POLITICAL HOMOPHOBIA IN BRAZIL

An Evaluation of the Pentecostal Threat to the Human Rights of Sexual and Gender Minorities

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MA in Understanding and Securing Human Rights
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BA (Hons) International Relations and Peace Studies

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation fits into wider research on the tensions between sexual and religious liberties in Brazil; a subject matter that is demonstrating an upward trend in political saliency. The analytical focus is placed upon the particular role of the Pentecostal segment of Protestantism within LGBT politics. By corroborating existing literature and contributing new empirical data through field research and discourse analysis, the aim is to assess the threat posed by rising Pentecostal political participation to the human rights of sexual and gender minorities. In more specific terms, the study examines Pentecostal discourse in order to put forward the claim that religious and political figures frequently employ inflammatory, prejudiced speech in the context of homosexuality and strategically target public policies proposed by the government to promote LGBT equality. The analysis further considers the immediate and wider implications of this. It finds that Pentecostal religious interference in the public sphere has caused Brazil to be governed by extremely Christian values, which has led to the subsequent failure of important human rights bills against homophobia. Moreover, under the application of theoretical frameworks, it is determined that the current situation has created a conflict of rights, which, in turn, exposes the fragility of laicity in Brazil. From a human rights perspective, Pentecostal influence on the politics of sexuality must, thus, be regarded with suspicion.

Key words: Pentecostalism; morality politics; sexual and gender minorities; conflicting rights; political homophobia; Brazilian Paradox.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

On June 7th 2015 the Brazilian transsexual actress and activist, Viviany Beleboni, caused a polemic at the 19th Gay Pride parade in São Paulo when she appeared crucified and covered in blood under a banner that read ‘Enough of homophobia!’ The act of protest drew an obvious parallel between Jesus’ suffering on the cross and the reality of religiously-motivated violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons.\(^1\) Within a matter of hours, Beleboni’s plead for awareness towards the alarming situation of private and public homophobia in Brazil backfired and was condemned by the country’s Evangelical front as blasphemy and intolerance of religious liberty. In response to the events, the strongest critic speaking out against the LGBT community was no other than Marco Feliciano; Federal Deputy, pastor and, paradoxically, the President of Brazil’s Human Rights and Minorities Commission.

The controversial incident from São Paulo is the most recent example to bring to the fore the wider tensions between religious and sexual liberties in Brazil. Although Brazil formally is a secular state, religious agendas increasingly intersect with public affairs, in particular in the field of human rights. This has not only become a hot-button issue for national policymakers, but also causes concern among the human rights community. Contrary to popular belief, however, the main opponent to LGBT rights is no longer the Catholic Church whose follower statistics in Brazil have, in fact, fallen to the lowest point ever recorded in history (Pew Research Center, 2013). Protestant churches, on the other hand, have raised their profile. Simultaneously, Evangelical political participation has adopted aggressive and omnipresent features following a pattern of unparalleled expansion in reach and power. Guided by extremely conservative Christian norms, more fervently than their Catholic counterparts, their principal interest has become morality politics. The uncontested leaders of this religious movement are the Pentecostal Churches;\(^2\) a segment of Protestantism, among other features,

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\(^1\) The acronym ‘LGBT’ is used as the politically correct umbrella term for sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression. In this dissertation it will be used synonymously to the term ‘sexual and gender minorities.’

\(^2\) It is important to note that for the purposes of this dissertation, the term Pentecostal will include classical Pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God, as well as more recent ‘Neo-Pentecostal’ denominations, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which originated in Brazil.
characterised by the belief in the inerrancy of sacred texts which ultimately makes Pentecostalism a fundamentalist movement.³

The theme of sexuality is central to the Pentecostal moral agenda in the wider attempt to regulate Brazilian society in the name of God. Pentecostal Churches and affiliated political figures are increasingly targeting public policies intended to guarantee the fundamental freedoms of LGBT persons. This dissertation is concerned with the human rights of sexual and gender minorities and evaluates the current level of influence held by Pentecostalism in Brazilian politics as a potential obstacle to the realisation thereof.⁴

B. Chapter Presentation

With the broader religious and political dynamics in mind, this dissertation looks at the implications of the Pentecostal moral agenda on the human rights of LGBT persons in order to determine the overall threat posed by the religious group. The analysis will be guided by the following three research questions:

1. Does Pentecostal discourse discriminate against sexual and gender minorities, and if yes, how does this create a situation of conflicting rights?

2. How, if at all, have the Pentecostal Churches impacted on public policies addressing homophobia?

3. What does rising Pentecostal political influence signify for Brazil as a secular state based upon the principle of separation of church and state?

³ I apply the term fundamentalism here in line with the definition provided by Hallencreutz & Westerlund (1996)

⁴ By no means do I claim that Pentecostals are the only opponent to LGBT rights in Brazil. The Catholic Church and generally conservative attitudes within the public sector, for instance, must also be acknowledged as opposition forces. Nonetheless, Pentecostalism is the central issue in this study due to its saliency in the LGBT debate. Other actors are therefore not of interest and will not be considered.
In Chapter One I review the human rights situation of LGBT persons in the Latin American region and, more specifically, their legal status in Brazil. Remaining within the Brazilian context, I will consider the prevalence of homophobia to approach the sociopolitical phenomenon referred to as ‘Brazilian Paradox.’ Chapter One further introduces the ways in which the Brazilian State has attempted to challenge homophobia through public policies. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to understand basic notions of LGBT rights and discrimination in Brazil, which will allow for a starting point to address the research questions in later chapters of this dissertation.

Chapter Two shall then develop the centre point of this thesis, i.e. the particular role of Pentecostalism within the LGBT debate. To begin, I review the main critiques that have arisen in the context of the relationship between Evangelical Fundamentalism and politics in Brazil. This section will be based upon contributions from academics and researchers in the fields of human rights, political theory, legal and religious studies. Following the interdisciplinary literature review, I will focus on dogmatic Pentecostal discourse in order to identify common contextual features. Having grasped general ideas about Pentecostal moral conservatism, the analysis will turn to strategies of influence employed by the religious group to gain political power and spread their Christian values into the public sphere. Understanding the main dynamics underlying Pentecostal political participation will form a crucial foundation to evaluate the immediate and wider implications on LGBT rights in the third chapter.

Chapter Three will apply a theoretical framework for analysing the challenges posed by Pentecostalism to effective LGBT protection in Brazil. First, the immediate consequences of Pentecostal political power will be discussed. In other words, how successful the Evangelicals have been at targeting public policies in favour of sexual and gender minorities. On this account, I will, then, debate the wider, more subtle, consequences on their human rights. Here, a focus is set on the dilemma of conflicting rights, that is, religious versus sexual liberties. Moreover, Pentecostal political influence will be examined under particular consideration of the ambiguity of laicity. Chapter Three will close by drawing together this analysis to provide, by way of conclusion, a coherent assessment of the threat Pentecostalism poses to LGBT rights.
C. Methodology

Data collection was manifold, consisting of both empirical and conceptual methodologies. The dissertation hereby relied on triangulation which meant “soliciting data from multiple and different sources as a means of cross-checking and corroborating evidence” to illuminate the theme from various angles (Rudestam & Newton, 2014: 134).

The first methodology was secondary research and data analysis. The principal source for critical investigation were peer-reviewed academic studies. This research design was chosen to understand the full complexity of the political situation in Brazil concerning the human rights of LGBT persons as well as the Pentecostal moral agenda. However, as the direct implications of this phenomenon had not been explicitly studied regarding the extent to which Pentecostalism interferes with the national LGBT agenda, nor under consideration of relevant human rights frameworks, primary data collection was conducted additionally.

The empirical material that informs this dissertation consists of two methodological bases; the first of which is discourse analysis. This qualitative methodology was beneficial because it allowed the extraction of political meanings that inform written and verbal statements of Pentecostal leaders. Sources investigated included raw data freely available in the public domain e.g. video statements on social media, political speeches and news articles published in the Brazilian and international media. Data was selected according to its relevance to the debate surrounding political homophobia. As a mode of theorising the data, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), heavily influenced by French philosopher Michel Foucault, was chosen. It was deemed appropriate for research purposes because sensitive social issues, such as discrimination, are central to this analytical tool (Van Dijk, 2008: 354). The corresponding objective of CDA is to comprehend how social relations and ideologies manifest in discourse. Hence, CDA allows to expose not only the meaning of a particular statement, but also the motivations of the speaker. Analysing Pentecostal language, thus, enabled a deeper understanding of the social and religious context by which political action on LGBT policies is informed. Certain limitations in this regard were encountered due to limited (intermediate) knowledge of the Portuguese language. Nonetheless, a sincere effort was made to obtain

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5 Further details can be found in the literature view in Chapter 2.1
accurate translations from native speakers or draw upon English-speaking material whenever necessary.

The second empirical element was data collected on a field trip to Rio de Janeiro from June to July 2015. A series of seven structured interviews were conducted in person in Rio de Janeiro or through means of a questionnaire which was emailed to participants who lived in other geographical locations within Brazil. Given this research project’s background as a phenomenological study, research subjects were identified according to their experiential relevance. Sampling consequently consisted of a small number of individuals who were assigned to two different groups. Group 1 participants (two persons) were actively involved in political advocacy and held extensive knowledge on national human rights and LGBT issues. Group 2 participants (five persons) were merely required to fulfil the eligibility criteria to identify as a Brazilian LGBT person. This approach was chosen because it offered a qualitative insight into the Pentecostal political rise from an objective (Group 1) as well as subjective (Group 2) perspective, thereby enabling the understanding of “the larger social structure and its effect on individuals” (Merriam, 1998: 34). It must be noted at this stage that for confidentiality reasons no names will be revealed (Appendix I). Details on interviewee characteristics, however, can be found in Table 1. Further, limitations of the methodological approach must be acknowledged. This concerns the fact that access to the LGBT activist community in Brazil turned out to be more difficult than priorly anticipated. Several potential participants who were contacted in advance and agreed to take part in the research study, ended up being unavailable for interviews. This severely changed the research methodology and led to a focus on secondary data and discourse analysis. Therefore, the interviews now serve the purpose to add a small personal perspective to an otherwise largely fact-based analysis.

The sum of sources investigated allowed to answer ontological questions as to why Pentecostals target LGBT policies and what the human rights implications of this are, thereby constructing “a cumulative body of evidence” (Hamilton & Corbett-Whittier, 2012: 19).
**Table 1: Interviewee Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee 1</th>
<th>LGBT activist, formerly employed at the International Gay and Lesbian Association, now works for a non-governmental organisation (NGO) concerned with promoting LGBT equality in Brazil.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td>Sociologist and human rights activist, formerly employed at Amnesty International Brazil, now works for an NGO concerned with promoting LGBT equality in Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 3</td>
<td>lesbian female, university student, from Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 4</td>
<td>gay male, full-time employed, from Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 5</td>
<td>lesbian female, university student, from João Pessoa (Paraíba)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
<td>gay male, full-time employed, from Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 7</td>
<td>gay male, university student, from Ribeirão Pires (São Paulo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. THE BRAZILIAN PARADOX

A. The Human Rights Situation of Sexual and Gender Minorities

1. A Latin American Perspective

In his article ‘Latin America’s Gay Rights Revolution’ published in the Journal of Democracy, Omar Encarnación (2011a: 104) asserts that we are in the midst of experiencing a “surge of gay rights in what historically has been one of the most hostile environments for homosexuals in the Western hemisphere.” Indeed, in terms of legal recognition contemporary Latin America has come a long way, moving beyond its traditionally, conservative image towards a new role as world leader in formalising LGBT equality.

On July 22nd 2010 Argentina set the ball rolling when it legalised same-sex marriage as the first country to do so in the Latin American region and only tenth in the world. In a speech to support this political move, the Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner famously stated that denying this human right to the LGBT community would be a “terrible distortion of democracy” (Diez, 2015: 151) The Argentine LGBT movement’s human rights language, interestingly enough, predated United Nations resolution 17/19 of 2011 which, at last, gave international weight to the notion of gay rights as human rights. Under the employment of a similar rhetoric, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) once and for all clarified linguistic ambiguity in 2013 by emphasising the right to private life. It ruled that sexual orientation and gender identity are protected categories, thus, making discrimination a violation of international law (Encarnación, 2011a). In almost all Latin American countries we have since witnessed sexual and gender minorities challenging traditional norms, thereby increasingly effecting progress on LGBT rights.6

A number of political and social reasons account for these legal victories. Principally, scholars consider the rebirth of civil society following decades of authoritarian rule a pivotal factor. This argument is supported by the fact that since the end of atrocious human rights violations committed under state terrorism in most Latin American countries, democratic values and

6 Even though progress has been documented in all Latin American countries, a vast discrepancy persists between them. Generally speaking, South America is much more progressive than Central America with the states of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil demonstrating the most legal equality indicators. For more, refer to Encarnación (2011a).

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civil rights have been highly valued by the respective societies. Further theories give credit to transnational activism and spillover effects from Europe and the United States, as well as growing secularisation and post-materialism characterised by improved economic security, education and access to international media (Encarnación 2011a, 2011b). Today, although laws governing LGBT rights in the Americas are complex and remain far from unanimous, the entire continent is slowly but steadily evolving. Victories, even small ones, have proven that “achievements once deemed improbable, if not impossible” are in fact, possible (Encarnación, 2011b).

2. Legal Status in Brazil

We are now in the position to move from the broader Latin American context to the specific geographical location and central theme of this dissertation, namely, the situation of sexual and gender minorities in Brazil. The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive overview concerning the legal recognition of LGBT persons. This section is insofar necessary as it will allow us to begin to understand the so-called ‘Brazilian Paradox.’

Brazil’s long struggle for LGBT equality began as early as 1830 when the country became the first in the Southern hemisphere to decriminalise sodomy (Thatcher, 2014). In modern times, the first major achievement occurred in 1985 when the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses. This not only carried social significance as it ‘normalised’ LGBT persons but also, remarkably, happened five years before the General Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the same measure with regard to the International Classification of Diseases. The most crucial step that would open the doors to the active promotion of LGBT rights followed shortly after: Brazil’s Constitution of 1988. The Constitution came into force after years of authoritarian rule and placed a strong emphasis on civil empowerment. Today, it represents a benchmark for human rights in Brazil. Accordingly, under Article 3 it prohibits any form of discrimination by state governments and the population, and encourages the enactment of state and municipal anti-discrimination laws (Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988). In 1989, this led the states of Mato Grosso and Sergipe to be the first to pass anti-discrimination legislation with specific reference to sexual orientation. Nowadays, they no longer stand alone as various others have followed suit in the early 2000s. Having set this baseline, Brazil has ascended as “a leading
state in the international, domestic and regional battle against LGBT discrimination” (Rosenberg, n.d.).

The Brazilian government’s human rights discourse on sexual and gender minorities has evolved into a comprehensive legal framework championing equality. The governments under former President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003-2010) as well as his successor, current President Dilma Rousseff (since 2011), were a decisive advantage in the process. Lula, in particular, repeatedly advocated for the LGBT cause. In 2008, he inaugurated the worldwide first National Conference of Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals, Transvestites and Transsexuals and pledged his support of free gender-reassignment surgery as “a constitutional basic right for all Brazilians” (Rosenberg, n.d.). Brazil’s public health system has offered the service since 2007. In 2009, the Constitutional Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) further expanded transgender citizen rights by ruling unanimously in favour of legal name and gender changes.

Even before the issue of same-sex marriage was debated in Brazil, same-sex couples were granted the right to jointly adopt children. Since as early as 2004, adoption by homosexual parents had been occurring due to a legal vacuum that did not specifically prohibit nor allow the procedure. As a direct result, the decision was at the discretion of a local judge or notary. In light of the non-discrimination provision inherent to the Constitution, same-sex couples were largely able to benefit from this legal ambiguity. In 2010, the Constitutional Court clarified the situation. The outcome was the official legalisation of same-sex adoption with the byproduct of advanced social and legal standing for LGBT couples. The judges grounded their decision in the fact that none of Brazil’s legal documents specifically imposed restrictions as to the sexual orientation of the potential parents. Attorney Adriana Galvão consequently states: “It was a new interpretation. The Constitutional Court found that it can break paradigms and demonstrated that the judiciary is trying to open their vision to our social reality in order to guarantee the rights of people” (Miranda, 2010).

Following this monumental breakthrough, the issue of same-sex marriage also gained momentum. Though Brazil was the first country in Latin America to allow same-sex civil unions for immigration purposes (2003), civil unions were not officially recognised until 2011. Again, it was the Constitutional Court that unanimously ruled in favour of an extension of the term ‘family,’ thereby granting new rights in the areas of pension, social security, health
security and property to homosexual partners in stable unions; rights which heterosexual couples had long enjoyed. Near to full legal equality in family-related matters was won in 2013 when the National Council of Justice sanctioned that civil registries could no longer withhold marriage licences on the basis of sexual orientation. A corresponding amendment of the Brazilian Constitution, however, is still pending (Micro Rainbow International, 2014: 55).

The overview of the legal status of sexual and gender minorities in Brazil has demonstrated that the main forces in empowering the domestic LGBT community are the Constitutional Court, the Constitution of 1988 and a gay-friendly government. From a human rights perspective, the product of this combined effort is that the Brazilian Government has accepted its role as duty-bearer with legal obligations vis-a-vis its population. The corresponding result is the active promotion of LGBT persons as rights-bearing citizens.

3. The Prevalence of Homophobia

I will now argue in accordance with Rosenberg (n.d.) and others (e.g. Mott, 2015) that Brazil functions within a conundrum in relation to its status on LGBT issues. Because of this, the term ‘Brazilian Paradox’ was coined. It refers to the inherent contradiction between the wide scope of legal protection available to gender and sexual minorities, and the equally high score in homophobic hate crimes and discrimination.

Despite the range of new legal protections available to LGBT persons, Brazil suffers from structural homophobia which perpetually results in human rights violations. Concerns about the grave situation in Brazil have been addressed by human rights mechanisms of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. For instance, Brazil’s 2008 national report on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the Human Rights Council of the United Nations (UN) stated that LGBT persons “are frequent targets of [violent] acts and homicides” (UN, 2008). Although the Brazilian State has since made a determined effort to strengthen human rights protection, it was acknowledged in its 2012 UPR that “challenges [homophobic violence] are still significant” (Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República, 2012: 117).
Evidence for the persistence of the issue of homophobic violence was provided in the 2014 homicide report by the Brazilian gay rights group Grupo Gay da Bahia (GGB). It confirmed that “at least 326 lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals were killed in attacks related to their sexual orientation last year, up from 159 in 2004” (GGB, 2014). These statistics do not only indicate that homophobic violence is a serious issue in Brazil, but directly assign the country the international lead position in LGBT homicides (Corrales & Pecheny 2010: 20). To put this into regional perspective, it is worth turning to a 2008 comparative study that registered 190 homophobic murders in Brazil as opposed to only 35 in Mexico and 25 in the United States (GGB, 2009). What is more, a total of 2680 violent acts that resulted in death were documented between 1980 and 2006 in all of which sexual orientation or gender expression represented a decisive factor (Corrales & Pecheny, 2010: 20). Today, it is assumed that approximately every 28 hours an LGBT person is murdered in Brazil (GGB, 2014). The problem is that “in a region where homicide may be so prevalent, these hate-crime statistics, however horrific, become commonplace and therefore insufficiently disturbing to generate public outcries” (Corrales & Pecheny, 2010: 20). Thus, specific cases occasionally make the news, yet the overall homophobic attitude is not publicly condemned. This has led former President Lula to describe homophobia in Brazil as “the most perverse disease impregnated in the human head” (Pierceson et al., 2010: 110).

Following up on the reasons for the prevalence of homophobia, thorough monitoring of the IACHR has come to the conclusion that “the common denominator of this violence is the perception by the perpetrator that the victim has transgressed accepted gender norms” (OAS, 2014). Building upon on this train of thought, high levels of homophobia must be linked to machismo and patriarchalism in Latin America which promote a strict male and female conduct. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights consequently affirms that hate crimes against LGBT persons should be categorised as “a form of gender-based violence, driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying gender norms” (OAS, 2014). On these grounds, GGB’s founder Luiz Mott remarks that a crucial problem is the absence of educational policies on homophobia (Leal, 2014). Mott’s demands are in line with Brazil’s

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7 Grupo Gay da Bahia is Latin America’s oldest gay activist group and receives funding from the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

8 Death is the most extreme form of homophobic violence. Institutional and cultural discrimination, physical and verbal aggression, unemployment and homelessness occur to even higher extents (Leal, 2014)
obligation under international law as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has urged OAS Member States to:

“[…] address the underlying causes of violence based on prejudice linked to the sexual orientation, gender identity or expression of persons who challenge socially established gender norms. This includes the adoption of policies and public campaigns to promote awareness and respect for the human rights of LGBT persons, in all sectors, including in the education and family settings, as a means to combat the prejudices that underlie violence related to sexual orientation and gender identity and expression” (OAS, 2014).

In the next section, it will be explored how the Brazilian State has addressed the situation to fulfil its international human rights obligations.

**B. Challenging Homophobia through Public Policies**

In response to the requirements of international human rights law to protect and promote the human rights of all individuals within Brazilian borders, the governmental administrations under Lula and Rousseff have challenged the ‘social disease’ homophobia by introducing public policies.

In 2003 members of the Brazilian National Congress created the Parliamentary Front for Free Sexual Expression which was renamed in 2007 to the Mixed Parliamentary Front for LGBT Citizenship. The most prominent attempt to prevent and reduce discrimination and violence against sexual and gender minorities that followed is the Ministry of Human Rights’ ‘Brasil sem Homofobia’ (Brazil without Homophobia) programme of 2004. According to its official caption it was designed to “combat violence and discrimination against GLBT and [promote] homosexual citizenship” (Ministério da Saúde, 2004). To give credit where credit is due, this step must be interpreted as to signal that the Brazilian State aims to go beyond the mere tackling of homophobic violence by setting the wider objective to empower the LGBT community in their fundamental role as rights-bearers.

9 ‘GLBT’ is the equivalent of the acronym ‘LGBT’ in Portuguese language
The programme functions within a two-fold pragmatic which discusses theoretical issues about homophobia within a framework for action. Central to this concept are “legal steps to alleviate inequity and intolerance” (Rosenberg, n.d.) with a focus on the public sector. An obstacle that has hindered the effectiveness in practice is that the programme largely depends upon political interest and support. The strongest opponent to anti-homophobia policies is the so-called Evangelical Bench (‘Bancada Evangélica’), which was called into life by Congressmen of various religious faiths as a counter-movement to the Parliamentary Front for Free Sexual Expression. The majority of the participating Congressmen and Senators are affiliated with the Pentecostal Churches. In total, they make up approximately one sixth of all parliamentarians, currently holding 73 out of 513 seats (Aranda, 2014). Due to Brazil’s complex political system in which the Congress holds more power than the President and a wide range of political parties are presented, the united Evangelical front holds great decision-making power over LGBT legislation. With growing moral conservatism in Brazilian politics, funding of the Brazil sem Homofobia programme and corresponding initiatives has become a crucial problem (Fitch, 2009: 137).

Therefore, it makes sense to dedicate the following chapter to the Evangelical movement in Brazil. I will focus in detail on the Pentecostal belief system and strategies of influence that have made the movement what it is today. That is - as I hope to demonstrate in this dissertation - a powerful actor in the LGBT debate and in the fight against (or in favour of) homophobia.

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10 As opposed to linguistic custom in other countries, the terms ‘Evangelical’ and ‘Pentecostal’ are frequently used interchangeably in the context of Brazil due to the fact that the majority of Evangelicals belong to the Pentecostal denomination. This is important to acknowledge as quotes cited in this research occasionally mix both terms to refer to Pentecostals.
III. MORALITY POLITICS: THE PENTECOSTAL AGENDA

A. Evangelical Fundamentalism on the Rise

In the last two decades a considerable amount of literature has been devoted to the growth of the Pentecostal segment of Protestantism in Brazil. The increasing scholarly interest in the subject stems from the fact that religiosity was expected to decline with modernisation, however, the trend has been reversed to the point where Pentecostalism now represents “the largest and fastest growing religion, not only in Brazil but in the world” (Dean, 2012: 1). The reason why specifically Brazil frequently features as a key country in sociopolitical and religious analysis is due to its important role as a BRIC state, i.e. rising economic power in international relations, as well as its status as the state with the overall highest Pentecostal fellowship (Lingenthal 2012: 41). Academic research to date has tended to focus on the appeal of the religious movement, how it has dramatically changed the religious landscape of the world’s largest Catholic nation and the relationship between Pentecostalism and politics (see p. ex. Das Dores Campos Machado 2006, Medcraft 1987, Dean 2012, Solt et al. 2011, Freston 2006).

Protestant membership in Brazil is estimated to lie at approximately 25 percent; almost four-fifth (19 percent) are Pentecostals (Lingenthal, 2012: 41). Considering in 1991 Pentecostals accounted for merely six percent of the population (Pew Research Center, 2013), it is hardly surprising that this significant rise has stimulated social research. The most prominent writer on this subject is Paul Freston, who has published several books on the sociology of Protestantism in Latin America. Freston (2006) explains the phenomenon by referring to ‘Deprivation Theory’ which asserts that marginalised (Afro-)Brazilians, who are frustrated with their socioeconomic situation as a result of globalisation, feel drawn to Pentecostalism because of its spiritual healing. On that account, Freston (2006: 21) deduces that Pentecostalism “is largely a non-white religion and is increasingly distant from worldly power and wealth.”

Though it is generally accepted that marginalised members of society are particularly receptive to the Pentecostal ideology, Freston’s claims demonstrate serious limitations. For instance, Dean (2012: 2) contests that deprivation theory “fails to explain the paradox of
Pentecostalism’s] simultaneously rapid growth in countries where human development and median incomes are high […] or why the wealthy [in Brazil] appear to be joining the Pentecostal movement at an ever increasing rate.” Following this train of thought, Dean (2012: 19) calls into the question whether it may be that not just poverty, but also prosperity attract people to this particular faith. Solt et al’s (2011) ‘Relative Power Theory’ offers valuable explanations. It predicates that due to the Church’s authoritarian model based on inequality, a wealthy rich elite benefits from offering spiritual rewards in exchange for the opportunity to spread Christian values into the social and political spheres. Dean (2012: 2), in line with this theory, argues that “Pentecostalism may be of as much utility to the poor as a coping strategy as it is to the rich as a tool of social control.” The Pentecostal organisational structure has therefore been studied extensively with a particular focus on corruption, yet to date there exist few empirical results on the direct exercise of social control.

In light of relative power theory, there is rapidly growing literature establishing that Pentecostals are occupying more and more mandates in the Brazilian political sector due to their high social standing granted by the power of the churches. Whereas Freston (2006) believed that Pentecostalism lacks institutional unity to present a real political threat, academic evaluations nowadays, especially following the 2010/2014 presidential elections, are of contrary opinion and characterised by rising concern. For example, Das Dores Campos Machado (2006) states that since 1988 Evangelicals have represented a united religious front on political issues, calling into existence the ‘politics of Christ.’ In more drastic terms, Dean (2012: 3) warns that Pentecostalism could realistically pose “a threat to the democratisation of Brazil” and calls for a reassessment of the “false sense of security” induced by Freston’s research. Loreto Mariz (1994) categorises Pentecostal political participation as a clear factor in hindering social change. Likewise, Duarte de Souza (2014: 53) notes that “religious associativism as instigator of social capital” exposes the artificiality of political and religious boundaries in Brazil.

Apart from concerns about the implications of the Pentecostal rise in power on the status of democracy and laicity, academic and media attention has more recently been wielded towards the moral agenda of Pentecostalism on the themes abortion and homosexuality. Though excessively discussed by NGOs and in the media, the to date only systematic academic studies of Pentecostal moral conservatism in the context of LGBT rights were reported by
Marcelo Natividade, Sandra Duarte de Souza and Marcelo Alves Lima. By method of discourse analysis, Natividade (2006) argues that Evangelicals construct a ‘homosexual threat,’ thereby stigmatising LGBT persons and inciting homophobia. Respectively, looking at the political implications of this, Duarte de Souza (2014: 61) finds that “abortion, homophobia and same-sex marriage [have] been used as currency in the relations of power contested in the Brazilian political scene.” It is important to point out, however, that neither research takes into account an explicit human rights perspective with reference to the direct impact on LGBT rights. Alves Lima (2012), therefore, remains the only author to date who has explicitly addressed religious discourse and its role in relation to the legal debate, albeit with a narrow focus on the bill proposing the criminalisation of homophobia. Thus, it appears that more research with a wider analytical framework is needed.

This dissertation builds upon peer-reviewed research by bringing together previous findings and contributing new ones. What is more, it adds to existing research by extending the interdisciplinary analysis and strengthening the human rights angle on the sociopolitical phenomena Pentecostalism. As a result, complementary perspectives are offered on a subject previously discussed primarily from sociological, political, legal and religious disciplines.

B. Pentecostal Doctrines

1. General

It is not of interest for this dissertation to attempt a detailed summary of every aspect of the Pentecostal belief system. All that is necessary is to emphasise those elements which inform Pentecostal discourse and action on the theme of sexuality.

To begin, Pentecostalism is a form of Evangelical Protestantism that rests on the belief in the inerrancy of the Bible as well as the necessity to accept Jesus for purposes of personal salvation. What distinguishes it from other Evangelical denominations is that Pentecostals reject conventional criteria for social hierarchy and, instead, create their own order in which “an elite called by God and confirmed by the gifts of the Holy Spirit” (Willems, 1996: 209) grants power and status. Distinct spiritual gifts that define Pentecostalism are speaking in
tongues and divine healing. This spiritual element, as well as the authoritarian understanding of God’s words, has evoked that Pentecostalism is classified as fundamentalist Evangelical movement.

In line with its dogma, Pentecostalism teaches a strict, moral conservatism. Hollenweger (1972: 405) elaborates: “For Pentecostals, rigorist ethics seem to be the only way of protesting against the moral perplexity of our times.” It is said that the religious denomination developed as a reaction to typical conduct in urban Brazil (Cesar, 1974: 22); a way of life which according to their belief system is characterised by immoral behaviour. Accordingly, the Pentecostal universal truth in relation to sexuality is strictly limited to a marital union between a woman and a man. Any deviation from this is considered ‘sinful worldliness’ (Medcraft, 1987: 77). This world view derives from their literal interpretation of the Bible and the inherent concepts of heaven and hell, meaning that the former is reserved for those who have accepted God as their saviour [Believers] whereas the latter is for those who have rejected Him [Sinners].

What is of interest to the research purposes of this dissertation is how the religious dogma of the believers affects the lives of the ‘sinners’ in practice. I will therefore now consider in detail an observation by Duarte De Souza (2014: 57), who comments that “traditional religious activism demands legislative and political regulation of the sex of others, especially homosexuals […] Evangelical politicians have [consequently] assumed the role of regulators of sexuality in the name of God.” In the following section it will be discussed how the fight against LGBT equality manifests itself in Pentecostal discourse on sexuality and assessed whether it is accurate to speak of political homophobia.

2. Political Discourse on Sexuality

Let us assume that there exists a direct link between the level of engagement with a religion and how this affects peoples’ acceptance of homosexuality (Das Dores Campos Machado & Piccolo, 2010: 15). Taking this together with Elżbieta Tabakowska’s (2002: 449) claim that “by means of language people express their psychological and social identities as well as their attitudes,“ we are in the position to use the power of language to assess the relationship between Pentecostals and the theme of homosexuality.
In this section, I will elaborate on the dogmatic religious discourses of Brazilian Pentecostal pastors (with political affiliation) and politicians on LGBT rights. By drawing upon examples from selected key leaders from the Pentecostal front, I will argue that political and religious figures alike share a common textual background systemically marked by homophobia. The findings will form the basis of my later claims that such homophobic discourse increasingly affects policymaking and implementation of legislation in place to protect and strengthen the human rights of sexual and gender minorities.

2.1. Marco Feliciano

When asked to name a Pentecostal politician associated with homophobic public statements, six out of seven interviewees who participated in this research study mentioned Marco Feliciano. As previously touched upon in the introduction, Feliciano is a Pentecostal pastor and Federal Deputy who was elected President of the Commission for Human Rights and Minorities of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2013. The Commission, “as part of one of the highest legislative authorities in Brazil, has the power to safeguard human rights and ensure equal treatment of minorities in the country” (Hazeldean et al., 2013: 1). It therefore represents a core national human rights mechanism in line with Brazil’s international commitments, in particular the Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Due to various statements made by Feliciano, the integrity of the Commission has been questioned as it has been reported, for example, that he said “the degradation of homosexual feelings lead to hate, crime and rejection” (Hazeldean et al., 2013: 2). In contrast to promoting all individuals within Brazil’s jurisdiction as equal, the usage of the word ‘degradation’ implies a personal view point that homosexuals are of lower worth and associated with negative, even criminal, actions. In response to public outcry, Feliciano stated: “I am not homophobic […] I am against their promiscuity. I don’t want my daughters to go out on the streets and see men with shaved legs kissing each other. The Brazilian family must be respected” (Watts, 2013). The fact that Feliciano rejects to be homophobic is an utterly Brazilian feature that has been studied by sociologists since the 20th century. A widely accepted theory by Florestan Fernandes (1971) has established that Brazilians show strong “prejudice against having

11 See: Appendix II question 13 and Appendix III question 9.
prejudice,” hence frequently hide their true attitudes in order to be socially accepted. In Feliciano’s situation having social approval is of major importance as he is a state representative interested in maintaining his powerful position. In order to appeal to the majority of Brazil’s conservative and religious society (of various faiths), referring to the ‘Brazilian family’ must, thus, be interpreted as a strategic step to justify his homophobic discourse on the basis of dominant heteronormative standards.

The heteronormative expectation centred around the heterosexual family unit, patriarchy and reproduction further becomes evident in his remark: “When you promote a woman to have the same rights as men, she would want to work, her part of being mother starts getting diminished. [She will] either not marry, or keep a marriage, or [have] a relationship with a person of the same sex, enjoying the pleasures of a childless union” (Comissão de Cidadania e Reprodução, 2013). This implies that Feliciano, whilst also disclosing a highly misogynistic attitude towards women, perceives the extension of human rights to women and LGBT persons as a threat to the rigorous ethics taught by the Pentecostal dogma. This fear of progress is continually re-enforced as Feliciano, on a regular basis, accuses LGBT activists of sponsoring a ‘gay dictatorship’ (Congreso em Foco, 2015). There is no doubt that such discourse marked by extreme metaphors is deeply homophobic and seeks to portray LGBT persons as oppressors of Christian heterosexual Brazilians.

With more explicit reference to his Pentecostal faith, Feliciano has made further anti-homosexual remarks, such as calling homosexuality a disease. The solution provided by Feliciano is ‘salvation’ in the form of a ‘gay cure.’ In fact, he has announced “In 2015, expect the Evangelical front!” (Pires, 2013) with reference to new plans to set in motion a law designated to reclassify homosexuality as a disease, thereby overturning the 1985 ban by the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine. Rather than protecting human rights and minority rights as his political position obliges him to, this suggests that Feliciano “actually holds the very beliefs he is supposed to protect against” (Hazeldean et al., 2013: 3).

12 Fernandes’ study was centred around racial prejudice in Brazil. However, his broader findings on societal patterns can be applied to various types of prejudice including against sexual and gender minorities.
2.2 Silas Malafaia

Besides Marco Feliciano, Silas Malafaia has been identified by five out of seven interviewees as a homophobic Pentecostal spokesperson known to be interfering with the LGBT agenda. Malafaia is an Evangelical leader, pastor and televangelist, and has openly embraced Feliciano on various occasions.

Drawing a close parallel to Feliciano’s portrayal of LGBT activism as a ‘gay dictatorship,’ Malafaia too considers the fight for equal rights ‘moral garbage’ and has declared that he will not let “Satan destroy our family values” (Boadle, 2013). These statements contain explicit homophobic content by alluding to LGBT persons as evil sinners and not worthy of equal standing in society. To further confirm this interpretation from a political angle, Malafaia also stated: “[…] Are you against the laws which are in the PNDH III [Brazil’s National Human Rights Plan] to vote for homosexual groups to become first class citizens, are you against it? So, pay attention to the citizens you’re voting for” (Duarte de Souza, 2014: 59). Evidently, the Pentecostal leader preaches an ideology of division; one in which only heterosexual Brazilians are worthy of human rights, whereas homosexual Brazilians are regarded as second-class citizens. In public denial of his own prejudice, Malafaia defends himself and declares, “I have nothing against homosexuals. I love them how I love criminals” (Global Voices, 2013), thereby using an analogy to imply that homosexuals need to be ‘cured’ in order not to harm society.

The most alarming aspect of Malafaia’s discourse on sexuality is the extreme level of aggressiveness directed towards sexual and gender minorities. In 2012, he openly incited violence against LGBT persons whilst nationwide on air, stating: “The guys in the Gay Parade ridiculed symbols of the Catholic Church and no one says anything. The Catholic Church must beat these guys up, you know? Beat them up so these guys can learn” (Alves Lima, 2012: 16). Rather than just expressing an opinion, as later argued by Malafaia, the appeal to harm the physical integrity of individuals with a specific group identity must be exposed as what it is, that is, an explicitly homophobic and violent attack on their human dignity.

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13 See: Appendix II question 13 and Appendix III question 9.
2.3 Jair Bolsonaro

The perhaps most scandalous case study in terms of a wealth of discriminatory statements makes Congressmen Jair Messias Bolsonaro, who three out of seven research participants associated with political homophobia. In his own words, Bolsonaro stated that he feels like a ‘brother’ to Marco Feliciano (Costa & Passarinho, 2013). Accordingly, his political agenda is equally marked by a reoccurring pattern of homophobia, racism and misogyny to the extent where he has been sued several times and faced expulsion claims from the Brazilian Congress by opposition parties.

In February 2010 Bolsonaro made the national headlines when he defended the actions of a father who had beaten his eight year old son to death for defying heteronormative gender expectations. Despite corporal punishment being outlawed in Brazil, the prevalence of machismo evokes that effeminate behaviour in men remains “an excuse for violence” (Leal, 2014). In a normative comment in response to the event, Bolsonaro stated that “beating the crap” out of children who are “a little gay” should be acceptable (Leal, 2014). Similarly, he trivialised the torture and murder of another homosexual teenage boy as “a public sob story” propagated by gay activist groups (Fry, 2013). These examples show that Bolsonaro not only lacks empathy for the grave human rights situation induced by homophobia, but also welcomes traditional machismo ideology which promotes such violence. In the attempt to downplay the severity of the problem, the right-wing Congressman denied the existence of homophobia in Brazil, affirming that: “There is no homophobic behaviour in Brazil. Those who die, the majority of homosexual deaths, they die in drug situations, prostitution, or even killed by their own partners” (Fry, 2013). Such statements illustrate the high degree of stereotypical prejudice held against LGBT persons, including in association with criminal acts. The absurdity of Bolsonaro’s homophobic prejudice gained a new low when he insinuated a correlation between legalising civil unions and legalising pedophilia (Global Voices, 2011a).

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14 This low result could be due to Bolsonaro’s position as Congressman from Rio de Janeiro, therefore operating within a more limited geographical reach than Feliciano and Malafaia. The three research participants who identified Bolsonaro were from Rio de Janeiro, whereas three out of four who did not were from other Brazilian states.

15 See: Appendix II question 13 and Appendix III question 9.
Contrary to Marco Feliciano and Silas Malafaia, Jair Bolsonaro makes no effort to disguise his attitude towards sexual and gender minorities. In fact, he has openly admitted “We Brazilian people don’t like homosexuals” and that he would rather his child die in a car crash than be gay (Planas, 2014). As a direct consequence of his personal beliefs, Bolsonaro has repeatedly confirmed his objection to pro-LGBT policies, such as plans for an anti-homophobia programme in public schools. In a 2011 Congress debate on the bill, he alleged that President Dilma Rousseff must be a lesbian herself if she approved of such a measure, stating that: “If you like homosexuals, admit it. If your thing is homosexual love, admit it. But don’t let that cowardliness get into first grade” (Planas, 2014). According to further statements, Bolsonaro fears that “they [LGBT persons] want to reach our children in order to turn the children into gay adults to satisfy their sexuality in the future. So these are the fundamentalist homosexual groups that are trying to take over society” (Fry, 2013).

2.4 Findings

The contextual references on the theme on sexuality made by the three Pentecostal religious and political figures analysed above share a range of key features:

(1) Pentecostal conviction is inherent to all statements, insofar, as it is claimed that the only legitimate function of sexuality is in heterosexual relations. What is achieved by such heteronormative discourse is a worldview wherein homosexuality is considered inferior to heterosexuality, and human rights for sexual and gender minorities are deemed irrelevant.

(2) There is an explicit use of theological language. Homosexuality is categorically dismissed as an ‘abomination’ or ‘sin’ in an appeal to divine authority. As a matter of fact, none of the speakers disguise that their religion is guiding their political agenda on sexuality.

(3) Sociolinguistically speaking, it can be observed that distance is maintained by distinguishing between ‘we’ and ‘they.’ This is of particular semantic relevance as ‘the others’ [LGBT persons] are frequently characterised by a lack of respect whereas the ‘we’ reflects a “verbal positive self-presentation” (Tabakowska, 2002: 456).
Under the application of Critical Discourse Analysis, the written and verbal statements of Pentecostals can be interpreted as to be openly spreading political homophobia on the grounds of their religious belief system. Placing this finding within its sociopolitical context, it clearly indicates that all three Pentecostals struggle to adhere to the concept of laicity, i.e. the separation of Church and State. Moreover, the offensive, distant language employed by Pentecostals against sexual and gender minorities, in conjunction with accusing the latter of authoritarianism, creates a ‘homosexual threat’ (Natividade, 2006). The more implicit motivation behind this could be interpreted as to mean that the speakers attempt to disrupt social cohesion and incite conflict amongst the Brazilian population in order to strengthen their political power in line with the heteronormative status quo.

C. The Acquisition of Political Power: Pentecostal Strategies of Influence

So far, certain Pentecostal doctrines as well as the political discourse on sexuality have been pinpointed. The analysis will now highlight the strategies employed by Pentecostals to spread their concept of sexual morality into the Brazilian political sphere.

1. The Church

There exists widespread consensus that converts to the Pentecostal faith are largely drawn to the religious denomination because of their disillusion with the Catholic Church. This has been explained by globalisation and corresponding demographical trends because of which rural migrants find themselves at the margins of society in their new urban setting (Medcraft 1987: 76). The Pentecostal response to disillusioned Brazilians, then, is to act as a “mechanism of integration in the passage of traditional to modern society” (Muniz de Souza, 1968: 106). Individuals from lower social classes with less education are particularly affected by this trend as they are drawn to the “warm, receptive, small-sized community for immigrants” where they are told that Christ is the solution to all their problems (Medcraft, 1987: 76). This practice of social inclusion, creating new public spaces for disenfranchised members of society, distinguishes Pentecostalism from other Protestant denominations which generally attract more privileged classes (Neri, 2011: 24-26).
Within this social context, Pentecostals strategically target marginalised Brazilians in order to adopt the role as a helper in time of need. Concretely translated, this means that believers are promised miracles that will allow them to escape their socioeconomic situation, sickness and otherwise melancholic existence. The Pentecostal dogma is key to achieving this, as well as a self-portrayal as ‘God’s chosen people.’ Linked to this, pastors perform exorcism, promise to cure diseases and speak in tongues. In a country like Brazil that still has vast levels of extreme poverty, poor health services and is largely influenced by spiritism due to its African heritage, a religion that is based on miracles becomes attractive. To underline this, Muniz de Souza (1969: 94) notes that there have been reports about a man who became a Pentecostal “if the Spirit would lead him to a job.” This shows the power of the gifts of the spirit within the Pentecostal faith. As a strategy of influence, Pentecostalism appeals to potential believers by offering a new social reality; one which “all of a sudden turns humble, small officials and maids into containers of enlightened spirits and carriers of sublime messages” (Camargo, 1961: 125). It is thus plausible that, as Medcraft (1987: 76) confirms, the Pentecostal churches’ success lies in their market-based approach, pursuing a simple, yet clever, demand and supply chain.

2. The Media

A main strategy of public influence employed by the Pentecostal churches to reach a wide audience and propagate evangelisation is written and broadcast media. Besides having the largest circulation of a daily newspaper in Brazil, the Folha Universal, the Pentecostal movement became a major player in the broadcast world in the year 1990 when Bishop Edir Macedo, founder of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), purchased TV Record, a television and radio network, for an alleged record sum of US$ 45 million (Reis, 2006: 169). Under Pentecostal entrepreneurial leadership, TV Record was renamed to Rede Record and transformed into Brazil’s third largest network.

The Pentecostal acquisition of media power did not go uncriticised. Apart from controversies surrounding the unconstitutional act for a charitable institution to purchase TV Record (Reis, 2006: 167), Macedo himself was accused of having received a US$ 1 million ‘donation’ from a Colombian drug cartel and was subsequently arrested.16 The Pentecostal movement,

16 Various corruption scandals have occurred. See: Reis (2006) and Dean (2012).
however, in the end turned out to be benefitting from related negative press as Macedo’s marketing techniques allowed him to depict himself as a martyr by blaming rival network Rede Globo for the ‘conspiracy’ (Reis, 2006: 172). Macedo and the UCKG hereby strategically used the Pentecostal faith as a way to pinpoint to Christ as the saviour who performs miracles for ‘the chosen.’

Though by now more than 25 percent of all Brazilian radio stations belong to Evangelical churches, television marketing remains a preferred method of evangelisation. On certain channels up to 22 hours of daily airtime are occupied by televangelists (Oualalou, 2014). A theory that has arisen in this regard is that of Reis’ (2006: 175) which affirms that, “for many people, religious broadcasting might provide an instantaneous, direct form of communication that mirrors the way in which they acquire most of their information and entertainment.” From this follows that Pentecostals employ the media strategically in order to use it, as I will outline now, as “an instrument of political socialisation” (Alves Lima, 2012: 23).

3. Politics

Pentecostals have used the media as well as church services resourcefully beyond the mere objective of increasing their visibility and fellowship. Most remarkably, they have “emerge[d] as agents of mediation able to offer material benefits of public and private character for their members […] but they also participate in the management of resources connected to the public sector and, in the case of Evangelicals, the interests of the traditional institutions of the political system” (Gurza Lavalle & Castello, 2004: 93). In short, media and church services function as effective instruments for vote catching in a wider attempt to cultivate political influence. Through all available tools believers are confronted with the core message ‘Evangelical votes for Evangelical.’ The slogan derives from a book by Josué Sylvestre (1986) in which he claims that in an Evangelical community the concept of ‘Irmão vote em Irmão’ (‘Brother votes for Brother’) holds. This practice of social solidarity, if one may call it so, has been criticised by various researchers because of the way it makes a “totalitarian claim on the individual” (Wilson, 1961) to the point where “all the Pentecostal member’s [political] acts come to be regulated and controlled by his church” (Medcraft, 1987: 75). The individual in possession of personal consciousness and free will is, in this sense, silenced.
To further elaborate on the strategy of political socialisation, a comprehensive study researched by Reis (2006: 176) on the use of media by the Pentecostal denomination UCKG finds that the Church’s daily newspaper Folha Universal has a strong content focus on political campaigning and the presentation of political candidates affiliated with the Church. Similarly, speeches from Pentecostal pastor Silas Malafaia are frequently characterised by pledges of support for public officials of Pentecostal faith or verbal attack against rival candidates in political elections. For instance, in his television programme ‘Victory in Christ’, Malafaia declared himself a political ally of conservative politician Jose Serra whilst “[showing] disconnected portions of speeches of the candidate Dilma Rousseff […] in which she affirmed not having a defined religion and being for abortion” (Duarte de Souza, 2014: 59). Clearly, strategies urging to vote for a particular candidate can be categorised as outright political propaganda and show strong features of clientelism. When confronted about his political influence, Malafaia responded: “I’m not interested in standing for election. I like to wield influence behind the scenes. At local level, we are able to impose any candidate we like. At the last municipal elections, I fielded a candidate who is unknown to the general public, but well known to evangelicals: He was one of those who won the most votes” (Oualalou, 2014).

Through the accumulation of electoral capital and by aligning themselves strategically with right-wing conservative parties, the Pentecostal movement has managed to successfully establish itself in the political realm. Hence, it was not necessary to found an own party as spreading ‘politicians for Christ’ among the whole political spectrum resulted in a more effective, formal legitimisation of the Pentecostal moral agenda. Representatives are now present at all levels of the Brazilian public sector and act as a strong voting block (Duarte de Souza 2014, Alves Lima 2012). As aforementioned, Pentecostal political influence on the LGBT debate has therefore unsurprisingly grown significantly; a situation which is increasingly impacting upon the human rights of sexual and gender minorities.
IV. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE: HUMAN RIGHTS OR HETERO RIGHTS?

A. The Implications of Pentecostal Political Participation

1. Targeting LGBT Legislation: Success or Failure?

The foregoing discussion has highlighted how Pentecostal discourse targets homosexuality and public policies in favour of LGBT equality in Brazil, thereby exposing deeply-embedded political homophobia. It also outlined the strategies by which influence on relevant legislation is aimed to be achieved in practice. On these grounds, this section will assess the degree of success the Pentecostal Churches have had at impacting on the LGBT agenda. The selected policy examples were chosen due to their controversiality in Brazilian politics and their capability to expose the tensions between sexual and religious liberties.

1.1 Education and Sexuality Policies

The state school system has been identified by several studies as a hotspot of homophobia which has prevented high numbers of LGBT persons from receiving an education, earning a qualification and entering the formal job market (Micro Rainbow International, 2014). In an empirical study, Castro et al. (2004) found that 25 percent of students expressed discontent with having a homosexual classmate. Along similar lines, a survey funded by the Ministry of Education showed that humiliation and homophobic violence commonly occur in public schools (Mazzon, 2009). These findings pinpoint to the need to implement public policies in the education sector to guarantee the basic human rights of sexual and gender minorities.

To stimulate the discussion on discrimination in the education sector, an ‘Anti-Homophobia Kit’ was proposed under the ‘Brazil without Homophobia’ scheme. The Kit consisted of various learning material to be disseminated in 6000 public schools nationwide, thereby having the capacity to reach more than six million young people and educate them on human rights and equality (GGB, 2015). The education policy was embraced by the UNESCO which deemed it as “appropriate to age and cognitive-affective development as intended according to the International Technical Guidance on Sexual Education” (Santana, 2013).
Contrary to prior election pledges, the project was vetoed by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff in 2011 on the basis that it propagated homosexuality, hence would be inappropriate for minors. In her own words, the President stated: “The government cannot allow any group to make propaganda relating to sexual orientation. We cannot interfere in people's private lives” (McLoughlin, 2011). Activists, such as the only openly homosexual Federal Deputy Jean Wyllis, have subsequently criticised the President for a lack of integrity in the face of an Evangelical backlash in Congress. Indeed, according to Jandira Queiroz (2013) from Rio Sexual Policy Watch, the failure of the education policy can be traced back to the influence of Pentecostal pastor Silas Malafaia and other Evangelicals who used their united power to force Rousseff to withdraw the initiative from the national curriculum. This view rests on the argument that Rousseff’s decision was announced shortly after Evangelical leaders and their political allies in Congress protested and threatened to interfere with various forthcoming legislation. This is a prime example of the previously outlined tactic by the Evangelical Bench to unanimously block legislation contrary to their Christian faith. Further confirmatory evidence is provided by a statement made by its Head, Paulo Freire, who notes: “Sometimes we paralyse the parliament by being absent when there’s a vote on a bill the government is supporting, so that there’s a problem getting a quorum” (Oualalou, 2014). In the case of the Anti-Homophobia Kit, which was ridiculed by the Pentecostals as ‘Kit Gay,’ the strategy worked, resulting in the bill aimed at promoting awareness and respect for sexual diversity to be off the table.

It is on this account that Mountian (2014: 15) argues that “regressive trends in terms of human rights and democratic values such as the respect for plurality” must be observed in the national education system. Relating this finding to the previously mentioned obligation imposed upon Brazil by the OAS (2014) to strengthen human rights awareness and respect for sexual diversity in the education sector, one must therefore identify a breach thereof.

1.2 The Criminalisation of Homophobia

The second major controversy to highlight Pentecostal influence on LGBT rights developed out of proposed anti-homophobia legislation (Bill PL122). If approved, Brazilian law would criminalise homophobia, meaning that “anyone convicted of preaching or teaching against homosexuality could be subject to a prison term of between two to five years” (Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada, 2008). The sole existence of such a law proposal highlights the government’s rising concern about the human rights situation of sexual and gender minorities. For this reason, PL122, which has received support from President Rousseff, sheered hope amongst activists that it could reshape ‘Brazil’s moral identity’ (Bevins, 2015).

The fact that PL122 has been pending in the Brazilian Congress for over a decade, however, implies the political force of the opposition. Pentecostals, in alliance with other religious groups, harshly criticise that, providing the bill were approved, all such statements as discussed in section 2.3 would be met with legal charges. In order to mobilise Brazil’s religious communities to engage in open protest, a different terminology was adopted by Evangelical leaders. Rather than in theological language, the criminalisation of homophobia is framed as the prosecution of personal conviction and presented as a threat to religious liberty and freedom of speech. That is to say, human rights language is employed to discredit proposed human rights legislation.

On June 1 2011, a crowd of 50.000 people staged a protest “in the name of family, freedom of expression, religious freedom and against PL122” (Alves Lima, 2012: 5). A similar ‘March for Jesus’ was held in 2012. Moreover, a petition with one million signatures was presented to the Senate by religious leaders. All such acts can be attributed to “the penetration of neo-Pentecostal leaders in media [which] ensures the full disclosure of this type of event” (Alves Lima, 2012: 5). Moving from the media to the political sphere, Pastor Malafaia distributed a free copy of a US-American homophobic publication called “The Agenda: The Homosexual Plan to Change America” to all members of parliament in the attempt to advocate for religious freedom and influence their vote. Though one may not confirm a causal link, the outcome was a significant adaptation to the bill’s original phrasing which is now known as PL122/206. In his research, Alves Lima (2012: 13) elaborates on this, stating that Article 3 now “excludes from the scope of the law the peaceful expression of thought derived from faith and morals founded on freedom of conscience, beliefs and religion, thus giving safe passage to homophobia, sheltered by religious discourse.” Moreover, Article 7, which criminalises the inducement of violence against LGBT persons now leaves out crucial provisions in which the right to express public affection was guaranteed to LGBT persons. In addition, it no longer specifically targets discriminatory statements expressed in the media, therefore quasi
annulling the original reason behind the bill, that is, to adopt a definite position on homophobia once and for all.

The failure of PL122 implies that not only have Pentecostals cultivated great influence over their followers and in policy circles, but also that the bill has fuelled the tensions between sexual and religious liberties. Arguably, to the extent where concealing these conflicting rights appears to be one of the most difficult tasks in current Brazilian politics.

2. A Culture War: Conflicting Rights

What can be observed so far by examining the rise of Pentecostalism in its attempt to influence the national LGBT agenda, quite evidently, indicates a clash on the theme of sexuality. The controversy surrounding sexual versus religious liberties in Brazil is no different from worldwide efforts to strike a balance between two freedoms in modern democracies. Religious leaders and their followers condemn homosexuality as an evil abomination that threatens traditional conservative norms, whereas liberal political figures defend the view of sexuality as a fundamental human right. From this results, as legal scholar Douglas Laylock (2014) calls it, a ‘culture-war.’

Let us begin to understand the dimensions of the culture war dilemma in Brazil by starting with the position adopted by the Pentecostal front. As we have seen from the analysis of the core doctrines, sexual diversity is considered immoral behaviour according to the Bible which is interpreted literally to this present day. Naturally, homosexuality is internalised as a ‘sin’ or ‘disease.’ Laws in favour of sexual diversity must, then, be understood as inconsistent with a religious person’s held beliefs that form part of their identity. Here lies the key issue as a religious person may struggle to disaggregate their belief liberty, guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution and international law, from their conduct. That is, to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. As a logical conclusion, the enactment of equality laws signals to Pentecostals that the government is adopting an explicit position on a contested political matter which contradicts the Christian fundamentalist view of homosexuality as something morally-problematic (Feldblum, 2006: 85).
Relating this to Bill 122/206, Pentecostals and other religious groups view themselves as disproportionately disadvantaged due to their teachings against homosexuality which form an integral part of their inner belief system. As a result, the bill has received large volumes of criticism for sending the message that it not “allowed to preach the Bible anymore” (Alves Lima, 2012: 22), thereby in theory criminalising Christianity. It is this complex situation that, without legitimising it, sheds light on earlier discursive statements by religious leaders equating pro-LGBT legislation to a ‘gay dictatorship.’ Moreover, Alves Lima (2012: 3) remarks that it is precisely “this short-circuit [that] has allowed these leaders to co-opt, beyond their religious comfort zones, a series of negative sensitivities about sexual diversity, transforming them into capital for political and electoral pressure.” In more specific terms, the Pentecostal political position on sexuality is defended on the basis that if homosexuals gain more rights and legal protections, this effectively means less rights for heterossexuals, especially Christians. An advantageous argument is hereby provided that goes beyond narrow religious framing. Instead, religious groups have adopted a human rights approach through which they articulate their opposition to the law by drawing upon their fundamental human right to freedom of expression. This certainly is a powerful charge. But, within this concept is there really an embedded ‘right to criticise homosexuality’ or even a ’right to hate speech’?

Before entering the legal discussion, let us look at this conflict of rights from another perspective, that is, the side of the targets of discriminatory statements made under the guise of religious liberty, namely LGBT persons. A person’s sexual orientation or gender forms part of their core identity. Perhaps, one could even argue, more so than a person’s religious belief as these criteria, rather than learnt, are an LGBT person’s natural human condition. To underline this point, we can draw upon the religious rhetoric ‘Love the sinner, hate the sin.’ This logic appears absurd in the context of LGBT persons as it is based on the assumption that it is permissible to be homosexual but not to engage in sexual activities with the same sex. On these grounds, Feldblum (2006: 104) poses the question, what then does it mean to be gay?

The principal actor obliged to uphold the inherent dignity and equality of all their respective citizens are states. From this follows that the Brazilian State has the responsibility to provide the climate necessary for the personal autonomy and security of all individuals within its

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17 I am implicitly assuming that sexual orientation and gender identity are not a choice.
In the case of minority groups that are largely discriminated against, this often requires ‘a baseline of non-discrimination’ (Feldblum, 2006: 119) to ensure that their lives cannot be dictated by majorities. Thus, it must be argued that equality laws do not go against religious liberties at all. Rather, prior to the proposed legislation, “the government [had] necessarily tak[en] a stance on the moral question [of sexuality] every time it fail[ed] to affirmatively ensure that gay people can live openly, safely and honestly in society” (Feldblum, 2006: 88). By not interfering with homophobia, the Brazilian government was supporting the view that homosexuality is, indeed, something morally-problematic. In other words, the government took the side of discrimination, perpetuated an environment of fear and humiliation and, most importantly, failed its legal obligations. However, for purposes of argument, assuming that even if the sexual conduct of LGBT persons were something morally-problematic as Pentecostals claim, Donnelly (2012: 283) emphasises that “discrimination cannot be justified from a human rights perspective [because] ‘perverts,’ ‘degenerates,’ and ‘deviants’ have the same human rights as the morally pure and should have those rights guaranteed by law.” Rio de Janeiro’s Senator Jean Wyllis subsequently published an open letter, referring to human dignity principles within the Brazilian Constitution and arguing that “the limit to anyone's freedom of expression is the human dignity of others. What fanatics and religious fundamentalists have done most in recent years is violate the human dignity of homosexuals” (Global Voices, 2011b). Without a doubt, Wyllis has a legitimate point. Although the United Nations affirm that no hierarchy exists, to some degree there must be limitations, even to human rights. International human rights law and the Brazilian Constitution, fortunately, offer some clarity.

It is important to begin the legal discussion by recognising that freedom of expression is a core pillar of liberal democracies and contributes to the idea of pluralism. It is also a fundamental human right. The principal source of evidence comes from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes the right of freedom, without interference, the right of having opinions and the right of seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 20 (2) of the

18 Per ex. applicable human rights law includes Article 1 of the UDHR (equality and dignity of all individuals), as well as Article 3 of the UDHR and Articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR (the right to life, liberty and security of person).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), however, adds certain restrictions, declaring that “it will be prohibited by law any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” (UN, 1966). Moving from the international to the national level, the Brazilian Constitution (Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988) has implemented the right to freedom of expression in Article 5.4. Though, it is affirmed that the right is not subject to any restriction, it is also not an absolute right and must be weight against other human rights. Henrique Mariano, President of the Brazilian Bar Association Pernambuco, consequently argues that in Brazil, freedom of speech “doesn’t mean someone can use that right to impinge on someone else’s rights, like the right to human dignity” (Barnes, 2012) manifested in Article 1 of the UDHR (UN, 1948). This rhetoric shows a strong resemblance to that of Senator Wyllis and disqualifies any kind of immunity for Pentecostal preaching along the lines of the homophobic statements analysed in Chapter Two. On these grounds, Marco Aurelio Mello of the Brazilian Constitutional Court notes: “These days it is politically incorrect to defend any cause that shows prejudice. If racial and gender discrimination are crimes, why not homophobia?” (Alves Lima, 2012: 2). Indeed, the Constitution’s (Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988) passages on racism offer the most conclusive ideas when clarifying the conflict of rights, declaring the practice a ‘non-bailable crime’ (Article 5.42). Religious discourse has not been exempt from this. This signals that religious rights may sometimes be religious wrongs and justifies the demand that homophobia, too, should no longer be considered merely an opinion, as Pastor Silas Malafaia claims (Diniz, 2015), but be incorporated in this law. After all, non-discrimination principles are deeply anchored in international human rights law (e.g. Article 2.2 of the ICESCR and Article 7 of the UDHR) and prohibit any form of “invidious public (or publicly supported or tolerated) discrimination” (Donnelly, 2012: 275).

Against this legal background, it can be advocated that the moral authority of sexual and gender minorities derives from the fact that the harm caused to LGBT persons - humiliation, dehumanisation and incitement of violence - is far greater than the other way around. If vulnerable individuals are not protected from political inflammatory speech, Brazilian democracy and human rights are at stake. As Feldblum (2006: 123) puts it: “Protecting one group’s identity liberty may, at times, require that we burden others’ belief liberty. This is an inherent and irreconcilable reality of our complex society.” A legal margin for proportionality
on religious discourse, however, must still apply.

Unfortunately, to say the least, the current political composition in the Brazilian Congress suggests that such a proposed solution towards reconciling the culture war, albeit necessary, does not appear likely. On the contrary, the increasing evangelisation of the public sector leads to the assumption that Brazil is heading in an ever-intensifying direction of uncontrolled religious power and subsequent decrease of the secular state.

In the next section, Brazilian laicity will therefore be questioned. I will argue that since Pentecostal religious values have evidently been spread into the public sphere, rather than a practiced reality, the separation of church and state remains nothing more but an illusive concept in Brazil.

3. **The Separation of Church and State**

The success of the Pentecostal movement in interfering with the national LGBT agenda and their parallel success in justifying their position in terms of freedom of speech, force us to take a closer look at the role of religion in modern, secular Brazil. Given the limited scope here, I will focus on the question: What does the political participation of this religious group in Brazil mean for the Western principle of a separation between church and state? The answer to this question is, insofar, of interest as understanding the potential fragility of the system in place to protect sexual and gender minorities will allow to further assess the level of threat posed by Pentecostalism.

In political terminology, the concept of laicity describes the neutrality of states towards religious beliefs and practices within their jurisdiction. It also prescribes a formal separation between the religious and public spheres, thereby creating the secular state. Laicity must therefore be understood as a non-interference principle on either side. By limiting the role of religion in public spheres, a government protects its citizens from “subordinat[ing] its policies to the specific truth-claims, norms and structures of a religious tradition” (Hallencreutz & Westerlund, 1996: 2) which may harm non-believers, persons of other faiths or those whose conduct is contrary to a dominant religion’s doctrines. Fundamentalists must, then, be understood as opposition groups of this secular ideal. Those, who do not accept that their state
is governed in the absence of dogmatic principles and instead push for a political rule based on the words of, in the case of Pentecostals, the Bible.

Dean (2012: 2) observes: “Despite Brazilian law separating church and state […] Pentecostal churches in Brazil have become more and more aggressively involved in politics in recent years.” Indeed, prior analysis confirms there is no doubt that the Pentecostal Churches strive to strengthen their political role in a wider negotiation for power. Evidence is found in a number of developments, among others, the occupation of important political positions in the Brazilian Congress, ministries and various commissions, as well as owning large television and radio networks, in the attempt to leverage their political power “to representative organs capable of mediating the increasingly important relationship with the state” (Freston, 1996: 147).

The strong visibility of religious figures in the political sphere has caused concern among the Brazilian population about the laicity of the State (Das Dores Campos Machado 2006, Duarte de Souza 2014). This is not unjustified. An increased interfering of religion with politics can be demonstrated by three observations. First, an explicit religious connection of a large number of politicians is immediately evident due to their bearing of the title ‘pastor,’ such as in the case of Marco Feliciano, President of the Human Rights and Minorities Commission, which implies a “high level of religious engagement” (Duarte de Souza, 2014: 57). A second factor is the presence of religious rituals in public institutions. According to Das Dores Campos Machado (2006: 144), it has become a ritual for the Evangelicals to perform a weekly service in Congress where a high number of politicians participate actively. Thirdly, the political discourse of Pentecostal politicians is characterised by dogmatic arguments and explicit religious references, including the fact that they have adopted the name ‘politicians for Christ’ and affirmed to be placing “God at the centre of politics” (Feliciano, 2005: 9). For instance, Pastor Guilhermino Cunha, a Congressman, is said to have publicly stated: “We [Christians] position ourselves in the light of the holy scriptures […]” (Gospelmais, 2007). More explicitly, when asked about the status of laicity in Brazil another Congressman, Henrique Afonso, responded: “This question of lay State is very debated, there are those who tell me that I shouldn’t legislate as a Christian but this is what I believe and I do what God asks me to do. I can’t imagine myself separating those two things” (Duarte de Souza, 2014:
Furthermore, the influential founder of the UCKG, Macedo, has gone as far as to declare his aim to become President of Brazil and “create a theocratic state” (Telesur, 2015).

As a result of the election of various, arguably biased, politicians, it is certain that Evangelicals are rewriting the rules of legislating and secularism appears to be under threat. The developments are particularly alarming from a human rights perspective. Senator Wyllis has subsequently stated that he feared “they [Evangelicals] could restrict liberties for ethnic, religious and sexual minorities” (Watts, 2014). On this note, I will close the theoretical analysis and address Wyllis’ concern in the final section by means of an overall evaluation of the findings.

B. Assessing the Pentecostal Threat to LGBT Rights

The purpose of this section is to draw together all at present available evidence and compare it with evidence gathered from empirical research. This triangulation of data will make it possible to evaluate Pentecostal political homophobia in terms of the extent to which it is subjectively perceived as a threat by LGBT persons in Brazil as well as how it represents an actual threat to the human rights of sexual and gender minorities. The leading question to be discussed is, should the human rights community be concerned about the situation in Brazil?

1. Voices from Brazil

Let us first consider the views of the research participants of this study. The leading question was: “How would you classify the Pentecostal threat to LGBT rights in Brazil?” (Appendix II question 19, Appendix III question 11). This question was analysed using a response scale of “high threat”, “medium threat” and “low threat.” Three interviewees classified the current state of Pentecostal political participation as a medium threat to LGBT rights. Four research participants perceived Brazil to be facing a ‘serious threat’ (see Table 2). The respective reasons were diverse.

Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 2 [LGBT rights experts] both deemed Pentecostal political power a seriously alarming threat. Interviewee 1 (2015) justified this on the basis of the
impact Pentecostal politicians have had on LGBT policies, citing the education and anti-homophobia bills, and pointing out the successful strategy of working in close alliance with right-wing parties to expand their influence. Interviewee 2 (2015), conversely, emphasised that “any threat to the laicity of the State is a serious threat to LGBT rights.” A crucial point to the answer of Interviewee 2 was the fact that this threat should not only be viewed in political terms, but also from a social dimension. Interviewee 2 hereby pointed to the increased use of communication channels [radio, television] as a secondary threat to LGBT rights due to the discriminatory messages spread.

### Table 2: Level of Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons agreeing with statement</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>medium</th>
<th>high</th>
<th>other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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Comparing the expert opinions with those of LGBT persons, the research showed that Interviewee 4 and Interviewee 5 also acknowledged a serious threat. Interviewee 4 (2015) hereby argued along similar lines, referring to the negative impact Pentecostals have had on important human rights bills. Moreover, the fact that Pentecostals are rising in numbers in the political sphere was perceived as a serious issue. Interviewee 5 (2015) did not give an explicit explanation and solely observed that Pentecostals have had a “strong negative influence” on LGBT rights. Contrasting this with the three research participants who deemed Pentecostal political participation as medium threat, arguments were similarly diverse. Interviewee 3 (2015), for instance, applied Freston’s logic by stating that Pentecostal influence was “not as strong as their reputation.” However, the possibility of this changing was acknowledged.
Interviewee 6 (2015) viewed Pentecostals to pose a medium threat due to Brazil’s overall status as a modern country with extensive LGBT legal record. It was noted that Brazil’s frequent interaction with international organisations, as well as various other countries, limits the desired influence of Pentecostals on national LGBT matters. Interviewee 7 (2015) did not justify their answer. It is important to highlight that no research participant perceived Pentecostals as a ‘low threat’ to the human rights of sexual and gender minorities.

To explore this further and assess the degree of concern among the Brazilian LGBT community, the five Group 2 participants were interviewed on their subjective view in relation to their legal status and whether this would improve, stagnate or worsen in a hypothetical scenario of increased presence of Pentecostals in national politics (Appendix III question 10).

### Table 3: Expected Changes to Legal Status

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<th>Number of persons agreeing with statement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>improve</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stagnate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worsen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0</td>
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The results in Table 3 demonstrate that three research participants were certain their legal recognition would worsen. Whilst Interviewee 7 (2015) did not state as to why, Interviewee 6 (2015) based their answer on the total rejection of sexual diversity on part of Pentecostal public figures and their constant attempt to attack proposed legislation or push for anti-LGBT legislation to limit current liberties, such as the classification of homosexuality as a disease as proposed by Senator Marco Feliciano. Interviewee 4 (2015) feared that Brazil might adopt similar policies to Russia in limiting existing rights such as homosexual affection in public.
This fear was justified on the legal basis that in Brazil the Congress holds greater power than the President. With approximately one sixth of the Congress adhering to Pentecostalism this reflects a strong potential threat according to Interviewee 4. In contrast, Interviewee 3 (2015), who believed the legal recognition of LGBT persons would stagnate under increased Pentecostal presence in the public sphere, argued that “minorities matter in Brazil. Any limitation of our rights would be unconstitutional.” It was reasoned that the Constitutional Court represents the highest legal institution and has frequently ruled in favour of sexual and gender minorities. At last, Interviewee 5 (2015) did not want to settle for a definite answer, however, mentioned that “politicians can hold their personal religious beliefs but also understand that as a representative of a diverse society, he is expected to act in the interest of everyone.” This statement indicates that Interviewee 5 trusts in the laicity of the Brazilian State and the protection of the right to sexual liberty, even if this may conflict with the religious liberties of some.

In the following section, the empirical data will be put in context and evaluated together with findings from previous chapters.

2. Evaluation

The evidence gathered from interviews with local activists and members of the LGBT community suggests that the rise of Pentecostalism into the public sphere in Brazil should be regarded with suspicion. The problematic themes identified by research participants agreed with a broad academic consensus that has criticised the religious group for its overt proselytism in Brazilian churches and media, aggressive religious interference with politics and discriminatory discourse on sexuality. The evaluation will accordingly address the themes (1) political influence, (2) artificial laicity and (3) homophobic speech as the three elements underlying the Pentecostal threat.

First and foremost, it must be said that Pentecostal influence among the Brazilian society is indisputably growing. Through means of clientelism and vote-catching this has allowed the religious group to extend its reach into the public sector. Here, Pentecostalism promotes a biblical fundamentalism into the legal sphere with the aim of defending hegemonic heteronormative privileges and limiting the human rights of sexual and gender minorities.
Their success in doing so is underlined by the observation that Pentecostals have infiltrated all committees dealing with relevant political issues. Speaking in concrete figures, currently 73 out of 513 Congress members prescribe to the Pentecostal faith. This, despite of having an LGBT-friendly government, has led Brazil to be governed by Christian values and to acquire an increasingly conservative face. A crucial condition that has aided this development is that Brazil is one of the only Latin American states where the President holds less decision-making power than the Congress. As an explicit result of this, legislation in favour of sexual diversity is frequently blocked, which most alarmingly became clear with the rejection of the bill criminalising homophobia, as well as the awareness programme in the public school system. The success the religious front has had in defeating human rights legislation supports the claim that Pentecostalism should by no means be classified to be supportive of the human rights of sexual and gender minorities, but rather as a worrisome obstacle.

Second, the research has shown that the separation of church and state is a largely illusive concept in Brazil. A primary indicator for this claim derives from the fact that the Human Rights and Minorities Commission, among others, is headed by a President whose personal religious belief system is contrary to the fundamental values the commission was founded upon. Discourse analysis has further shown that various Pentecostal leaders govern Brazil in accordance with their religious doctrines. This implies that they “seem to value these perspectives over constitutional principles that were hard-won after the collapse of the military dictatorship […]” (Queiroz, 2013). On logical grounds, a country that is increasingly governed under a religious faith which denounces a minority group as ‘sick’ and an ‘abomination’ must be classified as a serious threat as it stands in stark contradiction to pluralist values inherent to modern democracies.

Thirdly, the human rights discourse adopted by Pentecostal leaders to defend discriminatory statements against sexual and gender minorities under the guise of religious liberties has not officially been condemned by the Brazilian State. This can be seen by the rejection of the anti-homophobia bill and an overall lack of legal action on individual case basis. What is more, through human rights rhetoric the Pentecostal movement has succeeded in stimulating a series of negative associations with LGBT persons. Thus, it is important to emphasise that freedom of speech, whilst certainly of uncontested value in liberal democracies, is not an absolute right and should be restricted in situations where it undermines the basic freedoms of others. The
fact that Brazil has not put limits to discriminatory, homophobic hate speech, including the incitement of violence, signals an additional, rather disturbing, threat to the human rights of the target group.

All things considered, the findings provide confirmatory evidence to the claim that Pentecostalism is actively spreading political homophobia in the public sector and, thus, negatively interferes with LGBT rights in Brazil. In a country suffering from grave homophobic violence having additional political homophobia that legitimises such behaviour must accordingly be categorised as a serious threat to the human rights of sexual and gender minorities. This research therefore challenges Freston’s prediction that the Pentecostal political impact will be “smaller than some people hope and other people fear” (2014: 1).
V. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation set out to examine the threat posed by the Pentecostal religious group to the human rights of sexual and gender minorities in Brazil. Central to the analysis was the question whether Pentecostal political and religious leaders openly discriminate against LGBT individuals and if yes, what the immediate and wider implications of this are from a human rights perspective. Before formulating the final conclusion, I will briefly revisit the findings from previous chapters.

In Chapter One the sociopolitical phenomenon known as ‘Brazilian Paradox’ was introduced. By deconstructing this term, it was found that Brazil represents a regional leader championing LGBT rights in the Americas. This is reflected in the fact that LGBT persons enjoy near to equal legal recognition to their heterosexual counterparts. The country, thus, complies with recent advances in international law which now explicitly stipulates that the exclusion of sexual and gender minorities from the full protection of the law contradicts the concept of universal human rights. Turning to Brazilian society, however, evidence showed that social acceptance of LGBT persons is far from aligned with their legal recognition. Quite contrarily, the ‘Brazilian Paradox’ is born out of the bizarre situation wherein Brazil also demonstrates a deathly homophobic hate crime record which catapults the otherwise progressive country to the international top position in anti-LGBT violence. The government’s agenda to tackle the issue of homophobia through public policies, however, is confronted with a problematic political obstacle. That is, the rising presence of a powerful conservative front predominantly affiliated with the Pentecostal religious group.

In Chapter Two the analysis of peer-reviewed studies and Pentecostal discourse on homosexuality led to the finding that selected Pentecostal leaders not only frequently preach and justify political homophobia on the grounds of their religious dogma, but also construct a ‘homosexual threat’ (Natividade, 2006). Sexual and gender minorities are therein depicted as morally inferior sinners not worthy of human rights, and whose demand for equality is perceived and projected as radically authoritarian in the attempt to appeal to the largely heteronormative Brazilian society. Under further consideration of a threefold strategy to propagate Christian fundamentalist values - first in Pentecostal churches, then the national media and eventually in policy circles - it was confirmed that the religious group has
legitimised its moral agenda in the public spheres. Vote-catching and notions of clientelism were identified as key elements to this. A main indicator for success is the Pentecostal occupation of important mandates in all relevant areas dealing with issues at the intersection of sexuality and human rights. Pentecostal political participation was, thus, deemed an instrument of political socialisation.

Finally, Chapter Three discussed in detail the implications of Pentecostal influence in the Brazilian public sector. First, the immediate impacts on policies in the fight against homophobia were considered. These concerned the awareness-raising Anti-Homophobia Kit in the education sector as well as proposed plans to criminalise homophobia nationwide; both of which have failed. Pentecostal objection to their implementation was identified as a crucial factor to this outcome. Moreover, it was argued that in particular the debate surrounding PL122 exposes the deeper tensions between religious and sexual liberties as Pentecostals changed their language of argument from primarily theologically to increasingly human rights-based. In the name of freedom of expression, Pentecostals aggressively oppose further non-discrimination protections for sexual and gender minorities as they fear censorship of religious discourse.

Within a human rights framework on conflicting rights, it was established that Brazil is facing a ‘culture war’ (Laylock, 2014) between religious and sexual liberties. An in depth legal analysis has found that, although a sensitive topic, it is fundamentally important that one group’s religious liberty does not interfere with the basic human rights of another group. As a highly stigmatised minority, LGBT persons require special legal protections to not be subjected to unjustified harm. The moral authority of non-discrimination principles over freedom of speech must, therefore, not be regarded as a kind of privilege, but as a necessary foundation to uphold their human dignity. The fact that Brazil has not been successful at implementing corresponding policies against homophobic discrimination signals a breach of their national and international legal obligations. On a related note, it also highlights the superior status of religion in Brazilian society that has allowed Pentecostal ‘Politicians of Christ’ to govern in the name of God, thereby essentially disabling the separation of church and state and putting the human rights of sexual and gender minorities further at risk.
Returning to the original research question regarding the extent to which Pentecostal political participation poses a threat to LGBT rights in Brazil, the insights from locally-involved human rights experts and Brazilian LGBT persons lend support to the claim that the human rights community has compelling reasons to be concerned about the situation of political homophobia. The fact that all research participants perceived Pentecostals as a threat - most of them as a serious one - to their human rights speaks volumes. After all, it is the domestic LGBT population who is most affected by the political decisions their country makes and who experiences how their human right to a life in dignity is compromised by both discriminatory public statements and the government’s paralysis to take action against their initiators.

The Brazilian government should certainly not substantially burden the Pentecostal belief liberty and impinge upon their right to freedom of speech. However, if publicly expressed opinions want to be taken seriously they must be grounded on a rational foundation. Discrimination, the incitement of violence or any other kind of unjustifiable harm does not count as an opinion. In fact, prejudiced statements that are largely based upon irrational fears of immoral conduct must only be taken seriously insofar as these fears have to be addressed through awareness-raising programmes on sexual diversity and the universality of human rights. Therefore, compelling reasons to impose restrictions on religious discourse exist due to a profound society interest in combatting homophobia and its consequences.

To put it in a nutshell, violence against LGBT persons is a crime that is thriving in Brazil. Homophobic political discourse that trivialises or legitimises such violence is, therefore, extremely alarming. This is especially true given the level of public influence held by Pentecostal leaders and their corresponding abilities to spread their attitudes into the social fabric. If influential politicians do not act by moral example condemning discrimination against minority groups, how is the wider society to learn and change how it treats LGBT persons? Any political participation of actors who preach an ideology of hate and intend to restrict the human rights of others should not be tolerated in a democratic, pluralist society. For this reason, the pivotal message that ought to be sent by the Brazilian government is that gay rights are not a privilege; they are human rights. Inherent to this concept is the conviction that human rights do not have to be earned, nor can they be infringed upon because of their non-conformity with a religious person’s definition of morality (Donnelly, 2012: 284).
other words, in modern Brazil religious tradition should by no means be accepted as a cover for the discrimination of sexual and gender minorities.
APPENDICES

Appendix I: Declaração de consentimento [Consent Statement]

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Declaração de consentimento

Meu nome é Laura Isabella Brunke e sou estudante de pós-graduação na Universidade de Londres.

Eu estou aqui no Brasil para a realização de pesquisas sobre a relação entre o pentecostalismo e os direitos das pessoas LGBT. Eu pretendo escrever essa dissertação com base, em parte, no que você e outras pessoas me disserem nestas entrevistas.

Se você concordar em ser entrevistado, vamos falar sobre eventos que ocorreram, bem como suas opiniões. Sua participação nesta entrevista é completamente voluntária. Você deve se sentir livre para não responder qualquer uma das perguntas ou interromper a entrevista a qualquer momento.

Vou fazer todos os esforços para proteger sua privacidade. Não farei qualquer utilização do seu nome nos escritos que resultarem deste estudo e não contarei a ninguém que eu entrevistei-lhe ou sobre o que falamos.

Por favor, certifique-se de que você leu e entendeu esta declaração e que você concorda em ser entrevistado.

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Assinatura         Data

Nome impresso
Appendix II: Interview Group 1

Interview: Group 1

SITUAÇÃO LGBT NO BRASIL
1. Em que setor você trabalha e qual profissão você exerce?
2. Você acha que o Brasil é uma liderança em termos de reconhecimento legal das pessoas LGBT ou não?
3. Onde você enxerga o Brasil em termos da aceitação social de pessoas LGBT?
4. Como você explica os casos de violência e intolerância contra pessoas LGBT no Brasil?
5. No Brasil existem muitos casos de violência contra pessoas LGBT. Ao mesmo tempo se pode argumentar que houve nos últimos anos um avanço significativo em relação aos direitos LGBT. Como você explicaria este paradoxo?

RELIGIÃO NO BRASIL
6. Como você descreve o papel das religiões na sociedade brasileira?
7. Você vê alguma relação entre religião e homofobia?
8. Se você respondeu sim à pergunta 7, você vê manifestações homofóbicas em todos os grupos religiosos?
9. Há alguma religião ou grupo religioso em especial que você diria que é particularmente ativo na 'política da sexualidade'?

PENTECOSTALISMO NO BRASIL
10. Qual é a sua opinião sobre a relação entre Pentecostalismo e política no Brasil?
11. Como você resumiria o sistema de crenças pentecostais em relação aos temas família e sexualidade?
12. Você acha que a quantidade de políticos pentecostais tem aumentado nos últimos anos ou não?
13. Existe algum ou alguns políticos pentecostais que você considera particularmente homofóbicos?

CONSEQÜÊNCIAS POLITICAS NO BRASIL
14. Como então esses políticos pentecostais influenciam a legislação brasileira?
15. Eles têm impactado nos direitos LGBT?
16. O que esse ativismo político significa em relação ao princípio de laicidade?
17. Em termos gerais, o que isso significa para o pluralismo e os direitos de minorias no Brasil?
18. Onde você vê Dilma e o PT nesse debate? Como o estado brasileiro tenta conduzir os direitos conflitantes da liberdade de expressão e da liberdade sexual?
19. Finalmente, você classificaria a influência da política pentecostal como uma ameaça menor, média ou séria aos direitos LGBT no Brasil?
20. Você tem quaisquer outros comentários?

Muito Obrigada!
Appendix III: Interview Group 2

Interview Group 2

SITUAÇÃO LGBT NO BRASIL
1.) Você acha que o Brasil tem uma sociedade homofóbica ou não?
2.) Se você respondeu sim à pergunta 1, quais são os motivos da homofobia no Brasil?

RELIGIÃO NO BRASIL
3.) Como você descreve o papel das religiões na sociedade brasileira?
4.) Você vê alguma relação entre religião e homofobia?
5.) Se você respondeu sim à pergunta 4, você vê manifestações homofóbicas em todos os grupos religiosos?
6.) Há alguma religião ou grupo religioso em especial que você diria que é particularmente ativo na ‘política da sexualidade’?

PENTECOSTALISMO NO BRASIL
7.) Qual é a sua opinião sobre a relação entre pentecostalismo e política no Brasil?
8.) Como você resumiria o sistema de crenças pentecostais em relação aos temas família e sexualidade?
9.) Existe algum ou alguns políticos pentecostais que você considera particularmente homófobos?

CONSEQÜÊNCIAS POLÍTICAS NO BRASIL
10.) Em sua opinião, para você como pessoa LGBT, se sua cidade ou o Brasil inteiro fosse governado por um político pentecostal, a proteção jurídica seria melhoraria, estagnaria ou pioraria?
11.) Finalmente, você classificaria a influência da política pentecostal como uma ameaça menor, média ou séria aos direitos LGBT no Brasil?
12.) Você tem quaisquer outros comentários?

Muito obrigada!
Appendix IV: Glossary of terms

*Critical Discourse Analysis* - CDA

*Grupo Gay da Bahia* - GGB

*Acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender in Portuguese language* - GLBT

*Inter-American Court of Human Rights* - IACHR

*International Covenant on Civil, Political and Cultural Rights* - ICCPR

*Acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender in English language* - LGBT

*Non-governmental organisation* - NGO

*Organization of American States* - OAS

*United Nations* - UN

*United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* - UNESCO

*World Health Organization* - WHO
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Secondary Literature:


Primary Literature:


**Legal Instruments:**


**Interviews:**


