise anatomy of dis/simulation in its specific relation to love anticipated Torquato Accetto’s famous Della dissimulazione onesta (1641) by almost a hundred years. Accetto addressed the topic briefly in a chapter on ‘how this art [of dissimulation] can exist between lovers’. Having established that blind love reveals itself quickly (‘Amor, che non vede, si fa troppo vedere’) through a number of clearly visible signs, Accetto merely rehearsed the kind of conventional views which

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.: ‘Ma che diremo di quelli che sono innamorati e vogliono fingere di non esserci? Questo dico io non solamente esser difficile, ma impossibile: perché, essendo amanti, non siamo in nostro potere.’

92 See Chapter 1 above, section 1.4.

93 Ibid., p. 62.

94 Ibid., p. 63, e.g., Dido and Antiochus and Stratonice.

95 Ibid.: ‘che piú difficile sia dissimulare che fingere amore’.


97 He expanded on the topos of ardent love, comparing the fever of love (‘febre amorosa’) with a burning house; ibid., p. 42: ‘Quindi si può considerar come, mettendosi fuoco a tutta la casa, le faville, anzi le fiamme, ne fan publica pompa per le fenestre e dal tatto. Tanto avviene, e peggio, quando amor prende stanza ne’ petti umani, accendendogli da dovero, perché i sospiri, le lagrime, la pallidezza, gli sguardi, le
we have seen in Dutch emblem books and in Betussi’s dialogue on love, though he seems not to have been aware of this work.\textsuperscript{98}

The question of dis/simulation in relation to love and marriage was also raised in the early German enlightenment.\textsuperscript{99} Julius Bernhard von Rohr (1688–1742) devoted two chapters to this subject in his \textit{Neuer Moralischer Traktat von der Liebe gegen die Personen anderen Geschlechts} of 1717. His point of departure was the difficulty of concealing amorous feelings.\textsuperscript{100} Even if lovers resorted to dissimulation, the experienced observer would be able to spot their disguises.\textsuperscript{101} However hard it might be to feign love, it was easier than concealing it.\textsuperscript{102} Nevertheless, von Rohr remarked: ‘That both are generally not impossible can be seen in some marriages’,\textsuperscript{103} adding that ‘if certain married couples did not have the dexterity to … create the illusion of … the greatest fidelity and love towards their marital partner, … then many would have reason to be ill-humoured, which they are not because of the simulated and dissimulated comportment of their partner.’\textsuperscript{104} Here, once more, pragmatism prevails and parole, e quanto si pensa e si fa, tutto va vestito con abito d’amore.’

\textsuperscript{98} Accetto did, however, quote from Torquato Tasso, \textit{Gerusalemme liberata}, ed. by Giorgio Cerboni Batardi, Modena, 1991, p. 757: ‘Mal amor si nasconde.’

\textsuperscript{99} The problem was also discussed in an eighteenth-century academic dissertation; see Johann Simon Frank von Lichtenstein, \textit{De simulatione circa matrimonium}, Göttingen, 1743. On the genre of academic dissertations, see the ‘Epilogue’ to this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{100} Julius Bernhard von Rohr, \textit{Neuer Moralischer Traktat von der Liebe gegen die Personen anderen Geschlechts}, Leipzig, 1717, p. 60: ‘iedennoch glaub ich / daß die Liebe sich überhaupt gar schwerlich Bergen lasse / daß nicht die geliebte Person selbst / oder auch andere Leute mercken sollten / daß man Estim vor sie hätte’.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.: ‘Ein eintziger Blick / oder eintziger Seufftzer wird bei der Sprache der Verliebten einen Dolmetscher zu agiren geschickt sein.’

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp. 60–61: ‘Ich glaube / daß es noch leichter sei sich zu stellen / als ob man vor eine Person / die man doch gar nicht aestimiret / grosse Passion hätte… denn die Liebe gegen eine andere Person zu cachiren.’

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 61: ‘Daß aber auch beides an und vor sich selbst nicht unmöglich sei / siehet man bei einigen Mariagen.’

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.: ‘Denn wenn gewisse Eheleute nicht die Geschicklichkeit besässen / ihre Hochachtung die sie
dis/simulation is perceived as an instrument for preserving and maintaining marriage.

4.7. Conclusion

Early modern authors were aware of dis/simulation in contexts such as the simulated affection of cunning courtesans and the usefulness of prudent dissembling in the household. Feigning and pretending were, for better or worse, identified as important elements of intimate relationships of various kinds. Some authors such as Betussi juxtaposed the closely related notions of simulation and dissimulation and distinguished between them with regard to their practical application. There was widespread agreement that concealing love and passions challenged commonplace precepts on worldly wisdom. Love – and the passions in general – conditioned and impeded individual attempts at self-control and prudent reservation.105

Early modern texts on love and the passions, which have not previously been studied in this context, made a noteworthy contribution to these debates by addressing the natural limits of human dis/simulation.106 Apart from moral qualms (and leaving aside cases when extreme measures such as torture were used),107 there were few factors

105 Jealousy was regarded as a particularly powerful passion by means of which love was revealed. See, e.g., Torquato Tasso, Conclusioni amorose, in Delle opere di Torquato Tasso, VIII, Venice, 1742, pp. 161–165, at p. 164: ‘La gelosia esser segno certissimo d’ardentissimo amore.’ According to one of the interlocutors in the Dialogo d’amore, ed. by Pierre Martin, Poitiers, 1998, p. 74, written in 1528 by Sperone Speroni (1500–1588) and first published in Venice in 1542, ‘essendo sempre la gelosia segno d’amore’. Pierre de Deimier (c. 1570–1618), a poet and rhetorician from Avignon, also remarked on the problem of dis/simulating love, but from a different point of view. In his collection of love letters, Le printemps des letters amoureuses, Rouen, 1614, p. 628, he offered advice on how to inform the object of one’s desire that her dis/simulation had been detected: ‘ie vois… que vous avez plus de dissimulation à faire voir que vous me portez quelque amitié, que de vraie affection’.

106 I shall return to the connection between dis/simulation and the passions in Chapter 6 below, section 6.4.

107 See Jon R. Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, Berkeley, 2009, p. 95.
which significantly impeded individuals from using silence, secrecy and dissembling to veil themselves, especially when it was for their own benefit.\textsuperscript{108} Concealing one’s love and passions, however, meant strenuously controlling, if not defying, one’s nature – at least for a short moment of time. It was a challenging endeavour for anyone – from the least sophisticated simpleton to the most experienced and prudent sage. Keeping the passions and the ‘fever of love’ in check was in some respects a much greater test of one’s character than concealing \textit{arcana imperii,} professional secrets and other types of sensitive information.

\textsuperscript{108} In his influential essay ‘Of Simulation and Dissimulation’, Francis Bacon, \textit{Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall,} ed. by Michael Kiernan, Oxford, 1985, pp. 20–23, at p. 21, noted: ‘For Men … will so beset a man with Questions, and draw him on, and picke it out of him, that without and absurd Silence, he must shew an Inclination one way; Or if he doe not, they will gather as much by his Silence, as by his Speech.’ On this essay, see Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Bacon’s “Of Simulation and Dissimulation”’, in \textit{A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture,} ed. by Michael Hattaway, Oxford, 2010, pp. 329–336; and David M. Posner, \textit{The Performance of Nobility,} Cambridge, 1999, pp. 80–121.
5.1. Introduction

Annibale Magnocavalli, one of the two interlocutors in the first dialogue of Stefano Guazzo’s *La civil conversazione* (1574), is a physician. We might wonder whether Guazzo’s choice of a physician rather than a member of any other profession – for example, a philosopher, courtier or diplomat – is a subtle allusion to the inherent link between medicine and dis/simulation, for Magnocavalli turns out to be well acquainted with the subject. He lists a number of widely accepted and tolerated forms of disguise and pretence, which, as part of the ‘conversational and ethical status quo’, were used in different social and communicative contexts ‘without the intent to offend others’.

Magnocavalli does not, however, consider the importance which this subject acquired in the medical theory and practice of his time. Although feigning and concealing constitute a perennial problem which has been widely discussed from medical, clinical and psychological perspectives up to the present day, no other period devoted more attention to this subject than the early modern era. Occasional references to dis/simulation can be found in ancient medical writings, especially in the Hippocratic corpus and in Galen’s works; nevertheless, deception was not regarded as an important theoretical issue either in antiquity or in the Middle Ages. Sixteenth-century physicians, however, developed a keen interest in dis/simulation, which lasted well beyond their own day.

That this unprecedented interest arose in the early modern period was not, I believe, a coincidence. Partaking in the wider cultural and socio-political debates of their time,

1 Jon R. Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe*, Berkeley, 2009, p. 35.

2 Ibid. See Stefano Guazzo, *La civil conversazione*, ed. by Amedeo Quondam, I, Modena, 1993, p. 60: ‘Laonde voglio conchiudere che sì come non è lecito il simular adulando, perché nuoce al prossimo, così è permesso, né si può chiamar vizio, il simulare senza alcuno interesse e senza intenzione d’offender altrui.’

physicians and authors of medical literature seem to have become increasingly aware of dis/simulation and integrated it into their deontological and medico-legal debates. These debates, which have been ignored by those examining the cultural and intellectual history of dis/simulation, as well as by historians of medicine, deserve further study.

Early modern medical authors were concerned with dis/simulation in various ways, which can be subdivided into three main categories. First of all, illicit pretence and disguise were used rhetorically by licensed physicians as accusations against their unauthorised, unlicensed and itinerant counterparts, whom they pejoratively referred to as charlatans, mountebanks or quacks. Distinguishing themselves from other medical practitioners was a central part of licensed physicians’ carefully planned programme of self-presentation. Yet they themselves by no means consistently disapproved of deceit and mendacity. On the contrary, they legitimised their own use of similar strategies and incorporated them into their professional work ethics. The second category consists of the literary genre of deontological treatises, which codified the early modern ideal of the medicus prudens, the worldly wise physician, bears witness to this collective effort. An integral part of the physician’s prudence entailed adopting all necessary means – including lies and ruses – in the interest of healing. As I shall argue, the use of dis/simulation was a privilege of licensed physicians and one they carefully guarded

4 Many of the authors I discuss were court physicians and operated in close proximity to the Realpolitik and courtly culture of their time. It is not surprising, therefore, that some medical authors drew explicit comparisons between physicians, on the one hand, and prudent rulers and military leaders, on the other, all of whom were expected to be masters of disguise and feigning.

against other practitioners. The third category was the medico-legal and forensic literature of the time, which, from the end of the sixteenth-century onwards, displayed increasing attention to the problem of dis/simulation.\(^6\) I have already discussed the relentless campaigns which early modern authorities waged against the ruses of false mendicants and roguish impostors.\(^7\) Yet for early modern physicians, this problem was not only relevant in connection with socially marginalised groups and groups such as prisoners and soldiers, but constituted a universal and ubiquitous phenomenon pertaining to all social strata. Since potentially any patient, regardless of social background, gender or age, could have reasons to resort to such manoeuvres, unveiling dissemblers was regarded as a highly important, yet difficult and in some cases even impossible, task.

5.2. Charlatans
Without oversimplifying or generalising a complex picture, it is reasonable to say that, in an age when medical progress was slow, the chances of successful healing were often quite limited. The reputation of practitioners, therefore, depended not only on their ability to cure diseases, but also, to a significant degree, on their decorum, that is, their general appearance and manner. This, however, made it difficult to distinguish clearly between impostors and regular practitioners. Early modern medical literature was full of references to pretenders and simulatores, giving the impression of widespread medical malpractice – the extent to which this picture corresponded to reality is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Nor is this the place to discuss the different types of charlatan (who were not a

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\(^7\) See Chapters 2 and 3 above.
homogeneous group), a topic which has already been investigated elsewhere.\(^8\) Early modern charlatanism has received increasing scholarly attention in recent years, yet it still poses challenging problems of definition.\(^9\) Charlatanism was a genuine profession, though an informal and, in practice, largely unregulated one. The remedies sold by strolling healers and the methods by which they promoted their services were at times not so different from those of regular physicians and apothecaries;\(^10\) indeed, some itinerant practitioners, who acted as mediators between learned and popular forms of healing, were educated and carried out medical investigations identical to those used by many of their learned colleagues – with results which were not necessarily less successful.

The point I would like to stress here is that, charlatans, offering their accessible and cheap services and wares, represented a constant source of irritation to authorised physicians, who, worried about such competition, frequently launched vigorous attacks on them. Attitudes towards charlatans were deeply contradictory:\(^11\) the reactions of medical, civic and ecclesiastical authorities oscillated between utter contempt and revulsion, on one side of the scale, and tolerance or partial acceptance, on the other. Although marginalised, charlatans in Italy, for example, were nonetheless allowed to offer their services and to sell their remedies as long as they followed the specific

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10 For a case study on the overlapping techniques of persuasion and healing between orthodox and unauthorised practitioners, see, e.g., Margaret D. Garber, ‘Con or Craft? Defending Chrysopoeia in a Late Seventeenth-Century Journal’, *Cultural and Social History*, 3, 2006, pp. 264–272. For a convincing argument which stresses the differences between these two groups, see Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France*, Oxford, 1997, p. 232–233.

11 Gentilcore, *Medical Charlatanism*, pp. 53–54, has argued that the contradictory attitude towards charlatans began in Italy and was then exported to other European countries.
licensing procedures laid down by the medical colleges and protomedicati.12 Yet, despite the licensing procedures which itinerant practitioners commonly obtained in order to practise their profession, they were still perceived as a threat to the established social and moral order of early modern urban communities. This was similar to the case of mendicant vagrants and pedlars, whose mobility was highly suspicious to settled city-dwellers and urban authorities.

Charlatans – perhaps no less than regular physicians – were masters of self-fashioning who skilfully created an aura of professionalism. Since secrecy and mystery were essential elements of their success, they were reluctant to reveal the tricks of their trade, as were, for example, the professori dei secreti who also played an important role in early modern medicine.13 If the ingredients of a medical ‘secret’ became available to the public, it would lose its fascination. Even more important for the popularity and success of charlatans, however, was their use of theatrical performances. Combining entertainment and spectacle with medical treatment, they appealed to a wide and diverse audience and actively participated in the popular culture of the time.14 Masters of eloquence and sleight of hand, they managed a wide range of skills, conjuring up a colourful variety of tricks and creating a carnevalenesque atmosphere. The art of the charlatan was closely linked to that of other performers on the fringes of society such as jugglers and pedlars.15


14 David Gentilcore, Healers and Healing in Early Modern Italy, Manchester, 1998, pp. 115–119, at p. 116, stressed the significant overlap between commedia dell’arte troupes and charlatans, although, as he noted, not all itinerant comedians sold remedies and not all unauthorised healers performed extemporised comedies; see also Gentilcore, Medical Charlatanism, pp. 301–334. Recent studies on English rogues and conny-catchers have also established a link to theatrical performances and specifically to the commedia dell’arte; see Paola Pugliatti, Beggary and Theatre in Early Modern England, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 9, 155–159 and 165–166.

15 Peter Cryle, ‘La Mettrie and Charlatanism: The Dynamics of Recognition and Denunciation’, Cultural and Social History, 3, 2006, pp. 301–314, at p. 303; see also Roy Porter, Quacks: Fakers & Charlatans in
Itinerant and unauthorised practitioners were not, in reality, serious economic competitors to regular physicians. The two groups operated at different ends of the spectrum and usually recruited their customers under different circumstances and by different means. Charlatans were, nonetheless, a thorn in the side of regular physicians and were believed to represent an affront to the moral and social order and to pose a threat to the community’s livelihood. It was their theatrical (and sometimes deceitful) performances which seem to have most outraged other physicians. Although there were different, but overlapping, types of charlatan (snake-handlers, tooth-pullers and so on), unauthorised practitioners were generally perceived as an undifferentiated group of impostors and pretenders who operated in the public space, preferably in crowded squares, check by jowl with other agents of deceit and illicit dis/simulation. Calling a practitioner a ‘charlatan’ meant, above all, unmasking and ridiculing him as an agent of medical imposture. Samuel Johnson’s definition of a quack from his Dictionary of 1755 is worth quoting: a quack, he writes, is ‘1. A boastful pretender to arts of which he does not understand. 2. A vain boastful pretender to physic, one who proclaims his own Medical abilities in public places. 3. An artful, tricking practitioner in Physic.’ Johnson’s definitions are broadly in line with earlier perceptions of unauthorised practitioners. The etymology of the Italian word ciarlatano demonstrates this pervasive association: it originally designated someone from the central Italian town of Cerreto, the inhabitants of which had the reputation, during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, of being simulating mendicants and vagabonds. Towards the sixteenth century, ciarlatano acquired the connotation of ‘subtle and insidious eloquence’. We should also recall that Teseo Pini’s taxonomy of beggarly dis/simulations included the

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18 Quoted in Porter, *Health on Sale*, p. 4.


category of false protomedici, who, according to him, ‘are said to be princes among physicians’ and who ‘through simulated zeal and love of mankind, pretend to share the sufferings of other people’.  

Petrus Forestus (1521–1597), one of the most eminent Dutch physicians of his age, expressed his deep-rooted aversion to unauthorised healers in his unpublished dialogue Vander Empiriken, Landlooperen ende Valscher Medicynsbedroch (‘On Charlatans, Frauds and the Trickery and Deceit of False Medicine’). In this rich storehouse of contemporary medical practice, Forestus castigated the ‘disguised frauds of impertinent good-for-nothings [and] false impostors’ (‘die bedecte bedrieginge der onbeschaemder landloeperen, der valscher bedriegers’). The German scholar and physician Ludwig von Hörnigk (1600–1667, in his Politica medica of 1638, described unauthorised and marginalised practitioners and healers of whatever sort as a deceitful lot. The sixteenth-century Italian physician Scipione Mercurio (c. 1545–1615), who wrote a lengthy defence of orthodox medicine, devoted various chapters to the frauds of

21 See Chapter 3 above, n. 49.

22 For a partial transcription of the Van der Empiriken and a study of this work, see Henriette A. Bosman-Jelgersma (ed.), Pieter van Foreest; De Hollandse Hippocrates, Krommenie, 1996, pp. 256–90 and 299–326; see also Vivian Nutton, ‘Idle Old Trots, Cobblers and Costardmongers. Pieter van Foreest on Quackery’, ibid., pp. 245–255.


24 Ludwig von Hörnigk, Politica medica, Frankfurt am Main, 1638, p. 171: ‘Von allerhand betrieglichen, vermessenen Geltsüchtigen und unbefugten Ärzten, darunter seind Alte Weiber, Beutelschneider, Christallseher, Dorfgeistliche, Einsiedler, Fallimentierer, Gauckler, Harnpropheten, Juden, Kälberärzte, Landstreicher, Marktschreier, Nachrichter, Ofenschwärmer, Pseudo-Paracelsisten, Quacksalber, Rattenfänger, Segensprecher, Teuffelsbander, Unholden, Waldheintzen, Ziegeunern.’ Von Hörnigk, an outspoken anti-Semite, devoted more attention, however, to Jewish physicians, depicting them as malicious deceivers and pretenders in his treatise Medicaster Apella oder Juden Arzt, Strassburg, 1631.

Nor was he the only German author of the period to stigmatise Jewish practitioners on grounds of their alleged duplicity and deceitful dis/simulations; see Johannes Langius, Medicum de republica symposium, Augsburg, 1554, pp. 62–63, in which Langius, a physician from Lemberg, railed against fraudulent physicians, above all, those of Jewish origin (‘Iudeos pseudomedicos’). Attacks on Jewish physicians were not limited to Germany: Battista Codronchi (on whom, see Section 5.5.2 below) argued in his De christianae ac tuta medendi ratione, Ferrara, 1591, that it was a sin for Christian patients to consult Jewish doctors, unless there was no other choice; see Schleiner, Medical Ethics, p. 17.
charlatans, identifying their main characteristics as telling lies and wearing masks.\textsuperscript{25} Girolamo Bardi (b. 1603), an Italian physician and professor of philosophy at Pisa, wrote of unlicensed healers:

just as itinerant performers pull the wool over the eyes of bystanders by playful shows of dice and other games which rely solely on the dexterity of their hands, so, too, they, with their buffoons, construct cunning devices and deceits for these very people, and for their ingenuity and brains and, worst of all, their lives ... \textsuperscript{26}

This passage associates the deceits practised by medical charlatans on the same level as the ruses of conny-catchers, jugglers, conjurers or other urban tricksters.

Similar complaints were echoed in a large number of literary texts and medical treatises from other European countries and regions, which, for reasons of space, cannot be discussed here.\textsuperscript{27} These works show that dis/simulation was used polemically by licensed physicians for their own ideological and political purposes.\textsuperscript{28} The question was

\textsuperscript{25} Gentilcore, \textit{Medical Charlatanism}, p. 13; and see Scipione Mercurio, \textit{De gli errori populari d’Italia, libri sette}, Venice, 1603, f. 176\textsuperscript{v}:'... per Ciarlatani intendo saltainbanco, bagattellieri, buffoni, et universalmente qualunque persona in piazza stando in banco, o in Terra, o à Cavallo, vende medicine, polveri composti, ogli per guarir alcune infermità, perdicando con mille giuramenti, e buggie, mille meraviglie delle cose, che vendono’.

\textsuperscript{26} Girolamo Bardi, \textit{Medicus politico-catholicus}, Genoa, 1644, p. 271: ‘At vero sicut alearum, vel aliorum iocorum ludicris ludis, a manuum celeritate tantum dependentibus, adstantem oculis circulatores imponunt, sic et isti hominibus ipsis, et eorum ingenio, et cerebro, et vitae (quod peius est) technas, dolosque suis saennionibus construunt, quibus decipiuntur, et in foveas ab ipsis paratas, non tamen prae ignorantia crassisima animadversas volentes, nolentes pertrahuntur ... ’

\textsuperscript{27} It is worth pointing out that there were no legal restrictions on or laws against untrained and unauthorised medical practitioners in antiquity; the first scanty legislation relating to the examination and licensing of physicians appeared in the twelfth century, e.g., in the medical schools of Salerno and Montpellier; see Erwin Ackerknecht, ‘Early History of Legal Medicine’, in \textit{Legacies in Law and Medicine}, ed. by Chester R. Burns, New York, 1977, pp. 249–265. The deep-rooted and widespread anxiety about unauthorised healers and medical impostors, which began in the late Middle Ages and reached a pinnacle in the sixteenth century, resembles the contemporary perception of other lowly professions and groups such as beggars and vagrants.

\textsuperscript{28} We should bear in mind, however, that in the early modern period the entire medical profession was
not so much whether feigning and disguise were morally justifiable and licit, but instead who was permitted to make use of them. Licit pretences and ruses were a prerogative and an exclusive privilege which authorised physicians jealously appropriated for themselves and from which they excluded other practitioners by branding their employment of similar tactics as illicit.

Regular physicians, however, also frequently directed their accusations of illicit dis/simulations at authorised and licensed members of the profession. Rodrigo de Castro (c. 1546–1627), an émigré physician of Sephardi origin, tried to accomplish in Hamburg what Forestus had already achieved several decades earlier in Delft: convincing local city magistrates to establish a set of rules for and legal restrictions on the practice of medicine. De Castro stressed the crucial importance of distinguishing between pretenders, on the one hand, and learned and reliable practitioners, on the other. The aim of his seminal work of 1614, Medicus-politicus, was not only to depict the ideal frequently linked with imposture, whether in relation to the gravitas and learned speech of the professional physician or to the theatrical entertainment of the charlatan. Everyone involved in providing health care was generally held in suspicion; and accusations of medical malpractice and faking were a recurring topos in European literature, which went back to antiquity but still flourished in the Renaissance; see Klaus Bergdolt, ‘Zur antischolastischen Arztkritik des 13. Jahrhunderts’, Medizinhistorisches Journal, 26, 1991, pp. 264–282. Diatribes against physicians who lacked professional skills continued to be produced in the early modern era. The philosopher Rafaello Carrara, e.g., tried to unmask ‘the errors and deceit of physicians’ (′gl’errori, et gl’inganni de’ Medici′) in his biting satire Le confusioni de’ medici, Milan, 1652. Physicians were also widely believed to abuse their professional status in order to conceal their true intention of accumulating wealth, prestige or power. The author of another contemporary satirical treatise stressed that physicians, wearing merely a ‘mascara de servicio’, abused their power under the ‘titulo de cura y misericordia’; see [Manuel da Costa], Arte de furtar, espelho de enganos, theatro de verdades, Amsterdam, 1652, pp. 37 and 47. For further sceptical comments on and polemics against medicine in seventeenth-century literature, see Wolfgang Eckart, ‘Medizinkritiker in einigen Romanen des Barock. Albertinus, Lesage, Moscherosch’, in Heilberufe und Kranke um 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wolfgang Eckart and Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, Münster, 1982, pp. 49–75; and for a recent study of how regular physicians attempted to combat their bad reputation, see Christi Sumich, Divine Doctors and Dreadful Distempers: How Practicing Medicine Became a Respectable Profession, London, 2013.

The satirist Thomas Sonnet Courval (1577–1627), in his Satyre contre les charlatans et pseudomedecins empyriques, Paris, 1610, sig. B3v, pursued a similar agenda, not only attacking the deceptions (′ruses et tromperies′) of unauthorised practitioners but also encouraging civil authorities (′les prudens Magistrats des Republiques′) to identify impostors among licensed physicians;
physician but also to expose the errors and impostures of bad practitioners. In the chapter ‘On distinguishing between true and false physicians’ (‘De veri et falsi medici agnitione’), Castro directed his criticism against the ‘pseudomedici’, who, regardless of their academic degrees, should be ‘severely punished by the prudent magistrates’ for their malpractice. In this context, the very act of recognising (and stigmatising) a charlatan can be seen as a ‘key move in the consolidation of professionalism’. The ability to identify medical malpractice was, therefore, a defining trait of the competent and trustworthy physician and depended on his professional insight. It was also a way for physicians to improve their standing among the general public. Through vigilant surveillance and patrolling of the borders of their profession, licensed physicians created symbolic boundaries between themselves and other practitioners.

Attacking and denouncing colleagues as impostures was a commonplace feature of medical literature from antiquity to the early modern period. The influential Italian

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31 Castro, Medicus-politicus, p. 201: ‘At vero, pseudomedici, quibus indiciiis ab iis differant, operae pretium erit, nunc explicare, ut sicuti priores illi a professoribus in Academiis promoventur et honorifice insigniuntur: ita etiam hi debitis stigmatibus inusti a civibus fugiantur, et a prudentibus magistratibus pro grassandi licentia et nocumenti ratione piantur gravissime.’ De Castro also discussed the frauds of charlatans (plures agyrtarum fraudes); see ibid., pp. 146–149.

32 Cryle, Charlatanism in the Age of Reason, p. 246.

33 This was, of course, not only a symbolic and abstract exercise; the controlling and licensing of itinerant healers by protomedicato tribunals and colleges of physicians was a concrete process of unmasking alleged impostors and pretenders.

34 Pietro Castelli (c. 1590–1661), e.g., stated that ‘such [i.e. bad] physicians are very similar to actors on the tragic stage. For they have the looks, behavior, and the mask of those they represent, but they are not
physician Giovanni Argenterio (1513–1572), today mostly remembered for his criticism of Galenic theory,\(^{35}\) complained in his *De consultationibus medicis* of 1551 about the feigned erudition (‘simulata eruditio’) of physicians.\(^{36}\) According to him, some licensed and orthodox physicians tried to use their education and training to present themselves as knowledgeable and reliable professionals. Referring ostentatiously to medical authorities of whom they had little knowledge, they blackened the reputation of the entire profession. This type of criticism against licensed practitioners culminated in an anonymously published German pamphlet of 1698, *Machiavellus medicus*.\(^{37}\) Deceptive dis/simulation was one of the central themes of this short polemical piece, in which the various ruses practised by physicians were systematically exposed. While this criticism was not entirely new, the method of presentation was: stripping the contemporary ideal of the prudent physician of its positive connotations, the author mocked the deontological literature of the time, which is the subject of the next section.

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37 As in early modern political and ethical writings, the term ‘Machiavellian’ serves here as a loose label for immorality, that is, a devious physician who makes cunning use of his rhetorical and dialectical abilities, ignoring social and moral norms whenever it suits his purposes; see Wolfgang Eckart, ‘Machiavellus Medicus: Eine satirisch-kritische Schrift zur medizinischen Politik des ausgehenden 17. Jahrhunderts’, *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, 1982, pp. 97–125.
5.3 The early modern ideal of the *medicus politicus*\(^{38}\)

Argenterio’s critique of the *simulata eruditio* of licensed physicians went right to the heart of the matter. Apart from erudition, the principle rationales of (false) self-presentation of early modern physicians were prudence, gravity and honourability, all of which were in line with ideal forms of comportment among members of the upper echelons of early modern society. In what follows, I shall briefly sketch some of the main characteristics of the ideal early modern physician, focusing on practical wisdom and on the problem of medical dis/simulation, which gained increasing importance at the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth. A number of authors, most of whom were well established and renowned physicians, addressed this subject in professional treatises. Early modern medical theory was heavily based on the Greco-Roman tradition and above all, of course, on the works of Hippocrates and Galen. Yet unlike most other medical subjects, deceiving and lying in the interest of curing remained largely unnoticed by ancient writers. Galen’s short treatise, to which I shall return below,\(^{39}\) briefly set out some ways of detecting feigned diseases, but did not address the use of dis/simulation by physicians. Apart from occasional references to deceptions such as ‘sugar-coating’ medication in the Hippocratic corpus, we do not find any systematic discussion of this subject in ancient medical authorities.\(^{40}\)

Some early modern treatises, perhaps most notably Henrique Jorge Henrique’s *Retrato del perfecto medico* (1595),\(^{41}\) were completely silent on this intricate subject.\(^{42}\)

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38 In this context, the term ‘political’ did not so much refer to the dealings with structures or affairs of the government, politics and the state, but was, more or less, a synonym of prudent; see Wolfgang Eckhart, “‘Medicus Politicus’ oder ‘Machiavellus Medicus’? – Wechselwirkungen von Ideal und Realität des Arzttypus im 17. Jahrhundert, *Medizinhistorisches Journal*, 19, 1984, pp. 210–223, at pp. 212–213. In de Castro’s treatise, the term *politicus* unites the ideal of individual prudence with the public role of the physician in service of the authorities.

39 See section 5.5.1 below.


42 This was fundamentally different from Rodrigo de Castro’s *Medicus politicus*. Schleiner, *Medical
Henrique (c. 1555–1622), a university teacher and physician to the Duke of Alba, was of Jewish lineage but remained, unlike de Castro, in the Iberian Peninsula throughout his life and outwardly adhered to Catholicism. Having stressed that the physician should avoid lying, he merely issued generic and commonplace praises of silence and taciturnity. Another example is Ahasverus Fritsch’s *Medicus peccans sive tractatus de peccatis medicorum* of 1684. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Fritsch was well aware of the problem of dis/simulation, which he discussed at length in the context of beggarly ruses in his *De medicantibus validis* of 1659. In the *Medicus peccans sive tractatus de peccatis medicorum* of 1684 – a conventional deontological treatise which depicted the good practitioner by means of negative examples – he, however, remained silent on this subject: among all the misdeeds and sins which he ascribed to physicians, we find no mention of simulation or deception. While we should not assume that Fritsch considered such practices on the part of physicians to be acceptable, this omission is nevertheless somewhat surprising, considering that the subject was a common point of discussion in deontological literature and was wholeheartedly embraced by other physicians.

Gabriele de Zerbi’s *De cautelis medicorum* of 1495 was an important

*Ethics*, p. 59, does not provide a convincing explanation for the stark contrast between these two authors, merely arguing that de Castro’s awareness of the problem of feigning and disguise was connected to his Marrano background and his concerns with Inquisitorial persecution, while Henrique’s medical ethics were firmly anchored in the prevailing values of Counter-Reformation Spain.


44 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 63–64. Apart from these, Henrique spoke only of rhetoric (e.g., p. 50: ‘el ornamento de palabras dulces, sabrosas’), without, however, indicating where licit rhetoric ends and illicit ruses and deceptions begin.

45 See Section 3.4.1 above.

46 The same can be said about von Hörnigk’s *Politica medica*, pp. 24–26, which gives an overview of all formal and informal medical practices, but entirely omits the problem of feigning and concealment. This is especially surprising in his discussion of the ‘Hospital-Medicus’, a figure who was likely to have been in close contact with false beggars, as vividly depicted by Robert Copland in *The Highway to the Spital-House*; see Chapter 3 above, section 3.6.
deontological treatise, which codified customary and self-regulatory rules of collective behaviour and medical etiquette for physicians.\(^47\) Gabriele Zerbi (1445–1505), a professor at Padua and Bologna, stressed that the relationship between the patient and the physician should be based on mutual trust. One of his central premises was that the patient’s faith in the healing abilities of the practitioner actively contributed to his or her recovery.\(^48\) The practitioner, therefore, had to convey an impression of professionalism and trustworthiness through the display of a specific *decorum* and a code of behaviour.\(^49\) Although dis/simulation did not officially form part of the professional and ethical code prescribed by Zerbi, his precepts and *cautela*, nonetheless, alluded to the use of disguise and feigning. After initially condemning pretence and ruses,\(^50\) he established the category of benevolent and permissible deceit and subtly justified the use of such means in the interest of healing, recommending that the physician ‘should promise sound health and should not even refrain from using lies, since these are dutiful lies’.\(^51\) He did not, however, say anything more on this point, leaving it to his successors to elaborate this precept further.\(^52\)

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48 Schleiner, *Medical Ethics*, p. 25, noted that this precept goes back to ancient and medieval medical theory, e.g., to Avicenna’s dictum: ‘Illum medicum curare, cui plurimum confidunt.’

49 Paul Ridder, *Die Sprache der Ethik als Kunst der Verstellung. Moralische Grundlagen ärztlicher Autorität*, Greven, 1997, p. 19, notes that the *decorum* was, above all, supposed to enhance his reputation and to function as collective moral propaganda for physicians.


51 Zerbi, *De cautelis medicorum*, sig. B4’: ‘Et ad infirmum denuo reversus, firman ei promittat salutem et non vereatur etiam mendaciis uti sunt nam hec officiosa mendacia et salutem ei promittat.’

52 Zerbi also advised physicians, when pronouncing a judgement on health, to present themselves as happy, but never to do so with regard to death; see ibid., sig. C2’: ‘De salute autem iudicium depositurus
According to de Castro, the self-presentation of physicians was not only a question of attire and outward appearance, but also, and perhaps more importantly, pertaining to communication and interaction with patients. From the first encounter with the sick person onwards, the physician should always be in control of his facial expressions. He should, for example, look pensive and a bit sad, though not sour. We can thus see interesting analogies between the code of conduct of early modern physicians and contemporary ideals of civil and courtly behaviour.

In an age when healing was not only a private matter, practitioners were often surrounded by the family and friends of the sick person (the adstantes); and the reputation of physicians depended, to a certain extent, on their opinions. Early modern medical treatises, therefore, advised doctors to bend the truth and to simulate in front of them. Pietro Castelli (1574–1662), a Roman physician and botanist, recommended in his instruction manual of 1630 for young practitioners, De visitatione aegrotantium, that they should always pretend that the disease of the patient was serious; for even if it appeared mild at first, a more severe disease might be lurking in the background. In medicus sermonem amplificet, et letum se ostendat, nunquam vero sic de morte.’ This arguably implied a certain degree of dis/simulation.

53 De Castro, nonetheless, discussed the outward appearance of the physician in the chapter ‘De medici amictu, vultu, et ad aegrotantem ingressu’, stressing that it should be dignified and, above all, moderate; see Castro, Medicus-politicus, pp. 124–127.

54 De Castro devoted an entire chapter to the first encounter of physicians with their patients; see ibid., pp. 128–131: ‘Medici primus accessus ad aegrotum: quaeque ipso circumspectio, cautio, solertia, et providentia servanda sit.’


56 Jütte, Ärzte, p. 127.

57 Schleiner, Medical Ethics, p. 30.

58 Pietro Castelli, De visitatione aegrotantium, Rome, 1630, p. 80: ‘Dicat ergo semper medicus adstantibus morbum esse maxime considerationis, et difficultatis (licet primo appareat levis, quia aliquando serpens latet in herba), et remedia cum multa diligentia esse adhibenda.’
contrast to other medical authors, Castelli’s advice was not intended to support the process of healing but rather its sole purpose was to protect the good reputation of the practitioner. The underlying logic was simple: if the physician was not able to cure the patient, he could blame his failure on the gravity of the disease, while the reward for the successful treatment of a serious disease would be greater than for a less threatening one. This is a telling example of how early modern physicians justified their deceptions by linking them to praiseworthy worldly wisdom.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the notion of prudence for the early modern ideal physician. While Zerbi’s *medicus canonicus* followed the proper, that is, Aristotelian-Galenic, method of procedure, for most later authors the perfect physician was, above all, worldly wise. While the combination of profound scholarship and technical qualifications which guaranteed a balance between practical skills and theoretical learning, remained a fundamental requirement, early modern deontological literature increasingly stressed the importance of situational and flexible comportment.

59 Roger French, ‘The Medical Ethics of Gabriele de Zerbi’, in *Doctors and Ethics: The Earlier Historical Setting of Professional Ethics*, ed. by Andrew Wear, Johanna Geyer-Kordesch and Roger French, Amsterdam, 1993, pp. 72–97, at p. 90. Although the notion of prudence is not as important as in later works, traces of practical wisdom nonetheless shine through; see, e.g., Zerbi, *De cautelis medicorum*, sig. D1: ‘Et omnino oportet medicum in omnibus esse sagacem et astutum’; and his advice, ibid., to colleagues: ‘Estote prudentes: sicut serpentes’. Cf. Matthew 10:16: ‘Be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.’

60 This is hardly surprising, given that the art of medicine was dependent on prudence and entailed careful history taking, diligent examination and diagnosis, and skillful treatment and prognosis; see Linden, *Zerbi*, p. 19.

61 See Castro, *Medicus-politicus*, p. 121, where he lists the most important virtues of the ideal physician, placing prudence first; see also, pp. 5–6, where, in the chapter ‘Medicum virum bonum prudentemque et esse, et dici oportere’, he notes: ‘Nam quod prudentem esse medicum perfectum omnino conveniat, id in posterum latius sumus ostensuri: immo huic tantum rei hunc dicavimus tractatum, et medicum natura prudentem esse oportet, dixit Hippocrates: et fieri nullo modo potest, tu qui perfectus medicus fuerit, idem sit vir imprudens. Ad quaevis enim munia, quantumlibet vilissima, ut recte perficiantur, prudentia requiritur, et aurifaber vel sartor prudens reliquis antecellit. Tanto magis medicus ipse, cujus perfectio non solum in medicis actionibus consistit, verum etiam in oeconomia atque prudentia, quam si non habet in iis, quae ab incunabulis didicit, qui fieri poterit, ut eam obtineat in medica arte, cui iam grandior factus se tradidit.’ The German physician and astronomer Antonius Deusingius (1612–1666) noted in his *Oratio inauguralis qua idea medici absolati adumbratur, seu quod optimus medicus sit idem philosophus,*
Secrecy was another important precept, since medical prudence involved confidentiality and discretion with regards to the disease of the patient. The ideal of the physician as someone expert at keeping secrets has analogies with other contemporary professions such as the secretary, the statesman and the confessor, as well as Gracián’s *varon prudente*.

The normative catalogue of rules for physicians varied from one author to another, each stressing different points. Battista Codronchi’s *De Christiana ac tuta medendi ratione* of 1591 and Girolamo Bardi’s *Medicus politico-catholicus* of 1644 depicted the perfect physician as, above all, a devout Christian, trying to harmonise his professional comportment with church doctrine. Codronchi’s treatise was one of the most influential Catholic deontological works of the early modern period; against which de Castro wrote his *Medicus politicus*, in which he proposed a more secularised system of medical ethics (Bardi’s treatise was intended, in turn, as an answer to that of de Castro). Although Codronchi, de Castro and Bardi took very different approaches to medical ethics, they all addressed the problem of dis/simulation, as we shall see in the next section.

5.4. ‘Pious simulations’ or the deceived patient

Early modern physicians did not stop at praising secrecy and discretion, but also endorsed withholding information (above all, negative prognoses) from patients and even deceiving them. This precept suggested the use not only of prudent concealment but also of various rhetorical strategies such as promising a successful outcome to the healing procedure (even if it was unlikely) or, as we have seen, portraying the malady as worse than it actually was. This was particularly helpful as a way to compel

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62 Ahasverus Fritsch, *Medicus peccans*, Nuremberg, 1684, pp. 72–73, maintained that doctors who revealed the secrets of their patients were committing a sin. Castro, *Medicus-politicus*, pp. 126–127 and 129, stressed on several occasions the importance of discretion and silence. The Italian anatomist and physician Leonardo Botallo (1530–1587) even claimed that it was not licit for physicians to reveal the composition of medications prescribed to their patients; see Leonardo Botallo, *Commentarioli duo*, Lyon, 1565, p. 31.

63 Castro, *Medicus-politicus*, p. 143: ‘ac immorigeros nacti patientes, majora, quam sint, fingimus mala,
disobedient and difficult patients to obey the physician’s instructions. Zacutus Lusitanus (1575–1642), a renowned physician of Sephardi origin who lived in exile outside of Portugal, noted that ‘if melancholics cannot be cured by art [i.e., of medicine], then by industry; and we need to use deception by which, as experience teaches us, they can be healed’. Since in other cases a different approach might have been called for, the physician had to adapt to each new situation and problematic patient – it was precisely this flexibility in the use of various deceptive strategies which constituted his prudence.

Dis/simulation was, furthermore, legitimised as a psychological instrument used, for instance, in treating fearful patients. Very much a concern of ancient physicians, it remained an important and intricate question in the early modern era. De Castro remarked that, since fearful patients were very sensitive to any verbal nuance or facial expression, the doctor should prudently conceal through simulation (‘simulatione tegere’) whatever might increase their anxiety. He was well aware that the question of feigning was highly controversial (‘quaestio … dissensionis plena, et omnino controversa’). Interestingly, de Castro did not refer to any medical authors in this context but instead juxtaposed Plato’s notion of pharmakon with Aristotle’s ethics. Although generally agreeing with Aristotle that all lying was bad and only the truth was good and praiseworthy (‘mendacium per se improbum est ac vituperabile: verum autem probum et laudabile’), de Castro was able to resolve this problem by stressing that it was essential to distinguish between a mendacium nocivum, ‘a harmful lie’, and a

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64 Schleiner, Medical Ethics, p. 22.
65 Ibid., p. 9.
66 Castro, Medicus-politicus, p. 142: ‘priorem de medicis confirmari posse existimamus, quia aegri suapte natura suspiciosi cum sint, et formidolosi, accuratissime non solum verba, et ratiocinationes, sed gestus, et nutus medicorum observant, a cunctis, quae vel ex vultu medici colligunt, sibi metuentes; prudentis ergo medici fuerit, quae aegro metum allatura putarit, aut animi perturbationem, ea simulatione tegere’; and p. 126, where de Castro warns that the physician should watch his words carefully since patients ‘aegroti semper sunt pusillanimes, et suspiciosi’. Pio Rossi, Convito morale per gli etici, economici, politici, Venice, 1657, p. 440, speaks of ‘una coperta di simulazione’.
67 Castro, Medicus-politicus, p. 142.
68 Ibid., p. 143.
mendacium officiosum, ‘a dutiful lie’, from which something useful could spring.\textsuperscript{69} Arguing that Aristotle did not condemn benevolent lies and deceipts, de Castro affirmed that some simulations harmed neither the worldly wisdom nor the good reputation of the practitioner since they were part of prudent professional behaviour.\textsuperscript{70} In his conclusion, de Castro unequivocally stated ‘that the physician is allowed to feign anything for the sake of a person’s health, to dissimulate, and also to promise many thing which may strengthen the patient’s health’.\textsuperscript{71}

Towards the end of the treatise, de Castro included a short but interesting note, which, as far as I have been able to establish, does not seem to have been picked up by later authors. Addressing the self-determination of the patient, he wrote: ‘If we encounter a patient who is prudent and well equipped with regard to his mind and his learning, it will be permissible to insinuate the truth about his disease, presenting it as something which he should not fear, because he might be frightened by hearing the

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 144. De Castro went on to argue that a serviceable lie could be used as medication: ‘Ita insuper mendacio utendum, uti medicamento et condimento, hoc est, nunquam magnopere mentiendum aut sine magna proximi utilitate.’ There is a similar account of the usefulness of lying in Alberico Gentili, \textit{De abusu mendacii disputationio}, Hanover, 1599. Gentili also mentioned Aristotle’s condemnation of lying, carefully distinguishing between the \textit{dolus bonus} and the \textit{dolus malus}; on Gentili’s treatise in connection with early modern concepts of worldly wisdom, see Gianfranco Borrelli, ‘Tecniche di simulazione e conservazione politica in Gerolamo Cardano e Alberico Gentili’, \textit{Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento}, 7, 1986, pp. 87–124, at pp. 108–118. See also Michael Wendeler, \textit{Practica philosophia, hoc est, ethica, politica atque oeconomica}, Wittenberg, 1662, p. 109, for another dicussion of lying and dis/simulation in connection with Aristotle’s ethics, in which a conclusion similar to de Castro’s is reached: ‘Est itaque, ubi simulare licet et dissimulare, nec omnis dolus malitiae infamia laborat. Est autem distinguendum inter dissimulationem licitam, seu honestam, et inter illicitam, seu turpem.’

\textsuperscript{70} Castro, \textit{Medicus-politicus}, p. 144: ‘Neque id quicquam illius prudentiae, probitati, sapientiae, famae obstare, quia bonus dolus est seu solertia quaedam atque prudentia …’ See also p. 142, where de Castro says that benevolent simulation ‘digna laude virtusque reputanda censetur’.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 144: ‘His ita cursim annotatis, sit constans assertio, licere medico pleraque salutis aegroti causa fingere, pleraque dissimulare, polliceri etiam multa, quae animum in bonam spem erigere ipsi possunt.’ See also Schleiner, \textit{Medical Ethics}, p. 12.
Apart from the last point, de Castro’s relativism and his subtle casuistry was echoed by earlier authors who discussed the dialectics of medical deceit. A good example is Julius Alessandrini (1506–1590), who included in the opening of his *De medicina et medico dialogus libris quinque* of 1557, an important textbook on the education and duties of a physician, a short marginal note: ‘it is licit to deceive the ill’ (‘Licet decipere aegrotos’),\(^7\) adding that this should only be done as a last resort and ‘always for their greatest benefit’ (‘maxima semper illorum utilitate’).\(^4\)

Alessandrini, who, as a physician to Ferdinand I and Maximilian II, would have been familiar with the Realpolitik of European courts, justified these strategies by comparing the medical craft to political theory and practice; in his conclusion, he confidently proclaimed: ‘let us, to be sure, lie … just as it was never shameful for leaders of armies or princes of states to lie for the safety of their citizens or armies’.\(^5\)

Portraying the prudent and cunning physician, Alessandrini evoked the image of a battle of wits between patients and physicians: ‘surrounded by deceits and stratagems, we will try to defeat, with cunning speech, those who feign illness or practise any other form of imposture, so that they may, with greater respect, be obedient and know that we are able

\(^7\) Castro, *Medicus-politicus*, p. 145: ‘Si itaque prudentem, et bene tum animo, tum disciplinis instructum aegrum nacti simus, vera illi de morbi statu insinuare licebit, ut de quo metus non sit, quod vera audiendo perterreatur.’

\(^3\) Ibid. Another marginal note, p. 334, stated: ‘Licere mentiri pro salute laborantis.’

\(^4\) Ibid.: ‘mentiamur sane … quando neque exercituum ducibus, neque principibus civitatum turpe unquam fuit mentiri in civitatum, aut exercituum suorum salutem’. Ponce de Santacruz, *Dignotio et cura affectuum melancholicorum*, Madrid, 1622, f. 2r, continued and elaborated this analogy, comparing the physician to a statesman and an ingenious strategist, or, as he put it, ‘strenuus militiae dux arcem aliquam oppugnaturus’; see also Schleiner, *Medical Ethics*, p. 20. Another seventeenth-century Spanish physician compared the physician to a statesman skilled in concealment, and, if necessary, simulation, stressing that dis/simulation was useful and even necessary in both medicine and politics; see Gaspar dos Reys Franco, *Elysius jucundarum quaestionum campus, omnium literarum amoenissima varietate refterus*, Brussels, 1661, p. 139, who, interestingly, quoted, not a medical text, but Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, II.17.27: ‘Mendacium dicere aliquando sapienti concessum.’
to protect our territory’.\textsuperscript{76}

We find similar analogies with politics,\textsuperscript{77} and warfare, in other influential contemporary deontological texts such as Alfonso Ponce de Santa Cruz’s \textit{Dignotio et cura affectuum melancholicorum} of 1622, which his son, Antonio Ponce de Santa Cruz, a clergyman, professor at Valladolid and court physician to Philip III and Philip IV, published posthumously. In this treatise the \textit{medicus politicus} is compared to a ‘vigorous military leader about to overcome some stronghold’ (‘strenuus militiae dux arcem aliquam oppugnaturus’).\textsuperscript{78}

Bardi’s \textit{Medicus politico-catholicus} of 1644 is another interesting example. Perhaps unexpectedly in a portrayal of a ‘truly Christian’ practitioner, Bardi legitimised what he described as a \textit{politicus modus curandi}, ‘a political method of curing’, which involved deceptions of various kinds. In support of this method, interestingly, he referred to Gabriel Naudé (1600–1653),\textsuperscript{79} whom Cavaillé considered to be one of the key intellectual figures in the cultural history of dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{80} The proximity of early modern medicine to politics and to the pragmatism of worldly wise advice may not be so surprising, given that the subject was less controversial in political thought than in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Alessandrini, \textit{De medicina}, p. 331: ‘Hosce omnes, tum si qui, aut aegrotare se fingunt, aut cuiuscunque tandem modi imposturas exercent, fallaciis nos ipsi, et astutiis circumventos, callidoque sermone vincere conabimur, ut magis admirati obtemperent, nosque tueri partes nostras posse sciant.’ While Alessandrini endorsed the use of dis/simulation among physicians, he nevertheless insisted, p. 334, that they should be on guard to ensure that the sick person did not resort to lies when dealing with them: ‘Contra autem ut mendaciis ad nos utatur aeger, cavebimus diligenter, tanquam perniciosissimum malum.’
\item Early modern anatomy provided an important heuristic model for contemporary political thought; see D. G. Hale, \textit{The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature}, The Hague, 1971.
\item Cited by Schleiner, \textit{Medical Ethics}, p. 20.
\item Bardi, \textit{Medicus}, p. 294: ‘Hinc sit ut iamdiu exagitata quaestio hic etiam indicat, et traducatur, quae ut quartum etiam instrumentum medicinae a praestantissimo encyclopediae alumno Gabriele Naudaeo assumitur, et determinatur, an scilicet liceat medico aegrotum fallere … et pluribus validisque argumentis, rationibus, et auctoritatisibus celebrium virorum, et exemplis ad oculum propositis comparabat, et affirmativam partem tueretur, afferendo medico politicum curandi modum esse omnino necessarium, in quo quam plurimos, licet non adeo ut ars nostra requirit doctos plurimum excelluisse cognovi, quo quidem pacto eorum subita, et prompta industria miracula in medicina existebant.’
\item Cavaillé, \textit{Dis/simulations}, pp. 199–265.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
other contexts. ‘Qui nescit simulare, nescit regnare’ (‘A person who does not know how to simulate does not know how to rule’), a famous dictum which encapsulated the key role of prudence in the theory of raison d’état, continued to receive widespread approval until well into the eighteenth century; and it was not by accident that Friedrich Hoffmann (1662–1740), a Pietist from Halle and an important medical author of his day,81 chose to sum up the early modern discourse on this controversial subject in his Medicus politicus of 1714 by wittily turning this fashionable dictum into: ‘Qui nescit simulare, nescit etiam curare’ (‘A person who does not know to simulate does not know to cure’).82

Decades before the publication of Hoffmann’s treatise,83 Gaspar dos Reyes Franco (b. c. 1600), a Portuguese physician who lived in Carmona, wrote the voluminous Elysius iucundarum quaestionum campus, omnium literarum amoenissima varietate refertus of 1661. In this medical compendium, he provided a summary of previous discussions on the intricate question of whether a doctor was permitted to use dis/simulation in the interests of his patient’s health, which, as Dos Reyes noted, had already been treated in detail by de Castro.84 He endorsed the view that the ‘honourable impostures of physicians’ (‘honestae medicorum imposturae’) were licit and, indeed, necessary.85 He explained that physicians were permitted to resort to a dutiful, white lie


82 I have consulted a later edition: Friedrich Hoffmann, Medicus politicus, Leiden, 1738, p. 183.

83 As with literature on political theory, civil behaviour and worldly wisdom, deontological treatises were still flourishing in Germany in the eighteenth century; some noteworthy examples are: Ferdinand Carl Weinhart, De medici prudentia morali-politica, Innsbruck, 1716; Theodorus Andreas, Kluger und lustiger Medicus, Zittau, 1721; Johann Samuel Carl, Vorstellung vom Decoro Medici, Büdingen, 1723; Konrad Friedrich Uden, Medizinische Politik, Leipzig, 1783; and Christian Stark, Versuch einer wahren und falschen Politik der Ärzte, Jena, 1784.


85 Ibid.: ‘Eodem modo Valeriola [in margin: ‘Cap. 7, 6 enmart., 5’] dolo bono interdum cum aegris agere, non solum medico licere, sed necessarium esse affirmat.’ Dos Reyes refers to a work by Franciscus
(‘officiosum mendacium, et minime serium’), as well as to present harsh situations as favourable, hide unexpected and unfortunate situations, and threaten young boys with terrifying remedies.86 The physician, he added, was not only allowed to deceive, but, at times (for instance, when dealing with a patient suffering from a life-threatening illness) was even obliged to do so.87 Dos Reyes’s tone was somewhat different from that of his predecessors, since he largely ignored moral objections to the occasional use of ruses and pretence. This absorption of the notion of dis/simulation into contemporary medical ethics was, however, the cumulative result of earlier discussions, which had laid the foundation for the legitimation of these strategies.

Early modern authors of medical literature not only developed a dense discourse on dis/simulation, but also fully ‘rehabilitated’ its use in the interests of curing and reconciled it with contemporary morals. Paul Feyerabend’s famous phrase ‘anything goes’ could well have served as the motto for medical treatises in this period. These elaborate apologies paved the way for views such as Thomas Jefferson’s reference to medical deceit as ‘pious fraud’,88 which is reminiscent not only of de Soto’s defence of beggarly ruses but also of the concept of *pia simulatio*, ‘pious simulation’, used by Fortunato Fedele (1550–1630), a Sicilian physician, in his influential medical treatise of the early seventeenth century.89

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86 Ibid., 83: ‘Sic etiam fausta pro tristibus supponimus; sic trista, consanguineorum mortes, repentininos ac infelices casus occultamus; sic pueris formidolosa remedia comminamur, sic morbum extollimus ut obediens reddatur aeger, sic aliiu loqui, aliu facere officioso mendacio, et minime serio, non medicis tantum permittitur, sed necessarium est; hostem fallimus morbum, non aegrotum, ob cuius salutem fingere, dissimulare, polliceri, animum in bonam spem erigere, fallere, veritatem obturgere, dolo bono et omni arte, etiam utiliter mentiendo, uti licitum interdum est.’

87 Ibid., p. 83: ‘Solum igitur circa curationem, quotiescumque oporteat, medicus aegrotantem fallere potest, et debet, omni dolo, et nulla non utens cautela, ut aegrotantem decipiat immorigerum ...’


89 Fortunato Fedele, *De relationibus medicorum libri quattour*, Palermo, 1602, p. 184. For a detailed discussion of this phrase, see Schleiner, *Medical Ethics*, p. 5.
5.5 Feigning illness and the challenges of detecting dis/simulation

The third important nexus between early modern medicine and dis/simulation concerns patients who feigned illnesses or infirmities of various kinds (including real but self-inflicted wounds), whose behaviour was commonly linked to the deceptive practices of beggars, vagabonds and rogues. As we have seen in previous chapters, contemporary physicians were well aware of this problem. Juan Luis Vives argued that, in order to avoid beggarly deceptions, the judgment of doctors should be solicited.90 Physicians such as Cristóbal Perez de Herrera, by writing extensively on this subject and initiating social reforms, and Ambroise Paré, by assisting local authorities and personally unmasking false beggars, were involved in ongoing governmental attempts to eradicate alleged impostors. The underlying moral dichotomy was as clear as it was simple: settled, virtuous and law-abiding members of society were confronted by itinerant, idle and malevolent groups who posed a threat to the stability of the social and moral order.

Yet it was not only in connection with socially marginalised groups, prisoners and good-for-nothings that it was necessary to detect dis/simulation. Since potentially every patient could be a dissembler, regardless gender, age or social standing,91 physicians were faced with a universal and a ubiquitous phenomenon.92 Dis/simulation, moreover, occurred even in situations where it might not seem an immediately understandable choice to us.93

90 See Chapter 2 above, section 2.2.

91 In fact, the higher a person’s social status was, the more needful it might have been for him or her to resort to dissembling, e.g., pretending not to have a socially ostracised and stigmatised disease. Giovanni Battista Selvatico, Institutio medica de iis, qui morbum simulant deprehendendis liber, 2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1671, p. 197, noted that cases of dissembling syphilis were very frequent in his day (‘satis hoc tempore frequentes sunt’) and that almost any type of person had a vital interest in concealing this disease: ‘utrique namque sexui communis morbus hic est, eademque ratione eum occultare omnes student, adolescents, senes, conjugati, liberi, hominumque genus omne aliquid habet cuius occultare, et simulare studet’.

92 See, e.g., Paolo Zacchia, Quaestiones medico-legales, Amsterdam, 1651, p. 151: ‘Homines multis ex causis morbos simulant’; and for dissimulation, see p. 169: ‘Ratio autem dissimulandi multiplex est.’ On Zacchia, see section 5.5.2 below.

93 E.g., those who pretended to have leprosy; see Robert Jütte, ‘Lepra-Simulanten: “De iis qui morbum simulant”’, in Neue Wege in der Seuchengeschichte, ed. by Martin Dinges and Thomas Schlich, Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 25–42, at pp. 32–38. The general attitude towards lepers was highly ambivalent, oscillating
5.5.1. De iis qui morbum simulant

While many early modern physicians took the problem of feigning diseases very seriously, no one seems to have devoted more attention to it than the Milanese physician Giovanni Battista Selvatico (1550–1621). In his miscellaneous treatise Medicus of 1611, he included a chapter on how and when physicians might legitimately deceive patients.94 Digesting widespread precepts (and stating the obvious), Selvatico stressed that it was illicit to deceive or mislead patients out of base and immoral motives such as financial gain, ‘but [only] for the patient’s benefit and only for the sake of his health’ (‘sed in aegrotantis utilitatem, uniusque, illius sanitatis causa’).95 These tricks were particularly helpful when a doctor ‘encounters moody, delicate, obstinate or timid patients’ (‘morosos, deliocatos, obstinatos, timidos quosdam aegrotantes incidit medicus’).96 Like later authors, Selvatico drew an analogy between medical practice and the ars militaria, comparing the physician to the worldly wise army leader who sometimes has to resort to deception.97

between inclusion and exclusion; see Fritz Dross and Annemarie Kinzelbach, ‘“nit mehr alls sein burger, sonder alls ein frembder”’. Fremdheit und Aussatz in frühneuzeitlichen Reichsstädten’, Medizinhistorisches Journal, 46, 2011, pp. 1–23. The main motivation and reason for simulating leprosy was, of course, the prospect of charity (lepers usually received more alms than normal beggars). Not concerned about further social alienation and stigmatisation, socially marginalised and economically deprived individuals resorted to this form of simulation in order to obtain the right to enter leprosy hospitals; see, e.g., the chapter ‘Von der Lunckfrawen’ in Liber vagatorum, 1510, sig. B3⁰, and Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges, ed. by Jean Céard, Geneva, 1971, p. 72. This is why, e.g., German physicians in leprosy hospitals were concerned not only with dissimulators but also simulators, ‘welche sich zuvor nit etlichen kreutern und andern bößen stücken so meisterlich können zurichten und anschmiren’, quoted in Dross and Kinzelbach, ‘“nit mehr alls sein burger”’, p. 12.


95 Ibid., p. 213. Selvatico also discussed, p. 216, under what circumstances the adstantes should be involved or informed about the deceptive tactics of the physician.

96 Ibid., p. 213.

97 Ibid.: ‘edoctus Medicus, bonique militum ducis imitatione, aegrotantem aliquando astute decipit’. Selvatico legitimised his endorsement of dis/simulation by referring to ancient medicine and claiming that this was by no means a new precept; see p. 214: ‘Novum hoc nostrum inventum non est, sed usque ad
Selvatico’s main concern, however, was detecting feigned diseases, a subject he tackled in his comprehensive treatise *De iis, qui morbum simulant deprehendendis liber* of 1595. The problem of feigning, as we have seen, was familiar to ancient physicians, as is shown by Galen’s short tract *Quomodo morbum simulantes sint deprehendi*, which formulated the basic methods of discerning deceptions. It remained a constant point of reference for early modern authors such as Selvatico, who drew on Galen’s tract. Although Selvatico’s treatise was not particularly original nor the first to address this problem, as far as I can tell, it is the most extensive and detailed treatment of the subject, not only in the early modern era, but also in the entire history of European tempora Hippocratis in usum ductum.’

98 The second edition printed in Frankfurt in 1671, which I have consulted, has a slightly modified title: *Institutio medica de iis, qui morbum simulantes deprehendendis.*


100 Selvatico referred repeatedly to the tract, though he doubted its attribution to Galen; see, e.g., Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, pp. 2–3: ‘Sane vero eiusdem argumenti libellus quidam inter Galeni opera legitur, qui et propter brevitateam multum non admodum utilis est, et ob imperfectionem minimi usus in quo etiam quaedam optimo Galeni judicio indigna legi…’ Zacchia, Quaestiones, p. 153, later reported Selvatico’s view: ‘Licet Silvaticus hunc librum non esse Galeni genuinum autem, quod multa dicat continere eius doctrina indigna.’

101 As we have seen in Chapter 3 above, section 3.4, Ambroise Paré devoted several chapters of his *Des monstres et prodiges* to simulations by rogues and mendicants. Juan Fragoso (c.1530–1597), like Paré, was a famous sixteenth-century surgeon and an important physician (he was court surgeon to Philip II); and he, too, had briefly discussed the problem of dis/simulation: Juan Fragoso, ‘De las declaraciones que han de hacer los cirujanos acerca de muchas enfermedades y muchas maneras de muertes que suceden’, in his *Cirurgía universal*, Madrid, 1581, pp. 543–576. Fragoso did not, however, assign as much importance to this subject as later authors, above all, Selvatico. See Anotonio Carreras Panchón, ‘Juan Fragoso en la historia de la medicina legal’, in *La Obra de Juan de Villareal y otros estudios histórico-medicos*, ed. by Anotonio Carreras Panchón, Salamanca, 1978, pp. 24–44.
medicine. Going well beyond Galen’s brief tract, it offers a comprehensive survey of various feigned physiological conditions and diseases. Although given scant attention in the scholarly literature, this work deserves a place both in the cultural history of dis/simulation and in the history of early modern medicine. Despite relying on an ancient model, Selvatico’s treatise was very much a product of its time and emblematic of an age which was deeply concerned with deception, false identities and disguises. While Galen regarded discerning simulations primarily as an intellectual challenge, early modern physicians placed this task at the centre of their professional responsibilities.

Selvatico’s aim was to offer a universal method of detecting feigning and dissembling. His aspirations were similar to those of Scipione Chiaramonti’s physiognomical phenomenology, which will be discussed in Chapter 6; and, like Chiaramonti, Selvatico indulged in technical details and ramifications, turning his decidedly practical manual, at times, into a more theoretical and abstract work. The need for a comprehensive medical study of this subject was obvious, according to Johannes Wilhelm Ammon’s preface to the second edition, since ‘daily examples attest

102 See, e.g., Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, pp. 138–139: ‘Quod enim posuit Galenus mutationis pulsus, nomine amantis audito indicium, optimum quidem est ac certum, sed nec frequens, nec facile, casu factum est, ut eo praesente Pyladem saltasse [ed.: sultasse] enuntiatum sit; at non semper eveniet, ut nobis praesentibus amantis nomen in medium quispiam adducat; neque amantium omnium nota sunt nobis nomina, ut ea pro tempore ac necessitate, in medium afferre possimus, susceptam tamen amoris suspicione aliquem de amore sermonem suspicere medicus poterit, historiis praesertim amatorii recitatis, quo passionibus hisce commemoratis, pulsus immutentur.’ The story of Justus’s wife and her love for Pylades is discussed by Galen, *Prognostics to Posthumum*, chapter 6. This is a further example of the nexus between dis/simulation, love and the natural limits of human disguise and pretence.

103 The only authors who have even briefly touched on the treatise are Jütte, *Lepra-Simulanten*, p. 27 (in the context of the problem of simulated leprosy), and Fischer-Homberger, *Medizin*, pp. 148–49 and 167–168.

104 Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, p. 3.

105 See section 6.5 below.

106 See, e.g., Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, pp. 22–34, where he provides a detailed epistemological discussion of *epilogismi* and *analogismi*, displaying his scholastic education and intellectual background, but providing little of practical use for the physician in his examination of patients.
that ... an infinite number of simulations, both of diseases and of genuine conditions, are eagerly practised. Selvatico identified three types of dis/simulation: counterfeiting a non-existent disease; artificially creating a real pathological condition or illness; and covering up an existing illness by pretending to have another. For all three types, the main method of detection consisted in spotting inconsistencies and contradictions between the known symptoms of the disease and those reported by the patient. The signum pathognomonicum proper to the disease was the key point of reference for the physician. If it did not correspond to the particular disease, then dis/simulation was likely to be in play. Apart from that, the vegetative and vital functions of the body – pulse, blood flow, breathing and heart beat – were the most reliable indicators, since they largely defied wilful and intentional manipulation. Here, it is worth pointing out, Selvatico’s methods were similar to those recommended by Galen.

Selvatico stressed that detecting simulations in their all forms and variations required not specialist medical knowledge (‘neque ars medica illi sufficit’) but also great diligence in observing the patient and psychological insight into human nature; even more important, however, were prudence and common sense. A purely medical

107 Ibid., sigs 2v–3r: ‘quotidiana testantur exempla, etsi in meo tuoque scrinio nil simulati morbi vel affectus reperiri fas sit, attamen multorum aliorum in infinitum tam morborum quam sincerorum affectuum simulationes sic propense practicantur’.

108 Ibid., pp. 6–8.

109 Ibid., p. 56: ‘Huic, pathognomonicum quod vocant doloris particularis, signum si accesserit vix est, ut in proferendo judicio decipi possit prudens medicus’; and pp. 17–18: ‘Inprimis namque non unum idemque symptomata morbus quisque habet quo cognoscatur; quia cuique fere suum peculiare insit (pathognomonicum dicunt) cuius medio quasi typo quodam delineatur cognosciturque Medicum eapropter, qui morbum simulantes recte deprehendere voluerint, morborum omnium, et praesertim internorum, signa certa ac pathognomonica, ante omnia probe scire necese est.’

110 See, e.g., ibid., p. 58: ‘At si eiusmodi quoque parvam densamque simul respirationem simuli posse dixeris, non propter tere decipi posse te credas, pulsu arteriarum ipsarum diligenter observato, quos respirationi ipsi ex necessitate proportione respondere debere Galenus demonstravit; quod quidem nullo ingenio immutari posse manifestum est.’

111 Ibid., pp. 6, 19, and 61. See also p. 35, where Selvatico stresses once more that the judgment of the physician should be guided by common sense (‘judicio sive ratione communi duce’); and p. 40, where he
analysis was not sufficient; it was also needful to take into account the personal and wider socio-economic background of the patient and the context in which the examination took place. It was crucial to try to understand a patient’s motives and reasons for deception; and this could only be achieved by an experienced physician who ‘confounds the cunning of the simulator and discloses what is concealed with so much effort’. Selvatico discussed common reasons for the simulation of diseases in the first chapter of his treatise. After pointing out that it was virtually impossible to account for the complexity and variety of possible motives, he identified fear (timor), shame (verecundia) and financial gain (lucrum) as the three main ones; these were particularly frequent, he added, among prisoners, (melancholic) lovers and women. These three types serve as recurrent points of reference throughout the treatise.

As Zagorin noted, dis/simulation was a vital part of self-preservation and a survival strategy for those facing oppression and persecution – and not only in the early modern period. Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639), to mention a famous example from almost the same time as Selvatico’s treatise, feigned madness when held prisoner by the Inquisition in Naples on charges of heresy and rebellion. This simulated behaviour enabled him to avoid the death penalty and to be condemned, instead, to a lengthy detention. Although he did not refer to Campanella, Selvatico stressed the need

advises the physician to take into account the character of the patient, since a sly person will be much better versed in the art of feigning and disguise than a dull one, who will quickly reveal any dis/simulation.

112 Ibid., p. 20.

113 Ibid., p. 2: ‘Quarum omnium, ut aequus judex constituitur medicus, qui simulantis astutiam confundit, et rem quae vel omni industria occultatur, aperit.’

114 Ibid., pp. 3–6 (‘Quae sint causae, propter quas morbus simulari solet’), at p. 3; see also, e.g., pp. 19–20.

115 Ibid., pp. 3–4: ‘Itaque causas omnes, ac singulas propter quas aegrotos sese homines simulant, enumerare impossible est quoniam in particulares quasdam occasiones, quae infinitae propemodum sunt, referuntur; ut tamen ipse sentio, ad tria tanquam ad summa quaedam capita, haud inaniter reducuntur, ad timorem scilicet, vel ad verekundiam vel ad lucrum.’

to diagnose the physical and mental condition of prisoners accurately, an important task which physicians were frequently called on to perform by judicial institutions such as the Inquisition, for which they also gave medical advice during trials.

Selvatico was neither the first nor the last author to discuss the problem of dis/simulation in connection with confinement and torture and his remarks on this subject were not particularly innovative. Selvatico’s treatise, however, distinguishes itself through its richness of detail, giving us an idea of the subterfuges of early modern prisoners. These included spitting blood, counterfeiting fever, tumours, wounds and ulcers; such ‘tricks’, as Selvatico added, were also used by ‘many good-for-nothings’ (‘nebulonum multorum astutiae’). He displayed confidence in the ability of physicians to detect these minor types of simulation and advised them to look carefully for inconsistencies and contradictions between the symptoms displayed by the patient and the account which he or she gave of them and also to consider the patient’s humoral composition in order to distinguish internal from external, or self-inflicted, causes.

117 Ibid., p. 127.


120 Ibid., p. 11. See also Chapter 14: ‘Febris simulata, atque versutiae multae quae graviorem febrem insinuant, quomodo possint deprehendere’, pp. 128–132, at p. 131: ‘At facie coloris, quamlibet quo vismodo factam imposturam facillime detegemus.’


122 Ibid., p. 124: ‘Sane vero consimili methodo infecta ex industria ulcera detegentur, et nebulonum multorum astutiae confundentur.’ Apart from this comment, Selvatico, unlike many contemporary authors, did not moralise about vagrants, rogues or lowly criminal types.

123 Ibid., pp. 124 and 135. Selvatico stressed, that the physician had to be prudent at all times: e.g., pp. 59–60, it might not be sufficient merely to examine a patient’s urine or vomit, since this ran the risk of
Certain physical and mental conditions, however, such as headaches or malfunctions of the senses,\textsuperscript{124} represented a much more serious challenge for the physician, since he had to rely largely on the patient’s report.\textsuperscript{125} Selvatico acknowledged the limitations of medical inference in these and other cases.\textsuperscript{126} Madness, as well as other mental and cognitive disorders, were particularly problematic, since they were easy to feign but difficult to detect.\textsuperscript{127} In a chapter entitled: ‘How simulated insanity can be detected’,\textsuperscript{128} Selvatico tried to tackle this question; yet apart from numerous references to ancient authors such as Livy, Seneca and Pliny,\textsuperscript{129} and descriptions of different forms and manifestations of insanity, we find – not surprisingly, given the complexity of the subject – no compelling answers. He did, however, describe various different types of intoxication which produced temporary mental delusion.\textsuperscript{130}

Another key theme in the treatise was love and sexuality. Love, Selvatico explained, was often a reason for resorting to disguise: ‘It is certainly true that many people suffer and fall ill because of love, and they are induced by fear and modesty to deception; so, ideally, the physician should be present when the patient was urinating (or vomiting).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 105–16: ‘Simulata sensuum privatio qua ratione possit detegi.’
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp. 126–127: ‘Praeterea, cum plane immanifesti sint morbi fere omnes, quorum vim et malitiam cauterii medio retundere studet medicus eorumque multi sola patientis relatione manifestentur; hinc maior ad rem pro tempore dijudicandam nobis insurgit difficultas, quae eo etiam maior sit, si praecautionis gratia ulcus excitatum fuisset quis simulaverit.’
\item \textsuperscript{126} Selvatico expressed his scepticism on various occasions, e.g. noting, ibid., pp. 38–39: ‘Quantumcunque igitur judicio vel ingenio quis valeat, nisi morborum, qui simulantur signa probe sciverit, morbum simulantes deprehendere ullum posse impossibile est; suae imo exstimationis magna jactura turpiter decipietur. Hae eadem methodo, ad eum divitem deprehendendum, qui medicamentis gaudebat, eaque assidue assumebat, eo praeditus ingenio, ut familiares nullius certae scientiae libenter argueret ... .’
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 95: ‘simulare facile quidem est, deprehendere autem difficile’.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid., pp. 94–104, Chapter 10: ‘Simulata insania quomodo possit deprehendi’.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., pp. 95–96.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid., pp. 97–98: ‘Mandragorae radices accipiunt et in mustum adhuc fervens, in bullasque tumens dimittunt, indictoque operculo aptoque loco tribus mensibus servato, potui dant: qui hauserit prius [ed.: qrius] demergetur somno, exepergfectus mente captus remanet, et per diem egregie delirat.’
\end{itemize}
He devoted careful attention to lovesickness, which was closely linked to melancholy. Lovesickness and melancholy were pathognomical conditions which had to be taken seriously; nonetheless, they were not as relevant in the context of dis/simulation as venereal diseases such as syphilis, a ravaging and mysterious disease known to European physicians from the end of the fifteenth century onwards. Highly stigmatised, the morbus gallicus – as Selvatico referred to it in the contemporary Italian manner – was as ‘a perpetual mark of shameful intercourse’ (‘vitiosque concubitus signum perpetuum’), which those afflicted with it ‘try to conceal with all their might’ (‘omni studio occultare student’).

A specifically female issue was disguising the loss of virginity (‘deflorationem occultare, amissamque virginitatem ementiri’); according to Selvatico, many young women resorted to this tactic out of fear of disgrace and even punishment (or, instead, for financial gain). Virginity was the most important sign of modesty and, as such, the highest ornament of an honourable young woman. We have already seen that

131 Ibid., pp. 13–14: ‘Hoc sane verum est, multos prae amore tristari atque aegrotare, quos ad eum occultandum, timor aut verecundia inducit, indeque simulationis deprehendendae necessitas medico ingruit.’

132 Ibid., p. 14. See also pp. 135–149, Chapter 16: ‘Amantium deprehendendorum modus’. Referring to authors such as Lucretius, Plutarch, Avicenna and Arnold of Villanova, Selvatico, pp. 141–142, listed numerous symptoms of love sickness: ‘vocis repressio, rubor igneus, oculorum nutus, subiti sudores, inconstantia et pertubatio pulsuum, denique animo vehementer succumbente, angor, stupor, ac pallor, ... appetitus privatio, vigiliae intemae, cirinusque color’.

133 Selvatico noted, ibid., p. 136, that it was extremely difficult to distinguish between love and melancholia: ‘interque amorem ac melancholiam tanta est similitudo, ut de re huiusmodi judicium fere sit omni ex parte maxime difficile’.

134 Ibid., p. 16.

135 This illustrates, once again, the indissoluble connection, in practice, between simulation and dissimulation.


137 Ibid., p. 83: ‘decoris muliebris summum ornamentum esse pudicitatem existiment’.

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courtesans attempted to evoke the impression of decency and honourability by pretending to be virgins. Selvatico was aware of these stratagems and reminded readers that counterfeiting virginity was a popular trick in this profession;\(^{138}\) nor was it only dishonourable women such as courtesans who made use of this ruse.\(^{139}\) How, then, was the physician supposed to proceed in the delicate matter of establishing a woman’s virginity?\(^{140}\) Discussing whether ‘the sense of touch was a certain judge of the matter’ (‘virginitatem, quia sensus tactus rei certus esset judex’),\(^{141}\) Selvatico concluded that even this method was not completely reliable.\(^{142}\) Apart from establishing the sexual integrity of young women,\(^{143}\) physicians also had to know ‘how to catch women

\(^{138}\) Ibid., p. 43. He also explained how virginity could be simulated; see, e.g., p. 84: ‘Ex alumine sciiss, gella et omphacino cum vino amineo tritis, factum perichysma, vel cum succo pastinacae ad magnitudinem orobi effectum, et per horam ante coitum vulvae impositum … .’

\(^{139}\) Selvatico told the story of an Italian noblewoman whose virginity had to be established – a matter of great importance, which involved consulting numerous eminent physicians; ibid., pp. 87–88: ‘Illustrissimae mulieris imperforatae dijudicandae causa, ex pluribus Italiae uribus, plures accersiti illustres medici, num tale quidpiam in uteri ostio aut collo haberent foeminae a natura efformatum, quod crassius durususque ac par sit effectum imperformationem faceret, et coitum impeditret, in consultationem deduxerunt, ac in partem negativam pluribus inclinationibus, sensus tactus medio, rem plane determinandum esse sancitum est, virginibus xenodochio expositis diversa aetatis multis, propriis digitis exploratis; nequeunte in tanto virginum numero rem plane non manifestari, absente praesertim omni fraudis ac malicie suspicione, et ex improviso facta exploratione, ex qua nihil quicquam in iis omnibus virginibus earumve aliqua adesse innotuit, quod talem membranam vel etiam obscurius represenaret.’

\(^{140}\) Female virginity was widely and intensively discussed in medico-legal works during the early modern era; see, e.g., François Ranchin, Tractatus de morbis virginum, in his Opuscula medica, Lyon, 1627, pp. 350–441; Melchior Sebizius, Disputatio medica de notis virginitatis, Strassburg, 1630; and Severinus Pinaeus, De virginitatis notis, graviditate et partu, Antwerp, 1639. On methods of determining virginity at this time, see Fischer-Homberger, Medizin, pp. 210–222.

\(^{141}\) Selvatico, Institutio medica, p. 87.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., p. 90: ‘Nolo in hac re planius confirmanda plus temporis insumere, quia recentiorum medicorum plerique de re eadem fusius docteque disputaverunt, talemque membranam minime naturam efformasse manifeste ostenderunt, propter quod etiam, ementitam virginitatem certo deprehendi nequamquam posse, summa, ut arbitror, ratione existimarent.’

\(^{143}\) Interestingly, some physicians such as Ranchin, in his Tractatus de morbis virginum, also discussed whether it was ever licit for a physician to restore a woman’s virginity secretly; see Schleiner, Medical Ethics, p. 34.
disguising or simulating pregnancy and pretending to have other diseases’, a problem to which Selvatico devoted two chapters. Once again, he advised physicians to take account of the woman’s lifestyle and habits, though he admitted that diagnosing pregnancy in the first months was virtually impossible. While women had an interest in concealing defloration and pregnancy, men were concerned with disguising impotence. This was a sensitive matter which had considerable social and legal relevance, especially in questions of marriage and divorce.

Selvatico’s detailed discussion of simulated demonic possession is a reflection of the widespread interest in this subject, in both the popular and learned culture of the time. As with insanity and other mental disorders, it was very difficult to distinguish between what was believed to be genuine demonic possession and skilfully enacted


145 Ibid., p. 190: ‘foeminae, conditio, vitae institutum, moresque diligentius considerandi’.


147 Zacchia, *Quaestiones*, p. 151, also commented on the problem of *impotentia coeundi* and its forensic and legal implications for the validity of marriage: ‘denique nonnulli sunt, qui cum vere aegrotent, morbum tamen celant, ne illi ad aliquid impedimento sit, ut si impotens sit quis ad copulam carnalem, aut contagioso morbo laboret, aut quovis alio, ob quem illi matrimonio interdicatur, vel si Epilepsia, vel alio morbo ordinum suspicionem impediente detineatur, talesque morbum dissimulare dicuntur.’ This subject had previously been discussed in theological and jurisprudential treatises; see Joseph Bajada, *Sexual Impotence: The Contribution of Paolo Zacchia, 1584–1659*, Rome, 1988.

148 Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, p. 105, maintained that the importance of concealing impotence should not be underestimated, despite frequent dis/simulations of more serious physical malfunctions and diseases; he covered this subject extensively in Chapter 7, pp. 61–72: ‘Veneris impotentia simulata quomodo deprehendenda’, and Chapter 8, pp. 72–83: ‘Quibus ingeniis simulatam sterilitatem cognoscere licent’.

149 Ibid., pp. 149–150: ‘Daemone captos qui se simulant, quo deprehendi possint ingenio’.

161
feigning. This distinction was important because, as in the case of severe melancholy, demonic possession was understood to be a pathological condition which induced the patient to malinger. So, while simulation might well be in play, the possessed person or melancholic was not considered to be responsible for his or her actions.

5.5.2. Selvatico’s successors

Battista Codronchi (1547–1628), a physician from Imola and an expert on medical casuistry and medico-legal questions, was the next Italian physician to embrace the problem of dis/simulation. He did so in his treatise *Methodus testificandi* of 1597. Rather than focusing on a systematic presentation of the material, however, Codronchi’s

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150 Ibid., p. 149. Selvatico advised that the physician should base his diagnosis, above all, on the humoral disposition of the patient, adding, however, that this was not always easy to establish. He also addressed, p. 179, the problem of liberating and healing those ‘qui sine simulatioe daemonem habere se falso credunt, et imaginantur’, pointing out, nevertheless, that demonic possession was ultimately a problem for the religious authorities: ‘Sperandum ... est, his auxilis, vel ipnosnet simulantes simulationem prodituros, vel si non simulaverint, id quod est patefactum iri. Ultimus locus ad rem certius manifestandam exorcismis dandus est, neque quilibet ad id eligendus, sed sanctitate vitae, et doctrinae approbatus notusque religiosus, qui omnibus diligenter consideratis, exorcismisque aliquo temporis spacio administratis quid statuendum sit in medum afferat.’ The problem of alleged simulations of demonic possession was treated in other contemporary works, most famously, Samuel Harsnett’s polemics against Catholic exorcists in England in his *A Declaration of egregious Popish Impostures*, London, 1605.

151 Selvatico, *Institutio medica*, p. 168, also noted that was difficult to distinguish between melancholy and demonic possession: ‘Melacholicum igitur ab eo qui daemone captus est posse certo distinguere, difficillimum est, neque in his signis fidem totam reponere licet.’

152 A similar line of thought characterised contemporary perceptions of hysteria, on account of which women were believed not to be responsible for their abnormal behaviour, which might also involve lying and dis/simulation; see Fischer-Homberger, *Medizin*, pp. 167–168.

153 Among his works are: *Casi di coscienza pertinenti a medici principalmente e anco a infermi, infermieri e sani*, Venice, 1589; *De morbis veneficis ac veneficiis*, Venice, 1595; and his deontological treatise *De Christiana ac tuta medendi ratione*, mentioned in section 5.3 above. On Codronchi and his works, see Fischer-Homberger, *Medizin*, pp. 295–298, 358–361, 370–373.

main aim was to provide practical advice for physicians. Some of the methods he proposed for detecting malingers – twisting their fingers or puncturing them with needles – show that the problem of feigning was important for Codronchi and his colleagues.

Only a year later, Fortunato Fedele (1550–1630), whom I have already mentioned, made another noteworthy contribution to the subject with his *De relationibus medicorum libri quatuor* of 1598. Generally considered the earliest systematic work on legal medicine and the first forensic medical textbook in Europe, this treatise enjoyed great popularity throughout the seventeenth century (by 1774, it had gone through 17 reprints), despite competition from Paolo Zacchia’s ground-breaking *Quaestiones medico- legales*. In three concise chapters, Fedele set out the ‘three main types of simulation’, borrowing this classification, without acknowledgement, from Selvatico. Nor did his chapter on the methods of detecting ruses add anything to Selvatico’s account. Fedele emphasised that common sense and practical wisdom were as important as medical expertise. If, however, diligent observation, logical

155 The treatise was also intended for jurisprudential use, as indicated in the subtitle: ‘Opusculum non modo neoterics medicis, sed et iurisperitis, ac iudicibus, plurimum ex usu’.

156 Codronchi, *De Christiana ac tuta medendi ratione*, pp. 154–155. According to Lorenzo Ducci’s manual for courtiers *Ars aulica*, Ferrara, 1601, inflicting pain or using torture should be treated as a last resort for unmasking simulators; see Jon R. Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe*, Berkeley, 2009, p. 95.

157 See section 5.4 above.

158 See section 5.5.2 below.

159 Fedele, *De relationibus medicorum*, pp. 119–121: ‘De tribus simulationibus generibus’.


161 Ibid., p. 121: ‘in duobus praesertim diligenter versatum esse oportet: in quadam seicet medica experientia et in communi etiam ratione, qui pauci exactam ac perfectam habent’. For Fedele, part of this prudential approach to the problem of simulated diseases entailed avoiding the extremes of fully trusting the words of patients and displaying complete distrust and scepticism towards them and their manifest symptom; see pp. 119–120: ‘Quod ergo consilium capiendum? Putant aliqui, aut afferenti de se aegrotanti prorsus credendum esse: aut nihil omnino certi pronuntiandum. Neutrum tamen prorsus laudo: nam si enarranti tantum aegroto fidem adhibeas: dum tu ipse nihil compertum habes: temere quidem de incertis
reasoning and medical specialist knowledge do not produce a definite diagnosis, Fedele, like Codronchi, endorsed the exertion of force and infliction of pain. Finally, he turned his attention towards a social group which has been extensively discussed in this dissertation: mendicants, described by Fedele as the ‘most worthless kind of people’ (‘Vilissimum huiusmodi hominum genus est’). In the chapter ‘De mendicantium dolis dum morbos simulant deprehendendis’, he rehearsed the entire repertoire of stigmas projected onto beggars in his day, depicting them not only as idle parasites but also as dangerous impostors and spies. Instead of providing a taxonomy of various lowly tricksters, as in works such as the Liber vagatorum, Fedele, like Paré before him, tried to deconstruct the mechanics of beggarly ruses and dis/simulations.

The acute medico-legal interest in feigning persisted into the seventeenth century, as is shown by de Castro’s Medicus-politicus, which featured a chapter on how to detect simulators (‘Qua ratione morbum simulantes deprehendi queant’). Among the rebus certum aliquid affirmabis, atque interim sanctissimum iusiurandi ius, quod servare te semper oportet, maculabis. Si vero tuam prorsus neges assertionem: aut incerta omnia proponas: tunc quidem inscius esse videbere: ac te vel nolle officium praestare, vel nescire omnes existimabunt. Afferenda igitur ratio aliqua est, ut occultos hominum dolos, qui nos in nostro munere deludere, ac fallere tentant, detegere possimus.’ This passage also shows that detecting dis/simulation was a complex problem, which revealed the limits of medical inference and, therefore, had the potential to damage a physician’s reputation. Juan Fragoso (mentioned in n. 101 above) also remarked on this point and stressed that failing to detect simulation (in this case, that of convicts working on galleys) could lower a physician’s standing; see Fragoso, De las declaraciones, p. 569: ‘Ofrecense casos a vezes, en que la gente vulgar pretende engañar a los Cirujanos, de lo qual se les suele seguir algun riesgo, y menoscabo de su reputacion, como acaecio en cierta ciudad de este Reyno, donde unos hombres sentencionados a galleas, alegaron estar mancos, y asi lo declararon algunos Cirujanos, y despues averiguo lo contrario.’

162 Fedele, De relationibus medicorum, p. 124, cites the example of Alexander the Great cutting the ‘Gordian knot’.

163 Ibid., p. 125. See Chapter 3 above.

164 Ibid., pp. 124–127.

165 Ibid., p. 125.

166 Many of Fedele’s examples are strikingly similar to those listed by Paré in his Des monstres, which suggests that Fedele was familiar with this work and freely borrowed from it.
main suspects (servants, prisoners, soldiers and seamen,\textsuperscript{167} but, surprisingly, not mendicants), de Castro included women who cunningly manipulated their husbands.\textsuperscript{168} He repeated several well-known examples of malingering and offered some – again, familiar – practical methods of detecting them. What was new about de Castro’s discussion was that, unlike his predecessors, he completely left aside the demonological dimension.\textsuperscript{169}

The most important seventeenth-century work on medical dis/simulation was the \textit{Quaestiones medico-legales} by Paolo Zacchia (1584-1659), a milestone of legal-medical and forensic literature which appeared in several successive volumes from 1621 to 1635. It featured a systematic discussion of dis/simulation in ten compact \textit{quaestiones}. This erudite compendium went through numerous editions and soon became the unequalled authority in medico-legal questions and a constant point of reference in ecclesiastical tribunals; it continued to be highly regarded until well into the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{170} Zacchia, who was the \textit{protomedico} of the Papal State and medical advisor of the Rota (the High Court of the Roman Catholic Church) did not, on the face of it, contribute a great deal to previous debates and, in particular, to Selvatico’s

\textsuperscript{167} In contrast to many other medical authors, Castro, \textit{Medicus-politicus}, p. 251, gave an example from his own time, narrating a story of simulating soldiers in Lisbon in 1588 (before the war against England) and an anecdote about a \textit{famosum scortum} who feigned abortion.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 251: ‘Porro servi morbum simulant, ne munia a dominis imposita obeant: captivi, ut carceris aut torturae acerbitate et supplicium effugiant aut differant; milites et nautae, ut navigationis expeditio in persecutionem aliquos pericula vitent: necnon morosae quaedam foeminae, tum ob alias castum etiam quia hac ratione maritos ad benevolentiam flectere persuadent.’ With regard to female simulations, see also p. 253: ‘Cal[l]idae etiam mulieres uteri gestationem simulare consueverunt, sed percipitur simulata uteri gestatio, quia venter laxus est, lenis, et inaequalis.’ He, thus, showed his awareness of the problem of dis/simulations in the context of marriage and, more generally, private matters, discussed in Chapter 4 above.

\textsuperscript{169} Fischer-Homberger, \textit{Medizin}, pp. 152 and 170.

Yet Zacchia’s work was not without its merits, surpassing the accounts of Codronchi and Fedele in scope and richness of detail and exhaustively digesting, summarising and disseminating earlier treatments of the subject.

Zacchia addressed the usual social and legal issues such as the problem of false mendicants, whom he strongly condemned. He studied specific types of simulation (for example, syncopy, apoplexy, epilepsy and ecstasy), which, he noted, were frequently used by impostors and rogues to deceive the credulous populace. As Selvatico and Fedele had done, Zacchia insisted on the importance of the physician’s expert counsel in legal procedures and stressed that the testimonies of experienced doctors were to be trusted. He assessed a number of frequently simulated diseases, distinguishing, above all, between those which were easy to feign and those which were difficult. It was, he noted, particularly common to counterfeit ‘dementia, insanity, headache, or pain in the abdomen, kidneys or lower intestine, in other words, all interior pains’, since these conditions did not manifest themselves outwardly. The ruses of wily mendicants and other lowly individuals, which entailed displaying wounds and infirmities of various kinds on the exterior of the body, were quite easy to detect, as,

171 See, e.g., Zacchia, Quaestiones, pp. 152–154: ‘Liber III, Titulus II, Quaestio II: Qua ratione deprehendantur, qui morbum simulant’, which added very little to Selvatico’s treatment of the subject. Zacchia largely repeated earlier pleas for diligent and prudent observation of the patient.

172 Ibid, p. 151: ‘ita Lex abhorret, ut cuilibet volenti permittat, etiamsi id sui juris non sit, investigare, an horum mendicantium infirmitates verae sunt aut fictae.’


174 Ibid., p. 151.

175 Ibid.: ‘Qui morbi ut plurimum simulari soleant: qui item facilius, qui diffilius simulari possint.’ As an example of a condition which was difficult to feign, Zacchia, ibid., mentioned fevers: ‘Febris non potest facile simulari.’

176 Ibid., p. 152: ‘Caeterum prae omnibus simulari solet Dementia, seu insania, Dolores aut capitis, aut stomachi, aut renum, aut ventris inferioris, et in summa interni omnes, nam in externis partibus non de facili simulari possunt ... .’

177 Ibid.
for example, Paré’s efforts to unveil roguish scams make clear.\(^{178}\) Uncovering malingering internal pain, however, was far more challenging.\(^{179}\) Insanity was the most crucial problem for Zacchia, who noted that it was not only extremely simple to enact and, therefore, the most frequent type of simulation, but also the most difficult to detect.\(^{180}\)

Zacchia, in a casuistic manner, also made a moral distinction between different uses of simulation. Referring to several famous figures of the ancient past such as King David (to whom de Castro also referred),\(^{181}\) Ulysses and Solon, he depicted feigned madness as a noble form of deceit, which ‘some wise men of great intellect and remarkable virtue’ had used ‘in order to escape from imminent danger or for some other praiseworthy purpose’.\(^{182}\) This is an important point, since Zacchia justified not only

\(^{178}\) See Chapter 3 above, section 3.3.

\(^{179}\) Zacchia, *Quaestiones*, p. 152: ‘Praeter hanc tamen alia simulatio est cognitu multo difficilior, quam latentem appellare libet, eo quod causas aegrotionis, et morbus ipse manifeste se perscrutantibus prodant, sed sub levioris morbi tegumento lateat simulatio atrocioris morbi, quae quidem simulatio nonnullis connaturalis est, et nullam fraudem prae se fert, in aliis vero fraudulenta est, nam ex eius causa ad optatum finem pervenire student.’

\(^{180}\) Ibid., p. 158: ‘Nullus morbus fere est, qui facilius et frequentius simulari soleat, quam insania, nullus item, qui difficilius possit deprehendi.’


\(^{182}\) Zacchia, *Quaestiones*, p. 160: ‘adnotare licet, nonnullos sapientes viros, ac summi ingenii, et virtute maxime insignes insaniam aliquando simulasse, vel ut se periculis imminenteribus eximeneret, vel ad alium quendam laudabilem finem’. In the sixteenth century, Tomaso Garzoni had already praised the simulation of madness. Although he included those who pretended to be mad in the chapter ‘De pazzi simulati o da burla’, he pointed out that they were by no means fools, but should instead be placed among the ranks of wise men; see Tomaso Garzoni, ‘L’ospidale dei pazzi incurabili’, in *Opere*, ed. by Paolo Cherchi, Rome, 1993, p. 308: ‘non essendo pazzi da senno come gli altri, non hanno troppo presto collocare si debbano, dicendo il saggio Catone [*Disticha Catonis*, 2:18:2] che: Stultitiam simulare loco, prudentia summa est. E per questo viene attribuito molto alla sapienza.’ The idea of virtuous simulation was echoed by later scholars, e.g., Albrecht von Haller, *Vorlesungen über die gerichtliche Arzneiwissenschaft. Aus einer nachgelassenen lateinischen Handschrift übersetzt*, 2 vols, Berne, 1782–84, II, p. 2, distinguished between different types of simulation, not only justifying King David’s deception but also claiming that simulating impotence was an acceptable way for a husband to end an unhappy marriage: ‘dem König übel deuten, dass er sich närissch anstellte, um den Händen seiner Feinde zu entrinnen. Gleichfalls möchte ich es einem ehrlchen Manne, der keinen andern Weg vor sich sieht, eines bösen Weibes los zu werden,
dissimulation but also feigning as a licit method of self-defence.

While earlier medical authors were, to be sure, well aware of strategies of disguise and concealment (for example, of pregnancy or venereal diseases), Zacchia was the first one to devote a separate sub-chapter to what he termed ‘dissimulated diseases’ such as epilepsy, insanity and impotence. After setting out various reasons and motives for dissimulation, Zacchia closed his discussion with some comments on the natural limits of human disguise, as if trying to counterbalance the previous sections in which he had repeatedly acknowledged the limitations of medical inference in uncovering simulations. Many minor diseases and physiological conditions, he explained, often revealed themselves through external appearances, above all, in the face; as we shall see in Chapter 6, this was the central premise of physiognomy.

From the second half of the sixteenth-century onwards, a number of physicians – first, in Italy and the Iberian peninsula, and then increasingly north of the Alps – paid considerable attention to the problem of dis/simulation. Early modern deontological and medico-legal literature depicted a type of physician who was expected, at times, to play the role of a detective, carefully scrutinising and interrogating his patients. Yet in the

183 See, Zacchia, *Quaestiones*, p. 169: ‘De morbos dissimulantibus’. This new category became significant in later medico-legal texts, e.g., Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer’s *Institutiones medicinae legalis vel forensis*, Jena, 1723, pp. 142–154, which featured two separate chapters on the feigning and concealment of diseases.


185 Ibid.: ‘qui valetudinarii sunt, aspectu ipso se produnt’.

186 E.g., Alessandri, *De medicina et medico dialogus*, p. 330, emphasised the importance of knowing the ‘mores aegroti’; as I shall show in Chapter 6, this was the underlying idea of the early modern physiognomical art of reading men: *ars conjectandi hominum mores*. In this context, both medicine and physiognomy have analogies to wider contemporary precepts of prudential behaviour in a civil or political context.
battle of wits between the shrewd observational and deductive skills of the physician, on the one hand, and the skilful deception of patient, on the other, the medical expert might come out on the short end.\footnote{187 Johann Daniel Longolius, \textit{Wahrhaftiger Temperamentist, oder unbetrügte Kunde der Menschen Gemüther}, Bautzen, 1716, p. 164, a physiognomical treatise on the art of reading men, states that we can most readily recognise if someone is dis/simulating when the person in question is either violently disturbed (‘in heftigen Gemüthsbewegungen’) or ill, which impedes feigning (‘zur tüchtigen Verstellung in actionibus moralibus den Menschen sehr ungeschickt machen’).}

In an age in which physiology was still in its infancy, dis/simulation could pose a serious problem, if not an insurmountable challenge, which neither medical knowledge nor prudence was able to solve. Despite the gradual discovery of the ‘inside of the human being’,\footnote{188 Robert Jütte, ‘Die Entdeckung des “inneren” Menschen 1500–1800’, in \textit{Erfindung des Menschen. Schöpfungsräume und Körperbilder 1500–2000}, ed. by Richard van Dülmen, Vienna, 1998, pp. 241–260.} for example, through progress in anatomical studies,\footnote{189 Anatomical dissection, which made it possible to see inside the human body and which was disseminated in Andreas Vesalius’s seminal \textit{De humani corporis fabrica}, Basel, 1543, and other works on anatomy, revealed only the static inner structure of the dead human body and not its dynamic physiological workings.} the human body remained an impenetrable ‘black box’. Authors like Fedele, Selvatico and Zacchia, nonetheless, embraced this challenge, going far beyond Galen’s brief remarks on the problem of feigning. They covered a large variety of simulations,\footnote{190 Ironically, these discussions often read like guides to disguise and pretence; see, e.g., Zacchia, \textit{Quaestiones}, pp. 154–155: ‘De simulata febre effictisque ulceribus’, in which he describes ways to achieve these effects.} including elusive conditions and diseases such as internal pain, madness and sterility which did not manifest themselves physically and, therefore, were almost impossible to detect.\footnote{191 In the early nineteenth century, Carl Gustav Carus, \textit{Symbolik der menschlichen Gestalt: ein Handbuch zur Menschkenntnis}, Hildesheim, 1962, p. 371, suggested, in all earnest, that physiognomy was a valid solution to the problem of discerning simulated insanity.}

Early modern medico-legal discussions of dis/simulation largely focused on specific categories of impostor: beggars, rogues, prisoners and soldiers, as well as patients suffering from venereal diseases, lovesickness or melancholy. The accounts of de Castro and Zacchia, after Selvatico’s treatise, marked a turning-point in presenting and
discussing dis/simulation as a universal medical phenomenon, which not only pertained to lowly and deviant individuals but to virtually any type of patient, whether male or female, young or old, rich or poor. At the same time, medical questions relating to sexual diseases or mental abnormalities (above all, insanity) received increasing attention. Dis/simulation remained an important topic in medico-legal literature well beyond the early modern period, especially in Germany, including works such as Michael Alberti’s *Systema jurisprudentiae medicae* (1725), Christian Ehrenfried Eschenbach’s *Medicina legalis* (1746) and Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer’s *Anweisung zur gerichtlichen Arzneygelahrtheit* (1761). Although these texts display some shifts in the perception of dis/simulation in comparison to seventeenth-century treatments.

192 Of particular interest is a treatise by Nicolas de Blegny (1642–1722), an adventurer, historian, prolific author, court physician from 1678 to 1693, as well as the founder of the first medical journal in Europe; he died in poverty, however, after being imprisoned for several years. For de Blegny, one of the main issues in the examination of wounds was not being deceived by simulation; see his *Doctrine des rapports en chirurgie*, Lyon, 1683, p. 34: ‘D’aporter toutes les précautions possibles pour s’empecher d’estre déceus par sang seringué, par des contusions en peinture, et par d’autres apparences fausses et artificieuses.’ Jean Devaux repeated this precept almost verbatim in his *L’Art de faire les rapports en chirurgie*, Paris, 1703, pp. 21–22: ‘Il droit prendre toutes les précautions possibles pour s’empecher d’estre trompé par des maladies feintes, par des contorsions ou de convulsions simulées, du sang seringué, des rumeurs apparents, des contusions en peinture, ou par de semblables artifices et fourberies.’

193 Michael Alberti (1682–1757), a well-known professor of medicine in Halle, also dealt with the problem of dis/simulation in his *De melancholia vera, et simulata*, Halle, 1743.

194 Legal medicine became more and more a German speciality towards the end of the seventeenth century. Important treatises include Paul Amann’s *Medicina critica*, Erfurt, 1670 and Johann Bohn’s *Specimen medicinae*, Leipzig, 1690. Indeed, eighteenth century witnessed an almost uninterrupted production of German medico-legal treatises; see Ackerknecht, *Early History*, pp. 259–260. A number of eighteenth-century German dissertations were also written on this subject, e.g.: Johann Georg Neumann, *Dissertatio politica de simulatione morbi*, Wittenberg, 1688; Liebgott Michael Chalybaeus, *Dissertatio inauguralis de ingravidatione dissimulata et dissimulandi mediis*, Wittenberg, 1724; Wilhelm Heinrich Waldschmidt, *Dissertatio inauguralis medico-forensis de morbis simulatis ac dissimulatis*, Kiel, 1728; and Jacobus Janses, *Dissertatio medico-forensis de simulatis morbis et quomodo eos cognoscere liceat*, Göttingen, 1769. I shall return to the genre of early modern academic dissertations in the Conclusion to this dissertation.

195 It has been argued that, at the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth, the collective interest in simulated diseases shifted away from physical infirmities towards feigned
they were still heavily based on their early modern predecessors and did not make any significant advances on previous discussions.

5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have investigated the multifaceted and complex role played by the notion of dis/simulation in early modern medical literature. It is no coincidence that the new awareness of this subject emerged and developed in the second half of the sixteenth century and continued to be relevant and important throughout the seventeenth century: the period, in other words, which has been described as the ‘age of dissimulation’.

The notions of feigning and disguise were used in the polemics and invectives which regular physicians directed at their itinerant, unauthorised and allegedly unqualified colleagues. Intriguingly, however, these practices also developed into an independent point of discussion in the deontological literature of the seventeenth century. It quickly became an integral part of the ethical code and professional behaviour of the orthodox physician, who, as the medicus politicus, closely resembled the contemporary ideal of the prudent man who resorts to occasional dis/simulation. Having elevated worldly wisdom into a quintessential characteristic of the ideal practitioner, a large number of medical treatises – most of them written by renowned and highly respected physicians – confidently endorsed disguise, deception and even lying in the interest of healing. These works demonstrate that early modern debates on dis/simulation were centred on power: authorised and established physicians were able to appropriate this controversial notion and integrate it – only in its positive connotations, of course – into their professional ethical code, while, at the same time, using it as a point of accusation against other marginal practitioners. Acceptable and even laudable feigning and deception was the privilege of a specific category of practitioner who vigilantly guarded this exclusive and self-proclaimed right. It seems that early modern physicians were quite successful in establishing a monopoly over therapeutic deception and dis/simulation which persisted well beyond their own era.  

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196 Even in the present day, the notion of benevolent deception and dis/simulation continues to be intensively debated; see Jennifer Jackson, ‘Telling the Truth’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 17, 1991, pp. 5–9, which challenges Roger Higgs’s view on deceit and the duty of honesty in his ‘On Telling Patients the Truth’, in Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, ed. by M. Lockwood, Oxford, 1985, pp. 187–202; see psychological anomalies and that attention was increasingly paid to contagious diseases; see Fischer-Homberger, Medicin, pp. 171–172, and Jütte, Lepra-Simulanten, p. 31.
Dis/simulation, nevertheless, was a considerable problem for early modern physician. As in courts where courtiers were expected to adopt elaborate forms of (false) self-presentation and deceit, which other courtiers tried to unveil and undermine, the physician (who himself was at times a skilled pretender) had to detect the various disguises and tactics employed by malingerers. We might therefore expand Hoffmann’s dictum, saying not only that ‘someone who does not know how to simulate does not know how to cure’,¹⁹⁷ but also that someone who does not know how to detect dis/simulation cannot be considered a good physician. Most early modern practitioners, I think, would have agreed.

¹⁹⁷ See n. 82 above.

also Piers Benn, ‘Medicine, Lies and Deceptions’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 27, 2001, pp. 130–134.
Chapter 6

*Etiam valde dissimulatus homo, non potest adeo faciem mutare* – ‘Even the man who is very good at dissimulating cannot change his face’

The Physiognomical Discourse on Dis/simulation in Early Modern Europe

6.1. Introduction

In *Richard III*, Hastings says of the king: ‘I think there’s never a man in Christendom / Can lesser hide his love or hate than he; / For by his face straight shall you know his heart’ (Act III, Scene IV, 52–55).\(^1\) In isolation, this statement seems to suggest the simplest of physiognomical observations – something which we, instinctively or otherwise, do on a daily basis. Yet in the context of the play, it vividly illustrates the limits of physiognomy: constructing his judgement on the shaky grounds of the physiognomical study of a human face, Hastings fails to see the king’s true nature and to discern the hidden plans and thoughts of Richard, who shortly afterwards orders his execution. Perhaps, however, this tragic misinterpretation of someone’s external appearance exemplifies the superior capacity for simulation of a particularly skilled deceiver?

Despite the obvious ambiguities and shortcomings of physiognomical inference (and the possibly fatal consequences of trusting in its reliability), the early modern world continuously believed in the hermeneutic potential of corporeal signifiers – a belief which has persisted into our supposedly enlightened times, as can be seen by the steady stream of modern publications on physiognomy and the art of face-reading. In what follows, I shall analyse the relationship between physiognomical thought or, more generally, the conjectural arts – *ars conjectandi hominum mores* – and the notion of dis/simulation, demonstrating that the problem of dissembling and feigning played an important, yet overlooked, part in early modern European physiognomy.

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6.2. The place of physiognomy in early modern thought

Rather than attempting to recapitulate the complex history of physiognomical thought from its beginnings, I shall briefly outline some fundamental coordinates of the development of physiognomy up to the seventeenth century, in order to understand both the place which this discipline came to occupy in early modern scientific and scholarly thought and its relationship to the notion of dis/simulation.

In the Babylonian era, physiognomical thought was largely linked to prognostication and divination – a connection which lasted until well into the seventeenth century. Despite its supernatural bent, Near Eastern physiognomy also incorporated the semiotic reading of the human body, which would become increasingly prevalent in the early modern era. Physiognomy remained a popular practice among the Greeks, epitomised in the most influential extant work on the subject, the *Physiognomics*, written c. 300 BC. This seminal treatise, traditionally attributed to Aristotle, came to be regarded as highly authoritative and circulated widely up to the early modern period and beyond. For the author of the treatise, physiognomy was a system of ordering and classifying, based on the relationship between the particular and the general; but, by defining it in terms of the particular, as a discipline which systematises individual personal phenomena, he removed any demonstrable justification of it as a science. Physiognomy was, from its beginnings, built on contradictory and illogical premises, most famously, physiognomical syllogisms which purported to demonstrate, for example, that a man with bovine looks was slow and dull.

Yet Pseudo-Aristotle did try to establish a scientific foundation for the discipline, proposing three basic physiognomical methods: zoological (comparing men to certain species of animals), ethnological (attributing bodily and character traits to a specific country or race) and pathognomical (studying transitory facial expressions and bodily movements rather than fixed and immovable bodily and facial features). He, however, rejected the last method, noting that it was ‘defective in more than one respect. For one

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3 Confusingly, and seemingly in contradiction to his dismissal of fixed body parts as less reliable than mobile ones, Pseudo-Aristotle also ascribed considerable importance to facial expression; see Christopher Rivers, *Face Value: Physiognomical Thought and the Legible Body in Mirabeau, Lavater, Balzac,*
thing, the same facial expression may belong to different characters …; besides, a man may at times wear an expression which is not normally his …, and … the number of inferences that can be drawn from facial expressions alone is small’. The phrase to ‘wear an expression’ does not necessarily refer to conscious strategies of feigning and disguise: in antiquity – by contrast to the early modern era – the notion of dis/simulation was not employed as an argument to undermine the efficacy of the pathognomical method. What it, above all, suggested was that corporal signs, by their nature, could have multiple or even contrary significations. Roman physiognomical thought was heavily based on previous Greek authorities (mainly Pseudo-Aristotle and the ancient Platonist philosopher Polemon) and on the three principal methods outlined in the Physiognomics. It also relied on physiognomical syllogisms, which, by this time, regularly served as a rhetorical underpinning of the discipline.

Some Greek and Roman treatises, along with important Arabic works on physiognomy, were transmitted to the Middle Ages. Important medieval writings on physiognomy such as the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum Secretorum (one part of which deals with physiognomy) and treatises by Michael Scot and Pietro d’Abano closely followed and continued the ancient and Arabic traditions which they inherited. Physiognomical theory in the Middle Ages was still characterised by contradictory methodologies and remained linked to divination, astrology and medical descriptions of

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Gautier, and Zola, Madison WI, 1994, p. 221, n. 39.


the humours and temperaments, a point to which I shall return.\textsuperscript{9}

The Renaissance witnessed a renewed interest in the subject, most famously in Giambattista della Porta’s \textit{De humana physiognomonia} of 1586. The publication of this treatise marked the emergence of a ‘natural’ physiognomy, one which began to loosen the discipline’s close ties with astrology and prophetic practice. Giambattista della Porta (1535–1615), the most influential populariser of physiognomy until the late eighteenth century, attempted to distance this discipline from the occult and divinatory arts, which had been prohibited in Sixtus V’s ‘Bull against Divination’ (\textit{Coeli et terrae}) in 1586.\textsuperscript{10} He sought to establish his brand of physiognomy as a science which codified the human body; however, apart from his scepticism about astrological and divinatory methods, he did not break with the pseudo-Aristotelian physiognomical tradition. Firmly adhering to the zoological method and medical notions of humours and temperaments, his treatise was shaped by dichotomies (low-high, wide-narrow, light-dark and so on) and by analogy, as well as the usual physiognomical syllogisms.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite retaining much of the discipline’s heritage, seventeenth-century physiognomy was influenced by contemporary advances in the natural sciences and medicine, as increasing scientific rationality and critical reflection on the functions of the body reshaped the premises of the discipline.\textsuperscript{12} Although he was not a theorist of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{9}] See section 6.2.1 below.
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] See Rivers, \textit{Face Value}, p. 29.
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physiognomy as such, René Descartes (1596–1650) exerted a significant impact on the physiognomical thought of his time, especially through his Passions de l'âme of 1649. In this treatise, Descartes analysed the relationship between the human soul and body from both a physiological and philosophical perspective; the passions, which linked the otherwise disconnected soul and body, were legible as physiological manifestations in the body, which he conceived as a mechanistic system. His discussion of human passions is interesting for our purposes because it gave importance to bodily movement and facial expression, the key factors in the pathognomical method, which had been dismissed in the pseudo-Aristotelian Physiognomics and in the subsequent physiognomical tradition. This passage from Les passions de l'âme demonstrates the hermeneutic shift triggered by the Cartesian system:

There is no passion which is not manifest by some particular action of the eyes … the actions of the face which also accompany the passions … do not seem to be natural so much as voluntary. Generally, all actions, of both the face and the eyes, can be changed by the soul.14

Descartes then remarked on the problem of dis/simulation, which he was well aware of, as has been noted:15 ‘when, willing to conceal its passion, it [the soul] forcefully imagines one in opposition to it; so, they can be used to dissimulate passions as well as to manifest them’.16 With this brief comment on the possibility of deceit and disguise,

13 Giovanni Bonifacio, L’arte de’ cenni con quale formandosi favella visibile, si tratta della muta eloquenza che non è altro che un facendo silentio, Vicenza, 1616, was one of the earliest books devoted exclusively to this subject; see Westman, The Copernican Question, p. 198. For his awareness of dis/simulation, see n. 59 below.

14 René Descartes, Passions de l’ame, ed. by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Paris, 1966, p. 147: ‘Il n’y a aucune Passion que quelque particuliere action des yeux ne declare … des actions du visage, qui accompagnent aussi les passions … elles ne semblent pas tant naturelles que volontaires. Et generally toutes les actions, tant du visage que des yeux, peuvent estre changees par l’âme.’


16 Descartes, Passions de l’ame, p. 147: ‘lors que voulant cacher la passion, elle en imagine fortement un contraire: en sorte qu’on s’en peut aussi bien servir à dissimuler ses passions, qu’à les declarer’.

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Descartes touched on a fundamental issue for physiognomy, one which exercised many intellectuals in the early modern era and afterwards: the face, as the most complex and eloquent non-verbal communicator and, therefore, the primary object of physiognomical inference, was liable to manipulation through wilfully generated facial expressions.

The notion of passions and their manifestations also made an impact on other disciplines, for example, the visual arts, as can be seen in Charles Le Brun’s seminal lecture *Conférence sur l’expression des passions*, delivered in 1668 before the Académie Royal de Peinture et Sculpture. Le Brun (1619–1690), an influential painter and academician, tried to establish a method of painting human expressions, putting Descartes’s ideas into practice and visualising them with a set of elaborate and, at times, grotesque illustrations, which were featured in the numerous printed editions of the work.\(^1\) More than Descartes, Le Brun was concerned with the shifting visible manifestations of passions and their general legibility. His focus on facial expressions was apparent in his privileging of the eyebrows, which he regarded as the most expressive part of the human face, through which the emotions and passions, otherwise hidden, might be brought to light through motion.

This new emphasis on movement and the hermeneutic value of facial expressions was a crucial departure from earlier physiognomical thought,\(^2\) entailing a new perception of man, which concentrated less on universal truths about the natural disposition and essence of the individual and paid more attention to temporary emotional conditions. Descartes’s rejection of analogies and syllogisms was equally important for the development of physiognomy. The body was no longer understood to refer to something else, merely on grounds of resemblance, but was instead legible in terms of its own logical and physiological functions and principles. These significant shifts in physiognomical thought were, however, abandoned in the late eighteenth

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\(2\) Rivers, *Face Value*, pp. 28–29. According to Sibylle Baumbach, ‘Physiognomy’, in *A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture*, ed. by Michael Hattaway, Oxford, 2010, pp. 582–597, at p. 591, the distinction between the physiognomical and pathognomical methods was not established until the eighteenth century, above all, by Lavater. Seventeenth-century physiognomists were, however, aware of this distinction; see, e.g., Clemens Timpler, *Opticae systema methodicum*, Hanover, 1617, p. 164.
century by Johann Kaspar Lavater, whose work, as we shall see, marks a regression in physiognomical thought rather than a progression and continuation of previous advances.\textsuperscript{19}

6.2.1. Early modern perceptions of physiognomy
Physiognomy has always been prized and, at the same time, regarded as controversial and dubious.\textsuperscript{20} It would be anachronistic, nevertheless, to dismiss the discipline as unscientific, bearing in mind that a number of early modern scholars and authors, who were experts in other fields, devoted time and effort to physiognomy and took the discipline very seriously as a science.\textsuperscript{21} Martin Porter has suggested, in relation to physiognomy, the importance of an ongoing reconfiguration between theoretical and practical skills in early modern European culture\textsuperscript{r}.\textsuperscript{22} It is particularly difficult to draw a line between science and pseudo-science when considering the pervasive, age-old relationship between physiognomy and medicine. Both disciplines shared the same fundamental Hippocratic-Galenic principles, above all, the theory of humours and

\textsuperscript{19} See section 6.3 below.

\textsuperscript{20} See, e.g., the comment of Mario Equicola (1470–1525), in his \textit{Di natura d’amore}, Venice, 1607, f. 181v: ‘L’arte di conoscere per segni fissi, et ingenitii naturali affetti dell’anima nostra, che da i Greci è detta Fisionomia, credono alcuni non esser vera.’ These concerns did not, however, deter Equicola from discussing, ff. 182v–187r, the ‘inditi d’amore’ and the physiognomical traits of lovers. This attempt to discern the signs of love from external corporeal and facial features challenges the recurring advice to conceal one’s love prudently, which we have encountered, e.g., in contemporary love emblem books. In addition, Selvatico, \textit{Institutio medica}, pp. 135–149, devoted a chapter to detecting the dis/simulations of lovers and (melancholics).

\textsuperscript{21} Lodovico Settala (1552–1633), e.g., an important physician and scholar of his day, not only wrote medical works and an influential political treatise on reason of state (the \textit{Della ragione di stato libri sette} of 1627), but also a physiognomical tract on moles: \textit{Labyrinthisi medici extricati, sive methodus vitandorum errorum qui in praxi occurruntur}, Geneva, 1687. Another case is Ciro Spontone (c. 1550–c. 1610), who wrote works on political theory, as well as \textit{La Metoposcopia, overo commensurazione delle linee della fronte}, published posthumously by his son Giovanni Battista Spontone in Venice in 1626, a treatise on the art of judging character from the forehead or face.

temperament and their effect on physical appearance and behaviour. It was only a short journey from this theory to the belief that these were visible in the exterior features of the face and the rest of the body – in other words, from physiology to physiognomy. Both physicians and physiognomists attempted to disclose the inside of human beings through the study of the semiotic grammar and syntax of external manifestations caused by humours and passions, which could refer both to character and to disease. For the physician, diseases were hidden away in the ‘black box’ of the human body, just as temperaments and character were for the physiognomist. The physician, therefore, needed to be a good physiognomist and pathognomonist.

This figure of a medical physiognomist was exemplified not only in Hippocrates and Galen, but also in early modern intellectuals such as Antoine du Moulin (c. 1510–1551), one of the first to point out the medical utility of physiognomy (‘ad sanitatem hominum tuendam’). Johannes Friedrich Helvetius (1630–1709), a well-established physician and renowned alchemist from The Hague, made an explicit connection between physiognomy and medicine in the titles of two works in which he attempted to place physiognomy on the more scientific footing of rational medicine. Many other physiognomists also tried to elevate their discipline into an indispensable skill to be mastered by any capable physician. The early seventeenth-century German physician Christian Moldenarius, in his compendious Exercitationes physiognomicae of 1616, wove together physiognomy, medical practice and worldly wisdom, stating that ‘physiognomy is the prudence to foresee something about the health of a man from the main exterior parts of the human body’.


24 Antoine du Moulin, De diversa hominum natura, prout a veteribus philosophis ex corporum speciebus reperta est, Lyon, 1549, pp. 3–4.

25 Johannes Friedrich Helvetius, Amphitheatrum physiognomiae medicum, Heidelberg, 1660, and his Microscopium physiognomiae medicum, Amsterdam, 1676.

26 Christian Moldenarius, Exercitationes physiognomicae, Wittenberg, 1616, f. 6: ‘Physiognomia est prudentia ex partibus humani corporis exterioribus primariis ad salutem hominis aliquid praesaegiendi.’ Similar claims were made in the following centuries: Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709–1751), author of L’homme machine (1748), said that physiognomy could help a physician to discover the character of a
Physiognomy, as a discipline, generally referred to gaining knowledge of a person’s character by looking at his or her body and face.\textsuperscript{27} Understood as the art of detecting someone’s ‘inclinations towards good and bad things’,\textsuperscript{28} physiognomy was expected to serve moral, social and practical purposes. Yet, as Porter has shown, some early modern physiognomists were even more ambitious, aiming to deploy the discipline to open a window onto the hidden realms of human beings and, beyond that, to reveal the occult properties and virtues of all natural bodies.\textsuperscript{29} The foundation for this grandiose vision was the belief in a ‘natural language’, characterised by the mysterious resemblance between words and the things which they signified. As a consequence of the Fall, the original language of mankind, which gave us the ability to comprehend all of nature, had been lost. In this context, the term physiognomy acquired a deep and multifaceted significance: often astrological, sometimes medical and even divine. Physiognomical theory was textually and culturally interwoven with different strands of early modern Neoplatonism, Hermeticism and mysticism. Yet while Porter is correct to stress the Hermetic and occult notions linked to the European physiognomical tradition,\textsuperscript{30} he has largely left aside the socio-anthropological context, which is the focus of my investigation.\textsuperscript{31}

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\textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., a German translation of Bartolomeo della Rocca (Cocles), \textit{Phisionomei: Complexion und Art eins ieden Menschen, ausz gestalt und Form des Angesichts, Glider und allen geberden zu erlernen}, Frankfurt am Main, 1529, sig. A2: ‘Phisonomia ist ein sinnreich / im natürliche Kunst / dadurch die neygungen zum guten und bösen im menschen / erkent werden.’

\textsuperscript{29} See Porter, \textit{Windows of the Soul}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 18, 301–302.

\textsuperscript{31} Very few studies have focused on the social dimension of dis/simulation in connection to the ‘art of reading men’ and to early modern discussions of civil life and comportment; for brief discussions, see Jean-Jacques Courtine, \textit{Histoire du visage: exprimer et taire ses emotions, du XVIe siècle au début du XIXe siècle}, Paris, 1994, pp. 23–35, and Thomas Müller, \textit{Rhetorik und bürgerliche Identität. Studien zur
6.2.2. Physiognomy and prudence

A number of early modern authors believed in a natural physiognomical intelligence: an instinctive and unconscious ability to gain knowledge of other people simply by looking at and listening to them. Conceived in this way, physiognomy was a discipline which appealed to and sharpened our natural faculty of visual literacy.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, beyond this innate human capacity to read others, physiognomical inferences could be drawn by means of skills which had to be acquired and learned. Physiognomy, in this sense, was a technical proficiency connected to worldly wisdom. In the predominantly face-to-face society of early modern Europe,\textsuperscript{33} this type of physiognomical competence, as a specific method of assessing one’s fellow human beings, was of great interest.\textsuperscript{34}

The art of conjecturing human minds became an indispensable skill for the prudent man. Thomas Hill (c. 1528–1574) claimed, in the dedicatory epistle to his treatise \textit{A Contemplation of Mankinde} (1571), that it was an essential prerequisite for prudent comportment in everyday life: ‘without this Arte, a man can not so well detect their [other people’s] falsheode and doings’.\textsuperscript{35} Another Englishman, the Jesuit Thomas Wright (1561–1624), author of several treatises on religious questions, remarked in \textit{The Passions of the Minde in Generall}, when reflecting on the proverb ‘cor gaudens ex hila r at faciem’, that

questionlesse wise men often, throw the windowes of the face, beholde the secrets of the heart, according to that saying of Salomon [Proverbs 27:19], Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum

\textsuperscript{32}Porter, \textit{Windows of the Soul}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 320.

\textsuperscript{34}See, e.g., Marin Cureau de la Chambre, \textit{L’art de connoitre les homme}, Paris, 1663, p. 3: ‘En effet le secret de la Sagesse consiste à scavor ce que l’on est, ce que l’on peut, et ce que l’on doit faire; et celui de la Prudence, à connoitre aussi ce que sont les autres.’ On him, see section 6.6. below.

\textsuperscript{35}Thomas Hill, \textit{A Contemplation of Mankinde}, [London?], 1571, f. 5\textsuperscript{v}. 
manifesta sunt prudentibus: as the faces of those which looke into waters shine unto them, so the harts of men are manifest unto the wise.\textsuperscript{36}

Rather than a universal key available to everyone, introspection into other people’s hearts and minds was a prerogative of the worldly wise and, as such, ultimately a means of self-protection.

The link between physiognomy and practical wisdom was also strongly suggested in an intriguing passage which brings us back to the second chapter of this dissertation. In his essayistic meditation and psychological self-portrait \textit{Religio Medici} (1643), Sir Thomas Browne (1605–1682) noted:

\begin{quote}
I have observed that those professed Eleemosynaries, though in a crowd or multitude, do yet direct and place their petitions on a few and selected persons; there is surely a Physiognomy, which those experienced and Master Mendicants observe, whereby they instantly discover a merciful aspect, and will single out a face, wherein they spy the signatures and masks of mercy.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Here we encounter again the notion of prudence in the daily social interaction of beggars with potential alms-givers, but now in the context of human physiognomical intelligence.\textsuperscript{38} For Browne, disclosing the inner thoughts of men is less a means of prudent personal security than an instrument for generating income; and he granted those to whom he referred, almost respectfully, as ‘Master Mendicants’ (implying the internal hierarchy of beggars habitually mentioned in early modern beggar pamphlets), a

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\textsuperscript{38} The ‘Acte for Punyshment of Rogues Vagabonde and Sturdy Beggars’ of 1597 established another connection between the cunning use of physiognomy by beggars and other divinatory arts (here in their illicit form), punishing ‘… all idle persons going about in any Cuntry eyther begging or using any subtle Crafe… or fayning themselves to have knowledge in Phisiognomey Palmestry or other crafty Scyence’; see Baumbach, \textit{Physiognomy}, p. 30.
\end{flushright}

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virtually infallible ability to ‘physiognomate’ their fellow men, in order to detect the almsgivers among them.  

6.3. *Vultum sibi fingere multi possunt, frontem nemo* – The physiognomical limits of dis/simulation

Early modern physiognomical teaching, as we have seen, was heavily indebted to the authoritative ancient tradition of physiognomy, which was transmitted, largely unaltered, in a number of medieval and Arabic works; and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scholars contributed few changes or innovations to the established physiognomical theory. One significant exception, however, was the problem of dis/simulation. Unnoticed, for the most part, by ancient or medieval physiognomists, it became increasingly important in the discipline from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. The hermeneutical challenge posed by the notion of dis/simulation constituted a dynamic element in the otherwise static, derivative and uninspired discourse on physiognomy in this period. Exploring this phenomenon will contribute, I hope, not only to the growing amount of scholarship on European physiognomy, in which very little

39 Thomas Hill was the first early modern author to use the verb ‘to physiognomate’; see Porter, *Windows of the Soul*, p. ix. Francisco Sanches used this neologism, in its Latin form, in his commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomics*: see n. 62 below.

40 In Marin Cureau de la Chambre, *The Art How to Know Men*, London, 1665, sig. A4v, the translator, John Davies, promoted the study of the conjectural arts and justified his translation by stating that ‘it suffices not, to be guided by those common observations and characters of men, which are obvious to the Populace’. While simple folk might dispose of a certain level of natural physiognomical competence, the prudent man must engage more intensively with the ‘art of reading men’.

41 See, however, Geitner, *Die Sprache der Verstellung*, pp. 241–242, who claims that physiognomy, ‘since time immemorial’ (‘seit altersher’) struggled to locate and overcome the problem of dis/simulation.

has been said about dis/simulation in relation to the *ars conjectandi hominum mores*, but also to the cultural and intellectual history of dis/simulation, in which little attention has been paid to the physiognomical aspects of the problem.

Many physiognomists and, more generally, scholars and intellectuals were acutely aware of the problem of dis/simulation, which they frequently (though not always critically) addressed in their works. What position, then, did this notion occupy in early modern physiognomical discourse? In what ways did it shape collective attempts to yield insight into other people’s minds and souls? In an age which was obsessively concerned with simulators, dissemblers and hypocrites, and in which dis/simulation became the *mal du siècle*, physiognomy seemed to be an invaluable art. Confidently proclaiming the correspondence and reciprocal relationship between our exterior and interior, physiognomists established an authoritative and normative theory which promised an easy and universal method of reading and deciphering face-to-face interactions. In this context, there was a pressing need for a visual and physiognomical nomenclature of dis/simulation.

We encounter endless moralisations on – and emphatic warnings against – deceivers, impostors and rogues of all kinds in early modern literature; and physiognomy offered appealingly simple precepts about how to detect these threatening types. One year after Luther’s edition of the *Liber vagatorum* in 1528, for instance, a German translation of an early physiognomical tract by the Bolognese surgeon and physician Bartolomeo della Roca (Cocles, d. 1504) explained that ‘wide eyes’

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43 The *ars conjectandi hominum mores* should not be confused with Jakob Bernoulli’s *Ars conjectandi* (written c. 1685 and published posthumously in 1715), which is considered the founding document of mathematical probability. Geitner, *Die Sprache der Verstellung*, pp. 1–167, is a valuable study of the *ars conjectandi*, focusing on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century discussions of worldly wisdom and dis/simulation in Germany rather than in the wider European context.

44 Snyder, *Dissimulation*, pp. 47 and 94–95, briefly mentions physiognomy and refers to Marin Cureau de la Chambre’s treatise, without, however, saying anything further on the subject.


46 As Porter, *Windows of the Soul*, p. 208, has argued, some physiognomical tracts were read with the aim of practical application.
relation to the width of the face) signified a ‘malevolent rogue’; and similar diagnoses are found in the *Metoposcopia* (1558) of the physician and natural philosopher Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576). Della Porta maintained that a dissembler had the features of a monkey, revealing his vile nature. The Italian natural philosopher Camillo Bardi (1550–1637) also included a chapter on the simulator (‘De simulatore’) in his lengthy and widely disseminated commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian physiognomy, which seems to have been the most detailed and extensive discussion of the visual nomenclature of dissemblers. At the end of the seventeenth century, the German

47 Della Rocca, *Phisionomei*, sig. B1r: ‘Breyte augen / nach breyte des antlitz. Der ist ein boßhaftiger Schalk.’ A long chin, we learn, too, from Cocles, sig. C1r, indicates a tendency to deceive. See also the popular physiognomical treatise first published in 1692, Gran-Pescatore (pseudonym), *Metoposcopia et chiromantia*, Jena, 1705, p. 94, which likewise warned that a very crooked nose (echoing the stereotype of the deceptive Jew?) was an unmistakable sign of a feigner and pretender.

48 Among other types, Cardano describes the physiognomies (with corresponding schematic woodcuts) of socially and morally threatening social groups such as vagabonds and prostitutes, mentioning, e.g., the facial complexion of a malevolent ‘dissimulatrix’; see Girolamo Cardano, *Metoposcopia*, Paris, 1658, p. 163. Cunning dis/simulations by woman also played a prominent part in Nicola Spadoni’s *Studio di curiosità, nel quale si tratta di fisonomia, chiromantia, metoposcopia*, Venice, 1662, in which readers were informed, sig. G6r, about the ‘segni probabili di Donna Meretrice’ and, sig. G8r, the ‘segni probabili di Donna che t’ami di cuore’.

49 See della Porta, *De humana physiognomonia*, p. 522: ‘Simulatores. Ad simiam et ad apparentiam.’ Interestingly, della Porta, in the section ‘De simulatoris viri figura’, ibid., claimed that dissimulators sometimes had an appealing outward appearance: ‘Alterum extremum dissimulatio est. Dissimulator est qui quae sibi insunt, vel negat, vel diminuit. Interdum dissimulatores elegantes sunt.’ Giovanni Paolo Gallucci suggested in the fifth book of his Italian translation of Albrecht Dürer, *Della simmetria dei corpi umani. Libri quattro*, Venice, 1591, f. 133r, that, despite the corrupt nature of this type, the ‘imagine d’un huomo dissimulator’ should not be completely unappealing: ‘La forma dello spiegare con colori, un dissimulatore consiste ne gli’occhi, i quali deono essere tali, che paiano languidi, et deboli. Tutta la fugura nondimeno dee essere di conveniente aspetto.’ Both examples suggest that there was an aesthetic dimension to the notion of simulation and dissimulation: while the dissimulator was associated with visual appeal, the unattractive outward appearance of a simulator seemed to reflect the person’s corrupt inner disposition.

50 Camillo Baldi, *In physiognomica Aristotelis commentarii*, Mantua, 1621, pp. 176–180, explained that at the beginning of the chapter that, despite the title, he was mainly focusing on the type of the dissimulator. Baldi was the only physiognomist who referred to Theophrastus’s *Characters*, which also prominently featured a description of dissemblers; see also n. 188 below.
scholar Johann Ingeber offered his readers half a dozen physiognomies of sly and deceptive individuals.  

Dis/simulation was not only relevant to visual codifications and the relentless attempts to compile typologies of outward signs of wickedness and deceit, but was also understood and discussed as a hermeneutical problem in its own right. This concern was, once more, a European-wide phenomenon, as we shall see with examples from Italy, France, England and Germany. It should be noted, furthermore, that this new awareness of dis/simulation among physiognomists started around 1600, that is, when the general discourse on this subject reached its peak. While from our contemporary perspective, pathognomy (the physiognomical study of facial expressions) might seem to be a more rational and promising approach to human character than physiognomy, many early modern physiognomists had a different view: aware that the human face was, to use Paul Ekman’s phrase, a ‘dual system’, and that facial expressions were liable to manipulation or subterfuge, they resorted to the study of the fixed constitution of the body in order to avert deception and misinterpretation. The phenomenon of dis/simulation undermined the assumption that facial expressions refer directly and unambiguously to a corresponding mental condition. Placing emphasis on the volatile and fleeting features of the countenance, therefore, raised the risk of being misled or

51 Johann Ingeber, Chiromantia, metoposcopia, et physiognomia curioso-practica, Frankfurt am Main, 1692, pp. 126–127, 134, 137, 148, 159. Dominico de Rubeis, Tabulae physiognomicae, in quibus cloro ordine summaque facilitate tum antiquorum tum recentiorum physiognomorum axiomata vigent, Venice 1639, came up with more than thirty physiognomies of dissemblers and simulators. Physiognomy, however, not only revealed malicious and cunning types but also those endowed with wisdom: echoing the dictum ‘a man’s wisdom makes his face to shine’ (Ecclesiastes 8:1), Moldenarius, Exercitationes physiognomicae, f. 209r, stated: ‘In facie prudentis relucet sapientia.’

52 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage, New York, 1985, p. 123. The notion of the ambiguity of facial expressions was already encapsulated in the Latin distinction between vultus and faciem, e.g., in the dictum: ‘vultus hominis variat, facies semper est eadem’; for a detailed discussion of the etymology and semantics of both terms, see Davide Stimilli, The Face of Immortality. Physiognomy and Criticism, New York, 2005, pp. 70–75. The entire history of physiognomy can be encapsulated in the proverbs ‘vultus (frons) fiat’ and ‘vultus (frons) non fiat’, which were two of the many variations of similar Latin proverbs such as ‘fronte politus astutam vapido servas in pectore volpem’, ‘decipit frons prima multos’, ‘ne/nolito fronti credere’ etc.; for other Latin proverbs and their vernacular equivalents, see Emanuel Strauss, Dictionary of European Proverbs, 2 vols, London, 1994, I, pp. 117 and 193, and II, p. 1025.
duped and was, therefore, potentially a hermeneutical pitfall.

The solution to this problem was as simple as it was seemingly infallible and, for this reason, appealed to many generations of physiognomists all over Europe: instead of transitory expressions, one should rely on stable and immovable corporal signifiers, which defied all attempts at and strategies of dis/simulation. They constructed a ‘di/simulation-free zone’ in an age which had not yet discovered plastic surgery. Samuel Fuchs (1588–1630), a professor for rhetoric at Königsberg and author of one of the many (now largely forgotten) seventeenth-century physiognomical treatises, formulated the principle concisely: ‘Many can counterfeit their countenance (\textit{vultus}), but no one his forehead, which displays permanent mores, while the countenance often reveals deceitful and simulated ones.’

Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), the most famous of all physiognomists, attempted to establish an enlightened, holistic and scientifically solid theory of physiognomy. Yet the skilful rhetoric and scientific language he used scarcely concealed his irritation at the problem of dis/simulation, which called into question his idealistic vision of establishing a universal visual language and of making human communication and interaction as a whole completely transparent. Although Lavater dissociated himself from a number of earlier physiognomists, he was constrained to embrace the solution to the dilemma of dis/simulation offered by his predecessors: the study of firm body structures. Lavater’s approach to the problem is summed up in his laconic statement that: ‘It is pathognomy, not physiognomy, which has to fight with the art of dis/simulation.’

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53 Samuel Fuchs, \textit{Metoposcoopia et ophthalmoscoopia}. Strasbourg, 1615, sig. A4v: ‘\textit{Vultum sibi fingere multi possunt, frontem nemo, et frons constantes ostendit mores, vultus simulatos saepe et lubricos};’ see also sig. A5v: ‘Frons igitur faciei pars est inter sinciput et oculos, quam Metoposcoopia intuetur, severa atque immobilis est, neque simulare neque dissimulare edocta.’ Fuchs insisted, sig. A1r, that fixed bodily parts, especially the forehead, defy attempts at dis/simulation: ‘\textit{Premite vocem, mortales, eamque gemino dentium et laboriorum septo custodite, per frontis tamen secretum iter in mentis latebras perrumpetur et nudus animus sine pallio simulationis interprete fronte se prodet}.’


only physiognomist to exclude the study of facial expressions: up to the nineteenth century, various other authors invoked the division between pathognomy and physiognomy, and opted for the latter.57

Early modern discussions were not limited to apodictic refutations of pathognomy in favour of the study of stable bodily features. For a number of physiognomists, dis/simulation represented a considerable challenge to their intellectual endeavours. At the same time, by appealing to the ubiquity of pretence and disguise in the world, physiognomists were able to promote and sell their discipline. The author of the preface to the German translation of della Porta’s treatise was unusually open and critical in admitting that ‘the forehead, eyes and countenance sometimes deceive’, adding, however: ‘yet speech does so much more often’.58 Language, as the main instrument of deception, was even less reliable, leaving no other option but physiognomical observation.59

Clemens Timpler (1563–1624), a German Protestant philosopher and theologian, pointed out the utility of physiognomy, ‘even though’ appearances are ‘covered by many simulations’.60 Hermann Follin, a Dutch physician of the first half of the seventeenth

56 Johann Kaspar Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente, zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntniß und Menschenliebe, IV, Leipzig, 1778, p. 39: ‘Pathognomie hat mit der Verstellungskunst zu kämpfen; nicht so die Physiognomik’; see also pp. 55–65.

57 Although he also advised considering a person’s clothes and general appearance, Carus, Symbolik der menschlichen Gestalt, pp. 7–8, following Lavater, praised the study of immovable body structures as a comprehensive solution to the problem of dis/simulation. See also Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays, transl. by Sara Hay Dircks, Auckland NZ, 2010, p. 278: ‘the science of physiognomy is one of the principal means of a knowledge of mankind; arts of dissimulation do not come within the range of physiognomy, but within that of mere pathognomy and mimicry’.

58 Della Porta, Menschliche Physiognomy, f. 2r: ‘unnd betnegen einen die Stirn, Augen und Angesicht manchmal, die Rede aber noch viel öffter’.

59 Bonifacio, L’arte de’ cenni, p. 7: ‘Tanto più quest’arte de’ cenni merita d’esser commendata, et abbracciata quanto che in lei non hà così facilmente luogo la simulazione, come la vediamo havere nel nostro commune parlare. È vero che anco con cenni, e con gesti si può simulare, e finger quello che non si ha nell’animo.’

century, highlighted the contemporary importance of the conjectural arts, asking in his pocket-sized physiognomical manual: ‘since in this most corrupt age dissimulation occupies the minds of almost everyone, will the effort and the sagacity of the physiognomist be useless? This is very far from the truth’, he insisted, ‘since physiognomy is very suitable for detecting human habits’, given that it even ‘discerns habits hidden by simulation’.  

Francisco Sanches (1550–1623), a philosopher and physician of Sephardi Jewish origin from Portugal, is another good example. He stated unequivocally in the opening words of his commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Physiognomics that ‘if there was ever a need to practise physiognomy, then it is particularly necessary at this very time, in which we can find so many masked bears, hidden wolfs and foxes wearing togas’. Yet, Sanches indicated that the use of dis/simulation was by no means restricted to the threatening characters whom he associated with wild beasts: ‘What do human beings not simulate, what do they not feign?’ Given the universality of disguise and pretence, physiognomy was an invaluable aid for coping with the perils of contemporary society. Sanches was one of the first early modern authors to identify dis/simulation as an integral problem for physiognomical inference. He did not limit himself to the study of bodily structures, but also incorporated pathognomical observation in his study of face-to-face encounters. Facial expressions may be misleading and deceiving, he claimed:

wrinkled forehead and small eyes.

61 Hermann Follin, Speculum naturae humanae sive mores et temperamenta hominum, Cologne, 1649, f. 5r: ‘Verum quando hoc exulceratissimo aevo dissimulatio fere omnium mentes occupaverit, Physiognomi industria aut sagacitas inutilis videbitur? Hoc a vero longe dissitum est, cum enim Physiognomia ad detegendos hominum mores aptissima sit, si quid proferatur ab hominibus, quae indicis et notis in corpore eorum expressis refragari videantur, eorum simulatione tectos mores agnoscat.’ Follin also wrote a vernacular physiognomical treatise: Physiognomia, ofte Menschen-kenner, Haarlem, 1612.

62 Francisco Sanches, In lib[rum] Aristotelis physiognomicon commentarius, in his Opera, ed. by Joaquim de Carvalho, Coimbra, 1955, p. 83: ‘Si physiognominare unquam opus fuit, hoc quidem maxime tempore id perquam necessarium est: in quo invenire est tot larvatus ursos, personatus lupos, togatas vulpes.’ Cf. Hill, A Contemplation, f. 3r: ‘if ever this [physiognomy] were in any age a necessary science, then no doubt in this our time’.

63 Sanches, In lib[rum] Aristotelis physiognomicon commentarius, p. 83: ‘Denique quid non simulant, quid non fingunt hodie homines?’ As we have seen in Chapter 5 above, similar views on the ubiquity of dis/simulation were expressed in the medical literature of the time.
someone who is sad by nature can have a few happy days, while someone who is cheerful can have a few gloomy days, so that their facial signs change during those days; therefore, the expert in physiognomy will be deceived if he judges according to those signs. Consequently, a judgement based on external signs is not at all safe.  

Yet despite these difficulties, Sanches retained his trust in the art of reading men, concluding that ‘even the man who is very good at dissimulating cannot change his face so that it does not reveal a hidden passion to an expert in physiognomy’. In the contest between dis/simulation and the counter-strategies of face-reading, the prudent and experienced physiognomist will triumph, since the passions will make a person’s inner state visible.

While Sanches and a number of other contemporary authors did not shy away from the problem of dis/simulation, other physiognomists – consciously or not – avoided the subject, either by excluding it from their theoretical formulations or by declaring it to be of little relevance. Still others ignored it completely. This attitude was unlikely to result from complete unawareness of the problem. These authors, I believe, remained silent deliberately – though it is, of course, difficult to corroborate this.

64 Ibid., p. 88: ‘scilicet, qui natura tristis est, potest dies aliquos laetos ducere; et qui hilaris, maestos, ita ut signa faciei mutentur illis diebus: ergo physiognomon decipietur tunc, si iudicet secundum signa illa: proindeque iudicum ab externis signis non est valde tutum’.

65 Ibid.: ‘imo et, quod magis est, etiam valde dissimulatus homo, non potest adeo faciem mutare, ut non ostendat experto physiognomo latentem affectationem’. To corroborate this view, Sanches included four telling quotations from Roman poets, all attesting to the limits of dis/simulation. The first quotation, which Sanches ascribed to Cornelius Gallus, is from Maximianus (Elegiarum liber, II.4.27–28): ‘Certe difficile est abscendere pectoris aëstus / Panditur et clause saepius ore furor’. The second is from Tibullus’s ‘Forced Laughter’ (Carmina, III.6.33–34) : ‘Hei mihi, difficile est imitari gaudia falsa / Difficile est tristi fingere mente iocum.’ The third quotation is from Ovid’s Metamorphoses (II.447): ‘Heu quam difficile est crimen non prodere vultu’; and the last one comes from Ovid’s Epistolae Herodium (XVI.7.237–38): ‘Qua licet, et possum, luctor celare furem, / Sed tamen apparent dissimulasses amor.’ As we have seen in Chapter 1, the problem of concealing love was an important theme in early modern emblem books, which also quoted from Ovid, though not from the Heroidae.
contention with textual evidence, since the subject is passed over in silence. In such cases, the tacit omission of the problem of dis/simulation seems to have been more convenient than confronting the challenge of including it and coming up with a solution. Addressing the subject might easily have exposed the weaknesses and inconsistencies of physiognomical theory.

6.4. The passions of the mind and soul
Dis/simulation was also a troubling issue in humoral-pathological treatises, a loose genre which was closely linked to physiognomy and which was also of wide interest in this period. These texts treated a number of subjects associated with the human mind, the passions and what we would now refer to as psychology and human emotionality. Usually drawing on authoritative ancient philosophers (e.g., Aristotle and Cicero) and Church Fathers (e.g., St Augustine), as well as Thomas Aquinas’s lengthy and detailed ‘De passionibus animae’ (Summa theologiae, 1a2ae.22–48), early modern authors compiled knowledge about the complexion and the mechanisms of the human body and mind. Among these works, I would like to consider one particularly interesting text which shows how closely forms of feigning and pretending were linked to the discourse on human passions: Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde in Generall of 1604. Robert Burton obtained much material for his Anatomy of Melancholie (1621) from Wright’s treatise, which until that time was the most complete and extensive treatment of the subject in English.

Wright, whose main goal was to increase self-awareness and self-knowledge among his readers, enabling them to mortify their passions, considered prudence to be of crucial importance for this endeavour and should ‘be used in passions’ at all times.

66 A good example is Honorat Nicquet, Phisiognomia humana libris IV distincta, Hannover, 1648, an exhaustive treatise which discussed, among other things, objections against physiognomy but at no point addressed the problem of dis/simulation. In this work, Nicquet displayed his extensive knowledge of earlier physiognomical debates; furthermore, as a scholar, book censor and director of various French Jesuit colleges, he would certainly have been sufficiently familiar with the notion of dis/simulation to broach the subject and its close links to physiognomy.

67 As we have seen in Chapter 1 above, the connection between human passions and emotions, on the one hand, and dis/simulation, on the other, was frequently discussed in emblem books.

68 Wright, The Passions, p. 155: ‘Prudence is to be used in passions all the times.’
Prudence was of twofold relevance: to our own passions and to those of other people with whom we are in social interaction and communication (which he referred to as ‘policy’). For Wright, prudence in dealing with one’s own passions not only implied awareness of them, but also the ability to dissimulate them: ‘The second point of prudence in passions is to conceal as much as thou canst thy inclinations, of that passion thou knowest thyself most prone to follow’ and ‘not to lay their passions open to the censure of the world.’ Invoking a widely disseminated topos in early modern literature, Wright connected taciturnity to prudence and loquacity to foolish behaviour. More interestingly, he regarded silence as a prerequisite for worldly wisdom and for prudent comportment towards others: ‘prudence and policy require a space of silence’. Drawing again on traditional maxims of worldly wisdom, he devoted a chapter to the subject of ‘concealing and revealing secrets’, in which he admonished readers to disclose confidential information only to true friends.

Given his interest in the practical aspects of this discipline, Wright was not blind to the difficulties of successfully maintaining a veil of secrecy and concealment, since most expressions of emotions were immediately visible in the human countenance. Unlike some contemporary authors, he did not ignore the problem of dissimulation but admitted that ‘this question yieldeth some difficulty, for hardly can a passionate man bridle so his affections that they appear not’. Wright then proceeded to the main part of

69 Ibid. According to Wright, p. 160, people governed by the same or, at any rate, similar passions are most likely to appeal to and to sympathise with each other. ‘Policy’ was therefore a rhetorical strategy in which the passions were actively employed in order to establish a polite and civil context for social interaction.

70 Ibid., p. 156.

71 Ibid., p. 167: ‘Wherefore fools carry their hearts in the mouths, wise men their mouths in their hearts.’

72 Ibid., p. 168.

73 Ibid., p. 175.

74 Ibid., p. 176.

75 Ibid., p. 156. The problem of emotions, passions and love was also addressed in other contemporary treatises; see e.g., Thomas Rogers, A Philosophicall Discourse Entitled The Anatomie of the Minde, London, 1576, ff. 13v–25v.
his treatment of dis/simulation, in which he set out to

briefly deliver some means whereby one may discover his fellow’s natural inclinations, not by philosophical demonstrations, but only by natural conjectures and probabilities, because wise men mortify their passions and crafty men dissemble.\(^\text{76}\)

There are two points worth noting in this passage. Firstly, the art of decoding and unveiling dis/simulation is not presented as an abstract philosophical discipline, but is instead associated with practical wisdom. Wright advises his readers to follow the conversation of other people closely,\(^\text{77}\) while simultaneously observing all their external actions in a given social context.\(^\text{78}\) This shows that he was fully aware of the inherent difficulty of detecting other people’s disguises and of disclosing their hidden passions. Secondly, the art of reading men is grounded in ‘conjectures and probabilities’. This was an important moment in early modern physiognomical thought, for Wright was one of the first authors to speak in terms of probabilities rather than universal truths about mankind. Dis/simulation, I believe, was the catalyst for this new and increasingly realistic view of the limits of physiognomical inference. In accordance with this sober stance, Wright’s treatise is notable for its neutral tone, lacking the lengthy moralisations about dissemblers and pretenders which commonly featured in contemporary works on moral philosophy.\(^\text{79}\)

\(^{76}\) Wright, The Passions, p. 176.

\(^{77}\) This includes scrutinising the whole act of speaking, rather than just the words uttered: ibid., pp. 172–178.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., pp. 179–191. Another interesting social context, which Wright, however, does not consider, is the difference between private and public (ritualised) facial expressions.

\(^{79}\) One of Wright’s rare moralistic digressions on dis/simulation targets, ibid., p. 177, the instrumentalisation of ‘feigned secrets’ by flatters and malevolent deceivers or, as he calls them, ‘cozening friends’. Revealing supposedly confidential information in order to gain someone’s trust is a strategy repeatedly mentioned in contemporary English rogue literature, as we have seen in Chapter 3 above.
6.5. A phenomenology of dis/simulation

Another work which deserves closer scrutiny in this context is *De coniectandis ciusque moribus et latitantibus animi affectibus* (written in 1620 and published in 1625) by Scipione Chiaramonti (Scipio Claramontius, 1565–1652). Although largely neglected in modern scholarship, the treatise was well received in its day and reprinted several times.\(^8^0\) In this work, Chiaramonti, a professor of philosophy at the University of Pisa and a renowned mathematician, best remembered nowadays for his attacks on Tycho Brahe,\(^8^1\) produced a comprehensive and systematic account of the *ars conjectandi hominum mores*, physiognomy and related subjects. Covering a wide range of medical and physiological subjects, he discussed long-standing questions concerning the complexion of the human body, the temperaments, the influence of climate on character, the traits of different nations and types of people and the qualities of the human heart and other organs. For the most part, Chiaramonti adhered to the scientific consensus of the time, compiling and synthesising established tenets and theories on the subject.

What, however, distinguished his physiognomical tract from those of most of his predecessors was the considerable attention which Chiaramonti devoted to the problem of feigning and dissembling: his discussion – and this was a real novelty – comprised a lengthy chapter, which formed an integral part of his entire physiognomical theory. At the risk of anachronism, this chapter might be described as an attempt to provide a phenomenology of dis/simulation. As the title of the treatise indicates, it provided advice on how to detect and unveil human disguises and pretences of all kinds, though it is not clear whether Chiaramonti’s largely abstract, scholarly and, ultimately, impractical account lived up to this aspiration.\(^8^2\)

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80 The most important reprint of the treatise was Scipione Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis ciusque moribus et latitantibus animi affectibus*, ed. by Hermann Conring, Helmstedt, 1665, which enjoyed wide dissemination in the following decades. In the editor’s preface, sig. *2r–3v*, Conring praised Chiaramonti’s treatise as a ‘praeclarissimum volumen’ useful for various disciplines and also described it as a useful read for the *homo politicus*, the prudent man of the world. Conring’s positive evaluation is echoed in Johann Heinrich Zedler’s *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, XXXIX, Leipzig, 1744, pp. 1093–1103 (‘Stand, Zustand der Menschen, Stand der Menschen’), at p. 1093, and in Johann Kaspar Lavater, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. by Johann Kasper von Orelli, Zurich, 1844, p. 65.


82 For a later (and not unjustified) criticism of Chiaramonti’s treatise as unclear and abstract, see n. 158.
His carefully chosen vocabulary was one of the means by which he portrayed the shifting and fluid relationship between opacity and transparency characterising the human body. A term found throughout the treatise is veil, *velum* or *velamen*, which might be ‘dense and opaque’, but which, nonetheless, could be breached.\(^8^3\) Throughout, he retained the suggestive semantic dichotomy of the permanent tension between concealing and revealing, opacity and translucency, simulation and truth. Yet, like Wright, Chiaramonti tried to maintain a neutral tone: only in the section on the simulation of mores did he alter his tone, attacking deceivers for their sinful ‘simulation of simplicity’ (‘simplicitatis simulatio’) and closing the passage with the warning that ‘one should most of all be aware of insidious simplicity, which we see all around us’.\(^8^4\)

This image calls to mind the dissembling manoeuvres of urban tricksters, which featured in the vivid accounts of rogue pamphleteers discussed in Chapter 4 above.\(^8^5\)

Chiaramonti gives lengthy definitions of the terms simulation and dissimulation in connection with the notion of action,\(^8^6\) going well beyond the standard laconic explanations of dis/simulation. He differentiates between three forms of feigning,\(^8^7\) and he introduces sub-categories such as the pretence that a perfidious decision was made below.

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\(^8^3\) Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 348: ‘At simulatio aperi tur ex effectu subsequente interdum ut velamen satis per se densum, et opacum disrumpatur.’ On the semantics of the veil, which is closely connected to the notion of dis/simulation, see Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann, *Schleier und Schwelle*, III, Munich, 1997–1999.

\(^8^4\) Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 341: ‘Summopere cavendam esse insidiosam simplicitatem, quam dari vidimus.’

\(^8^5\) Another type of deceiver Chiaramonti tried to unmask was the flatterer; see ibid., pp. 363–364.

\(^8^6\) Ibid., p. 331: ‘Actio vero … alia externa est, alia interna. Actio exterior tegitur, ut adulterium a muliere impudica: duplex vero est obumbratio, alia privativa, alia contraria, haec simulatio, illa dissimulatio est.’ Chiaramonti also included a summary chapter on the three levels of deceit outlined in Justus Lipsius, *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex*, Antwerp, 1589, pp. 335–336 (IV.xiv).

\(^8^7\) Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 333: ‘Compositio autem vultus, dum affectum tegimus tripexus esse videtur, reprimens, quam et medium vocare possumus, contraria, et diversa. Reprimentem, ac medium voco, quae continent affectum, ne errumpat et in eo sititur …. Contraria est compositio, cum qui tristitia opprimitur, laetitiam vultu praetendit; et qui odit, praesefert amorem.’
impulsively. While ‘many display the contrary passion, so that the real one can be more readily concealed’, other emotional states can also be exhibited: ‘Those who do not simulate the contrary passion but a different one pretend to display a countenance different from the real affect; doubtless those who are afraid do not feign a bold appearance but a happy or compassionate one.’ In a rigidly schematic manner, Chiaramonti also identifies three main instruments of human feigning: ‘words, the face and actions’, which, he adds, citing numerous classical sources, can be combined in six different combinations. He then sets out to elucidate the ‘the ends of simulation and dissimulation’ (‘de simulatione finis’ and ‘de dissimulatione finis’). Chiaramonti is one of the few early modern authors to refer in this context to Ovid’s *De arte amatoria*, which, as we have seen, features numerous examples of dis/simulation. Feigned love and female deceits crop up repeatedly in his account, showing that this topic was of interest beyond the confines of popular treatises and the moralising warnings of contemporary social critics. Chiaramonti points out that lovers frequently resort to dis/simulation, which can therefore be useful, he suggests, in uncovering such deceitful strategies.

Apart from establishing ways of detecting deceptions and disguises, Chiaramonti was interested in their psychological and physiological mechanics. He explains, for

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88 Ibid., p. 334: ‘Electionem dissimulant, qui, quod ex insidiis faciunt, ut repente animi motu factum, praeseferunt.’

89 Ibid., p. 333: ‘Multi vero contrarium affectum praefertun, ut verus facilius occulatur.’ This also suggests an intrinsic connection between simulation and dissimulation.

90 Ibid., p. 334: ‘At diversum vultum praetendent, qui non contrarium affectum vero, sed diversum simulant; nempe qui timent non audacem vultum fingant, sed laetum, vel misericordem.’

91 Ibid., p. 337: ‘simulatur verbis, vultu, et factis’.

92 Ibid.: ‘vel duo tantum, tresque nascentur combinationes: alia orationis, et vultus; alia orationis, factorum; alia vultus, et factorum’.

93 Ibid., pp. 337–338.


95 Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 343.
instance, that interior actions of the soul and mind are more difficult to feign than exterior ones.\textsuperscript{96} The same applies to hiding one’s emotions and inner turbulence. In a section entitled ‘Concealment of a Passion’ (‘Occultatio affectus’), he writes:

> In internal actions, it is more difficult for a passion to be covered up when it is vehement; for it flows up to the face and the extremities. When we are afraid, not only does our face turn pale, but our entire body also trembles. It is therefore difficult to compose one’s appearance when in the grip of passions of this kind.\textsuperscript{97}

In noting that sudden and vehement emotional eruptions and physiological phenomena such as trembling, shivering, blushing or turning pale defy dis/simulation, Chiaramonti was merely stating the obvious.\textsuperscript{98} And in discussing ways of detecting these strategies, he also gave, for the most part, common sense advice: for example, that passions are sometimes revealed in a sudden outburst.\textsuperscript{99} Most of these tenets are conventional and uninspired; but Chiaramonti nevertheless has the merit of being the first early modern scholar to attempt to establish a coherent and exhaustive physiognomical discussion of dis/simulation.

Although his art of conjecturing did not go as far as abandoning pseudo-Aristotelian physiognomy and the Hippocratic-Galenic doctrines on which it was firmly based, it nonetheless introduced some significant changes to physiognomical thought. Firstly, Chiaramonti largely relinquished the idea of a straightforward insight into someone’s character on the grounds of physiognomical observation. Building on earlier physiognomical theory,\textsuperscript{100} he distinguished between permanent and evanescent signs and

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 331: ‘Actio interior, quae difficilius fingitur, praeertim est motus sentientes appetitus.’

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 332–333: ‘Ex interioribus autem actionibus difficilior affectus tegitur, quando vehemens fuerit; nam refluit is in ora usque, et in exteriora membra. In timore nedum ore pallescimus, sed etiam tremimus toto corpore. Componere ergo in illiusmodi affectibus vultum difficile est ... .’

\textsuperscript{98} Chiaramonti offers another account of how passions arise and become apparent at ibid., p. 374: ‘Erumpit vero is vel voce, vel vultu, vel facto.’

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 348.

\textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., Pseudo-Aristotle, \textit{Phisiognomia ... ordine compositorio edita ad facilitatem doctrinae}, ed.
their specific degrees of certainty. The prudent observer, according to Chiaramonti, had to evaluate the hermeneutic potential of each sign and carefully conjecture a person’s character on the basis of manifest facial expressions. By taking account of the socio-cultural and psychological aspects of the types of human interaction and communication in which dis/simulation might be employed, Chiaramonti’s treatise marked a significant stage in the early modern shift from physiognomy to the *ars conjectandi*, that is, from the study of bodily structures to a comprehensive and prudental observation of human nature and behaviour. The analogies to contemporary medical methods of detecting feigning and disguises, which advised physicians to take into consideration the social and personal background of the patient, are obvious.

Despite the intricacies and difficulties of distinguishing genuine from feigned words and actions, Chiaramonti maintained that there were certain indicators such as the background of the person acting and the context of the action to which careful attention should be paid. When, however,

neither of these paths is available, a conjecture is undertaken on the basis of the character both of the person acting and of the person with whom he is interacting. Certainly, if there is a wily person who acts and talks, and we do not know him to be other than a wily person, we will readily believe that he is feigning, especially if his simulation could be useful to him and, likewise, when the person with whom he is interacting is very powerful.

If the person is ‘artless, the action should not be taken as if it were simulated’, but if


101 See, e.g, Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 384.

102 Ibid., p. 349.

103 Ibid., p. 342: ‘Estque secundum caput methodi, vel neutra via agitur, sed ex qualitate personae agentis et eius, qui cum agitur, coniectura sumitur. Nempe si velerator sit, qui agit, ac loquitur: neque alias eum pro veteratore agnoverimus, facile credemus, tum etiam fingere; praesertim si simulatio tum usui possit illi esse: pariter cum persona, qui cum agitur, sit aliqua magna potestas.’

104 Ibid., p. 351: ‘si homo simplex ... non est tanquam ex simulatione accipienda eius actio’.

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the physician is treating a crafty and cunning individual, it is more likely that simulation may be at work. Some people, moreover, resort to dis/simulation for the sake of the ‘common good, which is divided into three parts: the honourable, useful and pleasant’.

This statement indicates that Chiaramonti, a flexible stance, in which deceit for a good end could be legitimised. This was, as we have seen, the central premise of contemporary justifications of medical deceit.

In attesting to the ubiquity of dis/simulation, Chiaramonti was in line with the great majority of early modern authors and social critics; but, unlike them, he tried to give an account of the possible reasons and motives for this collective phenomenon rather than simply joining in the chorus of complaints against the depravity of his age.

‘We interpret’, he suggested, ‘every word and deed according to the aim of the person speaking and acting, giving no consideration to honesty.’

Chiaramonti recommended, in particular, scrutinising the motives of those engaged in face-to-face communication, ‘as if everyone acted according to choice and deliberation, but not often from emotion and passion, and, finally, as if everyone knew exactly what is more useful for them’.

Inconsistencies between an individual’s words and actions might also be valuable clues to deceit: for example, if a person ‘claims to possess some virtue such as fortitude or temperance, but then acts in ways contrary to this virtue, he reveals himself to be simulating this virtue without really having it’.

The most reliable method of penetrating the façade of dis/simulation, in Chiaramonti’s opinion, was bringing the emotions and passions into play. Above all,

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107 Ibid.: ‘quasi omnes ex electione agant, et consultatione, non autem saepe ex affectu, et perturbatione, et demum quasi omnes, quod sibi utilius est, exacte cognoscant’.

108 Ibid., p. 378: ‘Si quis profiteatur aliquam virtutem, ut fortitudinem, aut temperantiam, dum postea contrariam virtuti actionem operatur, ostendit se simulasse virtutem, non vere habuisse.’

109 See also Baltasar Gracián, *Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia*, ed. by Miguel Romera-Navarro, Madrid, 1954, p. 415, who pointed out, in his laconic and aphoristic style, that the ‘true thumbscrew’ was the one which involved the passions: ‘El único torcedor, el que haze saltar los afectos; es un vomitivo para
for Chiaramonti, ‘anger and those things which stir up anger lay bare the soul’,\textsuperscript{110} limiting the effectiveness of strategies of dis/simulation. Other ways of uncovering a person’s true nature included the art of rhetoric and persuasion, ‘punishment’ and rewards.\textsuperscript{111} Chiaramonti also regarded the state of intoxication, in which all inhibitions were set aside,\textsuperscript{112} as ‘an efficient way of laying bare minds, so long as it is licit’.\textsuperscript{113} The most reliable sign of dis/simulation, however, was a sudden outburst of emotion: ‘The mark of an erupting passion is a more truthful indication of the mind than the opposite meaning which the person observed deliberately uses.’\textsuperscript{114}

Being ‘overly artificial and affected’, according to Chiaramonti, was ‘evidence of a feigned character and of simulation’.\textsuperscript{115} He was aware, nevertheless, of regional cultural differences, noting that Neapolitans, for instance, tended to express themselves with exuberant gestures and speech, which therefore lacked the significance these might otherwise have.\textsuperscript{116} There were also, however, ‘people who contracted this same

\textsuperscript{110}Chiaramonti, \textit{De coniectandis morbis}, p. 366: ‘Iram etiam, et quae iram concitant, animum denudare.’


\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., pp. 344 and 367.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., p. 370: ‘Vino grassari ad denudandos animos est via efficax, modo liceat.’ The truth-inducing properties of wine were well known in antiquity; see, e.g., Horace, \textit{Epistles}, I.xviii.37–38: ‘arcanum neque tu scrutaberis ullius unquam; commissumque teges et vino tortus et ira’, which sums up concisely the two effective modes of disclosing secrets of the mind discussed by Chiaramonti and his successors.

\textsuperscript{114}Chiaramonti, \textit{De coniectandis morbis}, p. 375: ‘Verius est inditium animi nota erumpentis affectus, quam significatio contraria, qua ex proposito observatus homo utitur.’

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., p. 372: ‘Nimium artificiosa, affectataque significatio affectus, aut moris fictionis, ac simulationis est argumentum.’

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.: ‘nunc Neapolitani vehementis conatu, et vocis, et vultus, et manuum, ac reliqui corporis ad exprimenda sensa sua utuntur: ex eo usu fit, ut quae affectata significatio in aliis esset, in ipsis nequaquam sit’.
affectedness of expression out of habit’. Chiaramonti concluded that it was important to observe factors such as the habits and cultural background of a person in order to be able to establish whether someone really was affected, producing ‘a just suspicion of simulation’.

Since each of the methods suggested by Chiaramonti might not be sufficiently telling in itself and since many of them aimed at uncovering the same type of simulation, he advised readers to conduct their enquiry by proceeding through all the methods he had set out. His account of dis/simulation contained a far greater wealth of detail than any earlier discussions, without, however, promising a universal key which would unlock all of humankind’s hidden and feigned passions and emotions. Our inner life or, more specifically our ‘deceits, simulations and dissimulations’, he stated, are truly visible ‘solely to the divine eye’, while, as far as we are concerned, ‘they can only be guessed at and investigated by means of probable conjectures’.

Chiaramonti’s perception of the opacity of the human mind and body was shared by other seventeenth-century intellectuals. It was widely held that the discrepancy between our inner and outer lives had been decreed by God and was therefore natural rather than a product of human wit or cunning. Torquato Accetto concluded his treatise Della dissimulazione onesta by remarking that only heaven was entirely free of

117 Ibid.: ‘Sunt etiam persone aliquae, quae eandem expressionis affectationem ex more contraxerunt.’

118 Ibid.: ‘iustam simulationis suspicionem affert’.

119 Ibid., p. 383: ‘Cum plura methodi capita ad eandem fictionem deprehendendam conspiraverint, praestat per omnia eius indaginem procedere.’


121 See, e.g., Camillo Baldi, Congressi civili, nei quali con precetti morali, et politici si mostra il modo facile d’acquistare, e conservare gli amici, Florence, 1637, p. 27: ‘È coperto il cuore de gl’huomini di molta carne … che l’intimo del nostro cuore à niuno deve scoprisi.’

122 See, e.g., Christian Georg Bessel, Neuer politischer Glücks-Schmied, Frankfurt am Main, 1681, p. 358. Gracián, who showed in his monumental allegorical novel El Criticón (1651–1657) that what goes on inside human beings can never be fully disclosed, postulated that all social interaction was similarly opaque; see Geitner, Die Sprache der Verstellung, p. 113.
Yet, although Chiaramonti also held these views, he was not completely pessimistic about the hermeneutic potential of the *ars conjectandi*. Like Sanches before him, he maintained that, through the cognitive interpretation of facial expressions and a number of other factors, the prudent man will be able, at least to some extent, to unmask human feigning and discern the subtle and transitory nature of facial expressions: ‘if, despite the perseverance of the veil of feigned passion, the truth may in part emerge, a wise and trained eye is needed in order for the ray of truth to be discerned among the clouds of simulation’.

Chiaramonti produced one of the most extensive – though not the most intellectually inspiring – accounts of dis/simulation in the early modern period. It was neither an elaborate advice book for courtiers, nor a practical guide for prudent rulers, nor a sententious manual on worldly wisdom. It was not as intriguingly obscure and subtle as Accetto’s treatise, and it was less captivating and appealing than Gracián’s skilfully written and ingenious aphorisms, which breathe the air of Spanish Baroque *conceptismo*. Nonetheless, it is an interesting and important treatise which deserves a place in the intellectual and cultural history of dis/simulation. It provides a monolithic and coherent discussion of a subject which was otherwise (apart from Accetto’s treatise) widely dispersed and scattered throughout a variety of heterogeneous texts. The work’s rather conventional scholarly form and tone, moreover, probably gives us a better idea of how dis/simulation was understood and debated in established academic contexts than we get by looking at it from the vantage point of controversial and polemical literature.

6.6. The ‘art of knowing men’ in seventeenth-century France

Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669), *médecin ordinaire* to Louis XIV and an early member of the Académie Française (as well as the Académie des Sciences), was an influential scholar who worked on a great variety of subjects, including philosophy,

123 See Torquato Accetto, *Della dissimulazione onesta*, ed. by Salvatore Silvano Nigro, Turin, 1997, pp. 19–20 (‘La simulazione non facilmente riceve quel senso onesto che si accompagna con la dissimulazione’).

124 Chiaramonti, *De coniectandis moribus*, p. 347: ‘si enim perseverante adhuc velo simulati affectus, verus per partem emergat, sagaci opus est oculo, et instructo, ut inter simulationis nubes veritatis radius dijudicitur.’
medicine, chiromancy, human psychology, the natural history of animals, colours and optics. Yet, for all his extensive and versatile intellectual activities and his widely disseminated writings, Cureau remains an enigmatic character about whom relatively little is known. He was the most famous and respected physiognomist of his time, and his physiognomical treatise *L’art de connoistre les hommes* (1659–69) enjoyed great success in Europe. Another important and closely related work was his monumental five-volume study of human physiology, *Les characteres des passions* (1640–62). In this attempt to unite medical knowledge with politics and morals, he systematically analysed human passions and discussed the difficulties and problems in understanding them.

Cureau represents a type of intellectual and author different from the university-based scholar we saw in Chiaramonti. He was fully integrated into the élite and aristocratic circles of Paris and its famous salons. Cureau was a man of the world, and it is hardly surprising that his essentially practical manual, which taught the art of knowing people, was well received among the upper social classes and the ranks of the worldly, who were aware of the need for (false) self-fashioning and for various forms of self-control in society. This was the cultural and intellectual context in which authors such as La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyère wrote their maxims and sententious reflections on the society of their day and in which Le Brun attempted to establish his

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126 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, *Les characteres des passions*, I, Amsterdam, 1658, sig. **2r**: ‘Ce que je donne icy n’est qu’une petite partie d’un grand dessein, où je veux examiner les Passions, les Vertus, et les Vices, les Moeurs et les Costumes des Peuples, les diverses Inclinations des hommes, leurs Temperaments, les Traicts de leur visage; en un mot où je pretends mettre ce que la Medicine, la Morale et la Politique ont de plus rare et de plus excellent.’

127 The practical value of the treatise was highlighted by the frontispiece of the first French edition of 1640, which, in the background, showed a group of men (possibly from a courtly context) in conversation and, in the foreground, a scholar sitting in his *studiolo* engaged in the study of physiognomy.
nomenclature of human passions and their visual manifestations. Cureau’s physiognomy, however, went beyond the higher echelons of society, reaching a wide and heterogeneous readership in several European countries.128

There are scarcely a new idea in Cureau’s treatise, much less a revolutionary one. A synthesis of established physiognomical tenets – such as the notion that the humours and temperaments become manifest and legible through specific corporeal signifiers – it was very much a work of its day. Although the treatise included a chapter on the usefulness of physiognomy for the art of knowing men,129 Cureau considered this discipline to be only one part of the science set out in what he claimed to be ‘the largest and most useful work which has ever been undertaken’.130 He did not limit his discussion to the study of external physical traits, emphasising that a number of other criteria such as the social background of a person and the specific communicative context also needed to be considered.131 His art thus went beyond purely physiognomical categories by integrating prudent observation of psychological and social factors. This, once again, is reminiscent of precepts in the medical and medico-legal literature of the seventeenth century.

Cureau explained that, when prying into the hidden realms of the human mind and body, one has to proceed from the known to the unknown and make deductions

128 See Sturdy, Science and Social Status, p. 94. The preface to a German translation, Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Die Kunst und die Art die Menschen zu erkennen, Frankfurt am Main, 1668, sig. A2r, promoted Cureau’s treatise as a very useful guide to ‘bourgeois life’ (‘Bürgerliche Leben’), including the ‘education of children’ and the ‘selection of servants’ (‘Unterweisung von Kindern’, ‘Auswahl der Diener’); see also sig. A2v, where the ars conjectandi is described as the ‘most beautiful and most useful science’ (‘schönste und notwendigste Wissenschaft’), which is essential for prudent behaviour in everyday life. The widespread interest in the art of knowing men and decoding their external appearances, along with the success of Cureau’s text, did not escape the attention of contemporary authors, some of whom gave their works fashionable titles recalling the ars conjectandi: see, e.g., Jean-Baptiste Morvan de Bellegarde, L’art de connaitre les hommes, Amsterdam, 1709, a generic work which does not live up to its appealing title and its associations with practical wisdom.

129 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, L’art de connoistre des hommes, Paris 1663, pp. 314–324: ‘Comment l’Art de connoistre les Hommes employe les Regles de la Physiognomie.’

130 Ibid., p. 2: ‘le plus grand ouvrage et le plus utile qui ait peut-estre iamais entrepris’.

131 Ibid., p. 191.
from the external effect to the temperament or, in other words, from effect to cause. There are certain means, he tells us, to achieve this goal, and these ‘are called signs, because they mark and show the things which are obscure’.132 Without dwelling on the complexities of the subject, Cureau offered a practical and straightforward account of corporal signs and guidelines on how to read them. Referring to the pseudo-Aristotelian Physiognomies,133 he listed nine ‘natural signs’ (‘signes naturels’), including movement, composure, colour, gaze, voice and so on,134 and he carefully distinguished a number of temporary and permanent signifiers and then discussed their different epistemological values.135

For Cureau, dis/simulation constituted a crucial problem. He began by stating that ‘there are two kinds of action of the soul: those which are bare and appear as they are, and those which are deceitful and covered by dissimulation’.136 To uncover these disguises, he continues, ‘it takes great effort, for it [i.e., dissimulation] is not only found in the body of the action, but also in the end which is veiled by various pretences’.137

After making a distinction between exterior and interior actions, which had been the starting-point for Chiaramonti’s discussion of dis/simulation, Cureau warns readers that ‘among actions, the exterior ones can be concealed under contrary appearances, and the

132 Ibid., p. 163: ‘Et ces Moyens sont appellez Signes, parce qu’ils marquent et designent les choses qui sont obscures.’


134 Cureau, L’art de connoistre, pp. 168–169.

135 Ibid., p. 171; see also p. 185: ‘Mais parce que tous ces Signes ne donnent pas une connoissance égale des choses ausquelles elles se rapportent, et qu’il y en a qui les designent avec plus certitude les uns que les autres, il en faut soigneusement examiner la Force, et la Foiblesse.’

136 Ibid., p. 326: ‘il y a en general deux sortes d’actions de l’Ame, les unes qui sont nuës et telles que’elles parouissent, les autres qui sont trompeuses et couvertes de la dissimulation’.

137 Ibid, p. 327: ‘Quant aux autres qui sont couvertes de la Dissimulation, il y a bien plus de peine à les découvrir, car elle ne se trouve pas seulement dans le corps de l’Action, mais aussi dans la Fin que l’on voile de divers pretextes.’

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interior ones, which are thoughts and passions, can easily be dissimulated’. 138 This is not
the only issue on which Cureau owed a great deal to Chiaramonti, though without ever
citing him explicitly.

Yet, while the content of his work might have been similar to Chiaramonti’s
chapter on dis/simulation, the form was not. Cureau’s discussion was far less detailed
and much more concise. It was not intended to be a scholarly disquisition, but rather a
handy manual, accessible to a miscellaneous lay audience. Not engaging with technical
questions and their ramifications, Cureau included only the most relevant practicalities
connected to dis/simulation, 139 which, he explained, ‘is created with words, with the
face and with effects, whether employed separately or all together’. 140 Again following
Chiaramonti, Cureau summed up twelve methods of detecting disguise, many of them
relying on passive observation such as searching for behavioural inconsistencies and
contradictions or considering what type of person is performing the actions in question:
whether the individual has a reputation for being sincere or, instead, for dissembling and
whether he is a social inferior. 141 It is also necessary to scrutinise ‘the person towards
whom someone acts, whether it is a man who is feared (prince, master)’. 142 The other
methods involved the active forms of influence and pressure (persuasion, rewards,
alcohol, torture and suchlike) suggested by Chiaramonti. So, although dis/simulation
posed a considerable challenge for Cureau, he believed that his conjectural art could, in
the end, cope with it: ‘ultimately, there is no dissimulation so profound that it is not

138 Ibid.: ‘Entre les Actions, les exterieures se peuvent cacher sous apparences contraires, et les
Interieures qui sont les Pensées, et les Passions, peuvent estre facilement dissimulées.’

139 Cureau does not maintain a clear division between the two terms, nor does he explain clearly which of
the two concepts he has in mind in specific contexts.

140 Cureau, L’art de connoistre, p. 328: ‘dissimulation … se fert de la parole, du visage, et des effets, soit
qu’elle les employe separément ou tous ensemble’.

141 Ibid.: ‘est de considerer la personne qui agit, comme si c’est un homme timide ou hardy, s’il est en
reputation d’estre sincere ou dissimulé, si c’est un inferieur qui parle’.

142 Ibid., pp. 328–329: ‘10. Et la personne envers laquelle on agit, comme si c’est un homme que l’on
redoute (Prince, Maistre).’ The final two points are: ‘11. Enfin on reconnoist encore la feinte par le
mouvement subit d’une Passion qui éclate, et découvre ce qu’il y a dans l’Ame, telle qu’est la Colere, 12.
La Ioye.’
believed to be possible to penetrate it’.  

Cureau was not the only French seventeenth-century intellectual to be concerned with the problem of dis/simulation in connection to human passions. Almost twenty years earlier, Jean-François Senault (1601–72) had published *De l’usage des passions* (1641), a comprehensive treatise on human passions and moral psychology, which enjoyed numerous reprints and which is thought to have influenced Descartes’s seminal analysis of human passions. For our purposes, the fifth part of Senault’s text is the most interesting. Employing a semantically charged vocabulary, reminiscent of Chiaramonti’s terminology and Accetto’s prose, Senault turned his attention to the problem of dis/simulation. He regarded language as the primary tool of deceit, and he stressed the usefulness of the conjectural arts in matters of the state. Yet Senault, too, was well aware of the limits of physiognomical inference, which he linked to practical wisdom: prudence, he wrote, ‘prides itself on seeing far into the future’, but at the same time ‘is to a very great extent impeded from discovering the intentions [of man]’. Senault did not, however, expand on this problem. His aim was primarily to

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143 Ibid., p. 329: ‘Enfin il n’y a point de dissimulation si profonde où il ne croye pouvoir penetrer.’


145 Senault, e.g., repeatedly uses the metaphor or light and darkness, and he speaks of abysses and veils to convey the opacity of the human heart; see Jean-François Senault, *De l’usage des passions*, ed. by Christiane Frément, Paris, 1987, p. 137: ‘Aussi tous les biens de l’homme sont enfermez dans son Coeur … . Mais comme les abysms sont des lieux obscurs que la lumiere du Soleil ne peut Eclarer, et où l’horreur et la nuict semblent avoir chiosi leur sejour, ainsi le Coeur de l’homme est environné de tenebres qu’on ne sçavroit dissiper; et tous les sentiments qu’il conçoit sont si cachez, qu’on n’a que foibles conjectures pour les deviner.’

146 See, e.g., ibid., p. 137: ‘les paroles ne sont pas toûjours les fideles images de ces conceptions’.

147 Ibid., pp. 137–138: ‘le plus grand ouvrage que puisse un homme d’Etat, c’est quand par son adresse il tâche de lire dans un Coeur dissimulé, et d’y remarquer des pensées qu’on luy veut celer’. Two decades later, John Davies also praised the value of physiognomy for politics and public business in the dedicatory letter to his English translation of Cureau’s treatise; see Chambre, *The Art How to Know Men*, sig. A4r–v.

148 Senault, *De l’usage des passions*, p. 138: ‘La Prudence humaine que se vante de penetrer bien avant dans l’avenir, est extrêmement empêchée à découvrir les intentions… .’ At the beginning of the chapter, p. 137, Senault also speaks of ‘foible conjectures’, suggesting the limits of the *ars conjectandi*. 
offer an exhaustive analysis of human passions, not a detailed discussion of dis/simulation and the *ars conjectandi*. He therefore confined himself to pointing out that, since passions are not under our conscious control, they are the best key to unlocking our hidden inner life,¹⁴⁹ for ‘once a passion is unsettled, it is impossible to keep it secret’.¹⁵⁰ As we have seen, this view was very much the consensus of the time.

6.7. The rise of the *ars conjectandi* in Germany around 1700

Physiognomical debates on dis/simulation by no means came to an end in the seventeenth century, continuing well into the epoch of the early Enlightenment. German authors, in particular, developed a keen interest in the subject, with discussions of dis/simulation rising to a peak in Germany around 1700.¹⁵¹ These debates are beyond the timeframe of this dissertation and therefore cannot be investigated in detail; I do not, however, want to limit the scope of my study by leaving them out entirely. Moreover, in many respects, they continue on directly from earlier discussions of the *ars conjectandi*: there are a number of parallels and intertextual connections between physiognomical treatises written almost two centuries apart. In this section, therefore, I shall briefly analyse one particularly telling example of the ideas and attitudes found in German works on dis/simulation and the *ars conjectandi* from the early Enlightenment, placing it in the context of earlier European physiognomical debates about feigning and pretending.¹⁵²

As we have seen, Julius Bernhard von Rohr, in his *Traktat von der Liebe* (1717), provided an interesting and thoughtful discussion of the parameters, limits and

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¹⁴⁹ Ibid.: ‘de toutes ces voyes, je n’en trouve point de plus facile ny de plus assurée que celle des Passions, car elles échappent contre nostre volonté, elles nous trahissent par leur promptitude et leur legereté’.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 140: ‘Depuis qu’une passion est déréglée, il est impossible de la tenir secrete.’

¹⁵¹ One reason for this interest in Germany was very likely the devastation caused by the Thirty Years War. In addition, many earlier European texts on worldly wisdom and dis/simulation became available in German versions in the second half of the seventeenth century – though the publication of these translations could be seen as a consequence of the rising interest in the subject in the German-speaking world rather than a factor which triggered and facilitated its development.

¹⁵² For a detailed analysis, see Geitner, *Die Sprache der Verstellung*, pp. 124–148.
possibilities of dis/simulation in connection with love, amorous feelings and passions.\textsuperscript{153} He also devoted attention to the problem of feigning and dissembling in his earlier treatise, \textit{Unterricht von der Kunst der Menschen Gemüther zu erforschen} (1714), in which he presented an art for the examination of the human mind. According to him, this art consisted of an ‘ability of the mind to deduce the inclinations of a person from a few characteristics, either with certainty or only with probability’.\textsuperscript{154} The \textit{ars conjectandi} was, therefore, a subtle battle of wits, in which one mind tries to scrutinise another. The application of this art required sharp observational skills, prudence and a certain mental agility or flexible disposition of the mind. Importantly, von Rohr defined physiognomy as an ‘art and not a science’,\textsuperscript{155} which merely allowed \textit{a posteriori} conclusions grounded in probability.\textsuperscript{156} Assessing the limitations of physiognomical theory, he insisted that only inclinations and passions could be discerned, while another person’s thoughts and inner life remained a ‘reservatum divinum’.\textsuperscript{157} Von Rohr severely criticised a number of physiognomical tracts by his contemporaries, including Chiaramonti, about whom he – not without a reason – noted: ‘he deals with simulation and dissimulation in the ninth chapter [of his treatise] but makes so many unnecessary divisions and sections that, having read all of them, one no longer knows anything about the rules’.\textsuperscript{158}

On one point, however, von Rohr did not differ from previous authors, maintaining that the ‘two main problems encountered when examining the minds of

\textsuperscript{153} See Chapter 4 above, section 4.6.


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.: ‘Kunst, und nicht eine Wissenschaft’.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., sig. A1‘.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., sig. A3‘.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., sig. B2‘: ‘Im neunten Buche handelt er von der Stellung und Verstellung, macht aber so viele unnütze Eintheilungen und Absätze, daß man, wenn dieselbigen alle gelesen, von den Regeln nichts mehr weiß.’

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men are simulation and dissimulation, followed by the volatility of human inclinations.\textsuperscript{159} Dis/simulation, he noted, result in and was considerably facilitated by the variety of different humours and inclinations.\textsuperscript{160} Displaying a considerable level of psychological insight, von Rohr gave a list of reasons for resorting to dis/simulation, including the desire to adapt to someone else’s humours, whether motivated by esteem, disgust or even hatred of that person or by respect for, or fear of, someone belonging to a higher social rank.\textsuperscript{161} Among these motivations, fear, in his view, was the principal driving force behind dis/simulation.\textsuperscript{162} Von Rohr was aware of the parameters and conditions of social interaction and communication, pointing out that even those belonging to the higher echelons of society sometimes resorted to feigning and disguise when dealing with servants in order to maintain their good reputation or simply out of vanity.\textsuperscript{163} What is more, he identified dis/simulation as an everyday phenomenon, which could even be found in children, who ‘simulate in the presence of their parents and teachers, for whom they feel fear and respect’.\textsuperscript{164} Parents, he counselled, should take

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\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., sig. B8:\textsuperscript{r} ‘Die zwei vornehmsten Hindernisse, welche man bei der Erforschung der menschlichen Gemüther antrifft, sind wohl die Stellung und Verstellung, und nach diesen die Unberständigkeit derer menschlichen Neigungen.’

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid: ‘Wenn alle Leute in der Welt einerlei humeur und Neigungen hätten, so würden die Menschen nicht so leicht simuliren und dissimuliren.’

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., sigs C1\textsuperscript{r}–C3\textsuperscript{r}, esp. sig. C2\textsuperscript{r}, where Von Rohr mentions, as examples, parishioners in front of their priest, soldiers in front of their commanding officers and pupils in front of their teachers.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., sig. C5\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., sig. C2\textsuperscript{r}: ‘Also verstellen sich Kinder im Beisein ihrer Eltern und Lehrmeister, vor die sie Furcht und Respect haben.’ See also the reference to feigning and lying among children in the pedagogical treatise of Lorenzo Palmireno, \textit{Tratado de la buena crianza en el niño del aldea}, Valencia, 1568, pp. 12–13: ‘Si el niño lleva nuevas al padre, o a la madre contra el Maestro, no lo crea; por que muchas veces mienten, por vengarse de los acotes que recibieron: pensando, despídan este, y tomaran otro que sera mas benigno. Pero por que alguna vez podría ser verdad, aun que le padre al hijo, quitateme delante, no me vengas con essas mentiras.’ Palmireno (1524–1579), a Valencian humanist and follower of Juan Luis Vives, goes on to say that the prudent father who intends to find out whether the child is telling the truth or merely pretending, has to use great prudence and to disguise his plan: ‘ydo el niño, con gran condura y disimulacion informese de lo que passa, para que prudentemente, si algo hay, provea en el remedio.’ This
great care in observing their offspring, ideally in unguarded moments, ‘since otherwise
they will not easily be able to examine the minds of devious children, who can be great
dissimulators’.  

Concerned, above all, with the practical implementation of his insights, von
Rohr listed a number of ways to detect dis/simulation, most of which can already be
found, in very similar words, in the works of Chiaramonti and Cureau. Although, like
Sanches and Cureau, he expressed his firm belief in the capacity of expert
physiognomists to read other people, he nevertheless admitted that ‘it cannot be denied
and is confirmed by experience that it is not always possible to discover simulations and
dissimulations’. Von Rohr’s anatomy of human behaviour forms an important point in
the history of the discourse of dis/simulation. It is especially interesting because it links
early modern and Enlightenment thought. On the one hand, Von Rohr’s account was in
many ways indebted to the previous literature on the subject, with which he was well
acquainted; and it is also shows that debates about dis/simulation did not come to an end
at the turn of the eighteenth century – at any rate not in Germany. On the other hand,

advice, however, applied only to boys, since Palmireno added, p. 13, that fathers should not listen to
similar complaints made by daughters, since these are always feigned; see p. 13: ‘Si las mocas de casa
dizen algo mal del Maestro, no las crea, que son enemigas de hombres recogidos, antes procure tener en
casa al que ellas persiguen, si la riña es fingida.’ This sweeping generalisation betrays the gender-based
dimension of the early modern notion of dis/simulation.

165 Von Rohr, Unterricht, sig. C2r: ‘Denn sonst werden sie nicht leicht die Gemüther der verschlagenen
Kinder, und die sehr dissimulieren können, erforschen.’

166 He advised readers to pay particular attention, e.g., when there were inconsistencies between a
person’s words and deeds (ibid., sigs C5v–C6r), when someone was overcome by a passion, resulting in a
lack of self-control (sigs C6r–C7v) and when alcohol had been consumed (sig. C7v). Of the authors I have
examined, von Rohr is the only one to point out that inebriation needs to be treated carefully, since wine
modifies behaviour to such an extent that it might mislead the observer. For von Rohr, sig. D2v, the ars
conjectandi entails detailed scrutiny of a person, including ‘all ihre Minen, alle ihre Worte und actiones’.

167 Ibid., D3v: ‘[so] ist es nicht zu läugnen, und wird solches auch die Erfahrung bestätigt, daß es
unmöglich sei, das simuliierte und dissimulierte Wesen allezeit zu entdecken’. Von Rohr, however, also
mentions some limitations to dis/simulation, e.g., sig. D1v, our inability to keep up a simulation over a
long period of time.

168 Another work worth noting is Johann Daniel Longolius, Wahrhaftiger Temperamentist, Oder
unbetrügliche Kunde der Menschen Gemüther, Bautzen, 1716, which further disseminated the ars
von Rohr approached this problematic subject, to an even greater extent than his predecessors, from a decidedly neutral perspective, refraining from speaking about, as he put it, the *Moralität*, ‘morality’, of dis/simulation. Finally, his scepticism deserves mention. Realistically acknowledging the limitations of our ability to discern dis/simulation, he broke with the century-long physiognomical tradition, which, in its normative classificatory system, promised to provide an infallible key to the inner life of human beings. Assessing established physiognomical methods, German authors of the early eighteenth century argued that the supposedly *a priori* conclusions and physiognomical syllogisms, in reality, ran counter to any form of prudence.

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170 This scepticism was also grounded in the general criticism of the inconsistencies and contradictions of the theory of humors and temperaments, which began to be voiced in the 1720s in Germany. The first fundamental criticism was formulated in Gottlob Haenisius’s dissertation *Meditatio philosophica de temperamentis*, Leipzig, 1712; see Geitner, *Die Sprache der Verstellung*, p. 138.

171 See Geitner, *Die Sprache der Verstellung*, p. 141. See, however, Johann Gottfried Gregorius, *Curieuxer Affecten-Spiegel, oder auserlesene Cautelen und sonderbare Maximen die Gemütber der Menschen zu erforschen, und sich dadurch vorsichtig und behutsam aufzuführen*, Frankfurt am Main, 1715, which, as is clear from the title, continued to unite the ideal of worldly wisdom with physiognomical
6.8. Relinquishing the *ars conjectandi* – The summit of prudence?

The desire to unravel people’s secret thoughts and feelings occupied many early modern thinkers throughout Europe. Approaches and opinions might have differed, but they had one thing in common: the seemingly relentless effort to disclose what was hidden, either by nature or by conscious choice, in human beings. There was one author, however, who bucked this trend: the little-known Jesuit, Antonio de Castro (1621–1684).\(^{172}\) His 1676 treatise *Fisionomia de la virtud y del vicio al natural sin colores ni artificios* was well received among the upper social ranks in Spain, prompting de Castro to add a second part.\(^{173}\) The *Fisionomia* of the title might seem misleading, as the treatise does not belong to the genre of physiognomical treatises in the narrow sense. It is nonetheless relevant in this context because de Castro produced an exhaustive work of moral philosophy on the nature of human virtues and vices, covering a wide range of topics and subjects related to physiognomy.

It is not surprising that the notion of dis/simulation, which permeated Spanish seventeenth-century moral and political literature, was discussed at length by de Castro.\(^{174}\) His perception of this problem was also representative of the early modern era: dis/simulation was a ‘malice’ (‘malicia’) of his time and, simultaneously, the ‘ordinary condition of men’ (‘la ordinaria condicion de los hombres’).\(^{175}\) To make matters worse, disclosing disguises and pretences ‘has always been not only a difficult but also a dangerous endeavour’.\(^{176}\) Although de Castro did not present a detailed

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\(^{172}\) Although he is not included in the *Diccionario histórico de la compañía de Jesús*, ed. by Charles O’Neill and Joaquin Dominguez, Madrid, 2001, there is a short entry on him in the *Biblioteca de escritores de la Compañía de Jesús pertenecientes a la antigua asistencia de España*, ed. by José E. Uriarte and Mariano Lecina, II, Madrid, 1929–30, pp. 181–182.

\(^{173}\) The title of the second part is: *Fisionomia de la virtud, y del vicio, al natural, sin colores, ni artificios. Segunda parte*, Valladolid, 1678.


\(^{175}\) Ibid., pp. 9 and 11; see also p. 92: ‘De un mismo tronco son las ramas, la malicia, y su disimulacion.’ On p. 273, de Castro discribed dis/simulation as ‘hija del pecado’.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., p. 124: ‘fue siempre intento no solo dificil, sino peligroso’.
physiognomical theory, he was nevertheless aware of the *ars conjectandi*. Like a number of authors before him, he established that passions, above all ‘anger and vengeance’, impose natural limits on dis/simulation.\(^{177}\) Having established this fundamental axiom, however, de Castro departed from the path taken by so many early modern physiognomists. Rather than discussing the various strategies of the conjectural art, he took the unusual step of urging his readers to consider whether it was even advisable to attempt to disclose the hidden thoughts and passions of others.

De Castro made it clear that ‘there is no knocking on the door of dissimulation without a response of anger’,\(^{178}\) and that ‘no greater annoyance can be caused than through making a malicious dissimulator reveal his intention’\(^{179}\). A man desperately concealing something in his heart resembles a ‘snake which has been irritated’ (‘serpiente irrittada’), and its poison is the dis/simulation.\(^{180}\) Going a step further, he concluded that ‘someone who preserves peace in [human] interaction and family affairs’ should perhaps, at times, ‘tolerate dissimulation and play the deceived’.\(^{181}\) Here, simulation becomes a legitimate and justified instrument to protect oneself prudently from possible attacks by others whose disguises have been unveiled. Although disclosing someone’s secrets was, in general, a noble act which might help to obliterate the ubiquitous vice of dis/simulation, de Castro did not promote the *ars conjectandi*, but instead made a plea for discretion and even tolerance of other people’s disguises. This

\(^{177}\) Ibid., pp. 100–110, at p. 100: ‘La ira, y la vengança es la passion, que sobresale sin saberse desimular [sic]’; see also p. 117: ‘La ambición suele ser mal encubierto.’

\(^{178}\) Ibid., p. 127: ‘No se llama a la puerta de la dissimulacion, para que no responda con enfado.’

\(^{179}\) Ibid.: ‘el mayor enojo, que se puede hazer a un dissimulado malicioso, sera sacar a la luz su intencion’.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., p. 125: ‘Viva con su veneno el dissimulado: para que se quiere que le salga del pecho, sino para que nos le escupe en la cara?’

\(^{181}\) Ibid., p. 128: ‘Tolerare la dissimulacion y dese por engañado tal vez, quien trata de conservar la paz en las correspondencia, y familiaridades.’ De Castro, p. 129, went on to discuss the problem of dis/simulation and love in marriage, emphasising the usefulness of concealment on the part of the husband. His main point of reference was Micah 7:5: ‘Ab ea, quae dormit in sinu tuo custodi clastra oris tui’, which was, he concluded, ‘la prudente circunspeccion, con que se han de recatar los secretos del coraçcon a la esposa’.
was essentially, I believe, a form of prudence and raison-de-soi-même.\textsuperscript{182} Penetrating the hidden realms of the human mind and heart might entail unpleasant and serious consequences. Not merely silence, but also a Stoic acceptance of pretence and dis/simulation characterised the prudent man. In adopting this unprecedented stance, de Castro made what appears to be a unique contribution to early modern discourse on the art of conjecture.

6.9. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to study the link between the discourses of dis/simulation and physiognomy in early modern Europe, showing that the notion of dis/simulation has a firm place in the cultural history of European physiognomical thought. Certain notions such as the eyes as the mirror of, or window onto, the hidden depths of the soul and the epistemological value of facial expressions and physical manifestations like blushing and turning pale were already well-established topoi in ancient and medieval literature. Encapsulated in age-old proverbial wisdom and part of common knowledge, the correspondence between mankind’s interior and exterior, as revealed through visual manifestations, and, consequently, the legibility of the human face were by no means novel ideas in the early modern era. Late medieval inquisitorial manuals, for example, advised examiners to pay close attention to specific signa corporis, from which a careful observer could deduce information about the physiological and psychological condition of the person under interrogation.\textsuperscript{183} The hermeneutical practice of reading and decoding visual manifestations – a kind of corporal semiotics – was not, however, limited to technical handbooks intended for an exclusive group of specialists. The Florentine humanist Matteo Palmieri (1406–1475), for example, in his 1429 treatise \textit{Vita civile}, referred to the interpretative potential of facial expressions and physiological reactions such as blushing and warned readers not to expose their thoughts and emotions through these involuntary ‘piccoli cenni’.\textsuperscript{184} In

\textsuperscript{182} In this regard, de Castro anticipates to some extent Helmut Plessner’s lucid philosophical-anthropological work, \textit{Die Grenzen der Gemeinschaft}, Bonn, 1924, with its plea for discretion and for private individual space and dissimulation.


\textsuperscript{184} Matteo Palmieri, \textit{Vita civile}, ed. Gino Belloni, Florence, 1982, p. 95: ‘Spesso adviene che per piccoli
the context of a treatise on civic life, this statement indicated that face-reading pertained to private individuals, that physiognomical observation had an important social function and that, as we have seen, it was linked to the notion of prudence.¹⁸⁵

Palmieri did not, however, problematise the limits of the cognitive interpretation of facial expressions, nor did he discuss the problem of dis/simulation. It was only from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards that a fully fledged physiognomical discourse on these issues began to develop. Physiognomists played an integral role in these discussions and were painfully aware of the ambiguous nature of the human visage as a dual system which simultaneously affirmed and denied the semiotics of facial expression. Fuchs and Ingeber assessed the notion of the face as an infallible doorway to hidden truths about people,¹⁸⁶ while the pseudonymous author of the Centifrons,

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¹⁸⁵ For another interesting reference to physiognomical inference, see Palmireno, Tratado de la buena crianza en el niño del aldea, p. 86: ‘Procurar quando tratas con alguno, que de tus ojos no se pueda colegir alguna falta de tu juizio, aunque Ciceron [Cf. Letters to Quntius, I.v.15] dize: Vultus saepe fallit. Y el Satyrico [cf. Juvenal, Satires, II.8]: Fronti non esse fidendum. Y el Epigrammatario [cf. Martial, Epigrams, I.25]: Nolite fronti credere, quia eam nemo non fingere potest. Biante uno delos siete Sabios siempre dezia: Mirad la cara del hombre, conocerlo heys.’ Palmireno blended his lessons on polite and civil behaviour (rules for wiping one’s nose, coughing, speech, laughter etc.) with physiognomical precepts, e.g., p. 8, on the eyes and the gaze: ‘Si los meneas mucho a una parte y a otra, ternante por loco: si muy abiertos, por bovo’; he also referred, ibid., to the physiognomy dissemblers: ‘las sobrecejas … decantadas hazia los pulsos, dissimulando, y burlador’. This passage shows that physiognomy was not limited to specialists on the subject but was part of the shared knowledge of learned men of the time. For another reference to the limits of physiognomical inference, see Jean Figon Le Moyen d’eviter proces: fait pour l’utilité des marchans et autres négociateurs, Lyon, 1574, sig. B3°: ‘In consilia simulanteis, ut maius lucrum consequantur: Usus apud veteres laruae fuit ante secunda / Quam famulis manibus mensa remota foret. / Causidicis nostris larua licet plurimis uti, / Tempore quo liebeat, quo liebeat que loco. / Verba solent multi vulgo simulata referre, / Ulla nec est fronti nunc adhibenda fides.’

¹⁸⁶ Fuchs, Metoposcopia, sig. A5', and Ingeber, Chiromantia, p. 116. Interestingly, none of the authors examined in this chapter commented on the problem of cosmetics as a tool of dis/simulation. The use of
published in 1661, weighed up the two opposing proverbial expressions, ‘fronti nulla fides’ (‘fair face, foul heart’) and ‘fronti multa fides’ (‘fair face, fair heart’), eventually endorsing the former.\(^{187}\) The notion of dis/simulation was at the heart of these discussions from around 1600 – precisely when European debates on feigning and disguise reached their peak. This new interest in and concern with dis/simulation in early modern physiognomical works demonstrates, yet again, that this notion permeated a wide range of social and intellectual contexts and literary genres. The example of physiognomical thought also shows how this subject shaped and linked various contemporary, but otherwise disconnected, discourses.\(^{188}\)

Dis/simulation was an issue which physiognomists had to take seriously. Nonetheless, as we have seen, some evaded this problem by resorting to the study of fixed and unchangeable bodily and facial features. In search of clues to dis/simulation, other authors like Chiaramonti delved into the core questions of semiotics and hermeneutics, incorporating pathognomical observation, together with a prudent consideration of various external factors such as apparel and the social and communicative context, into their ‘art of knowing men’. In order to establish careful and subtle assumptions about the characters and passions of others, these writers insisted that it was necessary, for example, to pay close attention to physiological and

makeup by women was discussed in a number of early modern handbooks, most famously, Giovanni Marinelli’s *Gli ornamenti delle donne*, Venice, 1562, which gave detailed instructions on the ingredients and methods needed for making cosmetics.

\(^{187}\) See Johann Praetorius, pseudonym [i.e., Hans Schultze], *Centifrons idolum Jani hoc est: metoposcoopia, seu prosopomantia*, Jena, 1661, pp. 884–885.

\(^{188}\) Another revealing example is the early modern genre of literary sketches, in which dis/simulation also became a problem. It was based on the classical model of Theophrastus’s *Characters* and was particularly popular in seventeenth-century England and France. Like physiognomical treatises, literary sketches also habitually featured representations of dissembling characters such as the hypocrite. As in physiognomical theory, the underlying assumption here, too, was that the mental disposition of different social and moral types could be recognised by a list of characteristic actions or on the basis of their physical appearance and outward behavior. Authors of literary sketches also postulated a direct connection between external behavior and inner dispositions, which became manifest through actions and other signs. That the problem of dis/simulation made a considerable impact on the epistemological value and concept of literary sketches has been demonstrated by Jacques Bos, ‘The Hidden Self of the Hypocrite’, in *On the Edge of Truth and Honesty. Principles and Strategies of Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period*, ed. by Toon van Houdt, Leiden, 2002, pp. 65–84.
behavioural inconsistencies. By the seventeenth century, physiognomy had developed into an indispensable device for detecting dis/simulation and, therefore, a solution to the threat which this phenomenon was widely believed to pose to the foundations of human interaction and communication.

The discipline of physiognomy was further problematised in the early German Enlightenment. Lavater’s return to the study of permanent bodily structures, which was motivated by the problem of dis/simulation, marked a clear regression. Regardless of the idiosyncrasies of individual approaches to this difficult subject, the entirety of seventeenth-century physiognomical thought was not only shaped, but also increasingly undermined in its basic assumptions by the continuing debate over dis/simulation. Increased sensitivity to feigning and disguise fundamentally challenged the idea of a straightforward reading of people through their external appearances.

Physiognomy indulged people’s desire to find out reliable truths about others by means of external signs and satisfied the almost voyeuristic fascination with what Kant described as ‘the art of spying on what goes on inside human beings’ (‘Ausspähungskunst des Inneren des Menschen’),189 which was emblematic of the early modern era. It is well known that the political theory and the literature on civility and on courtly life of this period postulated the need to make prudent use of dis/simulation in a number of social and communicative situations. Yet, in this extensive corpus of texts, we rarely find any references to the conditions and limitations of human disguise and pretence. The physiognomical concern with reading the human body and face can therefore be seen as complementary to the precepts of worldly wisdom which circulated at the time.190 Beyond the divinatory and astrological interpretations which had shaped physiognomical thought from its origins, the ‘art of reading and knowing men’ acquired, from the end of the sixteenth century onwards, an increasingly important social

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190 The French theologian and philosopher Pierre Charron (1541–1603), e.g., identified knowing and reading the people one deals with as the central aspect of prudential behaviour; at the beginning of the chapter ‘Se conduire prudemment aux affaires’, in Pierre Charron, *De la sagesse, trois livres*, Geneva, 1968, II, p. 222, he noted: ‘La premier consiste en intelligence, c’est de bien coenoistre les personnes avec qui l’on a affaire, leur naturel propre et particulier, leur humeur, leur esprit, leur inclination, leur dessein et intention, leur procedure: coenoistre aussi le naturel des affaires que l’on traicte, et qui se proposent, non seulement en leur superficie et apparence, mais penetrer au dedans.’
function. Given the epoch’s almost obsessive concern with deceit and dis/simulation, physiognomy, it seems, helped to soothe the collective anxiety. Fuchs, for instance, offered his metoposcopical method – rather than pathognomy – to ‘gullible youths’ who were easily deceived by ‘flattering words and a feigned expression’.

Physiognomists attempted to identify the limits to, as well as the possibilities of, dis/simulation and to explore whether it could be accurately spotted and deciphered. Was the *ars conjectandi* able to penetrate the natural opacity of the human body and bring to light the hidden realms of the human heart and mind? The extent to which the simplified tabular analogies and pseudo-empirical tautologies which featured in physiognomical treatises genuinely helped early modern readers to unmask disguise and pretence is another matter. Nevertheless, authors such as Cureu, Chiaramonti and von Rohr made important and noteworthy contributions to the broader early modern discourse on dis/simulation and to a field of study in which, even today, many questions remain open.

Early modern physiognomical discourse, far from being limited to moralisations, constituted a nexus of academic fields of study, including human emotionality, psychology and medicine. Physiognomists also touched on a number of anthropological and epistemological questions, including the tension between the opacity and transparency of the human body and the cognitive limits of human perception. Fostering a new type of socio-anthropological knowledge, the early modern era can be said to have witnessed the birth of *homo fingens* as the subject of a multifaceted intellectual discourse.

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193 The work of Paul Ekman shows that this field not only remains very popular but also continues to produce new scholarly research; see, e.g., Ekman, *Clues*, pp. 123–161, where he discusses facial clues to deceit; and, for a more recent study, Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen, *Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial Clues*, Los Altos, 2003. See also the exhaustive bibliography on detecting deceptions and simulations in various other contexts issued by the American National Intelligence Council: Barton Whaley, *Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception Across Time, Cultures, and Disciplines*, 2nd ed., Washington DC, 2006.
Epilogue

Having looked at the emergence and dissemination of the early modern discourse on dis/simulation, I shall now consider its decline around 1700. While it is important to reiterate that the phenomenon of feigning and disguise was not suddenly discovered in the late fifteenth century, only to be forgotten or ignored from the age of Enlightenment onwards, there is nevertheless little doubt that the subject occupied unprecedented importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Jon R. Snyder closed his study with a brief overview of the rejection of the concepts of deceit and dis/simulation in the eighteenth century in favour of an ideal of transparency and honesty.¹ Earlier, Ursula Geitner had offered a detailed analysis of the semantic shift in European thought at the beginning of the eighteenth century, which, she claimed, moved away from a ‘negative anthropology’ towards new concepts and perceptions of human communication and interaction grounded in sincerity and candour rather than secrecy and opacity.² While the explanations of Snyder and Geitner may be plausible, they suggest that interest in dis/simulation was an ‘essentially’ or ‘typically’ early modern phenomenon. Such a view can lead to the kind of hermeneutical circle which Ernst Gombrich warned against in his criticism of the historiographical notion of Zeitgeist as a collectively manifested and ‘independent supra-individual spirit’.³

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to reassess the assumption that early modern debates on the problem of feigning and disguise came to an end because of the gradual emergence of a new cultural era and a new collective mentality. While the semantic shift in eighteenth-century intellectual thought undoubtedly played an important (if not the most important) part in the story, I would like to propose an alternative or a complementary explanation, arguing that it was not only the Enlightenment moral imperative of honesty and sincerity which ultimately triggered the decline of the

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1 Jon R. Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, Berkeley, 2009, pp. 177–178, where his point of reference is the entry on dissimulation in d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie.


discourse on dis/simulation. The majority of early modern authors and intellectuals were deeply concerned with morality and truthfulness – concerns which were inextricably connected to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debates on feigning and disguise. Apart from the persistent emphasis on Christian virtues and the tradition of the Augustinian rejection of any form of lying and deception, secular concepts such as the honnête homme were also popular and highly regarded. In fact, the very notion of dis/simulation was persistently linked to morality and honourability, as becomes strikingly clear in seemingly contradictory terms such as pia simulatio (Fortunato Fedele) and onesta dissimulazione (Torquato Accetto) or, more generally, the idea of the dutiful lie and the benevolent deceit. We may say, therefore, that the moral imperative of sincerity, veracity and honesty was relevant to early modern intellectual thought and that it complemented – and even, to some extent, shaped – contemporary perceptions of the delicate subject of dis/simulation. The debates on dis/simulation were always linked to questions of transparency, sincerity and suchlike notions.

In my view, the reasons for the decline in interest in this subject cannot be explained solely through the advance of Enlightenment culture; it was also rooted in the

4 I deliberately speak here of the decline and not the end of the discourse, since the eighteenth century by no means lacked an interest in the notion of dis/simulation and related subjects, as we can see, e.g., from the bibliography in Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle, Paris, 2002.


6 This becomes manifest in the ideal of the homo fenestratus, which co-existed with the ideal of the prudent dissembler and which was also disseminated in emblem books; see, e.g., Hadrianus Junius, Emblemata, Antwerp, 1565, sig. A4v (the motto of the emblem which depicts the homo fenestratus reads: ‘Reprehendere proclive et animum apertum esse debere’). On the notion of the homo fenestratus in early modern literature, see Mario Andrea Rigoni, ‘Una finestra aperta sul cuore’, Lettere italiane, 4, 1974, pp. 434–458.

seventeenth-century discourse itself. A large corpus of academic dissertations (dissertationes, excercitationes, disputationes), held in numerous Western European libraries and, for the most part, unstudied, will illustrate this point and provide a new perspective on dis/simulation. Published roughly between the 1650s and 1720s, these dissertations, although sometimes used interchangeably and inconsistently, can usually be treated as the same thing: see Hanspeter Marti, Philosophische Dissertationen deutscher Universitäten 1660–1750: eine Auswahlbibliographie, Munich, 1982, pp. 16–18. The interest in dis/simulation within university circles becomes apparent not only in published dissertations but also in a number of other scholarly writings, which resembled the printed dissertations in style and format; see Ku-ming Chang, ‘From Oral Disputation to Written Text: The Transformation of the Dissertation in Early Modern Europe’, History of Universities, 19, 2004, pp. 129–187, at p. 171. I have been able to identify three examples of public scholarly orationes which did not differ significantly from dissertations on dis/simulation; see Paul Martin Sagittarius’s Oratio valedictoria de simulatione et dissimulatione, Altenberg, 1677; Johann Friedrich Cramer’s oration at the university of Heidelberg, which was subsequently printed in the same city in 1680 under the title Oratio styli exercendi gratia quam alter sinceritatem et candorem commendaret pro simulatione et dissimulatione; and Johannes Eisenhart’s moralising speech Falsum in persona. Die betriegliche Verstellung der Person, Helmstedt, 1700.

One exception is Hanspeter Marti, Philosophische Dissertationen; the impressive bibliography of this pioneering and comprehensive work contains almost 10,000 titles from all academic fields and is an invaluable research tool. The subject has, moreover, received increasing attention in recent German scholarship; see Marion Gindhart and Ursula Kundert (eds), Disputatio 1200–1800: Form, Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur, Berlin, 2010; Rainer A. Müller (ed.), Promotionen und Promotionswesen an deutschen Hochschulen in der Frühmoderne, Cologne, 2001; and Rainer A. Müller, Bilder-Daten-Promotionen. Studien zum Promotionswesen an deutschen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit, Stuttgart, 2007. See also Hanspeter Marti, ‘Dissertationen’, in Quellen zur frühneuzeitlichen Universitätsgeschichte: Typen, Bestande, Forschungsperspektiven, ed. by Ulrich Rasche, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 293–312. Early modern (German) dissertations, however, remain almost entirely unstudied in Anglo-American scholarship; and there is, for instance, no study of this corpus of texts in connection to the subject of my study (although Snyder, Dissimulation, listed Carl Ittig’s dissertation De simulatione et dissimulatione, Leipzig, 1709, in his bibliography, he did not comment on this text nor did he place it in its wider context.

I list here only dissertations published before 1700; those which are not mentioned in Marti, Philosophische Dissertationen, are marked with an asterisk. For an early academic thesis on this subject, see *Michael Schneider, Thema politicum, an et quousque principi liceat simulare et dissimulare?, Wittenberg, 1636. After roughly two decades, a stream of new dissertations followed: Caspar Alexander,
texts are an integral part of the intellectual and cultural history of dis/simulation and form a bridge between early modern discussions and the debates of the early Enlightenment. An exhaustive study of this genre, which I cannot attempt here, would address a number of questions, for example, why this tradition remained more lively in Germany, especially in Lutheran universities, than in Catholic areas of Europe.

Hypomnemata politica de simulatione et dissimulatione politica, Wittenberg, 1653; *Jacob Thomasius, Disputatio ethic de simulatione, Leipzig, 1654; *Martin Hanke, De simulatione et dissimulatione disputatio, Jena, 1657; *Jacob Schaller, Dissertatio philosophica de simulatione iudicis, Strasbourg, 1658; *Balthasar Bebel, Disputatio ethico-politica de simulatione, Wittenberg, 1659; Friedrich Gottlieb Raumer, Dissertatio de simulatione, Helmstedt, 1662; *Enoch Gläsner, Dissertatio de simulatione, Helmstedt, 1662; Gottfried Becker, Discursus de politico simulante, Wittenberg, 1666; Michael Christ Fischbeck, De simulatione et dissimulatione et ejus oppositis, Wittenberg, 1666; *Johann Ernst Gerhard, Exercitatio theologica de simulatione dei, Jena, 1666; Philipp Lomeir, Exercitatio moralis de simulatione et dissimulatione, Helmstedt, 1671; Nikolas Syllum, Disputatio de simulatione, Giessen, 1671; *Heinrich Uffelmann, Exercitatio moralis de simulatione et dissimulatione, Helmstedt, 1671; Dietlof Friedrich von Kappellen, Exercitatio historico-politica de simulatione et dissimulatione in regenda et administranda rep[ublica] an et in quantum licitae illae aut illicitae sint? Leipzig, 1675; *Conrad Juncker, Disputatio iuridica inauguralis de simulatione, Altdorf, 1676; *Christian Heideck, Justitia prudentes et benigna seu disputatio iuridica de dissimulatione, Jena, 1676; *Valentin Alberti, Exercitatio historico-politica de simulatione et dissimulatione in regenda et administranda rep[ublica], Leipzig, 1675; Joachim Weickhman, Exercitationis moralis de simulatione pars prior [et pars posterior], Danzig, 1683–1684; *Johann Georg Neumann, Dissertatio politica de simulatione morbi, Wittenberg, 1688; Johann Gottlob Stolze, Positiones ethicae de simulatione, Wittenberg, 1689; Johann Gottlieb Stoltze (brother of Johann Gottlob Stoltze), Idea religiosi-politici, sub expositione religionis simulationis compendiose descripta, Wittenberg, 1690; *Heinrich von Cocceji, Dissertatio iuridica inauguralis, de simulatione, Frankfurt (an der Oder), 1693; *Johann Philipp Cramer, Disputatio philosophica ordinaria de simulatione, Erfurt, 1694; Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, Disputatio philosophica ordinaria de simulatione, Erfurt, 1694; Johann Peter Gosel, Dissertatio politico-moralis de moralitate simulationis aulicae, Leipzig, 1698; *Christian Röhrensee, Disputatio de simulatione et dissimulatione, Wittenberg, 1699. There are also a large number of dissertations which might be relevant, even though they do not include the terms simulation or dissimulation in their titles, e.g., Viktor von Grabow, Fallaciae politicae, Rostock, 1684. It should also be noted that the stream of dissertations on the problem of dis/simulation and closely related subjects continued more or less unabated until the 1720s and even beyond.

11 Nevertheless, dissertations also played an important part in the academic culture of Catholic Germany; see Chang, ‘From Oral Disputation’, p. 163, and Marti, Philosophische Dissertationen, p. 53.

12 According to Chang, ‘From Oral Disputation’, p. 171, in Germany, unlike in other European countries, the importance of the dissertation, as a central element of academic and scholarly life, was not marginalised, because the university continued to participate in the contemporary habitus of knowledge
Leaving such complex questions aside, I would like to dwell instead on the historiographical value of this corpus. First of all, these dissertations show us that, from around the 1650s onwards, scholars at German universities such as Wittenberg, Helmstedt, Erfurt, Altdorf, Halle and Leipzig developed a significant interest in dis/simulation. Furthermore, they offer us an invaluable insight into the conventional perception of this complex subject within learned circles of the time. Digesting previous literature, while generally adhering to established knowledge, dissertations rarely expressed heterodox or controversial positions. It would also be wrong to assume that these texts inform us only about the perceptions of the subject within the narrow confines of universities and institutional academic learning. Seventeenth-century dissertations attracted the attention of learned circles which were not necessarily connected with the academic world: they were collected in private libraries, discussed in journals and sometimes translated into other languages.

Since I was only able to examine a small selection of the vast production of production.

13 Scholarly interest in the subject might, of course, have existed before the second half of the seventeenth century; but this is difficult to corroborate since very few dissertations were printed in the sixteenth century, nor have I found any references to earlier academic discussion of this subject in the printed dissertations I have consulted. The dissertation was originally a disputatio, which, in its primarily oral form, was a firmly established medieval institution and which was deeply rooted in the academic culture of medieval and early modern universities.


18 Marti, Dissertationen, p. 301.
seventeenth-century German dissertations from Lutheran universities, I will limit myself to a few remarks on the place of these texts within the wider seventeenth-century discourse on dis/simulation. Often lacking originality (a characteristic which they shared with a number of other contemporary works), university dissertations offered few novel or intellectually stimulating contributions to ongoing debates, but rather were erudite displays of the conventional wisdom of the day. Precisely for this reason, they give us an idea as to the literature which was considered relevant and authoritative in connection to dis/simulation. We encounter frequent scriptural and patristic references, as well numerous discussions of ancient (Cicero, Tacitus, Livy), medieval (Thomas Aquinas) and early modern (Lipsius, Grotius) authors. Literature on courtly comportment, civility and worldly wisdom, which was mostly written in the vernacular rather than in Latin (Castiglione, Guazzo, Gracián), is, unsurprisingly, completely absent.

The dissertations also illustrate a point which has wider implications for our understanding of the subject. The late sixteenth century was an “incubation period” for the discourse on dis/simulation. By the second half of the seventeenth century, the intellectual coordinates of this subject had been exhaustively demarcated in intense debates and in a variety of contexts: theological disputes, political theory, moral philosophy, jurisprudence, medicine and the social and natural sciences. Within the moral economy of the time, dissimulation was commonly linked to prudent and virtuous behaviour, while simulation, despite occasional justifications, was often described as a form of malicious deceit. Associated with hypocrisy and deception, simulation was a topos in moralisations, satires and invectives throughout the early modern era. Torquato Accetto’s Della dissimulazione onesta justified only dissimulation and not its problematic counterpart, while Francis Bacon praised concealment as a form of

19 I have been unable to find any printed editions of similar texts from other parts of the European seventeenth-century Republic of Letters. It seems likely, nevertheless, that the corpus of dissertations from northern and central Germany reflects, at least to some extent, transnational tendencies.

20 Nor do we find any comments about the contemporary debates which I have discussed in the chapters above (apart from one dissertation on the simulation of diseases). We should take into account, however, that the majority of these dissertations were submitted to philosophical, theological and jurisprudential faculties, which would have strongly influenced their frame of reference. Furthermore, access to literature published in other parts of Europe would have been limited.
prudence but linked feigning to moral failings. The notion of simulation, however, seems to have undergone a certain degree of semantic change and was treated in more neutral terms towards the end of the early modern era. This development, which unfolded in the seventeenth-century, began to appear in the medical, physiognomical and humoral-pathological literature I have discussed. Erudite *compendia* and scholarly treatises such as Paolo Zacchia’s medico-legal discussion or Scipione Chiaramonti’s *ars conjectandi*, for instance, treated feigning more as a hermeneutic and technical problem than a moral one. While they might not have addressed the issue with complete dispassion, their approach differed from that of many earlier and contemporary authors. Literature on civility was another strand of thought in which feigning tended to receive a more neutral treatment. A number of late seventeenth-century German dissertations further ‘neutralised’ the notion of feigning. Despite maintaining the established division between simulation and dissimulation, some academic authors insisted on their inseparability. Neither concealment nor (more importantly) feigning was considered to be *per se* malicious; instead, it was the underlying intention in using these techniques of (false) self-presentation which determined their moral status.

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21 Francis Bacon, ‘Of Simulation and Dissimulation’, in his *Essays or Counsels, Civill and Morall*, ed. by Michael Kiernan, Oxford, 1985, pp. 20–23, at p. 22: ‘a generall Custome of Simulation… is a Vice, rising either of a naturall Falsenesse, or Fearefulnesse; Or of a Minde, that hath some maine Faults’.

22 Cf. Guazzo’s notion of harmless feigning in polite conversation, discussed in Chapter 5 above, section 5.1, with, e.g., Jacob Schaller, *Dissertatio philosophica*, p. 4, who justified the use of feigning in everyday social interaction (‘simulatio ... quae in quotidiana conversatione cernitur’). For another neutral treatment of dis/simulation, see Julius von Rohr’s *Unterricht von der Kunst der Menschen Gemüther zu erforschen*, Leipzig 1715, discussed in Chapter 6 above, section 6.7.


24 E.g., Ittig, *De simulatione et dissimulatione*, p. 6, insisted on the inseparability of both notions: ‘Ast vero cum simulatio et dissimulatio semper indissolubili nexus sint conjunctae, ita ut qui amicitiam simulet, eo ipso inimicitiam dissimulet, et contra, qui amicitiam dissimulet, simulet inimicitiam.’

25 This view of simulation was not, however, entirely new and can be found in some earlier seventeenth-century moral treatises, e.g., Camillo Baldi’s *Congressi civili, nei quali con precetti morali, et politici si mostra il modo facile d’acquistare, e conservare gli amici*, Bologna, 1637, p. 27, where he argues that feigning depends entirely on the purpose and may only be used for a good end (‘quello solamente che è atto à produre il bene’).
Martin Hanke, after devoting a large part of his *De simulatione et dissimulatione disputatio* of 1657 to establishing the *bonitas simulationis* (and, notably, not the *bonitas dissimulationis*), maintained that ‘so long as the intention [of simulation] is not malicious, then it is nothing other than a certain form of sagacity of the mind combined with civil prudence’. In a typical sixteenth-century treatise, such a statement would probably have been rejected as ‘Machiavellian’ and profoundly unChristian. Hanke, however, elevated simulation to the sphere of worldly wisdom, which, as we have seen, was traditionally linked to secrecy and concealment. The pinnacle of this ‘rehabilitation’ of the concept of feigning – especially in an age which was still deeply immersed in Christian values and beliefs – was his reference to Christ’s virtuous and honourable use of feigning: ‘Christ’s simulation is well known, by which he meant to search out and excite greater enthusiasm by pretending in front of his disciples not to know those things which happened before his crucifixion and death in Jerusalem.’

26 See Martin Hanke, *De simulatione et dissimulatione disputatio*, Jena, 1657, pp. 20–25.

27 Ibid., p. 4: ‘Malitia enim intentionis si absit, nihil aliud est, quam animi quaedam sagacitas cum prudentia civilis coniuncta.’ Hanke, pp. 24–26, gave a detailed list of criteria according to which feigning was licit and justifiable: ‘Non violatur autem PRIMO in illis, qui propter immaturam vel corruptam rationem nulla judicii libertate laetantur, quales sunt infantes aut amentes . . . . Non violatur SECUNDO quoties ille, ad quem verba facimus, expresso consensu suo juri renunciat, ut si praedicendi, se falsa dicturum, idem permisit . . . . Non violatur TERTIO si adversarii injuria jus illud, quo ceteroquin gaudet, extinguat. VR[erbi] g[ratia]: Si vitae innocentium insidiatus fuerit, similis facinus molitus, jure merito falsiloquis illi et ab improborum scelerum perfectione potest avelli . . . . Non violatur QUINTO, quoties majus aliquod malum nobis impendet, quod alia ratione evitari nequit.’

28 Ibid., pp. 3–4: ‘Ille [Thomas Aquinas] enim vocabulum simulationis in malam omnino partem accipit et prout est vitium virtuti, veritati, contrarium, nos vero prout non fraudis sed prudentiae effectus. Prudentia autem activa cum recta ratione cum concordia ad legem aeternam et vetat perfide agere cum aliis . . . nec omnem simulationem bonam, nec omnem malam; sed eam tantum quae a bonitate seu malitia intentionis bonitatem aut malitiam habet.’

Here we see the notion of simulation raised from the lowly ranks of moral corruption and associated instead with the virtuous and exemplary deeds of the saviour.

I certainly do not want to make any sweeping claims about a teleological movement in early modern debates towards a dispassionate, neutral and objective understanding of dis/simulation, in a process of disenchantment, to use Max Weber’s phrase. Like many earlier texts on the subject (including medical and physiognomical treatises), seventeenth-century dissertations were not free of moralisations. Nonetheless, there does seem to have been a shift in the general perception of dis/simulation. Already before the rise of the Enlightenment ideal of transparency and sincerity, the notion of dis/simulation had lost some of its intriguing opacity and subtlety, gradually ossifying into the rigid structures of academic studies and bookish erudition. This is most apparent in relation to simulation. Defined as ‘neither bad, nor good’ (‘nec mala, nec bona’), its controversial and polemic potential was neutralised. For Hanke, simulation was an integral part of human nature, while the author of another dissertation on medico-legal and forensic questions noted that ‘whether praiseworthy or marching hand-in-hand with lies, fictions occur in all walks of life’.

These views were not part of the negative and pessimistic anthropology of the seventeenth century, analysed by Geitner in relation to German literature. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, dis/simulation was still widely believed to be

30 Accusations of hypocrisy continued to be made in seventeenth-century dissertations: see, e.g., Gerhard, Exercitatio, sig. D2v. Not surprisingly, given that most dissertations were written in Lutheran universities, there were frequent anti-Jesuit polemics: see, e.g., Hanke’s criticism of the casuistic teachings of the Jesuits in his De simulatione, p. 13: ‘Stolido autem, vel, ut verius dixerim, nefario utuntur effugio, quoquot sceleratorum Jesuitarum more, uti ad omne mendacii perfidiaque nomen, ita vel maxime supradictae declinandum, ad reservationes mentales confugiunt.’

31 Hanke, De simulatione, p. 8; see also p. 29: ‘Quanquam, ut dixi, omnibus humanae conditionis ordínibus non modo utile, sed et necessarium sit simulationis artificium, adeo ut vix ulla reperiatur vivendi ratio, ubi dolis et fraudibus uti non solum expediat, sed et necessitas postulet.’

32 Wilhelm Heinrich Waldschmidt, Dissertatio inauguralis medico-forensis de morbis simulatis ac dissimulatis, Kiel 1728, p. 1: ‘in omni vitæ genere fictiones occurrant, modo laudabiles, modo cum mendaciis pari ambulantes passu’. This dissertation is another good example of a decidedly neutral approach to dis/simulation as a technical and cognitive problem.

33 See Geitner, Die Sprache der Verstellung, pp. 117.
ubiquitous, as had been the case throughout the early modern era. Yet at the same time a more detached understanding of it as a universal socio-anthropological phenomenon pertaining to humankind’s pluralistic and protean nature, rather than a character trait of vicious individuals and a tool of malicious deceit, seems to have emerged. After almost two centuries of intensive discussions and heated polemics, the end of the seventeenth century witnessed the birth of homo fingens. Late seventeenth-century academic dissertations marked the final stages of long-lasting and persistent debates which had eventually exhausted the subject of dis/simulation. As I have already indicated, interest in forms and strategies of feigning and disguise did not fade away

34 As we see in modern approaches to, and understandings of, human nature and social communication and interaction: e.g., Erwin Goffman’s *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*, Garden City NY, 1959.

35 Nicolas Guérard’s engraving *Le Mascarade Universelle*, which circulated widely starting in the early 1700s, is a good example. It depicts a man and a woman wearing numerous costumes, belts and masks which are labelled with multiple positive (gender-specific) traits, attributes and concepts such as ‘Religion’, ‘Justice’, ‘Friendship’ and ‘Generosity’ (associated with the man) and ‘Sincerity’, ‘Fidelity’, ‘Compassion’ ‘Charity’ (associated with the woman). An allegorical, satyr-like figure impersonating time takes off the masks with a devious smile. The two faces which become visible are, however, almost indistinguishable from the masks. As a complex construction of manifold appearances, layers and disguises, human nature and character seem to be unknowable. The poem at the top of the image speaks of the universal masquerade, concluding that ‘Qu’en tout nous ne sommes rien moins / Que ce que nous paraissons être.’ The poem below the plate attests to the ubiquity of dis/simulation: ‘Bien des gens sont masqués sans être au carnaval / Soit campagnards, soit gens de villes / De tous sexe, de tous états, tout est habile / A déguiser le vrai, le faux, le bien, le mal / Soit pour tromper, soit pour détruire / Pour se venger ou pour médire. / Chacun dessous le masque des vertus / Tâche à cacher sa fourbe et sa malice / Son ambition, son envie, son avarice / Sa haine et se meurs corrompues / Et quoique déguisé autant qu’on le peut être / Personne néanmoins n’en veut passer pour l’être.’

36 A good point in case is Johann Dietrich von Gülich’s *Larva iuridico-politica detecta. Sive discursus iuridico-historico-politicus de simulatione et dissimulatione*, Osterode, 1688. Von Gülich (1646–1696), a German professor of mathematics and Greek, composed a typical early modern erudite storehouse of classical loci filling more than 600 pages and covering a wide range of subjects linked to dis/simulation, including politics, worldly wisdom and contemporary moral life. This voluminous treatise has not been mentioned in the scholarly literature on dis/simulation, even though it is one of the most extensive early modern treatments of this subject. Mainly summarising earlier literature, von Gülich’s thoroughgoing, but intellectually uninspiring, account corroborates my claim that debates on the problem of feigning and disguise had run their course by the end of the seventeenth century.
from the collective mental and intellectual horizon of the era; but by the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was little left to say on this subject.
Conclusion

It was never my aim or intention in this dissertation to provide an exhaustive account of all the authors, texts and genres relevant to dis/simulation in the early modern era. Nevertheless, I hope that I have been able to show that discussions of this subject (of and closely related topics such as lying, deceit, secrecy and concealment) were not limited to political theory, literature on civil and prudential behaviour or theological debates, but appeared in a wide range of genres. I also hope that I have demonstrated that early modern discussions of dis/simulation were neither coherent nor uniform, but, on the contrary, were more diverse, multifaceted and even seemingly contradictory than has been recognised in previous scholarship.

While the social and moral problems connected to false mendicants, rogues and courtesans had already, in most cases, been intensively debated in the early sixteenth century, the problem of feigning and disguise in physiognomy and medicine became a topic of discussion in the seventeenth century. The reason for this discrepancy seems to have lain in the dynamics of scholarly and intellectual debates of the time. Increasingly occupying the minds of many modern authors and scholars, dis/simulation started to make an appearance in various literary genres and intellectual contexts in which it had previously played only a minor and insignificant role. Although there were inevitable variations in the widespread interest in, and awareness of, dis/simulation between different scholarly disciplines and literary genres, the discourse as a whole peaked around 1600.1

The question of dis/simulation entered into a number of different contexts. It was addressed and discussed in many literary formats and genres, ranging from cheap, ephemeral pamphlets to lavish folio volumes and scholarly treatises. It also crossed the borders of countries and traversed language barriers. As I have tried to show with examples drawn from nearly all the countries of Western Europe, the new awareness of this subject was not limited to a particular region but appeared in texts written and published virtually everywhere – from Alcalá to Amsterdam, from Rouen to Rome, from

1 At the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth, feigning and disguise were integral points of discussion in all the genres and scholarly contexts I have examined. This also holds true for texts and genres which have been studied in earlier scholarship, most importantly, political theory, courtly treatises and literature on prudent comportment.
Many of the shared themes are found in early modern emblem books (and in florilegia and collections of proverbs and adagia). These works included precepts on prudent concealment and secrecy, the nexus between human passions, love and dis/simulation (especially love and the passions as the natural limits of human disguise), the problem of deception and disguise at the margins of society (beggars and courtesans) and the positive connotation of masks and feigning in society. Emblem books conveyed and depicted these notions in an appealing visual language (which was often symbolically charged and cryptic) and with fashionably concise, aphoristic mottoes and epigrams. The imagery of emblem books included, for instance, the erupting volcano, the *signum harpocraticum*, the burning fire under a barrel and Cupid triumphantly standing on a mask. Highly popular and successful throughout the early modern era, this genre digested, simplified, concisely reproduced and disseminated discussions on dis/simulation and related subjects to a heterogeneous readership, reaching beyond that of technical treatises and professional manuals. Furthermore, the great majority of emblem books presented popular representations of the contemporary moral consensus of the time and, as such, give us an idea about the conventional and generally accepted views on dis/simulation.

Many of the subjects mentioned in emblem books were also discussed and elaborated in other literary genres such as tracts on the problem of mendicancy and mass poverty. During the early modern era, as I hope I have shown, interest in feigning and disguise was not restricted to the upper strata of society and their notions of comportment and (false) self-presentation, but also extended to the use of dis/simulation among marginalised and stigmatised social groups. This can be seen in popular semi-fictional texts, which vividly depicted the ruses of rogues, conny-catchers, courtesans

2 Dis/simulation, moreover, was avidly discussed not only by authors based in important cultural and scholarly centres who were familiar with the most recent intellectual debates and the most vexing questions of the day, but also by those located at the periphery of the Republic of Letters and in its backwaters.

3 Most of these texts combined fiction with realistic accounts; and even if it were possible to do so, it was not my intention to determine the exact level of ‘realism’ (a concept borrowed from literary theory/studies which might itself be questioned) contained in these pamphlets and treatises. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth repeating here that they were not necessarily merely romanticised literary constructions but, to a certain extent, reflected the conditions of contemporary life at the margins of society.
and other impostors. Often entertaining, moralising and didactic at the same time, these texts reinforced collective stereotypes and fuelled the fears of the bourgeoisie and members of the upper echelons of society, who formed the main readership of these works. Beggar literature, rogue pamphlets and conny-catcher treatises conveyed the picture of ubiquitous deception and dis/simulation in the urban space (in market squares, inns and taverns, in front of church portals and even on the doorsteps of private houses), as well as in the countryside (where vagrants and so-called ‘masterless men’ were believed to roam). 4

Feigning and disguise were also recurrent themes in scholarly debates and learned treatises on the problem of mass poverty and mendicancy across Europe. The authors whom I have examined in this context include theologians such as Martin Luther, Juan de Medina, Ambrosius Paré, Teseo Pini and Domingo de Soto, and physicians such as Fortunato Fedele, Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera and Ambroise Paré. 5 The problem of dis/simulation was a central problem for contemporary poor relief and social reform. Ignoring the wider socio-economic context, early modern scholars were convinced that a large proportion of mendicants were idle dissemblers and fakers who abused the traditional system of indiscriminate alms-giving. False mendicants (the ‘ideal type’ of this impostor was the young, male and able-bodied beggar) represented the social and moral ‘other’ in the eyes of the authorities and of the supposedly law-abiding, settled bourgeois and higher social classes. 6

As I have argued, simulated mendicancy became the crux of early modern attempts at social reform of mass poverty, since both authorities and scholars believed that by obliterating all deceitful and illicit imposture and pretence among the low orders of society and the morally corrupt they would be able to solve the pressing problem of

4 The Romany formed a distinctive social and ethnic group which I have not discussed in this dissertation but who were persistently associated with deceit and dis/simulation from the sixteenth century onwards; for a short discussion of this group, see Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Renaissance Impostors and Proofs of Identity, London, 2012, pp. 121–136, and Franz Irsigler and Arnold Lassotta, Bettler und Gaukler, Dirnen und Henker. Außenseiter in einer mittelalterlichen Stadt. Köln 1300–1600, Munich, 1996, pp. 167–178.

5 The jurist Ahasverus Fritsch is one the few exceptions with regard to his professional background.

6 As I have pointed out, however, a few authors also directed their criticisms at the upper echelons of society, condemning the feigned piety of wealthy men or bemoaning the lack of charity shown by Christians.
widespread begging. Early modern debates on mendicant laws and social reforms occupy an important chapter in the cultural and intellectual history of dis/simulation and differ from other discussions on this subject, in that they addressed a matter of state and not only of the individual. Eliminating false mendicancy became an urgent point on the governmental agenda and an increasingly important part of political programmes and reform plans.

Dis/simulation was not only a question of social standing but was also closely linked to gender. A number of contemporary authors warned of the deceptive art of the meretrix, which was dangerous not only for the naïve and young but even for worldly wise men, who might get caught up in the net of the shrewd and morally corrupt courtesan. It was widely believed that courtesans disguised their evil intentions under the pretext of amorous feelings in order to exploit men financially, moving from victim to victim until they lost their allure and sexual attraction or contracted a venereal disease. Female pretence was considered to be superior to that of males, because it was based on erotic charms which ensnared men of all types and captivated their passions. Like the contemporary stereotype of beggars, this view of courtesans was entirely constructed from the outside – in this case, from a purely male perspective, which largely ignored the reality and the living conditions of the majority of courtesans. Instead, sixteenth-century male authors, projecting their fears – and possibly their desires and phantasies – onto courtesans, envisioned a prototype of the femme fatale.

Another area in which the use of dis/simulation was discussed – in its licit and praiseworthy form – was the early modern household and the private life of married couples. Interestingly, the husband, as well as the wife, was expected at times to resort to disguise and to feign in order to maintain the peace and concord of the household. This is a further example of the nexus between love, (amorous) passions and dis/simulation. In Giuseppe Betussi’s dialogue Il Raverta, the interlocutors talked about

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7 All the plans devised to establish a viable means of detecting and preventing such illicit imposture at the margins of society were unfeasible and doomed to failure.

8 This was the fundamental difference between early modern semi-fictional beggar and rogue literature, on the one hand, and reform plans for and scholarly discussions of (false) mendicancy, on the other.
whether feigning or concealing love was easier, deciding in favour of the former.\textsuperscript{9} Concealing true love and genuine passions was regarded as a considerable challenge. It was thought that while love largely defied dissimulation, it was possible to feign amorous feelings – this was, after all, at the heart of the courtesan’s art.

The issues which authors such as Betussi (and Julius von Rohr, in the early German Enlightenment) discussed in the context of love also had important implications for humournal-pathological treatises on human passions, physiognomy and the \textit{ars conjectandi hominum mores}, ‘the art of reading people’. Early modern political theory and tracts on civil and prudent behaviour widely endorsed the use of disguise and, to a lesser extent, feigning by rulers, diplomats, courtiers, secretaries, confessors and private men of all kinds. Yet almost none of these texts touched on the problem of the natural limits of such strategies.\textsuperscript{10} Here, the contribution of early modern physiognomy and the \textit{ars conjectandi}, which otherwise pertained to a rather small and controversial branch of early modern science, is noteworthy. Physiognomical tracts addressed not only the limits of human dis/simulation but also the limits of detecting feigning and disguise. They delved into core questions of semiotics, the hermeneutic potential of corporal signifiers and the possibilities of their cognitive interpretation.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, dis/simulation had evolved into a theoretical problem which threatened to undermine the basic assumptions of physiognomical theory. As I have tried to show, early modern physignomists were painfully aware that facial expressions were vulnerable to manipulation and subterfuge. Many of them evaded this problem by resorting to the study of fixed and unchangeable

\textsuperscript{9} This position corresponded with the maxims presented in emblem books; see Chapter 1 above, section 1.4.

\textsuperscript{10} For an exception, see Francis Bacon, \textit{The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall}, ed. by Michael Kiernan, Oxford, 1985, pp. 20–23, at pp. 21–22: ‘the discovery of a man’s self by the tracts of his countenance is a great weakness and betraying, by how much it is many times more marked and believed than a man's words'; yet his main point was that the limits of feigning and disguise were determined by the parameters of social interaction and communication and by the curiosity of other men who ‘will so beset a man with Questions, and draw him on, and picke it out of him, that, without an absurd Silence, he must show an Inclination one way; Or if he do not, they will gather as much by his Silence as by his Speech. As for Equivocations, or Oraculous Speeches, they cannot hold out long. So that no man can be secret, except he give himself a little Scope of Dissimulation; which is, as it were, but the Skirts or Train of Secrecy.’
bodily and facial features. Yet some seventeenth-century physiognomists such as Marin Cureau de la Chambre, in search of clues to deceit and dis/simulation, incorporated pathognomical observation (that is, the study of transitory facial expressions) into their *ars conjectandi*. An important part of their holistic art of reading people was the prudent consideration of various external factors such as apparel, personal background, the wider social context and so on.\(^{11}\) Seventeenth-century physiognomists made efforts to find solutions to the problem of detecting and unveiling dis/simulation,\(^{12}\) which they regarded as a *mal du siècle*. Their attempts, which responded to the collective concern with false identities and misleading appearances, ultimately contributed to the genesis of new socio-anthropological knowledge.

Many of the subjects addressed in early modern physiognomical treatises were also discussed by contemporary physicians. The medical and medico-legal debates on dis/simulation were multifaceted and encapsulated several independent themes and questions. As with the physiognomical theory of the period, this subject entered the medical literature at the end of the sixteenth century. Early modern physicians, like many of their contemporaries, regarded dis/simulation as a serious problem. Going far beyond Galen’s brief discussion of simulated diseases (the only extant ancient text on the subject), they tried to establish methods of detecting pretence, not only among specific groups such as prisoners, beggars and soldiers but also among their normal patients, since they, too, might have an interest in concealing and feigning specific medical conditions. Giovanni Battista Selvatico’s *De iis qui morbum simulant* was the most extensive early modern medico-legal discussion of dis/simulation.\(^{13}\) In an age in which physiology was still in its infancy, the opacity of the human body and mind was a fundamental problem. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that physicians of the time had to admit that medical observation and diagnosis were not always able to detect dis/simulation. What is more important for my purposes, however, is that they began to

\(^{11}\) Johann Kaspar Lavater’s work, which limited physiognomy to the study of fixed and immovable bodily and facial features, marked a regression in physiognomical thought.

\(^{12}\) This was also apparent in the numerous efforts of early modern physiognomists to establish a visual nomenclature of dis/simulation. Dissemblers and simulators were among the most frequent types described in physiognomical tracts.

\(^{13}\) Nor, as far as I am aware, was there any treatise from the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries which was longer or more detailed than Selvatico’s.
identify this issue as an integral part of their professional duties.

For seventeenth-century physicians, the *medicus prudens* had to apply skilful strategies of disguise and deception in the interests of healing. As we have seen, a number of well-established physicians self-confidently and authoritatively endorsed these strategies and perceived them, to borrow Fortunato Fedele’s phrase, as *pia simulatio*.\textsuperscript{14} It would be going too far, however, to claim that Julius Alessandrini’s proposal ‘mentiamur sane’ or Friedrich Hoffmann’s witty dictum ‘Qui nescit simulare, nescit etiam curare’ were representative of early modern medical ethics.\textsuperscript{15} Yet what was considered licit and even laudable for licensed physicians became a popular point of accusation and an instrument of polemics used by them against itinerant practitioners and charlatans, who were portrayed as malicious deceivers who pretended to have medical knowledge and skill.

This type of stigmatisation and attack on unauthorised healers vividly exemplifies what I have identified as a central characteristic of early modern debates on dis/simulation: they were, to some degree, about power. It was those whose economic and social capital was most threatened by dis/simulation – that is, the upper echelons of society – who most severely and vehemently condemned it. One of my aims in this dissertation was to discover which types and forms of dis/simulation were considered tolerable and licit – or even honourable and praiseworthy; and, as my research I hope has shown, this notion was not a rigid concept but constituted instead a moral grey area. The ideological and moral dominion over legitimate uses of disguise and feigning had to be established, negotiated and re-evaluated in each new context.\textsuperscript{16}

As early modern debates unfolded, specific groups and individuals tried to legitimise their own use of dis/simulation, while denying other groups the right to deploy similar strategies. Dissembling and feigning, in what was understood to be their licit forms, were associated with the virtue of prudence; while in their less acceptable

\textsuperscript{14} See Chapter 5 above, n. 89.

\textsuperscript{15} See Chapter 5 above, nn. 75 and 82.

\textsuperscript{16} This included what might be called institutionally determined and group-determined dis/simulation (I have adapted these terms from the discussion of different categories and forms of silence in Peter Burke, *The Art of Conversation*, Cambridge, 1993, p. 124), e.g., among physicians, diplomats and secretaries who integrated disguise and feigning into their professional conduct and ethics.
forms, they were linked to cunning and astutia.\textsuperscript{17} Other dichotomies were: honourable and morally reprehensible, authorised and unauthorised, rich and poor, sedentary and itinerant, male and female. With regard to the last of these dichotomies, early modern authors frequently linked illicit dis/simulation with women, juxtaposing the deceptions of cunning women (in particular, the impostures of meretrices and courtesans) with the prudent dissembling of men.\textsuperscript{18} Marriage and household tracts endorsed the use of dis/simulation by husbands, while wives were always supposed to be subordinate and submissive.\textsuperscript{19} In this gender-based distinction, praiseworthy and prudent dissembling were linked to male behaviour, while silence and obedience, on the one hand, and cunning deception, on the other, were associated with women.

The dichotomy between honourable and morally reprehensible dis/simulation seems to have depended to a large extent on the social status and economic standing of the person in question.\textsuperscript{20} The correlation between social standing and the right to use forms of disguise and simulation becomes clear if we consider two cases. Firstly, while the dis/simulation of the cortegiana onesta was generally accepted and her (false) self-fashioning perceived as graceful and pleasant, the deceptions of plain meretrices were generally condemned as malicious. Secondly, in contrast to undeserving beggars, whose dissembling was condemned, that of the pauper verecundus was treated with tolerance and acceptance, because such mendicants were believed to have fallen, due to misfortune rather than to their own moral failings, from the higher echelons of society into poverty and, too ashamed to reveal their destitute condition, preferred to resort to

\textsuperscript{17} As is apparent from the title of Johann Gottlieb Reichel’s dissertation, Paradoxon ethico-politicum: summa prudentia est nulla uti astutia, Wittenberg, 1716, prudence was clearly distinguished from astutia.

\textsuperscript{18} As we have seen in Chapter 4 above, n. 23, Robert Greene was one of the few contemporary authors who criticised the use of dis/simulation by men in order to seduce and corrupt young women.

\textsuperscript{19} See Chapter 4 above, section 4.5.

\textsuperscript{20} A passage from Camillo Baldi, Congressi civili, nei quali con precetti morali, et politici si mostra il modo facile d’acquistare, e conservare gli amici, Florence, 1637, p. 26, suggests that dis/simulation is a social privilege and a question of a person’s standing or profession. After first condemning lying, Baldi goes on to clarify that ‘due sorti di bugie, e d’inganno si trovano: una, che da legisti è chiamato buono, e l’altro cattivo’. His examples of the first types are the deceptions of physicians in front of patients, those of a father with his child and those of legislators. In all three cases, the dis/simulation is used for a good purpose (‘per fine il bene, et il commodo’) and is rendered licit through the virtue of the person acting.
dis/simulation. To illustrate the closely related dichotomy between authorised and unauthorised deception and feigning, I shall limit myself to one example. Early modern physicians tried to monopolise and appropriate dis/simulation as a privilege solely for their own use. While the *medicus politicus* had *carte blanche* to lie and deceive in the interests of curing patients, unauthorised healers were marginalised and stigmatised as impostors who deceived the credulous populace. The harshness of their polemics and the sheer number of diatribes and invectives which they directed against unlicensed practitioners and their alleged malpractice testifies to the importance of this conflict for early modern physicians.

Some of the topics and themes discussed in this dissertation have already been examined, most notably, in Schleiner’s study of the problem of deception and lying in early modern medical ethics and Jütte’s detailed analysis of the *Liber vagatorum*. Yet

21 Early modern authors did not, of course, condemn only the dis/simulations of lowly and marginalised groups. The criticism of deception, feigning and flattery was, for example, a topos of early modern antcourt literature; see Helmut Kiesel, “Bei Hoff, bei Höll”: Untersuchungen zur literarischen Hofkritik von Sebastian Brant bis Friedrich Schiller, Tübingen, 1979. Nonetheless, it seems that in broader contemporary discussions of this subject a pervasive distinction was made between sophisticated forms of (false) self-fashioning among members of the upper ranks of society and the illicit uses of similar strategies used by those belonging to the lower social strata. A case in point is the miscellaneous group of ‘cunning folk’ and itinerant fringe performers. These purveyors of both magic and entertainment, also known as jugglers, jesters, conjurors and wonder-mongers, had a defined place in early modern society but were, nonetheless, frequently associated with fraudulent deceit, ‘cozenage’ and imposture; see Nicoletta Caputo, ‘Entertainers “on the Vagabond Fringe”: Jugglers in Tudor and Stuart England’, in *English Renaissance Scene: From Canon to Margins*, ed. by Paola Pugliatti and Alessandro Serpieri, Berne, 2008, pp. 311–342. It would be interesting to see whether early modern authors justified the use of pretence and diguise in connection with magical performances, giving a positive connotation to the deception and misdirection of the spectator for the purposes of entertainment and recreation. These fringe performers and entertainers were clearly distinguished from the learned ‘high’ magician: see Owen Davies, *Cunning Folk: Popular Magic in English History*, London, 2003, p. 1; but some branches of learned magic were also considered illicit and theologically irreconcilable with Christian orthodoxy; see Frank Klaassen, *The Transformation of Magic: Illicit Learned Magic in the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, University Park PA, 2013.

neither these works nor any of the others which I have cited has drawn parallels with studies devoted to the history of dis/simulation, as I have attempted to do. More importantly, I have found a large number of primary sources which have not previously been examined in the context of dis/simulation and which, in some cases, have escaped the notice of modern scholarship. These texts, I believe, offer us a more complex and multifaceted picture of early modern debates on dis/simulation than has been available before. While this picture is, no doubt, still far from complete, I hope that I have provided new perspectives which will enrich our understanding of an important chapter in the intellectual and cultural history of the early modern period.

23 This is especially true of many of the medical and physiognomical treatises which I have discussed.
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