Exodus, Expulsion, Explication

Collective Memories of Silesia as a German-Polish Frontier Zone

Steven Jefferson
BA, PGDip, MRes, MCIL

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
School of Advanced Study, University of London

February 2016
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Steven Jefferson
BA, PGDip, MRes, MCIL

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the traumata associated with Poland’s frontier changes in 1945, within a collective memory paradigm. These events include expulsions from German territories incorporated into Poland, and population transfers between Poland and the USSR. The thesis addresses two components: a central trauma complex, and the resulting collective memory discourse. Being a matter of historical record, the statistical details and chronology of these events are seldom contested, although they have often been instrumentalised by various stakeholders. Instead, the relevant collective memory discourse has focused on the production of broad, often exculpatory, narrative frameworks designed to explain a set of largely accepted facts. Accordingly, my thesis is primarily focused on this collective memory discourse.

As an active phase, dominated by stakeholders with a high level of emotional investment in the narration and memorialisation of the relevant events, this collective memory discourse is currently undergoing a transition to the domain of History as a scholarly pursuit. This transition is best symbolised by the fact that, as of 2016, for the first time since 1945, all restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests in Poland’s former German territories, by Germans, will be lifted. Thus, for surviving expellees, the right of return, in conjunction with the potential to purchase any formerly held real estate and landholdings, will become a *de jure* reality, marking the end of the region’s long postwar period. Arguably, therefore, one can now engage, at a retrospective, analytical level, with the relevant collective memory discourse without being drawn into it.

In order to navigate this complex discourse, I have developed a number of analytical and conceptual tools, which I hope may prove useful beyond this project. In this sense, this thesis can be viewed as a proof of concept. Chief among these tools are a novel working definition of collective memory as a discrete phase in the historification and mythologizing of traumatic events, and a three-level model designed for the consistent analysis of narrative texts, artefacts and cultural productions. By tracing the relevant collective memory discourse through a number of
disparate fields, including political myth-making, historiography, toponymic practice, cartography and literature, I have been able to test these analytical and conceptual tools to breaking point, often benefitting from the resulting heuristic gain wherever lived complexity defies simplistic analytic idealisation.

To ensure a focused exposition of the theoretical framework and the sources analysed, this thesis is primarily centred upon Lower Silesia and the following broad research questions: what geo-socio-political power dynamics resulted in Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the associated traumata, and how were they justified at the time? How have historians reacted over time to Poland’s postwar frontier changes, and the humanitarian consequences, as well as to contemporary framework narratives relating to these events? How has the toponymic re-inscription of Poland’s former German territories influenced the relevant collective memory discourse, and to what extent have cartographic representations of postwar Poland been influenced by changing geo-political configurations? How have the prevailing socio-political conditions in postwar Germany and Poland constrained literary contributions to the relevant collective memory discourse? And, finally, in what ways, has literature contributed in turn, to the relevant collective memory discourse and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives?

This thesis presents a number of specific findings, the most significant of which is that political contingencies can result in a surprising deflection of collective memory discourse into seemingly unrelated fields, and can trigger a ripple effect, which has the ability to globalise collective memory discourse under certain circumstances. Similarly, my analysis of shared topoi in the works of German and Polish historians and literary authors demonstrates that, far from generating its own framework of reference based on specific traumatic events, collective memory discourse is exquisitely sensitive to broader socio-political narratives. In addition, I contend that mainstream historical narratives tend to simplify, for example, through the imposition of a chronology on multidirectional memories, and by focusing on homogenizing accounts of the collective at the expense of
individual narratives. In contrast, literature and local cultural performances often resist such simplification, thus preserving complexity. Viewed in this light, the pursuit of Cultural and Literary Studies addresses a clear problem within, and usefully augments, traditional historical scholarship. By carefully analysing a subset of Polish and German literature, historiography and cultural artefacts produced in response to the traumatic events in question, my thesis seeks to trace the transition from highly localised stakeholder-led collective memory discourses to hegemonic historical narratives developed and maintained in the service of broader geo-political agendas.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors, Drs. Godela Weiss-Sussex, Katia Pizzi, and Catherine Davies, all at the Institute of Modern Languages Research (IMLR), University of London, for their help and feedback over the past three years. My special thanks also go to Dr. Torsten Lorenz at Charles University, Prague, whose detailed feedback on every chapter, and generosity with his time and ideas gave me a much needed boost during the final stages of writing up.

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In memory of David Jefferson, the philosopher tramp
(1962-2012)
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<th>English</th>
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<td>AK</td>
<td>Armia Krajowa</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Home Army</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Armia Ludowa</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>People's Army</td>
</tr>
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<td>BCh</td>
<td>Bataliony Chłopskie</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Peasant Battalions</td>
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<td>BdV</td>
<td>Bund der Vertriebenen</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Federation of Expellees</td>
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<td>BVFG</td>
<td>Bundesvertriebenengesetz</td>
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<td>Federal Expellee Act</td>
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<td>CBKP</td>
<td>Centralne Biuro Komunistów Polski w ZSRR</td>
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<td>Central Bureau of Communists from Poland in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>CKL</td>
<td>Centralny Komitet Ludowy</td>
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<td>Central People's Committee</td>
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<td>CKJP</td>
<td>Centralny Komitet Żydów Polskich</td>
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<td>Central Committee of Polish Jews</td>
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<td>CUP</td>
<td>Centralny Urząd Planowania</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Central Planning Office</td>
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<td>Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych</td>
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<td>Delegation of the Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DVL</td>
<td>Deutsche Volksliste</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>German Nationality List</td>
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<td>Gwardia Ludowa</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Instytut Śląski</td>
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<td>Silesian Institute</td>
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<td>IZ</td>
<td>Instytut Zachodni</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Western Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBW</td>
<td>Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego</td>
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<td>Internal Security Corps</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Komitet Ministrów dla Spraw Kraju</td>
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<td>Ministerial Committee with Special Responsibilities for Home Affairs</td>
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<td>Polish Communist Party</td>
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<td>Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowości</td>
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<td>Milicja Obywatelska</td>
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<td>Ministry for the Regained Territories</td>
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<td>Narodowe Odziały Partyzanckie</td>
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<td>National Partisan Units</td>
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<td>NOW</td>
<td>Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa</td>
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<td>National Military Organization</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UNGEGN</td>
<td>United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>Związek Walki Zbrojnej</td>
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List of Historical Figures
The following people are all mentioned in the body of the text, where I have included information pertaining to rank, titles and other relevant detail, but omitted life dates in the interests of readability. For reference, therefore:

Adam Zagajewski’s (1945-)
Aleksander Lesser (1814-1884)
Alfons Klafkowsk (1912-1992)
Benno Ohnesorg (1940-1967)
Bolesław Bierut (1892-1956)
Boleslaw I the Brave (c. 965-1025)
Brigitte Seebacher (1946-)
Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961)
Carlo Schmid (1896-1979)
Charles Maier (1939-)
Edward Gibbon (1737-1794)
Egon Bahr (1922-2015)
Esther Kinsky (1956-)
Frederick II the Great (1712-1786)
Gabriel García Márquez (1927-2014)
Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989)
Gustav Mahler (1860-1911)
Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811)
Henryk I the Bearded (c. 1165-1238)
Hermann Niehoff (1897-1980)
Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss (1918-2000)
Horatio Nelson (1758-1805)
Hugo Andreas Hartung (1902-1972)
Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860-1941)
Joanna Bator (1968-)
Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638)
Josef Bachmann (1944-1970)
Josef Stalin aka Ioseb Besarionis Dze Jugashvili (1878-1953)
Józef Hen (1923-)
Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935)
Karl Hanke (1903-1945)
Kazimierz III the Great (1310-1370)
Koch-Erpach (1886-1972)
Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967)
Kurt Kiesinger (1904-1988)
Marek Krajewski (1966-)
Leonie Ossowski (1925-)
Michael Kammern (1936-2013)
Mieszko I (c. 960-992)
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975)
Mikołaj Rudnicki (1881-1978)
Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940)
Olga Tokarczuk (1962-)
Roman Dmowski (1864-1939)
Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979)
Sabrina Janesch (1985-)
Stanisław Kozierowski aka Dołęga (1874-1949)
Stanisław Mikołajczyk (1901-1966)
Stefan Chwin (1949-)
Tomasz Arciszewski (1877-1955)
Willy Brandt aka Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm (1913-1992)
Władysław Gomułka (1905-1982)
Władysław Raczkiewicz (1885-1947)
Władysław Sikorski (1881-1943)
Wolfgang Spielhagen (1891-1945)
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924)
Zygmunt Graliński (1897-1940)
Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900-1955)
1: General Overview of the Thesis

1.1 Introduction
This thesis contributes to existing scholarship on collective memory studies, discourse analysis, narratology, cartography and toponymy, as well as comparative literature (East and West German, and Polish). In addition, it contributes, to varying extents, to the historical study of Poland, Ukraine and Great Britain, specifically in the context of the World War duplex (1914-1945), identity studies, and questions of German victimhood in the shadow of the Holocaust.\(^1\) It also relates to philosophical questions concerning epistemology and essentialism. The object of study comprises two distinct components: a central trauma complex; and the resulting collective memory discourse. In the following introduction I briefly introduce the general context (Part 1.2) before presenting my specific research questions (Part 1.3) and an outline of the structure of the remainder of the thesis (Part 1.4). This is followed by a note on terminology (1.5). I conclude this introduction with a critical review of some of the key secondary literature on this subject in which I summarise some of the areas in which existing scholarship can usefully be augmented and/or reconsidered (Part 1.6).

1.2 General Context
This thesis takes as its starting point the events concomitant to, and ramifications of, the redrawing of Poland’s national frontiers in the wake of World War Two (hereinafter ‘WWII’). The most noticeable of these to contemporary international observers was the flight and expulsion (Flucht und Vertreibung) of Germans from the so-called Regained Territories or Ziemie Odzyskane (ZO).\(^2\) These were the

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\(^2\) Although I use the term Flucht und Vertreibung throughout this thesis to denote the specifically German experience of flight and expulsion in the wake of WWII, it should be noted that this term carries a certain amount of ideological baggage in that it has historically been used more often by one specific stakeholder community – the West German expellee groups – than others. Nevertheless, it is commonly used in relevant book and article titles as well as in more generalised German political discourse. My use of the term here reflects its wide currency within the associated discourse as well as its purely
parts of Germany annexed (de facto) by Poland in 1945. The population transfers that took place as a result of the Soviet Union’s (hereinafter ‘the USSR’) annexation of Poland’s eastern territories (an area collectively known as the Kresy) are less well documented in Anglophone histories. Even less has been written about anti-Polish pogroms carried out by Ukrainian nationalists (the OUN and UPA) in southern parts of the Kresy. These were particularly bloody in East Galicia, a region centred on the city of Lemberg (Polish Lwów; Ukrainian L’viv).

Yet all of these events are intimately connected. The ZO was resettled, inter alia, by Poles expelled from and/or relocated from areas incorporated into the USSR. These Polish refugees were joined by Ukrainians and members of lesser-known groups such as the Slavic Lemkos, forcibly relocated from the Carpathian Mountains. The matter is further complicated by the fact that some Germans were expelled from the ZO by other Germans. One of my objectives in the following study is to demonstrate the inadequacy of frequently evoked notions of distinct perpetrator and victim communities in relation to these events. Such a simplistic paradigm is incapable of encompassing the full complexity of the events themselves and the ensuing collective memory discourse.

In the following chapters, I seek to explore some of the ways in which members of various stakeholder groups have participated in and contributed to the relevant collective memory discourse in three specific areas of cultural endeavour:

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5 The Lemkos (Polish: Łemkowie) are a small and distinct ethnic group within the larger Ukrainian culture, whose ancestral homeland was the Carpathian Mountains in Galicia. Most were forcibly resettled in the aftermath of World War Two, either in the ZO (1947) or in the Ukrainian SSR (as early as 1944). Of those transferred to the ZO some 3060 families were deported to Lower Silesia in 1947. Many of them were later relocated back to their place of origin in the Carpathians. Interesting insights into their current situation can be gleaned from the following sources: Pochynjaj, P. J., *Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present*, Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), pp. 252-56; Lehmann, R., 'The Strength of Divinity: A Micro-History of Ethnic Conflict and Coexistence in Rural Southeast Poland', *Anthropological Quarterly, 82* (2009), 509-45; Jasiewicz, J., 'Mapping the Activism of Ethnic and National Minorities in Poland', *European Societies, 13* (2011), 735-56.

6 The most notorious example of this occurred during the Siege of Breslau (15th of February to the 6th of May 1945) and forms the basis for my case study in Chapter 6.
the practice of popular history writing, geography (cartography and toponymy),
and literature including life writing and fictions. To ensure a focused exposition of
the theoretical framework and the sources analysed, the thesis is primarily centred
upon Lower Silesia, although reference is also made to other regions for
comparative purposes.

My decision to focus on Lower Silesia is based on several considerations.
Scholarly treatments of the history of the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans
from Central and Eastern Europe often concentrate on ‘ethnic Germans’ expelled
from historical communities located far from the German Reich, such as the so-
called Wolgadeutschen. Others focus on populations from areas peripheral to but
contiguous with Germany, such as the Sudetendeutschen. The Lower Silesians,
by contrast, were Reichsdeutsche. Their legal status was the same as that of
Hanoverians, Bavarians or Hessians. They were not expelled from some external
state and ‘returned’ to Germany. Instead, they were moved from one region of
Germany to another, which complicates the relevant collective memory discourse
in interesting ways. Another compelling reason to concentrate on this province is
that, of all the areas incorporated into the ZO by Poland in 1945, Lower Silesia
had been the least historically contested region. Pre-war Polish nationalists had
laid claim to parts of Upper Silesia, the site of the outbreak of WWII (Gleiwitz),
but had rarely aspired to dominion in Lower Silesia. Historically, Silesia as a
whole had always been ‘a border land marked by an overlap of cultures with no
abrupt breaks between predominantly German-, Czech-, and Polish-speaking
regions’. Although always geographically peripheral to the polities that laid
claim to it, Lower Silesia had been central to German culture at least since its
incorporation into Prussia in 1763, and had been a rallying point for pan-German
resistance to foreign invasion. Home to a plethora of artists, writers, scientists and
other scholars of international standing, Silesia was also the site of significant

7 I explain the distinction between ‘ethnic Germans’ and German nationals in detail below in relation to the Bund der
Vertreiben (BdV). Simply put, ‘ethnic Germans’, in this context, are people with German ancestry but who were not
citizens of the Third Reich.
8 Some typical examples are: Eisfeld, A., Die Russlanddeutschen, Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kultur
rat, 2 vols (Munich: Langen Müller Herbig, 1999); Glotz, P., Die Vertreibung: Böhmen als Lehrstück (Munich: Ullstein, 2003);
Geschichte (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2011).
socio-political events and the birthplace of historically important political parties (see Appendix B, Section B.4).

In short, Lower Silesia had been a rare centre of stability and prosperity in Central Europe with an international border that had remained unchallenged for some six hundred years. This era of stability ended in the closing months of WWII. Breslau, the capital of Lower Silesia and a cosmopolitan centre of European importance, was the site of the last major battle of WWII on German soil. After WWII and the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of many of the German residents, the Polish government implemented a series of measures designed to obliterate all traces of German settlement in the province. These included a comprehensive program of resettlement and a major project of toponymic re-inscription (see Chapter 5). Lower Silesia, therefore, represents a microcosm of the complexity of postwar population transfers in Central Europe.

### 1.3 Research Questions

This thesis addresses the following broad questions, each of which encompasses a number of secondary questions which I introduce at the start of the relevant chapters: what geo-socio-political constraints and imperatives (power dynamics) resulted in the postwar changes to Poland’s frontiers and the two cases of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, and how were they justified and understood at the time (Chapter 3)? How have historians reacted over time to Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the accompanying sociocide as well as to contemporary framework narratives relating to these events (Chapter 4)? To what extent and how has the toponymic situation in the Zo influenced the overall discourse concerning Poland’s annexation of the Zo and the concomitant *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans from this territory and its resettlement by Poles relocated from the Kresy, and how far have cartographic representations of the

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12 Thum, G., *Uprooted*, p. 5.


local situation been influenced by changing geo-political conditions (Chapter 5)? How have different socio-political conditions constrained and shaped the production of literary contributions to collective memory discourses relating to postwar sociocide and territorial transfers, and how, and to what extent, has literature contributed in turn to the relevant collective memory discourse and the establishment of what I refer to throughout this thesis as ‘hegemonic historical narratives’ (Chapters 6 and 7)?

1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured around six theme-based chapters, each of which focuses on a specific aspect of the collective memory discourse engendered by the sociocide with which this study is concerned.

Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework within which I shall be presenting and analysing specific aspects of the relevant discourse. In particular, I present an original definition of collective memory and an original structural framework for the analysis of cultural artefacts and productions generated during collective memory discourse processes. This framework provides a solid foundation for a consistent comparative analysis between separate collective memory discourses as well as between diverse expressions of collective memory, regardless of the different media in which they are encoded. This chapter contributes directly to collective memory studies, discourse analysis and narratology as academic disciplines.

Chapter 3 comprises two main sections. In the first section, I provide an exposition of the overall context and trauma nexus which triggered the specific collective memory discourse that this thesis seeks to explore. The events in question are the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from Lower Silesia, and of Poles from East Galicia and their (the Poles’) subsequent resettlement in Lower Silesia in the wake of the Germans’ departure. In the second part of the chapter, I analyse the political circumstances under which these episodes of sociocide were

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15 I define the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ in Section 2.1 ‘Trauma-Based Collective Memory Discourse’.
16 With regard to collective memory as a putative phenomenon, my reason for presenting a specific and original working definition is motivated not by a lack of theory in this area, but rather by the wealth of (often contrasting) definitions that have been put forth in the relevant literature. That is, my purpose is clarity of exposition rather than originality for its own sake.
allowed to happen and provide an account of the postwar Polish government’s justification of them.

Chapter 4 addresses some of the historical and historiographical aspects of the case and demonstrates how writers of popular history have contributed to the relevant collective memory discourse through their responses to specific historical problems. These historical problems are partly rooted in the contrast between the postwar status quo, the pre-war aspirations of Polish nationalists, and British war objectives. In addition, historians have struggled, to some extent, to deal with what James Bjork refers to as ‘retrospective normalisation’, i.e., the extrapolation of present-day geo-political boundaries to earlier periods of history. This phenomenon is exemplified in the attempts described in Chapter 3 by the first postwar Polish government to explain and justify the loss of territory to the USSR, the annexation of parts of Germany as well as expulsions and other forms of population transfer with reference to Poland’s ‘deep history’.

My analysis of historical texts includes works by Anglophone as well as German and Polish historians. This reflects my desire to demonstrate that the events in question have had far wider ramifications than is generally understood. An exclusive close reading of German and Polish historical texts would work to the detriment of my objective of transcending assumed bilateral perpetrator-victim discourses. The inclusion of Anglophone scholarship broadens my research base to take in the often surprising ‘ripple effect’ of traumatic events far beyond the immediate vicinity in which they take place. It demonstrates that the ensuing collective memory discourse is considerably more complex than the over-simplistic German-versus-Polish or perpetrator-victim dichotomy so often encountered in the relevant scholarly texts.

It is necessary to read Chapters 3 and 4 in conjunction with Appendices A, B, and C. These provide additional detail about the affected regions and, in particular two historic Polish polities which have traditionally provided alternative models for a modern Polish state: Piast Poland (1025-1370), and the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1596-1795). Each has been referenced in

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17 Dr. Bjork (King's College, London) was asked to comment on the general thrust and concept of my thesis in the early stages of the project as he was able to provide a level of expert input that went beyond the then expertise of my supervisors. To that end I met with him on Friday the 20th of December 2013 (i.e., three months after starting my PhD) for an extended consultation and he provided extensive feedback by email some two and a half weeks later. See: Bjork, J., 06.01.2014: 18:32, Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3 (Email).
interesting ways within the relevant collective memory discourse. As explained in Chapter 3, Piast Poland was instrumentalised to justify the annexation of the ZO (including Lower Silesia). A knowledge of the differential status of Poles and Ruthenians within the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania provides interesting insights into the historical causes of the Ukrainian-led pogroms against East Galician Poles and their eventual expulsion and then resettlement in Lower Silesia.\(^{18}\) It is also essential in terms of understanding the position in which the postwar Polish government found itself vis-à-vis the USSR’s annexation of the Kresy (including East Galicia), which it began in 1939 and completed in 1945.

Chapter 5 focuses on the function of toponymy and cartography in the establishment of one specific narrative of these traumatic events as historical ‘fact’. Specifically, this chapter discusses and analyses the toponymic Polonisation of the ZO in the immediate postwar period, and the production and meaning of cartographic representations of the area between 1945 and today.\(^{19}\) Cartography is particularly interesting in the current context precisely because, between the dates in question, geographers in other parts of the world were obliged to take a stance on Poland’s postwar frontier shifts in a way that foreign historians and authors of literature were not. Thus, the production of maps of Poland’s postwar geo-political situation globalised the discourse engendered by the relevant events. With due consideration of the commercial and economic aspects of cartography, decisions taken by foreign geographers and cartographers (and publishing houses) provide interesting insights into the progress and parameters of the collective memory discourse in question. This is particularly true of those working in polities that may be loosely characterised as stakeholder collectives with regard to the specific trauma complex with which this thesis is concerned (Germany, Poland, and the USSR). Moreover, this globalisation of the relevant discourse is one of the key ways in which the collective memory discourse surrounding the postwar territorial settlement of Central Europe differs from other well-documented collective memory discourses.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) For a brief discussion on the historic use of the terms ‘Ruthenians’ and ‘Ukrainians’ see Appendix A.

\(^{19}\) In 1990 the shared border between the reunited Germany and Poland was fixed in perpetuity along the so-called Oder-Neisse line in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two Plus Four Agreement). See: Großbongardt, A., et al., *Die Deutschen im Osten Europas*, p. 42.

\(^{20}\) To a large extent the concept of collective memory has been developed in relation to the Holocaust. It has also been applied to other historic traumas such as the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Neither of these involved geography to the same extent as the current example. Both cases relate to the creation of new polities (Israel and the South African Native
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with representations of the relevant collective memory discourse in literature. Literature in this context is understood in its broadest possible sense and includes life writing as well as fiction. In these chapters, I explore how authors from East and West Germany and Poland have presented certain narratives of the events in question and the extent to which they may have contributed to their respective national collective memory discourses.

One reason for my decision to include a major section on literature is the assumption that the production of literature is far less costly than many of the other artefacts in which collective memories are encoded and contested. This circumstance, I argue, means that the production of literature is inherently more accessible to non-specialists rather than being the preserve of an elite. Specifically, the means of production, and therefore the ability to participate in collective memory discourses through the medium of literature, are available to more people than through the production of costly media such as memorials and similar high-status artefacts. Moreover, fiction and life writing also provide a useful counterbalance to historiography by embracing the ambiguities and contradictions of lived experiences.

The literary works selected include both popular and more ambitious works that already form part of the literary canon or are currently attracting scholarly attention. The two chapters within this section are based on specific case studies selected to demonstrate and problematise the irreducible complexity of the events in question. As the Polish and German texts referenced throughout this section rather surprisingly demonstrate, ‘the general hypothesis that texts published in […] Germany and in Poland during the Cold War reflected, respectively, two broadly national approaches’ is not supported by the evidence.

Chapter 6 surveys and analyses two key texts relating to the expulsion of German women and children from Breslau by Gauleiter Karl Hanke just prior to

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21 This is particularly the case following the advent of the Internet.
22 I am indebted to Dr. James Bjork for this formulation. See: Bjork, J., Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3.
23 For an excellent overview of some of the canonic literature relating to Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of WWII see: Berger, K., *Heimat, Loss and Identity: Flight and Expulsion in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present*, Studies in Modern German and Austrian Literature (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), 2; Please note, however, that, unless stated otherwise, all references to Karina Berger throughout this thesis refer to a pre-publication copy of her PhD thesis, which she was kind enough to send me for use in my own thesis: Berger, K. L., *The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present* (unpublished thesis, University of Leeds, Leeds 2012).
24 Bjork, J., Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3.
the siege of Breslau in 1945, an episode that confounds simplistic ethno-political victim-perpetrator discourses. Both texts are quasi-autobiographical, and I read them in conjunction with life writing and primary and secondary historical sources.

Chapter 7 studies Polish and German literature selected for the insights it provides into one specific aspect of these events, which is inadequately represented in the formal historical record, namely the arrival and integration of Poles in the ZO and Lower Silesia in particular. The corpus in question includes the novels by Janesch, Hen and Tokarczuk referred to above. All of these texts have been selected for their significant autobiographical content and the authors’ strong links to the regions in question (Lower Silesia and East Galicia).

Following a concluding chapter, this thesis is augmented by a set of appendices. These provide additional information and data not required to support the arguments and exposition set out in the main body of the thesis, but, nevertheless, useful for a fuller understanding of the context. In addition to Appendix A, which addresses Polish nation-building in pre-modern and modern eras, they include: a brief history of Silesia (Appendix B); a short study of the historical background to the anti-Polish pogroms in East Galicia, to which I refer in most chapters (Appendix C); a ‘distant reading’ survey of Anglophone historiography relating to the so-called Piast Formula, which I define in Chapter 3 (Appendix D); a timeline centred on the conflict zones (Appendix E), and a selection of maps (Appendix F).

1.5 A Note on Terminology

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26 What I mean by the term ‘quasi autobiographical’ is that in both cases the main protagonists are recognisably based on the authors as one can readily verify by reference to sources for the author’s lives. I do this in detail when I reintroduce the term in the Chapter in question.
27 There are very few scholarly accounts of the subjective experience of Poles arriving in Lower Silesia and other parts of the ZO, which increases the importance of autobiographical and quasi-autobiographical accounts of this transitional period to historians. However, the following works provide a comprehensive overview of the political and pragmatic aspects of the ‘Polonisation’ of Lower Silesia and of the arrival and integration of Germans and ethnic-Germans in Germany: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-1949 (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's, 1994); Autze, R., Treibgut des Krieges: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Berlin 1945 (Berlin: Quadriga, 2001), pp. 17-49; Kosser, A., Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (Munich: Random House, 2008), pp. 43-228; For a more general overview of the expulsion of Germans from annexed areas in Central Europe see: Douglas, R. M., Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
28 I also draw upon similar fictional works and life writing by authors with strong connections to other regions within ZO.
Throughout this thesis, I consistently use the German term *Flucht und Vertreibung* to refer specifically to the flight and expulsion of Germans and ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe in the wake of WWII, i.e., beginning in 1944 and ending in 1952. This reflects common practice in the relevant literature. For other population transfers and/or expulsions I employ the appropriate English terminology with the exception of the euphemism ‘ethnic cleansing’ which I prefer to replace with the word ‘sociocide’. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is problematic for two reasons. Its well-dated entry into most European languages during the course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) makes its use in historical contexts anachronistic. More importantly, the uncritical use of the term implies, at some level, a basic acceptance of the premise that removing specific ethnic groups, in certain socio-political situations, involves an act of ‘cleansing’. Whilst accepting the notion that some juxtapositions of mutually antagonistic ethnic groups can result in practically intractable socio-political tensions, I do not accept the corollary that the weaker groups in such difficult demographic configurations ought to be conceived of as contaminants. The word ‘sociocide’, by contrast, refers to the destruction of any social order by human agents. It adequately encapsulates all forms of social destruction, whether as a result of mandatory population transfers, expulsion, or mass flight in the face of actual violence or the credible threat thereof. In the absence of elaborating narratives pertaining to specific episodes, the word ‘sociocide’ is neutral with regard to reasons, causes, or perceived benefits to either party. In the current context, both the expulsion of Germans from the ZO and the population transfers associated with the transferal of the *Kresy* between Poland and various Soviet Socialist Republics (see Section 3.2 below) are examples of sociocide. As both of these examples demonstrate, the actual practice of sociocide, however pragmatic the longer-term socio-political objectives, can easily degenerate into genocide. Yet, the concept of sociocide also encompasses less murderous actions, a good example of which is the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO (see Chapter 5).

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29 There is a growing agreement among international legislators that populations who flee in the face of the credible perception of approaching danger are victims of sociocide. On a case-by-case basis they can arguably be categorised as the victims either of those whose imminent arrival they have reason to fear, or of whichever state is ultimately responsible for bringing about the conflict situation that resulted in the insecure situation. See: Ziegler, K. S., *Fluchtverursachung als völkerrechtliches Delikt: die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit des Herkunftsstaates für die Verursachung von Fluchtbewegungen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002).
My use of two other terms throughout the thesis also requires a short explanation. The term Ziemie Odzyskane has political and historical ramifications and is contested within the discourse concerning Poland’s de facto annexation of German territory in 1945 and concomitant expulsion of the resident population. Even during the Cold War, some Polish scholars preferred the term Ziemie Piastowskie (Piast territories) in an attempt to emphasise Poland’s historical continuity with the area rather than its recent annexation (‘regaining’). More recently, the term Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne (Western and Northern Lands) has found acceptance as a simple, apolitical geographic identifier, devoid of historical or political content. Nevertheless, due to its dominant role in the collective memory discourse with which this study is concerned, I shall use the acronym ‘ZO’ throughout this thesis to refer to all territories annexed (de facto) by Poland in 1945, which had formed part of the Third Reich until the 1st of September 1939. ‘ZO’ does not, therefore, refer to areas of Poland incorporated into or occupied by the Third Reich during WWII.

The word Kresy (lost borderlands or districts – compare German Kreise) is similarly problematic. In the current context, Kresy refers to parts of Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine which had formed part of the Second Republic (Poland from 1918 to 1939) and were annexed by the USSR in 1945. According to Nathaniel Copsey, although the term Kresy remains in widespread use in Poland to refer to these territories, pogranicze is a ‘more politically correct’ alternative. However, in Anglophone discussions on the subject the word pogranicze is rarely, if ever, used. I shall therefore continue to use Kresy, as a simple geographic identifier, throughout this thesis.

I also use the terms ‘essentialism’ and ‘essentialist’ (the latter both as an adjective and a noun) to refer to a specific view of the world which is evident in

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30 Chapter 3 explores the origins of this desire to emphasise continuity with the Piast Kingdom (1025-1370) among postwar Polish scholars. See Appendix A for historical detail of the polity in question.
34 For example in a range of texts published between 1962 and 2012, a full-text search for the word Kresy found it in 2 conference papers, 10 journal articles, 4 books, and 2 theses. A full-text search for the word pogranicze within the same sample found 4 instances in 1 journal article, 2 books, and 1 thesis. However in three instances the word formed part of a source reference written entirely in Polish. Copsey’s thesis was the only Anglophone text in which the word was used by itself and even then it only occurred once, in a footnote with no indication of a source. Copsey himself uses the word Kresy throughout his thesis.
much of the Anglophone secondary literature concerning German victimhood during WWII and its aftermath. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (hereinafter OED), essentialism is ‘the doctrine that essence is prior to existence’ whereby an essence is, *inter alia*, ‘the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, which determines its character’ and a doctrine is ‘a set of beliefs or principles held and taught by a Church, political party or other group’.\(^{35}\) As applied to human beings, the concept of essentialism is the opposite of existentialism which the OED defines as ‘a philosophical theory which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will’.\(^{36}\)

Essentialist thinkers, by contrast, view the actions of the group or polity as being of primary importance. Individuals are relegated to a subaltern position in which they are considered cellular parts of the primary organism (the group or polity) connected through the medium of a shared essence. The primary organism’s actions in international affairs are treated as a manifestation of the collective will of all of its cellular parts. To those who subscribe to this view, whether consciously or not, it follows that all members of a group or polity are jointly and severally responsible for its actions. As a logical corollary they can be considered legitimate targets in armed or economic conflicts and can be held collectively guilty of breaches of human rights and/or international law by the group or polity or any of its several cellular parts.\(^ {37}\) Thus, in the mind of the essentialist, which conceptualises ‘states as composite individuals governed by compact executive agencies animated by an indivisible will’, it becomes legitimate to target civilians in war and economic conflicts solely on the basis of their belonging to a given group or polity either *de jure* or *de facto* in terms of ethnicity or nationality.\(^ {38}\) Similarly, Hitler and his supporters held *all* Jews responsible for slights and offences against them and the German nation by *specific* Jews. It is not relevant, in the current context, whether or not specific


\(^{36}\) Ibid. p. 499.


Jews were guilty of the crimes of which they stood accused. The point is that the extrapolation of their actions to all Jews is a manifestation of essentialist thought.

During my reading of the secondary literature on the subject of German victimhood in the course of WWII, and on the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of (ethnic) Germans from Eastern and Central Europe in particular, I have been struck by a pronounced tendency on the part of certain authors to analyse the events in question from within an essentialist paradigm. An important objective of this thesis, by contrast, is to deconstruct such essentialist thinking in relation to these events.

1.6 Literature Review and Critique

In this section I briefly summarise some key texts relating to *Flucht und Vertreibung* to demonstrate the current consensus amongst scholars as well as to draw attention to certain issues that need to be more thoroughly explored.

There is no controversy about the fact that the expulsions took place. Certainly it remains the case that, given the fact that ‘the expulsions have been instrumentalised politically for decades, it is not easy to find a language that facilitates discussion, avoids becoming politically charged, and at the same time calls things by their real names.’ Nevertheless, these events are well documented in a plethora of texts and scholarly works, one of the most useful of which is the *Lexikon der Vertreibungen* (2010), which represents the current international consensus amongst researchers working in this field. It is a collaborative work produced by 122 academics from 68 universities in 20 countries. The main contribution this compendious volume makes to the field is its exhaustive coverage of mass (primarily forced) population movements in twentieth-century Europe. Thus, it places the postwar *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans and ethnic Germans within a wider geo-political context as just one (albeit extreme) episode during ‘the century of expulsions’. According to *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, at least 15 million Germans and ethnic Germans and up to 6

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39 Karl Schlögel in: Thum, G., *Uprooted*, p. 3.
41 In the subtitle to: Thum, G., *Uprooted*.
million Poles and ethnic Poles were forcibly relocated between 1939 and the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{42}

Moreover, the fact that these expulsions were taking place was known to contemporaries. Matthew James Frank’s \textit{Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context} (2007) provides compelling evidence that the British public and government officials followed these events with concern as they unfolded.\textsuperscript{43} One of the most interesting insights to be gained from Frank’s study is the degree of compassion displayed by the British public and their preparedness to differentiate between ‘ordinary Germans’ and ‘Nazis’.\textsuperscript{44} According to Frank, some 17,000 food parcels were sent from Britain to Germany during the expulsion era, a remarkable display of empathy given that food rationing continued in Britain until 1954.\textsuperscript{45} Frank also provides copious detail about the British Army’s direct involvement in the movement of Germans from those parts of Germany under Polish control to the British Zone in early 1946 (Operation Swallow).\textsuperscript{46}

Several important monographs have been written about the political, administrative and organisational transition of Silesia from a German province (Schlesien) to a Polish voivodeship (Śląsk).\textsuperscript{47} One of the most comprehensive studies is \textit{Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-1949} (1994) by Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach.\textsuperscript{48} More recently, Gregor Thum has focused on the transition of a single city in \textit{Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wroclaw During the Century of Expulsions} (2011).\textsuperscript{49} Andrew Demshuk published two works on the subject in 2012: a journal article entitled ‘Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk: Memory and Mythology in a Postwar German-Polish
Borderland’ and the monograph *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970*.\(^{50}\) The first of these, like the monographs by Siebel-Achenbach and Thum, focuses on the situation in the region after the expulsions. The second broadens the scope to take in the history of Silesia and the post-*Vertreibung* situation of the expellees in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which involved collective memorialisation, coming to terms with the loss of *Heimat* and political agitation for a right of return.

These topics are studied comprehensively in publications by the German Federation of Expellees or *Bund der Vertriebenen* (BdV).\(^{51}\) This organisation (founded on the 27th of October 1957) represents the interests of three categories of German and ethnic Germans: *Vertriebene*, i.e., Germans and ethnic Germans driven out of their homes as an immediate consequence of WWII up to the 31st of December 1952; *Aussiedler*, i.e., Germans and ethnic Germans who made their way to either the FRG or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between the 31st of December 1952 and the 1st of January 1993; and *Spätaussiedler*, i.e., Germans and ethnic Germans who arrived in Germany after the 12th of December 1992.\(^{52}\) In this thesis, I am solely concerned with the *Vertriebenen*.

The BdV pursues two distinct objectives in its publications. First, it produces copious histories of the regions from which Germans and ethnic Germans were expelled in the wake of WWII. The so-called ‘Kulturelle Arbeitshefte’ is a comprehensive series of such histories.\(^{53}\) Second, it publishes widely on the subject of *Flucht und Vertreibung* and its political and social ramifications. The organisation is unequivocal in its condemnation of these events.


\(^{51}\) It is illustrative of the intractability of the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned that some of the most relevant scholarship has been conducted on behalf of and by members of an organisation (Bund der Vertriebenen), whose views and *raison d’être* are challenged by other key stakeholders less interested in researching the German heritage of the regions in question. Whilst accepting the BdV’s version of history uncritically is problematic due to the fact that the organisation represents a specific, well-defined stakeholder collective, but not others, in many cases, other stakeholder collectives have either not conducted any research into the same questions, or have published narratives an uncritical acceptance of which is equally problematic. There is, in short, no entirely unbiased thread within the relevant collective memory discourse.

\(^{52}\) These groups are defined in the German Federal Expellee Act or Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), which regulates the rights and status of those represented by the BDV within the FRG. Specifically the following paragraphs are relevant: *Vertriebene* (§ 1), *Aussiedler* (§ 1 Section 3), and *Spätaussiedler* (§ 4). See: Anon., *Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler: Tatsachen und Argumente*, (Bonn: BdV, 2008), p. 2.


31
as a ‘Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit’.\textsuperscript{54} It is in these booklets and pamphlets that the BdV raises issues of compensation and the right to return home, and in which they hold the German political class and the general population to account for their perceived lack of interest in such issues.\textsuperscript{55} At the same time, the organisation is eager to present its pacifist credentials, for example by endorsing and reprinting the \textit{Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen} (5\textsuperscript{th} of August 1950) which includes the statement: ‘Wir Heimatvertriebenen verzichten auf Rache und Vergeltung’\textsuperscript{56}. However, despite the pacifistic tone apparent in such statements, they do not imply acquiescence in the status quo. As late as 1995 (i.e. five years after the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the Berlin Republic) the BdV reprinted the \textit{Deklaration zur Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen} (6\textsuperscript{th} of August 1960). This text states more problematically that:

\begin{quote}
Die Wiedervereinigung aller durch Wilkür und Gewalt voneinander getrennten Teile Deutschlands ist trotz aller Hemmungen und trotz aller Widerstände herbeizuführen. Dafür einzutreten und einzustehen ist den deutschen Heimatvertriebenen ernsteste Verpflichtung.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

In many ways, the BdV’s role with respect to the \textit{Vertriebenen} (but not necessarily to the \textit{Aussiedler} and \textit{Spätaussiedler}) has largely been obviated by wider geo-political developments. As Lynn M. Tesser rightly points out, following Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU) and the Schengen Agreement (1\textsuperscript{st} of May 2004), any EU citizen, including former German residents, can live, work and own property in Poland. A twelve-year derogation which placed restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests in Poland’s western and northern territories (the ZO) elapses in 2016.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, as of 2016 there will be no further impediment to prevent survivors of \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item \textit{Ibid}. p. 16.
\end{thebibliography}
from returning to their home regions and re-acquiring their lost real estate, should they wish to do so.\textsuperscript{59}

Tesser’s monograph on the \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} of Germans and ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of WWII is part of a broader comparative project. In her own words, her monograph offers the first multi-case analysis of [...] the (re)integration of areas that experienced relatively recent and large-scale forced migration based on assumed religious, ethnic or national identity [and seeks to explain] variation in threat construction surrounding potential minority return [and] the broader impact of repeated international sanctioning of minority removal in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{60}

As such, Tesser seeks to detail the historic events in question before moving on to explain their impact on modern European society. She expands upon existing structural analytical concepts to develop a \textit{quadratic nexus} in a largely successful attempt to find compelling explanations for historic episodes of sociocide and the related modern socio-political phenomena (securitisation issues) addressed in the book.\textsuperscript{61} On the whole, Tesser’s work is convincing and informative. However, she misquotes the summary protocol of the Potsdam Conference which, she states, called for the ‘humane and orderly transfer of ethnic Germans from Poland’s former German territories, from other parts of Poland, the Free City of Danzig, from Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, and from Hungary’ (my italics).\textsuperscript{62} In fact, the protocol states that the territories referred to throughout this thesis as the ZO are to be placed under ‘the administration of the Polish state’ and that ‘the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement’.\textsuperscript{63} With regard to the transfer of Germans the protocol records the following:

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland,\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} 71 years after the expulsions, the influx of returning Germans is unlikely to be overwhelming.


\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. pp. 17-29.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. pp. 62, 208; Tesser also misattributes this to Article VII of the Potsdam Protocol whereas the section that deals with Poland is Article VIII. The ‘Orderly transfer of German populations’ is dealt with in Article XII. See: Anon., ‘The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945 (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945’, in \textit{The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference}, (Potsdam, 1945).

Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.\textsuperscript{54}

Thus, it is Tesser who refers to these people as ‘ethnic Germans’ rather than simply ‘Germans’. This inadvertent, and seemingly minor, conflation between ‘ethnic Germans’ (i.e. minority populations within non-German titular states) and \textit{Reichsdeutschen} has important ramifications within the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. It is, therefore, worth examining in detail the categories of people considered by the BdV to constitute the \textit{Vertriebenen}.

Among the \textit{Vertriebenen}, the BdV recognises 22 distinct groups. Of these, 17 can be classed as ethnic Germans, i.e., they had lived beyond the frontiers of the Third Reich prior to the outbreak of WWII. A subset of these, ‘[die] Waisen von Versailles’, (or their direct predecessors) had lived in Germany (i.e., within the Kaiserreich or Austria) before the end of the First World War (hereinafter WWI).\textsuperscript{65} This subset comprised the following groups (official BdV terminology): \[\text{die}\] Danziger, Sudetendeutschen, Deutschen aus dem Weichsel-Warthe-Gebiet, and Westpreußen. The remaining ethnic Germans were \[\text{die}\] Deutschbalten, Banater Schwaben, Bessarabierdeutschen, Buchenlanddeutschen, Dobrudscha- und Bulgariendeutschen, Donauschwaben, Karpatendeutschen in der Slowakei, Deutschen aus Litauen, Russlanddeutschen, Sathmarer Schwaben, Siebenbürger Sachsen, and Deutschen in Ungarn. The remaining five groups encompassed not \textit{ethnic} Germans, but German citizens (\textit{Reichsdeutsche}). These were \[\text{die}\] Ost-Brandenburger, Ostpreußen, Pommern, Oberschlesier and the Lower Silesians (\textit{Schlesier}) with whom this thesis is primarily concerned.\textsuperscript{66}

Thus, it is correct to categorise those ethnic Germans ‘stranded’ in Poland following the creation of the Second Republic in 1918 as a minority population of ethnic Germans. The same is true of those who had been forcibly relocated to new German states created by the NSDAP within conquered Polish territory between 1939 and 1945 from the Baltic States, Galicia, West Volhynia, Bessarabia and the

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.} p. XII.


\textsuperscript{66} Anon., \textit{Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler}, p. 3.
Bukovina. In total 1,385,800 of this minority ethnic German population were expelled from Poland starting in mid 1944. However, those Reichsdeutsche expelled from the ZO between 1944 and 1952 (a total of 6,981,000 by 1949) cannot reasonably be considered to have formed a minority within Poland and should not be referred to as ‘ethnic’ Germans. They had been resident in territories that had been central to German culture and had formed part of Germany for centuries (in the case of Silesia since the Treaty of Trentschin in 1335). Moreover, in a strictly legal sense, they were not expelled from Poland: they were forcibly relocated from specific German provinces to other parts of Germany.

Another frequently encountered problem within the secondary literature relating to the Vertreibung is the uncritical assumption that they were, largely, a response to the Holocaust. As I demonstrate in Chapter 3, this notion of an explicit causal link between the Holocaust and the Vertreibung is wholly inadequate as an overarching explanatory framework at the geo-political level. The forced expulsion of Germans and ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the War was not a response to the Holocaust but rather to German aggression against specific non-Jewish citizens of titular states such as Poles and Czechs. Indeed, the notion of Vertreibung as retribution for the Holocaust is particularly problematic with respect to Poland given the institutionalisation of anti-Semitism in Poland during the interbellum and postwar periods.

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67 For an account of how such a resettlement action was experienced was experienced by ethnic Germans and the Poles, whose places they took in the newly established Warthegau see: Rees, L., The Nazis: a Warning from History (London: BBC Worldwide Ltd, 1997), pp. 108-11.
69 Bundesamt, S., Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste, p. 38.
The publication in 2001 of the monograph *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* by Jan Tomasz Gross triggered a nationwide debate about anti-Semitism in Poland. In it he alludes to the Polish ‘inhabitants of Jedwabne who engaged in the murder of the Jewish people’ on the 10th of July 1941.73 This episode also inspired Józef Hen’s *Pinpongista* (2008) which explores Polish anti-Semitism and the complicity of certain members of the Catholic clergy in anti-Jewish pogroms carried out under German occupation. However, by focusing the narrative on a Polish protagonist, Mike Murphy (formerly Michał Dembina), and including episodes of conspicuous bravery on the part of Poles who risked their lives to save Jews from the murderers, the (Polish-Jewish) author presents a highly complex version of the events in question.74

According to Piotr Madajczyk, in addition to existing anti-Semitic sentiments in pre-war Poland

> auch die nationalsozialistische antijüdische Propaganda blieb nicht ganz wirkungslos. Insgesamt führte die deutsche Politik zur wachsenden Entfremdung zwischen Polen und Juden, das jüdische Schicksal wurde nicht als ‘polnisch’ angesehen.75

Madajczyk goes on to argue that, from the perspective of the Polish underground organisations, the official end of WWII did not represent an obvious caesura. In many cases, they continued their activities which, during the war had been directed at foreign (i.e., non-Polish) elements in Poland. In this context, all non-ethnic-Poles, including Polish Jews, were regarded as invaders and occupiers, regardless of their actual status before the War. It was in this context that
animosity towards Jews grew, who, far from eliciting a feeling of solidarity and sympathy as victims of the NSDAP genocide, were seen as foreigners.\textsuperscript{76}

Calls to juxtapose every exhibition relating to \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} with images and records of the Holocaust are, therefore, misleading at best, and essentialist at worst. Essentialist because associating the killing or expulsion of any randomly-selected set of (ethnic) Germans with the murder of Jews by specific Germans, especially in order to justify the former, assumes the collective guilt of all (ethnic) Germans, disregarding the role of personal agency in the question of guilt.\textsuperscript{77}

This undercurrent of essentialism in scholarly and popular accounts of German victimhood \textit{per se}, and \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} in particular, is highly problematic. In general, much of the existing secondary literature on the subject of \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} suffers from a tendency to favour strategies of disambiguation in the search for identifiable perpetrators and victims. This observation is especially true of a significant proportion of the relevant Anglophone historiography, which takes as its starting point an axiomatic assumption of moral superiority vis-à-vis Anglo-American participation and actions throughout the World War Duplex. This attitude engenders a tendency to embrace reductionism, resulting in inadequacy at the explanatory level within the relevant narratives. In point of fact, the collective memory discourse pertaining to these events has been complicated by several factors, particularly in relation to perpetrator-victim narratives. For example, all of the events referred to in this thesis touch upon what is generally thought of as the thorny issue of German victimhood. The issue in question is predicated upon the idea that Germans living throughout the period during which the NSDAP rose to power and became the leading political body in Germany can legitimately be considered collectively guilty for NSDAP atrocities. Yet many Germans and ethnic Germans were themselves the victims of NSDAP policies. The fact that large numbers of Germans and ethnic Germans were forced out of their homes by the NSDAP

\textsuperscript{76} Piotr Madajczyk in: \textit{ibid}, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{77} This is not to deny or downplay the existence of a significant and broadbased German Volksgemeinschaft that, at least until the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad between September 1942 and February 1943, stood fsslquare behind Hitler and broadly supported his policies with varying degrees of enthusiasm, even fanaticism. For a recent multi-national exposition of the complexities and ramifications of this subject, see: Steber, M., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives} (2014); On the subject of collective guilt see: Gilbert, M., ‘Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings’, \textit{The Journal of Ethics}, 6 (2002), 115-43; Abdel-Nour, F., ‘National Responsibility’, \textit{Political Theory}, 31 (2003), 693-719.
authorities confounds simplistic interpretations of these events in which the perpetrators and victims are conceived of in ethno-nationalist terms. I have already mentioned the victimisation of ethnic Germans from the Baltic States, Galicia, West Volhynia, Bessarabia and the Bukovina pursuant to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Chapter 6 is concerned with another example of such German-German expulsions.\(^78\) The situation with regard to the Polish government’s part in population transfers across the new Polish-Soviet frontier is equally problematic in terms of clear perpetrator-victim definitions.

Yet, this tendency to simplify accounts of the War has not gone unchallenged. For example, supported by a cohort of Anglophone and German scholars, William (Bill) Niven has, over the past decade and a half, pioneered research into the postwar discourse on German victimhood.\(^79\) Niven has usefully drawn attention to the conceptual difficulties inherent in the use of such simplistic terms as ‘perpetrator collective’ to describe ‘the broad mass of [wartime] Germans’, and ‘liberator collective’ as applied to the Allies.\(^80\) The use of such terminology glosses over the actual complexity of the communities thus described. For example, the NSDAP came to power, not with the support of ‘the broad mass of Germans’, but rather in opposition to the wishes of some two thirds of voters in the two elections that marked the transition from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich in 1932 and 1933.\(^81\)


\(^80\) Of the 44.4 million Germans entitled to vote in the Reichstagswahl on the 6th of November, 1932 a total of 35.5 million cast valid votes. The NSDAP won 33.1% of the votes cast, or 26.46% of the maximum potential votes. Whilst there is no way of gauging support for the NSDAP among the non-enfranchised sector of the population, it is interesting to note that this result equates to 11,750,500 committed supporters out of a total population of 65,226,600 living Germans or 18.01% of the overall population. Whichever of these figures one chooses to focus on, none of them suggest ‘the broad mass of Germans’ voted for the NSDAP. In fact, a minority (albeit a large one) of the population are known to have backed Hitler in this election. In the final election, on 5th of March 1933, which cannot be considered free and fair by modern standards, the NSDAP increased their vote to 43.9% of 39.3 million valid votes which equates to 17,252,700 supporters or 26.5% of
Another complicating factor that questions the legitimacy of the reference to Germans, who lived through the Third Reich and WWII, as ‘perpetrator collective’ is the fact that Hitler arguably carried out a coup d’état of sorts known in German historiography as the *Machtergreifung*. This political manoeuvre was enabled by a series of crises culminating in a final round of elections on the 5th of March 1933 and the so-called *Ermächtigungsgesetz* (24th of March 1933). This legislation, all of which was enacted in strict compliance with the Weimar constitution, effectively bestowed dictatorial powers on Hitler who then implemented a totalitarian regime aimed, among other things, at the suppression of all dissent among ‘the broad mass of Germans’. One of the first institutions to be implemented under Hitler’s new regime were concentration camps which were, initially, used for the incarceration of German political prisoners.

This tendency to exaggerate the level of support for Hitler among ‘the broad mass of Germans’ does not reflect contemporary views among non-German populations. Indeed, I have already noted above that many Britons differentiated clearly between ‘ordinary Germans’ and ‘Nazis’ in the immediate aftermath of the War. Yet, an ordinance issued by the Polish *Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych* or Ministry for the Regained Territories (MZO) on the 6th of April 1946 went even further. Taking account of the fact that party membership was, in many cases, compulsory, the ordinance states, *inter alia*, that an individual’s proven membership in the NSDAP does not in and of itself debar him or her from being recognised as a Polish national.

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82 The *Ermächtigungsgesetz* was flanked by equally important legal acts such as the Ordinance [from the Reichspräsident] on the protection of the German people and state (February 23, 1933), and the Nuremberg laws (September 15, 1935). Which, if any, of this legislation can strictly be defined as constituting a coup d’état of any sort is open to debate. What is certain is that, because much of this legislation curtailed the liberties of the very people who helped Hitler to power, one can legitimately characterise his Machtergreifung as a betrayal of the mandate bestowed upon him by the voting public. Moreover, considered in its entirety, this legislation amounts to a new constitution, popular support for which was neither measured at the time nor can it be accurately assessed now, even in principle. See: Hürten, H., ed. *Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung: Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich 1918-1945* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007), 9, pp. 144-45, 63-65.


85 The ordinance concerns the process of national verification in the ZO (see below).

A final objection to the notion of Germans as an undifferentiated ‘perpetrator collective’ arises logically from the conception of the Allies as a ‘liberator collective’. For, this latter concept entails the notion that the Allies were liberating ‘the broad mass of Germans’ from their NSDAP oppressors.\textsuperscript{87} The logical corollary of this position is that ‘the broad mass of Germans’ constituted a ‘victim collective’, which cannot be reconciled with representations of the same people as a ‘perpetrator collective’.

Further complicating the concept of the Allies as a ‘liberator collective’ is the fact that the Allies agreed to, and actively supported the new Polish authorities in executing the expulsions. This has specific ramifications for British historiography, because people who choose to portray the Allies as a ‘liberator collective’ must necessarily classify forced expulsion as an act of liberation.\textsuperscript{88} Any such classification, however, is at odds with both popular and elite discourse in Britain throughout the interbellum period. According to Matthew Frank, contemporaries regarded such events as ‘monstrously wicked’ acts of ‘Asiatic abomination […] which all right thinking people regard as detestable’.\textsuperscript{89} Moreover, it is at odds with current international law and norms.\textsuperscript{90} It is because of Britain’s intimate involvement in both instances of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned that I treat Anglophone literature on the subject as part of a specific stakeholder narrative within the relevant collective memory discourse. Specifically, I treat this corpus as being \textit{on a par with} scholarly works produced by all other stakeholders (Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Soviets and so on).

The subject of victim identification has also been complicated by arbitrary assignment of the affected populations to various identity categories, first by agents of the German Reich and later by the Polish government. The issue turns on the so-called Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) in which NSDAP officials categorised individuals in the occupied areas of Poland, grouping them in accordance with stated or perceived ethnic affiliations.\textsuperscript{91} Groups A and B were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} I return to this theme in Chapter 4 in relation to representations of one of the Allies, the Soviet Red Army, as a liberating force in both Poland and the GDR.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Unless specifically indicated I use the word historiography in the sense of the writing of history throughout this thesis. See: Soanes, C., et al., eds., \textit{Concise OED}, p. 676.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Frank, M. J., \textit{Expelling the Germans}, pp. 10, 21.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Frackowiak, J., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart}, pp. 181-220.
\end{itemize}
reserved for people who had openly professed their German ethnicity prior to the German invasion, and those who had lived as Germans in private but not in public. Group C was for people of mixed race and/or with non-German spouses, and/or for non-Polish Slavs.\(^92\) Group D was reserved for the non-German spouses of ‘pure’ Germans (from Groups C) and for politically suspect ‘pure’ Germans (who would otherwise qualify for inclusion in Groups A or B). Neither German nor Polish Jews were eligible for inclusion in any category.\(^93\) During the period of German occupation, which at the time the DVL was compiled looked likely to be indefinite, there were obvious advantages to being included in one of the ‘safe groups’ in terms of citizenship, status, and treatment within the legal system.\(^94\)

However, after these lists fell into the hands of the Polish authorities in the closing months of WWII, those who had sought to improve their survival chances by denying their Polish identity were persecuted as traitors, collaborators, and enemies of the state.\(^95\) In addition, the Polish authorities implemented a process of national verification (weryfikacja narodowościowa) within the ZO beginning on the 22\(^{nd}\) of March 1945.\(^96\) This process essentially mirrored the DVL in every way except that the focus was on Polish ethnicity.\(^97\) As had been the case with the DVL, the assignment of individuals to one or other of the available categories during national verification was often based on arbitrary decisions and political considerations. Skilled German workers in key industries were often ‘converted to Poles’ \(\textit{en masse}\). Far from being expelled, these workers were forced to remain in Poland and the annexed territories regardless of their personal preferences.\(^98\)

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\(^92\) Poland has always been home to several Slavic tribes. This is similar to the situation in early England in which there were various tribes such as the Angles, Saxons, Jutes, and Danes. However, the degree of ethnic blending has been less in Poland than in England such that even today a given individual might self-identify as, for example, Kashubian rather than Polish. In this respect, as in so many others, the situation in Poland is rather more similar to that in Germany than in England.


\(^94\) These ‘obvious advantages’ (i.e., less likelihood of immediate persecution, involuntary relocation or forced labour) were tempered by the fact that the more German one was deemed to be, the more likely it was that one would be drafted into the Armed Services. See: Frackowiak, J., et al., \textit{Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart}, pp. 181-225.


\(^96\) For an interesting discussion of the changing fates and status of those Germans and Poles whose ethnic classification and self-perception was ambiguous throughout the relevant period see Chapters 6 to 9 in: Service, H., \textit{Germans to Poles: Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).


\(^98\) Those who subsequently managed to leave Poland between 31.12.1952 and 01.01.1993 constitute the Aussiedler whose status within the FRG is regulated by § 1 Section 3 of the BVFG. See: Anon., \textit{Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler}, p. 2.
miners from Waldenburg (Walbrzych), for example, were treated in this manner.\textsuperscript{99} Another group of key German workers retained within the annexed territories were the railway workers.\textsuperscript{100} Others affected in this way were the so-called autochthons, the allegedly aboriginal inhabitants of Upper Silesia, who were neither German nor Polish.\textsuperscript{101}

A further historic circumstance that has complicated the ensuing discourse is the changing role played by the USSR between 1939 and 1952 (when the \textit{Vertreibungen} as defined by the BdV ceased). Having actively colluded with Germany in the invasion and partition of Poland in September 1939, the USSR advanced to become the leading partner among the Allies by the end of WWII. This assessment is true in terms of the USSR’s contribution to the military defeat of the Third Reich and of the part Josef Stalin played in establishing the postwar geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{102} By 1952, the so-called Cold War had already begun and the USSR was regarded by ‘the West’ (which included the FRG) as an enemy state.\textsuperscript{103} This state of affairs was reflected in the relevant historiography on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in various ways. In Chapters 3 and 4, I elaborate further on the historical situation and the relevant collective memory discourse.

Thus, it is clear that all attempts to characterise any ‘broad mass’ of people in such simplistic terms as ‘perpetrator’, ‘liberator’, or ‘victim’ collectives are fraught with conceptual difficulties and tend to substitute analytical sophistication with conceptual simplification, which occludes, rather than illuminates, the relevant historic situation. In this thesis, I seek to build upon the work carried out in the field of German victimhood by Niven \textit{et al.}, augmenting it through a consideration of Polish discourse on German victimhood. Moreover, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, viewing WWII and its immediate


\textsuperscript{100} Siebel-Achenbach, S., \textit{Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland}, p. 161.


\textsuperscript{103} In a speech delivered on 05.03.1946 Winston Churchill declared that ‘an iron curtain has descended across the continent’ 1946. Quoted in: Edwards, O., \textit{The USA and the Cold War, 1945-63} (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2002), p. 28; Various blockades of West Berlin by the USSR culminated in the Berlin Airlift, the first major confrontation of the Cold War. This began on 26.06.1948. See: MacDonogh, G., \textit{After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation} (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 525-37; The FRG was a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. See: Banchoff, T. F., \textit{The German Problem Transformed}, p. 15.
aftermath from a Polish perspective also problematises the general assessment of the Allies a ‘liberator collective’ in some interesting and productive ways.

By contrast with much of the earlier nationally-based historiography and public discourse, with which Tesser, Eigler, Niven et al., have taken issue, the subject of postwar sociocide is treated with considerably more circumspection in recent collaborative work by European scholars based in the immediately affected regions. In addition to the *Lexikon der Vertreibungen* mentioned above, another recent excellent example of the collaborative scholarship currently taking place in this field is *Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart* (2013) by Johannes Frackowiak (Editor) et al. This book presents a collection of essays based on papers presented by Polish, Czech and German historians and political scientists at an international workshop organised by the Hannah-Arendt Institut für Totalitarismusforschung (HAIT) on the 16th and 17th of September 2011. The workshop was convened to explore the influence of nationalism and nationalist policy in historical relations between Germans and Poles. In addition, the delegates were interested in the question of whether, and to what extent, longer-term nationalist attitudes are still shaping political discourse in Poland, particularly in relation to the kind of anti-German resentment that surfaced there during the PiS regime under Jarosław Kaczyński. The authors’ balanced contextualisation of events which are often discussed in highly charged emotional terms, such as postwar territorial and population transfers, opens up new perspectives and questions established narratives. Even the fact that Frackowiak has taken 1871 as his starting point usefully augments the usual periodization encountered in Polish historiography in which the entire period from 1795 to 1918 is treated as a single epoch (The Partition Era). Frackowiak’s point of departure is interesting because 1871 is arguably the first time in history as of which one can talk in terms of ‘Germany’ in anything like its modern meaning. I draw liberally on this source throughout the following study, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4.

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104 Hannah-Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism at the Dresden University of Technology
105 PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość = Law and Justice (a Polish political party with nationalist-conservative leanings)
107 Prior to that, each German state acted in its own interests which were often to the detriment of other imperial states (or their successors after 1806). It is not legitimate, for example, to characterise Prussia’s participation in the three Partitions of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1772, 1792, and 1795) as an expression of German aggression per se. By
The foregoing discussion primarily relates to key secondary sources, whose object of study is either sociocide per se (e.g. Brandes et al.), longer term contextualising of Polish-German narratives (e.g. Frackowiak et al.), German victimhood during WWII per se (e.g. Niven et al.), contextualisation with respect to the Holocaust (e.g. Eigler), the process of territorial transition (e.g. Siebel-Achenbach and Thum), and the current relationship between expellees and the titular states now incorporating their places of origin (e.g. Tesser). I have reserved discussion of the literature relating to the notion of collective memory for Section 2.1 below, in which I review the development of the concept and clarify the way I shall be using the term throughout this thesis.

In the next chapter I turn to the theoretic paradigm within which I analyse the collective memory discourse pertaining to Poland’s annexation of parts of Germany, surrender of the Kresy to the USSR, and the concomitant population transfers.

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contrast, Prussian policy and measures towards ethnic Poles after 1871 can only be regarded as an all-German matter (at least in terms of corporate responsibility). See: Schulze, H., *Gibt es überhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte?*, Corso bei Siedler (Berlin: Siedler, 1989); Breuilly, J., *Austria, Prussia and Germany, 1806-1871* (London: Longman, 2002).
2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Trauma-Based Collective Memory Discourse

The theoretical framework underpinning the following chapters is based on aspects of the phenomenon of collective memory. The concept of collective memory has been defined in a number of different ways, some of which are mutually exclusive. The concept is further complicated by the different meanings implied by the use of the grammatical article ‘the/a’ before ‘collective memory’. For example, it could be interpreted as having a genitive function, i.e., it refers to ‘the/a memory of the/a collective’. Alternatively it could imply specificity, i.e., ‘the/a specific instance of collective memory’. The use of the plural ‘collective memories’ can also be interpreted in several ways: ‘several collective memories relating to one incident’, ‘several instances of collective memory relating to different incidents’ and so on. Moreover, the term ‘collective memory’ by itself implies a phenomenon that can be discussed without reference to a specific incident. Therefore, extreme care is required when using the term. For the sake of clarity, I present below a working definition of the term ‘collective memory’ as used throughout this thesis. I first define ‘collective memory’ as a phenomenon and then discuss ‘collective memories’ relating to two specific instances of sociocide (i.e., potentially conflicting shared relevant memories espoused by several stakeholder communities). Before I do so, however, I will explore the problems of the concept as originally introduced by Maurice Halbwachs and survey more recent thought on the subject.

The English term ‘collective memory’ is a translation of Maurice Halbwachs’ notion of mémoire collective. Disputing Halbwachs’ claim to originality in conceiving of memory at a group level, Nicolas Russell argues that ‘we can trace the notion of group memory to the earliest texts in Western civilization […]although] the term collective memory appeared only recently’. Pre-Halbwachsian French terms, such as la mémoire des hommes, la mémoire de la postérité, une mémoire éternelle or une mémoire perpétuelle, straddle a socio-academic complex ranging from legend to recorded history and are arguably

identical to Halbwachs’ concept of ‘collective memory’. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it was Halbwachs who popularised ‘collective memory’ both as a concept and as a term. Yet, his definition of the term is by no means unambiguous, a fact that has resulted in disagreement within the field of collective memory studies and a proliferation of definitions.

Lewis Coser, translator and editor of On Collective Memory (1992) which combines Halbwachs’ Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (1925) and La topographie légendaire des évanges en terre sainte (1941), states that ‘collective memory [as defined by Halbwachs] is essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present’. Halbwachs argued that individuals remember only fragments of the past and that ‘the greatest number of memories come back to us when [others] recall them to us […] and that it is in society that people normally acquire their memories’. He goes on to assert that

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\text{[there] is no point seeking where [memories] are preserved in the brain […] for they are recalled to me externally […] and it is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.}
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This apparent denial of the existence of individual memory outside of collective memory and social frameworks suggests that, for Halbwachs, collective memory is more than a convenient metaphor. It also places him at odds with mainstream neuroscience. Indeed, Halbwachs appears to be unconvinced by his own theory, and asks rhetorically whether explaining ‘the memory of an individual by the memory of others’ is not a tautology. However, he goes on to

\[110\text{Ibid. pp. 793-94.}\]
\[111\text{Lewis A. Coser in: Halbwachs, M., On Collective Memory, p. 34.}\]
\[112\text{Halbwachs cites two pieces of evidence for the fragmentary nature of personal memories: a report about a neglected child found wandering in the woods in France in 1731 which was published in the Magasin Pittoresque and reproduced in Revue philosophique in 1923, and the fact that we have no clear memory when we dream (which, he argues, proves that when fully isolated from social input – as we are during sleep – personal memory breaks down). See: ibid. pp. 37-38.}\]
\[113\text{Ibid. p. 38.}\]
\[114\text{In other places in the text Halbwachs appears to contradict himself. Rather than disputing the retention of individual memories per se, he refers to them (in the English translation) as ‘resonance’ which, he says, ‘is not to be confused at all with the preservation of memories’. In another section he admits that any definition of collective memory as a mutually reinforcing framework presupposes the existence of individual memory. See: ibid. pp. 38-40.}\]
\[116\text{Halbwachs, M., On Collective Memory, p. 38.}\]
develop his theory whilst leaving this central tautology unresolved. This issue notwithstanding, by Halbwachs’ definition, collective memory is the primary phenomenon and personal memories – if they exist – are subjective perspectives not on the events in question but on the narrative created and sustained by the group.¹¹⁷ From a subjective perspective this is unconvincing. Logically too it cannot be correct because one remembers things that happen when one is alone, including certain things, such as dreams and the perception of qualia, which are irreducibly subjective and categorically inaccessible to the collective.

A number of researchers, including Jan and Aleida Assmann, have put considerable effort into clarifying Halbwachs’ original ideas. The Assmanns have, for example, refined the entire field of trans-personal memory studies by introducing and defining a number of now standard terms designed to tease out and mobilise the various perspectives inherent, but not necessarily fully elucidated in, Halbwachs’ original concept. Jan Assmann identifies clear theoretical differences between cultural, communicative, and social memory.¹¹⁸ Yet, Jan Assmann’s ideas remain axiomatically rooted in the paradigm established by Halbwachs. For example, he writes that ‘Maurice Halbwachs has shown, even our auto-biographical memory is a social construction that we build up in communication with others’ and that ‘[it] was Halbwachs’s great discovery that human memory depends, like consciousness in general, on socialization and communication’ (my italics).¹¹⁹ Thus, Assmann argues that Halbwachs has ‘shown’, i.e. demonstrated, the primacy of collective worldviews over personal memory and that this is a ‘great discovery’. As I have already argued above that, far from having demonstrated this relationship between social constructs and individual memory, Halbwachs asserted that it holds true, before recognising the tautological aspect of his own argument and leaving it unresolved. To that extent, I must conclude that those elements of Assmann’s exposition that wholeheartedly endorse Halbwachs’ core idea, treating it as axiomatic, are themselves built upon a central tautology. However, Jan Assmann then goes on to state explicitly that his own concept of cultural memory is not intended to replace Halbwachs’ notion of


¹¹⁹ Jan Assmann in: Meusburger, P., et al., Cultural Memories, pp. 15-16.
collective memory, but rather to ‘distinguish between the two forms as two different […] ways of remembering’. Whilst this is certainly an interesting distinction, it does contribute to the terminological and conceptual imprecision in the field of trans-personal memory studies, which I address below.

Many post-Halbwachsian collective memory researchers, by contrast, have admitted the existence and primacy of personal memory and argued for an understanding of collective memory as a phenomenon which augments it in some way. Nonetheless, defining the concept has proved challenging. For example, following Paul Ricoeur, Russell begins his review of the concept of collective memory pre- and post-Halbwachs with what he designates ‘a broad working definition’, namely that ‘memories attributed to more than one person are collective memories’, which he freely admits is ‘frustratingly simple’. Indeed, it is a simple tautology.

Halbwachs argued that every group of individuals can be thought of as having a shared identity based on its collective experiences and that no two group-identities are ever exactly the same. As a result, each group has its own collective memory and these are largely unique. Assuming this is ever true, it is more likely to apply to groups that remain stable over time and share most experiences, such as isolated village communities. Halbwachs goes on to argue that group identity is based on collective memory and that, therefore, when the collective memory changes the group ceases to exist. However, this is another example of tautological reasoning: the group is identified as such because its members share a collective memory; but the collective memory is defined as such because it represents the version of events agreed upon by the group. Therefore, the group must pre-date the formation of the collective memory but at the same time the collective memory must pre-date the formation of the group. Moreover, according to the working definition I set out in detail below, the collective memory of any given event is a socio-political performative process actively expressed through the production of physical and cultural artefacts. It is, therefore, in a constant state of flux and subject to on-going renegotiation. Thus, collective memories change

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120 Jan Assmann in: ibid. p. 17.
121 Russell, N., 'Collective Memory before and after Halbwachs', pp. 792-96.
122 ibid. pp. 792-93, 96.
continuously and, were Halbwachs’ assertion true that the group ceases to exist whenever they do so, the group would never form in the first place, or else it would be so ephemeral as to be almost meaningless as a focus for historical or cultural study.

One crucial aspect of Halbwachs’ definition of the concept of collective memory, which was still current in the late twentieth century, is that it concerns knowledge (i.e. direct memories) of lived experience. Writing in 1998, Marie-Claire Lavabre, for example, defined collective memory as, *inter alia*, ‘lived experience belonging to a specific group’.

According to Jeffrey Olick, a similar level of knowledge about an event not acquired through subjective lived (‘organic’) experience constitutes knowledge of history. Silke Arnold-de Simine, on the other hand, argues convincingly that ‘all memories are mediated experience […] and that it is only a question of how many layers of mediation distance [one] from an event.’ Indeed, in a recent work concerning the mediation of memory in museum settings, Arnold-de Simine asks rhetorically whether ‘collective memory’ even exists: perhaps, she suggests, it ‘[is] just a metaphor for certain forms of cultural representation … or simply a heuristic tool that helps us to distinguish these forms from other modes of engagement [with past events].’ Several authors have suggested and used ‘collected memories’ as an alternative term. This is less reminiscent of Jungian mysticism and, by contrast with Halbwachs’ original concept, implies a specific physical repository of information rather than a phenomenon, however defined. For Dutceac Segesten, on the other hand, the term ‘collective memory’ remains useful, but needs to be understood as a cultural practice that involves an element of political myth making. In this definition, collective memories are based on a selection of

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127 Ibid. p. 21.
129 Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) proposed the idea of a ‘collective unconscious’ as part of a comprehensive pseudo-scientific system of psychotherapy. According to Jung ‘there is nothing mystical about the collective unconscious’ which he defined as ‘a kind of reservoir of symbols and images that we come equipped with at birth’. However, there is no known mechanism for such a transfer of symbols and images between successive generations nor is there any known location for such a reservoir. Furthermore, Jung claimed that mystics have the ability to vividly experience the collective unconscious and claimed such an ability for himself. Critics and acolytes have, therefore, consistently referred to him as a mystic. See: Jung, C. G., *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); Lachman, G., *Jung the Mystic: The Esoteric Dimensions of Carl Jung's Life and Teachings* (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 1-3.
past events, presented more or less accurately as required to support the prevailing shared group myth. The overall objective, she argues, is ‘to mobilize emotions and generate or modify attitudes among the members of [a] community.’ Other researchers, such as Olick et al., suggest that, whilst the term ‘collective memory’ does refer to something real, the term is imprecise and could usefully be replaced by the expression ‘social memory’. Yet, as Arnold-de Simine rightly points out, the inherent imprecision of the concept is a function of the word ‘memory’, which has more than one referent … a neurophysiological capacity, which resides in the individual […] and a formation of social and cultural practices […] which extend individual memory beyond first-hand experiences.

Thus, I argue, many problems with the concept of collective memory are rooted in the purported trans-personalisation of memory, not with the word we choose to represent this trans-personalisation (‘collective’, ‘social’, ‘cultural’ and so on). As if in response to this objection, Susan Sontag favours the use of the term ‘collective instruction’. This usefully emphasises questions relating to who is being instructed and by whom.

To further complicate matters, the concept (or metaphor) of collective memory, however defined, is based on our understanding of personal memory gained through subjective experience. However, post-Halbwachsian scholarship has identified different types of personal memory, all of which have the potential to serve as the conceptual referent to which collective memory, as a metaphor, points. The two kinds of personal memory that are most relevant in the current context are episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory is what most people mean when they talk about memory in a non-academic context. It ‘refers to the context-rich recollection of unique personal experiences’. By contrast, semantic memory is neither experiential nor subjective, but rather it

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deals with facts, knowledge about the world and objects, knowledge about language, knowledge about oneself, and conceptual priming. Information is represented in long-term memory as a network of associations among concepts.\textsuperscript{136}

According to Russell, ‘early modern collective memory greatly resembles semantic memory [in that it …] is not connected by nature to any particular individual’s or group’s memory or identity.’\textsuperscript{137} Thus, the story of some Herculean feat performed somewhere in the world is gradually disseminated to other places where it becomes part of the collective memory. However, Russell quickly falls foul of the terminological confusion surrounding collective memory discourse when he states: ‘I can remember [Alexander the Great’s] actions, but they are not part of my past experience’.\textsuperscript{138} Citing this as an example of semantic memory, he might more accurately have said: ‘I can remember learning about one culturally-biased version of the history of [Alexander the Great’s] actions; they are not part of my past experience [therefore they are part of my semantic memory], but learning about them is [episodic memory].

As the preceding paragraphs, which touch upon a tiny sample of the available literature on the subject, amply demonstrate, there is a considerable degree of terminological and conceptual imprecision within the field of collective memory studies, sufficient to warrant, not another attempt at an authoritative definition, but rather a specific working definition for the current thesis. For the sake of clarity, the exposition and arguments presented throughout the following chapters are predicated on a definition of trauma-based collective memory as a \textit{contested narrative discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact}.\textsuperscript{139} Thus, it encompasses three distinct aspects, namely a specific trauma, a set of stakeholders and a goal-oriented discursive process.

Crucially, it is not only the victims of an event who form collective memories about it. Perpetrators or alleged perpetrators, if they form a collective, also participate in an analogous process to produce their own negotiated

\textsuperscript{136} Meusburger, P., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Cultural Memories}, p. 353.
\textsuperscript{137} Russell, N., ‘Collective Memory before and after Halbwachs’, p. 798.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} NB: It is emphatically not my intention to ‘reject’ any given definition of collective memory as such. Instead, I merely argue that, given the potential for misunderstanding on the part of readers familiar with one or more existing definition, it is important to clarify precisely how I shall be using the term ‘collective memory’ throughout this thesis.
explanatory model, or collective memory, of the events in question. At an analytical level, the subject of investigation is the entirety of the artefacts and performative acts in which the relevant discursive process, or more precisely, the various, competing strands of the associated discourse, are encoded.

The concept of collective memory as used throughout this thesis is not based solely on episodic memory and therefore differs significantly from Halbwachs’ original concept. This does not imply that specific individuals within a given memory collective cannot have their own episodic memories of the events in question. Indeed, within the definition of collective memory presented in this thesis, episodic memory plays an important role although the crucial process involves the transition from episodic to semantic memory. Certainly, it is the case that those who do have episodic memories of the event in question often claim a privileged position within the on-going process of negotiating and contesting the relevant facts and information as they will eventually become ossified in the history books and in the built environment. However, it is worth noting in this context that eyewitnesses’ testimony can be limited both through what Erich Maria Remarque termed the ‘frog perspective’, or, to coin a phrase, the myopia of proximity, and by the conditions under which their memories were formed.\textsuperscript{140} Battle conditions, for example, are not conducive to the formation of accurate memories because of the negative impact stress can have on the hippocampus upon the intact functioning of which episodic memory depends.\textsuperscript{141} In addition, an important concept within Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical system known as dialogism, which is highly relevant to the analysis of eyewitness testimony in collective memory discourses, is the ‘law of placement’. This emphasises the uniqueness of perception within a given existence and the fact ‘that the meaning of whatever is observed is shaped by the [mental, experiential, existential] place from which it is perceived’.\textsuperscript{142}

Collective memory, as I use the term in this thesis, is more than a collection of discreet personal (episodic) memories of a given event, regardless of


the extent to which these may converge. Thus, the term ‘collected memory’, as favored by Young, Olick, and Browning, does not adequately express the concept. Indeed, one of its key characteristics is that witnesses of a given (usually traumatic) event strive to express, externalize, and share their personal memories with other victims. This initiates a process of expression (in the sense of uttering or ‘outing’ episodic memories to make them public) and negotiation in which a shared version of the memory is developed and agreed upon. It is this version that the collective espouses as a whole and which it strives to bring to the attention of a wider public (although I do not mean to imply that all, or even any, members of the group are conscious of this process). Thus, the process of collective memory, as defined here, begins with and continues, throughout its active phase, to involve a transition from a collection of isolated episodic memories to a single shared semantic memory of the event in question.

This movement is essentially a process of narrative homogenisation whereby an assemblage of first-person singular narratives (what I saw was…; what I experienced was…; what I know is…) becomes one shared first-person plural narrative (what we saw was…). An interesting example of this process of homogenisation in action is the work of the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission between 1972 and 2008. The objective of the collaboration was to produce a negotiated version of German-Polish history acceptable to both nations. Certain aspects of the Commission’s work were received with consternation by representatives of the affected stakeholders, precisely because of the eradication of the particular through an artificial (if laudably conciliatory) focus on the generic.

Various stakeholder narratives are encoded in documents and artefacts ranging from eyewitness testimony in the form of legal affidavits and autobiographic writing, to scholarly studies or literary works either by eyewitnesses or others, to the presentation of a given version of the relevant discourse through museums and exhibitions. The layouts of these last two, as well as the materials included and excluded, represent a kind of walk-through narrative. Yet, collective memory narratives can also be represented in objects

143 Young, J. E., The Texture of Memory; Olick, J. K., 'Two Cultures'; Browning, C. R., Collected Memories.
145 For a recent overview of this subject see: Simine, S. A.-d., Mediating Memory in the Museum.
within the built environment such as monuments, buildings and toponyms that favour or promote one strand of the relevant discourse over others.\textsuperscript{146}

Collective memory, as defined in the current thesis, is always trauma-based. It is triggered by a specific trauma and represents an on-going attempt to express, explain and narrate the trauma in question. As is the case with the concept of collective memory, there is a vast literature on the subject of trauma; to review this in detail would go beyond the scope of the current study which is concerned with the concomitant collective memory discourse rather than with the trauma that triggered it.\textsuperscript{147} Instead, I present in the following paragraphs a working definition of a specific type of trauma for the purposes of this thesis.

Any given trauma can be categorised as either being man-made or the result of natural causes. I will suggest that because man-made trauma involves human victims and human perpetrators it involves \textit{symmetry of kind} between the sufferer and the agent of the trauma. I shall therefore refer to this kind of trauma as ‘symmetric trauma’. By contrast, when humans become the victims of natural, often inanimate, agents of trauma, there is a difference in kind, or asymmetry, between victim and ‘perpetrator’. I therefore refer to it as ‘asymmetric trauma’.

I argue further that, in addition to the basic \textit{categorical} division between symmetric and asymmetric trauma, one can also identify two distinct \textit{modes} of trauma: systemic and acute. Systemic trauma is sustained and involves an ever-present threat, i.e., the cause of the trauma is integral to the system. Examples of systemic trauma are apartheid, slavery or long-term abusive relationships. Acute trauma, on the other hand, is the result of a specific occurrence or set of events that unfold over a relatively short period of time. Notwithstanding Van Den Berg’s comment in the footnote above, neither acute nor systemic asymmetric traumas usually give rise to the type of contested collective memory discourse with which I am concerned in this thesis.\textsuperscript{148} The opposite is true of symmetric trauma, which, I argue, tends overwhelmingly to result in a public search for, and

\textsuperscript{146} For a discussion of this subject see: Young, J. E., \textit{The Texture of Memory}.

\textsuperscript{147} Readers specifically interested in trauma may wish to consult one or more of the following works: Caruth, C., \textit{Trauma: Explorations in Memory} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); LaCapra, D., \textit{Writing History, Writing Trauma} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Caruth, C., \textit{Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Luckhurst, R., \textit{The Trauma Question} (London: Routledge, 2008); Fromm, G., \textit{Lost in Transmission: Studies of Trauma Across Generations} (London: Karnac, 2012); Craps, S., \textit{Postcolonial Witnessing: Trauma Out of Bounds} (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

\textsuperscript{148} This, I suggest, is because the lack of human agency obviates the need and natural urge to seek justice or recompense. Thus when such asymmetric trauma (e.g. living in the shadow of a volcano [asymmetric systemic], falling victim to an avalanche [asymmetric acute]) is remembered publically the relevant narratives are seldom contested.
exposition of, the facts. This in turn leads to the generation of competing explanatory narratives and often to long-term acrimonious debates between different stakeholder groups. It is this reaction to symmetric trauma, to which the term ‘collective memory’ refers in the current context.

As a minimum, any symmetric trauma will involve two stakeholder groups, the victims and perpetrators, whereby the categorisation of a given individual in these terms is often problematic, as are attempts by some individuals to appropriate the relevant identities for themselves.149 Crucially for the current definition of collective memory, I argue that this stakeholder discourse can be defined as a goal-oriented process, even if the participants are unaware of specific objectives or, for that matter, of their contribution to any specific discourse. The goal, or objective, is to establish hegemonic historical narratives dominated by one specific version of the relevant traumatic events. Such hegemonic historical narratives differ from the preceding collective memory discourse in two specific ways. The first difference is one of relative salience, which is to say that collective memory discourse, as opposed to the practice of History as an academic pursuit, is characterised by what Aleida Assmann has called ‘emphatic reverence’ vis-à-vis the events in question.150 Assmann contrasts this visceral, emotion-laden engagement with the subject matter, with the ‘specialized historical curiosity’ of objective historians (see below).151 The second difference between the active phase of collective memory discourse and subsequent hegemonic historical narratives involves relative rates of change within the overall narrative framework. Collective memory discourse is volatile, involving many, often contrasting narratives concerning the events in question, and, to a large extent, involves a process of narrative homogenisation, or winnowing, eventually resulting in fewer starkly contrasting narratives. It is this process of homogenisation that gradually leads to the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives, which hold sway in a given geo-political region. I do not mean to suggest that a point is ever reached at which the academic pursuit of History as a subject comes to a natural halt. I do, however, argue that historians gradually

149 Even in cases limited to this basic dichotomy the resulting discourse can be complex, involving a nexus of issues such as the generation of an acceptable description of the traumatic event, degrees of victimhood and perpetrator guilt, and inclusion or exclusion from one or other group. Simine, S. A.-d., Mediating Memory in the Museum, pp. 25-26.

150 Throughout this thesis ‘History’ with an upper case ‘H’ refers to the study of history as an academic discipline and the production of historiography.

develop orthodox views of historical events and that these become established over time, supported by a preponderance of (accepted) evidence and scholarly research, but also, significantly in the current context, encoded in high-status artefacts, such as monuments, the production of which is costly and therefore not equally open to all sectors of society.\(^{152}\) I argue that once such orthodox positions have taken root it is extremely difficult to replace them with contrasting or alternative views, regardless of the epistemological merits of the arguments in question. Collective memory discourse, as understood in the current context, takes place prior to the establishment of such entrenched, orthodox positions and is, I argue, an attempt to influence their content. This is explained in more detail below.

Broadly, hegemonic historical narratives, as I use the term throughout this thesis, are established on the basis of, and bolstered by the record of, all artefacts relating to a given case, whereby the hegemonic influence of a given version of the events in question is largely a function of the cost of production (in terms of time, money and tangible and intangible resources) in conjunction with power, status and visibility.\(^{153}\) Thus, an expensive set of history books produced by leading scholars at a high-status institution and forming part of the received academic canon can be considered part of a hegemonic historical narrative. Scholars working in the field, within the geo-political region in which this set of volumes is considered part of the canon, cannot ignore it and all other works on the subject are likely to have to take a stance on it in order to be taken seriously. When Edward Gibbon published his six-volume *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* between 1776 and 1789, for example, he effectively shaped the course of Anglophone scholarship on the history of Rome for at least two hundred years.\(^{154}\) Similarly, a statue commemorating a given event and taking up expensive real estate in a capital city forms part of the relevant hegemonic

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\(^{152}\) To some extent, my use of the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ can be understood as a specific example of ‘path dependency’, a concept which has recently been explored in the context of studies of seemingly irrational, or counterintuitive, ‘lock-in’ developments in the fields of political, economic and business studies. Whilst a detailed exposition of this concept is outwith the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that it merits further exploration in relation to the creation of hegemonic historical narratives. For an interesting discussion of this concept in relation to postwar Germany, see: Banchoff, T. F., *The German Problem Transformed*, pp. 2, 165-66, 70ff.

\(^{153}\) Tangible resources are, for example, materials and built infrastructure. Examples of intangible resources are know-how, skills, institutions, personal networks, and organisational structures.

historical narrative. A good example of this is Trafalgar Square and Nelson’s Column in London.¹⁵⁵

What is at stake for the various stakeholder groups, therefore, is the version of the events in question that is propagated within the pages of high-status historiography or, quite literally, set in stone on the plinth texts and in the symbolic elements of commemorative statues. The same applies to monuments, museums, commemorative naming (streets, buildings, schools and so on.), films, works of art and cartography. Thus, the conscious or tacit objective of collective memory discourse from a stakeholder perspective is to ensure that the version that comes to occupy this privileged position is the one espoused by the stakeholder (group) in question. Collective memory, as defined here, is, therefore, an inherently competitive process.

In addition to exploring the ontological aspects of the trauma in question, collective memory discourses encompass a search for meaning. Victims attempt to understand the causes of their suffering; third party observers try to create explanatory models based on various socio-historical paradigms, and members of the perpetrator collective may also strive to understand their own psychological drivers and to explain or justify their actions. Clearly, the search for meaning always has the potential to degenerate into a fresh round of accusations and recriminations, which would in turn necessitate a reinvestigation of the facts of the case. Collective memory processes are, therefore, by no means linear; instead, they tend to oscillate and incorporate a pronounced iterative aspect. This can increase as new generations of scholars adopt their preferred positions in the relevant debates and the descendants of victims and perpetrators alike take up the cause and start contributing to the public discourse. Even first-generation victims may have to wait years or decades to achieve a public voice which, when finally exercised, can move the process back to an earlier stage, rekindle interest in some hitherto overlooked aspect or bring new facts to light. Michael Rothberg’s concept of ‘multidirectional memory’ reflects the non-linear nature of specific

¹⁵⁵ This complex was erected in 1843 to commemorate one version of the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) in which the British victory over the French and Spanish was ascribed primarily to one man, Admiral Lord Nelson (1758-1805). This reductionist, glorified view of the events in question is just one of several possible interpretations. My point is that the cost of production, status and visibility of these commemorative structures render it virtually impossible to disagree effectively (i.e., in such a highly visible, permanent manner) with the orthodox version they represent, which therefore forms part of the relevant ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ by default. See: Haigh, C., *The Cambridge Historical Encyclopedia of Great Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 265.
collective memory discourses.\textsuperscript{156} Rothberg conceives of collective memories as being ‘subject to on-going negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and privative’, which is very much in line with the definition I am proposing here.\textsuperscript{157} On the other hand, however, Friederike Eigler reminds us in 	extit{Heimat, Space, Narrative} (2014) that Rothberg introduced his concept of multidirectional memory specifically as an alternative to competitive memory concepts. My working definition of collective memory does not follow his lead in this respect.\textsuperscript{158}

Aleida Assmann, by contrast, does emphasise competition as a central aspect of collective memory. However, her focus is more on competition between the public attention given to completely different memory nexuses, for example, memories of German wartime suffering and the Holocaust. Moreover, citing Günter Grass, she suggests that this competition arises from the fact that such immensely traumatic events cannot be processed simultaneously in public discourse and, therefore, that the relevant memory discourses tend to push one aside to become the dominant mode of public remembrance for years at a time. Thus, Assmann talks in terms of cultural forgetting, counter-narratives, resurgence of suppressed memories, and similar concepts.\textsuperscript{159} In essence, I agree with Assmann’s analysis, however my thesis, and therefore my working definition of collective memory, has a more narrow focus. I am interested in the collective memory discourse relating to 	extit{Flucht und Vertreibung}, not in questions of wider German suffering \textit{per se}, which has been adequately treated by Niven \textit{et al.}, and not in the broader course of German postwar discourse, which necessarily includes the Holocaust and issues of German guilt. Within this thesis, therefore, the competitive aspect of the relevant memory discourse concerns different stakeholder narratives as distinct threads within the overall discourse. As the following chapters make clear, these competing narrative strands transcend national borders and therefore move beyond Assmann’s immediate focus in the quoted article.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Rothberg, M., \textit{Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization, Cultural Memory in the Present} (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009).
  \item \textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.} p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Eigler, F., \textit{Heimat, Space, Narrative}, p. 64.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Closer to my own ideas are those of Marianne Hirsch, who has focused much of her work on the notion of ‘postmemory’, which, she argues, ‘approximates memory in its affective force and its psychic effects’. Moreover, she draws a clear distinction between postmemory and history based on the absence in the latter of ‘a deep personal connection’. To a certain extent, this understanding of the concept of postmemory maps on to my working definition of collective memory in two ways. First, my usage of the term ‘collective memory’ allows for the participation in the collective memorialisation of a given trauma by later generations and/or contemporaries not having direct experience of the trauma itself. Indeed, a key aspect of my working definition is the homogenisation of *collected* accounts of a given trauma to form a *collective* narrative: this process, the transition from episodic to semantic memories, transcends the group whose memories of the events in question are unmediated. Second, I use the term ‘collective memory’ to describe a post-traumatic discourse that takes place prior to, and which can, therefore, be usefully analysed separately from, the treatment of the relevant events as ‘History’ in the academic sense (see above). Like Hirsch, I identify the difference between History and collective memory, *inter alia*, with respect to the salience of the narrative to the individual concerned. In other words, those having ‘a deep personal connection’ to the relevant events are, in my definition, participating in a collective memory discourse, whilst others, for whom the subject is of academic interest only, are practicing History as a scholarly endeavour. As with all such binary distinctions, part of the value of this one lies in its heuristic productivity and I am a long way from claiming that any given person can, in every case, be assigned to one or other of these categories and no other. Another interesting aspect of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory, is that, whilst she has specifically developed the concept in relation to the Holocaust, she speculates that it may also ‘usefully describe other second-generation memories of cultural or collective traumatic events and experiences’. Thus, it could potentially be applied in relation to German *Vertriebenen*, or, more controversially, to the decedents of perpetrator groups, who may well be traumatised by the ‘postmemory’ of their ancestors’ crimes.

Yet, there are differences between my working definition of collective memory and Hirsch’s notion of postmemory, the most important of which is that I am discussing a wider discourse which not only includes the second generation of trauma sufferers (the focus of Hirsch’s work), but the actual sufferers, in addition to contemporary witnesses and even the perpetrators. In short, I am interested in the complete discourse rather than a specific thread within this wider discourse. This notwithstanding, Hirsch’s concept of postmemory is certainly useful in terms of its clear delineation of one specific type of contribution to, or experience of, the relevant discourses, and can easily be accommodated within my own working definition. Another aspect of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory, which certainly warrants further study, but transcends the scope of this thesis, is the extent to which the kind of postmemory scenarios, to which Hirsch refers, can themselves be thought of as a traumatic setting for the people concerned (e.g. the children of Holocaust victims). I refer interested readers to the excellent work carried out in this field by, *inter alia*, Gerard Fromm.\(^{163}\)

Despite its inherent multi-directionality and iterative tendency, no collective memory discourse continues indefinitely. The production of artefacts, including those referred to above but also newspaper and magazine articles, photographs, and even stamps as well as active cultural productions such as re-enactments, plays and teaching events throughout the relevant discourse, tends towards the eventual convergence on a small number of ‘grand narratives’.\(^{164}\) I argue that even the most self-consciously balanced account will tend, however slightly, to support one version of events at the expense of others. Indeed, such a balanced account is itself just a ‘version of events’. Thus, within a given geopolitical region, a dominant version is constructed over time which, albeit still contested in some quarters, is supported by a preponderance of accepted evidence, or majority opinion. The gradual accumulation of high-value, high-status artefacts in support of a given version of events is highly likely to result in the creation of an barrier of sorts, which other, less well-positioned stakeholders with contrasting

\(^{163}\) Fromm, G., *Lost in transmission.*

views may eventually be unable to cross to gain an effective public voice.\textsuperscript{165} This, I argue, amounts to the production of a hegemonic historical narrative. It is important to note that, whilst this process is likely to involve a certain amount of public discourse and stakeholder negotiation, economic and socio-political factors can easily come to dominate.\textsuperscript{166} As such there is no guarantee that any hegemonic historical narrative, as one may encounter it at any particular time or within a given socio-political situation, will represent the ‘truth’ in any epistemologically meaningful sense. Nevertheless, a point is usually reached at which it makes more sense to talk of the historical record of a given event rather than thinking about it in terms of an on-going, active collective memory discourse.

The point at which collective memory makes the final transition to ‘history’ is also influenced by the overall subjective salience of the events in question. Aleida Assmann also addresses the importance of salience as a diagnostic difference between what she calls ‘cultural working memory’ and ‘reference memory’, which roughly map onto collective memory, as I use the term in this thesis, and History as an academic pursuit. In her own words:

> While emphatic appreciation, repeated performance, and continued individual and public attention are the hallmark of objects in the cultural working memory, professional preservation and withdrawal from general attention mark the contents of the reference memory. Emphatic reverence and specialized historical curiosity are the two poles between which the dynamics of cultural memory is played out.\textsuperscript{167}

First-generation victims and perpetrators inevitably die; their descendants lose interest as new, more pressing needs vie for their attention, and the practitioners of History eventually come to consider the matter closed for all of the reasons alluded to above.\textsuperscript{168} This transition can be ragged and uneven. It can

\textsuperscript{165} A useful analogy from the field of economics is the concept of ‘market entry barriers’. See: Stokes, D., et al., Small Business Management and Entrepreneurship (Andover: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2010), pp. 73-75.

\textsuperscript{166} Examples of the kind of socio-political factors to which I refer here are state propaganda, censorship and the work of the deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission (see above).


\textsuperscript{168} To be clear, it is not my intention, in this thesis, to declare a ‘winner’ in terms of which stakeholder narrative is likely to become enshrined in some generally acknowledged, definitive version of the relevant events. Instead, my thesis concerns certain aspects of the relevant discourse that took place prior to the notional transition between collective memory (as defined for the purposes of this thesis) and History as an academic discipline. The basic facts have been acknowledged by scholars throughout the world. In terms of pure statistics, for example, I do not expect any significant challenges to those presented in Lexikon der Vertreibungen (see above). The crucial point, with respect to the transition between collective memory discourse and History as an academic discipline, is that, in the latter phase, one expects to see a more ponderous and more carefully argued move towards international (or stakeholder) consensus than that which takes place during the earlier, more emotionally-driven stage of collective memory discourse. As with all History, the record of the Flucht und
involve significant status changes as erstwhile champions of a popular cause come to be viewed as anachronistic diehards. It can result in a loss of information as well-informed stakeholders and an interested public gradually fade from the scene and leave the field open to impartial academics with completely different life experiences and agendas. It is certainly not necessarily the case that the transition from collective memory to History will always involve resolution or the dispensation of justice. However, the transition period itself does present an opportunity to document the ways in which the collective memory discourse has played out in a given case. Eyewitnesses may still be alive; the artefacts produced during the discourse process can still be read and interpreted by those with sufficient cultural proximity to the times and events in question, and an examination of the post-traumatic discourse is as relevant to the subsequent historification of the episode as a record of the events themselves.

At the time of writing, accounts of the postwar *Vertreibung* of Germans from the ZO in Poland and its resettlement by Poles expelled from the *Kresy* are arguably traversing the final stages of the transition between an active collective memory discourse and history as received wisdom. According to Johannes Frackowiak, nationality-based antagonisms between Poles and Germans are regarded increasingly as anachronistic in both countries. Vestigial *ressentiments* are maintained by ‘bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, die in Deutschland relativ schwach, in Polen etwas stärker sind’.\(^{169}\) However, as Tytus Jaskułowski argues in the same volume, these are unlikely to jeopardise relations between the two countries and ‘[solange …] die Bürgerkontakte stark sind, werden die Ressentiments die Tagespolitik nie entscheidend belasten können’.\(^{170}\) There are several indicators that, at least the territorial aspect of the collective memory discourse is no longer an active issue within Germany. One of these is the fact that, despite an alarming increase in right-wing radicalism throughout Germany, the relevant debates concern elements of social-Darwinism (Sarrazin debate) and a yearning for ethnic and cultural homogeneity, but are not concerned with

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\(^{169}\) Frackowiak, J., et al., *Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart*, p. 20.

\(^{170}\) Tytus Jaskułowski in: *ibid.* p. 303.
territorial expansion or recovery. Any such territorial aspirations on the part of Germans would, in any case, be baseless as recent Polish-German treaties have removed the legal basis for any German territorial claims against Poland. One of the tangible results of the finalisation of Central European frontiers, which coincided with the end of the Cold War, is that government denial and secrecy over the Vertreibung of Germans and Poles in the wake of WWII ceased in 1990. In addition, state-level initiatives such as the abolition of all border controls between Germany and Poland in 2007, have rendered the Oder-Neisse Line less visible and, therefore, less likely to re-emerge as a political issue. Whilst Lynn Tesser, in Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, does discuss continuing Polish fears of widespread German land acquisition within the ZO, she also points out that these are rooted in the convergence of the four elements of what she calls the ‘quadratic nexus’ in the wake of Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU). Thus, such concerns are engendered not by a fear of state-led revanchism, but rather by new opportunities for personal mobility within the EU. One clear indicator that the Polish government is confident in the stability of the German-Polish border region is their recent decision to withdraw the majority of troops stationed along the frontier and concentrate them along the Polish-Ukrainian border.

Beyond territorial issues, there are other signs that the Vertreibungen are becoming a matter of History rather than the source of an on-going collective memory discourse. The most visible of these is the Deutschlandhaus in Berlin. This is currently undergoing restoration and re-purposing to house a permanent archive and exhibition centre focused on postwar sociocide. This Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen was first suggested by the BdV in 1999. Initially, the proposed memorial site divided public opinion in Germany and Poland. However,
following widely publicised, often acrimonious public debates, leading Polish and German politicians have now embraced the idea, diffusing its potentially divisive aspects in the process.\textsuperscript{177} The new centre is due to open its doors in 2016 under the new name of \textit{Sichtbares Zeichen gegen Flucht und Vertreibung}.\textsuperscript{178} With the active support of the Polish government, it is being constructed under the auspices of a German government foundation known as the \textit{Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung}.\textsuperscript{179}

The collective memory discourse concerning the \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} of Germans from the ZO is, therefore, coming to an end in terms of Aleida Assmann’s ‘emphatic reverence’ vis-à-vis the events in question, and is giving way to the ‘specialized historical curiosity’ of objective historians.

For the potential participants in the relevant collective memory discourse, visceral memories of the events in question are giving way to a preoccupation with more pressing current issues.\textsuperscript{180} Accordingly, one can find a wealth of accounts of the events in question from all of the relevant stakeholder groups, as well as a plethora of cultural artefacts that have been produced during the ensuing collective memory discourse. One indication of the mature state of research in this area, and a good example of the kind of high-value, high-status cultural artefact referred to above, which tends to ‘raise the entry barrier’ for competing narratives, is the \textit{Lexikon der Vertreibungen} to which I have already referred in the literature review above.\textsuperscript{181}

However, the current thesis is one of very few accounts of how different stakeholder groups have influenced the public discourse on the transition of Lower Silesia from a German to a Polish cultural landscape, and how these events would eventually be ‘remembered’ in the relevant hegemonic historical narratives, rather than simply what each group has said and/or done in relation to this process.

\textsuperscript{177} For a reasonably comprehensive overview of some of the ways in which the proposed centre has been understood by various stakeholders see: Breuer, L., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Jenseits von Steinbach: Zur Kontroverse um ein Vertreibungscentrum im Kontext des deutschen Opferdiskurses.} (Berlin: Arbeitskreis Geschichtspolitische Interventionen (AGI), 2010); Anon., \textit{Zentrum gegen Vertreibung}, \texttt{<http://www.z-g-v.de/>}, Accessed on: 25.06.2015.

\textsuperscript{178} For the latest news of the activities and status of this foundation see: Kossert, A., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung}, \texttt{<http://www.sfvv.de/>}, Accessed on: 25.06.2015.


\textsuperscript{181} Brandes, D., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Lexikon der Vertreibungen}, pp. 13-16, 801.
2.2 Analytical Reference Framework

In order to investigate different aspects of how various stakeholder groups have influenced hegemonic historical narratives throughout the collective memory discourse triggered by the two specific episodes of sociocide that form the central focus of this thesis, I employ an original analytical framework which I describe in the following paragraphs.

My initial intention was to adopt the three-layer model presented by Mieke Bal in *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (1997). According to Bal, a narrative text tells a story, which ‘is a fabula presented in a certain manner [whereby a] fabula is a series of logically and chronologically related events.’

The fact that the same story can be related in different texts demonstrates that the story and the text are not identical. Because the story is one of several possible ways of presenting the fabula, the story is not identical to the fabula. Therefore, Bal argues, any narrative text can be analysed with reference to three distinct layers. At the textual layer one can assess the extent to which it compares with other narrative texts that tell the same story. One can examine its formal structural elements, either by comparison with other texts or on its own, and one can comment upon its linguistic aspects. The text can also be analysed at the story layer. Specifically, one can ask which fabula is being presented and in what manner. The manner in which the story presents the fabula relates to questions of completeness and viewpoint vis-à-vis the fabula. And finally, one can analyse the fabula upon which the story and therefore the text is based. Fundamental questions pertaining to the fabula are whether or not it is wholly or partially fictional, its degree of verisimilitude in relation to the natural world and/or reality, and its material basis (sources, artefacts). In a short essay appended to the second edition of *Narratology,* Bal helpfully pointed out the potential of using her three-layer model beyond literary analysis, in the field of Cultural Studies.

I concur that any field of study that incorporates a narrative element is amenable to study through the tools of narratology. This applies to collective memory as defined for the purposes of this thesis (a contested narrative discourse

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183 Ibid. pp. 5, 6.
directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact). During the course of my analysis, however, I found it necessary to expand on Bal’s model in a number of significant ways. Rather than attempt to stretch her model beyond what it was designed to accommodate I formulated my own analytical model, which I explain below with all due acknowledgement to Bal as my initial inspiration.

At a superficial level I have modified the basic terminology. Whereas Bal’s model incorporates the three well-defined layers described above, I shall refer to the ‘ontological’, the ‘explanatory’, and the ‘narrative’ levels respectively. In this context ‘level’ denotes an aspect rather than a hierarchical layer. There are two reasons for this: first, to avoid confusion with Bal’s use of the terms ‘fabula’, ‘story’, and ‘text’, which are likely to remain closely associated with her specific model; second, some of her terminology has already been used slightly differently by other scholars. In addition to the more restricted sense in which Bal uses the word ‘fabula’, for example, the Russian Formalists defined the fabula as ‘the way in which an event unfolds as a brute chronology’. They used it interchangeably with the word ‘story’. They distinguish this word pair from the ‘syuzhet’ (plot), which refers to the way in which this basic assumed chronology is distorted (reversed, varied, reordered) in any given text.\footnote{This understanding of the Russian ‘syuzhet’ does not necessarily exhaust the potential translations of the term, a full consideration of which is outwith the scope of the current thesis.} In this approach, the literariness or textuality of a text is revealed by studying the differences between the plot and the hypothetical fabula.\footnote{Holquist, M., Dialogism, p. 113.}

In my proposed model, analysis at the ontological level concerns (purported) facts and events; it therefore touches upon issues of objective and subjective reality. The ontological level addresses questions such as who/whom, what, where, and when. In relation to literature the ontological level encompasses direct speech and touches upon matters of author/narrator identity. Lies and deception can be analysed at the ontological level (because they are amenable to analysis vis-à-vis specific facts and events), as can matters of direct perception and, crucially in the current context, intent. The main difference between the ontological level, as defined here, and Bal’s fabula layer is that the ontological level encompasses all aspects of being rather than just ‘a series of logically and
chronologically related events.’ Thus, whilst it fully incorporates Bal’s fabula concept, it can also apply to political realities as well as to the material aspects of an artefact or cultural production.

There are ontological aspects to all of the fields addressed within the current thesis. In terms of history these are straightforward enough. What happened, where and when ought to be answerable questions but, as will be shown in the following, the lived complexity of real events often confounds this expectation. Issues of toponymy are intimately related to historical fact, and cartography is, in essence, an attempt to depict some version of reality, which is to say that it revolves around questions of ontological status. In literary analysis one can raise ontological queries at various levels including, inter alia, narrator-author identity, verisimilitude or degrees of similarity between a given literary world (World₂) and real life (World₁), and anything relating to accounts of specific events.

The explanatory level, in the current analytical framework, equates roughly to Bal’s story layer, but rather than simply accepting a given story as ‘a fabula presented in a certain manner’ it specifically relates to the question of why a specific event occurred or why a given artefact is as it is and where it is. In literature, it is the level at which one can recognise and analyse any plot. In works of history it relates to interpretation. Whereas the ontological level works at the perceptual level (who, what, where and when are all questions to which one could respond by pointing to a specific person, action, place and time: the target of the ‘point’ can be directly perceived by the questioner), the explanatory level of analysis appeals to the intellect and reason.

The explanatory level is crucial in historical and historiographical analysis: History without interpretation and explanation is merely statistics. A basic assumption underlying the entire study of history is that those involved in specific historical events or situations were faced with certain fundamental choices and that the choices they made were reasonable (or at least explicable) from a given point of view.\textsuperscript{187} History can, therefore, be studied as both a series of effects and happenings (ontological level analysis) and a series of reasons.

(explanatory level analysis). The explanatory level is less relevant to, but not completely irrelevant for the study of, cartography and toponymy. Historical atlases, for example, could simply juxtapose a series of political status quos, but usually they explicitly acknowledge previous or other potential status quos in the form of additional text (e.g. to ‘to Poland 1366’), notes (e.g. z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung) or legend entries (e.g. Verwaltungsgrenze). The explanatory level is all but de rigueur in literature. In fiction it helps the reader to make sense of the protagonists’ actions and in (auto-) biography it is required to turn a simple timeline of events into a reasonable account of a life (even the most sober biography must be regarded as a cultural construct shaped by the need to explain rather than simply to report). Even in works of literature in which explanations are famously absent, such as Uwe Johnson’s Mutmassungen über Jakob (1978), the text can still be analysed at the explanatory level, as a search for meaning (hermeneutic analysis). This means that the explanatory level, like the ontological and narrative levels, is integral to the analytic model presented here but not necessarily explicitly expressed within the narrative artefact being studied.

In the model developed throughout this thesis, the narrative level addresses the question of ‘how’: how an event unfolded; how a specific act was performed, but also, crucially, how a given account of an event is presented, symbolised or inscribed. This differs significantly from the explanatory level, which addresses the question of why certain events occurred as they did. It is therefore descriptive, and, in written narratives, often involves the use of adverbs and adjectives. But the question ‘how’ can also be answered with reference to a comparison, either in the form of a simile or metaphor, or even, symbolically, through association. Therefore, the narrative level often works through the emotions, evoking archetypal associations and the concomitant visceral responses.

A key finding of the current study is that specific authorial choices at the narrative level can significantly affect the emotional impact of facts perceived at the ontological level and the intellectual acceptability of accounts posited at the explanatory level. Analysis at the narrative level therefore goes beyond the facts of a given case (ontological level) and any explanations offered to account for them (explanatory level) to illuminate the effect of a given rendition of these. It is,

therefore, relevant to reception studies and for assessing the impact of a given narrative artefact on an on-going collective memory discourse. This is the level at which one might discern aspects of literariness, tendentiousness or ‘spin’ in a given text.

It is important to note that the analytical framework outlined above is not intended to suggest that the authors of texts or artefacts that play a role in a specific collective memory discourse necessarily create their products with the foregoing analytical levels in mind. Thus, whilst my analytical goal is to identify objective aspects inherent in specific artefacts and texts, and to comment upon their contribution to the overall collective memory discourse under consideration, the degree to which I ascribe their presence to authorial intent will differ from case to case. 189

It may not prove possible, in a given case, to clearly categorise every aspect of the text or artefact under analysis in accordance with the three-level model developed above. An adjective used at the narrative level may well give a certain slant to a text, but it could, in some circumstances, also be understood as a statement of fact best analysable at the ontological level. Similarly, explanations are seldom presented neutrally. Their authors generally believe them to be accurate, which again entails issues of factuality and therefore the ontological level. Likewise, with the exception of subjective experiences, direct perception and first-hand participation in events, ontological issues must be communicated, i.e., narrated, if they are to become part of a given discourse. Yet, narratives of ontological matters often entail an explanatory aspect. The model presented above recognises such ambiguities and can therefore, I argue, contribute significantly towards an understanding of the issues in question. For, if one cannot say exactly what a certain thing is, it is nevertheless useful to be able to say what it is not and a common framework of reference enables one to do this productively. As a minimum, this model can fulfil a heuristic function, specifically where the theoretical interfaces between the different analytical levels are most difficult to delineate

189 NB: It is not my intention to systematically analyse each of my selected sources at all three analytical levels. Instead, I present my analytical framework as a point of reference, to which I return at certain crucial points throughout the thesis, at which I consider an analysis in these terms to be productive.
2.2.1 The Corpora

In terms of my choice of corpora, I could have chosen examples from any amount of cultural categories of performance, representation, and historification, such as coins and banknotes, museum displays, national holidays, films and TV programmes or even stamps, and ephemera produced for the tourist trade. However, a selection has to be made and, as I have outlined a new theoretical framework based on three discrete levels, I considered it appropriate to focus on those areas of cultural production, which, arguably, best exemplify the three analytical levels in question. As indicated above, toponymy and cartography operate primarily at the ontological level, history mainly concerns the explanatory level, and literature can be productively approached at the narrative level. Of course, certain aspects of each of these broad subject areas are amenable to analysis at all three levels, which would also be true of the other examples of cultural performance, representation, and historification alluded to above. Nevertheless, the three broad areas around which this thesis is constructed, tend to transcend parochial, national borders in way in which stamps, banknotes and national holidays, for example, do not, and therefore provide a reasonable basis for cross-cultural comparisons in relation to the same set of traumatic events.190

In the following chapter I turn to the historical detail of the events in question.

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190 For a more granular justification of my chosen sources, please see the relevant chapters below.
3: Prawo i pięść

3.1 Introduction

Building upon the definition of collective memory presented in Chapter 2, this chapter presents an overview of the specific acute symmetric trauma complex that informs the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned (hereinafter ‘the Ur-trauma’). In addition, I present an overview of the political situation appertaining to these events and an exposition of the way in which the first postwar Polish government sought to justify them. This chapter contributes to my overall thesis by providing the historical background necessary for a clear appreciation and understanding of the subsequent discourse. It contributes to existing scholarship in this field by analysing the underlying causes within a transnational framework centred on Polish state-building narratives, and ideological differences between various parties vying for power in Poland in the closing stages of WWII. This contrasts with the majority of existing studies concerning Flucht und Vertreibung from the ZO, which invariably treat it as a problem of German history. However, I contend that it is precisely this one-sided approach that can result in the de-contextualisation of German victimhood on the part of some German writers and the kinds of problems in Anglophone treatments of the subject identified in my literature review (see Section 1.6 Literature Review and Critique).

In my literature review I have already noted certain untenable claims according to which the Flucht und Vertreibung of native Germans from the ZO was either a direct response for the Holocaust (Eigler et al.,) or was to some degree justifiable on the grounds that ‘the broad mass of Germans’ had voted for Hitler (Niven et al.). However, the actual situation was more complex. The Polish government (TRJN) which oversaw the expulsion of Germans from the annexed territories also acquiesced in, and actively supported, the transfer of eastern Poland (the Kresy) to the USSR and the accompanying sociocide on either side of

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191 The Law and the Fist. Title of a Polish film about the Poland's annexation of German territory in 1945 based on the novel 'Toast' to which I refer in Chapter 7. My analysis is based on the only version I was able to obtain, which is an authorised Dutch translation. See: Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, trans. Pezisko Jacobs (Haarlem: In de Knipscheer, 1964).

192 From the German Ur = primary/original.
the new frontier. This placed the TRJN at odds with Polish traditionalists who continued to imagine the Kresy as an inalienable part of Poland.

On the face of it, there was no reason for the Polish government to offer any other justification of their actions than that of simple pragmatism in the face of unfavourable Realpolitik, i.e., for raisons d’état. Their apparent lack of opposition to Soviet annexations in the east seems understandable given the USSR’s overwhelming presence in Central Europe after 1944. In addition, notwithstanding the non-tenability of such a position, many people, even in the successor states of the German Reich, accepted Poland’s territorial adjustments at Germany’s expense as, to some degree, justifiable in light of German wartime atrocities. Once again, therefore, there appears to have been little demand for alternative explanations. Viewed in this light, the fact that the postwar Polish authorities actually did seek to explain these events on the basis of an alternative central narrative – the restoration of Piast Poland, the original Kingdom of Poland (1025-1370) – raises a number of interesting issues.

To explore the ramifications of these, this chapter addresses a range of questions: how did it serve the postwar Polish government’s interests to explain the expulsion of Germans from the ZO with reference to Piast Poland rather than to recent atrocities committed by agents of the Third Reich? How did it serve their interests to underplay the Ukrainian-Polish sociocide in East Galicia and the loss of the rest of the Kresy to the USSR? Both of these questions point to two further questions: who was speaking for Poland on the international stage in the closing months and immediate aftermath of WWII, and how had they risen to power? Before attempting to answer these questions, I shall delineate the Ur-trauma in more detail.

3.2 Acute Symmetric Trauma
As stated above, the exposition and arguments presented throughout the following are predicated on a definition of trauma-based collective memory as a contested narrative discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact. The acute symmetric trauma complex (Ur-trauma) in the current case involved two specific episodes of sociocide that took place during and in the wake of WWII. One of these affected
some 2,519,000 Germans, who were compelled to flee or were forcibly expelled from their homes in Lower Silesia, mostly during 1945. Hundreds of thousands were murdered en route or died of exposure. The majority of these people either fled in advance of the Red Army or were forcibly expelled by irregular and regular Polish forces. The other episode affected Poles living in East Galicia. Between 1941 and 1946, Ukrainian partisans from the OUN-UPA drove a total of around 200,000 Poles out of this region, murdering tens of thousands in the process.

These events begun as a series of, from the Allies’ perspective, uncontrollable local events – spontaneous popular pogroms against Germans during late 1944 to early 1945. These are often referred to in the German secondary literature as wilde Vertreibungen. However, by the end of the Potsdam Conference at the latest (2nd of August 1945) this process of sociocide had been incorporated into the internationally ratified postwar settlement for Central Europe. The westward shift of the USSR-Polish frontier to bring it into rough alignment with the course of the River Bug and the so-called Curzon Line lent an air of teleological legitimacy to both the wilde Vertreibungen and similar actions directed against Poles. This impression was reinforced by the fact that the postwar Polish government ratified a number of border treaties with the Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). These agreements included provisions for the bilateral exchange of populations along the frontier, based on ethno-linguistic criteria.

What links these two episodes of sociocide is the fact that the majority of Poles expelled from East Galicia at that time were relocated to Lower Silesia, where their arrival overlapped with the departure of the native German population.

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199 Ibid., pp. 723-25.
The examples of sociocide outlined above were two relatively small (in terms of the overall numbers of people involved) episodes in a much larger sociocide at the end of WWII. According to official figures published by the Statistisches Bundesamt in 1958, a total of 11,603,400 Germans and ethnic Germans were driven out of their homes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as within the German Reich between 1944 and 1950. Not including prisoners of war (POWs), some 6 million Poles were directly affected by forced relocations resulting from upheavals ultimately caused by WWII during the 1940s and 1950s. These figures do not include forced migrations carried out pursuant to the Hitler-Stalin Pact (23rd of August 1939) nor internal deportations within the USSR, which affected ethnic Germans and Poles both prior to, during, and after the War. Whilst this thesis is solely concerned with the two episodes of sociocide in Lower Silesia and East Galicia, this wider context has certainly had an impact on the relevant collective memory discourse and must be borne in mind. The same is true of the Holocaust. Although not causally related (in the sense that the Vertreibung of Germans and ethnic Germans was by no means conceived of as revenge for the Holocaust), collective memories and widespread cultural knowledge of the Holocaust have nevertheless had an impact on the subsequent discourse relating to German victimhood in general and Flucht und Vertreibung in particular as the examples alluded to in the Literature Review amply demonstrate.

201 The figures quoted are among the most conservative encountered in the relevant literature. Other authors work on the assumption of up to 16 million expellees. See: Bundesamt, S., Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste, pp. 38, 174, 220-24, 58-59, 75-77, 322-26, 80-82, 414-15, 60-62.

202 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, p. 505; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 252-56.

3.3 The Grand Narrative

Today, the expulsion of Germans from the ZO is frequently portrayed as both a reprisal for German wartime atrocities, and a pragmatic solution to the problem of ethnic German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Accounts of these events by the main actors and contemporary observers confirm that such ideas did indeed inform the decision-making process. An additional consideration for the British government was the need to accommodate a functioning Poland within a Europe that was much reduced in size as a result of Soviet encroachments since 1939. However, the postwar Polish government originally emphasised an alternative explanation with far-reaching ramifications for the relevant collective memory discourse. They justified the expulsions, with reference to Poland’s ‘deep history’, as the unfortunate result of a necessary realignment of Poland’s borders with those of the original Kingdom of Poland or ‘Piast Poland’ (hereinafter ‘the Piast Formula’). Essentially, they argued that they had seized the opportunity brought about by the collapse of the Second Republic (1918-1939) in 1939 to rectify a historical mistake.

In this version of history, long-standing ethno-political tensions between Germany and Poland, ultimately rooted in an unwarranted ‘Drang nach Osten’ on the part of Germany, had resulted in various failed attempts at Polish state-building. These had taken place under inauspicious circumstances and beyond Poland’s ‘natural boundaries’. Braving short-term opprobrium, therefore, the postwar government had now rectified this situation by expelling all German intruders and re-establishing an ethnically pure Polish nation state within natural, defensible boundaries. This ‘grand narrative’ had the added merit of explaining why it had also been necessary to accept the expulsion of Polish residents from the region annexed by the USSR in 1945 (the Kresy). It followed logically that if

Piast Poland, the original west-facing Kingdom, had been the true home of the Poles, then ‘the whole history of Polish expansion eastwards from the mid-fourteenth century was […] an imperialist aberration’. This eastward expansion coincided with the establishment of the so-called Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1569-1795). The foregrounding of the Piast Kingdom in favour of the Commonwealth is sometimes referred to in the secondary literature as the ‘Teheran Formula’. Because it originated in the struggle for political dominance between two distinct Polish power collectives during WWII, a brief excursus is necessary to explain who they were and which constituencies they represented.

Despite the German and Soviet incursions in September 1939, as a result of which the Second Republic ceased to function as a territorially-based polity, it had not ceased to exist de jure. At the behest of Władysław Raczkiewicz, then President of the Second Republic, a Continuation Polish Government in Exile was legally constituted in France on the 30th of September 1939. The first Prime Minister in exile was General Władysław Sikorski. On the 18th of June 1940, during the Battle of France (10th of May to 22nd of June 1940), Sikorski was airlifted to London followed shortly by the remaining members of the exile government. For the sake of brevity, and in keeping with existing secondary sources, I refer to this group as the ‘London Poles’ in the following chapters.


210 Because the postwar Polish government initially appealed to ‘deep history’ to explain these episodes of sociocide, even while they were still on-going, they can only be studied with reference to the history of Poland. Therefore, as this thesis is based on an analysis of the concomitant collective memory discourse, I have included a brief, but ‘dense’, overview of Polish history in Appendix A. It cannot be stressed enough that a full appreciation of this history is a necessary prerequisite, firstly for obtaining answers to the foregoing questions, and secondly as a foundation for the remaining, analytical chapters. As I argue below, the rise to power of one of the competing Polish political camps, at the expense of the other, in 1945 is explicable only in relation to the successful instrumentalisation, by one of these, of Piast Poland in preference to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. Similarly, a basic knowledge of the position and aspirations of Ruthenians within the Commonwealth is necessary for an understanding of the motivating factors behind the Ukrainian-led pogroms in East Galicia.


213 To review the complex composition of this government in terms of party membership would neither add to nor subtract from my main argument, but interested readers may refer to the following for more detail: Tendrya, B. I., 'General Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-1943', pp. 41-49; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 73-75.
Another power collective, to whom I refer in the following as the ‘Lublin Poles’, grew out of resistance groups within occupied Poland and the many Poles who fled, or were deported from, Poland during the so-called September Campaign (1939). Of these, a large number ended their journeys in the USSR, as PoWs, civilian deportees, forced labourers, political prisoners, and ‘ideological refugees’.\(^{214}\) A politically schooled cadre among them eventually formed the core of an alternative Polish government with strongly Communist leanings. Because some of its constituent groups contributed separately to the events described below a very brief overview of the main developments is necessary.\(^{215}\) It will also be illuminating in relation to the extreme socio-political complexity that arose in the wake of the September Campaign.\(^{216}\)

The Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) was founded on the 28\(^{th}\) of December 1941. Just over two years later, the foundation of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) was ‘heralded’ in Moscow on the 31\(^{st}\) of March 1943 around the same time as the Workers' Party of the Polish Socialists (RPSS) began underground operations within occupied Poland. Less than a year later, the PPR established the Homeland National Council (KRN) in Warsaw on the 31\(^{st}\) of December 1943, followed in January 1944 by the Central Bureau of Communists from Poland in the Soviet Union (CBKP) in Moscow. This organisation only remained operational until August 1944. In June 1944, certain members of the KRN travelled to Moscow to help organise the Polish National Committee of Liberation (PKWN), although its formal inauguration as the so-called ‘Lublin Committee’ was delayed until the 22\(^{nd}\) of July 1944. Later that year on New Year’s Eve, the PKWN restyled itself as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity or Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej (TRJN). The British and Americans agreed to and accepted this designation at the Yalta Conference.\(^{217}\)


\(^{215}\) The London Polish Government in Exile also encompassed members of a broad range of political parties, but, for the most part, conducted its foreign policy as a single entity. Thus there is no need to dwell upon its constituent parts in the current context. For more detail, interested readers may wish to consult: Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 73-75.

\(^{216}\) The term ‘September Campaign’ refers to Poland’s two-front war against the German Reich and the USSR during September 1939, which resulted in the complete de facto annihilation of the state as a territorial polity.

\(^{217}\) One encounters different dates in the secondary literature for the inauguration of the TRJN. In accounts that reflect the Eastern Bloc view, the inaugural date is stated as being the night of the 31st of December 1944 to the 1st of January 1945. In other histories, written with a more western bias, the inaugural date is often given as either the 11th of February 1945 (the final day of the Yalta Conference) or the 1st of August 1945 (when the proceedings of the Potsdam conference where published). Norman Davies cites the 28th of June 1945 as the inaugural date, at which point there was a ‘merger of the existing Soviet-sponsored body with a group associated with the leader of the Peasant Movement, Stanisław Mikolajczyk, the only representative of the legal Polish Government-in-Exile in London who agreed to return home’. See: Anon., ‘The Tehran Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943’, in The Tehran Conference, (Yalta, 1945), p. VII; Anon., ‘Potsdam
3.4 Polish Nation Building in the Modern Era

3.4.1 The Second Republic (1918-1939)

Notwithstanding the existence of the five post-Partition Polish polities briefly mentioned in Appendix A (Section A.4), the founding of the Second Republic (1918-1939) is regarded in popular Polish historiography as the end of a 123-year struggle for national independence.\(^{218}\) The concept of a new Polish state emerged during the course of WWI on the basis of plans tabled by Austria-Germany as well as corresponding ideas put forward by Russia, first Tsarist then Communist.\(^{219}\) These were picked up by President Woodrow Wilson following his intimate talks with the composer, pianist, and politician Ignacy Jan Paderewski. In Point XIII of his Fourteen-Point Speech (8\(^{th}\) of January 1918), Wilson specifically called for the establishment of ‘[an] independent Polish state [...] which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations’.\(^{220}\) The new state, which had existed \textit{de facto} since 1918, was duly vouchsafed in the Treaty of Versailles (28\(^{th}\) of June 1919) which, however, only regulated the boundary between Poland and Germany.\(^{221}\)

Finalising the eastern, southern, and northern frontiers involved a series of military campaigns against neighbouring states.\(^{222}\) These were not always under


\(^{221}\) See in particular \textit{Putzger Historischer Weltatlas}, p. 131. This map can usefully be compared with the maps of Piast Poland (p. 71) and of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at its greatest extent (p. 115) and at the time of the Partitions (p. 131).
central control but were always prosecuted with the connivance of government officials and even certain Allied powers (notably the French), against five of the adjoining states. The common objective of these border wars was territorial expansion and consolidation.\(^{223}\) Between 1918 and 1938, Polish forces, both regular and irregular, took to the field against Germany, Russia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine (which existed in various ‘incarnations’).\(^{224}\) In summary, these campaigns were fought against the following: The Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1919); Lithuania (1920); in an alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic against Soviet Russia (1920-1921), and Germany for parts of Upper Silesia (1920-1921).\(^{225}\) The Second Republic’s final campaign before the German-Soviet invasion was fought against Czechoslovakia for the Teschen Region in 1938.\(^{226}\)

However, despite the Polish victories and territorial consolidation that these military campaigns and associated plebiscites brought about, the Second Republic lasted just over twenty years before being partitioned and occupied once again. On the 1\(^{st}\) and 17\(^{th}\) of September 1939 respectively, Germany and the USSR invaded and conquered Poland.\(^{227}\) The Second Republic surrendered on the 27\(^{th}\) of September 1939 and ceased to exist \textit{de facto} on the 28\(^{th}\) of September.

\(^{223}\) Sword, K., ‘British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland’, p. 97.


1939. Eastern Poland was annexed by the Soviet Union whilst parts of the remainder were integrated into the Greater German Reich.

3.4.2 The Polish People’s Republic (1945/52-1989)

By the 6th of May 1945 at the latest, Stalin and the Red Army were in control of all Poland. Despite his having been one of the invaders of September 1939, the heads of state of the Western Allies had been meeting with Stalin since November 1943 (Tehran Conference) and making decisions of fundamental importance on the future of Poland. However, in contradiction to commitments made by the Allies, including the London Poles, in the Atlantic Charter (14th of August 1941) to the effect that ‘they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’, postwar Poland’s territorial coverage was strikingly dissimilar to what it had been in September 1939. Its ethnic composition was also fundamentally different to that of the Second Republic. Moreover, the newly appointed (later elected) Polish government presided over the two major episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned (see Introduction). So what had happened?

In part, this question is easily answered: by the 1st of February 1945 the Red Army held all of Poland up to the German border, and Stalin was able to dictate his own terms in relation to the Soviet-Polish frontier. He was prepared to tolerate a Polish state of unspecified dimensions, though not large enough to pose a direct threat to the Soviet hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe, and

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229 See Section 4.4.3 below.
230 The new Polish state that came into being after WWII was originally known as the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolitа Polska) but this was officially changed to the Polish People's Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolitа Ludowa) on the 22nd of July 1952 when the Sejm signed off a new constitution to replace the initial postwar constitution of the 19th of February 1947. However, this arcane detail has no bearing on my thesis, therefore, for the sake of convenience, I consistently refer to postwar Poland as the Polish People's Republic. In addition, it should be noted that, especially prior to 1989, Polish historians often specified various dates in 1944 as the starting date for postwar Poland, although this practice is questionable on the grounds that no Polish government had achieved de facto control over the country during that year and de jure control was only universally acknowledged in the wake of the Potsdam Conference. For a comprehensive study of Poland’s postwar constitutional situation see: Lasok, D., ‘The Polish Constitutions of 1947 and 1952: a Historical Study in Constitutional Law’ (unpublished thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1954), pp. 195-256, 57-89.
constitutional type, but only to the west of the so-called Kresy. In the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (23rd of August 1939), the two powers had agreed that the demarcation line between their discreet spheres of interest (the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line) would follow the northern frontier of Lithuania and cut through Poland along the River Vistula and its tributaries the Narew, and the San. This coincided with the Curzon Line which had originally been proposed as a frontier between Soviet Russia and Poland by the Allied Supreme Council on the 8th of December 1919 in the context of the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921). Following Germany’s invasion of the USSR (i.e., Germany’s violation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line) on the 22nd of June 1941 and the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement (12th of July 1941), the USSR was pushed out of Poland but began making plans for its eventual return. An integral part of these plans was the annexation of those parts of Poland that lay to the east of the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. Operating from a position of complete domination, Stalin set out his specific demands during the Yalta Conference (4th-11th of February 1945). Soviet aspirations in Eastern Poland happened to coincide with Ukrainian nationalist ambitions in East Galicia, which, for the reasons set out in Appendix C below, included the full integration of this region into an independent Ukrainian nation state. These irregular forces were bent on creating a fait accompli by carrying out pogroms and expulsions among the resident Poles whilst these major geopolitical conferences on the frontiers of postwar Poland were still taking place.

Churchill (and later Clement Attlee) and Roosevelt (and later Harry S. Truman) agreed to the eastern frontier proposed by the Soviet regime because to

237 Čepič, Z., 1945 - A Break with the Past, p. 91.
oppose it may well have meant war with the USSR.\textsuperscript{240} Lacking the forces and political mandate for such a confrontation, they were forced to wait until Stalin

felt like telling [them] what he thought about … what was necessary for the defence of the western frontiers of Russia […] and] were also obliged to consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland.\textsuperscript{241}

Politically, this left Britain and France in a difficult position. Both countries had pledged to protect Poland against external aggression in 1939 and had declared war on Germany in fulfilment of their pledges. Winston Churchill is very clear about the fact that Britons ‘wanted the Poles to be able to live freely and live their own lives in their own way [and it] was for this that we had gone to war against Germany in 1939.’\textsuperscript{242} It was, therefore, not politically acceptable to end the War without a functioning Polish state.\textsuperscript{243} However, taking into account Stalin’s territorial demands, the Poland that would have emerged from the War would have been barely viable without territorial compensation elsewhere. Prior to the German-Soviet invasions in 1939, Poland had encompassed an area of some $389,617 \text{ km}^2$. The USSR was determined, and in a position, to annex \textit{circa} $178,709 \text{ km}^2$ of that territory. This would have left a tiny rump state of just $210,908 \text{ km}^2$, or 54 per cent of its former size.\textsuperscript{244} This is not much smaller than the United Kingdom, but with a coastline of around 150 km, most of it would have been landlocked.\textsuperscript{245} Within this space, the government would have had to find room for all of the returning émigré Poles and those expelled from the annexed regions. In short, the Allied governments would have had to admit to their own war-weary peoples that they had failed to achieve the very objective for which they had declared war on Germany.

\textsuperscript{240} Attlee (1883-1967) succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister and was present at the Potsdam Conference, as was his US colleague President Truman (1884-1972).


\textsuperscript{242} Churchill, W., \textit{The Second World War}, p. 883.


\textsuperscript{245} Bruckmüller, E., \textit{et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas}, p. 198.
However, the issue turned on more than simply what ‘Britons wanted’. Article 1 of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance (25th of August 1939) states unequivocally that:

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.246

Article 7 states that:

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.247

When German troops crossed the Polish border on the 1st of September 1939, the British government had responded swiftly with an ultimatum, which fully honoured this agreement, and had followed it up with a declaration of war and the opening of hostilities against Germany on the 3rd of September 1939.248 However, the situation was entirely different just over two weeks later when the Soviet Army launched a sudden attack on Poland on the 17th of September 1939.249 Minute 8 of a meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Sunday the 17th of September 1939, records the government’s decision to regard the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement as not being applicable to the USSR on the grounds that the agreement had bound

His Majesty’s Government only if Poland suffered aggression from a European power [and that] there was a further understanding between the two Governments that the European power in question was Germany250

247 Ibid.
248 Hürten, H., ed. Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich, pp. 337-38; Bessel, R., Nazism and War, p. 77.
250 CAB 65/1/18, War Cabinet Response to Soviet Attack on Poland September 17, 1939: Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1. on Sunday, September 17, 1939, at 12 noon., UK War Cabinet, 17.09.1939, Conclusion, National Archives.
On the face of it then, Great Britain had failed to meet its commitments to Poland, prompting criticism among contemporaries and into the post-Wende era. In addition, there can be no doubt that Britain had failed to achieve that perennial object of its foreign policy and diplomacy, the balance of power in Europe. At the end of 1945 the Red Army was firmly in control of an area of Western Europe that extended as far as west as Schwanheide less than 65 kilometres from the centre of Hamburg. Worse still, from a purely British perspective, was the notion that the nation’s sacrifices both on the field of battle (250,000) and on the home front (60,000) had been in vain. Clearly then, the British government, represented by Churchill then Attlee, needed to secure territorial compensations for Poland to counter the impression that the entire War had been an unmitigated disaster. The only viable source of territory that could potentially be appended to the narrow strip of land that Stalin had left the Poles was Germany.

It was against this background that the so-called ‘Piast concept’, first promulgated by Roman Dmowski during the Paris Peace Conference (1919), was resurrected. Dmowski’s insistence on the inclusion of Upper Silesia in the Second Republic, based on the territorial extent of a Polish polity that had ceased to exist in the Middle Ages, had been ignored at Versailles. It had also been ignored by Józef Piłsudski whose ‘Denken war vielmehr auf die Grenzen der polnischen Adelsrepublik (Rzeczpospolita) von 1772 fokussiert’. However, Dmowski’s concept had been taken up in the interbellum period by a group of Polish enthusiasts centred on Zygmunt Wojciechowski a professor of history and

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251 See for example: Prażmowska, A., The Betrayed Ally.
254 Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 15.
255 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. xvi; Prażmowska, A., Poland: a Modern History, pp. 41, 116; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen; Denishuk, A., ‘Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk’, p. 47.
256 Roman Dmowski’s concept for an independent Polish state after WWI was based on a notion of ethnic nationalism. He wished to include parts of Upper Silesia and East Prussia which, he believed, were home to large Polish minorities. He specifically did not wish to include those areas to the east of the Rivers Bug and San in which the majority of the population were Ruthenians and Lithuanians. Thus, the territorial extent of the state he envisaged differed significantly from that of the Commonwealth before the First Partition (1772). Józef Piłsudski, by contrast, rejected the notion of an ethnically-based state. Instead, he envisaged a federal polity based the reinstatement of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania in which a central Polish state would play a leading role. See: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 13; For a more general understanding of Polish aspirations to German territory prior to the founding of the Second Republic see: Gehrke, R., Der polnische Westgedanke bis zur Wiedererrichtung des polnischen Staates nach Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2001).
political agitator. This group advocated the ‘liberation’ of the whole of East Prussia, Danzig, and the remainder of German Upper Silesia.257

According to Tony Sharp, as early as the 4th of December 1941 at a meeting in Moscow, Stalin took up the ‘Piast concept’ and broached it in a meeting with Sikorski, then head of the exile government in London. However, Sikorski avoided serious talks on territorial issues during his visit, an issue for which he was severely criticised upon his return to London.258 Like Dmowski and Wojciechowski, Stalin envisaged a Polish state extending to the banks of the Oder in the west. Unlike them, his imagined state was to be bordered in the east by the River Bug (the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line).259 However, also unlike them, by the end of the War Stalin was in a position to enforce such a vision. It was in this context that Churchill made his famous after-dinner quip to Stalin to the effect that he personally ‘thought Poland might move westward, like soldiers taking two steps “left close” [and that if] Poland trod on some German toes [in the process] that could not be helped’. He demonstrated the concept to a ‘pleased’ Stalin with the aid of three matchsticks on the table top.260

Churchill’s proposal to Stalin was typical of the casual, even reckless, attitude certain British statesmen displayed towards Central European affairs throughout the Great Conference Era (arguably 1815-1945). According to Keith Sword, ‘[many] British politicians and officials seemed to feel they had a God-given right to dispose of Poland as circumstances dictated’.261 The suggestion simply to move Poland to the west, made with no real understanding of the historical development of the region, and the prevailing conditions, resulted in misery. In Churchill’s own words, it unfortunately initiated and lent the weight of British government support to an idea that left Poland ‘quivering in the Russian-Communist grip’, to say nothing of the fate of the German population it affected.262

262 Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 746.
It is not hard to imagine that most Polish politicians may have been easily persuaded to accept a certain amount of German territory (in the event, Poland acquired around 108,780 km\(^2\) at Germany’s expense). However, what was required to keep the peace between the Western Allies and the USSR was a Polish government that would also agree to the loss of the Kresy (i.e., eastern Poland beyond the River Bug, at about 178,700 km\(^2\)).\(^{263}\) Accordingly, on the 1\(^{st}\) of December 1943, the final day of the Tehran Conference (28\(^{th}\) of November to 1\(^{st}\) of December 1943), Winston Churchill approached the London Poles with the offer of a postwar state bounded in the west by the River Oder and in the East by the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. The territories to the east of the Bug and the northern half of East Prussia around Königsberg, he told them, would be ceded to the USSR. This concept, a slightly modified version of Dmowski’s and Wojciechowski’s ‘Piast concept’ or ‘western concept’ is what is often referred to as the ‘Teheran Formula’\(^{264}\). However, the London Poles continued to regard the pre-war frontiers as sacrosanct (the ‘Jagiellonian concept’).\(^{265}\)

According to Churchill, the postwar settlement in Poland could have been completely different had the London Poles accepted the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line ‘as a basis of frontier between Russia and Poland’ with no caveats. Had they done so, he reports, Stalin would have been quite willing to accept Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister in Exile from the 14\(^{th}\) of July 1943 to the 24\(^{th}\) of November 1944, at the head of the new Polish government.\(^{266}\) During a meeting in Moscow on the 13\(^{th}\) of October 1944 with Churchill and Stalin, the Russians formally proposed the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line ‘as a basis of frontier between Russia and Poland’\(^{267}\). Mikołajczyk, on the other hand, insisted

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263 Poland, A. C. i., ‘Poland's New Frontiers’.
264 In his discussion of the conference, Churchill refers to the territory between the Curzon Line 'subject to interpretation' and the Oder (without mention of any of its tributaries) as seeming to ‘afford a true and lasting home for the Polish nation after all its suffering’; see: Churchill, W., *The Second World War*, p. 745; Sharp, T., ‘Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers’, p. 381. NB: Churchill does not mention this conversation in his memoirs, but Sharp quotes Volume 1 of General Sikorski Historical Institute, ed., *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1943*, pp. 264-265, 274-275, 365; However, we do know that General Sikorski was present at the Tehran Conference. See: Tendrya, B. I., ‘General Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-1945’, p. 8.
265 Whilst I focus on the two main territorial visions for postwar Poland which were based on the Piast and Jagellonian territories respectively and which informed the relevant debates at the end of WWI and WWII, other more extreme versions of what constitutes Poland's natural boundaries have been advocated from time to time. For example, demands were raised during the interbellum period for a Poland that would extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea and would include all former Piast and Jagellion territories. See: Fuchs, W., *Der neue Polenspiegel: Selbstzeugnisse politischen Eroberungswillens* (Berlin: Deutscher Ostmarken-Verein, 1930), pp. 82-85; Sharp, T., ‘Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers’, p. 381.
on referring to it ‘as a line of demarcation between Russia and Poland’ (my italics in both quotations). He also opposed the surrender of East Galicia to the Ukrainian SSR.\(^{268}\) Churchill pressed the issue with Mikołajczyk and tried to convince him that \textit{de facto} acceptance of Stalin’s proposal was only intended as a provisional measure, designed to remove obstacles preventing a cessation of hostilities. Mikołajczyk was encouraged to view it ‘as a working arrangement, subject to discussion at the Peace Conference’.\(^{269}\) However, when Mikołajczyk sounded his government on the subject upon his return to London, his apparent lack of resolve on this point cost him his position.\(^{270}\) Tomasz Arciszewski replaced him as Prime Minister in Exile on the 29th of November 1944 and the London Poles continued to pursue an intransigent policy vis-à-vis the eastern frontier. At the Yalta Conference (4th-11th of February 1945) they protested vigorously against the Allies’ acceptance of the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line as the eastern frontier of the new Polish state.\(^{271}\)

At the same time, the London Poles were by no means completely enamoured with the thought of annexing the major part of Lower Silesia and other heavily populated parts of Germany. Eighteen days after taking office, Arciszewski had disavowed any intention or desire to annex the areas around Breslau and Stettin in interviews published in \textit{The Sunday Times} and \textit{The Observer} on the 17th of December 1944. His objection turned on the fact that the area in question was populated by some eight to ten million Germans.\(^{272}\)

The known territorial aspirations of the London Poles, the retention of the \textit{Kresy} coupled with an ambivalent attitude towards the acquisition of densely populated German areas in the west, demonstrate that they were operating within a traditional paradigm – the ‘Jagiellonian concept’ – which was based on the restoration of the Commonwealth. Insurrection aimed at the restoration of Polish dominance within the former Commonwealth territories was a perennial Polish obsession during the Partition Era (1772-1918) and dominates the country’s


\(^{269}\) Churchill, W., \textit{The Second World War}, p. 856.


literature and historiography.\textsuperscript{273} It was precisely this paradigm that had motivated Piłsudski’s attempt to establish an eastern frontier well into what is today Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Lithuanian territory during the period of state formation earlier in the century (1918-1921).\textsuperscript{274} The immediate consequence of the London Poles’ adherence to this eastward-looking tradition was that they were unceremoniously dropped by the Western Allies during the course of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt and Churchill were more interested in pragmatic solutions than unachievable pipe dreams, which is what these aspirations amounted to in the face of Stalin’s intransigence and ability to enforce his will militarily. It is also undeniable that their insistence on retaining East Galicia contributed to an intensification of the Ukrainian-led pogroms there.\textsuperscript{275}

Through their close collaboration with the Moscow elite, the Lublin Poles, on the other hand, were highly conscious of the fact that the eastern territories were about to be annexed irreversibly by the USSR. At the same time, they were aware of the potential of territorial gains in the west to both bolster their own claims to power and reconcile the majority of Poles to the loss of the 	extit{Kresy}. The leadership of the ZPP had been among the earliest to grasp this and made calls ‘to wipe out the Jagiellonian traditions and revert to the great traditions of the Piasts’ in their first published documents in late 1943.\textsuperscript{276} The KRN published a series of documents in early 1944 amounting to a full political manifesto.\textsuperscript{277} Their programme was based on the restoration of an independent Poland, democracy and social justice, placing power in the hands of the workers, agrarian reform, friendship and cooperation with the USSR, territorial adjustments in the East based on ethnic concentrations and the ‘restoration of Poland’s former Piast


territories in the North and West’. Similarly, in their manifesto from the 22nd of July 1944 the PKWN called upon all Poles to fight for the return of ‘polnischer Gebiete wie Pommern, Oppelner Schlesien, Ostpreußen, um breiten Zugang zum Meer und um polnische Grenzsäulen an der Oder’. Later that year in October 1944, Bolesław Bierut, the then leader of the PKWN, used the same meeting with Churchill and Stalin at which Mikołajczyk had proven intransigent on frontier adjustments in the east, ‘to demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov [in East Galicia] shall belong to Russia.’

Until this time, Churchill had regarded the Lublin Poles as nothing more than ‘an expression of the Soviet will […] and] a kind of Quislings’. Nevertheless their cooperation on the matter of the eastern frontier rendered them indispensable under the circumstances. On their part, the Lublin Poles accepted Stalin’s and Churchill’s offer of a west-shifted Poland for the simple reason that it was their only route to power in the short term. Despite a tangible presence in Poland, where they advanced in line with the Red Army, their prolonged collaboration with the Soviet Union, one of the invaders of September 1939, made them highly unpopular with many Poles, both within Poland and abroad. Considerable numbers of Poles had remained in exile in Britain, the British Commonwealth and in other enclaves such as Belgium, and could have posed a serious threat to the members of Lublin Committee had they failed to take power prior to the exiles’ return. Thus, the position of the Lublin Poles and their successors was by no means as strong as a superficial analysis of the situation might suggest. Had these exiles ever returned to power during the lifetimes of Poland’s postwar leaders, there is every chance that the latter would have been executed, or imprisoned, for high treason. In the event, by acquiring power during the Yalta Summit, they were able to turn the tables on the hostile exiles. Of those exiles who returned to Poland after the War, many were themselves arrested and executed as traitors. Others ‘lingered in gaol in the company of Nazi war

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280 Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 856.  
281 Ibid. p. 857.  
criminals and other “enemies of the people” [and] were tried and condemned in secret in trials continuing into the 1950s’, which demonstrates how high the stakes were for both parties.284

Given Stalin’s strong position going into the Yalta Conference (which began on the 4th of February 1945), the London Poles never had any realistic chance of obtaining concessions. Shortly after its inauguration on the 22nd of July 1944, the so-called ‘Lublin Committee’ (PKWN) had formally ratified the USSR’s annexation of the territory beyond the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line (the Kresy) on the 27th of July 1944.285 In return, Moscow had formally recognised them as the Polish government on the 31st of December 1944.286 By the end of the Yalta Conference (11th of February 1945), the TRJN had replaced the London Exile Government as the de facto representatives of Poland on the international stage. The Protocol of Proceedings issued after the conference on the 24th of March 1945 merely called for the reorganisation of the provisional government ‘on a broader democratic basis’.287 In the same month, long before the area east of the Oder-Western Neisse line had been occupied by Polish forces, the ‘government in waiting’, already had plans to divide the area into several administrative units: Masuria (Mazury), Western Pomerania (Pomorze Zachodnie), Lower Silesia (Dolny Śląsk) and Upper Silesia (Górny Śląsk). As soon as the Red Army captured Danzig on the 30th of March 1945, the Soviet authorities established the Prefecture of Gdańsk.288

Augmented by representatives from across the political spectrum, but still dominated by Communists, the TRJN formally took office on the 28th of June 1945 and remained constituted until the 17th of January 1947 when the Democratic Bloc won the elections and Bierut became President.289 It was officially recognised by Paris on the 29th of June 1945, and by London and

284 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 85.
288 Yoshioka, J., 'Imagining Their Lands as Ours: Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II, in Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present, ed. by Hiroshi Fukuda, (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), p. 275.
289 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 5; Prażmowska, A., Poland: a Modern History, p. 167.
Washington on the 5th of July 1945. On the same day, recognition of the government in exile (London Poles) was formally withdrawn.

3.4.3 Consolidation and Transition

Having agreed to redraw Poland’s frontiers in compliance with Stalin’s wishes, it was clear to all that the political transition of sovereignty would be easier to achieve if the territorial extent of the new Poland were co-extensive with the demographic distribution of Poles in Europe, whereby the former took priority (i.e., the state boundaries were given and populations would have to be moved to fit with these). This was very different to the circumstances prevailing at the end of WWI. At that time, a Polish state had been envisaged that coincided with the actual distribution of ethnic Poles in Central Europe, i.e., whose borders were to be drawn around those areas ‘inhabited by indisputably Polish populations’, in other words those in which ethnic Poles were numerically dominant. This policy had resulted in a Polish state comprising significant minority populations including over 6 million Ukrainians, one million Byelorussians, and around one million Germans (the ‘Waisen von Versailles’). However, in the wake of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, and the population-transfer agreements signed between Poland and the various SSRs, it was the Poles/ethnic Poles who had to be moved to fit within prescribed borders. At the same time, other ethnic populations within Poland’s new frontiers would have to be expelled. Non-Poles, and those deemed as such, living in the area designated as Poland (including areas of Germany placed ‘under the administration of the Polish state

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294 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 142-44, 208-09, 195-97; for an overview of the main areas of German settlement in the Second Republic and German territorial losses to Poland following World War One see: Schmidt, C.-D., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, pp. 16-17, 75.
296 What is remarkable in this context is the difference in the attitude of Western statesmen to the prospect of mass expulsions compared with official expressions of horror and disgust in relation to the forced population exchanges that took place after WWI. For a detailed overview of shifting attitudes towards sociocide among members of the British establishment and public see: Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans, pp. 1-12.
[...pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier’) were therefore expelled to make room for incoming Poles.297

Under these circumstances, the TRJN had no choice but to consent to sweeping population exchanges, and expulsions (sociocide). Having risen to power without the broad-based consent of the Polish people, this, initially unpopular, government would have been too weak to assert control in the annexed territories had the native population (9.3 million Germans in the ZO and 1.4 million ethnic Germans in the rest of Poland) remained in place.298 Not only was there the potential of hostility on the part of these Germans, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, but, as I have already mentioned, significant numbers of Poles had remained in exile, in many cases in organised formations.299 At the same time, it would have been extremely difficult to rehouse Poles displaced from the Kresy or returning from German and Soviet captivity (the survivors of the 6 million Poles displaced after September 1939) had the postwar government decided to retain non-Polish populations within the boundaries of the new state.300 Therefore, the TRJN, with the backing of the Allies, took the decision to expel the native population from the newly acquired German territories.301 At the same time, they acquiesced to bidirectional population exchanges along the new Soviet frontier.302 An important fact, in terms of the creation of the framework paradigm within which historians from all stakeholder groups would subsequently work, was the active participation of the British government in physically expelling Germans from the ZO (Operation Swallow).303

At the beginning of this chapter I asked who was speaking for Poland on the international stage in the closing months and immediate aftermath of the War, and how they had risen to power. As the foregoing exposition has shown, Poland was represented on the international stage (i.e., at the Yalta and Potsdam

300 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 252-56; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 509-10, 605.
Conferences) by the Communist-dominated, Soviet-backed PKWN-TRJN at this time. They had risen to power as the willing instruments of Stalin’s strategic plans for Central Europe. However, the extent to which specific actors played an active role in exploiting the growing rift between the exile government and the British government should not be overlooked. Many of the men who would go on to play a significant role within the Polish People’s Republic held key positions within the PKWN-TRJN and the precursor organisations. There can be no doubt that they saw the potential for exploiting Poland’s westward shift to their own ends. As early as the 20th of May 1945 Władysław Gomułka, for example, assured the plenary of the Central Committee of the PPR that territorial expansion in the west, coupled with land reform, would neutralise dissenting voices and win broader support for the government among the populace.\footnote{Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 285.} In the final analysis, the TRJN came to power through a combination of accommodating to the contingencies of the prevailing \textit{Realpolitik}, and a certain amount of ruthlessness vis-à-vis Polish tradition and the immediate needs of Central European populations, particularly within the ZO and \textit{Kresy}.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

3.5.1 Summing Up
The state the TRJN were given to rule over under Soviet suzerainty, the Polish People’s Republic, was very different from the one destroyed by the joint German-Soviet invasion in 1939, (the Second Republic). Vast territories to the east of the River Bug, which had animated the imaginations of generations of Polish patriots, had been surrendered to the USSR. The western and northern frontiers had been extended to encompass broad swathes of German territory. Millions of people had been forcibly expelled from the country or else had been ‘encouraged’ to migrate to new areas both within its borders and beyond. The demographic situation was also unrecognisable, with none of the cultural diversity remaining that had characterised Polish life for centuries. So how do these observations bear on the research questions set out in the introduction to this chapter?
3.5.2 Owning the Grand Narrative

With an, as yet, fully intact exile government in London, it would have been political (and for many of the actors, actual) suicide to deliberately forfeit the support of their Soviet backers. Thus, it served their interests to underplay the Ukrainian-Polish sociocide in East Galicia and the loss of the rest of the Kresy to the USSR for reasons of naked survival. Their dependence on continued Soviet support also explains why postwar Polish governments consistently underplayed the Soviet invasion of the 17th of September 1939 and subsequent Soviet atrocities against the Polish populace. For, as Norman Davies rightly points out, any differences between NSDAP and Soviet atrocities committed in Poland during the pre-Barbarossa era (1st of September 1939 to 22nd of June 1941) were minor.

At a time when the Germans were still refining their preparations for Auschwitz or Treblinka, the Soviets could accommodate a few million Polish and West Ukrainian additions to the population of their ‘Gulag archipelago’ with relative ease [...] and of] the estimated two million Polish civilians deported to Arctic Russia, Siberia, and Kazakhstan in the terrible railway convoys of 1939-40, at least one half were dead within a year of their arrest.305

Moreover, having risen to power through their acquiescence to the territorial losses in the east and acceptance of the Piast Formula, the TRJN had no choice but to take ownership of the grand narrative this implied. Not to have done so would have meant publically accepting the role of ‘puppet government’ (which is how they have often been characterised right up to the present day).306 It was therefore vital for the TRJN and subsequent postwar governments to continue to promote an interpretation of history in which Piast Poland, with its claims to the territories encompassed by the ZO, truly did provide a credible model for the modern state, whilst justifying the loss of the Kresy along with the concomitant episodes of sociocide. As a logical corollary, the Commonwealth of Poland-

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Lithuania, which had covered all of the areas incorporated into the USSR (and more) had to be portrayed as a historical aberration. If Piast Poland had been the ideal Polish state then the Commonwealth, which eventually replaced it, was rooted in historical contingencies and the temporary, but doomed ascendency of the land-owning classes over the proletariat, whose members the Communist government claimed to represent. This explains how it served the postwar Polish government’s interests to justify the annexation of Lower Silesia and the rest of the ZO with reference to Piast Poland. But why not also blame it on recent atrocities committed by agents of the Third Reich as one might have expected?  

In fact, the answer to that flows logically from the necessity to embrace the grand narrative outlined above and to forget the USSR’s original role in the conquest and partition of the Second Republic in September 1939. One recalls that this was part of a joint effort by the USSR and the Third Reich executed pursuant to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. It would have been difficult for the TRJN to present the territorial acquisitions at Germany’s expense as just retribution for German atrocities against Poles between 1939 and 1945, without also demanding retribution from the USSR for similar atrocities between 1939 and 1941. Not only was the TJRN not in a position to demand such retribution from the USSR from an objective standpoint, but they had also actively acquiesced in the secession of territory to the USSR in their own bid for power. 

All things considered then, it was better for the TRJN to portray their ascent to power, subservience to Moscow, and active participation in the redrawing of Poland’s frontiers as a historical mission to restore Poland’s former Piast territories in the North and West rather than as an act of revenge and reprisal. This version of events was indeed adopted as the official narrative. It is, however, important to note the fact that the instrumentalisation of Piast Poland to this end was only ever intended for immediate Polish ‘consumption’. It is for this reason that I have chosen to work with Polish texts in translation throughout this thesis. This corpus, which was approved by the censor for international consumption, represents the least extreme version of the TRJN’s Piast Formula and constitutes a condensed summary of the officially sanctioned historiography.

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307 According to Zdenko Čepič, the Communist regime’s propaganda neither admitted that the ZO had been given to Poland by the Allies as compensation for the loss of the Kresy, nor did it support the notion that it was compensation for atrocities and material damage suffered under German occupation. See: Čepič, Z., 1945 - A Break with the Past, p. 95.
of Poland during the Communist period. In other words, the pre-Wende Polish texts quoted in the following chapters represent the Polish government’s official contribution to the international discourse relating to the subject of Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide. This narrative was never presented to the wider world as a legitimate claim that would stand up to historical scrutiny, and the censor never forced serious Polish historians to espouse this tactical version of events in publications subject to international peer review.\textsuperscript{308} It is also important to note that the current consensus among Polish historians is that the TRJN’s Piast Formula was based on a myth. Indeed, as Elżbieta Opiołowska explains, the Communists’

Verleugnung des deutschen Erbes in den Nord- und Westgebieten, das Beharren auf dem Mythos von den ‘Wiedergewonnenen Gebieten’ […] und die Tabuisierung der verlorenen Heimat in den polnischen Ostgebieten […] trugen dazu bei, dass nach 1989 die Geschichte der Regionen aufs Neue aufgearbeitet werden musste.\textsuperscript{309}

Thus, Polish scholars have been working since 1989 to deconstruct the TRJN’s Piast Formula. It is, therefore, not the case that Polish and German historians harbour radically different views either on the history of the ZO or of the circumstances appertaining to its de facto annexation by Poland in 1945 or the Flucht und Vertreibung of the German population. Nevertheless, this central narrative – the Piast Formula – survived long enough to leave a discernible trace in the ensuing collective memory discourse. In the following chapter I explore some of the ways in which Polish, German and Anglophone historians have responded to some of the issues and ramifications of the TRJN’s early espousal of the Piast grand narrative.

\textsuperscript{308} Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{309} Elżbieta Opiołowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 255-56.
4: Historians’ Discourse

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I analyse a selection of secondary sources to explore some of the ways in which specific stakeholders – Polish, German, and Anglophone historians – have responded to some of the issues and ramifications of Poland’s postwar frontier changes, particularly the TRJN’s espousal of the ‘Piast Formula’. As previously argued, what is at stake during such ‘contested narrative discourses’ is dominance within what I refer to as ‘hegemonic historical narratives’. The following analysis is structured around four specific research questions: how has the situation changed between the postwar era and the post- *Wende* era in terms of the relevant historiography produced by historians operating within various stakeholder communities? How have historians from different stakeholder collectives responded to the invocation of Piast Poland as a model for the Polish People’s Republic and justification for the two cases of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned? What narrative strategies have historians employed to influence the relevant collective memory discourse? What tropes and topoi have emerged and been most persistent during the collective memory discourse, and what (implicit or explicit) purpose(s) do they serve? Attempting to answer these questions will illuminate some of the ways in which historians have contributed to the relevant collective memory discourse.

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310 I am aware of the practical difficulties involved in classifying a given author in ethno-national terms, particularly when the author does not express an allegiance to any specific stakeholder group. Professor Anita J. Prażmowska is a case in point. Her surname, always written with Polish diacritical on the fourth letter, is undoubtedly Polish. Indeed, her father was a Polish bomber pilot during the War (he was stationed in Britain and was deployed on the basis of negotiations held between the London Poles and the British War Cabinet). Her mother was a member of the (British) Women’s Auxiliary Air Force. Prażmowska spent her first 19 years in Poland, but most of her adult life in Britain. She is therefore at least as British as she is Polish. However, given that her parents both fought in the War on the opposite side to the Lublin Poles (TRJN), one cannot remain blind to the possibility that she harbours a specific outlook that could be loosely defined as ‘anti-Lublin-Committee, pro-London-Government’, and probably anti-German. In at least one of her books she openly declares her emotional involvement in the subject of Poland’s wartime dealings with Great Britain and states frankly that she has had to recognise and challenge assumptions and preconceptions that form part of her heritage. Prażmowska’s personal biography typifies the irreducible complexity at the heart of the two cases of sociocide I address in this thesis. Such reductionist ‘stakeholder categories’, therefore, can only serve a heuristic function within the current discourse analysis. Prażmowska, A., *The Betrayed Ally*, pp. ix-x; Prażmowska, A. J., *A History of Poland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). See author biography on the back cover.

311 To some extent, this chapter can be read as a general critique of the context-fallibility of historiography, *per se*, in that the writing of history is fundamentally inseparable from more general socio-political paradigms. This observation holds true both for historians, who work within a dominant hegemonic historical narrative, whether consciously or unconsciously, and for those who seek to challenge the same on the basis of personal experience. In both cases, the relevant research is carried out vis-à-vis a well-defined socio-political narrative, and must, therefore, at least to some extent, follow its contours. By the same token, collective memory discourse cannot but be influenced by a similar degree of context-fallibility. This chapter, therefore, is presented more as a case study of a specific instance of context-fallibility than a criticism of the context-fallibility of this particular case.
4.2 The Piast Formula in Post-War Propaganda

Having explained the annexation of parts of Germany and the loss of the Kresy as necessary expedients in a historical mission to reinstate the Piast Kingdom of Poland, the TRJN needed to substantiate their claims. To this end it was necessary to construct a history in which the ZO had formed part of the Piast Kingdom and the Kresy had not. According to Johannes Frackowiak this is ‘ein geradezu klassisches Beispiel für eine “Erfindung von Traditionen” im Sinne Eric Hobsbawms’. As Anna Wolff-Powęska explains:

[German text]

As early as March 1945 (i.e., over a month before the German surrender) an article in Głos Ludu (The People’s Voice) claimed that the Polish people understand that the return of the ZO to the motherland is not only economically beneficial to Poland, but is also a matter of historic justice. Later that year, the Polish government founded the Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych or Ministry for the Regained Territories (MZO) on the 13th of November 1945. Headed by Władysław Gomułka, then General Secretary of the PPR, this organisation was responsible for all matters relating to the ZO. It collaborated with the Instytut Zachodni or Western Institute (IZ) and the Polski Związek Zachodni or Polish Western Federation (PZZ) which provided propagandistic materials designed to support the Piast Formula. The historical content of this propaganda was provided by Polish academics, such as Zygmunt Wojciechowski, who produced scholarly arguments in support of the claim that the ZO had been part of the Piast

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314 Głos Ludu was published by the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) between 1945 and 1948 when it was merged with Robotnik (The Worker), a newspaper published by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) to form the Trybuna Ludu (People’s Tribune), which was then published by the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) from 1948 to 1990. Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 251.

315 The MZO was responsible for the rapid expulsion of the German population from the ZO, the erasure of all traces of German settlement in these areas, the resettlement of the area by Poles expelled from the Kresy, the ‘Polonisation’ of any Germans remaining within the ZO, the reconstruction of the built environment, industry and agriculture, and the construction of a Communist-based society within the ZO. It was also supposed to manage the transfer of German property to the incoming population but the majority of this was taken into state ownership. See: Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 154; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertriebenen, pp. 434-35.
Kingdom. Literary authors were also pressed into service for propaganda purposes. Several historical novels were published in the immediate aftermath of the *Vertreibungen* which emphasised the ‘Ur-Polishness’ of the ZO. Other academics, such as Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Alfonś Klafkowski, published on the legal basis of the annexation. Despite a tendentious misreading of the Yalta and Potsdam Treaties, Klafkowski’s work remained influential until the early 1970s.

I argue that these observations support the claim that Polish historians working in Poland in the immediate aftermath of the War can be considered a distinct stakeholder collective for analytical purposes. This does not mean that individuals within this group did not espouse contrasting private views on any given subject. However, these historians were pressed into service by the government to provide support for the Piast Formula and, in the immediate postwar period, any publically expressed dissent was vigorously suppressed. At stake for those who refused to collaborate on this project was their personal freedom. For those who supported the regime, the objective was the successful integration of the ZO into Poland and preventing the overthrow of the TRJN.

This stakeholder collective responded to the Piast Formula by producing scholarly texts that supported the government narrative. In addition to its explanatory content, this government narrative entailed an ontological claim about the Piast Kingdom, namely that it had been largely coextensive with the Polish People’s Republic, and Polish historians focused their research on proving this.

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317 I use the word ‘pressed’ advisedly in this context. Since the Partitions Polish authors had seen themselves as ‘spokesmen for the victimized collective’ and worked in opposition to state authority. Bates, J. M., ‘*PUWP’s Preferences in the Contemporary Polish Novel*’, pp. 43-45.
318 Some examples are: *Dzikowy skarb* (1945) by Władysław Jan Grabski, *Ojciec i syn* (1946) by Karol Bunsch and *Bolesław Chrobry* (1947) by Antoni Golubiew. To my knowledge, none of these novels are currently available in English. The titles can be translated as: *Wild Treasure*, *Father and Son*, and *Boleslaus the Brave* respectively. Frackowiak, J., *et al.*, *Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart*, p. 251.
320 See my discussion of Witold Kula below.
321 Ostrowski, M., ‘*To Return to Poland or Not to Return*’, Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*, p. 85.
Therefore, the resulting historiography contributed to the subsequent collective memory discourse at the ontological level.

The epitome of the Polish government’s (known as the Democratic Bloc since the 17th of January 1947) efforts to lend credibility to the Piast Formula was the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ in Wroclaw in 1948. Its primary objective was to justify the Oder-Neisse Line historically, politically and economically. Whilst emphasising the Piast claims to the ZO, the organisers were careful to avoid mentioning any historic expansion by Piast princes into those regions now encompassed within the USSR. Omissions of this nature are a characteristic narrative strategy within the collective memory discourse engendered by the shifting of Poland’s frontiers and the concomitant sociocides (see Section 4.5.2 below). This, I argue, is another example of a direct effort to influence the collective memory discourse at the ontological level by tailoring the hegemonic historical narrative of the Piast Kingdom to better match the TRJN/Democratic Bloc’s explanatory narrative. For, as explained in Chapter 3, restoring the Piast Kingdom as it had actually been at the time of its maximum cultural and political development prior to the decline of the dynasty would have required the retention of East Galicia, which the TRJN did not have the power to do.

Around 1.5 million people, mostly schoolchildren and workers, attended the exhibition in organised groups. Thus, the exhibition served a didactic purpose and catered to the Polish public. This observation supports the point I made in Chapter 3 to the effect that the Piast Formula primarily served the TRJN/Democratic Bloc’s domestic agenda of political legitimation and justifying the frontier changes and concomitant sociocide to the Polish population, not to the international community. Indeed, writing a decade later, in 1958, not long after the start of the so-called ‘Thaw’ which took hold in Polish politics in 1956, Polish historian Witold Kula explicitly criticised the exhibition as propaganda for the Piast Formula which, he wrote, sought to instrumentalise emotion-laden cultural

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322 Čepič, Z., 1945 - A Break with the Past, p. 95.
323 One such incursion was Boleslav Chrobry’s (967-1025) military campaign against Kiev (1015-1019). See quotes from Witold Kula in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 254.
memories of popular figures from Polish history, such as Bolesław Chrobry, to promote trust in the current regime. The government’s strategy succeeded and, according to Kula, ‘[eine] marktschreierische Berufung auf die ersten Piasten beherrschte Polen’ in the immediate wake of the exhibition. Yet, the fact that Kula was able to publish such a critical analysis just ten years after the exhibition suggests that, whilst the TRJN/Democratic Bloc did succeed in establishing a new state within the borders that had been established de facto by the end of 1945, neither their espousal of the Piast Formula nor their attempt to fully control the historiography of the country went unchallenged by Polish historians in the longer term.

Nevertheless, by 1948, the Democratic Bloc was convinced of the success of the integration of the ZO and dissolved the Scientific Council for the Regained Territories. The MZO was abolished a year later in 1949. Although the Polish government never publically rescinded the Piast Formula, their preparedness to invoke it as a historical justification for the postwar frontier adjustments declined markedly after this time. Since the early 1950s, Polish historiography that fully endorses the Piast Formula has become increasingly rare. By the 1970s, the justification for retaining the ZO as part of Poland no longer depended upon proving the Ur-Polishness of the area. An entire generation of Poles had been born and raised in the ZO since 1945 and considered it to be their natural home. To forcibly relocate them would itself have constituted an act of sociocide. In addition, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, particularly the Treaty of Warsaw (1970), which guaranteed the existing German-Polish frontier, had in fact eliminated the need to further justify the region’s retention within Poland.

In the introduction to this chapter, I asked how historians from different stakeholder collectives have responded to the TRJN’s invocation of the Piast

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Formula to justify Poland’s postwar territorial configuration and the sociocides with which this thesis is concerned. Thus far, I have argued that Polish historians in the immediate postwar era responded by producing a historiographical corpus that supported the ontological claim implicit in the Piast Formula, i.e., that the Piast Kingdom was largely coextensive with the Polish People’s Republic. The situation with regard to the later Polish and German historiography has been complicated by the work of the *Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission* between 1972 and 2008 (see Chapter 2). Rather than pursuing historical research in an objective manner, this group served a political agenda designed to promote peace and reconciliation between Germany and Poland.\textsuperscript{332} Notwithstanding the laudable intent, this still amounts to the production of propaganda, and not all German historians have welcomed the initiative. Ignoring the work of the *Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission*, many German scholars have focused on producing a large corpus of work designed to demonstrate the *Ur-Germanness* of the ZO. I have already mentioned the BdV’s research activities in this context, much of which is presented in the ‘Kulturelle Arbeitshefte’ series.\textsuperscript{333} I discuss further examples in Section 4.3 below. This corpus implicitly contradicts the Piast Formula at the ontological level, that is, if one accepts the axiom that the annexation of the ZO was justifiable because it involved *Ur*-Polish territory, then proving it to have been *Ur*-German nullifies the justification.\textsuperscript{334} To my knowledge, Anglophone historiography has not directly addressed the Piast Formula.\textsuperscript{335} Nevertheless, as I demonstrate below (Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.2), much of this corpus does reflect Polish propaganda both with respect to Piast history in the ZO and to long-standing German-Polish border conflicts.

Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* eliminated the legal basis for any vestigial threat of German revanchism, which arguably existed, at least in principle, until 1970. This development was good for Poland but not necessarily for the Polish government,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{332} Brandes, D., et al., *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, pp. 205-07.
\item \textsuperscript{334} It is worth remembering the fact that, despite the amount that has been written by Polish and German historians on the original status of Silesia (and other areas in the ZO), ancient ownership does not provide legal grounds for annexations in the modern period. What counts in international law is recent de facto juridical control over a substantial period of time rather than alleged rights derived from feudal contracts. See the International Court of Justice's decision in *France v United Kingdom* [1953], a case involving disputed sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos islands in the English Channel. See Hillier, T., *Sourcebook on Public International Law*, pp. 236-38.
\item \textsuperscript{335} See Appendix D for more detail on Anglophone responses to the Piast Formula.
\end{itemize}
which had drawn sustenance from the putative threat scenario that had allegedly existed before the ratification of the Treaty of Warsaw. For it was precisely the imagined danger of a German re-annexation of the ZO that had bound the settlers to the regime and, ultimately, to the USSR as guarantors of their personal safety and welfare. These settlers, therefore, represented a significant element in the government’s power base. As Elżbieta Opilowska explains:

[von] Anfang an bildeten die Grenzfrage und eine antideutsche Haltung für die kommunistische Regierung wichtige Quellen der Legitimation. Allein die neuen Machthaber sollten als einziger Garant der Unantastbarkeit der Grenze betrachtet werden.336

Without the German threat, the settlers no longer had any reason to support a government which had positioned itself as their protector whilst curtailing their freedoms in various spheres of activity. Thus, Brandt’s Ostpolitik inadvertently weakened the Polish government’s power base.337

These geopolitical developments had an impact on Polish government-sponsored historiography after 1970. Continuing to justify the annexation of the ZO as part of a historic mission to restore the Piast Kingdom had become anachronistic. Yet, the government’s original motivation for the propagation of the Piast Formula (the need for legitimation in the absence of a popular mandate) still obtained. The censor, therefore, continued to favour historiography that portrayed Germany and Germans as the long-term enemy and potentially dangerous. Given the existence of the Warsaw Treaty, which demonstrated the Federal Republic of Germany’s pacifistic intent and aspirations towards Poland and its commitment to preserving Poland in its current territorial configuration, this narrative had to be constructed around an understanding of Germany and the Germans as being prone to treachery. Moreover, it needed to emphasise the long-term nature of the threat and portray Germany as a potential annihilator of Poland per se, rather than a mere competitor for frontier territory. The construction and propagation of this narrative enabled the government to explain the continued presence in Poland of the Soviet Army (the Northern Group of Forces or NGF) as

337 Whilst establishing the degree to which this effect was or was not ‘inadvertent’ would be highly interesting for the study of German-Polish relations as well as the collapse of the Communist Bloc in the late twentieth century, it is outwith the scope of the current thesis.
a necessary evil in the face of a persistent German threat that had been set aside only temporarily under Brandt’s chancellorship.\footnote{Staar, R. F., ‘New Course in Communist Poland’, p. 70.} It also helped deflect suspicions that one of the main reasons for Soviet Army’s presence in Poland was to help secure the Communist’s hold over the country.\footnote{Przaźniewska, A., Poland: a Modern History, p. 161; Elżbieta Opilowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 246.} Government-sponsored historiography after 1970 focused more on the Red Army’s services to Poland during the War and the fraternal bonds between the Warsaw Bloc countries.\footnote{Although it is common to refer to the Soviet Army as the ‘Red Army’, this appellation is only valid until the 25th of February 1946, after which it is proper to use the term ‘Soviet Army’.} This effectively meant writing the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland in 1939 out of Polish historiography. In the following sections, I analyse some of the ways in which this discourse of danger with respect to Germany and the Germans, and of Soviet benevolence, has been reflected in Polish, German, and Anglophone historiography.

### 4.3 Discourse Deflection

The historiography of Poland’s annexation of the ZO and loss of the Kresy and the concomitant sociocide falls into two distinct categories: direct and indirect histories. To a significant extent, direct histories work at the ontological level. That is, they include factual descriptions either of episodes of sociocide or of specific measures taken to incorporate territories annexed from Germany into Poland and to manage the political ramifications of territorial losses to the USSR. Alternatively, they treat the *Vertreibung* from the German perspective, for example by analysing the subsequent experience of the *Vertriebenen* in terms of their integration into East and/or West Germany. The material is often presented in conjunction with statistical summaries and reproductions of primary documents such as photographs, contemporary official documentation, and affidavits.\footnote{Some examples of this kind of direct history are: Bundesamt, S., *Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste*; Ther, P., *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene*; Theisen, A., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen*; Nawratil, H., *Schwarzbuch der Vertreibung 1945 bis 1948: das letzte Kapitel unbewältigter Vergangenheit* (Munich: Universitas, 1999 [1982]); Glotz, P., *Die Vertreibung*; Urban, T., *Der Verlust: die Vertreibung der Deutschen und Polen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 2004); Demshuk, A., *Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory*.} The titles of such direct histories hint at some of the key questions that have been raised in relation to the events in question. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, for example, appears certain that the motive for the *Vertreibungen* was revenge.\footnote{Zayas, A.-M. d., *A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans, 1944-1950*, trans. John a. Koehler (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993 [1986]).}
Kriwat characterises them as a second Holocaust.\textsuperscript{343} Steffen Prauser \textit{et al.}, question the identity of those affected by placing the word ‘German’ in inverted commas.\textsuperscript{344} In the introduction to his PhD thesis, Steffen Harmel expands upon the title which includes the subheading ‘Verbrechen oder Kollektivschuld’ and asks:

\begin{quote}
Kann man die Vertreibung der Deutschen nach 1945 aus angestammten Siedlungsgebieten im Osten vor allem als Sühne für die Taten der Nationalsozialisten rechtfertigen oder muss sie eher als Verbrechen an unschuldigen Zivilisten gesehen werden?\textsuperscript{345}
\end{quote}

Questions of this kind are raised in relation to alternative explanatory narratives. As such, they can be explored at the explanatory and narrative levels. Nevertheless, all such questions primarily address ontological issues i.e., they ask ‘what is and what is not true’ about various aspects of the \textit{Vertreibung}. Is it a fact that the motive for the \textit{Vertreibung} was revenge? Is it a fact that the \textit{Vertreibung} was a second Holocaust? Is it a fact that the \textit{Vertreibungen} can be justified ‘als Sühne für die Taten der Nationalsozialisten’ or is it a fact that they represent a ‘Verbrechen an unschuldigen Zivilisten’? Even a superficial reading of such direct histories will show that the closed questions implicit in the titles are often posed for purely rhetorical reasons, whereby the author’s preferred answer forms the axiomatic framework of his or her explanatory narrative.\textsuperscript{346} Nevertheless, I would argue that, as a corpus, direct histories can be analysed most productively at the ontological level, not least because each of the implicit framework axioms is likely to be true to some extent or with respect to some subset of actors and/or events.

Indirect histories, by contrast, barely mention the events that triggered the collective memory discourse to which they contribute. Instead, they function primarily at the explanatory level to construct broad historical framework narratives within which the relevant events can be contextualised and therefore

\textsuperscript{343} Kriwat, K., \textit{Der andere Holocaust}.
\textsuperscript{345} Harmel, S., ‘Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den Ostgebieten 1945-48’, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{346} My use of the term ‘closed question’, in this context, follows the distinction made in business studies, especially sales, and refers to questions that ‘elicit a yes/no answer’. Indeed, the very fact that a careful use of such closed questions, in tightly circumscribed circumstances and at a specific stage in the selling process, is recommended by experts in sales and marketing ought to alert us to their potential to narrow consumer (read ‘researcher’) choice and simplify a given proposition. See: Bird, T., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Brilliant Selling: What the Best Salespeople Know, Do and Say} (New York: Pearson, 2012), p. 134.
explained. Such indirect histories tend to support specific stakeholder standpoints implicitly rather than explicitly, a strategy that takes account of the fact that, because ‘the expulsions have been instrumentalised politically for decades, it is not easy to find a language that facilitates discussion, avoids becoming politically charged, and at the same time calls things by their real names.’\textsuperscript{347} The explanatory frameworks implicit in such indirect histories can serve various purposes in addition to the primary objective of contextualising the events in question. They may, for example, fulfil an exculpatory, accusatory, or reconciliatory function depending upon the historian’s understanding of the events in question and/or the socio-political constraints acting upon him or her at the time of writing. It is this corpus that is of most interest for my current study, as it represents a little-studied phenomenon which I shall term ‘discourse deflection’.

‘Discourse deflection’ is a narrative-level strategy in which alternative points of view (explanations) about a given event are suggested rather than stated outright. It is left to the reader to draw conclusions about the events in question from the material presented in relation to longer-term, even seemingly unrelated, issues.\textsuperscript{348} Nevertheless, I argue, by creating the historical framework within which private and public discourses on the subject are conducted, these historians effectively channel and constrain the production of hegemonic historical narratives.

‘Discourse deflection’ is characteristic of the collective memory discourse relating to Poland’s annexation of the ZO and loss of the Kresy and the concomitant sociocide. By explaining their actions with respect to the ZO and the Kresy as a mission to right a series of historical wrongs and aberrations, the TRJN set the resulting collective memory discourse on just such a deflected trajectory, even while the events were still unfolding. In this discourse, the ‘historical wrong’ refers to Germany’s allegedly wrongful acquisition of the territories encompassed

\textsuperscript{347} Karl Schlögel in Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{348} For example, a historian may present purportedly irrefutable evidence that Lower Silesia had ‘always’ been a German province prior to 1945. Should the reader accept this evidence then he or she may well conclude that Poland’s annexation of the province was unjustifiable. The author need not explicitly state that this was the case. However, if a different author succeeds in demonstrating to the reader’s satisfaction that Germany had, in fact, wrested the province from Poland under dubious circumstances, then the post-war annexation may appear in a completely different light. In both cases, the scholars in question avoid being drawn into direct, often acrimonious public debates about the rights and wrongs of the events in question. Just a few examples of the many books and articles that emphasise the Germanness of Silesia are: Hartung, H., Deutschland deine Schlesier; Elze, G., Breslau: Biographie einer deutschen Stadt (Leer: Rautenberg, 1993); Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier; Spata, M., et al., ‘Vom Oberhof in Neurode 1598 zum Hotel “Dwór Górnny” in Nowa Ruda 2012’, Schlesische Geschichtsblätter, 40 (2013), 5-13; Schiller, G., ‘Ein kulinarisches Kulturerbe: Die über 900-jährige Geschichte rund um den Pfefferkuchen in Schlesien und Europa’, Schlesische Geschichtsblätter, 41 (2014), 33-63.
within the ZO in the course of a long-term colonial project (‘Drang nach Osten’). Poland’s unwarranted oppression of Ruthenians and Lithuanians during the Commonwealth and Second Republic Eras is viewed as a historical aberration. Accordingly, historians, who are arguably (and often self-consciously) representative of competing stakeholder perspectives, have produced a broad range of indirect histories which have contributed to the deflected discourse. The following examples may suffice to illustrate the general trend.

As the title suggests, *A Panorama of Polish History* presents a wide-ranging account of Polish history from the earliest times to the year of publication (1982). However, the only thing that the authors, Stefan Krzysztof Kuczyński et al., write about the expulsion of the German population from the ZO is that no such expulsion took place. Instead, they assert, the Germans had already fled of their own accord by the time the Red Army and Polish forces had arrived. Echoing Klafkowski, the same authors explain the loss of the *Kresy* by stating that its retention was ‘at variance with the main lines of the Great Powers’ policies’. 349

In another example, Norman Davies reveals a similar apparent lack of interest in the postwar frontier changes and the associated sociocides in *Heart of Europe* (2001), a substantial monograph on Polish history. In 483 pages, in which he covers the history of Poland and the Poles from the earliest documentary evidence (and beyond) to the year of publication, he devotes just 3 pages to the postwar population transfers. By comparison, he devotes over 2 pages to the ‘prehistory’ of the Poles and the settlement of the ‘great Polish plain’. 350 Similarly, Joachim Bahlcke et al., devote just 3% of their equally broad-ranging *Schlesien und die Schlesier* (2004) to the subject of *Flucht und Vertreibung*.

A superficial reading of this corpus could create the impression that the historians in question are simply not interested in the postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide. Yet, I argue, a deconstructive close reading reveals a number of consistently used narrative strategies that converge to support several tropes and topoi which in turn influence the readers’ understanding of the historical situation of the affected regions (the *Kresy* and the ZO) and of long-term relations between Germany and Poland. This understanding, I argue, then forms the framework or paradigm within which the reader seeks to characterise,
evaluate, categorise and judge the events in question. Therefore, these narrative strategies (see Section 4.5 below) serve a tendentious function within the overall collective memory discourse. It is this kind of implicit, thought-shaping narrative content to which I apply the term ‘discourse deflection’. In the next section I deconstruct some of the most persistent tropes and topoi that have emerged during the relevant collective memory discourse, and analyse the ways in which they might influence a reader’s understanding of the events in question.

4.4 Tropes and Topoi

4.4.1 Poland, the ‘Christ of Nations’

One of the most frequently encountered tropes in Polish historiography and popular culture involves the notion of Poland as ‘the eternal victim’ or ‘Christ of Nations’. In a travel guide written for the Lonely Planet series, for example, Krzysztof Dydyński informs his readers (under the heading ‘Facts about Poland’) that ‘[nearly] all the historical wrongs and atrocities the world could inflict have been experienced by Poles.

In addition to historic traumata such as the Partitions of 1772-75, the wretched state of the country by 1945 and the horrors the population had suffered at the hands of the Axis Powers (Germany) and Allies (the USSR) between 1939 and the end of the War have left a lasting impression of Poland as a victim state. Yet, like most other nations and states, Poles and Poland have participated in many un-Christ-like acts of aggression in the past. Less than a year before the outbreak of WWII, for example, the Polish army had invaded Czechoslovakia with a view to capturing the Zaolzie District (Tessin Region) in October 1938. Contemporary western observers found it difficult to distinguish between German expansionism and Poland’s hunger for new territory. In his memoires


354 For an example of how the incident was reflected in the British press see: Anon., ‘Polish Demands on Prague: A Sharp Note’ (Oct 01); ‘Polish Refusal of Mediation: Anglo-French Approach Rebuffed’ (Oct 04); ‘The Poles Take Possession:
of WWII, Churchill expressed his chagrin over the fact that the same Polish state, for the protection of whose sovereign integrity Neville Chamberlain had offered guarantees of British support on the 25th of August 1939 (Polish-British Treaty of Mutual Assistance) was ‘that very Poland which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in the pillage and destruction’ of Czechoslovakia, displaying a ‘shameful attitude’ towards the principle of territorial sovereignty by annexing the Teschen Region.\textsuperscript{355}

Regardless of its historic merits, it is illuminating to analyse the discourse value of the trope of Poland as the eternal victim and ‘Christ of Nations’ from a functional perspective. In Christian tradition, Christ was a fundamentally good being. His role on Earth was to show mankind, by example, how to live in peace and harmony among themselves and in accordance with God’s will. He allowed himself to be betrayed and murdered in order to atone for the sins of all humanity. He was then resurrected to eternal life. Linking Poland to this legend, therefore, emphasises the state’s fundamental righteousness and exemplariness. In addition, it suggests that betrayal has played a significant role in the nation’s history. At a more fundamental level, the implicit identification with Christ’s resurrection, that this metaphor suggests, serves to meld the historical fact of Poland’s ‘resurrection’ as an independent polity in 1918 and again in 1945 with a mythological understanding of Poland as an eternal and, therefore, indestructible and naturally ordained entity.

This notion of Poland as the victim of betrayal is particularly interesting in the postwar context. With a fully functioning, legally constituted Polish government in exile in London, and having ‘no known measure of popular support’ the TRJN had an urgent need for legitimisation when they assumed power in 1945.\textsuperscript{356} One of the ways in which they attempted to legitimise their regime was by casting the London Poles in the role of traitors. In the TRJN’s narrative, the pre-war government had already betrayed the international proletariat by

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\textsuperscript{355} Chamberlain, N., \textit{British Guarantee of Polish Independence}; Churchill, W., \textit{The Second World War}, pp. 144-45; Bethell, N. W., \textit{Gomulka}, p. 106; For a detailed overview of Polish territorial acquisitions and losses between 1916 and 1945 see: Bruckmüller, E., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Putzger Historischer Weltatlas}, p. 131. This map can usefully be compared with the map of Piast Poland (p. 71) and of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at its greatest extent (p. 115) and at the time of the partitions (p. 131).

waging war against the Soviet Union in the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921). The fact that they had aligned themselves with the Capitalist West after 1939 was further proof of their base treachery. According to Davies:

The more prominent among them [i.e., Poles returning from exile in Britain], having lingered in gaol in the company of Nazi war criminals and other ‘enemies of the people’, were tried and condemned in secret in trials continuing into the 1950s.

Kuczyński et al., on the other hand, emphasise the TRJN’s Christ-like forgiveness. According to them, the TRJN proclaimed an amnesty ‘for those who had participated in the conspiracy that supported the émigré government in London’ (my italics). Other Polish historians, such as Anita Prażmowska and Mark Ostrowski, agree that Poland was betrayed during WWII, but view the London Poles as the injured party, betrayed by Great Britain and the TRJN.

The functional effect of the trope of Poland as the ‘Christ of Nations’, therefore, is to romanticise Polish suffering whilst lending an air of righteousness and legitimacy to the state’s actions. This has two important ramifications for the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. First, it implies that the annexation of the ZO and expulsion of the resident population must have been fundamentally righteous, because Christ (Poland) is not capable of evil. Second, it implies that the decision to cede control over the Kresy to the USSR must have been inspired by a kind of divine wisdom, because Christ (Poland) cannot err.

### 4.4.2 German-Polish Territorial Struggle

One of the most influential topoi encountered in the deflected discourse, with which this chapter is concerned, involves the notion of an age-old struggle for territory between Germany and Poland. The editors of *A Panorama of Polish*

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357 For a detailed study of Poland's part in preventing the ascendency of the international proletariat under Soviet leadership, see: Croll, K. D., *Soviet-Polish Relations, 1919-1921*.

358 The anti-Western, anti-Capitalist argument became easier for the Communist government to support the more the former Western Allies waged war against emerging Communist states in the postwar era.

359 Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*, p. 85.


362 Indeed, one of the TRJN’s primary objectives in organising the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ was to support the narrative of a long-standing German-Polish conflict. For the Polish government's instrumentalisation of the notion of a long-term latent threat emanating from Germany see Piotr Madajczek and Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., *Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart*, pp. 229-30, 42-49.
History, for example, reinforce this topos by using a reproduction of Death of Wanda, a painting by Aleksander Lesser, as a narrative device. The painting concerns the legend of a Polish girl, who killed herself rather than marry a German prince. This, they suggest, is ‘proof of an early origin of Polish-German conflicts’.

Similarly Plates 4 and 5 refer to the ‘threat of German invasions’ and ‘numerous victorious wars against the [German] Empire’. This topos, of a long-term struggle between ‘Poland’ and ‘Germany’, has also gone largely unchallenged in British historiography. Davies, for example, summarises his discussion on the Partitions as follows:

[the] German Kings of Prussia, the German Habsburgs of Austria, and the German Empress of Russia had assumed power in Poland at the end of a long series of assaults and humiliations’ (my italics).

This is a clear example of using a narrative device – the repeated use of the ethnic identifier ‘German’ in conjunction with retrospective ethnicization – to suggest an explanation of the ontological situation (the Partitions) which is in fact untenable (i.e., that they were the result of a concerted German effort to annihilate ‘Poland’). For, whilst the basic observation that these people were German is true, this fact had no bearing on the decisions they made with regard to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.

It is important to my argument to demonstrate the way in which such a specific, but, I contend, irrelevant historical detail can be used to support the topos of a long-term territorial struggle between Germany and Poland, which in turn lends weight to the TRJN’s justification for Poland’s territorial gains at Germany’s expense and their treatment of Germans and ethnic Germans. I shall, therefore, include a short digression to qualify the statement I made above to the effect that the fact that the Kings of Prussia, the Austrian Habsburgs, and the

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364 Plates 4 and 5 in: ibid.
365 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 213.
366 The reductionist conflation of Poland with the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is itself problematic. I address this in more detail below.
367 The Austrian Habsburg who presided over the Second and Third Partitions, France II (Holy Roman Emperor 1792-1804 / Emperor of Austria 1804-1835) was half Spanish on his mother's side. See: Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des Heiligen Römischen Reiches (Wiesbaden: Marix, 2008), p. 174.
Empress of Russia were ethnically German had no bearing on the decisions they made with regard to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.

Catherine the Great of Russia, for example, was indeed of German stock, having been born in Stettin in German Pomerania (now Szczecin, Poland). Nevertheless, having ascended to the Russian throne through a series of highly contingent occurrences, the Empress’s foreign policy was entirely devoted to maintaining her own position and, where possible, promoting the interests of Russia. She regarded herself as having been born to rule Russia for its own sake ‘[und hat] tausendmal gesagt: ich gehöre nach Rußland’.  

Nor did Prussia and Austria cooperate to their mutual advantage. On the contrary, the two states were frequently at war, for example, over the ownership of Silesia (1740-1742, 1744-1745, and 1756-1763). Following the defeat of Austria in the last of these wars, Frederick II the Great of Prussia gloated over the fact that ‘Austria [will never] get over the pain of Silesia’s loss […]never will it forget that it must now share its authority in Germany with us’. 

Indeed, it was Frederick the Great who effectively split the German Empire by assuming and asserting the title King of Prussia under which he ruled both his Imperial and extra-Imperial territories as of 1772. According to Christopher Clark

the Francophone Frederick the Great […] was famously dismissive of contemporary German culture and believed in the primacy of the state, not that of the nation. 

Furthermore, from the inception of the Holy Roman Empire to the founding of the Second German Reich in 1871, the particularistic tendencies of Imperial princes were diametrically opposed to concepts of pan-German cooperation. This particularism ‘penetrated political, social and cultural life’

370 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 8; Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 41.
373 My italics. See: Clark, C. M., Iron Kingdom, p. 233.
374 Several of the Germans to whom Davies refers as the partitioners of Poland were Imperial princes. These included Frederick II the Great and Frederick William (reigned 1744-1797) both of whom ruled as Electors of Brandenburg (i.e., as Imperial princes) as well as King of Prussia in which capacity they owed neither loyalty to the Empire nor fealty to the
and generated resistance to pan-Germanic tendencies in law, historiography and even language. Long before the abolition of the Empire in 1806, the authority of the German Kaisers, and therefore the cohesion of the Reich, had been challenged on many occasions and in many ways. The independence of the Hanse towns in the Middle Ages, for example, called the entire concept of the German Empire, and by extension, of German unity, into question. The most important of these towns, such as Lübeck, frequently conducted their own foreign policy in defiance of the Empire. Similarly, many of the German polities encompassed within the Empire where difficult to control. During the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), for example, the Kaiser was moved to wage war against a coalition of German polities, nominally held either in feu or as appanages of the Empire, but now backed by external powers in defence of their religious and political freedoms. Even before this period, individual states within the Empire had regularly fought among themselves. Later, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), in which Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony joined forces with (inter alia) France, Spain, and Sweden against the Austrian Habsburgs, further demonstrates the lack of loyalty and solidarity among German potentates in the period just prior to the Partitions. Finally, the lack of unity among Imperial princes resulted in the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire during the so-called French Period (arguably 1792-1813). Yet, the start of this period coincided with the Second and Third Partitions.

Emperor. The ‘Habsburgs of Austria’ to whom he refers are Maria Theresa (1717-1780), Joseph II (1741-1790), Leopold II (1765-1792), and Francis II (1768-1835). Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des HRR, pp. 165-86.


Measured from France’s declaration of war against Austria and Prussia in April 1792 to the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813.

Leopold II (reigned 1790-1792) almost saved the Empire by brokering two defensive treaties against France: the Pilnitzer Konvention (27th of August 1791) and the Defensivbündnis (7th of February 1792). On this basis the entire Reich entered the War of the First Coalition against France (1792-1797). However, Prussia (under the rule of Frederick William II 1786-1797) pulled out of the coalition in 1795 just as the Third Partition was being carried out. Under the reign of Frederick William III (1797-1840) Prussia also remained neutral during Wars of the Second and Third Coalitions (1798-1802 and 1805 respectively). Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Nassau all fought on the French side in 1805. Sixteen Imperial polities placed themselves under Napoleon’s protectorate on the 12th of July 1806 and notified the Kaiser of their secession from the Empire on the 1st of August 1806. Less than a week later (8th of August 1806) Francis II I, who
Thus, Davies’ implied characterisation of the Partitions as being the result of a concerted ‘German’ assault on the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is highly misleading.\textsuperscript{383} It is the result of an untenable conflation of Prussia and Austria with ‘Germany’ \textit{per se}. As I demonstrate in Section 4.5.1 below, reductionist conflation of this type is common in the deflected discourse with which this chapter is concerned. The frequent, conflation of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania with Poland \textit{per se}, for example, is equally untenable.\textsuperscript{384}

Nevertheless, the \textit{topos} of a long-term German-Polish struggle for territory, supported and sustained by reductionist conflation of this type, is influential within the historiographical corpus relating to German-Polish relations. Within the collective memory discourse currently under consideration, the functional effect of this \textit{topos} is to help contextualise Poland’s annexation of theZO as a necessary expedient in the face of a persistent, long-term German menace. In addition, it supports the \textit{topos} of Poland’s having been ‘wiped off the map’, with Germany’s active involvement to which I now turn.

\textbf{4.4.3 Poland Wiped off the Map}

It is frequently asserted that Poland has been ‘wiped off the map’ or annihilated several times in history, always with Germany’s active involvement.\textsuperscript{385} The gist of this \textit{topos}, within the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned, is that the \textit{de facto} abolition of the Second Republic between 1939 and 1944 was just the latest in a series of such events. Prior to 1939, according to this \textit{topos}, German aggression had already climaxed in the Partitions between 1772 and 1795. Thus, this \textit{topos} reinforces the \textit{topos} of a long-standing territorial conflict between Germany and Poland. It also supports the trope of Poland as the ‘Christ of Nations’. It maps onto the legend of Christ in two ways.\textsuperscript{386} First, Christ

\textsuperscript{383} For a more detailed exposition of the Partitions see Appendix A, (Section A.3).
\textsuperscript{384} See Appendix A, Section A.2 and Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1. The Commonwealth was a multinational polity. As such, in addition to Poland, three sovereign states (Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania) could, with equal justification, claim continuity with the Commonwealth. Whilst it is true that the seat of government lay within modern Poland, there were no ethnic or national restrictions on the elected monarch. Consequently, just four of the Commonwealth’s eleven elected kings between 1573 and 1574 were ethnically and culturally Polish. The remainder being French and Hungarian (one of each), Swedish (three consecutive kings from the Vasa Dynasty) and two Saxons (agnates of the Wettin Dynasty). See: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., \textit{A Panorama of Polish History}, p. 23; Davies, N., \textit{Heart of Europe}, 2008), p. 263.
\textsuperscript{386} Following the OED I use ‘legend’ in this sentence to refer to ‘a traditional story popularly regarded as historical but which is not authenticated’. See: Soanes, C., \textit{et al., eds., Concise OED}, p. 814.
was annihilated by his enemies and, therefore, suffered the same fate as Poland. Second, Christ rose from the dead, thus defying his enemies, just as Poland did in 1918 and again in 1945.

Undeniably, Germany collaborated with the USSR in the active annihilation of Poland as a sovereign state in 1939. Following the partition of Poland between the USSR and Germany on the 28th of September of that year, the German government created several administrative units within its zone, the overall status of which was that of a Reichsprotektorat. On the 8th of October 1939 the south eastern part of this area was redubbed the Generalgouvernement and four days later on the 12th of October 1939 the remainder, which was known as the eingegliederte Ostgebiete to mark its closer integration within the Reich, was subdivided into two Reichsgaue, Danzig-Westpreußen and the Wartheland (often referred to as the Warthegau), and two Regierungsbezirke, Kattowitz and Zichenau. Thus, this topos approaches historical fact. It is, however, problematic in two respects. First, it implies historical continuity between the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania and the Second Republic which, as I have already argued (see Section 4.4.2), is an untenable conflation. Second, it ignores the proliferation of Polish polities that existed between the demise of the Commonwealth and the founding of the Second Republic. Functionally, within the collective memory discourse concerning the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO, this topos establishes territorial acquisition as a matter of national defence rather than expansion.

Together, these tropes and topoi combine to create an impression of Poland as an embattled redoubt struggling for existence against an aggressive Germany bent on its destruction. I argue that ‘inhabitting’ this narrative helped the TRJN, and subsequent Communist Polish governments, to legitimise their rule and justify their treatment of German residents in the ZO, and that this strategy largely succeeded. Moreover, as I demonstrate below, one can still find traces of these tropes and topoi in Polish and Anglophone historiography published right up to the second decade of the twenty first century. They all find expression in and

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388 See Appendix A, Section A.4
are reinforced by a number of narrative strategies, which include conflation, omission, ahistoricism, vagueness and the use of non sequiturs. In the following section I analyse the two narrative strategies most frequently encountered within the deflected collective memory discourse with which this chapter is concerned: conflation and omission.

4.5 Narrative Strategies

4.5.1 Conflation
The most frequently encountered narrative strategy in the collective memory discourse triggered by Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide is conflation. In the deflected discourse, for example, historians frequently conflate historical Polish and German polities with the modern titular states of Germany and Poland. Specifically, it is often implied that actions by, or insults to, certain historical polities can be understood as having been perpetrated by, or against, modern Poland and Germany. The implied corollary is that actions by these modern states can be explained and or justified as being reactions to these historical events.

For example, the Teutonic Knights fought against the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania on several occasions for control over Prussia. In the context of ‘discourse deflection’, many historians have a tendency to conflate the State of the Teutonic Order (1226-1561) with the Holy Roman Empire (hereinafter HRE), or simply with Germany per se. At the same time, they frequently conflate the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania with Poland. In both cases, the conflation

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389 Ahistoricism: ‘a system of thought or analysis which fails to view persons, texts, cultural phenomena, etc., within their historical context’ see: OED-Online, ‘Oxford English Dictionary Online’; Ahistorical: ‘lacking historical perspective or context’ see: Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise OED, p. 27.
390 Space restrictions prevent me from presenting examples of every type of narrative strategy, but focusing on the role played by the use of conflation and omission within the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned will suffice to illustrate my arguments.
391 In this context ‘the modern period’ means 1919 to the present. Three Polish titular states have existed during this period: the Second Republic (1918-1939), and the People’s Republic (1945-1989), the Republic of Poland (1989 to present). Germany has been constituted in several forms during the same period: Imperial Germany or the Second Reich (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), the Third Reich (1933-1945), the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1990), the German Democratic Republic (1949-1990), and the Berlin Republic (1990 to present). Both notional states ceased de facto to exist for significant periods during this era: Poland (1939-1945); Germany (1945-1949).
394 For example, when talking about ‘Poland’ having been wiped off the map when referring to the dissolution of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (see below).
is untenable. I have already alluded above to the situation as regards Poland and the Commonwealth, i.e., that any simplistic equation of the two polities cannot be supported by the historical evidence. Similarly, any conflation of the State of the Teutonic Order with any other German polity is ahistorical.\(^{395}\) Whilst the historiography relating to the Teutonic Knights may appear to have nothing to do with the subject of this thesis, my argument is precisely that such arcane detail is often instrumentalised within the deflected discourse which serves to contextualise the events of 1945. More specifically, I argue that the use of certain narrative strategies in connection with this deflected discourse – conflation in conjunction with ahistoricism – can significantly influence a reader’s perception of the historical framework situation appertaining to the TRJN’s decisions and actions in the immediate postwar era.

Functionally, this ahistorical conflation of the State of the Teutonic Order with the HRE/Germany and of the Commonwealth with Poland *per se* has several specific ramifications for the collective memory discourse engendered by the annexation of the ZO and the *Vertreibungen*. At the ontological level, it contributes to the *topos* of a long-term territorial conflict between Germany and Poland, the functional effect of which, as I argued above, is to explain Poland’s annexation of the ZO as a necessary expedient in the face of persistent German aggression. Moreover, at the explanatory level, it supports the TRJN’s characterisation of the annexation of this part of Germany as regaining or restoring lost Polish territory.\(^{396}\)

Another ontological-level conflation frequently encountered within the secondary literature, which I argue constitutes the deflected discourse relating to Poland’s annexation of the ZO and *Vertreibung* of the German residents, concerns the historic province of Silesia. By the outbreak of WWII, the greater part of Silesia (all of Lower Silesia and over half of Upper Silesia) was an integral part of

\(^{395}\) None of the lands held by the Teutonic Knights were imperial fiefs. Under the Golden Bull of Rimini (1226), they owed loyalty (i.e., in fulfilment of a treaty commitment), but not fealty (i.e., loyalty arising from a feudal obligation) to the Emperor. In 1525 the Order was secularized and their Prussian lands became the (Polish) Duchy of Prussia. The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Albrecht von Hohenzollern (1490-1568), became the Duke of Prussia, now owing fealty (as opposed to allegiance as in 1466) to the King of Poland, not to the Kaiser. Their landholdings in what is now Lithuania became the Duchy of Kurland in 1561, which was never part of the German Reich. Thus the Knights of the Teutonic Order were originally beholden to the Pope, not the Kaiser, and were not acting in the interests of ‘Germany’ as such. See: Clark, C. M., *Iron Kingdom*, pp. 9, 12-13; Du Boulay and Boockmann in: Whaley, J., *Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648*, pp. 22-23.

\(^{396}\) Because German East Prussia was largely coextensive with Ducal Polish Prussia for which the ‘German’ Teutonic Knights had owed fealty to the King of Poland.
Some of Upper Silesia had been integrated into the Second Republic in the wake of WWI. Another part, Cieszyn Silesia, formed part of Czechoslovakia. However, this complexity is often ignored in the relevant historiography, much of which conflates these various Silesian provinces and refer simply to ‘Silesia’ with no qualifying adjectives such as German, Polish, Upper, Lower, historic and so on (see below).

This conflation has several ramifications for the deflected discourse under discussion in this chapter. First, it suggests a level of continuity between the territorial aspirations of the leaders of the Second Republic (who coveted parts of Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia but not Lower Silesia), and the TRJN, who annexed Lower Silesia.

Second, it suggests continuity between Polish Silesia (i.e., the parts of Upper Silesia acquired during the interbellum period) and German Silesia. The narrative function of the first of these notions is to underplay the marked policy differences between the TRJN and the Piłsudski/Sanacja regime and, by extension, between the TRJN and the London Poles. Yet, as I have already demonstrated in Chapter 3, the TRJN’s annexation of Lower Silesia (and their surrender of the Kresy) represented a significant caesura in post-Partition Polish state-building objectives. Functionally, this narrative sleight of hand could affect one’s perception of the ontological situation (no difference in policy rather than a radical break with tradition) which may in turn influence one’s understanding at the explanatory level (the annexation as the culmination of long-term state-building aspirations rather than as a contingency measure in response to non-negotiable geo-political changes imposed by the Allies). In addition, the ontological-level conflation between Polish Silesia and German Silesia has a

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399 This was the de jure status of Cieszyn Silesia. De facto Germany had annexed Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1938, after which Poland occupied the Cieszyn Silesia between October 2 and 9 the same year. Slovakia then declared independence on March 14, 1939 effectively abolishing Czechoslovakia. See: Ostrowski, M., ’To Return to Poland or Not to Return’, p. 146; Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 308; Stuckelberg, R., et al., The Nazi Germany Source Book, pp. xvii, 219-21; Hegenscheidt-Nozdrovicz, E., ’Die Slowakei den Slowaken!’ Die separatistischen Strömungen in der Slowakei zwischen 1918 und 1939 (Hamburg: Diplomica, 2012), pp. 88-89.

direct bearing on how one seeks to understand or explain the TRJN’s actions in the immediate postwar era. For if one overlooks or accepts the conflation then reports of German troops crossing the frontier into ‘Silesia’ in 1939 appear to suggest that ‘Silesia’ had been part of pre-war Poland. If this were so then one need look no further for an explanation of the TRJN’s annexation of ‘Silesia’: they were simply restoring the pre-war frontier. However, the annexation encompassed several hundred thousand square kilometres of land that had lain beyond Poland’s pre-war frontier. This conflation also disguises the referent of ‘the Regained Territories’ (Ziemie Odzyskane/ZO) as it implies that what was regained was territory which had been part of the Second Republic until September 1939. In fact what was ‘regained’ was territory that had last been Polish in 1335 (see next section).

As both of these examples demonstrate, the functional effect of conflation, used as a narrative device within the deflected discourse, is to imply a certain ontological situation which, if true, must necessarily influence one’s understanding of the postwar situation as explained by the TRJN.

4.5.2 Omission

If one accepts the notion that the TRJN had the right to restore the Piast Kingdom of Poland, it follows that all of the areas annexed from Germany ought to have been constituent parts of this ancient polity at the time of its demise (1370). It also follows that, if the restoration of the Piast Kingdom justifies the TRJN’s acceptance of the USSR’s annexation of the Kresy, then this region ought not to have been a constituent part of this polity at the time of its demise. However, three key pieces of information demonstrate that neither of these two conclusions are correct, which is why it is common for both Polish and German historians to talk in terms of the ‘Piast myth’ today. First, Silesia as a whole no longer formed

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401 Andrzej Ajnenkiel, for example, states that the front line in the early days of WWII ran ‘through Silesia and down to the Carpathians’. This creates the completely false impression that Silesia per se must have been part of Poland at that time, as it is clear from the context that the battle front referred to is within Poland and that the German forces had already penetrated deep into the country. In fact, what he is referring to is the tiny enclave of Polish Upper Silesia awarded to Poland following the plebiscites held in the wake of World War One. The majority of Upper Silesia and all of Lower Silesia still formed part of the German Reich at that time (1939). See Andrzej Ajnenkiel in: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 131.

402 There was no demise of the Kingdom of Poland at this time, but rather it ceased to be ruled by members of the Piast Dynasty and underwent a significant constitutional reform (see Appendix A).

part of the Piast Kingdom by 1370. Second, East Prussia never formed part of the Piast Kingdom. Third, Kazimierz III Wielki, the last of the Piast kings, had incorporated the principality of Halych (roughly co-extensive with East Galicia) into his Kingdom by the time of his death in 1370. However, despite the fact that, as the works cited in the footnotes show, all of this is well documented, the first two of these facts are omitted from much of the Polish and Anglophone historiography which constitutes the deflected discourse with which this chapter is concerned.

The third fact – the incorporation of East Galicia into the Piast Kingdom – is discussed but not evaluated with reference to the TRJN’s Piast Formula. To take just one example, the Treaty of Trentschin (1335), is one of a number of key documents in which successive Polish monarchs renounced all claims to Silesia. Yet, the Treaty of Trentschin is rarely mentioned in the relevant historiography. However, neglecting to mention the Treaty of Trentschin in relevant histories – an ontological-level omission – has significant ramifications at the explanatory level, as it fails to dispel the notion (implicit in the Piast Formula) that Silesia always formed part of the Piast Kingdom and ought, therefore (assuming the TRJN’s right to restore this ancient kingdom in 1945), to be annexed in the context of the Piast Formula.

Just as there is a tendency, in both the direct and indirect historiography, to omit important information about the status of those territories claimed by the TRJN under the Piast Formula, mention of the USSR’s role in the annihilation of

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See Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia (Section B.3).

This fact can be verified by overlaying an outline map of post-war Poland, which includes the southern part of East Prussia, with maps showing the fluctuating territorial holdings of members of the Piast Dynasty between 960 (the earliest estimated date for the consolidation of large swathes of land in what is now Poland under Mieszko I) and 1370. For a clear example of this, see: Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, p. 186.


See, for example: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 52; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 253.

See Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia (Section B.3).

For the results of a ‘distant reading’ exercise designed to assess the presence of the Treaty of Trentschin in the relevant historiography, see Appendix D.
the Second Republic and its subsequent annexation of formerly Polish territory is often omitted.

The historiography of the part played by USSR in WWII is complex and subject to multiple interpretations. With the Red/Soviet Army permanently stationed in Poland from 1945 to 1989, it is easy to understand why the Polish censor between these dates favoured an interpretation of the USSR as a friendly power. In this interpretation, the Polish government had fled the country following the German invasion, abandoning the populace to its fate. Stalin decided to intervene to create a safe haven to the East of the Bug and San Rivers, beyond which the German forces could not advance. The Hitler-Stalin Pact, if mentioned at all, is portrayed as a clever ruse on Stalin’s part to gain time in the face of German aggression. Following the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army had fallen back to regroup and wait until the Soviet armaments industry could produce the necessary ordnance to drive the Germans out of the Slavic homelands. Having arrived back at the Bug and San River line (coincidentally the old Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line), Stalin pointed out that the majority of people to the East of this line were not Polish. The Polish Communists who had fought their way back to Poland alongside the Red Army agreed that this was the case and that Poland had no natural claim to these territories. Those who had enforced Polish control over these areas in the past were the enemies of ordinary Byelorussians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians and, ultimately therefore, of the international proletariat. By contrast, there is no doubt that the Polish government in exile considered themselves to be at war with the USSR. Zygmunt Graliński, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the exile government, confirmed this unequivocally at a meeting of the Polish National Council on the 16th of April 1940 when he stated that:

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412 In a speech delivered to the Polish Workers' Party or Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR) on December 07, 1945, Władysław Gomułka (1905-1982) justified the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939. He asserted that the pre-war Sanacja regime had rejected ‘all Soviet offers of an anti-Nazi pact’ and that by the time of the invasion the ‘Polish state apparatus had already collapsed and the government [had] fled into Romania’. He went on to say that the French and British governments had displayed a clear intention to redirect German aggression towards the USSR. Finally, he explained, ‘the territories the Red Army [had] occupied were inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whom the Soviet government had a moral right and duty to protect.’ Quoted in: Bethell, N. W., *Gomułka*, pp. 117-18.

413 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., *A Panorama of Polish History*, pp. 54, 139.
In British historiography, the situation is similarly problematic. Having chosen to interpret the Anglo-Polish Agreement as not being applicable to the USSR, the British government continued to ignore Soviet atrocities such as the Katyń Forest Massacre and finally signed the Anglo-Soviet Agreement (12\textsuperscript{th} of July 1941).\textsuperscript{[415]}

Subsequent Soviet atrocities were Allied atrocities for which all of the Allies, including Britain, shared corporate responsibility. This reading of history does not sit easily with Britain’s national WWII mythology, the gist of which is that Britain noticed Poland’s peril and took immediate, morally righteous, and ultimately successful action to thwart overwhelming German forces, both in Poland and throughout Europe. Coupled with Britain’s powerlessness to oppose Stalin’s postwar plans and the USSR’s subsequent dominance in Eastern Europe, this problematic wartime alliance became a national embarrassment, best not examined too closely.\textsuperscript{[416]}

In many ways therefore, British historiography vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, particularly in relation to Poland, converges on that produced in Poland during the Communist Era (1945-1989). It selectively omits certain aspects of the USSR’s conduct towards Poland, both in 1939 and in 1945.\textsuperscript{[417]}

In both East and West Germany, the historiography of WWII in general is heavily overshadowed by the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by German forces. There is an overwhelming pressure on German historians to, as it were, accept full responsibility for the War on behalf of Germany. German historians who attempt to point out the wrongdoings of other belligerents run the risk of being castigated as NSDAP apologists, revisionists or worse. German historiography on WWII is equally ambivalent about the Red Army. Historians in

\textsuperscript{414} Quoted in: Sword, K., 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland'. p. 98.

\textsuperscript{415} Quoted in: Sword, K., 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland', p. 98.


\textsuperscript{417} On British powerlessness against Stalin see: Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 733.

\textsuperscript{417} Some popular accounts of the War, such as Forgotten Voices of WWII, simply omit any reference to the USSR as an aggressor. In this particular instance, the first mention of the Soviet Union appears a quarter of the way through the book. It is made in the context of the non-explanation of Operation Barbarossa having been the result of Hitler’s having been thwarted in his ambition to invade Britain. Neither the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 nor Soviet war crimes in Poland are mentioned. See: Arthur, M., Forgotten Voices of the Second World War: in Association with the Imperial War Museum (London: Ebury, 2004), p. 120.
the GDR were under the same pressures as their Polish colleagues to forget Soviet atrocities against other Slavic nations. In popular culture within the GDR, the Red Army was portrayed as the liberator of Germany whereby any undeniable excesses against Germans were treated as understandable under the circumstances and primarily directed at NSDAP activists, not ordinary Germans. In popular West German historiography and the type of populist literature (including ‘pulp fiction’) it inspires, there is a tendency to characterise the Russian Campaign as a ‘Katastrophe’ in which both the Soviet people and German soldiers were the victims of Hitler’s ‘wahnwitzige Forderung’ and Stalin’s mistake ‘in Unterschätzung des Gegners die eigenen Kräfte zu zersplittern’ as well as overwhelming impersonal natural forces (such as General Winter). German historiography is often frank about Stalin’s collusion with Hitler, but rather silent on the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland in 1945. The otherwise very comprehensive Historischer Bildatlas, for example, completely omits the Soviet attack on Poland in 1939. The timelines and related text on the relevant pages leap, in one example, from the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (23rd of August 1939) to the German invasion of the USSR (22nd of June 1941), and, in another example, from the German Blitzkrieg in Poland (1st-27th of September 1939) to Stalin’s attack on Finland (30th of November 1939).

As with conflation, the functional effect of omission, used as a narrative device within the deflected discourse, is to imply a certain ontological situation which, if true, must necessarily influence one’s understanding of the postwar situation as explained by the TRJN.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

Summarising the arguments presented above, it is now possible to address the specific research questions set out in the introduction to this chapter. I first asked how the situation has changed between the postwar era and the post-Wende era in terms of the relevant historiography produced by historians operating within

various stakeholder communities. The situation is, in fact, completely different and it is important to note that there is no longer any serious debate among Polish and German historians concerning the details of Poland’s annexation of the ZO and loss of the Kresy in the wake of WWII and the concomitant sociocide. Nor is the broad history of the region contested as such. Consequently, it is common for both Polish and German historians today to talk in terms of the ‘Piast myth’. I have already quoted Gregor Thum’s assessment that ‘[among] historians of [Germany and Poland], nationally-based standpoints have disappeared [and joint] German-Polish research projects and publications … are today in fact a matter of course’.\(^{421}\) This is partially the result of the collaborative, non-confrontational historiography produced by the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission.

However, even without this corpus and the channelling of history that it entailed, it is doubtful whether the Piast Formula would have ever become part of any hegemonic historical narrative in the longer term. As I argued in Chapter 3, this was never the TRJN’s intention. Instead, their instrumentalisation of the Piast Formula was only ever intended for immediate Polish ‘consumption’ in the context of legitimisation. Indeed, the Polish government’s efforts to lend credibility to the Piast Formula largely ceased after the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ in 1948. There has, in fact, been little explicit Polish government support or propaganda for the Piast Formula since 1949 when the Scientific Council for the Regained Territories and the MZO were abolished. In addition to a lack of Polish governmental propaganda in support of the Piast Formula and increased collaboration between Polish and German researchers since the Wende, it is becoming increasingly difficult, and indeed anachronistic, to talk in terms of nationality or ethnically defined stakeholder groups. Multi-national collaborative volumes, such as Lexikon der Vertreibungen and Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments, both of which I have cited frequently throughout this thesis, represent non-partisan efforts to delineate the relevant history rather than contributions to an on-going debate between antagonistic nationality-based stakeholder collectives. Today, the relevant discourse is neither contested nor can one clearly differentiate between specific stakeholder narratives.

\(^{421}\) Thum, G., *Uprooted*, p. 3.
Nevertheless, I also asked how historians from different stakeholder collectives have responded in the past to the TRJN’s invocation of Piast Poland as a model for the Polish People’s Republic and justification for the two cases of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, and one can still draw some broad conclusions from the available corpus. As the results of my ‘distant reading’ (see Appendix D) demonstrate, Anglophone historiography has not directly addressed the Piast Formula. I have, however, demonstrated that there is a tendency within this corpus to uncritically reflect early (pre-Wende) Polish propaganda both with respect to Piast history in the ZO and to long-standing German-Polish border conflicts. I have, therefore, devoted the majority of this chapter to the relevant Polish and German historiography, which is more informative in relation to an analysis of the collective memory discourse.

In the immediate aftermath of the War (until around 1950), certain Polish historians (those subject to censorship by the TRJN/Democratic Bloc) responded to the Piast Formula by producing scholarly texts that supported the government narrative. In addition to its explanatory content vis-à-vis the two cases of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, this official narrative entailed an ontological claim about the Piast Kingdom, namely that it had been largely coextensive with the Polish People’s Republic. In the early postwar period, Polish historians focused their research on proving this, the culmination of their efforts being the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ in Wrocław in 1948.

Later (between 1972 and 2008), some (West) German and Polish historians responded, not only to the TRJN’s Piast Formula but also to longer-term Polish-German political issues, by coordinating their historiographical output in the context of the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission. The historiography produced by this organisation was specifically designed to produce a non-contested hegemonic historical narrative of the German and Polish past. Thus, in terms of the definition of collective memory presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis, this corpus represents a conscious effort to expedite the transition of the public and private understanding of the events in question from being a matter of collective memory to a subject of History. Not only was this joint narrative not contested, but the boundaries between German and Polish historians as
identifiable stakeholder groups was deliberately blurred, such that the terms of my working definition no longer apply in this context.

At the same time, other German historians, such as those affiliated with the BdV, have countered the Piast Formula implicitly rather than explicitly by focusing their efforts on demonstrating the Ur-Germanness of the ZO. This historiography, I have argued, contributes to what I have called the ‘deflected discourse’. Although at a superficial level the deflected discourse appears to have little to do with addressing the Piast Formula and the episodes of sociocide that its realisation entailed, I have argued that by creating the historical framework within which private and public discourses on the subject are conducted, historians who contribute to this corpus effectively channel and constrain the production of hegemonic historical narratives. Accordingly, I devoted over half of this chapter to analysing the deflected discourse in an attempt to answer my third and fourth research questions, the first of which asked what narrative strategies historians have employed to influence the relevant collective memory discourse.

I have argued that historians have employed a number of narrative strategies within the relevant historiography, including ‘discourse deflection’ itself. As a narrative strategy, ‘discourse deflection’ can best be understood as a kind of outer shell within which other more specific narrative strategies are deployed. Considered together, such narrative strategies, which include ahistoricism, vagueness, conflation, omission, and the uncritical inclusion and acceptance of non sequiturs in the relevant texts, have the potential to substantially alter one’s perception of the ontological aspects of the events in question and therefore one’s preparedness, and ability, to accept or refute competing stakeholder narratives presented at the explanatory level. In particular, I discussed examples, and the functional effects, of conflation (of ancient and modern polities, and of different historical and modern Silesian polities) and omission (of relevant information about the Piast Kingdom such as its precise relation to Silesia and other areas within the ZO, and to Galicia and the rest of the Kresy; as well as of the role of the USSR in the destruction of Poland in 1939 and its geo-political and territorial configuration after 1945) within the relevant historiography. I have argued that the functional effect of both conflation and omission, used as narrative devices within the deflected discourse, is to imply
certain ontological situations which, if accepted as fact, must necessarily influence one’s understanding of the postwar situation as explained by the TRJN.

I also asked what tropes and topoi have emerged and been most persistent during the relevant collective memory discourse, and what (implicit or explicit) purpose(s) they serve, and went on to identify a number of them that bear directly on the deflected discourse analysed above. The most persistent of these are the notion of Poland as ‘the Christ of nations’, the functional effect of which is to romanticise Polish suffering whilst lending an air of righteousness and legitimacy to the state’s postwar actions, and the myth of a long-term territorial struggle between Germany and Poland, centred on the areas encompassed within the ZO, which serves to contextualise Poland’s annexation of the ZO as a necessary expedient in the face of a persistent German menace and also supports the *topos* of Poland’s having been ‘wiped off the map’, with Germany’s active involvement. This *topos*, in turn, contributes to an understanding of Poland’s territorial acquisitions at Germany’s expense as a matter of national defence. Such tropes and topoi, I have argued, combine to create an impression of Poland as an embattled redoubt struggling for existence against an aggressive Germany bent on its destruction. I have argued that ‘inhabiting’ this narrative helped the TRJN, and subsequent Communist Polish governments, to legitimise their rule and explain their annexation of parts of Germany, surrender of the *Kresy* to the USSR (and the continued presence of the Soviet Army in Poland), and the harsh treatment of German residents in the ZO as necessary, historically justified expedients.

Thus, a careful textual analysis reveals a complex feedback loop at all three of the analytical levels I defined in Chapter 2. Narrative devices (conflation of different polities, vaguely drawn maps, omission of relevant information) influence the reader’s ability to assess the facts of the case at the ontological level (the status of Lower Silesia and other parts of the ZO in relation to Piast Poland, the Second Republic and the territorial aspirations of pre-war Poles). This, in turn, affects the extent to which one can critically evaluate the merits of arguments presented at the explanatory level (e.g., that Poland’s annexation of Lower Silesia was justified because the province had formed part of Piast Poland and because pre-war Poles had attempted to annex ‘Silesia’ by force and plebiscite).
In the next chapter I turn to some of the practical measures taken by the TRJN to ‘Polonize’ the ZO, and how these actions impacted the wider world and, in a sense, globalised the collective memory process triggered by the postwar re-configuration of Poland and the concomitant sociocide.
5: Toponymy and Cartography

5.1 Introduction

An important aspect of the working definition of collective memory that I have adopted for the purposes of the current thesis is its inherently competitive nature, which, I argue, involves conscious and unconscious attempts to influence what I have termed ‘hegemonic historical narratives’. One way in which hegemonic historical narratives are stored and propagated is in the artefacts of geography including toponymic inscriptions and cartographic texts. The manifestation of toponymic decisions in the built environment (signage) and the production of maps depicting political narratives (past and present) are both high-cost endeavours resulting in cultural artefacts with a significant historical impact. It therefore makes sense for stakeholders in collective memory discourses who wish to influence subsequent hegemonic historical narratives to focus on the production of geographic artefacts that support their preferred version of the events in question. This chapter addresses past (1945-1989) and present (1990-present) toponymic practice within the ZO in addition to the globalisation of the collective memory discourse triggered by Poland’s annexation of German territory in 1945 through the requirement for cartographers around the world to map the region affected.

This chapter is structured around two main thematic complexes, the first of which addresses the importance of toponymy in political discourse and the ramifications of the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO. This section begins with a general overview of toponymy and its potential impact on the creation of historical narratives. Using specific examples, I demonstrate that, far from being an incidental aspect of life, place naming is a fundamental expression of socio-political aspirations, and is often fiercely contested. I then move on to discuss the subject in more detail with specific reference to Lower Silesia. The section includes a brief review toponymic issues in postwar German and Polish literature.

Based on the assumption that ‘[maps] are more than simply innocent repositories of name data’, the second main division in this chapter then presents
an overview of postwar cartography in relation to the ZO.\footnote{A. Melville in: Reuben Rose-Redwood, \textit{et al.}, 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription: new directions in critical place-name studies', \textit{Progress in Human Geography}, 34 (2010), 453-70, p. 463.} Drawing upon Polish atlases produced in the postwar period, I demonstrate how Polish cartographers reacted to the toponymic changes discussed in the previous section, as well as their approach to mapping Poland’s post-1945 \textit{de facto} national boundaries. I then analyse a series of maps produced by cartographers in East and West Germany as well as elsewhere in Europe and beyond to identify specific differences and the political positions implicit in them within the broader collective memory discourse associated with Poland’s annexation of the ZO in 1945 and the concomitant trauma.

5.1.1 Research Questions: Toponymy

With respect to toponymic practices within the ZO, this chapter address the following specific research questions: what re-naming strategies have been most important in the postwar toponymic re-inscription of \textit{Schlesien} as \textit{Śląsk}? To what extent did the postwar toponymic situation in the ZO take into account the linguistic, cultural and political needs and aspirations of minority groups? How has the toponymic situation in the ZO influenced the overall discourse concerning the \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} of Germans from the ZO and its resettlement by Poles relocated from the \textit{Kresy}? Are there discernible differences between the toponymic situation in Poland, and the ZO in particular, during the postwar period and the post-\textit{Wende} period? How has the toponymic situation in the ZO been reflected in the relevant literature?

5.1.2 Research Questions: Cartography

With respect to cartographic representations of the ZO, this chapter address the following specific research questions: how have Polish, German and other cartographers reacted to Poland’s annexation and resettlement of parts of Germany in 1945 and to the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO? To what extent are political developments in relation to the Polish frontiers and other postwar geo-political configurations reflected in the mapping of the ZO by cartographers around the world?
5.2 The Importance of Toponymy in Political Discourse

5.2.1 General Overview
Researchers in the field of onomastics and toponymy have discerned and expressed their concern about ‘a tendency to focus on theory at the expense of empirical evidence’.\textsuperscript{423} As a result, in the estimation of Michael F. Goodchild, the field of toponymy is ‘old and largely discredited’.\textsuperscript{424} This chapter addresses this issue and contributes to the field by providing a specific case study against which existing theories can be tested and evaluated. In addition, toponymic research is ‘a field that has traditionally been characterized by political innocence’.\textsuperscript{425} However, the toponymic activities carried out within the ZO, i.e., the re-inscription of Schlesien as Śląsk following the annexation of the region by Poland in the wake of WWII, were overtly political.\textsuperscript{426} An exposition and analysis of the relevant process in terms of the practicalities, conventions and political paradigms involved, therefore, presents a further opportunity to expand the field in a useful direction. In addition, a significant proportion of the texts produced in the field of toponymy over the past 30 years relate to post-colonial re-naming practices. However, the question as to whether Poland’s annexation and Polonisation of the ZO represents a post-colonial situation or was itself a colonial enterprise is one of the outstanding explanatory-level issues in the relevant historical discourse (see Chapter 3). This situation implicitly questions the assumed dichotomy between colonial and post-colonial naming practices as the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO can be, and has been, interpreted as both. An analysis of the measures taken during the toponymic re-inscription of Lower Silesia therefore contributes to the fields of collective memory studies and toponymy in relation to post-colonial paradigms.

Places and topographic objects are often referred to by different allonyms for historical, cultural and linguistic reasons. However, the choice of which allonym to use in a given publication or public utterance can be, and often is,

\textsuperscript{424} Michael F. Goodchild in: Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., ’Geographies of Toponymic Inscription’, p. 455.
\textsuperscript{426} Demshuk, A., ’Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk’.
politically motivated or can be interpreted as being so.  

This is particularly true where places have been occupied, reoccupied, shared, obliterated, or rebuilt by different ethno-linguistic groups, or are subject to competing claims by two or more titular states. In such cases, ‘debates about place names are entangled with all the most difficult questions of cultural identity, ownership rights and recognition’. The political importance of toponymy and the inherent potential for conflict in relation to certain place names was recognised by the United Nations in 1960 through the inauguration of the Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNEGGN).

UNEGGN’s mission is ‘to further the national standardization of geographical names and to promote the national and international benefits to be derived from standardization’, which it achieves by facilitating

the development and dissemination of principles, policies and methods suitable for resolving the problems of consistency in the use of geographical names. It [also] encourages the collection of locally used names and their storage, authorization, dissemination and systematic Romanization where necessary.

Today, the group issues toponymic guidelines and standards for most of the world’s countries. These documents are published in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic. In addition, they publish reference works such as a glossary of standard terms for use in toponymic publications. Many of their publications are based on information provided by state organisations. For example, UNGEGN Working Paper No. 27: *Toponymic guidelines of Poland for map editors and other users* (2011) is a short, 8-page document based on the 110-page, bi-lingual (Polish-English) *Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map Editors and Other Users* (2010) produced by the Polish Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography or Główny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii (GUGiK).

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5.2.2 What is at Stake

Place names, the names of topographic features, and elements of the built environment constitute repositories of historic information. Scholars are interested in ancient toponyms as a source of information about how specific regions have been used over long periods of time. Others are interested in the preservation of ‘emotional landscapes’ in toponyms that ‘tell of dangers, but also of ownership, quality of farmland, and could even explain why those huge stones were set up on the moor’. This data can potentially be used to achieve a better reconstruction, and therefore, understanding of the past.

Yet all of this information can be lost, either when linguistic drift within the local language renders place name elements no longer intelligible to modern speakers, or, more permanently, when place names are consciously changed for political purposes. Such political re-naming projects are often designed to reinforce claims of national ownership and to assert state power. Renaming projects may also be undertaken to better reflect pre-colonial situations, for example, by reinstating aboriginal toponyms. Alternatively, toponymic changes may be made to accommodate the needs of minority language speakers. All such toponymic re-inscription takes place at the ontological level in that it implies that a specific situation – and no other – holds true with respect to the places in question. Simultaneously, however, the insistence on the use of a specific set of toponyms within a given territory functions at the explanatory level, underpinning a broader political and/or historical narrative about the region concerned. Thus, toponymic systems can and do serve as arenas of cultural competition, i.e., ‘as sites of contest, debate, and negotiation as social groups compete for the right to name’. Toponymic choices, therefore, have a direct bearing on hegemonic historical narratives and consequently have interesting ramifications in collective memory discourses involving territorial transfers.

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Consequently, there are two things at stake in relation to toponymic usage, both of which have implications for the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. First, the preservation or loss of cultural information in the landscape can affect one’s ability to identify with ancestral populations in a given region. Being able to read and navigate a toponymic system is a vital aspect of feelings of belonging and therefore of *Heimat*.\(^{436}\) Second, having the ‘right to name’ identifies a given community as the owners of, and/or the rightful heirs to, the region in question. As I demonstrate in the following, toponymic policy within the ZO as a whole, and Lower Silesia in particular, has impacted stakeholders in both of these ways. It has, therefore, had a significant effect on the collective memory discourse surrounding the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans from the region. In the next section I show how the TRJN expedited the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO to overwrite its German history and support their explanatory narrative to the effect that the region in question had been, and still rightfully was, Polish.

5.3 The Toponymic Re-inscription in the ZO

5.3.1 Summary of Events

As noted in Chapter 3, the TRJN’s hold on power in postwar Poland was tenuous and their annexation of the ZO was rooted in the pragmatics of *Realpolitik*. They adopted a three-part strategy aimed at securing power which, in the final analysis, was directed at subduing the expression of revisionist aspirations vis-à-vis the *Kresy* among the Polish population, whilst simultaneously obtaining international recognition for Poland’s territorial annexation of parts of Germany. The first part of the strategy was to derive the moral justification for the territorial changes by appealing to Poland’s ‘deep history’ in the form of the Piast Formula (see Chapter 3). The second was to bring about a *fait accompli* by expelling Germans from the ZO and encouraging ethnic groups on either side of the new Polish-Soviet border to relocate to corresponding ethno-cultural regions. Among other things, this

\(^{436}\) This does not imply that people can necessarily decipher place name based on their etymological elements. I merely mean to suggest that by the time one reaches adulthood, having grown up within a specific region, one tends to know the names of places and topographic features and, with greater and lesser degrees of precision, how they relate to one another spatially. Whilst it would be interesting to consider the use of toponymic reminders of lost *Heimat* by expellees resettled in Germany, and the extent to which this practice may have helped inculcate a new sense of belonging, this subject goes beyond the scope of my current thesis. Work in this area, however, certainly represents a promising avenue for further research.
involved the rapid resettlement of the ZO with Poles from the \textit{Kresy} and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{437} The TRJN’s third strategic decision, which mirrored NSDAP policy in Poland between 1939 and 1945, was ‘to obliterate the former national character of the regions’.\textsuperscript{438} One of the methods employed to achieve this final objective was to implement a policy of toponymic re-inscription throughout the ZO. By the end of 1950, a total of 32,138 traditional German place names in these regions had been replaced with Polish alternatives.\textsuperscript{439}

5.3.2 Schlesien to Śląsk: Strategies of Toponymic Re-Inscription

Just as the first wave of expulsions, the so-called ‘wilde Vertreibungen’, was carried out without official assistance, the initial phase of toponymic re-inscription within the ZO was carried out in an informal, unofficial manner. Both processes resulted in chaos. New arrivals in the ZO adopted a range of \textit{ad hoc} strategies to denote distinct elements of their new surroundings in a meaningful way. Sometimes they retained existing German names, especially when the etymological roots of these were Slavic, but changed the spelling and/or pronounced them in accordance with modern Polish orthographic rules (e.g., Zecow-Czechów, Boyadel-Bojadła, Poberow-Pobierowo, Duchow-Duchowo, Grabow-Grabowo, Albertinenhof-Albertynów). This linguistic strategy has been practiced for many centuries when new language communities have come to occupy a region with an existing toponymic system in place. ‘Berlin’, for example, is meaningless in modern German, but ‘Brлин’, from which the modern toponym is derived, meant ‘the area fenced for cattle’ in the Slavic language originally spoken in the area (possibly Sorbian or a related dialect). Today it is spelt ‘Berlin’ and is pronounced in accordance with standard German orthography (IPA: bɛɐ̯ˈliːn). Its Slavic roots attest to the fact that the region had originally been home to a Slavic population.\textsuperscript{440} Other toponyms were transliterated based on recognised or imagined place name elements, for example Eichberg-Dębogóra (oak mountain), Glashütte-Huta Szklana (glass factory), Linde-Lipka (linden),

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{Zayas} Zayas, A.-M. d., \textit{A Terrible Revenge}, p. 29.
\bibitem{Siebel-Achenbach} Siebel-Achenbach, S., \textit{Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland}, p. 274; Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 284.
\end{thebibliography}
Neudorf-Nowawieś (new village). This kind of transliteration is also a well-attested toponymic practice around the world. One well-known example is Dunedin in Scotland, which has been transliterated to today’s Edinburgh (both meaning ‘fortification at Eidyn’).\textsuperscript{441} Some toponyms were formed by appending modern Polish naming elements to existing German place names to reflect topographical characteristics or important events or people associated with the feature or place in question. This practice resulted in mixed-language toponyms such as Bergkolonie-Górki (Mountain Colony Hilly), and Plätzig-Piaseczno (Sandy-Sandy).\textsuperscript{442} Another strategy was to rename a place using an existing Polish toponym from the settlers’ region of origin.\textsuperscript{443} In some cases, different groups of settlers bestowed different names on one and the same place. Reichenbach im Eulengebirge (Lower Silesia), for example, was known variously, during this period, as Rychbach, and Drobniszew before it was officially renamed as Dzierżoniów.\textsuperscript{444}

These ad hoc solutions met the immediate requirements of the settlers, but ran counter to the TRJN’s need to implement an efficient administrative structure within the region. Most of them were later replaced in the course of more ambitious re-naming campaigns organised by semi-official and official bodies. Some of these began drawing up plans for the toponymic re-inscription of vast swathes of German territory well in advance of the Potsdam Conference (17\textsuperscript{th} of July to 2\textsuperscript{nd} of August 1945) at which Poland was placed in administrative charge of those areas to the East of the Oder-Neisse Line ‘not considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany’\textsuperscript{445} As early as the 27\textsuperscript{th} of February 1945 the Institute for Western Affairs or Instytut Zachodni (IZ), under the directorship of Professor Zygmunt Wojciechowski, a mediaevalist from the University of Poznan (Uniwersytet Poznański), began researching Polish-German relations in what Wojciechowski considered to be Poland’s Western and Northern territories.\textsuperscript{446} The IZ inaugurated an Onomastic Section in July 1945. Under the


\textsuperscript{442} See ‘Piaskowa Góra’ (Sandy Hill) in: Bator, J., Sandberg, trans. Esther Kinsky (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012 [2009]).

\textsuperscript{443} Yoshioka, J., ‘Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II’, pp. 278-79.

\textsuperscript{444} Yoshioka, J., ‘Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II’, pp. 278-79.

\textsuperscript{445} Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{446} Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 279; Demshuk, A., ‘Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk’, p. 48.
guidance of linguist Mikołaj Rudnicki, another professor from the University of Poznan, this section surveyed the existing and emerging toponymic situation in the German border regions. The results were published in The Pocket Dictionary of Place Names (Słowniczek nazw miejscowych) in late 1945.447

Wojciechowski’s (and therefore the IZ’s) agenda was a continuation of longer-term geo-political aspirations aimed at the incorporation of German territory into Poland.448 However, other centrally-organised bodies had a more mundane interest in the unambiguous naming of specific places. One of these, the Regional Administrative Bureau of the National Railway (hereinafter RABNR), was among the first to advocate the establishment of a more consistent approach. In April 1945 the RABNR in Poznań ‘organised a commission on the revival of Slavic names in the area along the Oder’.449 Interestingly, German railway workers were among several groups of key workers actively prevented from leaving Lower Silesia and obliged to work for the Polish authorities in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The role they played in the topographic re-inscription of their own country is significant in terms of cultural continuity, which has ramifications for the collective memory discourse under discussion, especially with regard to identity politics.450

Following the Potsdam Conference, the TRJN immediately moved to implement official re-naming policies throughout the ZO, and scheduled a series of onomastic conferences.451 The first of these convened in Szczecin (Stettin) between the 11th and 14th of September 1945. It was attended by political representatives and academics from various relevant disciplines such as Linguistics, Slavic Studies, and Cartography.452 Its immediate purpose was the toponymic Polonisation of Poznan, but it established a number of principles that served as a guideline for similar endeavours in other areas of the ZO. One of the more interesting aspirations of the conference was to expunge traces of non-standard dialects in Polish place names. Where several historic Slavic allonyms

447 Yoshioka, J., ’Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 280.
449 Yoshioka, J., ’Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 279.
450 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 161.
451 Unless otherwise stated, all factual material in this subsection is taken from: Yoshioka, J., ’Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, pp. 273-87.
452 Yoshioka, J., ‘Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II’, pp. 280-82.
existed for a given place, the conference delegates agreed to use whichever one was closest to modern Polish. Thus, the notion of Polonisation had ramifications that went beyond expunging traces of German cultural heritage. Far from taking the linguistic, cultural, and political needs and aspirations of non-German minority groups into account, the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO specifically pushed these aside in favour of a linguistic homogenisation of the region.

Delegates to the initial onomastic conference developed a set of principles which were later applied throughout the ZO. One of the most important of these was to use the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands (Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich) as the main source for historical Slavic place names. This dictionary was compiled between 1880 and 1902, i.e., prior to the end of the Partition Period (see Appendix A). Another important source for Slavic allonyms for German settlements and topographical features was the Atlas of Geographical Names of Western Slavs (Atlas nazw geograficznych Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej). This was published between 1934 and 1937 by another delegate from the University of Poznan, Stanisław Kozierowski, a historian, linguist, and Catholic priest who sometimes used the pseudonym Dołęga. The fact that these pre-war sources provided names for recently occupied German territories suggests that these authors had regarded parts of Germany as ‘other Slavic lands’ prior to overt German aggression against Poland during WWII. This is remarkable in the context of the current collective memory analysis. The final volume of the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands predates the TRJN’s assertion of historic Polish claims to the same territories by at least 43 years suggesting that the origin of the Piast Formula was rooted in a broader narrative that transcended the considerations of Realpolitik with which the TRJN was confronted in 1945. In the absence of Slavic allonyms for a given settlement or topographic feature, the decision was taken either to extend the Slavic names of surrounding settlements

453 Ibid. p. 281.
455 Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 279.
456 Possibly for the town of Dołęga, which is 125km from his birthplace Trzemeszno in Greater Poland.
or to replace German place names with the names of the places of origin of the majority of settlers, often with a slight change (e.g. Kalisz-Kaliszany).\textsuperscript{457}

By contrast with the less ideological practice of early settlers in the ZO, the decision was taken, during this first onomastic conference, to avoid the translation or transliteration of German names into Polish. However, a comparison between German and Polish toponyms in the region demonstrates that this rule was not always enforced. For whilst examples such as Polish ‘Zielona Góra’ and German ‘Grünberg’ both meaning ‘Green Mountain’, and the pairing Karlsdorf-Weinberg, – Winna Góra (Wine Mountain, in the sense of Vineyard, in both languages) reflect traditional toponymic practice, which involves a significant descriptive element – the mountain is green so it is called ‘Green Mountain’ – others are more obviously pure transliterations. The coincidence between German ‘Hirschberg’ and Polish ‘Jelenia Góra’, both meaning ‘Stag Mountain’, for example, is less likely to have come about as a result of convergent observations of an outstanding feature of the landscape.\textsuperscript{458}

The toponymic re-inscription of Poznań was completed by the 8th of November 1945 when the Governor of the Voivodeship and the Onomastic Section of the IZ issued a joint statement confirming the new official Polish toponyms to be used henceforth.\textsuperscript{459} The conventions developed during the first onomastic conference in Poznań were then applied systematically throughout the ZO. This project was coordinated by the Commission for the Determination of Place Names or Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowości (KUNM) which was inaugurated in January 1946 as an advisory body to the Warsaw-based Department of Public Administration.\textsuperscript{460} The toponymic re-inscription of German Silesia was the responsibility of the Kraków Commission I under the auspices of the KUNM. Much of the relevant work was carried out by the Silesian Institute or Instytut Śląski (IS), which was based in Katowice but covered the whole of Lower and Upper Silesia (the Wrocław and Katowice Voivodeships respectively).\textsuperscript{461}

\textsuperscript{457} Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{458} It is improbable that both the original German settlers and the Polish incomers in 1945 noticed an unusual abundance of stags on the mountain in question. The Polish toponym looks like a transliteration of the German and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems likely that this is indeed what it is. See: Zedlitz, A., et al., Schlesien: alle Orte, Accessed on: 09.04.2013.

\textsuperscript{459} Yoshioka, J., ‘Imagining Their Lands as Ours’, p. 282.

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid. p. 283.
New toponyms within the ZO required the approval of the Minister of Public Administration and Ministry for the Regained Territories or Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych (MZO), and were published in an official gazette.\footnote{Ibid. p. 284.} The KUNM first convened from the 1\textsuperscript{st} of the 4\textsuperscript{th} of March 1946 to determine the names of all of the Polish Voivodeships and some 220 cities and transportation hubs with populations in excess of 5000. Further meetings were held from the 1\textsuperscript{st} to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of June and the 26\textsuperscript{th} to the 28\textsuperscript{th} of October 1946 to agree on Polish toponyms for smaller towns and villages (1000-5000 and 500-1000 residents respectively). By the end of December 1946 the KUNM had re-named 4400 places in the ZO, and the original names of all important stations along the railway network had been replaced with Polish alternatives by June 1947.

### 5.3.3 Historic Polish Toponyms in Lower Silesia

The guidelines developed during the first onomastic conference in Szczecin in September 1945 were easier to apply in regions such as Poznań, which, unlike Lower Silesia, had a lengthy and relatively recent history of Polish administration (latterly as the Grand Duchy of Posen: 1815-1848) and was therefore replete with historically attested Polish names.\footnote{Kamusella dates the Grand Duchy's inception as 1827, which was when the first parliament was held (see Footnote 339). A more common date range for its independent existence is 1815-1848. See: Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 184; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 138, 42-43.} By contrast, the etymological origins of place names and topographic object names in Lower Silesia prior to the Polish annexation in 1945 had been mixed. Whilst a few had had Proto-Slavic roots (e.g., Jetsch-Laskowitz, Liegnitz, Nimptsch), the majority were based on Proto-Germanic and older German (\textit{c.} 1200-1933) elements (Wohlau, Frankenstein, Landeshut). A few were modern German constructs (\textit{c.} 1933-1945) invented at the behest of the NSDAP authorities to replace historic names that struck them as being too Slavic (e.g., Polykwitz, Pohlom, and Polnish Peterwitz changed to Heerwegen, Ostwalde, and Petersweiler respectively by the NSDAP).\footnote{Prussia, C. b. F. I. o., 'Polskie-nazwy śląskich miejscowości z patentu Fryderyka II 1750', in \textit{Wznowione powszechne taxae-stolae Sporządzienie dla samowładnego Xięstwa śląsku podług którego tak Auszpur斯基 Konfessyi iak Katolicey Fararze, Kazonodziecie i Kuratusowie,} (Berlin, 1750); Map on inside cover in: Trierenberg, H., Schlesien heute; Zedlitz, A., et al., Schlesien: alle Orte, Accessed on: 09.04.2013.} In many cases, therefore, the toponymic re-inscription of Silesia involved the invention of new place names rather than the discovery of existing historic Polish allonyms. Not all Poles supported these efforts and some, notably the so-called autochthones
in Silesia, actively opposed them by tearing down newly erected signposts and refusing to adopt the new place names in their daily speech.\textsuperscript{465} Their resistance was based on a conscious rejection of the, certainly in the case of Silesia, unhistorical notion of \textit{re}-Polonisation.\textsuperscript{466} Thus, the TRJN’s toponymic practice in the ZO has played a significant role within the collective memory discourse following Poland’s annexation of the region and expulsion of most of its native population. It supported a historical narrative in which the majority of the native population were classed as Germans (which they were) and non-natives (which they were not), and a minority (the autochthones) were classed as Poles (which significantly strained the definition of what it meant to be Polish) but whose linguistic practice was deemed foreign, and was therefore regarded as dispensable.

5.3.4 Breslau or Wrocław? New Toponyms in Practical Discourse
Whatever the perceived merits of the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO, it was and is a historical fact and one that has had an important impact on the relevant collective memory discourse. In this section I briefly address two of the issues that have arisen in this context.

5.3.4.1 Political Correctness?
In an article for a special edition of \textit{Der Spiegel: Geschichte} dedicated to an exploration of the German presence in Eastern Europe, Annette Grossbongardt marvels at the fact that several young German authors are turning to this history as background material for their novels in a way that is ‘[ganz] unverkrampft’. This relaxed attitude, she explains, contrasts markedly with the pre-\textit{Wende} situation ‘in denen bereits der Gebrauch alter Ortsnamen einen politischen Streit auslöste’.\textsuperscript{467} Joachim Rogall agrees:

\begin{quote}
Da wurde schon die Gesinnung daran festgemacht, ob man Breslau oder Wrocław sagte […] in Polen hätte man vor 1990 nicht von Danzig gesprochen, weil man den Deutschen keine Argumente zuspielen wollte, und bei uns hat man nicht Danzig gesagt, damit die Polen nicht denken, wir wollten es wiederhaben.\textsuperscript{468}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{465} For many of the autochthones, daily speech was as likely to be Polish as German and, in many cases, was a Polish dialect with a strong German admixture known colloquially as \textit{Wasserpolnisch}.

\textsuperscript{466} Yoshioka, J., ‘Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II’, p. 285.


\textsuperscript{468} Joachim Rogall in: \textit{ibid}.
This politicisation of allonymic preference was fuelled by statements such as the following by Carlo Schmid, then Vice President of the German Bundestag:

Ich will meine Stellung hier noch einmal genau präzisieren: Was man 1945 östlich der Oder und Neiße getan hat, ist Unrecht gewesen. Kant ist nicht in Kaliningrad geboren, sondern in Königsberg, und Eichendorff - weiß Gott einer der deutschsten der deutschen Dichter - hat in Breslau gelebt und nicht in Wroclaw. Das ist wahr, das soll man nicht vergessen, und das werden wir nicht vergessen.\textsuperscript{469}

In this statement, Schmid explicitly links his moral and judicial judgement of the situation ‘östlich der Oder und Neiße’ (Unrecht) with toponymic choice (Königsberg not Kaliningrad; Breslau not Wrocław). He goes on to embed these historical ontological-level observations, i.e., what is or is not true about the nature of ‘[was] man […] getan hat’ and of the circumstances of Kant’s birth and Eichendorff’s Germanness and residential history, in an explanatory-level manifesto (‘das soll man nicht vergessen, und das werden wir nicht vergessen’).\textsuperscript{470}

At the same time, however, Schmid’s assessment of the importance of historic toponyms in relation to specific ethno-cultural periods within a given region presaged later developments in the relevant collective memory discourse. Based on the observation that ‘[names] and the nomenclatures they belong to occupy a central place in any cultural system’, it became increasingly common, during the postwar period, for German authors to match their toponymic choices to the official form applicable during the period and prevailing cultural system under discussion.\textsuperscript{471}

It is against this ‘politically correct’ strategy, in which one may, for instance, talk about Breslau rather than Wrocław in relation to any period up to, but not beyond 1945, that Grossbongardt’s mild astonishment at young German authors’ ‘[ganz] unverkrampft’ treatment of toponyms within the ZO is to be understood. In the novel Katzenberge (2011), for example, Sabrina Janesch’s toponymic practice neither reflects any specific political outlook nor does it.


\textsuperscript{470} Incidentally, the fact that Schmid was a long-term member of the left-wing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and was only half German (his mother was French and he was born in France) gives the lie to the notion that the espousal of expellee issues (as, for example, practiced by the BdV) is an inherently right-wing preserve. This is important in the current context, because this accusation (i.e., that of espousing extreme right-wing views) has frequently been leveled at those who promote expellee interests.

\textsuperscript{471} Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., ‘Geographies of Toponymic Inscription’, p. 458.
genuflect at the altar of ‘political correctness’. Her casual, non-problematizing, attitude is amply demonstrated in a scene at the beginning of the main protagonists’ journey to Schlesien (not Śląsk as pre-Wende ‘political correctness’ would demand) to attend her grandfather’s funeral. Nele, the first-person narrator, asks a German railway worker at Berlin’s Ostbahnhof for directions to the platform for the train to ‘Wrocław’. ‘Nach Breslau?’ he answers (my italics): ‘Meinetwegen auch dorthin’ she responds, seemingly disinterested in the veiled challenge implied in the railway worker’s answer (i.e., to adopt a firm stance either for Breslau or Wrocław as the proper toponym for the city in question).472 Such a nonchalant attitude towards the transition of German territory to Poland and its subsequent re-inscription or Polonisation was, by contrast, still unthinkable in 1978 when Leonie Ossowski published her quasi-autobiographical Weichselkirschen (1978).

Recounted by a third-person omniscient narrator, Ossowski’s Weichselkirschen presents a snapshot of the postwar German geopolitical situation: it involves two sisters, erstwhile members of the landed gentry, expelled from their ancestral home, one living in the GDR, the other living in the FRG, both of whom undertake a journey to their former family seat, now incorporated into Poland. It shares many of the topoi typical of German Vertriebenenliteratur and the literature of Heimattourismus involving postwar cross-border journeys. Just as in Janesch’s Katzenberge, the main protagonist in Weichselkirschen, Anna, combines a visit to Poland with a journalistic mission. And, like the first-person protagonist in Christa Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976), Anna’s daughter serves as a foil to her own personal involvement with her private lieu de mémoire, providing a second-generation perspective on the current (i.e. early 1970s) geopolitical situation in Poland’s former German territories.473 The general storyline in Weichselkirschen is based on a trip Ossowski undertook to Poland in 1974 and reportedly contains a plethora of autobiographical elements.474 However, despite the author’s well-documented pro-Polish attitude, she appears to feel constrained to continuously re-emphasise her political position on the current

status quo throughout the novel. One example of this, in which she specifically refers to the region’s toponymic transition to make her point, is when the heroine Anna decides that she will ‘nach Hause fahren, nach Rohrdorf, das nicht mehr Rohrdorf heißt, sondern Ujazd und natürlich auch kein Zuhause mehr ist’. This somewhat defensive clarification reflects and responds to the collective memory discourse taking place in the contemporary real world rather than arising naturally from within the novel, in which it is superfluous as it already explicit in the plot itself.

One interesting strategy authors occasionally employ as a way of avoiding the choice between Polish and German toponyms altogether is to use a third language, usually Latin, as a sign of good faith, before proceeding to write about the ZO in their native language. It is significant, for example, that the Borussia Foundation, which is concerned, inter alia, with the German-Polish history and culture of Prussia, uses the Latin version of Prussia – Borussia – in its name rather than the more familiar German or Polish allonyms. In a similar vein, a collection of essays by Polish and German academics on postwar literature produced by Silesian-born authors, all of whom share the ‘kaum überwindbaren Trauma’ of Heimatverlust, bears the Latin title Silesia in litteris servata, which obviates the need to choose between German ‘Schlesien’ and Polish ‘Śląsk’. However, this strategy is not always an option. One situation in which its use would be questionable and is, in fact, rarely encountered, is in literary translations. In the following section I discuss the difficulties for translators engendered by the fraught, politicised discourse pertaining to German-Polish allonyms in the ZO.

5.3.4.2 Toponymy in Translation
According to Tatiana Nazarenko, ‘the theme of the Regained Territories and the impact of the redrawing of state borders on people’s lives [is] quite new for
contemporary Polish literature’. Nevertheless, several Polish novels have been published in recent times that do engage with the subject. One of these is Dom dzienny, dom nocny (1998) by Olga Tokarczuk, which appeared in German translation in 2001 (as Taghaus, Nachthaus) and then in English as House of Day, House of Night in 2002. Tokarczuk is extremely frank about the mechanics of the toponymic transition between German Schlesien and Polish Śląsk. In one passage she refers to a ‘guy who spent his nights changing German place names into Polish ones’ and finds that not all of his creations were successful. This acknowledgement of the need to create new names for formerly German villages, towns and cities contrasts markedly with the ‘official’ view of Silesia as a re-conquered territory in which old Polish allonyms simply needed to be remembered and reinstated. Rather than accepting this narrative, Tokarczuk emphasises the lengthy German presence in the area. The von Goetzen family, for example, had lived in the same mansion ‘[for] centuries’. Moreover, she writes, they had had ‘no warning that they would have to leave their mansion. The very idea was … absurd’. In the English version of the book, the narrator invariably uses the original German names for towns and cities when discussing specifically German experiences in the region. Thus, in the chapter concerning the German Peter Dieter, Nowa Ruda is referred to as Neurode, and Kłodzko is called Glatz. Later, in the chapter on the German Franz Frost, Klotzsche is called by its old name of Königswald. According to Antonia Lloyd-Jones, who authored the English translation, this practice precisely reflects Tokarczuk’s toponymic choices in the original. Lloyd-Jones, who knows the author well and has stayed with her in the house that inspired the novel, believes that Tokarczuk’s toponymic choices are

483 Ibid. p. 198.
484 Ibid. p. 93 & 126.
designed to reflect how the German characters would think of these places. Indeed, the relevant section in the book supports this view:

First came Karpacz, which was full of souvenir kiosks, then Szkłarska Poręba, which Peter insisted on calling Schreiberhau, as if afraid to tackle the new Polish name. But in fact all they could think of was finally getting to Neurode and Glatz, and whether they would manage to see everything.  

Interestingly, however, the only exception to this general rule is Breslau. This city is invariably referred to as Wrocław even when seen through the eyes of German protagonists, whose real-life counterparts would certainly know it by its German allonym. This special-handling of Breslau possibly reflects the continuing psychological importance of Breslau within Silesia and Poland as a whole: ‘Breslau ist Schlesien!’ (my italics). If Breslau is generally seen to represent Silesia as a whole, as the foregoing assertion by Hugo Hartung suggests, then it is understandable that Polish authors may resist referring to it by its German name ‘weil man den Deutschen keine Argumente zuspielen [will]’. Indeed, until recently the only community still using the allonym ‘Breslau’ nonproblematically and routinely were the expatriate Breslau Jews in Israel. It is, however, remarkable that this reluctance to use the German allonym for the most important city in Lower Silesia appears to have been shared by the translator. For Wrocław is not a common allonym in English texts, although Anglophone cartographers have been using it increasingly without its German allonym in atlases published since the Wende (see below for a more detailed analysis of toponymic practice in cartography). Lloyd-Jones’ decision to follow the author in using ‘Wrocław’ rather than ‘Breslau’ draws attention to the status of allonyms

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487 Ibid. p. 92.  
488 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten (Berlin-Grunewald: Non Stop-Bücherei, 1951), p. 156.  
490 For more detail on the Breslau Jews as an expatriate community in Israel, see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 23; Kossert, A., Kalte Heimat, p. 29.  
as translations of, rather than simply alternatives to, specific toponyms. The English translation of ‘Wrocław’ is ‘Breslau’ (as is the German). Polish readers of Dom dzienny, dom nocny would read ‘Wrocław’ as familiar and ‘Neurode’, ‘Glatz’, and ‘Königswald’ as foreign. For English readers of House of Day, House of Night, by contrast, Lloyd-Jones’ decision to use precisely the same toponymic choices as Tokarczuk reverses the experience. ‘Wrocław’ becomes the foreign element whilst ‘Neurode’, ‘Glatz’, and ‘Königswald’ are familiar. Thus, by attempting to navigate the political ramifications of toponymic choice in relation to the ZO, Lloyd-Jones has been forced to adopt a foreignising translation strategy in the sense described by Lawrence Venuti.492 The fact that this was unintentional is demonstrated by a comment made by Lloyd-Jones in a private communication in which she writes:

Polish writers very often put all the German place names in Polish, whatever historical period they're describing - it is a real trap for translators, and one I have learned not to fall into (my italics)493

Referring to her earlier translation of Paweł Huelle’s novel Castorp (2004), Lloyd-Jones goes on to elaborate:

All the place names are in Polish! so I had to research them to put them back into German […] I have often had this experience when translating Huelle in particular, but it isn’t exclusive to him. It would seem absurd and confusing to me to leave them in Polish494

More recent examples of Polish literature that have appeared in translation suggest that the perceived need to emphasise the Polishness of Breslau-Wrocław is currently abating among Polish authors, but that the general toponymic situation remains challenging for translators. Piaskowa Góra (2009) is a Polish novel by Joanna Bator set in Wałbrzych, formerly Waldenburg in Lower Silesia, which lies just to the southwest of Breslau, the author’s own birthplace. It outlines the fortunes of three generations of a Polish family traumatised by their experiences during and in the aftermath of WWII, the worst of which, according to the text, was their forced resettlement in Lower Silesia following the

494 Lloyd-Jones, A., Toponymic Issues Involved in Translating Dom dzienny, dom nocny.
Vertreibung of the native German population.\textsuperscript{495} It was translated into German in 2013 as Sandberg by Esther Kinsky (who also produced the German translation of Dom dzienny, dom nocny) a German-born Slavic Studies specialist. Herself a prize-winning author, Kinsky’s detailed notes together with her short analysis of the plot and the historical context, which she provides as a postscript, are extremely illuminating and helpful.\textsuperscript{496} By contrast with Tokarczuk (and Lloyd-Jones), Bator (and Kinsky) uses the new Polish names for almost every location mentioned in the book except for Wroclaw, which is referred to as ‘Breslau’ throughout the book.\textsuperscript{497}

This on-going toponymic ambiguity and the challenge it presents for translators working from Polish into German and/or English mirrors shifting official attitudes to place naming throughout Poland. In the following section I briefly outline the current situation with reference to the use of non-Polish toponyms in the ZO and elsewhere in Poland.

5.3.5 Current Toponymic Practice in the Ziemie Odzyskane
The current situation in Poland is considerably more pluralistic, tolerant, and inclusive than it had been in the postwar period and prior to the country’s accession to the EU in 2004.\textsuperscript{498} Polish authorities currently recognise seven different dialect groups, which make up the modern Polish language and reflect various aspects of Polish history and culture.\textsuperscript{499} In addition, The Polish government now officially recognises the fact that:

\textsuperscript{495} Bator, J., Sandberg.
\textsuperscript{496} Esther Kinsky in ibid. pp. 483-92.
\textsuperscript{497} See for example ibid. p. 164.
\textsuperscript{498} Determining the extent to which this reflects shifting cultural attitudes among ordinary Poles and in Polish institutions or the need to comply with externally enforced conditions (for example, those pertaining to EU membership) is beyond the scope of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{499} Kashubian, which is spoken to the west of Gdańsk, bears witness to the subsumption of the Kashubian tribe in the historical formation of Poland. Mazovian (spoken throughout a region centred on Warszawa and extending from Olsztyn in the north to Bialystok in the east) preserves the memory of the Mazovians in the same way. The Greater (spoken around Bydgoszcz, Toruń, Poznań and Łódź) and Lesser (spoken around Kielce, Lublin, Kraków and Rzeszów) Polish dialects preserve one of the earliest known socio-political organising principles of Polish territory (Wielkopolska and Małopolska respectively). There are a range of traditional mixed dialects spoken along the River Bug and in a small enclave in the Carpathians. These are the ‘linguistic fossils’ of a long-term borderland situation in which the linguistic and political boundaries were not clearly defined until the early twentieth century. A set of new mixed dialects, which reflect the mixed origins of the residents (some of which were not natural Polish speakers at the time of their forced relocation), has developed throughout the ZO since 1945. And finally there is a Silesian dialect that is still spoken along the upper Oder basin. There is no indication in the official Polish documentation on the subject as to whether this Silesian dialect is identical with the so-called Wasserpolnisch spoken in the same region. The Wasserpolnisch incorporates such a significant German substrate that it borders on a creole. See: Brown, E. K., et al., Languages of the World, p. 877; Figure 1 in: Wołnica-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 25.
Some geographical names, especially those near the borders, have a foreign origin and are a witness of old linguistic contacts of Poles with other nations. A majority of foreign geographical names in Poland are Germanisms, i.e. names with a German origin. They can be found not only in the North and the West of Poland where they are a heritage of times when those territories belonged to Germany (Prussia), e.g. Olsztyn, Grunwald, Malbork. Such names can also be found in the South of Poland along the main mountain range – Karpaty, e.g. Rychwałd, Grybów, Łańcut, Szymbark, Czorsztyn, Melsztyn, etc. These names were given by German settlers who have been coming to Poland since the 13th century. One can see Polonized German words, such as: Wald, Burg, Stein, in these names.

There are currently nine officially recognised national minorities in Poland, namely: Armenians, Byelorussians, Czechs, Germans, Jews, Lithuanians, Russians, Slovaks, and Ukrainians. In addition, there are four ethnic minorities, the Karaims, Lemkos, Roma, and Tartars. In recognition of this cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, the Polish Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) enacted the Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language (2005). This legislation, the first of its kind in postwar Poland, ‘comprehensively regulates the issues related to national, ethnic and language minorities.’ It has far-reaching implications for the collective memory discourse relating to Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant flight, expulsions, and population transfers. For the first time since 1945, this act stipulates that, in addition to Polish toponyms,

traditional names [in minority languages] may also be used as additional names for localities, physiographical objects and streets […] which are established upon a motion of the commune council and have to be approved by the Commission on Names of Localities and Physiographic Objects

The key word in this passage is ‘traditional’, which adequately reflects the historical (ontological) reality of the regions in which such minority language toponyms are likely to be encountered. The early postwar government had

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502 ‘The difference between a national and an ethnic minority is that a national minority may identify itself with a nation with its own independent state whereas an ethnic minority may not.’ Ibid. p. 33.
503 This legislation (Polish: ustawę o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym) was approved on January 06, 2005 and entered into force on May 01, 2005. See: ibid. pp. 32-36.
504 In places in which the minority does not equal or exceed 20 per cent of the population, non-Polish toponyms may be introduced alongside their Polish counterparts provided that 50 per cent or more of the local population agrees to it. See: ibid. p. 35.
espoused an explanatory narrative in which these toponyms were deemed to be markers of an illegitimate intrusion into Polish territory, which the annexation of the ZO and expulsion of the native population had reversed. The wording of the quoted passage implies a different narrative in which these place names were ‘traditional’ and, by implication, historically legitimate.

The Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language (2005) contains some interesting caveats, which also have a direct bearing on the official narratives of, and therefore on the collective memory discourse relating to, both WWII and the postwar settlement from a Polish perspective. For example, it states that ‘names in minority languages may not refer to the names used in the years between 1933-1945 given by the authorities of the German Third Reich or the Soviet Union’. This thus, provided the criteria set out in the act were met, it would be legitimate to introduce the German ‘Alt Schalkowitz’ as an additional name alongside Polish ‘Stare Siolkowice’ as this had been the legitimate toponym of the place until 1936. But it would inadmissible to adopt ‘Alt Schalkendorf’ as an allonym, as this was introduced by the NSDAP in 1936 who deemed the traditional German toponym to be too Slavic. This restriction on the use of NSDAP terminology is not unexpected: what is more interesting is the equal rejection of Soviet-coined toponyms. This runs completely counter to the to pre-Wende historical and official Polish discourse (see Chapters 3 and 4) by implicitly recognising the role of the USSR as aggressor in WWII and placing it on the same footing as the Third Reich.

The change of attitude towards Polish Germans and other minority groups signalled by the Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language (2005) represents a significant concession and effectively marks the end of any vestigial postwar hostilities. For, as noted above, the ‘right to name’ identifies a given community as the owners of, and/or the rightful heirs to, the region in which they are permitted to exercise the right. Further linguistic concessions underpin this new of era of détente. For example, Polish is still the only language permitted for ‘contacts with public administration offices’, but otherwise ‘there are no limitations on the use of any language in both private and

505 Ibid. p. 36.
public life’. Moreover, minority languages can now be used as supporting languages in contacts with ‘third-order administrative units’ at the communal level as long as the speaker community constitutes no less than 20 per cent of the local population and has been recorded in the ‘Official Register of Communes, where a supporting language is used’.

Figure 3 in Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map Editors and Other Users (2010) shows a small area in what used to be Oberschlesien in which German is registered as a supporting language. Figures 2 and 4 in the same source show that the only official German minority currently recognised by the Polish government is located in this region, which is also the only area in which German toponyms are currently used alongside their Polish counterparts.

In the remainder of the chapter I analyse shifting representations of Poland’s territorial and toponymic situation in cartographic texts produced in the postwar and post-Wende eras.

5.4 Aspirational Cartography: Mapping Political Paradigms

5.4.1 General Overview

The role of cartography in collective memory discourses has hitherto been largely neglected, possibly because many of the episodes of acute symmetric trauma that have triggered collective memory discourses, such as the Holocaust, have not involved changes to international frontiers. The fact that the postwar Vertreibungen did take place in conjunction with permanent territorial transfers, and that these are reflected in maps, is one of the things that make the relevant collective memory discourse so interesting from a comparative perspective. For, according to A. Melville:

[maps] are more than simply innocent repositories of name data. They work – through their textual authority and repeated use – to normalize certain ways of knowing and naming the landscape over others.

508 German is currently used as a supporting language in 22 communes of Opolskie. Moreover, 286 German allonyms have been introduced throughout this region as well as in two communes in the Śląskie Voivodship. See: Wolnica-Pawlowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, pp. 38-40.

509 Figure 3 in: ibid. p. 34.

510 Figures 2 and 4 respectively in: ibid. pp. 33, 35.

Mark Monmonier is even more explicit about the power of maps to shape one’s understanding of history and therefore to bolster hegemonic historical narratives and the potential for manipulation that this entails:

There’s no escape from the cartographic paradox: to present a useful and truthful picture, an accurate map must tell white lies. Because most map users willingly tolerate white lies on maps, it’s not difficult for maps also to tell more serious ones.512

This is particularly significant in the current context given that the spate of newly independent states formed after World War II revived the national atlas as a symbol of nationhood … [and] between 1940 and 1980 the number of national atlases grew from fewer than twenty to more than eighty.513

It is also the case that ‘[that] which is marked on the map is affirmed as real and changes to the map are important matters’ and that, among other considerations, ‘[the] reality that is given on the map is influenced by … the deliberate strategies of the cartographer […] and] by the world-views of particular cultures’. 514

Thus, the ways in which cartographers choose to depict the world can have a significant impact on hegemonic historical narratives and must therefore be considered as part of a given collective memory discourse if it involves territorial transfers and frontier changes.515

Not only are cartographers obliged to adopt a specific position on toponymic issues, but they also need to address purported political situations, e.g., questions of de facto versus de jure sovereignty, the permanence or otherwise of borders, or whether or not a given region is contested between different powers. This is important in the current context because, whilst it is by no means

514 King, G., Mapping Reality, pp. 2, 18.
515 The process of cartographic publication is constrained in many ways, including economic and political pressures. Politically, the censor often plays a significant role and can intervene either to dictate what should be shown on a given map or else to prevent the publication of maps that do not represent the regime’s favoured view of the world. Economic constraints on specific cartographers can include the availability of materials such as engraved plates and current data, but also the marketing objectives or raison d’être of the institute or publishing house for whom they work. Therefore, it is not always true to say that a specific cartographer chooses to depict the world in a certain way. Nevertheless, unless otherwise stated, I use the expression here, in conjunction with a hypothetical or ‘apocryphal’ cartographer, as a short-hand proxy for all of the forces that converged upon and informed the production of any given map.
incumbent upon historians or literary authors around the world to address the postwar expulsions, all cartographers wishing to depict the postwar world, by contrast, necessarily have to take a stance on the concomitant geo-political changes. Thus, the relevant collective memory discourse is globalised in the artefacts produced by cartographers in a way that is not true of other cultural artefacts. Moreover, the public understanding of these changes in any given polity, which is inevitably informed to some degree by maps, has a direct bearing on the status and reception of expellees and their cultural products (including their historical narratives). To be specific, my argument is that, even in cases in which a given cartographer or cartographic institute has no direct interest in the area in question, their chosen approach to contested toponyms and territorial issues cannot but be, at least partially, informed by their political and cultural paradigm and the information available to them. I would like to introduce a new term ‘quasi-political discourse’ to refer to this situation in which any position one adopts towards a given political or politicised issue must necessarily align with a specific stakeholder narrative regardless of the fact that one has no interest in the matter and nothing to gain one way or the other.516

In many cases, cartographic institutes and publishing houses have rules in place prior to the emergence of any specific geo-political issue, which are then consistently applied to all situations arising. Addressing the Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation following the referendum on 21st of March 2014, for example, the National Geographic Society (NGS) decided to shade the peninsula in grey to indicate ‘that it is a disputed territory’.517 This course of action, the organisation states, is in line with its existing policy which ‘is one of portraying the world from a de facto point of view; that is, to portray to the best of our judgement the current reality’.518 However, to those who voted in favour of the accession and to many other observers and governments around the world the

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516 To fulfil the definition of ‘quasi-political discourse’ as I shall use the term throughout the remainder of this thesis, the following conditions must be met: all aspects of the relevant discourse must be governed by an all-encompassing socio-political or geo-political paradigm, where assessments are informed by the same, and where there is no immediately obvious political benefit to be gained by espousing a particular view in relation to the events in question, but where the views expressed correlate to some definable position within a politicised discourse.


status of the territory is not disputed (or rather, it is indisputable). Moreover, the NGS’s decisions on the status of any given territory are made by the Map Policy Committee and are informed by ‘a number of external entities [including] the United Nations, the European Community, as well as the [US] Board on Geographic Names’. They are, therefore, political in nature. Were the NGS to accept the assessment of those states which have already formally recognised the transfer of Crimean sovereignty to the Russian Federation they would have to represent the area as ‘not disputed’. Their actual decision to depict the region as ‘disputed’ reflects a US-centric worldview as expressed by Peter Valesco, a spokesman for the US State Department, who stated, prior to the referendum, that the US would neither honour the referendum nor reflect even a de facto change to the Crimea’s sovereign status in US government maps. Thus, any institute or cartographer wishing to represent the current de facto status of the Crimea must first decide whether or not to accept that the territory is disputed. It is my contention that this binary decision will be informed by an explicit or tacit socio-political and cultural paradigm, and that this is inherently problematic.

Furthermore, I argue that one can extrapolate from this specific example to recognise the unavoidability of working within a specific socio-political and cultural paradigm as a general, systemic issue applicable to the entire field of international cartography. Therefore, the decision to represent any given area as ‘disputed’ or ‘not disputed’ is unavoidably political as are decisions relating to the presentation of information having a bearing on the political and cultural status of territories such as the ZO. As such, a close reading of maps of postwar Poland produced within different stakeholder communities, in conjunction with those produced in polities less directly affected by specific events, can provide interesting insights into the development of relevant socio-political and cultural paradigms over time. Moreover, it reveals narrative shifts within the relevant collective memory discourse over time and between stakeholder communities. Such narratives function primarily at the explanatory level, but can strongly influence one’s understanding of the ontological status of the ZO or its historical

519 Ibid.
520 Conant, E., 'How Should Crimea Be Shown on National Geographic Maps?'.

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relationship to Germany and Poland as well as its de jure situation at various times during the postwar period.521

According to Geoff King ‘[the] most important line on the postwar map was drawn between East and West Germany’.522 Eventually, this line became a permanent political reality when each of the two German states formally recognised the other as de facto sovereign states in the Grundlagenvertrag signed on the 21st of December 1972.523 However, I would argue that the Oder-Neisse Line was a far more significant geo-political boundary. Provisionally allowed to stand after being drawn in on maps during the Potsdam Conference at the insistence of the Soviet delegation, pending ratification or revision at a peace conference to be convened in the near future, its ramifications for global diplomacy and policymaking far outreach the impact of the inner German border. For, whereas the Inner German Border was originally conceived of as a line of demarcation between (at that time still) collaborating, allied occupying powers, the Oder-Neisse Line first came into being as one of the limit-lines of Poland’s annexation of German territory, i.e., it was the result of an act of war. It is true that the Inner German Border, which began as an imaginary line pencilled in for the sake of administrative convenience, was subsequently reinforced by troops, then with barbed wire, and finally, in some places, concrete walls.

However, the Oder-Neisse Line was reinforced through more drastic means including multiple waves of sociocide, expropriation of the native population on the side of the divide occupied by Poland, the installation of military garrisons and concentration camps, toponymic re-inscription, and propaganda in support of the ahistorical Piast Formula. Thus, whilst the FRG’s ultimate recognition of the Inner German Border simply meant recognising the GDR’s right to an autonomous political and cultural development, the formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line (1950, 1970 and 1990) was tantamount to recognising the right of states to acquire foreign territory by force of arms and to commit acts of sociocide and oppression against the native population.

521 The postwar de jure status of the ZO has always been clear, and has changed over time in conjunction with the relevant international treaties. However, the issue here concerns the extent to which ordinary people within the various stakeholder communities could have been able to understand the present de jure and historical status of the annexed territories during the period in question, based on the information presented in high-value, authoritative sources, such as atlases.


523 Kühnl, R., Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage: was ist das und was soll das?, Kleine Bibliothek (Cologne: Pahl-Rugerstein, 1986).
Unsurprisingly then, attempts to map the Oder-Neisse Line and the previously German territories to the east of it have involved an ideological aspect. Identifiable differences to the ways in which the region has been mapped in different stakeholder communities and changes to such maps over time can, arguably, stand as a proxy for long-term trends in the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. In the following three sections, I turn to specific cartographic representations of the ZO in the pre- and post-Wende eras in order to delineate and analyse such long-term differences and changes.

5.4.2 Drawing the Future (1945-1970)

Despite a significant loss of life among Polish geographers during WWII, they – and more specifically cartographers – played an important role in delineating and defining postwar Poland.\textsuperscript{524} In addition to existing cartography departments in universities in Warszawa, Kraków and Poznań, all of which were operating normally by the end of 1945, new ones were rapidly established in Toruń, Łódź, Lublin and Wrocław.\textsuperscript{525} Polish cartographers attended peace conferences where they were instrumental in ‘defending Poland’s western boundaries in the international arena’.\textsuperscript{526} They were intimately involved in the issues of resettlement and regional planning.\textsuperscript{527} After publishing widely on the ‘geographical assets of the new territories’ they devoted their efforts to ensuring that the general population became familiar with them through the production of detailed maps and atlases.\textsuperscript{528}

An early example of the presentation of an aspirational, rather than the actual, political status quo in the ZO and along Poland’s frontiers is the \textit{Atlas Polski} (1953).\textsuperscript{529} In this atlas, the relevant plates include nothing to indicate that the ZO was still only under Polish administration pending a final peace

\textsuperscript{524} Kostrowicki, J., ‘Geography in Poland Since the War’, \textit{The Geographical Journal}, 122 (1956), 441-50, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{526} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{527} Ibid. pp. 419-23.
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid. p. 418.
\textsuperscript{529} The year in which the Atlas Polski was published, 1953, is significant in the history of the Eastern Bloc. It was the year in which Stalin died and in which a popular uprising broke out in the German Democratic Republic, directed against the imposition of Walter Ulbricht’s (1893-1973) form of Socialism. Conceivably, the Polish censor – and therefore the publishers of the atlas (Centralny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii) – were concerned about the stability of the region and therefore chose not to portray direct challenges to the status quo by including notes about the contested nature of the Oder-Neisse Line and the ZO. For the time being, however, that remains speculation and any in-depth investigation of the question goes beyond the scope of this thesis. See: Burant, S. R., ‘East Germany: a Country Study’, (Washington, USA: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1988), pp. 230-31; Judt, T., \textit{Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945} (London: Heinemann, 2005), pp. 177-310.
conference and that its status as part of Poland was still fiercely contested by the Adenauer government in the FRG.\textsuperscript{530} The Oder-Neisse Line is depicted as a state border with nothing to indicate its provisional status. In addition, none of the previously German toponyms are shown alongside newly coined Polish place names. Major cities like Görlitz and Breslau, both of which had been given both their German names and their Polish allonyms (Zgorzelec and Wrocław) in pre-war Polish maps like the \textit{Mapa Taktyczna Polski} (the cartographic plates for which were produced between 1928 and 1936), have also been replaced by their Polish allonyms in the \textit{Atlas Polski}.\textsuperscript{531} Moreover, the plate bears no trace of several earlier Polish toponyms in the region. A Prussian document from 1750, for example, shows existing Polish allonyms for 109 towns and cities in Prussian Silesia. One of these is Hyrszberga (Hirschberg).

However, this appears in the 1953 atlas as Jelenia Góra.\textsuperscript{532} Hyrszberga, an etymologically German Polish allonym, was, presumably, considered too German and has been transliterated to Jelenia Góra.\textsuperscript{533} Other older Polish or Slavic allonyms outside of Silesia, but still within the ZO, have received the same treatment. The pre-war \textit{Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej} (1934), for example, provides two Slavic names for a small town in German Western Pomerania. The first, reflecting contemporary German usage, is Belgard, a toponym adopted into modern German despite its Slavic etymology. The second is Białogród, as the town was known to Poles of the Second Republic.\textsuperscript{534} By the time it appears in \textit{Atlas Polski} in 1953, both of these Slavic allonyms have been modernised to Białogard.\textsuperscript{535}

What this close reading of the \textit{Atlas Polski}’s version of the status quo along the Oder-Neisse Line in 1953 reveals is that the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO was not only designed to expunge traces of the region’s German legacy, but also that it was aimed at other non-Polish Slavic heritage.


\textsuperscript{531} Anon., \textit{Breslau (Wrocław) in Mapa Taktyczna Polski} (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1933); Anon., \textit{Görlitz i Cernousy in Mapa Taktyczna Polski} (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1936); Anon., \textit{Western Poland in Mapa Przeglądowa in Atlas Polski} (Warsaw: Centralny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii, 1953).

\textsuperscript{532} Prussia, C. b. F. L. o., ‘Polish Names for Places in German Silesia in 1750’; Anon., \textit{Western Poland 1953}.

\textsuperscript{533} As noted above, this change was made in spite of the decision taken at the first onomastic conference in Szczecin in September 1945 not to transliterate existing German toponyms.

\textsuperscript{534} Anon., \textit{Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej} (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1934).

\textsuperscript{535} Anon., \textit{Western Poland 1953}. 

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This strategy contributed towards a collective memory narrative which emphasised the ur-Polishness of the region. The *Atlas Polski* supports this narrative by omitting important information at the ontological level, i.e., the actual historical allonyms used by pre-war Poles to refer to German places now claimed by Poland. Looking beyond Poland to those areas of Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia visible on the plate that depicts the Oder-Neisse region, one notices that the cartographers have not used double allonyms anywhere. Instead they have consistently shown a single name for each location, always in the current official language of the state in question and always spelt with the correct diacritics. On the one hand this supports the notion that the plate was simply designed to respect and reflect the current geo-political status quo: Czechoslovakian places have Czechoslovakian place names; German places have German place names. The onus is on Polish users of the atlas to accept these as they are and to acquire the necessary knowledge to decipher the foreign orthography and diacriticals. However, the implicit logical corollary is that Polish places have Polish names and, therefore, that all those areas in which Polish names predominate must be part of Poland. Thus, the toponymic strategy adopted by the cartographers actually serves as propaganda for the official Polish geo-political outlook in which the ZO was already a permanent, *de jure*, part of Poland. In this respect, the *Atlas Polski* presents a narrative based on the omission of crucial data about the contemporary ontological status of the ZO in favour of an aspirational status, that was not realised for another 17 years (Treaty of Warsaw).

Considered together, a selection of contemporary maps of the region produced outside Poland more accurately reflect the undecided status of the annexed territories and the Oder-Neisse Line, and the resulting confusion at the explanatory and ontological levels. Two atlases published in the USA in 1948 and 1951 exemplify this trend. The map of Poland included in *Hammond’s World Atlas* (1948), for example, includes the disclaimer:

> Post-war territorial changes shown on this map do not necessarily represent the final status of such boundaries. Only

536 Interestingly, this is not the case for the map’s hydrographical content. All rivers and minor waterways bear modern Polish names regardless of location and regardless of whether or not they originate in or traverse Polish territory.

537 The only exception to this practice is in the Kresy, particularly in East Galicia where the former Polish names are still shown. See: Anon., *Eastern Poland in Mapa Przeglądowa in Atlas Polski* (Warsaw: Centralny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii, 1953).
after the signing of Peace Treaties can changes be considered official and definite.\textsuperscript{538}

However, the relevant plate includes several features that appear to question this clear and accurate statement. In one example, an insert on the same map, which shows ‘Polish Boundaries 1938 / 1945’, promotes a perception of these changes as permanent.\textsuperscript{539} In addition, toponyms on the map of Poland are treated differently to those on all other maps in the atlas. For example, all toponyms in the ZO are shown in their Polish forms only (e.g. Wrocław, Wałbrzych, and Gorzów). However, uniquely in this atlas, the map of Poland is overlaid with a glossary of ‘Present Polish’ and ‘Former German’ allonyms, once again suggesting permanence of the situation depicted. Indeed, no double toponyms are provided for any place in Poland, even outside of the ZO. By contrast, the atlas includes double allonyms for large towns and cities throughout Europe outside of Poland (e.g., Munich/München, Cleves/Kleve, Florence/Firenze, Torino/Turin, Beograd/Belgrade).\textsuperscript{540} All such pairings include the current Anglophone allonym for the locations in question. However, as noted above, the current Anglophone allonym for ‘Wrocław’ is ‘Breslau’, which is omitted from the relevant map, as is ‘Warsaw’, the Anglophone allonym for ‘Warszawa’. That such differences do reflect a quasi-political paradigm, rather than simply the house style of the publisher, is suggested by the fact that Poland is the only country in which Anglophone allonyms are completely absent.\textsuperscript{541}

Thus, in the \textit{Hammond’s World Atlas}, one finds on the same page a clear disclaimer as to the provisional nature of the geo-political situation depicted on the map of Poland in conjunction with several editorial inclusions that tend to weaken the statement. For example, the insertion of a glossary, especially one that includes the words ‘Present’ and ‘Former’, in conjunction with the fact that the German-Polish frontier is marked as an international boundary with no indication of its provisional status on the map plate itself, detracts from the reader’s


\textsuperscript{539} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{541} Hammond, C. S., \textit{Poland 1948}, p. 61.
awareness of the lack of permanence of the depicted status quo, in spite of the disclaimer to that effect. To summarise these observations, Poland is treated differently from all other maps in the atlas. However, it is not easy to deconstruct the contradictory features included on the Polish plate such as to demonstrate any overt political support or preference for the permanence or otherwise of the postwar status quo with respect to Poland and Germany at this time.

The attitudes of Anglophone cartographers towards the situation arguably changed in the five years following the GDR’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent boundary between Germany and Poland in 1950. After this point, complete neutrality on the issue was impossible because there were now two realities to choose between. One could agree with the Adenauer government of West Germany, who were still steadfastly refusing to acknowledge the permanence and irreversibility both of the territorial shifts in Poland’s favour and of the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent frontier between the two states. Moreover, the FRG did not recognise the GDR, and consequently refused to be bound by any international treaties entered into by the GDR, and, furthermore, claimed the sole right to represent all Germans. On the other hand, one could accept the GDR-Polish consensus to the effect that the originally de facto postwar geo-political configuration of the region had become a de jure reality with the signing of the Görlitzer Vertrag. The ramifications of these two alternative worldviews became increasingly difficult to ignore as the so-called Cold War worsened and Europe, and indeed the world, polarised into two politically opposed blocs, each with its distinct economic, socio-political, and ideological axioms.

And yet, these divisions are not immediately apparent or reflected in the maps and atlases produced soon after the signing of the Görlitzer Vertrag, such as another American atlas published by the National Geographic Society just one


543 This attitude towards the GDR and the FRG's claim to represent all Germans was expressed in a number of Adenauer's official statements and eventually came to be known as the 'Hallstein Doctrine' after Walter Hallstein (1901-1982), who was one of its chief exponents. See: Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Bock, 1999), pp. 337-38; Alhonen, P., After the Expulsion, pp. 122-23.
The relevant plate includes the German/Anglophone allonyms for all places within the ZO, but not for other places in Poland (such as Kraków / Krakau / Cracow). German/Anglophone allonyms within the ZO are provided in brackets after the Polish allonyms as in ‘Wrocław (Breslau)’, ‘Wałbrzych (Waldenburg)’, and ‘Gorzów (Landsberg)’. This decision certainly indicates an awareness of the special status of the ZO but, interestingly in light of the subsequent development of the Cold War, does not reflect any western-centric ambiguity about the GDR’s recognition of the border. If anything, one could argue that placing the German allonym in brackets suggests the incidental nature of these, which would indicate the cartographer’s acceptance of the situation as presented by the GDR and Poland. Arguably, favouring the German allonyms and placing their Polish counterparts in brackets after or below them could be taken as an endorsement of the Adenauer position in which the long-term future of the region was still undecided. By contrast, the cartographers/publishers at the NGS had, consciously or unconsciously, espoused the GDR-Polish-Soviet paradigm pertaining to the current ontological status of the ZO. The subtitle of the map – ‘Russian and Polish boundaries according to treaties and claims as of July 1, 1951’ – is significant as it suggests that any outstanding claims would be indicated on the map. However, the FRG’s outstanding claim to the ZO and northern East Prussia is not registered on the map, which limits its explanatory power by omitting significant information at the ontological level.

The situation appears to have been similarly vague in Great Britain during the same period. In 1952, for example, the editors of The Citizen's Atlas of the World appear to be ‘hedging their bets’ in terms of the permanence of Poland’s postwar frontiers. These are depicted and duly labelled as international boundaries, which corresponds to the GDR’s worldview, not that of the FRG. However, the map of Western and Central Europe is overlayed with a thick yellow line labelled ‘1938 Boundary of Germany’. Whilst one could regard this as a convenient way of including some illuminating information about the recent history of the area, it is not a method that was repeated on any other plate in the

544 Grosvenor, G., Central Europe including the Balkan States (Russian and Polish boundaries according to treaties and claims as of July 1, 1951) (Washington, USA: National Geographic Society, 1951).
545 Grosvenor, G., Western Poland in Central Europe including the Balkan States (Russian and Polish boundaries according to treaties and claims as of July 1, 1951) (Washington, USA: National Geographic Society, 1951).
atlas. This is despite the fact that many of these plates depict other states which had also undergone significant boundary changes in the wake of WWII. It does not, for example, show the ‘1938 Boundary of Poland’, which had been modified to a far greater extent than that of Germany.

The *The Times Atlas of the World, Volume IIII, Northern Europe* (1955), by contrast, does show an additional ‘Boundary of Poland 1939’.\(^{547}\) On the other hand, it includes no separate map of Poland which, arguably, suggests a relative lack of interest in the relevant geo-political issues. Instead, there is a single two-page map entitled ‘Germany Poland and Czechoslovakia’. This plate does, however, show all *de facto* postwar borders without comments or caveats, all of which are labelled ‘International Boundary’. This suggests support for the GDR-Polish-Soviet position in which all of Poland’s postwar borders have acquired *de jure* status. In addition, it shows Poland’s internal administrative boundaries including those that encompass areas within the ZO. This detail also supports a narrative in which there was no ontological difference between the ZO and the rest of Poland at the time of publication, which was contrary to West German claims at that date. Further support for this ‘narrative of no difference’ is suggested by the consistent use of double allonyms wherever they exist around Europe, always favouring the language deemed to be dominant in any region at the time of printing, and by treating former German cities in the ZO in the same way.\(^{548}\)

Such an apparently unproblematic acceptance of the Eastern Bloc view among British cartography houses at this time is rather surprising. After all, the FRG, which rejected this paradigm, was a full member of NATO by then, and was therefore an ally of Britain and the USA.\(^{549}\) The implied lack of solidarity among Anglophone cartographers suggests a lack of interest in the region, and possibly a widely held assumption that Poland’s *de facto* frontier changes did, to all intents and purposes, have *de jure* character.\(^{550}\) By contrast, opinion as to the permanence


\(^{548}\) Gdańska (Danzig) and Wrocław (Breslau) within the ZO, and Kraków (Krakau), Warszawa (Warsaw) elsewhere in Poland. See: Bartholomew, J. G. *et al*., *The Citizen's Atlas of the World*; Bartholomew, J., *The Times atlas of the world*.


\(^{550}\) Incidentally, it also suggests a general lack of support, or perhaps of awareness, of the FRG’s claim to represent all Germans and consequent lack of recognition of the GDR.
and/or the legitimacy of the postwar frontiers appears to have been split in France, traditionally a staunch supporter of a sovereign Polish state.

Éditions Larousse’s *Atlas général*, published in Paris in 1959 follows the Russian and Polish approach in showing the postwar border situation with no additional commentary (see below), thus ignoring their actual political status at the time. Like contemporary Soviet-authored maps of the region, it completely ignores historical German place names in the ZO. It includes a detailed map of Poland in its *de facto* form, suggesting a recognition of the current territorial configuration of the area. In short, there is no overtly western paradigm evident in this atlas, which may reflect the fact that France had withdrawn from NATO in 1959, thereby signalling neutrality in the emerging Cold War. On the other hand, it may reflect a lack of willingness on the part of the cartographers/publishers to espouse the FRG’s worldview, possibly based on lingering enmity in the wake of WWII and previous Franco-German conflicts. However, the editors have also provided a section entitled *Histoire de la Pologne*, which includes two plates showing Silesia outside of historical Poland: ‘La Pologne sous Casimir III le Grand (1333-1370)’ and ‘La Pologne au XVIIe Siècle’, with separate maps for 1772, 1793, 1795 (Partitions). 551 This suggests an interest in the region, and, moreover, one that takes full account of its longer-term history whilst not challenging the current status quo.

Another French atlas, published in Paris just four years later, in 1963, by the *Société européenne d'études et d'informations*, presents a very different worldview. In the *Atlas of Western Europe* (1963), Poland’s current borders are drawn in a line-type labelled in the legend as ‘de facto boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe’. Both Germany (green) and Poland (blue) are still shown in their pre-war configurations with *de facto* borders superimposed to show the territorial extent of postwar Poland. This does not suggest any recognition of the likely permanence of the situation or of the *Görlitzer Vertrag*. In addition, the Baltic States are shown as separate states but the remainder of the Soviet Union is depicted as an undifferentiated bloc. For example, the Ukrainian SSR is not identified in any way. 552 This special treatment of the Baltic States also, arguably, suggests an attitude of not fully recognising the *de facto* status quo in Central and

Northern Europe. Of all of the maps studied for this chapter, this one is most glaringly at odds with the ontological situation of the region it purports to depict.

In Cold War parlance, the first of these French atlases (1959) appears to support, or at least not to seriously contradict, the Soviet Bloc paradigm, whilst the second (1963) reflects a NATO worldview in which the Soviet Union’s territorial advances in Central and Northern Europe are questionable and the German-Polish frontier is still awaiting final ratification. The French example suggests that, both Poland’s annexation of the ZO and the Polish government’s explanatory narrative were sometimes challenged even outside of the two nations directly affected. Thus, the collective memory discourse was exported beyond the immediate vicinity and, to some extent, this is evident in the choices made by geographers and cartographers around the world.

Such differences in the way the German-Polish border region was depicted become easier to identify as the Cold War intensified in the late 1960s, especially when one considers maps produced within the main stakeholder polities. Soviet atlases depicted Eastern and Western Europe in simple terms at that time. The 1967 The World Atlas (published in Moscow), for example, shows all de facto postwar borders with no comments or caveats to indicate their provisional nature. Similarly, it shows only Polish names for all towns and cities in postwar Poland, neither including recent German nor historical Russian alternatives. At least one contemporaneous East German map, the Übersichtskarte Deutsche Demokratische Republik und Westdeutschland published in Potsdam in 1966, is staunchly in line with the Soviet worldview. The few Silesian places shown on the map all bear Polish toponyms only, and place names in other countries are shown strictly in the relevant national language including diacritical marks. Similarly, it presents no historical alternative to Karl-Marx-Stadt (as Chemnitz was called in the GDR) and does not cater to non-German speakers with regard to any other place names throughout the German-speaking regions. This is a clear statement of a paradigm in which every state has a right to its own particularities, despite overriding political allegiances, and which respects national boundaries as they currently stand, from the perspective of Moscow. The only challenge to this

554 Anon., Übersichtskarte DDR und Westdeutschland.
pacifistic, inclusive worldview is the reference to the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (FRG) as simply Westdeutschland, whereas Ostdeutschland is given its full official name (Deutsche Demokratische Republik).

Contemporary Polish maps, such as the Pergamon World Atlas (1968), present a similarly confident view of the region, with nothing to indicate or acknowledge West Germany’s outstanding territorial aspirations and claims. Published in Warsaw by British publishers Pergamon Press, this atlas included maps of Central Europe first prepared by the Polish Army Topographical Service in 1963, which the English editors and advisers, Stanley Knight et al., adopt without change. The fact that it depicts the Soviet Union as an undifferentiated bloc, with no visible Baltic states and no delineation of the individual SSRs, suggests some level of ideological or political intervention during the production and/or publication process. Like its Soviet counterpart, the Pergamon World Atlas shows the postwar Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western border, with no comments or caveats and depicts all towns and cities in postwar Poland (including the ‘recovered territories’, which are not marked in any way) with Polish toponyms only. German allonyms are completely absent from the relevant plate. This Polish atlas betrays its political bias in other ways too. For example, it includes a linguistic map in which postwar Poland is represented as a homogenous and contiguous Polish-speaking bloc. In fact there is significant linguistic diversity within Poland to this day (see above).

On the other hand, this omission of detail may be a matter of scale: minority languages in other regions, outside Poland, are also ignored. In summary, this Polish atlas presents a geo-political vision of Poland in general, and the ZO in particular, which completely ignores the, as yet, still contested nature of the postwar geo-political configuration in Central Europe.

By contrast, the West German Deutscher General Atlas (1968) labels the Oder-Neisse Line as a ‘Verwaltungsgrenze’ which, from a West German perspective, properly reflects its de jure status at this time. The overall status of

558 One illuminating example of this trend is Sorbian in Germany. As the only member of the West-Slavic language family spoken outside of the Soviet Bloc, this minor language ought to have been of interest to the atlas’ target readership. See: Crystal, D., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 300, 02.
the ZO was similarly contested in the *Deutscher General Atlas* which labels the contested region as ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’.* All place names in formerly German territories are given in German with no Polish or Russian allonyms.559 Thus, the *Deutscher General Atlas* and the Polish edition of the *Pergamon World Atlas*, both published in exactly the same year, represent the two most divergent interpretations possible of the contemporary geo-political situation along the German-Polish border region.560

Other features in both maps, in addition to those mentioned above, demonstrate that both were at least partially intended as political instruments and not merely as educational tools designed to reflect the world as it currently stood.561 In the Polish atlas, for example, all towns in rump Germany are named in German with no alternatives offered, even where the alternatives have a wider currency throughout Europe; thus München is not ‘explained’ to the non-German-speaking reader by the inclusion of ‘Munich’ (English, French) or ‘Monachium’ (Polish) in a smaller typeface. In the German atlas, place names in the area covered by pre-war Poland are generally written in Polish except where traditional German names exist, e.g. Warschau instead of Warszawa. Therefore, the only territories in which the cartographers’ respective national language is used exclusively in these two works are precisely those areas contested by the FRG and Poland, the ZO. The German map also challenges the status of East Prussia by labelling its northern and southern divisions as ‘z. Zt. unter sowjetischer Verwaltung’ and ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’ respectively. In addition, the entire former German province is demarcated by a line-type decoded in the legend as a ‘Staatsgrenze’ indicating its continued status as part of an intact

559 Anon., *Deutscher General Atlas*.


561 Interestingly, British cartographers were still avoiding the extremes of the controversy at this time by diligently including German/Anglophone allonyms for all Polish towns and cities in the ZO. See: Philip, *The International Atlas*. 

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German state.\textsuperscript{562} That this state was envisaged as being coextensive with pre-War Germany is demonstrated by the fact that both the inner-German and Berlin borders are labelled as ‘Verwaltungsgrenze’, not ‘Staatsgrenze’. These internal dividing lines were represented as being impermanent whereas the inclusion of a ‘Staatsgrenze’ around the whole of East Prussia suggests continuity between the Third Reich and the current geo-political situation at the \textit{de jure} level.\textsuperscript{563} Interestingly, the above applies only to the introductory overview map at a scale of 1:300,000. The rest of the atlas is dedicated almost entirely to West Germany as it stood in 1968. Most of the GDR is absent from the map, which obviated the need for the mapmakers to take a stance on places that had been renamed for ideological reasons, such as Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), and pre-war German territories, such as Posen and Silesia. Thus, having made a political statement in the smaller scale map, the cartographers/publishers avoid labouring the point in the larger scale plates that follow. Certainly, this was mainly because the GDR and Poland were ‘off-topic’ in an atlas of West Germany. Nevertheless, it fortuitously avoids contentious issues at a point in time when the frozen fronts of the Cold War were beginning to show some movement as a result of Egon Bahr’s (1922-) and Willy Brandt’s \textit{Ostpolitik}.\textsuperscript{564}

In summary, one can argue that Anglophone and French cartography between 1945 and 1970 reflected an ambivalent attitude and/or lack of emotional or political concern for the precise situation in the ZO and regarding the Oder-Neisse Line. Nevertheless, by depicting the \textit{de facto} boundaries as if they already had \textit{de jure} status, cartographic products such as \textit{The International Atlas}, published in 1969 by London-based publishers George Philip & Son, presented a view of the geo-political situation that reflected Polish, not West German, aspirations.\textsuperscript{565} Cartographers from stakeholder communities more closely linked to the events in question, particularly those working in the two German states, Poland and the USSR, expressed more polarised worldviews in their cartographic products. Postwar Polish and German maps and atlases therefore served a well-

\textsuperscript{562} Otherwise there would have to be two Staatsgrenzen to indicate the fact that the northern part of East Prussia had been annexed by the USSR and the southern part by Poland.

\textsuperscript{563} It is worth noting that, within the international legal frameworks recognised by their respective countries, both the West German, the Polish, and the Soviet cartographers were all depicting the \textit{de jure} situation. The fact that their cartographic representations differ so markedly from one another is simply a function of the arbitrary, quasi anarchic nature of international law.


\textsuperscript{565} Philip, \textit{The International Atlas}, p. 31.
defined socio-political purpose. Rather than mapping the world as they found it, Polish cartographers helped to project an image of postwar Poland as their political masters, initially the TRJN, wished it to be and to anchor this in the collective consciousness of both their countrymen and the world at large. This ‘aspirational cartography’ (to coin a phrase) has a long tradition in Poland. Polish cartographers in the immediate postwar period were following in the footsteps of previous generations of Polish cartographers, who, ever since the First Partition in 1772, have been instrumental in keeping alive an idea of an aspirational Polish state among a subjugated Polish nation.566

To explore the extent to which this situation changed in line with the period of détente in German-Polish relations that began in 1970, the following section includes a direct comparison between a Polish atlas, Narodowy Atlas Polski, produced between 1973 and 1978 and intended for an international readership (it was accompanied by a separate, extremely detailed book of texts and map keys in English), an East German atlas from 1981, the Atlas Deutsche Demokratische Republik, the West German Diercke Weltatlas (1974), and the Historischer Weltatlas (1974), produced in West Berlin.567

5.4.3 Détente (1970-Wende)
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, a period of détente between the FRG and Poland set in following the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw in 1970 (12th of August and 7th of December respectively). In Article 1 of the Treaty of Warsaw both parties (the FRG and Poland) promised to respect

die Unverletzlichkeit ihrer bestehenden Grenzen jetzt und in der Zukunft und verpflichten[ten] sich gegenseitig zur uneingeschränkten Achtung ihrer territorialen Integrität. Sie erklären[ten], daß sie gegeneinander keinerlei Gebietsansprüche haben und solche auch in Zukunft nicht erheben werden.568

566 One way in which they have striven to achieve this was through a close collaboration with the educational authorities, and the ‘Flying University’ a tradition that continued in the newly reconstituted Poland after World War One as well as after 1945. See: Joerg, W. L. G., ‘The Development of Polish Cartography since the World War’, Geographical Review, 23 (1933), 122-29, p. 122; Kostrowicki, J., ‘Geography in Poland Since the War’, pp. 441-42; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 235; Großhongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 41.


Article 3 in the Treaty of Moscow states unequivocally that both parties (the FRG and the USSR)

betrachten heute und künftig die Grenzen aller Staaten in Europa als unverletzlich, wie sie am Tage der Unterzeichnung dieses Vertrages verlaufen, einschließlich der Oder-Neiße-Linie, die die Westgrenze der Volksrepublik Polen bildet, und der Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.\footnote{Artikel 3 in: Brandt, W., et al., Deutsch-sowjetischer Vertrag, 12 August 1970 (Bonn: Das Auswärtige Amt, 1970), p. 2.}

Thus, for all practical purposes, there was no longer any ideological difference between the key stakeholders with respect to the German-Polish border and the permanent integration of former German regions into Poland. At the same time, social forces were at work in Poland during the 1970s that would eventually culminate in the Solidarność movement in 1980 leading to a political crisis in Poland and, arguably, to the collapse of the entire postwar geo-political system by 1990.\footnote{Fehr, H., Legitimitätskonflikte in Ostmitteleuropa, pp. 49-59.} It is interesting to see the extent to which these political changes together with the simple progress of time and the changing outlook of the postwar generation found their pendants in the cartographic practice of the period.

Turning first to the West German Historischer Weltatlas (1974), one is struck by the fact that no Polish allonyms are included anywhere within the ZO.\footnote{Putzger, F. W., et al., Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 138-41.} This is a remarkable editorial decision for a historical atlas, which one might reasonably expect to provide contrasting relevant information about current and historical situations. For example, some indication of the toponymic transition within the ZO would have been entirely relevant on the map plate entitled ‘Mitteleuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 – 1960’. The omission is particularly striking given the fact that the same map does include a border line labelled in the legend as ‘Deutschland und Danzig in den Grenzen von 1937’ and text superimposed on both the western part of the ZO and the northern part stating ‘1945 unter poln. Verwaltung’ and ‘1945 unter poln. bzw. sowjetischer Verw.’ respectively. In addition, the map includes the ‘Oder-Neisse-Linie’ shown in its own dedicated line type, which differs from that used for other internationally
ratified frontiers. However, the omission of Polish allonyms within the ZO on the same map is even more problematic. Whilst it is true that, wherever German allonyms exist for any place in the world, they are used exclusively throughout the atlas, the decision not to include Polish allonyms in the contested region reduces the historical accuracy of the map as this is relevant information for the period covered. One is therefore tempted to interpret the map in a political light, especially given the publication date, four years after the Treaty of Warsaw came into force. At this time, 1974, it was more accurate to regard German allonyms in the region as historic and one might have expected the editors to include the modern Polish names with a note explaining the historical situation obtaining during the period covered by the map. That the cartographers/publishers were politically aware is demonstrated by the fact that the only place on the same map for which modern and historic allonyms are included is ‘Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-Stadt)’ in the GDR. Placing the postwar allonym in brackets in this way arguably questions the legitimacy of the modern allonym. At the very least, it indicates that the two allonyms exist side-by-side, which is precisely the same situation that pertained to German and Polish toponyms within the ZO at that time. A direct comparison with the relevant plates in the *Diercke Weltatlas*, published in the same state in the same year, reveals the extent to which cartographers were free to represent the world in an alternative way at that time and place.

In the West German *Diercke Weltatlas* (1974), ‘Karl-Marx-Stadt’ is the only allonym included for the city in question. For all other places for which both German and local allonyms exist, the cartography team has chosen to include both. In every case, the modern German allonym appears first followed by the local allonym in brackets, for example, Lüttich (Liège), Warschau (Warszawa), Mailand (Milano). The only exception to this practice is Breslau which appears in conjunction with its Polish allonym Wrocław without the use of brackets. It is difficult to deconstruct this decision in terms of the historical German-Polish conflict in the region. As the historical capital of Silesia Breslau is one of the most important cities in the ZO. Its Polish allonym is well attested in the historical

572 This differentiation does properly represent the *de jure* situation, from a West German perspective, during the period covered by the map. See: *ibid.* p. 141.

573 Not every allonym pairing accurately reflects the contemporary geo-political status quo. The by then Ukrainian city of L’viv, for example is designating by its German and Polish allonyms in the following format: Lemberg (Lwów).

record. Its status as either a predominantly German or Polish city or both is important within the deflected collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. However, this exceptional juxtapositioning of the two allonyms in exactly the same typeface and without preferring one over the other (as would have been suggested by the use of brackets) is open to multiple interpretations. It could suggest that both Germans and Poles have equal historical claims on the city, which would be inaccurate. Alternatively, it might mean that the cartographers and/or publishers are still asserting a German claim at the time of publication, which would be equally inaccurate. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the inclusion of a dotted line which delineates the ZO but is not explained either in an accompanying legend or on the map itself. There is no corresponding line showing the extent of pre-war Poland. On the other hand, the Rivers Oder and Neisse are both depicted and are named in both German and Polish (in that order and with the Polish version in brackets), but the German-Polish border is not specifically referred to as the Oder-Neisse-Linie as it is in the Historischer Weltatlas. Thus, whilst the inclusion of the pre-war German border suggests some ontological difference between the ZO and the rest of Poland, and perhaps some lingering resentment on the part of the cartography team, nothing on the map questions the current status of Poland’s western frontier. In summary, this atlas appears to reflect the de jure geo-political situation in Central Europe, but the inclusion of two unique features on the map of Poland (the unique treatment of the two allonyms ‘Breslau’ and ‘Wrocław’ and the unexplained inclusion of the pre-Treaty-of-Warsaw frontier as asserted by the FRG) disrupt the implied narrative. These features beg an explanation that is not forthcoming either on the map plate in question or elsewhere in the atlas.

This level of ambiguity is completely absent from the Polish atlas produced during the same period. The Narodowy Atlas Polski (1978) is surprising in its rejection of any spirit of German-Polish détente. It is frank about the fact that part of its current territory was annexed from Germany in an act of war and that part of its pre-war territory had been lost to the Soviet Union. Plate 47 is entitled ‘Population shifts as a result of the recovery of the western and northern territories’. Among other things, it shows the territorial origins of the

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575 All plate titles and other text quoted in this section is taken from the accompanying English volume: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut, G., National Atlas of Poland: Texts and Map Keys in English.
population inhabiting the western and northern territories in 1950, by Voivodeship. The wording here and the fact that Polish cartographers have the confidence to openly criticise Soviet actions at this time are both significant. The decision to refer to the ‘recovery of the western and northern territories’ can be interpreted as a conscious rejection of German attempts to normalise the postwar situation. By the time the cartography team began working on the atlas in 1973, both the GDR and the FRG had fully recognised Poland’s western border and had renounced all territorial claims against Poland. The cartographers’ ‘hard-line attitude’ is, therefore, surprising, particularly when compared directly with the East German atlas referred to above. It supports my argument, presented in Chapter 4, about the Polish government’s instrumentalisation of historic German-Polish conflicts in the interest of legitimising their own undemocratic hold on power and the continued presence of the Red Army on Polish soil. Moreover, it suggests that Cold War rhetoric was slow to react to geo-political changes aimed at a lowering of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, especially along the German-Polish border. This is a significant observation in the current context: the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned was, until 1990, performed against a broader background discourse in which the main stakeholders (the expellees, the settlers and the Polish government) were located inside two ideologically opposed blocs. That this wider Cold War discourse left a clearly identifiable trace within the collective memory discourse concerning flight and expulsion is amply demonstrated by the examples I present in Chapter 6.

Support for the notion that Cold War rhetoric was slow to react to geo-political changes along the German-Polish border and, therefore, interfered with the progress of the collective memory discourse concerning Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide can be found in the Atlas Deutsche Demokratische Republik, which is also still firmly mired in Cold War rhetoric. A colour-coded insert in Blatt 1 shows an irreconcilably divided Europe. The whole of Western Europe and Scandinavia (green) is labelled ‘Kapitalistische Staaten’, whilst the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, including the GDR.

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576 The fact that the mapmakers dare to refer to territorial losses to the Soviet Union and the concomitant population transfers is also interesting, if slightly off topic. It arguably reflects the growing confidence amongst Poles during the 1970s that would eventually culminate in the showdown with the Communist, and therefore ultimately Soviet-backed, authorities during the Solidarność era.

577 Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin Ost) Kommission zur Herausgabe des Atlas DDR, Atlas DDR.
(pink) is labelled ‘Sozialistische Staaten’. However, although the insert divides Europe on the basis of the prevalent economic systems, the individual state boundaries are still dotted in.\(^{578}\) The fact that all information in the atlas is presented in five languages (German, English, Russian, French, and Spanish) demonstrates the aspirational reach of the publishers. The narrative of an irreconcilably divided Europe presented in the maps and accompanying texts was intended for global consumption. However, this uncompromising, confrontational stance is tempered slightly by the fact that all place names are shown in postwar local languages with no additions in brackets. Thus, despite the multilingual accompanying text, no effort is made to assist the international reader with the recognition of unfamiliar sounding places (e.g. Köln) by including more familiar versions (Cologne in English and French). Enforcing this rule across the board has the benefit of ostensibly depicting the world as is, or as it would be if one were standing on location in front of a signpost saying ‘Willkommen in Köln’ for instance.\(^{579}\)

A far greater benefit from the point of view of East-West détente is that it obviates the need for the authors and/or publishers to take a stance on naming conventions within the ZO. The Oder-Neisse Line is shown as an abstract, ideal line based on specific coordinates. It does not follow the current course of the rivers after which it is commonly named. Both the Oder and the Neisse are shown crossing back and forth across the political border. The considerable effort that has gone into plotting the two river courses against the intangible border can be understood as a measure of the GDR’s political commitment to it as a specific, inviolable border based on carefully established and ratified coordinates. Thus, whilst the overall atlas does embody a Cold War outlook, the naming convention adopted throughout and the specific attention paid to delineating, and thereby honouring, Poland’s western frontier can arguably be interpreted as signs of political détente between Germany and Poland.

\(^{578}\) Although strictly speaking outside of the purview of this thesis it may be worth noting that in British maps and atlases pink is usually reserved for the British Empire, the British Commonwealth and/or Britain and its dominions. Cartographers in other parts of the world have adopted the same tradition. Even pre-World War One Germans maps, such as the Andrees Allgemeiner Handatlas of 1899 followed the same convention. The colour pink is therefore associated with world domination and it may be significant that the East German cartography team selected the same colour for the ‘Socialist Empire’, which arguably aspired to replace all previous empires. See, for example: Scobel, A., et al., \textit{Andrees Allgemeiner Handatlas in 126 Haupt- und 137 Nebenkarten nebst vollständigem alphabetischen Namenverzeichnis} (Bielefeld; Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1899). Plates 21-22, Europa, Politische Übersicht, map dated ‘Juni 1898’

\(^{579}\) It is worth noting that the archaic spelling ‘Cöln’ can still be frequently encountered within Köln and its environs, a good example of the limits faced by mapmakers when trying to depict reality.
A contemporary British atlas shows that the ambiguity about the prevailing geo-political and toponymic situation in Central Europe was also in evidence outside of the region during the final decade of the Cold War. *Philips’ New Practical Atlas* (1981) is highly inconsistent in its use of allonyms throughout Europe. Some German cities, for which English allonyms are commonly used, such as Nürnberg and Braunschweig (Nuremberg and Brunswick respectively) are only shown in their German forms. Others like Munich and Vienna are shown in both the local German and (in brackets) the English variants. The situation in the ZO and Russian East Prussia is equally mixed. Kaliningrad, Śląsk, and Wrocław are all included in both their local and English/German versions (Königsberg, Silesia, and Breslau respectively). However, for other former German towns, such as Waldenburg, only the Polish allonym is shown (Wałbrzych).

In the following section I compare a selection of cartographic works produced during the post-Wende period to trace the development of the collective memory discourse connected with the German-Polish border region into the modern era.

### 5.4.4 The Transition: 1990 to Present

British cartographers in the post-Wende period consistently treat Poland and, sometimes, the *Kresy* significantly differently to other European countries. The *Dorling Kindersley World Atlas* (1997), for example, implements a general policy of using local allonyms as the main toponymic identifier followed by the English allonym in brackets, if such exists. For instance, one finds toponymic pairings such as München (Munich), Wien (Vienna), and Firenze (Florence) on the relevant plates. However, only the Polish allonyms are used throughout the ZO. Similarly, Kaliningrad is labelled using only its Russian allonym whilst the common English allonym of ‘Königsberg’ is omitted. The same omission of English allonyms is evident in the *Kresy*, where the Ukrainian L’viv is not paired with its common English allonym ‘Lemberg’. A consistent application of the general policy would have substantially increased the historical content of the

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map of Poland. For example, the general policy would have required Wrocław (Breslau), Kaliningrad (Königsberg).

The *Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World* (1997) takes a very similar approach, whereby the general practice is to include the local allonym followed by the English name in brackets. In this case, the cartographers differentiate between former German territory annexed by Poland and by Russia. For example, the general policy would have required Wrocław (Breslau), whereas the Polish allonym alone is used. By contrast, Russian allonyms are used in conjunction with English allonyms in the northern part of East Prussia: e.g., Kaliningrad (Königsberg). Only local allonyms are used throughout the *Kresy*.582

Fifteen years later the cartographers and editors of the *Times Desktop Atlas* (2012) also diverge from their general naming policy for all areas annexed and lost by Poland in 1945. Their general policy stipulates the use of the English allonym first followed by the local variant in brackets. However, only the local allonym (Polish or Russian) is used in historically German areas, whereas the general pattern is reversed in the *Kresy* where the local allonym is followed by the English equivalent in brackets as in L’viv (L’vov).583

Post-1990 German atlases take differing approaches to toponymic labelling in formerly German territories. The *Diercke Weltatlas* (2006), for example, implements a consistent toponymic strategy for all areas around the world. Wherever a German allonym exists it is used as the principal identifier with local allonyms following in brackets. There are no exceptions.584 This implies that, whereas British cartographers during the same period continued to regard Poland and former Polish territories as toponymically unique areas, their German colleagues no longer did so. The specific date of publication, 2006, is interesting in this context. According to Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg and Robert Traba, writing in 2006, public discourse on the *Vertreibungen* was characterised by a confrontational approach at that time. They contrast this negative development with a high point in Polish-German reconciliation between 1993 and

582 This is the part of East Prussia annexed by the USSR. See: Reader's Digest, A., *Reader's Digest illustrated Atlas of the World*.
583 Anon., *Desktop Atlas of the World*.
2000. Yet, the *Diercke Weltatlas*’ undifferentiated treatment of Poland does not suggest a commensurate level of anti-Polish or pro-German revisionism on the part of the cartography team involved in its production. Moreover, changes to the toponymic policy implemented in the Diercke series of atlases between 1974 and 2006 were very minor. ‘Karl-Marx-Stadt’ (1974) has been replaced with ‘Chemnitz’ (2006), and L’viv which had been labelled ‘Lemberg (Lwow)’ in 1974, has been updated to ‘Lemberg (Lwiw)’ by 2006. There are no changes to Polish toponyms.

The differences between the *Putzger Historischer Weltatlas* (2011) and its 1974 counterpart are, by contrast, more pronounced. In the 1974 version, the cartography team favoured the consistent use of German allonyms on all historical maps, only using local allonyms where no German ones were available. This policy even extended to the inclusion of the rarely encountered ‘Lodsch’ for Polish Łódź. However, whereas this policy had been applied throughout Poland and the rest of Europe in the 1974 version, the 2011 version implements a significantly different toponymic policy for the ZO and Kresy. Polish allonyms are now included in brackets after the German allonyms throughout the ZO. Place names in the Kresy are rendered in Polish but without diacriticals. Kaliningrad, which had been labelled only ‘Königsberg’ in 1974, is shown as ‘Kaliningrad (Königsberg)’ in 2011. Overall, this atlas adopts a toponymic policy with respect to former German territories that is more similar to contemporary British atlases than to the 2006 version of the German *Diercke Weltatlas*. This suggests that the toponymic decisions evident in cartographic representations of historically contested regions, such as the ZO, can no longer be taken as a proxy for shared national narratives. Instead, they reflect the more specific worldview of the publishing house and the cartography team.

Irrespective of its historical aspirations, the *Atlas historii Polski* (2011) uses modern Polish allonyms wherever these exist, and completely omits all

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586 Both Lwow and Lwiw are modified versions of Lwów (Polish) and L’viv (Ukrainian) respectively. The toponymic decision in 1974 appears to have memorialised the city’s recent Polish past, whereas the policy in 2006 was to respect the current ontological situation in which the city was Ukrainian.
historical toponyms, including older versions of Polish toponyms.\footnote{Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski.} Whilst the general policy appears to be non-political, it actually distorts the historical record in some interesting ways. For example, a map showing the defensive positions of the Polish forces during the September Campaign (1939) includes a vast swathe of what was then still Germany in which Polish toponyms are used for all places and waterways as per the general policy. However, rather than using ‘Białogród’, which was the contemporary Polish allonym for the German ‘Belgard’, the cartographers have chosen to use the modern ‘Białogard’, a toponym invented after the end of WWII (see above).\footnote{Anon., Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; Anon., Western Poland 1953; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, pp. 128-29.} This practice of ahistorical naming is applied throughout the atlas, regardless of the time period represented on any given map. German ‘Bunzlau’, for example, is consistently referred to by its modern Polish allonym ‘Bolesławiec’ even on a map that shows information about the national economy in the Commonwealth during the sixteenth century.\footnote{Jankowiak-Konik, B. et al., Atlas historii Polski, p. 34.} At that time, the only Polish allonym for this place was ‘Boleslic’.

5.5 Concluding Remarks

The most important strategies employed in the postwar toponymic re-inscription of Schlesien as Śląsk involved the cataloguing of existing etymologically Slavic or Polish toponyms in the ZO, the extension of these to nearby places for which no such Slavic allonyms existed, and transferring the names of the places of origin of the majority of settlers to their new homes in German Silesia. The first of these strategies had already begun in the pre-war era and was carried on by the IZ, primarily for ideological reasons, and by the RABNR for more pragmatic reasons to do with train scheduling. The decision was taken at the First Onomastic Conference in Szczecin to use the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands (1880-1902) and the Atlas of Geographical Names of Western Slavs (1934-1937) as the main sources for historical Slavic toponyms. The IZ published its toponymic decisions in gazetteers such as The Pocket Dictionary of Place Names (1945). Another decision, taken

\footnote{Prussia, C. b. F. I. o., ‘Polish Names for Places in German Silesia in 1750.’}
during the same onomastic conference, to avoid the translation or transliteration of German names into Polish remained largely aspirational.

The extent to which the postwar toponymic situation in the ZO took account of the linguistic, cultural and political needs and aspirations of minority groups was minimal. On the contrary, the conference delegates aspired to linguistic and cultural homogenisation throughout Poland. This objective was easiest to achieve in the ZO, which the delegates treated as a blank canvas in terms of cultural inscription. One of the most controversial decisions taken in the course of the First Onomastic Conference was to expunge traces of non-standard dialects in Polish toponyms. Wherever several historic Slavic allonyms were attested for a given place, the delegates agreed to adopt whichever one was closest to modern Polish as the official place name.

The toponymic situation in the ZO has influenced the overall discourse concerning the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans from the ZO and its resettlement by Poles relocated from the Kresy in some interesting ways. The TRJN’s toponymic practice in the region supported a historical narrative in which the majority of the native population were categorised as non-natives and only a minority (the autochthones) were classed as Poles, although, as explained above, even these were subject to certain restrictions in terms of their linguistic practice. This narrative, which I have called the ‘Piast Formula’, enabled the framing of the annexation of German territory and the expulsion of the German natives as a post-colonial endeavour. The TRJN’s toponymic reinscription of the area, especially the elevation of existing Polish allonyms to the only officially permitted place names at the same time as prohibiting the use of German allonyms anywhere in the region, lent credence to this narrative. Essentially, this narrative of a post-colonial re-conquest worked at the ontological level: either Germany had originally occupied the territories included in the ZO as part of a colonial enterprise – the infamous *Drang nach Osten* – or they had not. Important stakeholder collectives, such as the BdV, spent much the postwar era publishing historical texts that countered this version of history. Others, notably the *Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission* (1972-ongoing) sought to work within the constraints of the general narrative. Following the *Görlitzer Vertrag* (1950) and more so after the Treaty of Warsaw (1970), it became increasingly anachronistic
for Germans to use German allonyms in relation to the ZO in a post-1945 context. This introduced the concept of ‘political correctness’ into the relevant collective memory discourse, whereby the use of German allonyms in relation to places within the ZO was taken to indicate a right-wing revanchist mentality.

There are a number of discernible differences between the prevailing toponymic situations in Poland, and the ZO in particular, during the postwar and post-*Wende* periods, particularly following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. For example, the impact of the decision taken at First Onomastic Conference in Szczecin in 1945 to expunge traces of non-standard dialects in Polish place names has been lessened by certain provisions set out in the *Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language* (2005). By contrast with the TRJN’s aspiration for linguistic and cultural homogeneity, this act allows for the use of traditional toponyms, etymologically rooted in minority languages, in addition to Polish toponyms. Moreover, the Polish authorities currently recognise seven different dialect groups including Silesian (sometimes known as Wasserpolnisch), with its German substrate, and nine national minorities, including Germans.\(^{594}\)

Thus, the current linguistic and toponymic situation in Poland is considerably more pluralistic, tolerant, and inclusive than it had been in the postwar period, the effect of which within the collective memory discourse under discussion has been to lessen the political implications of toponymic choice. This development is most evident in the way it has been reflected in the relevant literature. Until recently, most authors interested in supporting the status quo, or at least not openly challenging it, habitually used German allonyms up to and including 1945 and Polish allonyms after that, thereby conforming to the strictures of ‘political correctness’. At the same time, however, as the example I quoted from Leonie Ossowski demonstrates, this chronological toponymic usage was often problematized within the narrative of a given piece of literature. This practice has changed since the *Wende*. German authors, such as Sabrina Janesch, are currently flouting this convention and, whilst this change has not gone unnoticed in the German press, it is generally being greeted as a sign of normalisation as the article in *Der Spiegel: Geschichte* quoted above

\(^{594}\) Within the current discourse the term ‘Wasserpolnisch’ can be considered to have pejorative connotations although these bear no relation to the characteristics of this dialect from a purely linguistic perspective and often obscure its socio-historic origins. In the current context I use the term, with caveats, in order to differentiate between this Polish-Czech dialect, and the German Silesian dialect spoken throughout the region until 1945.
demonstrates. Some Polish authors, such as Olga Tokarczuk, appear to accept the use of German toponyms for minor towns and cities in the ZO but to insist on the Polish toponym for important metropolises like Wrocław. Others, for example, Joanna Bator, take the opposite approach and prefer German ‘Breslau’ even in modern settings, but the official Polish toponyms for less important places in the ZO. Other authors, German and Polish, have used allonyms from a third language, often Latin, in order to avoid naming a place either by its German or Polish allonym.

As a rule, translators have tended to adopt precisely the same naming strategy as their authors. This has, on occasion, introduced an inadvertent foreignising effect into the texts in question. By following Tokarczuk’s use of the – for her Polish readers – familiar ‘Wrocław’, Antonia Lloyd-Jones, for example, has actually introduced an unfamiliar, foreignising element in her translation of Dom dzienny, dom nocny, from the perspective of Anglophone readers. At the same time, her decision implies the untranslatability of ‘Wrocław’, whereas it is eminently translatable as ‘Breslau’. However, Esther Kinsky’s decision to follow Joanna Bator in her use of ‘Breslau’ but Polish toponyms for all other places in the ZO is equally problematic, if not more so, as it foreignises all toponyms in the former German territories except ‘Breslau’. By attempting to avoid the potential political ramifications of making specific place-name choices appropriate for an Anglophone readership, both translators have treated the relevant text sections as non-translatable insertions. Rather than playing down the importance of allonomic choice in relation to this region, this strategy has highlighted it as an unresolved issue. To this extent, the toponymic reinscription of the ZO continues to leave traces in literature despite the fact that it is no longer considered a prominent or emotive issue within the relevant collective memory / historical discourse.

The reaction of Polish, German and other cartographers to Poland’s annexation and resettlement of parts of Germany in 1945 and to the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO has been complex. On the whole, is true to say that political developments in relation to the Polish frontiers and other postwar geo-political configurations, such as the establishment of two ideologically

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595 Sabrina Janesch is half-German, half-Polish. Her mother grew up on a farm in (Polish) Lower Silesia where her maternal grandfather was forced to resettle after being driven out of East Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists. See: Janesch, S., 03.02.2013, Autobiographical Content in the Novel ‘Katzenberge’ (Email).
opposing blocs during the Cold War, have been reflected in the mapping of the ZO by cartographers around the world. However, the cartographic products analysed above demonstrate that the reaction of cartographers and publishing houses to political developments within the region have been slow and uneven. Whilst the majority of these maps and atlases do treat the ZO differently to other parts of the world, in many cases, certainly outside of the immediate stakeholder nations (Germany, Poland, and the USSR), it is difficult to reconcile these differences with the overt political alignments one expects to see in the context of the Cold War.

In the immediate postwar era, Polish cartographers played a leading role in establishing the Piast Formula as a rationale for the annexation of parts of Germany. They attended peace conferences to defend Poland’s western frontier and were involved in the resettlement and regional planning of the ZO. This ideological orientation is reflected in their cartographic output. The *Atlas Polski* (1953), for example, presents an overtly politicised view of the region, omitting any reference to the *de jure* status of the ZO and depicting the situation as if the annexation had been accepted and ratified when in fact it was still challenged by the FRG. It also expunges non-Polish Slavic allonyms attested in earlier documents, such as *Polskie-nazwy śląskich miejscowości z patentu Fryderyka II* (1750) and maps such as *Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (1934). The (Polish) *Pergamon World Atlas* (1968), presents a similarly confident view of the region, with nothing to indicate or acknowledge West German territorial aspirations and claims. It continues to refer to the annexed territories as the ‘recovered territories’ and refers to the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western border, with no comments or caveats. In addition, it shows only Polish toponyms for the – from a *de jure* perspective at the date of publication – still German towns in the ZO. A decade later, and in an apparent rejection of the spirit of détente taking hold within the wider collective memory discourse following the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970, the *Narodowy Atlas Polski* (1978) is aggressively assertive about Poland’s annexation of the ZO. The editors’ decision to refer to the ‘recovery of the western and northern territories’ (my italics) can be interpreted as a conscious rejection of German attempts to normalise the postwar situation. More recently, the *Atlas historii Polski* (2011) uses modern Polish
allonyms wherever these exist. This approach distorts the historical record in some interesting ways, for example by failing to reinstate those non-Polish toponyms expunged during the most zealous phase of the TRJN’s toponymic reinscription of the ZO.

Soviet atlases, such as the The World Atlas (1967) depicted Eastern and Western Europe in simple terms throughout the Cold War era. This volume shows all *de facto* postwar borders as if they already had *de jure* status, despite outstanding claims on the part of the FRG. Similarly, it shows only Polish names for all towns and cities in postwar Poland, neither including historically attested German nor Russian alternatives. The East German Übersichtskarte Deutsche Demokratische Republik und Westdeutschland (1966) is staunchly in line with the Soviet worldview. The few Silesian places shown on the map, for example, all bear Polish toponyms only despite the fact that the map was produced for the German market. Another East German example, the Atlas Deutsche Demokratische Republik (1981) is similarly rooted in Cold War rhetoric. However, this uncompromising stance is tempered slightly by the fact that all place names are shown in (postwar) local languages only, suggesting a non-confrontational aspiration (but see my analysis above).

West German cartographers were slow to react to the new *de jure* situation following the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970. Two years earlier, the Deutscher General Atlas (1968) had labelled the Oder-Neisse Line as a ‘Verwaltungsgrenze’ and the ZO as ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’. From a West German perspective, these explanatory notes correctly reflect the *de jure* situation at the time of publication. However, the decision to use only the German allonyms for all places and topographic features in formerly German territories strikes one as provocative given the developing political rapprochement taking place at the time (the Treaty of Warsaw was the culmination of several years’ of highly publicised Ostpolitik led by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, *inter alia*). The Historischer Weltatlas, published in West Berlin in 1974, is even more striking in its omission of Polish allonyms anywhere within the ZO. The editors also include text about the recent historical situation in relation to Poland’s frontiers, which they do not include for other regions similarly affected by recent territorial changes. Whilst this may simply reflect the difficulty and expense involved in
obtaining updated plates, the idea is unconvincing as such plates were readily available at the time. The West German *Diercke Weltatlas* (1974), for example, already includes updated plates. In every case, the modern German allonym appears first followed by the local allonym in brackets, and the atlas generally appears to reflect the *de jure* geo-political situation in Central Europe. However, the cartography team’s unique treatment of the two allonyms ‘Breslau’ and ‘Wrocław’ (see above) and the unexplained inclusion of the pre-Treaty-of-Warsaw frontier as asserted by the FRG disrupt the implied narrative of acceptance of the status quo. Thus, until the mid 1970s, traces of the ongoing collective memory discourse pertaining to Poland’s annexation of parts of Germany in 1945 and the concomittant expulsions and toponymic reinscription of the region, can be discerned in West German maps. This is no longer the case in more recent German atlases such as the *Diercke Weltatlas* (2006), which implements a consistent toponymic strategy for all areas around the world including Poland and the ZO. Wherever a German allonym exists it is used as the principal identifier with local allonyms following in brackets. There are no exceptions.

Cartographic artefacts produced beyond the region immediately affected by Poland’s postwar frontier changes do not reflect any consistent national bias. Were these products consistently aligned, for example, with the Cold War fronts, then one would expect to observe a preference for the *de jure* situation as understood by the FRG at the time of publication. Instead, one gets the impression that a certain amount of confusion existed among the Western Allies about the current status of Poland’s frontiers at any given time. In France, the *Atlas général* (1959) follows the Russian and Polish approach in showing the postwar border situation with no additional commentary, thus suggesting an acceptance of the *Görlitzer Vertrag* and a *de jure* permance of the situation that would not actually obtain until 1970. Another French atlas published just four years later presents an entirely different worldview. In the French *Atlas of Western Europe* (1963), Poland’s current borders are drawn in a line-type labelled in the legend as ‘de facto boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe’. Germany and Poland are still depicted in their pre-war configurations with *de facto* borders superimposed to show the territorial extent of postwar Poland. This does not suggest any
recognition of the likely permanence of the situation or of the Görlitzer Vertrag. The situation is similarly contradictory among Anglophone cartographers. Hammond’s World Atlas (1948) includes relevant information about the difference between the de facto and de jure status of the ZO, but also some potentially misleading information that seems to indicate the permanence of the situation. Poland is the only country in which Anglophone allonyms are completely absent, suggesting its special status in the minds of the cartographers. A map of Central Europe including the Balkan States (1951) by National Geographic Society includes German/Anglophone allonyms for all places within the ZO, but not for other places in Poland, indicating that the ZO is, in fact, different to the rest of Poland (the FRG view). The Citizen's Atlas of the World (1952), by contrast depicts Poland’s postwar frontiers as international boundaries, which corresponds to the GDR’s worldview, not that of the FRG. However, the map of Western and Central Europe is overlayed with a thick yellow line labelled ‘1938 Boundary of Germany’, suggesting the continuing importance of this fact. Thirty years later the Philips’ New Practical Atlas (1981) is highly inconsistent in its use of allonyms. For example, Kaliningrad, Śląsk, and Wrocław are all included in both their local and English/German versions. However, only the modern Polish allonyms are given for minor former German towns, such as Waldenburg (Wałbrzych). Moving forward a decade and a half, the Dorling Kindersley World Atlas (1997) implements a general policy of using local allonyms as the main toponymic identifier followed by the relevant English allonym in brackets throughout the world except for the ZO, where only the Polish allonyms are used. The Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World (1997) takes a very similar approach, but differentiates between former German territory annexed by Poland and by Russia. For example, the general policy would have required Wrocław (Breslau), whereas the Polish allonym alone is used. By contrast, Russian allonyms are used in conjunction with English allonyms in northern East Prussia: e.g., Kaliningrad (Königsberg). Only local allonyms are used throughout the Kresy. Another fifteen years later, the Times Desktop Atlas (2012) also diverges from its general naming policy for all areas annexed and lost by Poland in 1945. Their general policy stipulates the use of the English allonym first followed by the local variant in brackets. However, only the local allonym
(Polish or Russian) is used in historically German areas, whilst the pattern is reversed in the *Kresy*.

What this analysis reveals is that, even recent cartographic products created far away from the region in question and, in the final example, published a full 67 years after the annexation of, expulsions from, resettlement in and toponymic reinscription of the ZO, the concomitant collective memory discourse has left its trace, however faint. There remains a broad potential for future research in this area as it is by no means obvious in which specific cases seemingly politically-motivated decisions, or those which are amenable to interpretation within the discourse in question, are taken in response to political pressures to conform to a certain narrative or are the result of an unconscious acceptance of dominant cultural paradigms or, alternatively, reflect economic concerns. It is highly likely that at least a subset of all cases examined will be the result of a combination of several or all of these factors.

In the next two chapters, I turn to Polish and German literature to track the relevant discourse in one of its more explicit modes.
6: Festung Breslau in German Literature

6.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the contribution of literature and the study of literature to specific collective memory discourses and analyses. The novels I analyse in this chapter are representative of a genre to which I shall refer in the following discussion as ‘quasi-autobiographical novels’, which I define and justify below (Section 6.3). In addition, they were produced by authors who were eye-witnesses to the events they describe in the novels, but who, at the time of writing, lived in separate German states (the FRG and GDR respectively) and were therefore exposed to divergent official narratives concerning wartime events and questions concerning German guilt and victimhood, particularly in relation to the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from Poland. As such, I argue, they are illuminating from the point of view of assessing literary reflections of these events in different stakeholder communities.596 In particular, I seek to explore the ways in which different socio-political conditions constrain and influence the production of literary contributions to collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung, and how and to what extent literature contributes to collective memory discourses and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives.597 Before moving on to these questions, however, I shall briefly examine some of the ways in which German armed forces directly contributed towards the acute symmetric trauma in Lower Silesia that triggered the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. The events in question occurred in Breslau in 1945 and, unlike the majority of German narratives of Flucht und Vertreibung, whether presented as literature or historiography, involved German victims of German perpetrators.

596 In the following chapter I broaden my analysis to take in relevant examples of Polish literature pertaining to the same events, but in the current chapter I am solely concerned with the pre-Wende German-German discourse on Flucht und Vertreibung.

597 For a definition of the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’, see the Introduction, Section 1.1.
6.2 Acute Symmetric Trauma

6.2.1 Breslau 1944

Compared with other German cities, Breslau in Lower Silesia had been relatively safe until late 1944. Military discipline had been lax and the atmosphere calm. The city had been considered so secure that, when author Hugo Hartung evacuated his family from Silesia prior to the Soviet invasion, his comrades teased him mercilessly for his seemingly unnecessary caution. But around the same time Gauleiter Karl August Hanke, who had been in possession of far more detailed information about the military situation, had secretly moved his valuables to his chalet near Rosenheim in Upper Bavaria. Indeed, the security situation changed dramatically when Hitler designated Breslau as one of a number of future Festungen in the Autumn of 1944 (Unternehmen Bartold). Each of these was to be defended ‘to the last man’ against the expected onslaught of the Red Army. Accordingly, Breslau was prepared for a lengthy siege. Regular troops who happened to be in the city, either on convalescent leave or as members of the rear echelons, were formed into a defensive garrison. This was augmented by the Volkssturm, a people’s militia made up of adolescents and old men. The Volkssturm was officially launched on the 18th of October in line with a ‘Führer Erlass’ issued on the 25th of September. The Lower Silesian Volkssturm was sworn in by Hanke in Breslau two days later.

Due to the fact that up to 73% of Breslauers lived in the densely built-up town centre, they were particularly vulnerable to attack from the air or by ballistic armaments and airborne ordnance. Its precarious situation became apparent to all when it suffered its first significant air attacks on the 13th of September and the 7th of October (by the US Air Force).
The Red Army offensive against Germany began on the 12th of January 1945. Soviet forces crossed into Silesia on the 19th of January, reaching the Oder to the north and south of Breslau on the 22nd of January. At that time, the population of Lower Silesia was 4,700,000 which included some 450,000 ethnic German refugees from the Warthegau and the General Government. A recent influx of refugees into Breslau had swelled the city’s population from 626,000 to around 1,000,000 people.

The Red Army bombed Breslau for the first time on the 18th of January. The resident population immediately began to flee westwards and south towards the Sudeten Mountains. Officially, only those living on the eastern bank of the Oder were permitted to leave their homes, of whom some 700,000 succeeded in crossing over to the western bank between the 19th and 25th of January. It was during this period, on the 22nd of January, that Breslau was officially declared a Festung. By an unfortunate twist of fate, thousands of Silesian refugees who had fled across the Lausitzer Neiße into Saxony, were subsequently killed during the Allied bombing of Dresden on the 13th and 14th of February, just one day before the Red Army succeeded in fully isolating Breslau.

The Red Army had fully encircled the city by the 15th of February. At that time, there were still some 150,000 to 250,000 German civilians left in the city, as well as non-Germans including prisoners of war (PoWs), forced labourers and concentration camp inmates. In addition, the city was home to between 45,000 to 50,000 soldiers (i.e., trained adult soldiers and members of the Volkssturm).
On the 1st of April, the Red Army Air Force began regular blanket bombing runs on the city centre. Nevertheless, terrorised by their NSDAP masters and terrified of the treatment they expected at the hands of the Red Army, the besieged population continued to defend Breslau even after Hitler’s suicide on the 30th of April and the surrender of Berlin on the 2nd of May. Breslau finally capitulated on the 6th of May, following talks with the attackers initiated under the aegis of some of the city’s leading Protestant and Catholic clerics. Wehrmacht General Hermann Niehoff signed the articles of surrender, in his capacity as Festungskommandant of Breslau, whilst Gauleiter Hanke had fled the city by light aircraft earlier that day, and the Red Army took formal control of the city.

Of those who remained in, or had been forced to return to, Breslau following failed attempts to break through the Soviet lines, 400,000 had been killed in the fighting by the time the town surrendered on the 6th of May. At this point, around 70% of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed as the result of Soviet bombardments and measures taken by the German authorities to clear their field of fire. Most of the regular military personnel caught within the city were transported to the USSR as PoWs. The Soviet and Polish authorities had expelled about 27,000 of the remaining civilians by the 5th of December 1945.

6.2.3 NSDAP Actions Against German Civilians

A review of actions carried out against German civilians during the Siege of Breslau by Gauleiter Hanke (Wehrmacht Oberleutnant a.D., and SS Obergruppenführer) is particularly illuminating in relation to perpetrator-victim discourses and notions of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’. Hanke had been appointed Oberpräsident and Gauleiter of Lower Silesia on the 14th of January 1941. Hanke’s behaviour prior to and during the Siege of Breslau confounds simplistic narratives propounded by some stakeholders during the

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614 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxviii.
616 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxix.
subsequent collective memory discourse, in which Germans and ethnic Germans have invariably been presented either as the victims of retaliations by Slavic forces, usually Soviet and Polish, or, equally problematically, as members of a ‘perpetrator collective’.  

The first of Hanke’s commands to directly affect the city’s civilian population was his order to construct the so-called Ostwall on the 10th of August 1944. This enormous civil engineering project, consisting of a series of ditches intended to halt Soviet tanks, was undertaken by tens of thousands of German Lower Silesians whom he forced to work without remuneration, on pain of death. Five months later, he ordered the evacuation of non-combatants from Breslau on the 19th of January 1945, driving them out into ‘[den] verharschten Schnee [und den] scharfen, schneidenden Wind’. This order was further clarified on the 20th of January 1945 with the amendment that ‘[alle] Frauen und Kinder verlassen sofort die Stadt Breslau zu Fuß’. Under the harsh winter conditions prevailing at the time, ‘[tens] of thousands [of Breslau’s women and children] either froze to death or died of exhaustion’ en route. Apparently, unmoved by their fate, Hanke (now promoted to Reichsverteidigungskommissar) issued another order on the 26th of January 1945 stating that:

Frauen jeden Alters sowie männliche Jugendliche unter 16 Jahren und Männer über 60 Jahre haben das Stadtgebiet von Breslau zu verlassen!

Again, he demanded that they leave Breslau on foot, regardless of the inclement weather conditions. The next day, he ordered women and children to evacuate all populated areas on the left-bank of the Oder but decreed that men were to remain at their homes.

Around 3-400,000 civilians, mostly elderly citizens, women and children left Breslau during this period. Men of fighting age (16-60) were forbidden, on

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620 Niven, W. J., et al., Germans as Victims, p. 15.
621 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 27.
622 Ibid.
625 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxi.
626 Hanke, K. A., Breslau, Anordnung zur Evakuierung (Poster).
pain of death, from deserting the town. Those who did, even if only to see their families to safety, were summarily and publically executed by firing squad in the market square, and on Hanke’s express orders. This was the fate of Wolfgang Spielhagen Mayor of Breslau. Hanke announced such executions on officially printed posters placed at prominent points around the city.628

Another decree issued by the Special Plenipotentiary of the Army Group, (Wehrmacht) General Koch-Erpach, stated that as of the 2nd of February 1945, everybody over the age of ten years old still remaining in Breslau and not being a member of either the Wehrmacht or the Volksturm would require a proof of authority to remain in the town, which would only be issued by the NSDAP authorities.629 On the 7th of March 1945 the authorities decreed that everyone in the city, starting with boys aged ten and over, and girls over the age of twelve, would be obliged to carry out work ‘regardless of the dangers involved. Anyone who refused to work was shot on the spot’.630 Those who deserted their posts were dealt with severely by the NSDAP.631

Thus, decisions taken by the NSDAP (Hitler, Hanke) and implemented with the aid of the Wehrmacht (Niehoff, Koch-Erpach) resulted directly in the death and injury of German civilians. However, it is precisely this type of complex detail, which is often omitted from black-and-white accounts of WWII and/or the Vertreibungen, in which ‘Germans’ are represented as an undifferentiated collective, either of perpetrators or of victims. Moreover, this episode in German history represents an example of the kind of acute symmetric trauma that often triggers long-term collective memory discourses. Accordingly, it has spawned a rich literature comprising life writing and historical fiction to which I now turn.

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630 See decree signed by Gauleiter Hanke and Festungskommandant Niehoff on March 07, 1945, stipulating the introduction of forced labour for all male residents of Breslau over the age of ten years and females over the age of twelve years. reproduced in: *ibid.* p. 147; Thum, G., *Uprooted*, p. xxv.

6.3 Key Texts and Authors
This chapter is centred on a comparison between two key texts by eyewitnesses to the siege and fall of Breslau: *Der Himmel war unten* (1951) by Hugo Andreas Hartung, and *Schlesisches Himmelreich* (1968) by Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss.632 These novels were published in completely different socio-political conditions, as the authors lived and wrote in the Federal Republic of Germany (Hartung) and German Democratic Republic (Rauchfuss), and were therefore subject to divergent official narratives about the fall of Breslau and the loss of German Silesia to Poland. In addition, the two authors were each working under a different set of socio-political constraints (see below). Nevertheless, both novels directly address the German-German expulsions in the lead up to the Siege of Breslau and can be productively compared and contrasted in this context.633 The results of such a close comparative reading are particularly informative in relation to postwar collective memory discourse in the two German states. Moreover, such a German-German (i.e., FRG v. GDR) comparison directly addresses the particularities of literature-based discourse. By focusing on the similarities and differences between shared topoi in the works of East and West German authors, my analysis specifically illuminates the contribution literature can make to the creation of hegemonic historical narratives, as accepted within a specific socio-cultural space, toward which, as I contend, collective memory discourse is ultimately directed.

Hugo Hartung’s oeuvre bridges the gap between academic History, life writing, and the short story. In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with his novel *Der Himmel war unten*, which has been described as a ‘Roman zwischen Dichtung und Reportage’.634 This text is a literary reworking of Hartung’s own experiences during the siege of Breslau. He documented these in a set of diaries, which he later published under the title *Schlesien 1944/45: Aufzeichnungen und Tagebücher* (1956). These diaries represent an important historical source for the

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632 Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*; Rauchfuss, H. M., *Schlesisches Himmelreich* (Leipzig: Paul List, 1968). An alternative spelling of 'Rauchfuss' that one frequently encounters is 'Rauchfuß'. Throughout this thesis I adhere to the former, simply because that is the spelling reproduced in the specific edition of the novel in question to which I refer.

633 Further reasons for my selection of these two specific texts are provided in the relevant sections below.

Siege of Breslau, and have been used as such by historians. As a glance at my footnotes will reveal, along with the diaries of the Reverend Paul Peikert, Hartung’s diaries are one of my main sources for the specific events in question. They are particularly informative in relation to the experiences of military personnel during the siege.

Having earned a PhD in literary studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich in 1928, Hartung embarked on a career encompassing the performing arts and literature. As of 1929 he wrote satirical pieces for the magazines Simplicissimus, Jugend, Stachelschwein, Querschnitt, and other satirist publications, under the Pseudonym ‘N. Dymion’. He also worked as a dramatist, storyteller, author of radio dramas, novels, short stories and historical reference works. These activities brought him to the attention of the NSDAP censor who had begun to interfere in the freedom of artists and theatre directors as early as the 30th of January 1933 demanding, for example, that the latter adhere to a ‘zeitgenössischen Spielplan’. The result was falling visitor numbers which caused many producers to concentrate on those classics which were both ideologically sound (from an NSDAP perspective) and entertaining to the public. Hartung resisted this trend and his career as an author was temporarily halted in 1936 when the NSDAP forbade him to write. This act of censorship was the result of an accumulation of minor infringements against NSDAP

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635 Kempowski, for example quotes three of Hartung's diary entries in: Kempowski, W., Das Echolot: Abgesang ‘45: ein kollektives Tagebuch (Munich: Random House, 2005), pp. 85-87. These entries cover April 20, 25, and 28, 1945 respectively. Kempowski mistakenly reproduces Hartung’s diary entry from April 28, 1945 under the date April 30, 1945.

636 Peikert’s diaries were published in 2004 by, and with introductory comments by, Karol Jonca and Alfred Konieczny under the title "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers: 22. Januar bis 6. Mai 1945.

637 Stein, C., 03.02.2013, Hugo Hartung at LMU Munich (Email).


639 Hartung was employed as a dramatic advisor to the Bayerischen Landesbühne (1928-1931), a radio editor in Munich (1931-1936) and principle dramatist at the Oldenburg State Theatre (1936-1940), before taking on the same role at the Städtischen Bühnen in Breslau in 1940. See: Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 1; Neumann, K.-H., Theater in Oldenburg: Wesen und Werden einer nordwestdeutschen Bühne (Oldenburg: Holzberg, 1982), pp. 141-43; Kempowski, W., Das Echolot: Abgesang ‘45, p. 464.


sensibilities, including ridiculing the future *Führer* in a 1929 edition of *Simplicissimus*.\(^{643}\)

At the age of 42, Hartung was drafted into the German forces in Breslau in 1944, and was later thrown into the defence of the town with no military training.\(^{644}\) He was injured in the fighting and captured by the Red Army. During his time as a PoW, part of his diary was lost and never recovered.\(^{645}\)

The foregoing short biography contains three points of particular relevance for the current chapter. First, Hartung’s anti-NSDAP stance is important in the context of the ‘good Germans versus bad German’ *topos* (see below). Second, he witnessed the events in question as an active, adult participant and mature writer, and recorded them as they unfolded. His *Aufzeichnungen und Tagebücher* can, therefore, be considered a primary document for the relevant history (and are in fact used as such by historians). This fact is significant in respect of one of my research questions pertaining to the contribution of literature to collective memory discourses and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. The fact that Hartung based part of his literary *oeuvre*, including *Der Himmel war unten*, on a non-literary text he produced himself, to which historians refer for first-hand evidence, is a potent illustration of the multi-directionality of collective memory discourse. Viewed in this light, it is more appropriate to talk in terms of interstices and interfaces between literature and historiography rather than seeking to identify unambiguous differences. The third point of interest in Hartung’s biography is the gap in his contemporary record of events due to the loss of parts of his diary during his time in Soviet captivity. The missing diary entries cover the period from the 13\(^{th}\) of December 1944 to the 19\(^{th}\) of January 1945.\(^{646}\) This, together with differences between Hartung and the protagonist of *Der Himmel war unten*, which the author signals throughout the text (see below), demonstrates that, regardless of how convincing a given novel may be in terms of historical verisimilitude, it ought never to be treated as simply history disguised under a veneer of literariness. Moreover, it reveals the epigraph to *Der Himmel war unten* – ‘Mögen

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\(^{643}\) In the article in question, Hartung described a ‘Hitolf Adler’ presenting the American exotic dancer Josephine Baker with a swastika-shaped cookie cutter after an appearance scheduled to take place the following year (February 15-19, 1930) at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich. See: Dymion, N., *‘Münchner Bakeriana’*, in *Simplicissimus*, (Stuttgart: Albert Langen und Th. Th. Heine, 1929), p. 634.


andere es anders gesehen haben – ich sah es so ...’ – as, at least in part, a literary device, rather than an unambiguous statement by the author to the effect that the novel is based entirely on actual events.647

The second author considered in this Chapter is Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss, who was born in Breslau and died in Leipzig.648 Her father had been an officer in the Imperial Guard and her mother was French. Rauchfuss was expelled from the Lyzeum in Breslau for taking sides with her Jewish friend against the school authorities (an episode repeated by her alter ego in Schlesisches Himmelreich). Rauchfuss fled Breslau in 1945 and spent over a year in Cieplice near Jelenia Góra (formerly Hirschberg) working at a Polish garden nursery before moving to Leipzig. There she worked in an accounting department and then in radio, during which time two of her short stories were broadcast. She became a freelance author in 1952.649 During her writing career, Rauchfuss produced cabaret texts, chansons, and television plays as well as seventeen volumes containing novels, short stories, and poems.650 Her career profile, therefore, overlaps with that of Hartung although it began a quarter of a century later. Between 1967 and 1976, Rauchfuss was an inoffizielle Mitarbeiterin for the GDR’s Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi). It is not currently known to what extent this arrangement was voluntary.651

Several aspects of the foregoing short biography are relevant in the current context, particularly in terms of points of contrast and similarity with Hartung. First, like Hartung much of Rauchfuss’ writing career took place at a time and place in which a de facto state censor strongly influenced the content of all published texts.652 As I demonstrate below, Schlesisches Himmelreich contains clear allusions to the class struggle and makes fairly blunt propaganda for a

647 Epigraph on first unnumbered page in: Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten.
Marxist worldview. This ideological slant satisfied the censor in the Communist GDR (or else the novel would not have been published), but it is difficult to determine the extent to which it was also an expression of her own convictions. To my knowledge, Rauchfuss neither publically disavowed East German Communism nor demonstratively endorsed Western Capitalism after the Wende.

The second point of interest is that, by defying the authorities and defending her Jewish school friend to her own detriment, Rauchfuss, like Hartung, demonstrated an anti-NSDAP stance at a time when the party controlled all aspects of German life. Conversely, her complicity with the GDR regime is problematic in the context of the ‘good Germans versus bad German’ *topos* (see below). Third, Rauchfuss witnessed the siege of Breslau as an active, adult participant, but did not, to our knowledge, record them as they unfolded. Therefore, her contribution to the relevant discourse has been made exclusively through fictional literature, an interesting point of difference between Rauchfuss and Hartung.

Both *Der Himmel war unten* and *Schlesisches Himmelreich* can be interpreted as ‘quasi-autobiographical novels’, which is to say that they are centred on a main protagonist (Werner Rönnig and Carlotta Fähndrich respectively) who, as is evident from biographical and autobiographical sources, strongly resemble the authors.653 This resemblance is physical, ideological, familial, and professional (i.e., they are described working in the same or similar professions to those pursued by the authors). In addition, the authors in question are known to have lived through events very similar to those in which the main protagonists are portrayed.654 Therefore, both main protagonists can, arguably, be considered to represent the authors’ respective alter egos, by which I mean that the actions, personalities, and apparent attitudes of the fictional characters are informed, to a considerable extent, by those of the authors.655

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654 Specific examples of such congruencies are provided in context during the following analysis.

655 The reader is reminded of my comments in the Introduction (Section 1.4) on the cautious use of autobiographical literary fiction as an adjunct to historiography under certain conditions. In addition, however, I would also remind the reader that my purpose in this chapter is not to search for historical detail in these novels but rather, as stated above (5.1) ‘to explore the ways in which different socio-political conditions constrain and influence the production of literary contributions to collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung, and how and to what extent literature contributes to collective memory discourses and the establishment of ‘hegemonic historical narratives’.

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All of the action in Der Himmel war unten takes place in the period immediately before and during the siege. Rauchfuss’ Schlesisches Himmelreich is set in Breslau but encompasses a much longer period. It begins just before the Kapp Putsch (1920) and concludes with a lengthy section on the Siege of Breslau and its immediate aftermath.\(^{656}\)

In terms of the analytical framework set out in the Introduction to this thesis, both novels display a high degree of verisimilitude at the ontological level. Rauchfuss achieves a sense of historical realism in Schlesisches Himmelreich by using the names of real streets, shops, churches and other institutions as well as by including well-known historical events in the story. These are presented either as major historical backdrops to the protagonists’ individual lives (Kapp Putsch, WWII, the Siege of Breslau), or as incidental, datable incidents such as the execution of Dr. Spielhagen on the 29\(^{th}\) of January 1945 (see above).\(^{657}\) Yet, her dates are not always accurate. For example, she immediately follows the Spielhagen episode with another event that actually took place nine days earlier when Hanke ordered women and children out of the city (20\(^{th}\) of January 1945). This combination of a high-degree of verisimilitude with a lack of accuracy in relation to easily verifiable dated events can be interpreted in at least two ways. On the one hand, it supports the notion that the author is writing from episodic (i.e. inherently fallible) memory rather than having carefully researched the background material to her novel. This is likely, as we know from her biography that Rauchfuss did live in Breslau at that time.\(^{658}\) On the other hand, the lack of accuracy in relation to easily-verifiable dated events signposts the ‘literariness’ of the text, which may have been the author’s intent, specifically to emphasise the separation between herself and her protagonist.

Similarly, although the protagonists in Der Himmel war unten are fictional, the novel is also replete with references to historical characters such as Gauleiter Hanke.\(^{659}\) To add to the apparent ontological authenticity (verisimilitude) of the novel, Hartung also mentions important places and

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\(^{658}\) Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon, pp. 443-44.

\(^{659}\) Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, pp. 18, 37.
buildings in Breslau such as the ‘Rathaus, Staupsäule, Matthiaskirche; [und auch] Straßen (Schmiedebrücke oder Albrechtstraße)’. Nevertheless, although based on Hartung’s own direct experiences during the Siege of Breslau, one must exercise caution in terms of the novel’s alleged autobiographical content. Whilst the main protagonist, Rönnig, does resemble the author in many ways, Hartung uses subtle narrative devices to create distance between himself and this character. For example he specifically refers to Rönnig as ‘[ein] Nullnuller’, i.e. someone born in 1900, whereas Hartung himself was born 1902. This subtle differentiation between the main protagonist and the author, more pronounced in Hartung’s novel than in Rauchfuss’, is what justifies the use of the term ‘quasi-autobiographical’. As a narrative strategy it clearly signposts the ‘literariness’ of the work as opposed to the historical verisimilitude of the setting and context. Indeed, one contemporary reviewer finds the literary sophistication of Der Himmel war unten problematic, stating that ‘[diese] Darstellungsart mutet bei der ungewöhnlich massierten Dramatik des Themas fast schon zu schriftstellerisch geschickt an. A different reviewer, however, praises its masterful composition but predicts that it ‘will not survive for its artistic qualities but for its documentary value’.

Over half a century later, a third critic sees no value at all in any of Hartung’s oeuvre opining that:


Schlesisches Himmelreich is unabashedly programmatic and, as such, is reminiscent of novels written in the Nachmärz tradition of programmatic realism, the purpose and effect of which was to convey an unambiguous socio-political

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661 Alleged, for example, by Jutta Radczewski-Helbig in: ibid. p. 147.
662 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 141.
663 That is to say, the similarities are so striking that one has to conclude that there is a pronounced autobiographical thread running through the work in question. However the overlap between the author and protagonist is not total. In fact one could argue, as Mikhail Bakhtin does, that it is impossible to achieve a total conflation of identity of author and protagonist even when the author sets out to do so. Indeed, in the Bakhtinian paradigm ‘[authors] are somehow both inside and outside their work. In literary texts, interactions between author and heroes is what constructs the relation that gives the deepest coherence to the other meanings of relation, not least relation understood as a telling’. See: Holquist, M., Dialogism, p. 30.
Rauchfuss explains the actions and decisions of her protagonists in terms of a longer-term struggle between the forces of Fascism and Capitalism and Marxist modernisers. In a single sentence, for example, Henriette Fähndrich, the mother of the main protagonist, Carlotta, identifies the class enemy and sets out a basic left-wing manifesto when she says:

Im Grunde geht es gegen alle, die ... immer nur raffen und raffen und das Geraffte mit Zähnen und Klauen verteidigen [...] Meinem Gefühl nach sollte jeder Geld für Milch haben, genug zu essen, ein anständiges Bett.

Such socialist propaganda is inserted throughout the text. Joachim Fichte, a friend of the Fähndrich family and early influence on Carlotta, for example, suggests to her father that ‘[ein] gewisser Marx wäre eigentlich eine ganz interessante Lektüre für einen abwartenden Zivilisten’. At other places, the author places words into the mouths of her protagonists that amount to a manifesto for a new Communist or Socialist postwar Germany strikingly reminiscent of the GDR. For example, Matzel, the hunchback son of a shoemaker who lives in the basement flat in the same residential block as Carlotta, explains that postwar Germany will be ruled by a:


It is also very apparent throughout the novel that Carlotta’s sympathies are with working-class people rather than with representatives of her own class (the Upper Bourgeoisie or ‘heruntergekommener Adel’). For example, her main confidants at the banks she works at in Breslau and, following her Flucht, in Hirschberg, are the two janitors Bomaschke and Hinke.

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667 This instrumentalisation of literature for political ends is best exemplified in the œuvre of another Silesian author, Gustav Freytag (1816-1895). For a brief exposition of programmatic realism in German writing in the Nachmärz period see: Becker, S., Bürgerlicher Realismus (Tübingen: A.Franke, 2003), p. 179.

668 Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon, pp. 443-44.

669 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, p. 62.

670 Ibid. p. 102.

671 For example Matzel at: ibid. pp. 546-47.

672 Ibid. p. 582.
Thus, notwithstanding its apparent verisimilitude at the ontological level, *Schlesisches Himmelreich* can best be analysed at the explanatory level. Rather than simply narrating the events as they unfold, Rauchfuss attempts to explain them within a Marxist framework. The calamity of war and the fall of Breslau are presented as the inevitable result of the ultimately unsustainable ascendency of the Capitalist Bourgeoisie and landed gentry. In this narrative, the Red Army has arrived to liberate Germany and reinstate it on a new, inherently fairer political footing. The working class will hold sway in this new democratic state, but there will also be room for members of the former elite, as long as they are prepared to participate (‘Und dann tu was!’).

This programmatic content needs to be read in the context of the socio-political upheavals that took place in the year of publication. The year 1968 was a critical period in postwar Europe during which the legitimacy of both German states was called into question. Students and left-wing activists in the FRG were anxious about the re-emergence of Fascism in German politics. The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), a neo-Nazi organisation, had been founded on the 28th of November 1964. 673 Both the Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and his Minister of Defence Gerhard Schröder were former members of the NSDAP. 674 The killing of student Benno Ohnesorg by the police during a demonstration on the 2nd of July 1967 had increased fears that the FRG was becoming a police state. 675 The attempted assassination of student leader Rudi Dutschke less than a year later (11th of April 1968) by the neo-Nazi Josef Bachmann caused outrage throughout German society. 676 The state’s handling of the student protests during 1967 and 1968, together with its continued allegiance to the USA and NATO (and, therefore, its tacit support for the US-led war in Vietnam), and the continued presence of former NSDAP personnel in positions of


674 For Gerhard Schröder see: Anon., ‘Quittung vorhanden’; Gassert, P., *Kurt Georg Kiesinger*, p. 69; For a more general understanding of the continued presence of former NSDAP members in German politics and society see: Gassert, P., et al., *West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975*.


authority prompted some FRG citizens to call for armed ‘counter violence’. At the same time, however, a process of so-called Ostpolitik or East-West détente was underway in the FRG, which seemed to legitimise the SED’s totalitarian hold over the GDR. The notion of a specific, largely pacifistic and reconciliatory Ostpolitik was first mooted in a 1963 speech by journalist Egon Bahr. In the course of this speech Bahr called for ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’. This policy was vigorously promoted by Chancellor Willy Brandt in his campaign speeches throughout 1968 in the lead up to the 1969 federal German elections.

However, the Bahr/Brandt policy of ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ coincided with a series of crises of legitimisation in Central and Eastern Europe. These crises culminated in the so-called ‘Prague Spring’ when Warsaw Pact forces invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) to put down a popular uprising against the Communist regime. Although this event did not represent the same kind of fundamental caesura in the political consciousness of East Germans as it did in the minds of many Czechoslovakians and Poles, a disproportionate number of the young adults arrested in the GDR during the ensuing unrest were members of families counted among the political elite. Partially to distance themselves from the actions of their wayward offspring, the SED regime publically expressed its support and approval for the brutal suppression of dissent in the ČSSR.

Thus, just as the FRG was being challenged by protesters with a predominantly left-wing Weltanschauung, which, in combination with Bahr-Brandt’s Ostpolitik may have led to closer cultural ties with the Communist Bloc, the latter was also undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. As an ‘inoffizielle Mitarbeiterin’ for the Stasi and prominent public figure, Rauchfuss was compelled to support the party line and promote a vision of history in which the political status quo in Eastern and Central Europe was basically sound, legitimate and historically justified. Thus, although a programmatic element is

677 Among those calling for the overthrow of the state was Ulrike Meinhof, one of the leaders of the Rote Armee Fraktion. See: Meinhof, U. M., ‘Vom Protest zum Widerstand’; For a general overview of the genesis and actions of the RAF see: Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 584-88.
679 Fehr, H., Legitimitätskonflikte in Ostmitteleuropa, pp. 33-36.
681 Anon., ‘SED zur Intervention in der ČSSR 1968’.
clearly present throughout the novel, this element is just as likely to represent the author’s contemporary concerns as to reflect her feelings regarding the siege, fall and annexation of Breslau.

Hartung, by contrast, resists presenting a well-developed explanatory level in *Der Himmel war unten*. The protagonist is Werner Rönnig, a musician, who, like Hartung, is drafted into the *Luftwaffe* shortly before Christmas 1944 and deployed as a guard at a military airbase (*HoKo-Mann*).\(^{683}\) Rönnig’s wife flees Breslau by train whilst he is on duty and unaware of her decision. She and their two children reach Dresden and are still there when it is firebombed, although it is never explicitly stated that they die in the resulting inferno.\(^{684}\) This lack of resolution is characteristic of the novel as a whole. Rönnig’s ensuing struggle for survival during the siege of Breslau is narrated in the form of a set of free-standing, uncommented episodes. There is no overarching storyline or plot that attempts to *explain* the facts. This resistance to plot is succinctly expressed in the novel’s epigraph ‘Mögen andere es anders gesehen haben – ich sah es so ...’\(^{685}\) People witness events, whereas explanatory narratives (plots and stories) are developed after the fact. Hartung’s collage-like presentation of a number of intricately developed scenes with no accompanying explanation contrasts markedly with the works of historians, which are often characterised by the narration of a simplified subset of events within an overriding explanatory framework (see Chapter 3).

Hartung’s staunch resistance to adding to or embellishing the facts as he observed them also stands in marked contrast with much of the German *Vertriebenenliteratur* published around the same time. Many examples of this genre are characterised by overt attempts to explain the *Vertreibungen* with reference to some overarching framework that goes beyond WWII as a historically circumscribed event.\(^{686}\)

Conversely, notwithstanding Hartung’s omission of a well-developed explanatory model, like *Schlesisches Himmelreich, Der Himmel war unten* does

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\(^{683}\) *HoKo* = Horst Kompanie

\(^{684}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, pp. 32, 48, 50, 72.

\(^{685}\) *Ibid.* [n.p.]

\(^{686}\) I discuss one of these below in connection with the Biblical topos. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I have already noted the fact that the postwar Polish government (TRJN) also made recourse to an explanatory framework rooted in Poland’s ‘deep’ history and the narrative of a long-term German-Polish conflict to justify their annexation of the ZO and the *Vertreibung* of the native German population.
convey a well-defined socio-political message. Although less obviously programmatic, its inherent potential as an anti-war tract has been noted by one contemporary reviewer who opines that ‘[i]f the substance of this book were part of everyone’s consciousness the danger of future wars might be somewhat reduced.’\(^687\) Over and above this pacifistic or anti-war content, the novel conveys a message of social optimism, which is one of the main hallmarks of Hartung’s entire \textit{oeuvre}. Even in the midst of the siege of Breslau ‘dringen grüne Spitzen aus der Erde, die der Soldat mit seinem Stiefelhacken auflockert, um das junge Wachstum zu erleichtern’.\(^688\) Time and again the author expresses this basic attitude both through ‘stage-ready’ humour and consciously artistic excurses. Indeed, Hartung’s reflections upon life often approach the mystical or numinous: ‘[nichts] geschieht. Aber im Nichts ist alles …’.\(^689\)

This optimism is remarkable when one considers the period during which the novel was written and published. The \textit{Reich} for which Hartung had reluctantly fought had already begun to disintegrate with Austria’s declaration of independence in 1945.\(^690\) The foundation of the FRG and GDR in 1949 had then signalled a potentially permanent partition, not only of Germany but of Europe as a whole.\(^691\) One of the ramifications of this split was that the legal status of the place in which the novel was set, Breslau/Wroclaw, was now interpreted in two different ways between East and West. A year before publication, the GDR had formally recognised the Oder-Neisse Line, and therefore the irrevocable secession of Lower Silesia and the remainder of the ZO, in the Treaty of Görlitz (1950).\(^692\) However, the FRG did not recognise the GDR (even \textit{de facto}) until 1972 and was not bound by the treaty.\(^693\) Recognition of the German-Polish border by the FRG was still 19 years in the future (Treaty of Warsaw, 1970).\(^694\)

\(^{687}\) Meyer, H., ‘Review of Der Himmel war Unten’.

\(^{688}\) Hartung, H., \textit{Der Himmel war unten}, p. 136.

\(^{689}\) Ibid. p. 150.


\(^{691}\) Ibid. pp. 299-300.


\(^{693}\) See Grundlagenvertrag (December 21, 1972) reproduced in: Nawrocki, J., \textit{Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten in Deutschland: Entwicklungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen} (Berlin: Holzpfahl, 1986), p. 113; Before 1972 successive governments in the FRG had adhered to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine which held that the FRG was the sole representative of the German people and in light of which any recognition of the GDR by other powers was interpreted as an unfriendly act against the FRG. See: Kühnl, R., \textit{Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage}, p. 100; 09; Burant, S. R., ‘East Germany’, p. 203.

\(^{694}\) Brandt, W., et al., \textit{Warschauer Vertrag, 1970}; The FRG had already agreed to recognise the Oder-Neisse Line some 4 months earlier in Article 3 of: Brandt, W., et al., \textit{Deutsch-sowjetischer Vertrag, 1970}. 

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therefore, Breslau was still an occupied German city and, with the backing of the Western Allies, Chancellor of the FRG Konrad Adenauer was still refusing to accept the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent frontier between Germany and Poland.695 Thus, whilst the Allies had formally declared the end of the War on the 9th of July 1951, it was by no means certain that a state of peace would endure.696

6.4 Literary Reflections: East-West Topoi

In this section, I turn to two of the most common topoi found in German literary reflections of WWII and Flucht und Vertreibung: the Biblical topos and the notion of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’.

6.4.1 Biblical Topos

The Biblical topos primarily functions at the narrative level, and has the potential to inflate explanatory frameworks by linking localised events to culturally embedded mythical narratives. In the following paragraphs I mention several works of literature that employ various aspects of this topos, but several historical works, such as those alluding to the ‘Breslauer Apokalypse’, demonstrate that this topos is also relevant outside literature.697

In her doctoral thesis Karina Berger posits that ‘in the early postwar years the focus on German suffering was a central feature both of private and public memory’.698 She also points out that novels with a Biblical and/or eschatological motive were common in the early 1950s. As examples she cites Ernst Wiechert’s Missa sine nomine (1950), Menschen und Dämonen (1951) by Hanna Stephan, Wintergewitter (1951) by Kurt Ihlenfeld, Ruth Storm’s Das vorletzte Gericht (1953), and Jenseits der Schleuse (1953) by Werner Klose.699 This preoccupation with faith-based narratives is reflected in the wording of the Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen published on the 5th of August 1950. Statements such as ‘Gott hat die Menschen in ihre Heimat hineingestellt. Den Menschen mit Zwang von seiner Heimat trennen bedeutet ihn im Geiste töten’ and ‘Die Völker sollen

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695 Banchoff, T. F., The German Problem Transformed, pp. 34, 38, 58.
696 Grunwald, A., et al., Chronik der Weltgeschichte, p. 300.
699 Ibid. pp. 61-103.
handeln, wie es ihren christlichen Pflichten und ihrem Gewissen entspricht’ reveal a degree of religious conviction not often encountered in European politics today.\(^{700}\)

Published at precisely this time (1951), Hartung’s *Der Himmel war unten*, supports Berger’s analysis. One of the most interesting moments in the novel, and the most overt use of a specifically Biblical concept, is when Hartung penetrates the third-person narrative voice to declare, in the only instance of first person narration other than in the epigraph:

> Nein, ich wäre auch nicht in Breslau, wenn ich der liebe Gott sein müßte. Ich möchte es nicht mit ansehen, was ich da angerichtet habe, als ich den Menschen schuf und ihm als einzigem Lebewesen die Vernunft mitgab. Großartig, wozu er die benutzt!\(^{701}\)

The novel also includes a winter-birth scene which invokes the Nativity. The inter-textual reference is reinforced by the presence of ‘the Three Wise Men’ in the shape of three officers.\(^{702}\) The Biblical *topos* is also reflected in the title, which relates to the narrator’s explanation that ‘[in] Breslau ist der Himmel unten’ because all Hell has broken loose above ground and in the skies and the only relatively safe (i.e. heavenly) places are cellars and catacombs.\(^{703}\) Conversely, Hartung chooses to finish the novel just at the point when, for the first time in 85 days, everything is back as it should be: ‘unter ihren Füßen ist die Erde. Und der Himmel ist oben’.\(^{704}\)

Similarly, the title of *Schlesisches Himmelreich* appears, at first sight, to allude directly to the same Biblical *topos*, and, just as in *Der Himmel war unten*, certain passages in the novel appear to invoke it explicitly. In one example, Joachim Fichte, an old school friend of Carlotta’s father and an important mentor in Carlotta’s life, muses that ‘[genaugenommen], versuchte Christus sozialdemokratische Ideen unter die Menschheit zu bringen’.\(^{705}\) Fichte is even described as looking like Jesus. However, Rauchfuss does not develop the idea, least of all as part of an overarching explanatory concept. The *Himmelreich* of the

\(^{700}\) Czaja, H., *et al.*, *Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, p. 15.

\(^{701}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, p. 172.


title may also allude to the Biblical *topos*, although other potential explanations for the book title are more mundane. One of the protagonists, Henrietta, actually visits a village called *Himmelreich*, which represents a place of relative safety, during her search for food in the mountains.\(^{706}\) In addition, there is a Silesian culinary speciality called *Schlesisches Himmelreich*.\(^{707}\) The title could have been inspired by either or both of these circumstances. However, it is equally likely that it was intended to be ironic in that Silesia, at that time of the Soviet counter offensive, was anything but heavenly, in the sense of idyllic.\(^{708}\) Nevertheless, Rauchfuss’ use of Biblical terminology and her overt conflation of Jesus with Marxism as redeeming forces invoke the Biblical *topos*.

More recent literature by Polish authors on the subject of Polish expulsions from the Kresy and the Polish resettlement in the ZO also make use of the Biblical *topos*. Marek Krajewski, for example, employs an overtly eschatological framework in his *Festung Breslau* (2006).\(^ {709}\) More recently still, the focal character in *Sandberg* (2009) by Joanna Bator is born on Christmas day following a difficult journey during which nobody offers to help the struggling parents thus invoking the Biblical ‘no room at the inn’ motif.\(^ {710}\) The observation that Polish authors use elements of the same Biblical *topos* in relation to the same events is interesting, and usefully extends Berger’s analysis of German *Vertriebenenliteratur* to take in a larger corpus.

In terms of my three-level analytical model, the Biblical *topos* in *Der Himmel war unten* and *Schlesisches Himmelreich* functions at the narrative level rather than at the explanatory level. That is, it works through inter-textual references to evoke culturally embedded notions of wholesomeness (Marxism as a Messianic force for good), easily comprehensible metaphors for the state of chaos to which Breslau had been reduced (the spatial inversion of Heaven and Hell), and a sense of pathos (Nativity scenes and the associated narrative of society and fate’s cold indifference to essentially good people). At another level, the Biblical *topos* also provides the moral framework for another frequently encountered

\(^{706}\) Ibid. p. 575. NB: There are over 20 places of that name spread throughout Germany and Austria, but none in Silesia.


\(^{708}\) At least one other author has used the same name for a novel based on her childhood in Görlitz, a town now split between Poland (Zgorzelec) and Saxony in Germany. See: Schöne, R., *Schlesisches Himmelreich* (Munich: Herbig, 1991).


\(^{710}\) Bator, J., *Sandberg*, p. 121.
staple within this corpus, the notion of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’. It is to this *topos* that I now turn.

### 6.4.2 Good Germans: Bad Germans

A common *topos* in postwar German thought and literature involves the attempt to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad Germans’. In her discussion of the main characteristics of so-called *Vertriebenenliteratur*, for example, Karina Berger points out that:

> ‘the main characters are portrayed as unpolitical, yet it seems to be implied that in their disposition as honest and righteous people [i.e. “good Germans”], they would naturally be at odds with National Socialist ideology. Genuine pro-Nazi sentiment is generally limited to just one or two characters who, in their overzealousness, serve as a contrast for the rest of the population [“bad Germans”].’

In terms of the three-level analytical model set out in the Introduction to this thesis, the ‘good versus bad Germans’ *topos* operates at the ontological level. It pertains to the nature or behaviour of specific human beings, who, in this specific discourse, are deemed either morally bad or good, or else their specific actions can be described in these terms with reference to a specific cultural framework.\(^{712}\)

This *topos* has played a role in terms of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in relation to the Holocaust as well as in the discourse surrounding German victimhood *per se*, and as a result of *Flucht und Vertreibung* in particular. In general terms, since 1945 in both East and West Germany, people are considered to be ‘good Germans’ if they opposed the NSDAP and either had no involvement in the Holocaust or else actively defended and/or befriended Jews in Germany and in the occupied areas. In the GDR, this definition was augmented to include

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\(^{711}\) Berger, K. L., *The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present*, p. 44.

\(^{712}\) The ‘good German v. bad German’ concept is often explored in relation to the so-called ‘clean Wehrmacht’ or ‘two-wars’ hypothesis, which conjectures that the Holocaust and WWII were two entirely separate, but overlapping, events. In this version of history, the former was perpetrated exclusively by agents of the NSDAP, including the SS, whilst the later was prosecuted by the Wehrmacht, whose members fought an ‘honourable’, ‘clean’ war and can, therefore, be considered ‘good’ Germans. This understanding of events was challenged by the so-called Wehrmachtsausstellung (subtitled: ‘Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht [1941 bis 1944]’) organised by the Hamburg Institut für Sozialforschung, which toured Germany between 1995 and 1999 and then again from 2001 to 2004. The exhibition focused on war crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht. See: Lentin, A., *et al.*, *Retrospect: War and Change in Europe 1914-1955*, Total War and Social Change in Europe 1914-1955 (Milton Keynes: Open University, 2007), pp. 48-49; Stone, D., *Histories of the Holocaust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 16; for a useful overview of literary approaches to the theme see: Cooke, M., *et al.*, *Representing the “Good German” in Literature and Culture after 1945: Altruism and Moral Ambiguity* (2013); and for a good specific example of how the subject has been treated in recent German literature see: Hahn, U., *Unscharfe Bilder* (Munich: DTV, 2003).
Socialists, Communists and others whose ideas or actions were broadly in line with Marxist thought. At times the relevant discourse has revolved around the proper classification of entire groups or organisations such as the Wehrmacht. For example, until the so-called Wehrmachtaustellung (March 1995 - July 1999 and November 2001 – March 2004) presented unambiguous evidence of the Wehrmacht’s active complicity in the Holocaust and other war atrocities, there had been a tendency, particularly in the FRG, to regard all members of the Wehrmacht as ‘good Germans’ unless specifically proven otherwise. More frequently though, ‘good Germans’ are identified on an individual basis. In both the FRG and the GDR, victims of the NSDAP automatically ‘qualified’ as ‘good Germans’. Both Hartung and Rauchfuss fall into the category of NSDAP victims, Hartung for having been banned from writing and Rauchfuss for having been expelled from school for defending her Jewish school friend.

Traces of the ‘good versus bad German’ topos are present in both Der Himmel war unten and Schlesisches Himmelreich. An analysis of how the two authors use it can partially illuminate the formation of East and West German hegemonic historical narratives in relation to Flucht und Vertreibung. However, in undertaking such an analysis it is necessary to bear in mind the different socio-political constraints to which Hartung and Rauchfuss were subject at the time of writing (see above).

On the whole, key scenes in Der Himmel war unten combine to give the unmistakable impression that this book is primarily about ‘good Germans’. Hartung presents his heroes (Rönnig and those with whom he chooses to spend time) as non-Nazis who stand apart from any perpetrator collective. They mentally resist the destruction of Poles, Jews and German culture at the hands of the NSDAP through a kind of ‘internal migration’, albeit whilst bearing arms externally. Rönnig’s commanding officers, for example, sing the traditional words to Stille Nacht rather than those prescribed by the NSDAP (i.e. sans...
references to the Jewish homelands). In another example, Rönnig, a professional musician, gives a public rendition of *Tochter Zion freue dich* at a military hospital, the very title of which challenges Nazi anti-Semitism.\(^7\) Rönnig also spends time in the company of a Lieutenant Colonel in the Luftwaffe who demands a performance of something by Gustav Mahler, a composer shunned by committed Nazis and other anti-Semites for his Jewish ethnicity.\(^8\) Later, *Gruppenleiter* Michalke reveals a similar low-level opposition to the NSDAP, despite his forced membership of the party, by stubbornly greeting everyone ‘zu jeder Tageszeit mit “Morjen!”’, instead of the required ‘Heil Hitler!’\(^9\)

One common way of delineating ‘good and bad Germans’ in both East and West-German literature throughout the postwar period was to reveal a given protagonist’s (or the narrator’s) attitude towards the NSDAP via the symbol of the Führerbild. The narrator in Christa Wolf’s *Kindheitsmuster* (1976), for example, expresses her delight when a picture of Hitler is incinerated.\(^10\) Rönnig’s Lieutenant Colonel makes a point of putting him at his ease by pointing out that ‘[nein], ein “Führerbild” ist nicht im Raum’.\(^11\) And whilst the Hitler portrait in *Kindheitsmuster* was deliberately burned, one old Breslau resident in *Der Himmel war unten* – a ‘bad German’ – goes out of his way to save an expensively framed picture of the Führer from a fire. This painted image then goes on to watch ‘das neronische Schauspiel’ of Breslau in flames through ‘starr aufgerissene […] Augen, die nicht einmal der Flammenglanz belebt’.\(^12\) What Hartung effectively draws attention to in this short scene is that a significant section of German society did in fact support the Führer and remained defiantly committed to his agenda even in the face of defeat and in the full knowledge of its humanitarian consequences.

Interestingly in the current context, Hartung also refers to other ‘bad Germans’ but not in connection with the *Vertreibungen*. For example, he excuses the Hitler Jugend (HJ) on the grounds that ‘ein Verbrechen geschieht, nicht durch

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\(^{7}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, pp. 15, 25.

\(^{8}\) Ibid. p. 21.

\(^{9}\) Ibid. pp. 116-17.

\(^{10}\) Wolf, C., *Kindheitsmuster*, p. 29.

\(^{11}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, p. 19.

\(^{12}\) Ibid. p. 179.
thus, the organisers and leaders of the HJ are criminals and therefore not just ‘bad Germans’ but bad people *per se*. However, his comments on *Flucht und Vertreibung* are more reserved in terms of the ‘good Germans versus bad Germans’ *topos*.

The first mention of *Flucht* in *Der Himmel war unten* is in the context of Germans (represented by Regina Schirmer and her young child) fleeing into Lower Silesia *from* the General Government in Poland just before Christmas in 1944.\(^724\) The narrator notes that, at the time, things are still so peaceful in Breslau that it is rather difficult for the residents to understand ‘daß sich nicht nur im Osten Menschen auf die Flucht machen, sondern, daß sogar im Westen welche ans Fliehen denken’.\(^725\) However, he does not comment on the refugees’ status in terms of ‘good and bad Germans’. It is important to note, however, that in terms of their victim status, Germans driven out of the General Government are in a fundamentally different category to those driven out of historical German territories such as Lower Silesia.\(^726\) Yet Hartung is just as reserved in his description of people fleeing from Breslau. In the first such scene, a mother is separated from four of her children when the train in which she has placed them leaves without her. Once again, Hartung merely recounts the circumstances without pathos, pointing out that, at that time, nobody was yet aware that the unexpected and involuntary separation of family members was to become a frequent and pervasive feature of Germany’s collapse after which ‘wochen-, monate-, jahrelang Mütter ihre Kinder, Kinder ihre Mütter suchen werden’.\(^727\) Later in the novel, the narrator describes a refugee trek in detail (the historical accuracy of which can be verified on the basis of thousands of photographs and eyewitness reports), but again chooses not to problematise it in terms of ‘good Germans versus bad Germans’:

Da wandern endlos die Frauen und Kinder. Nur ganz wenige Männer sind im Zug. Da sind die Kinderwagen, die Rollwägelchen, die Schlitten. Da schleppen welche Bündel in Hand und auf dem Rücken. Da mühen sie sich mit Koffern,

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\(^{723}\) Ibid. p. 197.


\(^{725}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, p. 11. Bombs had fallen Breslau on November 13, 1944 but ‘only’ 61 people were killed. For details see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., *Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland*, p. 23.

\(^{726}\) See Introduction, Section 1.6

\(^{727}\) Hartung, H., *Der Himmel war unten*, p. 19.
Whilst Rönnig is clearly to be reckoned among the ‘good Germans’, any unambiguous characterisation of Carlotta in these terms, is problematic. Rauchfuss portrays some of her German characters as being ‘good’ or ‘bad’, depending upon the extent to which they sympathise with the plight of Jews and Poles. In one scene, for example, Arnold Fähndrich (Carlotta’s brother) and his father argue over the NSDAP’s treatment of the Jews which Arnold finds repugnant. He refers to Adolf Hitler as the ‘Anstreicher aus Braunau’ (an idea probably inspired by Bertold Brecht’s habitual public references to the Führer as ‘the house painter’).\footnote{Rauchfuss, H. M., \textit{Schlesisches Himmelreich}, p. 541.} Carlotta Fähndrich too is portrayed as being a friend and supporter of Jews. She refuses, for example, to join the Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM), explaining that ‘sie es Betty [her Jewish friend] nicht antun [konnte]’\footnote{Anon., \textit{Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn}; Madden, R. J., \textit{The Katyn Forest Massacre: Final Report}.} Later, when a Polish forced labourer, identifiable by the large ‘P’ sown to her garments, tries to run away and is shot dead in one of the main streets of Breslau, the narrator expresses disgust at the mind-set of the perpetrators by referring to her with bitter irony as ‘[ein] Untermensch weniger’, thus invoking and subverting a familiar NSDAP trope to accuse the murderers.\footnote{Rauchfuss, H. M., \textit{Schlesisches Himmelreich}, pp. 191-92, 96; Thomson, P., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Cambridge Companion to Brecht}, p. 31.} These scenes would suggest that Rauchfuss conceived of her main protagonist, Carlotta, as a ‘good German’.

However, other aspects of Carlotta’s behaviour are less easy to categorise in such binary oppositions as ‘good Germans versus bad Germans’. For example, as soon as the Red Army appears in Lower Silesia she volunteers to work for them, despite the Soviet Union’s record of recent atrocities such as the Katyn Massacre.\footnote{Ibid. p. 37; Cf., for example: Gleiss, H., \textit{Breslauer Apokalypse 1945}, pp. 357-58; Bahlcke, J., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Schlesien und die Schlesiern}, pp. 164, Fig. 43.} She also seizes upon the opportunity to work for Polish settlers in Lower Silesia, and welcomes a Polish couple into her aunt’s house, even helping them to steal her own parents’ money. She then revels in the spectacle of her Aunt, an elderly, non-NSDAP-affiliated civilian, being dispossessed of her house by this aggressive young couple, and expelled by the (Soviet-Polish) authorities at
extremely short notice. Later in the story, she betrays her father in two highly problematic scenes. In the first, she fails to come to his aid when she sees him being robbed of his boots in the street by Red Army soldiers. Later, she denies any relationship with him when he falls foul of Polish militiamen whilst trying to smuggle out more of his possessions, during the expulsion event, than the occupying forces had permitted. Most abjectly of all, she turns her back on her mother, when she (the mother) half jumps, half falls from a moving train, in her desperation to remain with her husband, Carlotta’s father.\textsuperscript{733} By any ‘normal’ standards of morality this is reprehensible behaviour. However it is clear from the novel’s programmatic objective that the author intends it to be read as commendable.\textsuperscript{734}

It is clear how overt condemnation of the ‘Rolle […] der sowjetischen Freunde und Genossen’ during the War may have been regarded as being ‘wesensfremd’ in SED circles during the 1960s (see above).\textsuperscript{735} In light of the socio-political constraints acting upon GDR authors in the 1960s, one can also understand why many of them chose not to question the USSR’s role in the War. However, to satisfy the censor, Rauchfuss could simply have omitted all references to the Red Army. It is, therefore, far from obvious why she portrays Carlotta as actively collaborating with the Red Army during the War, especially given the USSR’s invasion of Poland on the 17\textsuperscript{th} of September 1939 in collaboration with Nazi Germany. The fact that Rauchfuss was a known \textit{Stasi} informant makes it difficult to read Carlotta’s readiness to serve the interests of the Red Army, Polish Militias and incoming Poles as anything other than a questionable betrayal of her friends and family, on a par with the actions of many other \textit{Stasi} operatives. Thus, just as Hartung’s problematization of the role of German youth in the HJ moves the focus from ‘good or bad’ Germans to ‘good or bad’ people \textit{per se}, Rauchfuss’ portrayal of her protagonist’s active involvement in morally dubious activities expands the thrust of the moral question beyond the immediate context of the Siege of Breslau and WWII more generally.

\textsuperscript{733} Rauchfuss, H. M., \textit{Schlesisches Himmelreich}, pp. 615, 17, 24, 32, 77, 87.

\textsuperscript{734} It is, of course, impossible to know what a given author intended at any point in time. However there has been enough research carried out on human cognition in the recent past to justify the statement that people have a well-developed ability to gauge thoughts of others based on their actions and utterances. See, for example: Gallese, V., ‘The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy’, \textit{Journal of Consciousness Studies}, 5 (2001), 33-50.

\textsuperscript{735} Wichner, E., \textit{et al.}, “Literaturentwicklungsprozesse”, p. 118.
Moreover, it calls into question the epistemological and ontological basis of notions of ‘good versus bad’ Germans. Rauchfuss’ inclusion of, from *my* perspective, morally reprehensible actions on the part of Carlotta suggests that, in late 1960s GDR culture, a ‘good German’ was deemed to be someone who had not only resisted the NSDAP but also actively welcomed and supported the Red Army and Poland’s annexation of the ZO. Moreover, it was also someone who would betray his or her own family as the Stasi required of its *informelle Mitarbeiter* from time to time. This was by no means the case in the FRG in the early 1950s when Hartung published *Der Himmel war unten*.

To further complicate matters, despite her well-documented defence of specific Jews during the NSDAP period, which might usually ‘qualify’ her as a ‘good German’, Rauchfuss characterises the *heruntergekommene Adel*, to which class the Fähndrichs belong, in essentialist terms more traditionally applied to Jews in European literature (i.e., as money-grabbing misers). For example, for her grandfather, Wilhelm Fähndrich, the safe in his study is a treasure store that overshadows all other interests and ‘glick für ihn einem lebendigen Wesen in dem ein Herz schlug’. He stores in it the only thing that still interests him, ‘die Golddollars’. Similarly, when the announcement is made that Breslau is to become a *Festung*, the bank in which Carlotta works is besieged by people for whom ‘Geld, Schmuck, Wertpapiere, Hypothekenbriefe [und] Aktien’ are apparently more important than ‘die Rettung des eigenen Lebens.’ Clearly Rauchfuss’/the narrator’s sympathies are with the Jewish and Polish victims of the NSDAP. However, her strategy of inverting NSDAP rhetoric, whilst retaining its essentialist, underpinnings (i.e., all Jews are …, all Poles are …, all *heruntergekommener [deutsche] Adel* are…) is highly problematic.

The foregoing analysis reveals several instances of the ‘good versus bad Germans’ *topos* in both *Der Himmel war unten* and *Schlesisches Himmelreich*.

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736 I am fully aware of the fact that ‘my perspective’ entails a culturally inculcated sense of morality, which cannot be placed on a sound philosophical footing. Nevertheless, the same can be said of every moral perspective, and my own is the only one of which I can speak with authority and upon which I can form moral judgements.

737 Some of the better known examples are Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*, Fagin in *Oliver Twist*, Veitel Itzig in *Soll und Haben*.

738 Wilhelm Fähndrich specifically thinks of the safe in his study as an Aladdin’s cave, and this Middle Eastern reference is interesting in this context. By the time of publication at the latest (1968), the Middle East was a region firmly established in the minds of many Europeans, and indeed Zionists, as the Jewish homeland. The State of Israel had been established and formerly recognised (by the United Nations) by 1949. The new state had already fought several wars in the intervening period (1948 and 1956) and most recently, in relation to the year in which the novel was published, in 1967.

However, the differences are striking. Hartung regards members of the HJ as victims of a crime perpetrated by the NSDAP, and therefore as ‘good Germans’ based on the ‘qualification criteria’ alluded to above. Conversely, by saying that Carlotta would have been betraying her Jewish friend by joining the BDM, Rauchfuss is implying criminal agency (or at least active immorality) on the part of the child members of such NSDAP youth groups. This would make them ‘bad Germans’ in the terms set out in this chapter. The two authors also differ in relation to the subject of *Flucht und Vertreibung*. Hartung merely presents the facts in the form of a verifiably accurate reportage.

By contrast, Rauchfuss presents as commendable the fact that her alter ego Carlotta actively sides with and collaborates with those carrying out the expulsions and concomitant expropriations, and turns her back on members of her own family caught up in these events. Carlotta expresses her contempt for her parents as ‘bad Germans’ by denying her father when he is arrested for trying to take more of his property with him than is permitted by the expelling authorities, and ignoring her mother’s plight when she falls from the train in which she is being expelled.

What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is that notions of ‘good and bad Germans’ reflect culturally informed rather than absolute categories. As such, they are too simplistic to be useful in historic or epistemological analyses. However, they are relevant to the analysis of discourses concerning the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans from the ZO as expressed in the *Vertriebenenliteratur* of the FRG and GDR because they represent one of the ways in which the discourse was framed differently in the two German states. One way in which the study of literature can contribute to analyses of specific collective memory discourses is by revealing culturally-informed differences in relation to concepts expressed at the ontological level.

### 6.5 Concluding Remarks

In the course of the foregoing analysis, I have provided some preliminary answers to some of the research questions set out in the introduction to this chapter. Section 6.1 details some of the ways in which German armed forces, including NSDAP agents and *Wehrmacht* soldiers, directly contributed towards the acute
symmetric trauma in Lower Silesia that triggered the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. Decisions taken by both the NSDAP and the Wehrmacht resulted directly in the death and injury of German civilians, and account for a significant proportion of German victims of Flucht und Vertreibung.

As demonstrated in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, works of literature contribute to collective memory discourses and the creation of hegemonic historical narratives by providing cultural space for the development of topoi at three levels (narrative, explanatory, ontological). Topoi that work at the ontological level (e.g. ‘good versus bad Germans’) have the potential to ossify into generally accepted ‘facts’. As such, they could influence the thrust of grand explanatory narratives that compete for inclusion in hegemonic historical narratives, which embody the prevailing explanation of a set of purported facts. Those topoi that work at the explanatory level (e.g. a Marxist explanatory framework) can compete directly for a place within a given hegemonic historical narrative.

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 also shed light on how different socio-political conditions constrain and influence the production of literary contributions to collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung. A close reading of the similarities and differences between shared topoi in the works of East and West German authors demonstrates that, far from generating their own frameworks of reference based on specific traumatic events, collective memory discourses are exquisitely sensitive to broader socio-political narratives. In the next chapter, I turn to Polish and Polish-Jewish literature to follow the collective memory discourse engendered by the forced resettlement of Poles (and others) in the annexed areas in non-German contexts. This aspect of Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide has not, to my knowledge, received serious attention in the relevant Anglophone corpus.
7: Lived Complexity

7.1 Introduction

Despite the many differences between the ways in which the subject of Flucht und Vertreibung from the ZO is treated in the works of East and West German authors, there are similarities. One of the most noticeable of these, not unexpectedly, is the consistent focus on the fate of the outgoing German population rather than on that of the (in the case of Silesia) mostly Polish incomers. In this chapter, I focus instead on literary representations of the plight of Poles expelled from the Kresy and obliged to begin their lives anew within the ZO.740

The literary corpus explored below, contributes to collective memory narratives of Poland’s resettlement programme within the ZO and hints at some of the inter-personal complexities involved.741 The authors, whose texts I have chosen to analyse in relation to the research questions set out in Section 7.1.1 below, represent a broad cross section of the stakeholders directly affected by the transfer of the ZO to Poland and the loss of the Kresy to the USSR.742 Moreover, I have selected the authors and texts such that birth and publication dates align chronologically in exactly the same order. In combination with ethno-cultural and locational differences (i.e. place of birth, upbringing and subsequent residence), this strategy of dual-chronological alignment is useful for comparative purposes.

For example, Józef Hen and Leonie Ossowski were both born in the interbellum period. Their respective works under review below, on the other hand, were published during the Cold War. Hen published his novel just prior to, and Ossowski hers shortly after, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the FRG, which cleared the way for the era of Heimattourismus (with which Ossowski’s

740 In particular I focus on Poles from East Galicia although, as pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis, Polish settlers in Lower Silesia came from all over Poland as well as the Kresy, in addition to which other ethnic groups, including the Lemkos and Ukrainians as well as Greek refugees, were settled in the region.


742 The authors of the corpus discussed below include a Polish Jew, Józef Hen (born in Warszawa in 1923), one member of the German landed gentry, Leonie Ossowski (born in Röhrsdorf in Lower Silesia in 1925), four Poles, born and raised within the ZO, Adam Zagajewski (born in Gliwice in Upper Silesia 1945), Stefan Chwin (born in Gdańsk in 1949), Olga Tokarczuk (born in Sulechów in Lower Silesia in 1962), and Joanna Bator (born in Wałbrzych in Lower Silesia in 1968), and a third-generation author, Sabrina Janesch (born in Gifhorn in Germany in 1985), of more complex parentage, being the daughter of a Polish mother of Polish-Galician extraction and a German father. NB: References here to Lower and Upper Silesia refer to historic German divisions, which do not map directly onto modern Polish voivodships.
novel is concerned). In another example, both Adam Zagajewski and Stefan Chwin were born in the immediate postwar era whilst their texts, which I analyse in this chapter, were published post-Wende. Olga Tokarczuk and Joanna Bator were also born during the Cold War but towards the period of peak tensions shortly before the era of détente ushered in by Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Like those of Zagajewski and Chwin, Tokarczuk’s novel was published in the immediate post-Wende era, whilst Bator’s was published, like that of Sabrina Janesch, around the cusp of the transition to the second decade of the twenty-first century.

In many ways, Janesch, the youngest of this selection of authors, both in terms of her date of birth (immediate pre-Wende) and the publication date of the novel under consideration (at the time of writing, still describable as ‘the present’), could form the centre of an imaginary star diagram connecting the rest of my chosen authors and the corpus under discussion. At a biographical level, for example, her mixed heritage (German-Polish) is not dissimilar from that of Hen (Polish-Jewish), and Chwin (Polish-Lithuanian). More obviously, she shares the central location of her novel, Lower Silesia, with Bator, Ossowski, and Tokarczuk. In addition, like Sandberg, House of Day, House of Night, and Weichselkirschen, Janesch’s Katzenberge touches upon the topos of the treasure hunt (see below). In common with Weichselkirschen, Katzenberge addresses the notion of Polish ‘stewardship’ of German heritage in Lower Silesia, and, although written in two different genres, both Zagajewski and Janesch problematize inter-generational differences of perspective with respect to the lost Heimat (Lwów in both cases), and the area of resettlement (Upper and Lower Silesia respectively). Interestingly, Janesch, whose mixed German-Polish (Galician) parentage and familial ties and third-generation perspective provide her with an inter-cultural vantage point not easily obtainable through study alone, can also be productively compared with Ossowski (German) and Tokarczuk (Polish) on the basis of their use of magical realism in the novels under consideration. And finally, at a more tentative level, Chwin’s novel, the only one not set in some part of Silesia (which I have included for comparative purposes), is focused on Danzig/Gdańsk, whilst Janesch has been Gdańsk’s first ‘writer in residence’ since 2009.

As the following analysis will show, other, equally interesting parallels can be discerned between the other authors and texts under consideration. In
addition, whilst I do not pursue them in the current thesis, useful connections and comparisons can be made between the two texts set outside of Lower Silesia, included in this chapter for comparative purposes, – Two Cities and Death in Danzig – and the oeuvre of Horst Bienek (1930-1980) and Günter Grass (1927-2015), respectively.

My decision to approach collective memories of the transfer of the ZO from Germany to Poland and the loss of the Kresy to the USSR through the medium of literature was primarily motivated by a pronounced dearth of official sources relating specifically to the Polish expellees as a separate collective within the broader category of Polish settlers in the ZO. According to Philipp Ther, very little research was carried out in Poland into the Polish expellees as a distinct group prior to the 1990s.743 This was partially due to the censor who watched over the officially propagated version of events. This propaganda asserted that the population exchanges between Poland and the USSR, and the subsequent integration within the ZO of Poles relocated from the Kresy, had been successful and voluntary, and underplayed the role of anti-Polish pogroms in encouraging the mass migration of Poles out of the Kresy. The following words from a member of the Polish government exemplify this optimistic narrative:

[Even] the peasants from the other side of the River Bug who were probably the most hostile to us [the PPR], saw a better life opening up before them when they entered the Recovered Territories.744

The government’s insistence on the success of these actions is understandable given the TRJN’s active collaboration with the Soviet authorities in the bi-directional transfer of various ethnic groups out of and into the Kresy.745 Any hint of failure associated with these territorial and population exchanges would have seriously undermined the TRJN’s position.746 It was, therefore, politically expedient to insist upon the rapid success of the measure and to

744 Jakub Barman, Undersecretary of the State in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, quoted in: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 149.
746 See Chapters 3 and 4 for a reminder of the challenges to the TRJN’s legitimacy that existed in the early postwar period.
underplay the difficulties involved. As a result, the latter are not well documented in the official record.\textsuperscript{748}

Initially, the Polish expellees had been euphemistically referred to as the ‘Repatriates’. But soon after the War they start to appear more frequently in official reports under the collective label ‘Settlers’, a term that also applied to internal immigrants from Central Poland. This made sense, in terms of social planning, as the legal status of both groups had been equalised by the end of 1946. However, it also means that the Kresy expellees, as a separately identifiable group, virtually vanished from the official record and therefore from historical accounts.\textsuperscript{749}

It is largely due to this circumstance that many aspects of the subject of the Polish resettlement in, and appropriation of, the ZO remain virtually untreated in Anglophone and German historiography.\textsuperscript{750} Historians wishing to carry out research in this field have had to turn to less common sources of information. Much of the information about the immediate postwar situation within the ZO which Ther includes in his monograph Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene (1998), for example, comes from archived entries to writing competitions held under the auspices of government-backed research institutes within the ZO. The purpose of these contests was to obtain publishable accounts from the ‘Settlers’ that would support the officially propagated story of success. Yet, as Ther recounts,

\[\text{[viele] Autoren nahmen [...] kein Blatt vor den Mund, deshalb sind vor allem die Einsendungen von Interesse, die nicht oder [nur] zensiert veröffentlicht wurden}\textsuperscript{751}\

Thus, the current historic record on the events in question is informed, to a considerable extent, by literary texts specifically produced to create a collective narrative and support the TRJN’s Piast Formula. However, as Ther’s account

\textsuperscript{747} It is not my intention here to suggest that the TRJN did not achieve some remarkably rapid progress within the ZO, which was entirely in line with their propaganda of success. In some areas the situation was quickly stabilised following the cessation of hostilities. In Breslau, for example, the electrical supply, telephones and gasworks had all been partially restored to a serviceable condition by the 22nd of August 1945. In addition, schools for the children of Polish incomers were already operating throughout Lower Silesia by the 1st of September 1945. See: Thum, G., Uprooted, pp. 66-67; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{748} Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, pp. 13-15, 21.

\textsuperscript{749} Ibid, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{750} A number of focused case studies have been published since the Wende, the most interesting examples of which directly compare German and Polish experiences in the same small town or village. For an example of this genre see: Halicka, B., et al., Aurith - Urad: Zwei Dörfer an der Oder/Dwie wioski nad Odru (Potsdam: Deutsches Kulturforum, 2009).

\textsuperscript{751} Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 22.
indicates, some of these early sources already evince a considerable degree of resistance to the TRJN’s positive narrative on the part of the ‘Settlers’, which, as I demonstrate below, continues to find an echo in modern Polish literature produced by authors with a personal connection to the ZO.

Other Anglophone and German studies of the transition period, such as Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach’s Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-1949 (1994), Zwischen Stettin und Szczecin: Metamorphosen einer Stadt von 1945 bis 2005 (2010) by Jan Musekamp, and Gregor Thum’s Fremde Stadt (2011), focus on socio-political issues rather than engaging with less easily studied human factors at the personal, emotional and subjective levels. They, therefore, contribute towards the construction of a depersonalised historical framework within which the relevant collective memory discourse is conducted. Moreover, like other historical accounts, these texts tend slightly to favour narrative homogenisation over lived complexity. By contrast, one of my overriding objectives in this chapter is to draw attention to the fundamental difference between the heterogeneous character of individual lived experience and the emotionally impoverished narratives that often become enshrined in hegemonic historical narratives. In order to do so, I analyse some of the ways in which such lived experience has been reimagined in a selection of Polish and German literature relating to the Polish resettlement of the ZO and loss of Heimat in the Kresy, and the concomitant sociocide.

To be clear, it is emphatically not my intention here to treat these works of literature as historical sources. Instead, I contend that, given the dearth of historical sources about the arrival of Polish expellees in the ZO, it is interesting to analyse the literary oeuvre of authors with a personal involvement in the events

752 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland; Musekamp, J., Zwischen Stettin und Szczecin: Metamorphosen einer Stadt von 1945 bis 2005 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Thum, G., Uprooted.

753 Whilst it may be contested that historical simplification is necessary in the pursuit of comprehensible narratives, it is my contention that the loss of complexity that this process entails results in a product – historical texts – which bears little resemblance or relevance to the events it purports to narrate. The academic subject of Cultural Studies differs from History in that it attempts to preserve and live with the inherent complexity of lived experience. Viewed in this light, the pursuit of Cultural Studies addresses a clear problem within, and usefully augments, existing historical scholarship. In fairness, however, I do not wish to overstate the differences between History and Cultural Studies, as the boundaries between these two disciplines are often extremely flexible.

754 A key finding of my research into the subject of collective memory is that historical accounts tend to simplify, for example, through the imposition of a periodic subdivision of the event chronology, and by focusing on the collective at the expense of the individual. In such narratives, entire nations are often sublimated under titular states, which are, in turn, treated like sentient organisms guided by a single will. Thus, ‘Germany’ invaded Poland rather than certain specific Germans participated in the invasion of Poland. Literature, as I show in the following analysis, resists such simplification and preserves complexity. Indeed, I have already discussed Hugo Hartung’s rejection of any overriding explanatory narrative in Der Himmel war unten, which offers a good example of one of the possible strategies available to authors interested in the preservation of complexity.
in question in terms of its contribution to collective memory discourses and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. This is particularly true of works of literature that exemplify two peculiarly Polish genres, ‘the literature of small homelands’ and ‘the literature of lost homelands’. Both of these genres are based on personal memories of actual places, whereby the former deals with those that are still accessible at the time of writing (i.e. they are located in the Polish People's Republic) whilst the latter refers to areas in the Kresy to which access was restricted after 1945.\textsuperscript{755} Moreover, rather than merely reflecting the relevant collective memory discourse, this body of work forms an integral part of it, often juxtaposing shifting cultural narratives and, to a greater or lesser degree from case-to-case, providing insights into the authors’ own understanding of the issues involved at the time of writing.

7.1.1 Research Questions
In order to productively interrogate the literary corpus I have selected for this chapter, I analyse it in relation to four specific research questions: to what extent does the Polish literature analysed in this chapter support the TRJN’s portrayal of the ZO as a regained Polish homeland, and of its annexation and the concomitant Vertreibung of the German population as a matter of historical expediency rather than as simple revenge for recent German atrocities in Poland (Piast Formula)? Are there any examples of shared topoi between German and Polish literature relating to sociocide, the ZO and/or Kresy, and, if so, how do they function within the relevant collective memory discourse? What are some of the ways in which Polish literature about life in the ZO characterises Germans and the German heritage within the region? What can one learn by comparing literary texts from different eras by authors of different backgrounds in relation to intergenerational perspectives on the impact of Flucht und Vertreibung?

7.2 The Corpus: the Authors
Before moving on to address these questions I shall briefly introduce the authors and texts upon which I base my analysis. The texts are introduced in chronological order based on their publication dates, and I include more

\textsuperscript{755} Stańczyk, E., 'Polish Contact Zones', pp. 51-52.
information about Józef Hen than about the other authors to reflect both his longer personal involvement in the historic events in question and his more complex social position as a Polish Jew under German and Soviet occupation and in the People’s Republic.

7.2.1 Józef Hen: Toast (1964)
Born into a Jewish family in Warsaw in 1923, Józef Henryk Cukier permanently changed his name to Józef Hen in 1945 and no longer answers to what he refers to as his ‘prewar name’ (sic). His wartime diaries have met with critical acclaim, and, since the War, he has worked as a journalist, author, and film producer. He is an eyewitness to, and a recognised authority on, the Polish and Soviet military reconquest of Poland and annexation of the part of the ZO that runs adjacent to the Oder and Neisse rivers.

As a Jew, Hen and his family suffered decades of unrelenting persecution both under the German and Soviet occupiers of his native Poland and later under postwar Polish governments. His mother survived the Holocaust but was incarcerated in the Warsaw Ghetto before being sent to work in a German ammunition factory in Skarżysko-Kamienna. His father was initially incarcerated in a concentration camp at Majdanek before spending some time at the same munitions factory where his mother had worked. However, he never returned after the war and Hen presumes that he may have been one of many men massacred near Częstochowa just before the end of the War, or else that he was murdered in Buchenwald. His mother’s mother ‘died soon after the Germans entered Warsaw’ and her father was deported to Treblinka and was never seen or heard of again. His sister Mirka was gassed in a death camp (Hen has not said where this was).

All of these close family members were victims of the NSDAP, but his brother Hipek was arrested by the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs or Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennih Del (NKVD) and ‘disappeared somewhere in Russia after a stay in a Soviet prison camp in

756 Hen, J., 06.08.2014, Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast (Email).
757 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist. See back cover; Prażmowska, A., Civil war in Poland, 1942-1948, pp. xiii-xiv.
759 Ibid. pp. 55-56.
760 Ibid. p. 22.
Hen never discovered what happened to him. The NKVD also arrested his other sister Stella and deported her to Yakutia (in the eastern USSR), which saved her from the Holocaust. After the war, Hen himself faced censorship and persecution at the hands of the Polish authorities. According to Hen, this was an era of rampant anti-Semitism in Poland during which many Holocaust survivors were encouraged to leave the country so that “[in] 1968, the last remaining Jews appeared again at the Gdańsk station, from which the trains departed to Israel via Vienna.” Although officially denied for many decades, the Polish government now fully acknowledges the existence of an anti-Jewish socio-political climate in the Polish People’s Republic.

As a boy, Hen attended the ‘military training school for kids’ (cadets) and later became an ‘attentive and disciplined soldier’ when the war forced him to join the army. Cadet training for boys began in the final year of the gimnazjum (i.e. at the age of 15-16) and was welcomed by many simply for the increased respect one gained among other young people by appearing in a smart uniform. However, things became more serious following the German and Soviet invasions in 1939. Not yet sixteen years of age, Hen’s first quasi-military post was as the building commander’s liaison assistant in the opening days of the September campaign. This position came to entail a high level of responsibility during the subsequent bombing of Warsaw. Shortly afterwards, having died his hair blonde in a successful attempt to disguise his Jewish appearance, Hen crossed into Soviet-held territory the day before his sixteenth birthday (7th of November 1939).

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762 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, p. 4.
763 Ibid. p. 290.
765 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, p. 88.
766 Of the 300,000 Polish Jews who survived the Holocaust (out of a population of 3.5 million) and were living in Poland in 1945, only 1055 remained by the time of the 2002 census. The rest left Poland in three waves in 1945-1948, 1957-1959 and finally 1968-1970 ‘as a result of anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic … battue’). See: Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 42.
767 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, pp. 11, 187.
768 It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this thesis, to look into the extent to which German boys were motivated to join the HJ by similar, non-ideological considerations. See: Ibid. p. 237.
769 Ibid. p. 249.
770 Notwithstanding the scientific merits of this situation, it appears that, all other things being equal, racists (German and Polish) were less likely to suspect a blonde-haired individual of being a Jew. See: Ibid. p. 279.
his, largely autobiographical oeuvre. In his partial autobiography *Nowolipie Street* (2012 [1991]), for example, Hen describes a minor incident that took place in 1942 whilst patrolling near to the Don River in the USSR (in a town called Millerovo), but does not say with which force he was serving nor what rank he held at the time.\(^771\) What we do know for certain is that his wartime Odyssey took him to Samarkand and Tashkent in Uzbekistan, as well as to Russia, Sumy in the Ukraine, and other regions within the USSR. In Tashkent, he was refused entry into the so-called Anders Army for his Jewish ethnicity.\(^772\) As this Polish army, which was originally established in the USSR following the German incursion into Soviet occupied Poland in 1941, was dispatched to the Middle East in 1942, we know that he must have been in Tashkent between these two dates.\(^773\) He had more luck in joining the so-called Berling Army, a ‘leftist’ Polish army established in the USSR in 1943 that merged with the underground People's Army or Armia Ludowa (AL) in 1944 to form the Polish People's Army or Ludowe Wojsko Polskie (LWP).\(^774\) It was as a member of this force that Hen ‘took part in the last offensive to cross the Neisse River in April 1945’.\(^775\)

Hen’s oeuvre is considered so realistic, that at least one of his books – *Skromny Chłopiec w Haremie* (1957) – was translated by the Pentagon for the insights it provided into life behind the Iron Curtain.\(^776\) As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, Hen specifically states that much of his oeuvre is based on barely fictionalised historical events and that his novels and short stories ‘show the atmosphere […] in Poland just after the end of WWII’.\(^777\) It is, therefore, with a reasonable degree of confidence that I turn to his 1964 novel *Toast* to gain an impression of one of the ways in which Poland’s annexation of the ZO was accomplished, and how it has been remembered in Polish literature.

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\(^771\) Ibid. p. 191.

\(^772\) For a brief introduction to the so-called Anders Army see: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., *A Panorama of Polish History*, p. 136.

\(^773\) Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*, p. 82.

\(^774\) Hen, J., *De Wet en de Vuist*. Biographical information on the back cover; Hen, J., Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast; For the so-called Berling Army see: Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*, p. 83.


\(^776\) Hen translates the title as ‘A Modest Boy In Harem’. The book is about a visit he made in 1957 as a correspondent for the Świat weekly newspaper to Tashkent and Samarkand to see some of his wartime comrades. See: Hen, J., *Visit to London*.

\(^777\) Hen, J., Questions on Nowolipie Street; Hen, J., 12.10.2014, Response to “Compliment on your short stories” (Email); Hen, J., *Visit to London*; Hen, J., 02.11.2014, *Cider with Rosie* (Email).
*Toast,* also released in film under the name *Prawo i pięść* (*The Law and the Fist*) describes the violent, planned military takeover of a fictional town in German Silesia in the immediate postwar period.\(^778\) The protagonist, whose appearance, character and role in the plot Hen modelled on the sheriff played by Gary Cooper in the film *High Noon* (1952), is Henryk König (Polish despite his German surname).\(^779\) König, we learn, had been picked up in a general raid by the German authorities during the War and given the opportunity to be entered in the *Volksliste* as an ethnic German. Having declined ‘that particular pleasure’ (a piece of information, which, in the context of the novel, indicates a high level of personal courage and integrity) he was arrested and sent to Buchenwald concentration camp.\(^780\) Immediately after the War, König is deployed to the ZO as a member of a government paramilitary task force, whose job it is to seize the German town of Graustadt, the majority of whose German residents had already left.\(^781\) König’s group, under the command of a petty criminal named Mielecki, is ordered to secure the town and everything in it and make it habitable for Polish evacuees from the *Kresy,* who are bivouacking at a nearby railway station.\(^782\) Mielecki is determined take the opportunity to enrich himself instead of guarding the real estate and infrastructure for the Polish people but clashes with König, who reveals himself to be staunch supporter of the new state and the TRJN, and believes in a rapid return to normality.\(^783\)

At the ontological level, Hen’s decision to set the novel in a plausible, but fictional location within a broader real-world region serves to remove the events described in the novel from the stream of historical reality, thus potentiating its symbolic significance. One way in which this symbolic potential is then realised is the inclusion a large statue of Frederick the Great II (*der große Fritz*) on horseback, which dominates the market square in Graustadt. In fact, the only such statue extant in 1945 was located in Berlin. At the narrative level, Hen’s inclusion

\(^{778}\) It is interesting to note that, although Hen has chosen to set his narrative in the fictional town of Graustadt, he has has also invented a Polish toponymn ‘Siwowo’ for the town. This reflects the contemporary toponymic situation in the ZO (see Chapter 5) and, arguably, supports a reading of the novel as aspiring to a high degree of verisimilitude.


\(^{780}\) Hen, J., *De Wet en de Vuist,* pp. 19-20.

\(^{781}\) Ibid. p. 19.

\(^{782}\) Ibid. pp. 19, 21.

\(^{783}\) Ibid. p. 68; Theisen, A., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen,* p. 9; Brandes, D., *et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen,* pp. 144-49.
of a statue known only to exist in Berlin in a fictional location in the ZO symbolises Poland’s victory over German militarism per se.

7.2.2 Adam Zagajewski: Two Cities (1991)

Whilst not an eyewitness to the expulsion of Poles from the Kresy, Adam Zagajewski, who was born in Gliwice in 1945, certainly lived through the period of adjustment and settling in, during which he was in intimate contact with the victim community (i.e. Polish expellees from the Kresy). When Zagajewski’s family arrived in Gliwice it was still occupied by the Red Army which, as Siebel-Achenbach has made clear, was no guarantee of law and order or civil obedience. Nevertheless, many members of Zagajewski’s extended family managed to locate each other in and around Gliwice, and, together with other expellees from East Galicia, succeeded in establishing a Polish community among the ruins of the former German city.

In Two Cities (1991), Zagajewski narrates the events surrounding the forced eviction of his own parents and sister from Lwów in October 1945, just four months before his own birth, and their subsequent resettlement in Gliwice, where he grew up. Two Cities is an autobiographical essay, and therefore makes an explicit claim to historical authenticity. In terms of my analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), this text is of most interest at the ontological level, where its claim to historical authenticity differs markedly from Hen’s novel with its conscious fictionalisation of the location of the action. Nevertheless, although it is presented as an autobiography, the book reads like a novel because of the author’s poetic turn of phrase and the imagery he employs to conjure up the scenes and feelings of his childhood. It is very reminiscent of the ‘small homelands literature’ described above, focussing on local specifics as well as the topoi of settling in and alienation. It is highly illuminating to contrast this non-fictional text with fictional works that engage with the same subject matter, which I do in the course of the following analysis.

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784 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, pp. 3-68.
785 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 158.
786 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, p. 12.
7.2.3 Stefan Chwin: *Death in Danzig* (1995)

Stefan Chwin was born in Gdańsk in 1949, where he continues to live. He makes his living as a novelist and essayist, whereby his portrayal of life in the ZO during the transition period has been particularly well received. In 1997, he was awarded the Danziger Erich-Brost Preis specifically ‘für seine herausragende literarische Bearbeitung des Verhältnisses von Deutschen und Polen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Danzig und Umgebung’. 788

Although not set in Lower Silesia, *Death in Danzig* (1995) provides useful and interesting insights into comparable experiences of the arrival of Polish refugees in other previously predominantly German populated areas within the ZO. 789 Moreover, the narrative is set in a place and period with which the author is demonstrably very familiar from personal experience and addresses subject matter in relation to which he is an acknowledged expert. The novel recounts the transition of German Danzig to Polish Gdańsk and the integration of one German, Doctor Hanemann, in the Polish People’s Republic after 1945. Interestingly, Chwin (or rather the narrator) differentiates between Danziger Poles, whom he portrays as having much in common with Danziger Germans, and Polish immigrants from other regions, whom the native Poles treat with a certain degree of scepticism. 790

Chwin’s narrative approach is rather complex. The story is narrated by two distinct voices. A third-person omniscient narrator recounts the story until the appearance of the another narrative voice on page 69, which does represent an active character within the story. From then on, the narrative voice speaks in the first-person but remains omniscient (i.e. the narrator retains an insight into the minds and hidden actions of third persons). 791 Yet, even this already complex narrative structure is disrupted by the second narrator, who appears from time to time during the first part of the narrative before taking on his role as an active character in the novel and its main narrator. 792 In addition, for a whole chapter, the

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789  Chwin, S., *Death in Danzig*.
790  Ibid. p. 131.
791  Ibid. p. 93.
792  Ibid. p. 63.
narrator speaks as a first-person observer at a time when he is still growing in his mother’s womb.

The central character in the novel is the German Doctor Hanemann, a well-respected anatomist, who loses interest in his profession and becomes depressed when he enters the dissecting room to give a lecture to a group of medical students and unexpectedly finds his girlfriend, Louisa Berger, lying dead on the table. Having lost interest in his work he subsequently falls foul of the authorities and is dismissed from his position. When the Red Army enters Danzig on the 30th of March 1945 he attempts to flee to Hamburg but returns to his home after the family he was travelling with is killed by Soviet artillery whilst boarding a tug boat in the port of Danzig. He remains in Danzig following its incorporation into the Polish People’s Republic, and becomes an object of interest, first to the (first-person) narrator, who had been evacuated from Warsaw following the failed uprising, and later to a woman who had come to Gdańsk from the Carpathian Mountains where she had suffered badly during the War.793 Beyond this basic plot, the novel takes the form of a rather loose assemblage of episodes, suffused with thought-provoking ideas and given unity by Chwin’s treatment of recurrent themes such as death, suicide, transformation, and transition.794

Born in Sulechów in 1962, but now living in Wałbrzych, Olga Tokarczuk, who originally trained as a psychologist, is another award winning Polish author. Her oeuvre encompasses literature and literary criticism.795 According to Joanna Bator (see below) Tokarczuk’s texts ‘undermine the boundary between nature and culture, between woman and man, as well as the truth of life and the truth of a story.’796

Her book, *House of Day, House of Night* (1998) is a ‘hybrid of diverse and more or less advanced plots, quasi-essay observations, private notes and the like’

rather than a novel in the accepted sense of the word.\textsuperscript{797} It is set in Nowa Ruda (Neurode), in a part of the ZO close to the Czech border, and addresses ‘the theme of the Regained Territories and the impact of the redrawing of state borders.’\textsuperscript{798} Predominantly unfolding in the present, the region’s German past is ‘explored through flashbacks or “documented” materials’ presented in the form of ‘an oft-dreamy chronicle woven out of multifariously structured short prose texts’.\textsuperscript{799} Several of these chronicle entries involve Germans returning to the town from which they had been evicted in 1945, and accounts of Polish-German interactions that took place during the immediate postwar period. The book includes elements of magical realism and ‘leads us deeper into the mythology of the author’s native region’, a complex composite of native Polish and German histories and legends with an admixture of folklore from regions such as East Galicia whence the new Polish settlers came in 1945.\textsuperscript{800}

7.2.5 Joanna Bator: Sandberg (2009)
Like the other authors reviewed in this chapter, with the exception of Janesch, feminist author Joanna Bator was born (in 1968) and lives in the place in which her novel is set.\textsuperscript{801} In her case, this is Wałbrzych, formerly Waldenburg in Lower Silesia, although she also spends lengthy periods living in Japan. According to her German publisher, Joanna Bator is ‘die stärkste neue Stimme der polnischen Literatur’, an opinion shared by the Association of Polish Publishers from whom she received a prize for her novel Sandberg, which I analyse below.\textsuperscript{802} According to Paweł Koziół, Sandberg ‘can be regarded as a history of [Wałbrzych], narrated from the perspective of one family and covering about thirty years’.\textsuperscript{803} Translator Esther Kinsky, a German-born Slavic Studies specialist, herself a prize-winning author and translator, has usefully augmented the German version of the novel with detailed notes together with a short analysis of the plot and the historical context.\textsuperscript{804}

\textsuperscript{797} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{798} Nazarenko, T., ‘House of Day, House of Night’, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{802} See publisher's comment in: Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{803} Kozioł, P., Joanna Bator: Biography, Accessed on: 09.08.2014.
\textsuperscript{804} Esther Kinsky in: Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 483-92.
7.2.6 Sabrina Janesch: Katzenberge (2011)

Sabrina Janesch was born in Gifhorn, Germany in 1985 to a German father and a Polish mother, the daughter of East Galician settlers in Lower Silesia.\textsuperscript{805} Janesch, who is fluent in both German and Polish, is currently regarded as an author of note in Germany and, among other things, received ‘much media attention as the first writer in residence in Danzig, Günter Grass’s city of birth’.\textsuperscript{806}

According to Janesch, her novel Katzenberge represents a ‘Versatzstück der deutschen Gegenwartsliteratur’ and was inspired by several Polish novels including ‘Das Tal der Issa, von Czesław Milosz, Tod in Danzig von Stefan Chwin, und vielleicht ebenfalls Taghaus, Nachthaus, von Olga Tokarczuk’.\textsuperscript{807}

The novel is based on the fortunes of Janesch’s own grandparents who fled East Galicia to escape one of several Ukrainian-led pogroms in the province.\textsuperscript{808} Her grandparents’ journey ended in the village of Osola (Ritschedorf) near Oborniki Śląskie (Obernigk) in Lower Silesia. According to Janesch, some 95% of her protagonist Nele’s adventures, on a visit to Lower Silesia and East Galicia, are autobiographical, and the remainder of the novel is also biographically accurate.\textsuperscript{809} Katzenberge is set at a point along the collective memory timeline that Jan Assmann has called the ‘Epochenschwelle’, a time of transition between eyewitnesses to the trigger event, with their own episodic memories of it, and those for whom the relevant trauma can only ever be known in the form of semantic memories.\textsuperscript{810} In Katzenberge this transition moment is marked by ‘ein Abschiednehmen von der alten Zeit’ when Nele’s grandfather dies and she travels, first to Polish Silesia for the funeral, and then to East Galicia in search of clues about certain aspects of her grandfather’s past, such as the unexplained disappearance of his brother during the post-pogrom migration trek.\textsuperscript{811} In addition to Nele’s own personal investigation of her family’s roots, her mother asks her to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{805} Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel ‘Katzenberge’.
\item\textsuperscript{807} Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel ‘Katzenberge’.
\item\textsuperscript{808} Sword, K., Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-48, p. 175; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 530, 676-77.
\item\textsuperscript{809} Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel ‘Katzenberge’.
\item\textsuperscript{810} Jan Assmann in: Berger, K. L., ‘The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present’, p. 24.
\item\textsuperscript{811} Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
travel back to her (Nele’s) grandfather’s home village near Lemberg in what is now the Ukraine, in order ‘zu sehen, wo wir eigentlich herkommen’, a mildly essentialist notion, which Nele roundly rejects: ‘Man brauche keine drei Sekunden, um im Internet festzustellen, wo Nele Leibert herkommt. Aus Berlin. Basta.’

7.3 The Piast Formula in Polish Literature

One way to assess the degree of acceptance of the Piast Formula on the part of Polish authors is to analyse the ways in which they narrate the act of taking possession of German territory, infrastructure, and property in the ZO. As a rough proxy I shall posit that narratives in which overt triumphalism and/or aggression, on the part of incoming Poles, is foregrounded without being problematized, can be interpreted as being supportive of the notion that the Polish resettlement of the ZO represented a justifiable regaining of historically Polish territory. In addition, I argue that novels that portray the settlement process in highly positive terms can be interpreted as supporting the narrative of success in relation to the annexation and resettlement of the ZO. Novels that combine these features, I suggest, are broadly in line with the TRJN’s Piast Formula.

An in-depth reading of the available quasi-autobiographical Polish literature on the subject of annexation and settlement of the ZO reveals very few examples of overt triumphalism or even Schadenfreude on the part of characters and protagonists taking part in these events, or an the part of the narrators. Indeed, many of these literary accounts present a differentiated, psychologically complex history of the transition, highlighting a sense of alienation, unhappiness, and varying levels of cross-cultural tolerance and/or conflict. Explicit inter-ethnic violence is largely absent from Polish accounts of the immediate postwar situation within the ZO, but Hen’s Toast is an interesting exception to this trend.

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812 Nele’s mother’s suggestion is based in an essentialist paradigm as it suggests that Nele and her mother essentially come from the place where their ancestors used to live although neither of them had ever been there. This is not different from ascribing the attributes, actions or putative guilt of any one specific member of an ethnic or national group (e.g. Jews or Germans) to others on the assumption that they share some essential, inherited quality. See: ibid. pp. 41-42.

813 My use of the word ‘acceptance’ in this context does not necessarily imply a conscious espousal of the TRJN’s narrative on the part of the author. I simply mean to suggest that some texts appear to question the relevant paradigm whilst others do not and, therefore, can be thought of as accepting it to some extent.

814 The reader will recall that certain non-Polish authors, such as Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss, describe the Polish appropriation of German homes in just such triumphalist, aggressive terms, apparently with approval. See: Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 630-36.

815 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist.
By contrast with the Polish incomers described in more recent Polish fiction (see below), those in Hen’s novel are not hesitant about entering abandoned German homes and searching through the former owners’ private possessions. On the contrary, they are aggressively assertive about their right to do so and cynical in their approach, which suggests support for the TRJN’s actions. Moreover, Hen’s use of symbolic narrative devices that relate to Piast Poland suggests some degree of acceptance of the Piast Formula as an explanation for the TRJN’s actions. For example, on the face of it Hen’s choice of a German surname, König, for his protagonist is remarkable as it implies an ethnically ambiguous character for what was, in effect, a nationalistic role within the plot. In postwar Poland a ‘Henryk König’ would have continuously had to explain away his German name, as indeed the protagonist in the book has to do on several occasions. Moreover, this authorial choice serves no obvious function within the plot, and the theme of König’s paternal ancestry is never developed in the course of the novel. At the symbolic level, however, the name can be interpreted as subverting a specific important episode in the region’s German-Polish history, which relates directly to its Piast past. It was the Piast King Henryk I who actively encouraged large numbers of German migrants to settle in Lower Silesia, long before it reverted to the Holy Roman Empire in 1335. Thus, whereas König Henryk had helped secure Lower Silesia for German settlers, in the novel, Henryk König reversed the process and helped secure it for Polish settlers.

However, another interesting difference between Hen’s narrative and more modern Polish Vertriebenenliteratur is that the former is replete with essentialist references designed to represent all Germans as part of an NSDAP perpetrator collective, irrespective of their own actions during the War. König sums up this general paradigm when he says, with reference to an old German man whose house he and a comrade had forcibly entered in search of lodgings for the night: ‘His son gave me a kick in the guts – even if he doesn’t have a son – and he

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816 Ibid. p. 39.
817 It should be noted that Henryk I was actually one of the High Dukes (Supreme Princes) of Poland during the Period of Feudal Disintegration. These senior princes aspired to the status of King of Poland but their effective power was severely circumscribed. They did, however, carry the succession or ‘germline’ of the Polish kings during this turbulent period and, within the region of Małopolska, ruled as de facto Kings from their centre of power in Cracow. See: Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 6; Wolniec-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 30.
818 See for example: Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, p. 42.
kicked me and kicked me’. This runs counter to the Piast Formula as it suggests that the Polish presence and anti-German violence in the ZO is justified as a response to atrocities committed by agents of the German Reich during the recent occupation of Poland, rather than by rights derived from ancient Polish ownership of the region during the Piast period. Indeed, the author further emphasises the motive of revenge for recent atrocities by having his protagonist speculate about what the expelled Germans might have been thinking in relation to the current state of affairs. He wonders whether they might have drawn parallels in their minds between their own situations, as they were forced to flee their homes ahead of the Red Army, and that of the Poles some five to six years earlier as NSDAP agents deported hundreds of thousands of Poles to make room for Baltic Germans evacuated under the Hitler-Stalin Pact. On balance, whilst certain elements in Toast can be interpreted as being broadly in line with the Piast Formula, the action is also adequately explainable within a framework of revenge for recent German war crimes against Poles.

By contrast with Hen’s portrayal of an assertive, centrally directed annexation of German territory in Toast, the demeanour of the Galician Poles arriving in Lower Silesia in Janesch’s Katzenberge is timid and non-assertive. The protagonist, Nele’s grandfather Janeczko (a young man at the time), and his countrymen, are simply released into the German countryside to fend for themselves. The only possible way for them to survive is to take possession of the vacant German properties in the vicinity, which they do with extreme reluctance. To this extent, Katzenberge does not reflect the TRJN’s propagandistic portrayal of the population transfers as a triumphant retaking of Ur-Polish territory which was achieved rapidly and with a minimum of trauma on the part of the incoming Poles.

On the other hand, Janesch employs various narrative devices to emphasise the justifiable nature of Nele’s family’s occupation of German property in Lower Silesia, which go beyond the contingencies of immediate survival. In one example, Nele’s grandfather finds a copper swastika above the door of the house into which he moves, and in which he grudgingly lives right up until his

821 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 28-30.
The narrative effect of this is to suggest that German Silesians deserved their fate, their *Vertreibung* and the loss of their property, because they had actively supported Hitler. However, just as in *Toast*, this scene works at the explanatory level to justify the Polish presence in the ZO on the grounds of recent NSDAP atrocities, which does not support the Piast Formula.

Opportunities for social mobility and well-paid work were objectively better for settlers in the ZO during the wave of postwar Stalinist industrialisation in the region than they had been in their home regions in the *Kresy*. Yet, far from celebrating their newfound prosperity, many of the incomers appear to have felt guilty vis-à-vis the displaced Germans. In *Katzenberge*, Nele’s grandmother compares her family’s situation in Lower Silesia to that of the cuckoo ‘*indem sie sich in ein fremdes Nest setzten und von fremder Arbeit zehrten.*’ As a narrative device, Janesch’s inclusion of this scene increases the reader’s sympathy for, and empathy with, the Galicians. Janesch shows them to have been cognisant of how their German predecessors might have viewed them, and in so doing she demonstrates that they were in fact anything but cuckoos, which notoriously treat their host families with callous indifference. Janesch portrays the Galician Poles as having been mindful of those Germans from whose labour they were so unexpectedly benefitting, and represents them as unwilling victims rather than perpetrators. Such feelings of guilt and empathy toward the displaced native Germans do not support the TRJN’s propaganda of triumph and legitimacy derived from ancient rights rooted in the Piast Formula.

Other scenes in *Katzenberge* serve to emphasise the complexity of the relevant collective memory discourse in Germany at the time of writing, which was strongly influenced by historical misconceptions and a lack of understanding of the legal situation pertaining to the territorial transfers. Such misconceptions transcend the discourse surrounding the Piast Formula and are also not directly related to notions of collective or corporate guilt on the part of the German *Vertriebenen*. In one example, the protagonist expresses bemusement at her
grandfather’s reluctance to trample through the planted fields he encounters upon his arrival in Oborniki. However, her statement ‘[natürlich] gehörten diese Felder zu jenem Zeitpunkt schon niemandem mehr’ is rooted in a teleological view of history which is both anachronistic as well as historically and legally incorrect.\textsuperscript{826} Certainly it was the \textit{de facto} case that few, if any, of the former proprietors of the land in question were ever able to reclaim it. Nevertheless, \textit{de jure}, it remained their property until both German governments formally assented to the secession of Lower Silesia to Poland (1950 in the case of the GDR and 1970 in the case of the FRG).\textsuperscript{827} However, of more immediate concern to Polish settlers in the ZO was the fact that, as early as the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May 1945, the new Polish government had claimed \textit{all} German movable and immovable property for the Polish state.\textsuperscript{828} Thus, it was anything but the case that these fields no longer belonged to anybody at the time of her grandfather’s arrival. From the perspective of both the Polish and German judiciaries, occupying property and real estate within the ZO did \textit{not} constitute, imply, confer or usually involve, any legal transfer of property rights to the new residents, nor was the property deemed to be ownerless. In this example, Janesch inadvertently perpetuates a falsehood, which favours one strand of the relevant discourse over another. This alerts us to the fact that authors of literature are apt to become the unwitting carriers of disinformation or false information if their primary historical research happens to be superficial.\textsuperscript{829} Moreover, even when historical fiction is based on episodic memories, there is no reason to assume \textit{a priori} that the author’s understanding of the historical geopolitical situation is any deeper than that of the uninformed layman.

In \textit{House of Day, House of Night}, Olga Tokarczuk describes the Poles’ arrival, in Neurode and other nearby villages, in very different terms. Whereas Hen’s protagonist enters and occupies German territory in the course of an aggressive, government-backed paramilitary mission, and Janesch’s protagonists are simply abandoned to their own devices to make whatever use they can of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{826} Ibid, p. 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{827} Neubach, H., \textit{Geschichte Schlesiens}, p. 32; Theisen, A., \textit{Die Vertreibung der Deutschen}, p. 3; Großbongardt, A., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Die Deutschen im Osten Europas}, p. 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{828} Bahlcke, J., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Schlesien und die Schlesiern}, p. 347.
  \item \textsuperscript{829} There is no more reason to assume or demand that authors of historical fiction carry out in-depth research into the historical events that form that backdrop to their plots that one would expect a painter to thoroughly acquaint himself or herself with the natural or social history of a scene they choose to paint. Indeed, even in paintings by artists renowned for the verisimilitude of their oeuvre, such as the Russian Itinerants, compositional considerations take precedence over realism. See: Aigner, C., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Russland: Repin und die Realisten}, trans. Roswitha Fraller (St. Petersburg: Palace Editions, 2002).
\end{itemize}
deserted German property, the immigrants in *House of Day, House of Night* are forced to share small houses with Germans still awaiting deportation. They are met by newly appointed Polish officials, who impatiently urge them to unload their belongings before allocating them to homes that are still occupied by the owners. Tokarczuk describes a significant period of overlap during which the newly arrived Poles are forced to share kitchens and bathrooms as well as cooking utensils and, to some extent, chores with people they still think of as the enemy.

However, despite their uncomfortable situation, the Polish incomers to Neurode, in Tokarczuk’s novel, are still confident about their right to be there. Just as in *Katzenberge*, the incoming Poles in *House of Day, House of Night* erect crosses to claim the land for God and the Poles. The planting of a Catholic cross on newly acquired land was by no means a trivial act in this context: it symbolised nothing less than the full integration of the territory into Poland. As in many aspects of Polish life, the Church played an important role in the Polonisation of the ZO, by providing new settlers with a familiar cultural environment in the midst of their strange new surroundings. One is reminded of Roman Dmowski’s simplistic, but not altogether inaccurate, ethno-cultural identifier ‘Polak-Katolik’. The sense of continuity represented by the Church was reinforced when priests relocated alongside their congregations as they often did. The encroachment of Polish Catholicism in these formerly predominantly Protestant regions was symbolised by the appearance of roadside crosses and chapels. Protestant churches were re-consecrated as places of Catholic worship and German inscriptions were painted over. In some cases, German Protestant churches were demolished to provide building materials for Catholic clergy.

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831 In this part of the novel, Tokarczuk's characterisation of the situation suggests a high level of complexity in the context of population and land exchanges in Lower Silesia that stands in stark contrast to the official Polish propaganda on the subject. Nor is it reflected in other Polish works on the subject. Neither Sabrina Janesch in *Katzenberge* nor Stefan Chwin in *Death in Danzig* nor Joanna Bator in *Sandberg* mention anything approaching this difficult, and potentially incendiary, situation. Certainly Chwin’s German protagonist Doctor Hanemann continues to live in his own apartment, whilst incoming Poles take possession of other flats within the same apartment block. However, that is an issue of a completely different order of magnitude than having to share crowded quarters, limited utilities and few resources with strangers still regarded as belonging to an enemy collective. See: ibid. pp. 234-38; for a historical account of the transition period that suggests a high degree of verisimilitude in Tokarczuk's novel, see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., *Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland*, p. 159.
833 For a more in-depth discussion of the direct role played by members of the Polish Catholic clergy in the de-Germanisation of the ZO see: Zemella, G., *Deutschland im Fadenkreuz*, pp. 443-50; For an example of the prominent role played by individual Catholic priests in shaping ideas about Polish expansionism, see J.A. Łukasiewicz in: Fuchs, W., *Der neue Polenspiegel*, pp. 82-85.
834 Wilson, A., *Unexpected Nation*, p. 103.
houses. However, despite the fact that the Piast period was undoubtedly the era when Catholicism was consolidated throughout the western ZO, this foregrounding of the advancement of Catholic institutions in the vanguard of the postwar Polish settlement of the ZO has little to do with the TRJN’s Piast Formula. Instead, it is rooted in more recent German-Polish conflicts, notably the Prussian Kulturkampf during which everything German ‘von vielen Polen mit aggressivem Protestantismus gleichgesetzt [wurde]’.  

Of the novels analysed in this Chapter, the one which most clearly contradicts the TRJN’s narrative of success, in terms of human happiness and social equality, is Bator’s Sandberg. In this novel, it is clear from the start that the Polish refugees will not be finding a paradise in their new homeland, at least not one in which social equality is likely to be a salient feature. Indeed, Bator highlights the continuities of social disparities between the pre and post-annexation societies, interestingly focusing on the function of the built environment in perpetuating such divisions. Immediately after the arrival of Polish settlers in Waldenburg, the narrator notes:

\[\text{[man] fängt erst an einzuteilen: wer Gold hat und wer keines, wer mit Gott ist und wer gegen ihn'].}\n
Thus, assuming that Bator’s novel reflects the reality of the situation in this respect, the visible gulf between rich and poor, an ontological feature of German Waldenburg, survived the transition to impress itself upon the new community of Polish Wałbrzych. This flatly contradicts the government’s assertion that settlers ‘saw a better life opening up before them when they entered the Recovered Territories’.

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835 One example of a German Protestant church that was demolished and used as a source of building materials for a Polish Catholic clergy house was the St.-Anna-Kirche in Broniszów (Brunzelwaldau). See: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 251.


837 Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 15.

838 Ibid. p. 84.

839 Jakub Barman Undersecretary of the State in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, quoted in: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 149.
Similarly, right from the start of her novel Bator is extremely frank in her acknowledgement that the mining town of Wałbrzych (Waldenburg) had until recently been populated by Germans. Yet, she is careful to avoid depicting the Polish takeover as an unambiguous triumph over the Germans. Whilst the younger generation of Poles enjoy taunting the last few remaining Germans with the truism ‘Hitler kaputt’, older settlers are concerned with covering over all traces of the former German residents in order to quickly forget their situation as the beneficiaries of other people’s labour. To this extent, Bator does not represent the transition period in Lower Silesia in terms that suggest support for the Piast Formula.

On the whole, Bator’s implicit contradiction of the TRJN’s propaganda is reflected throughout the literary corpus analysed above. Hen’s *Toast* comes closest to supporting the TRJN’s portrayal of the ZO as a regained Polish homeland, and of its annexation as matter of historical expediency and triumph. However, as with *Katzenberge* and *House of Day, House of Night*, key scenes in the novel suggest that the author preferred to portray the annexation of the ZO and the concomitant *Vertreibung* of the German population as simple revenge for recent German atrocities in Poland. This does not indicate a high level of support for the Piast Formula in postwar Polish fiction by authors with intimate personal connections to the area and the historical events in question. Together with Philipp Ther’s analysis of early texts produced by ZO settlers in the context of early postwar writing contests, the above analysis suggests that the Piast Formula failed to convince a significant section of Polish society, and that resistance to the ‘formula’ as an adequate explanation for the events in question emerged almost immediately after the War and continued to grow into the modern era.

7.4 Topoi and the Formation of Hegemonic Historical Narratives

Despite the heterogeneous nature of the incoming Poles’ early experiences in the ZO, a number of interesting topoi are evident in the relevant literature. Like the tropes and topoi that have arisen in the course of the historians’ discourse (Chapter 4), these ‘cultural memes’ reveal the force of the underlying trend

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840 Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 15.
towards homogenisation in the course of the collective memory process. In this section, I analyse two of the more prominent of these, the first of which pertains to the notion of hidden German treasure and the hope, among incoming Poles, of discovering it, whilst the second involves the use of magical realism in several of these novels.

7.4.1 German Treasure

To many of the Polish incomers into formerly German territories in Western Poland, the hope of unearthing buried German treasure represented a kind of ‘silver lining’. It, arguably, furnished the immigrants with the psychological wherewithal to come to terms with their, otherwise bleak, situation. This shared dream, a topos in much of the relevant Polish literature on the subject, is, interestingly, reflected, and often subverted, in German Vertriebenenliteratur.842

According to the narrator in Bator’s Sandberg, for example, the search for buried treasure was a major preoccupation for Polish incomers in Walbrzych in the decades following the Germans’ exodus.843 Their efforts usually ended in disappointment, leaving them jaded and bitter. This, however, did not deter them from trying again and again. Unlike the unlucky incomers to Walbrzych in Sandberg, many of the new Polish residents in Tokarczuk’s literary reimagining of Nowa Ruda considerably improved their material circumstances through chance discoveries of buried German ‘treasure’.844 Intriguingly, Tokarczuk also writes of Germans who, returning to their earlier homes decades after the Vertreibungen, undertook their own clandestine searches for valuables they had buried before fleeing or being forcibly evicted.845 Whilst this idea may well be based more on urban legend than verified historical fact, it would certainly be an interesting avenue for future study. Indeed, Rauchfuss’ Schlesisches Himmelreich includes a scene in which the German protagonists are actually preparing to bury their most valuable possessions in case they are forced to leave their temporary refuge, in the hills outside of Breslau, with a view to retrieving them after the end

842 In addition to the texts analysed below, this topos is present in other recent examples of Polish literature in which the setting within the ZO is of a more incidental nature and has no bearing on the plot. The presence of the treasure hunt topos in novels of this type suggests that it is a common and culturally relevant aspect of Polish postwar collective memory and does, perhaps, contain an element of non fiction. See, for example: Huelle, P., The Last Supper, trans. Antonia Lloyd-Jones (London: Serpent's Tail, 2008 [2007 ]), p. 39.
843 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 37, 81.
845 Ibid. p. 245.
of the War. Given Rauchfuss’s credentials as an eyewitness to the events in question, this suggests that there may have been more than just a grain of truth in such stories, although my interest here is not the veracity or otherwise of the topos, but rather its role in the relevant collective memory discourse.

One of the things that their potential enrichment at the expense of the Germans represented for the protagonists in Sandberg, was a form of belated Gerechtigkeit. Indeed, notwithstanding the reluctance with which most Poles moved into deserted German homes, this yearning for justice, if indeed Bator presents an accurate picture of the postwar situation in Walbrzych, demonstrates that the incomers understood their current predicament within a wider perpetrator-victim narrative. To these involuntary ‘cuckoos’, the expelled German collective belonged firmly within the perpetrator category and they, the new residents, were clearly victims. Within the essentialist paradigm that prevailed in the Polish People’s Republic it seemed outrageous that

die Deutschen, die doch den Krieg angeblich verloren und so viele Menschen ermordet hatten, jetzt Supermärkte, Otto-Kataloge und Getränkedosen hatten, während die Sieger Frikadellen aus Paniermehl und gehackter Mortadella machten.

Yet, at least for the residents of Bator’s reimagined Walbrzych, the vague chance of stumbling across something valuable that Germans had left behind represented hope and a sense of justice in their otherwise humdrum existence in this dreary industrial town.

In Katzenberge, Janesch also weaves the treasure-trove topos into her narrative in a number of interesting ways. At its most basic it simply involves the villagers taking items the Germans had left behind, and for which they had no immediate use, to a market at Oborniki to turn them into cash. More interestingly, however, another version of the topos underpins the scene in which Czesław is showing Nele around a local mansion where he is carrying out some restoration work. His main task involves digging through layers of paint to

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847 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 37, 81.
848 For more on the notion of the incomers as 'cuckoos' in somebody else's nest see: Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 103; Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 81.
850 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 117.
discover, or rather, uncover, traces of German heritage. He explains to Nele that people are currently doing this all over Śląsk, and that ‘[in] jeder Bar, jedem Kino sucht man nach diesen Zeichen.’ Thus, in this scene, it is the German heritage of Lower Silesia itself that represents ‘treasure’.

This attitude of stewardship towards the treasures of German culture still extant within the built environment in the ZO suggests an interesting change to the prevailing situation in 1978 when Ossowski’s (quasi-autobiographical) protagonist in Weichselkirschen expressed her indignation about the fact that Poles were neglecting the German heritage of the buildings they had made their homes. In one kitchen she visited, the wall tiles were ‘voll Fliegendreck [und] lassen den deutschen Sinnspruch über dem Herd kaum noch erkennen.’ However, far from simply alluding to the Poles’ lack of respect for traces of German heritage, Ossowski also subverts the otherwise harmless, rather optimistic treasure-hunt topos by setting a macabre version it in a deserted German graveyard. There, local Poles and Russians smash their way into old German crypts and dig down to buried coffins containing the remains of the village’s former German residents. They then break open their skulls to tear out gold teeth, as well as filching any jewellery that had been buried along with the bodies.

Ossowski’s inclusion of representatives of two Slavic nations, Poles and Russians, in this disturbing episode, reflects NSDAP propaganda in which ‘the Slav’ is depicted as the Untermensch, a charge to which her portrayal of grave-robbing Slavs responds with a resounding quod erat demonstrandum! For who but Untermenschen would allow their German-built infrastructure to fall into dilapidation and disrepair, and defile the dead in their unsavoury lust for the trinkets of German civilisation?

Thus, whilst the same basic topos can be shown to be present in both German and Polish literature, the way in which it is used at the narrative level is very different in each case. Whereas Polish authors overwhelmingly use the treasure hunt topos to communicate a sense of hope for justice and recompense,
Ossowski employs it to reveal her personal bitterness and loathing towards the incomers. Leonie Ossowski is one of several *noms de plume* used by German author Jolanthe von Brandenstein who was forced to flee her home in Röhrsdrof (now Osowa Sień) in Lower Silesia. Since the War, she has constructed a well-known pro-Polish public persona, based on the principles of forgiveness and conciliation. However, her inclusion in *Weichselkirschen* of such accounts of *Polenwirtschaft*, in the case of the kitchen scene, and her implication of Poles, in the graveyard scene, is difficult to reconcile with this image.\(^{856}\)

Turning again to more recent literature relating to the Polish annexation of the ZO, Janesch gives the treasure hunt topos another intriguing twist when Nele goes in search of ‘treasure’ for her host, Mr. Adamczyk’s, elderly mother, Babuś. What she finally unearths turns out to be a small horde of Tirschenreuth porcelain, apparently given to old Babuś by her German lover during her, initially involuntary, sojourn in Germany during the War. In this case, the discovery of this ‘treasure’ was anything but good for Mr. Adamczyk. The fact that one of the expensive cups had been inscribed with the words ‘Meiner geliebten Terezia’ suggested that his Polish mother had actually come to treasure her exile in Germany. But, more importantly for Adamczyk’s sense of identity, the fact that his mother had returned to Poland pregnant with him and carrying this gift of personalised porcelain meant there was a good chance that his father had been a, from Adamczyk’s point of view, hated German.\(^{857}\) In this scene, Janesch draws attention to the complexity inherent in Polish-German relations, a complexity, which is increasingly reflected in the public collective memory discourse triggered by the *Flucht und Vertreibung* of Germans from the ZO and its resettlement by Polish victims of sociocide in Eastern Poland.

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856 Indeed, the removal of the gold teeth of murdered victims is well attested in the context of the Holocaust whereas there are, to my knowledge, no historical sources for such activity on the part of Poles or Russians after the War. Ossowski’s arbitrary insertion of this imagined, non-plot-related, scene seriously undermines her credibility as a person who has come to terms with the loss of her childhood home in the spirit of reconciliation with the new residents. At the same time though it arguably reveals something interesting about the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which involves both an intellectual and a visceral processes of coming to terms with the past. The fact that certain scenes in Ossowski’s literature appear to contradict, and subvert her carefully cultivated and consciously projected public stance on the loss of the ZO and her own expulsion as a young woman reveals the power of the subconscious. For it is at this basic, inaccessible level that suppressed resentments can continue to fester despite one’s best intentions at the intellectual level. For details of Ossowski’s public recognition as an outspoken champion of the Polish occupation of the ZO see: Anon., *Niemiecka pisarka otrzyma polskie odznaczenie*, Accessed on: 16.02.2013; ‘Weichselkirschen und Emanzen. Leonie Ossowski und ihre anspruchsvolle Unterhaltungsliteratur,’ Neue Zeit 4 September 1992, quoted in: Berger, K. L., ‘The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present’, p. 141; Anon., *Kulturpreis Schlesien des Landes Niedersachsen* [online], Accessed on: 16.02.2013.

7.4.2 The Magic of Silesia

Still operating at the ontological level, but of a fundamentally different order to the inclusion of plausible detail, such as the treasure-hunt topos, are those texts that shade into the genre of magical realism. Both *Katzenberge* and *House of Day, House of Night* fall into this category. In Janesch’s *Katzenberge*, magical realism is focused on *das Biest* which finds employment throughout the narrative as a device whose effect is to undermine the reader’s understanding of the ontological status of the world being described. However, one of the most interesting aspects of *das Biest* is that it appears to have taken on a life of its own and works in a way completely unintended by the author. In response to a question I put to her by email, Sabrina Janesch took the time to explain what *das Biest* was intended to represent:

Das Biest, der Teufel, der für die Angst und ein möglicherweise schlechtes Gewissen der Polen steht, existiert in seiner metaphysischen Bedeutung nur in den Köpfen der Bauern. Aber es hat seine Entsprechung, seine ganz konkrete Spiegelung in der Realität (und da haben Sie mit ihrer Deutung ganz recht): Es handelt sich (das habe ich nie auf irgendeiner Lesung verraten!) um einen schwarzen Kater, der, anders als die anderen Tiere der Deutschen, weder verhungert noch fortgerannt ist. Katzen binden sich an einen Ort und verlassen ihn nicht einfach. Als die Polen angekommen sind, ist er auf Abstand gegangen und hat den Hof umkreist ... die Bauern haben das sehr wohl bemerkt, und für sie war diese Hinterlassenschaft der Deutschen ein dunkles ‘Mal’, dass sie zu verfolgen schienen und sie nie vergessen ließ.\(^{858}\)

In the novel, however, *das Biest* actually defies this explanation. Despite the many indications that it is a living entity, perhaps a cat as Janesch suggests, there are several scenes in which its behaviour is supernatural. For example, it comes into Janeczko’s (Nele’s grandfather’s) house and attacks his new-born son leaving a sulphurous smell in its wake, an odour often associated with the Devil in folklore, but never associated with cats.\(^{859}\) *Das Biest* finally dematerialises on the day on which Janeczko’s second son is born – the first of the Galicians to be born in their new homeland. When the baby cries for the first time, the creature sinks into the ground and vanishes. Janeczko who watches it happen, ‘war sich sicher,  


nicht geträumt zu haben’. It is highly symbolic that das Biest – the ‘dunkles Mal’ left behind by the Germans – vanishes at the very moment when the first modern Polish Silesian is born.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 145-48.}

The fact that, although all of the scenes alluded to above take place in 1945 and 1946, but that das Biest reappears to haunt the place in the 1980s and 1990s, is further evidence of the creature’s supernatural nature. Looking through the train window as a young child, Nele spots a large dark animal moving about among the beech trees. Her grandfather immediately concludes that she has seen das Biest and that it ‘[sich] ausgerechnet mir [Nele] gezeigt hätte, weil ich beide Teile vereine, von drüben, von jenseits der Oder [Germany], und von hier [Poland]’.\footnote{Ibid. p. 148; Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel ‘Katzenberge’.
\footnote{Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 27.}} Then, over a decade later, when Nele returns to Poland for her grandfather’s funeral, she is convinced ‘einen Schatten gesehen zu haben, den Einen, Unerhörten, der aufmerksam jede meiner Bewegungen verfolgt’.\footnote{Ibid. p. 8.} This is the very same creature her grandfather had seen over half a century earlier on his first day at his new Hof in Lower Silesia when he notices a ‘Paar gelber Augen, das ihn die ganze Zeit aufmerksam beobachtet hatte’, the eyes of the ‘Unaussprechlichen, dem Körpergewordenen, dem dreimal Vermaledeten’.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 56, 63.}

Thus, whilst, according to her own account, the author clearly intended das Biest to work as a psychological device through which she could indicate certain aspects of her protagonists’ mental life, its longevity, manifestations of devilry, in the form of sulphurous smells, and the fact that it magically vanishes into the ground in plain sight, questions its ontological status. This circumstance gives the novel a veneer of magical realism which – as the author’s email demonstrates – was entirely unintended. Moreover, it places the novel at a further remove from the historical events that form the backdrop to the plot than those of older authors such as Hartung, Rauchfuss, and Hen, all of whom lived through the traumatic events described in their novels.

House of Day, House of Night also incorporates elements of the supernatural, which blur the ontological distinctions between consensus reality, magic, and liminal psychological states. Tokarczuk writes of the ghost of Marek,
the Doppelgänger of Franz Frost’s son, and Frost’s dream premonition of his son’s death by mushroom poisoning, as if they were everyday events requiring no particular explanation. Like Janesch, she also makes use of a magical, or out-of-place, beast to signpost the otherworldliness of her narrative. Just as das Biest in Katzenberge occupies an ontological superposition – the devil in the minds of the Polish incomers as well as a manifestation of their fear and feelings of guilt, and, in reality, a black cat left behind by the former German residents – so the monster in House of Day, House of Night can be interpreted in different ways. Described as being crocodile-like, it could well have been a crocodile: it is certainly not unthinkable that animals could have escaped from zoos during the Allied bombing of Germany. The zoo in Breslau, some 80 kilometres from Neurode, where the novel is set, was bombed on the 7th of October 1944. Although most large predators were shot for safety reasons during the siege of Breslau in 1945, some may have escaped and continued to survive in the surrounding area for a while. Tokarczuk’s creature, which spent most of its time in a pond, could also have been a Wels Catfish, which can grow up to 4m long. Janesch also mentions these creatures, which are not uncommon in that region, in Katzenberge, describing them as ‘mannsgroß’.

Equally, the monster could be intended as a metaphor for the dangers left behind by the retreating Germans – land mines, poisons, unexploded bombs – or for the existential threat to the ZO posed by the FRG until 1970. This interpretation works well within the collective memory discourse relating to the Polish settlement of the ZO, as many years passed before the settlers could feel really safe from German revanchism (see Chapter 4). However, given the characteristics of the storyteller, Whatsisname (sic), ‘a shaggy, ugly little gnome, [like] the sort that spring up [...] under the amanita each summer’, the creature could also represent nothing more than a manifestation of the narrator’s alarming focus on entheogenic mushrooms and the psychological states they engender.

Interestingly, the use of magical realism in Vertriebenenliteratur is not restricted to Polish authors of a generation that had not personally experienced the

867 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 126.
868 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 31, 74, 249, 139-40.
transfers. Examples of magical realism are also included in Leonie Ossowski’s quasi-autobiographical novel *Weichselkirschen*, written during the early period of *Heimattourismus*. Intriguingly, for a novel that is usually read as being largely autobiographical, the ontological status of the world and events described in *Weichselkirschen* is called into question by startling interpolations of episodes of magical realism. These are usually centred on Jula, an old Polish ‘witch’ who had already lived in the village prior to the Polish takeover. In one scene, Jula bestows the gift of second sight on Jurek who (supernaturally) sees his girlfriend Sabina in mortal danger when her mother attempts to set fire to their farm in order to be able to make a fraudulent insurance claim. In another episode, Anna (the novel’s protagonist who shares so many biographical details with Ossowski that she can, arguably, be regarded as the author’s alter ego), in the presence of Jula, becomes aware of, and enters into a conscious exchange with, the ghost of one of her famous ancestors, communicating with him through mime and facial gestures.

But, even when Jula is not present, Anna is able to demonstrate the presence of a supernatural influence permanently attached to the spot where her ancestor had been stabbed to death.

The use of magical realism in relation to what were, after all, a series of brutal, life-changing events, is striking, as are the continuities between the relevant German and Polish literature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of a profound, cross-generational ontological disjuncture caused by the type of acute symmetric trauma that tends to trigger the collective memory process. The fact that Gabriel García Márquez (1927-2014), often regarded as the ‘father’ of the genre, wrote some of his major relevant works during a time of intensive conflict in Colombia, would tend to support this suggestion. These parallels suggest that the use of magical realism in trauma-related literature is a narrative device that enables the eyewitness author to deal with the trauma in question at a psychologically safe

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870 Ossowski, L., *Weichselkirschen*, pp. 139-41.


However, this explanation is less convincing when applied to younger authors such as Tokarczuk and Janesch, whose exposure to the traumatic events in question has always been mediated, albeit through close family members and neighbours who had been directly involved. This is certainly an area that would benefit from further comparative study.

7.5 Post-German Germans: Living with the Enemy

Poles arriving in Lower Silesia in the aftermath of WWII encountered Germans in various ways, some of which have had a lasting effect on the relevant collective memory discourse. In addition to taking possession of previously German homes, land, moveable property, and livestock, they also encountered dead Germans and, in many cases, entire families of Germans who were very much alive and not always inclined to leave their homes and property to the newcomers. However, the ontological situation regarding supposed Germans was often extremely ambiguous, with many being officially identified as autochthones, i.e. Germanised or German-speaking Poles. Rather than being forcibly expelled, members of this group were forced to remain in what was now Poland. From Zagajewski’s autobiography we learn that, upon their arrival in ‘post-German Gliwice’ the Polish Galicians found themselves in the company not only of autochthonous Silesians, but also of other ‘post-German Germans’. Indeed, it is a well-documented fact that key German workers, such as railway engineers and miners, were prevented from leaving Upper and Lower Silesia and were obliged to work for the Polish authorities during the postwar period. All of the novels reviewed for this chapter refer to such ‘post-German Germans’, and it is interesting to note the shifting attitudes towards Germans and the cultural artefacts they left behind in the relevant Polish literature with increasing temporal distance from the events in question.

I have already alluded to scenes in Toast in which ‘post-German Germans’ encountered in the course of appropriating and securing the fictional town of

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874 Although it cannot be accommodated within the scope of the current thesis, this is an area that would reward a broader research project carried out on a comparative basis.
876 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, p. 26; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, pp. 194-95.
877 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, pp. 10, 90; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 161.
Graustadt were dealt with severely as representatives of a perpetrator collective conceived of in essentialist terms.\textsuperscript{878} In Katzenberge too the initial meeting between the East Galicians and Germans (the deceased Herr Dietrich found hanging in the attic of the house into which Janeczko moves) are framed in hostile, essentialist terms.\textsuperscript{879} By contrast with these accounts, Tokarczuk describes an uncomplicated and unemotional attitude towards the previous German residents of Nowa Ruda (Neurode). Yet even in this account there are hints of animosity towards Germans immediately after the arrival of the Poles who ‘would not look those leftover Germans in the face, because it was all their fault – they were the ones who had sparked off the war’.\textsuperscript{880} However, by the time the German expellees return as Heimattouristen decades later, the Polish residents of Nowa Ruda receive them with bemused civility and uncomplicated hospitality.\textsuperscript{881} ‘Every year Germans come pouring out of coaches […] walk about in small groups […] take photos of empty spaces [where their houses used to stand]’ and embarrass the local Polish residents by trying to offer them a handful of Deutschmark in return for the hospitality shown them.\textsuperscript{882} Thus, in Tokarczuk’s narrative, contemporary Germans are an interesting, but non-threatening feature of modern life in Nowa Ruda.

In an interesting illustration of the fact that ontological reality is purely a construct of subjective consciousness, rather than something that can be proven to exist objectively, many incoming Poles openly resented the fact that they were forced to live in German houses which they found to be foreign and uncomfortable Bruchbuden. Bator makes this clear in Sandberg: ‘[ein] Haus hatten sie drüben gehabt, mit Matthiolen an der Wand, mit Dach und Fußboden, und neben der Scheune wuchs der Reineclaudenbaum, den Władeks Großvater gepflanzt hatte’.\textsuperscript{883} Władek not only ‘meinte, drüben wäre alles besser gewesen’, he even begins to think that his wife, Halina, had been different at home than she was in Walbrzych (i.e. ontologically different rather than just behaviourally

\textsuperscript{878} Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{879} Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 55, 74-79.
\textsuperscript{880} Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{881} Ibid. pp. 91-92.
\textsuperscript{882} Ibid. p. 91.
\textsuperscript{883} Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 32, 80.
This lack of enthusiasm for the new home and nostalgic longing for the home from which they had been forcibly evicted is also characteristic of the Poles in Janesch’s *Katzenberge* (2011). The first-person narrator’s grandfather, for instance, picks up a handful of Silesian soil to compare it with that of his native home, Galicia, and finds ‘[es] sei nichts in ihr gewesen: kein Wurm, kein Käfer, kein Engerling, nichts ... als hätten die Deutschen sie nicht bestellt, sondern gesiebt’. Like the protagonists in *Katzenberge*, the Polish incomers in *House of Day, House of Night* also detest the look of their new homeland upon arriving in Neurode and its surrounding villages: ‘[the] whole place was so empty and alien … [and] memories of those gold-green plains they had left behind went through their heads.’ And yet, objectively, much of the German property and infrastructure that the incoming Poles inherited within the ZO was of a quality far higher than that to which they had been used in East Galicia and elsewhere within the *Kresy*. The built infrastructure and agriculture in their home regions had not kept pace with modern developments elsewhere in Europe. In addition, particularly in East Galicia in the interbellum period, the Poles had not enjoyed unopposed ownership of their own homes and landholdings. Yet, the Polish literature analysed in this section suggests that those Poles forced to relocate from their insecure homes in East Galicia did not feel any more secure in their new homes, surrounded, as they were, by constant reminders of the shortly departed owners.

*House of Day, House of Night*, for example, is replete with references to the German presence in the region, and the objects and infrastructure they left behind, much of which is described in neutral terms, whereas some examples of the German heritage is represented as being ominous, threatening or even lethal. This nexus of issues is exemplified in the interactions of ‘Marek Marek’ (sic) with objects left behind by the German natives. In one scene, Marek’s sisters are

884 Ibid, pp. 88-89.
888 Although many of the worst anti-Polish pogroms took place in Volhynia, the status of Poles in East Galicia had also been challenged by Ukrainians who claimed the overlordship of the region, a claim that would finally be made brutally manifest in the anti-Polish pogroms conducted by the OUN/UPA in the latter stages of WWII. See Appendix C, Section C.2 and: Wilson, A., *Unexpected Nation*, pp. 129-33, Urban, T., *Der Verlust*, pp. 146-52; Brandes, D., et al., *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, pp. 529-32.
889 Marek Marek is the name of the character, i.e. the repetition is deliberate.
pushing him along the mountain paths in an old German pram, but later one of their younger siblings is killed by an unexploded German bomb left over from WWII. Later, as an adult, Marek, an alcoholic by then, ‘went wandering about the ruins of the houses that had been abandoned by the Germans’ looking for things to sell to raise money for vodka.\textsuperscript{890} Thus, in the life of a single character German artefacts are associated with innocuous childhood fun, a horrific family trauma, and hope for a man who has fallen through the social net.

However, Tokarczuk also suggests that members of the younger generation are often quite unaware of the recent German history of their current homeland. In one example the narrator asks long-term resident Marta: ‘Why should any [German] be interested in our house?’ Marta’s response is straightforward: ‘Because they built it’.\textsuperscript{891} This is interesting given the fact that the narrator had been brought up by a German nanny, who had been forced to remain in the region after the War. Clearly, the nanny had not seen the need to explain her presence in a Polish community nor to ensure that her ward was appraised of the region’s recent history.\textsuperscript{892} This suggests a kind of collective forgetting, on both the Polish and the German side, during the decades that followed the end of the War. There is, of course, no way of assessing the degree to which Tokarczuk’s representation of this situation coincides with actual Polish-German interactions in the region. However, the book is itself part of the collective memory discourse and it is interesting to note Tokarczuk’s inclusion of scenes that emphasise the non-confrontational nature of Polish-German relations in the region at the time of writing.

Other Polish-German encounters were of a more psychological nature. Bator evokes scenes in which objectively useful German facilities prompted feelings of revulsion among the incoming Poles. The ‘German’ water from the taps, for example, has to be boiled before it is felt to be Polish woda fit to drink.\textsuperscript{893} German symbols evoked different psychological responses, depending on their referent. For example, not only was German lettering and signage on buildings and various artefacts illegible to the majority of the new arrivals and, therefore,

\textsuperscript{890} Tokarczuk, O., \emph{House of Day, House of Night}, pp. 12, 13, 18.
\textsuperscript{891} Ibid. p. 92.
\textsuperscript{892} Ibid. pp. 239-41.
\textsuperscript{893} Bator, J., \emph{Sandberg}, pp. 15, 36.
foreign and vaguely menacing, but it also served as a potent reminder of their immediate predecessors’ cultural and legal claims to the land. In Sandberg, German books ‘mit Frakturschrift’ that resembled ‘Haare auf einer Warze’ are used as fuel in domestic ovens.\textsuperscript{894} By contrast, NSDAP symbols served to remind people of the recent brutality of German occupation in Poland, and helped shore up an explanatory framework in which the current occupation of the ZO could be understood as just retribution for recent crimes committed against Poles.\textsuperscript{895}

German housing and infrastructure looked and felt noticeably different to their Polish counterparts and were experienced as being irreconcilably foreign.\textsuperscript{896} This subjective experience of foreignness on the part of relocated Poles represents an interesting difference between these expellees and the German \textit{Vertriebenen}. Poles arriving in Lower Silesia from rural Galicia found themselves in a very alien built environment, whereas Germans expelled from the ZO to western and central Germany at least arrived in towns and cities that looked familiar.\textsuperscript{897} Indeed, both from a legal perspective and from the point of view of the perception of the built environment and infrastructure, the Polish expellees from the \textit{Kresy} were deported to a foreign environment, whereas the German Silesians were relocated \textit{within Germany}, and remained within a familiar cultural space.

The fact that the effect of this perception of foreignness could only be felt by the first generation of immigrants and not by those Poles born within the ZO, must inevitably have driven a psychological wedge between the generations. As Zagajewski points out in this context, there is an unbridgeable gulf between any migrant generation and their descendants. In \textit{Two Cities} he describes the bewilderment of the older Galicians who, having arrived in Gliwice, look ‘in amazement at the Prussian bricks of the tenements … taken aback by the place in

\textsuperscript{894} Whilst it is tempting to link the burning of German books as fuel to the book burning events staged by the NSDAP, such a connection is extremely tenuous. It was NSDAP themselves, who demanded the change from Fraktur to Latin type face in books and newspapers in 1941. In addition, book burning in the Third Reich was a purely symbolic act, whereas, having no other use for them, the Poles in Bator’s novel utilise German books as a convenient source of fuel. This does not suggest that the Poles were trying to make any symbolic statement about the authors or contents of the books in question. See: \textit{ibid}; Berbenni, D., \textit{Schrift und Herrschaft: Das Verbot der Frakturschrift durch die Nationalsozialisten im Jahre 1941} (Norderstedt: Gin Verlag, 2013), pp. 5-17.

\textsuperscript{895} As noted above (see Chapters 3 and 4, and Section 7.4 above), this ‘folk explanation’ of the annexation as just retribution for recent NSDAP atrocities differs fundamentally from the Polish government’s Piast Formula.

\textsuperscript{896} Urban, T., \textit{Der Verlust}, pp. 157-58.

which they were to die’. \footnote{Zagajewski, A., \textit{Two Cities}, pp. 15-16, 29.} Zagajewski goes on to develop this point, arguing that first-generation immigrants have experienced life at both ends of the journey, and, depending upon the circumstances of the relocation (e.g., as a result of sociocide, or other overwhelming pressures), often tend to disparage their new home and idolise their place of origin, but that those born after the migration event can only experience the destination as their natural \textit{Heimat}. Whilst one can readily agree with this, his assertion that second-generation immigrants have no reason to hate their birthplace and nothing to compare it with is not necessarily true. \footnote{Ibid. p. 31.} They can certainly compare it with an imagined, and quite possibly idealised version of their parents’ lost \textit{Heimat} based on the stories they hear from them and from the wider expatriate community. They may also be familiar with their family’s place of origin through personal visits. And finally, their social status within the land of their birth may well be such that they come to hate it. This notwithstanding, Zagajewski draws attention here to an interesting aspect of sociocide, which often manifests itself as a major \textit{caesura} in diasporic collective memory narratives. \footnote{This subject has been treated quite extensively in relation to the Holocaust. See, for example: Hirsch, M., \textit{Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory}, p. e.g. 241ff.} In the context of this section, i.e. Polish encounters with ‘post-German Germans’, Zagajewski’s generation of Polish Galicians must have had a fundamentally different experience of such encounters to that of their parents and grandparents whose memories of the lost \textit{Heimat} and of the traumatic event itself are concrete and unmediated (episodic memory). Those of the second generation, on the other hand, are constructed, mediated, impersonal, and require a conscious research effort to prevent them from slipping into the category of legend rather than History (semantic memory). With his usual wry humour Zagajewski neatly encapsulates the situation for second-generation immigrants when he points out that to the older generation who had suffered Soviet, then German, then a repeated Soviet occupation before and during WWII, ‘the fact that someone [Zagajewski] was born a month after the end of the war bordered on a joke … like arriving at the Philharmonic ten minutes after the end of the concert’. \footnote{Zagajewski, A., \textit{Two Cities}, p. 31.}
7.6 Concluding Remarks

One can draw several key findings from the above analysis, all of which apply to the specifically Polish discourse strand within the collective memory process triggered by the acute symmetric trauma outlined in the Introduction to this thesis and Chapter 3 above. Addressing the explanatory level of the corpus analysed in this chapter, I asked to what extent the Polish literature analysed in this chapter supports the TRJN’s Piast Formula. It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of Polish protagonists in the corpus analysed above reject the Piast Formula and its justification of the annexation of the ZO and the concomitant Vertreibung of the German population as a matter of historical expediency based on ancient Polish claims to the territory rather than as simple revenge for recent German atrocities in Poland. Instead they, or rather, the authors, insist upon a ‘folk explanation’ of the annexation and Vertreibung precisely in terms of just retribution for crimes committed by agents of the German Reich.

One of the main ways in which we see this expressed is in the ‘treasure trove’ topos in which Polish settlers in the ZO conceived of their potential enrichment at the expense of the Germans in terms of Gerechtigkeit. This also pertains to another of my research questions about shared topoi between German and Polish literature relating to sociocide, the ZO and/or Kresy, as the ‘treasure trove’ topos is indeed found in examples of the relevant Polish and German corpus. Paradoxically, in the Polish context these hopes for enrichment tend to be centred on buried treasure, rather than on that which was freely accessible to incomers in the form of leftover German property. The resolution to this seeming paradox is that, because the new Polish government had claimed all German movable and immovable property for the Polish state, nothing that was visible on the surface and readily available really held out any hope of personal enrichment and therefore compensation and Gerechtigkeit. Ultimately this yearning for justice also suggests that the incomers did, in fact, understand their current predicament as that of victims, not as victors triumphantly reclaiming land to which they felt they had a historical right, as the TRJN had tried to portray them. More precisely, the consistency with which the Polish authors whose texts I analysed above portray their protagonists as rejecting the Piast Formula in favour

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of a ‘folk explanation’ based on retribution for recent war crimes, suggests this interpretation enjoyed a wide currency during the period in which these texts were produced. In the example I provided of this topos being used in German Vertriebenen literature, in Ossowski’s Weichselkirschen, the topos functioned very differently. Rather than symbolising hope and justice, as it does in the minds of the immigrant Poles, Ossowski’s version inverts the historical record by showing Poles and Russians engaging in activities known to have been practiced by members of the NSDAP organs but not otherwise recorded. As stated above, the most remarkable aspect of Ossowski’s use of this version of the topos is the way it apparently reveals her subconscious feelings about the territorial and population transfer, which contrast markedly with her carefully cultivated public persona. Thus, whereas in the Polish context the authors’ use of the topos serves an explanatory function in relation to the immigrants understanding of their own situation – they understand themselves as victims, not victors, and seek Gerechtigkeit in the form of treasure taken from the perceived perpetrator collective – in the German context the author’s use of the topos, arguably, works at the unintentional subconscious level.

In terms of my three-level analytical model, such topoi can be analysed at all three levels. They all entail an ontological component in that they pertain to things with a concrete existence such as actions, and aspirations. Yet these actions and aspirations are embedded within a wider explanatory framework, in this case pertaining to the immigrants reason for being in previously German territory and having to make use of artefacts produced and, for a certain period, still owned by an enemy collective. At the same time, the use of such topoi can serve a narrative function. In Ossowski’s case, for example, to cast the Slavic incomers in a negative light, in contradiction to both the author’s and the narrator’s avowed acceptance of their right to be there.

Another of my research questions in this chapter pertains to the ways in which Germans and the German heritage have been characterised in Polish literature about life in the ZO. My findings in respect to this question are mixed. On the one hand, one can detect traces of an essentialist paradigm in which, not individual Germans but rather Germans as a nation or ethnic group are held to be responsible for recent anti-Polish atrocities and, more specifically, for the Poles’
current plight as involuntary immigrants in the ZO. Hen’s protagonist holds one particular German responsible for the actions of his son ‘even if he doesn’t have a son’. At the narrative level, Janesch uses NSDAP symbolism in association with deserted German property to suggest that the Lower Silesian Germans deserved their fate. And the topos of the ‘treasure trove’ in its Polish version, turns on the essentialist notion that finding the buried belongings of any specific German represents a degree of *Gerechtigkeit* vis-à-vis Germans as a perpetrator collective. On the other hand, all of the texts analysed above evince a willingness to engage with the complexity of the situation. Janesch exemplifies this trend beginning with her own and her protagonist’s mixed Polish-German parentage, a personal identity theme which she develops later in the novel in relation to Mr. Adamczyk’s sudden discovery of his own probable German heritage resulting from his mother’s relationship with a German during her enforced stay in the country as a forced labourer.

And finally, I asked what one can learn by comparing literary texts from different eras by authors of different backgrounds in relation to intergenerational perspectives on the impact of *Flucht und Vertreibung*. Whilst this question is rather broad and would certainly benefit from further comparative analysis, the foregoing analysis has shown that both Tokarczuk and Zagajewski allude to the complexities of intergenerational memory. Whilst Tokarczuk refers to a lack of knowledge about the region’s German heritage on the part of members of the younger generation resulting from a simple lack of communication, Zagajewski goes further in pointing out the fundamental unknowability of the victim generation’s trauma by subsequent generations. The ontological gap between episodic and semantic memories, as Zagajewski reminds us, is unbridgeable.
8: Final Thoughts

8.1 Introduction
As I have already summarised my specific arguments and the answers to my research questions at the end of Chapters 3 to 7, I do not intend to repeat myself here. Instead, I wish to turn to the broader conceptual and philosophical implications of my research before briefly outlining the potential for further research in this field. First, in Section 2.1, I went to considerable lengths to define the concept of collective memory as I use it throughout this thesis. One thing I did not do, however, was to question the fundamental usefulness of the term ‘collective memory’ as a metaphor. Yet, this question is entirely legitimate and I would like to address this subject in Section 8.2 below. Second, in defining the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ for the purposes of this thesis, I explained that, as a result of the conflict of interest between different stakeholder collectives vis-à-vis a given event in combination with economic disparities and unequal opportunities to participate in the relevant discourse, there is no guarantee that hegemonic historical narratives, as one may encounter them at any particular time or within a given socio-political situation, will represent the ‘truth’ in any epistemologically meaningful sense. In Section 8.3, I would like to return briefly to this statement to assess its validity and ramifications in light of the discussion presented in the foregoing chapters.

8.2 Collective Memory: a Useful Metaphor?
Having discussed some of the ways in which other researchers use the term ‘collective memory’ as well as a selection of suggested alternatives, I defined collective memory, for the purposes of this thesis, as a contested narrative discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact. I also posited the notion of a transition period after which collective memories relating to a given episode of acute symmetric trauma give way to, or can better be conceived of as a matter of, ‘History’. However, both my broader discussion and my specific working definition of the concept were based on the tacit assumption that it is useful to use the term ‘collective memory’ as a metaphor in the study of historic events. Yet, it
is by no means immediately obvious that this is the case. In other words, one may
legitimately ask whether one could not simply replace the term ‘collective
memory’ with the word ‘history’ in any given text. Would this result in a loss of
analytic productivity or, to turn the question around, does the concept of
‘collective memory’ add anything specific to the traditional concept of History as
an academic pursuit?

Even if one does accept the validity of the concept of collective memory,
one can also ask whether or not it ought to be used in relation to a specifically
German trauma. This question arises due to the fact that that the majority of books
dealing with the phenomena of collective memory, however defined, focus on the
Holocaust as the central trauma. This raises the question of whether it is somehow
provocative to use a concept developed within the field of Holocaust Studies to
explore other collective traumas, especially one which affected Germans? In my
view, this is a legitimate, and somewhat troubling, question even if one rejects the
notion of collective, rather than individual, German guilt for the Holocaust.

The notion of collective guilt notwithstanding, Germany has, and has
accepted, a corporate responsibility for the Holocaust, and at one level it does
seem distasteful to use the same terminology to describe the suffering of Jews at
the hands of the NSDAP and that of (ethnic) Germans at the hands of various
enemy collectives. Book titles such as Karsten Kriwât’s Der Andere Holocaust: Die
Vertreibung der Deutschen 1944-1949 strike one as unnecessarily
provocative and disrespectful.903

In the case of collective memory, however, there is an implicit claim,
certainly in the working definition I present above, that the term objectively
describes something other than History. This is not the case with the word
‘Holocaust’ which, regardless of any broader dictionary definition, is generally
thought of as describing a specific historical event, and, moreover, one in which
one of several extant German collectives was implicated beyond doubt. Thus,
whereas Kriwât’s choice of title was almost certainly intended to provoke a
reaction, an examination of the term ‘collective memory’ in relation to cases other
than the Holocaust is a necessary prerequisite for assessing its general validity and
usefulness as an academic concept. To this extent, my thesis represents a test case

903 Kriwât, K., Der andere Holocaust.
for the concept of collective memory in general in addition to being an analysis of a specific collective memory discourse.

To address the question as to the validity and usefulness of the concept of collective memory, I find, on balance, that yes, it is useful to delineate a period and discursive process that bridges the gap between any specific episode of acute symmetric trauma and the general convergence on hegemonic historical narratives of the event. The period in question is characterised by the active, interested participation of several competing stakeholder collectives whose ultimate objective (conscious or unconscious) is the inclusion of their specific, subjective, understanding of the events in question in the relevant hegemonic historical narrative. This differs from the pursuit of History as an academic discipline in that History is generally dominated by professional historians striving for a disinterested, objective understanding of specific events rather than the interested portrayal of a specific version of the events in question. The extent to which a given historian manages to achieve this ideal in the real world is irrelevant in the current context, as the defining factor is the starting point of any individual’s engagement with the topic in question. Historians begin with an objective quest for the epistemological ‘truth’ about a specific subject (see below). Participants in collective memory processes, by contrast, begin their engagement in the relevant discourse with a belief that they already know the truth about the events in question.

Thus, there are two objectively different periods involved in the production of hegemonic historical narratives of acute symmetric traumas. The first period is ostensibly open to people from every walk of life and tends to be dominated by eyewitnesses; the second is dominated by professional historians. Having worked through the above case study, I have found the term ‘collective memory’ to be a useful metaphor for the process of narrating, commemorating, and explaining the events in question, that takes place during the first of these periods.

8.3 Epistemological Relevance

In the Introduction to this thesis I stated that this study relates, among other things, to philosophical questions concerning the field of epistemology.
Epistemology is concerned with the acquisition of ‘true’ knowledge and the question of how one can, in principle, be confident that one’s beliefs about a given subject are valid and accurate. Philosophers interested in this nexus of problems often consider it from an extremely abstract position, challenging themselves with idealised examples and thought experiments that have little direct bearing on our everyday lives. My usage of the word in this context differs slightly from such lofty concepts, but only by degree. I am more interested in what one might refer to as ‘folk epistemology’, which turns on the matter of how we can, in principle, discriminate between information and disinformation about past events as well as developments in the contemporary world to which we have no direct personal access.

As my analysis of cartographic representations of the ZO amply illustrates, it has been, and still is, possible for two equally well-educated people, each with access to a similar range of scholarly texts and reference materials, to form completely different views on the region in question. Depending upon which set of atlases one happens to consult, one may come to believe that the ZO is in some way different to the rest of Poland, for example, because dual allonyms are shown for most of the towns and cities within the region, but not for the rest of Poland. A different selection of atlases could leave one with the impression that this area is not historically different from the rest of Poland, for example, if only the modern Polish toponyms are provided and no additional historical notes are included. Another interested individual could be left with the impression that the region is still contested between Germany and Poland, for example, if different atlases among those selected should happen to take radically different approaches to the toponymy of the region and/or include contrasting pieces of additional historical information in relation to the frontiers.

Because many households, schools, and even public libraries have only a limited selection of atlases available for consultation at any given time, one can readily understand that the view a given individual ultimately develops in relation to the current and historical status quo of a specific region is subject to a certain degree of arbitrariness or coincidence. The situation will not necessarily become any clearer in the mind of the casual reader should he or she choose to investigate it in more detail, for example, by consulting an equally arbitrary subset of all the
scholarly texts that have ever been written about the region. This is because, in the case of the ZO, there is no complete agreement between scholars concerning various details of the region’s history. This situation can only be exacerbated if one or more of the texts in question have been produced by scholars with strong links to a specific stakeholder collective or group, such as the BdV, the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission or any of the Polish historians writing on behalf of the TRJN in the immediate postwar era.

Nor is it possible to refer to some external source for an impartial understanding of the region’s history, because – and this is my point – all information is generated by human beings operating within specific cultural paradigms. There is no neutral position on history in general and of the ZO in this particular case. No one group of historians, including, as I argued in Section 1.6, those working in predominantly Anglophone centres, can transcend their own cultural paradigms to produce an unbiased, ‘true’ history of the region. To be more precise, it is possible to transcend whichever cultural paradigm happens to dominate the environment in which one lives and works, but only to exchange it for some other paradigm, even if the newly won perspective is unique to oneself. All such cultural paradigms (including unique personal world views) are limiting to some extent as they, by definition, exclude certain viewpoints and purported facts in favour of others.

Yet, to argue that no specific hegemonic historical narratives of the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO and the repopulation of the area with, inter alia, Poles transferred from regions within the Kresy, such as East Galicia, must necessarily represent the ‘truth’ in any epistemologically meaningful sense is not the same as arguing that all versions of the relevant history are equally valid. Nor does the fundamental impossibility of producing a history of any given region that is one hundred per cent accurate and comprehensive preclude the possibility of identifying and discarding disinformation and/or fabricated histories.

Within this thesis I have alluded to four different historic narratives of the ZO, the Kresy, Flucht und Vertreibung, population transfer and Polonization, each of which needs to be treated with circumspection for a number of reasons. In Chapter 3, I discussed the TRJN’s ‘Piast Formula’ and explained how this
narrative served their immediate political agenda. In Section 3.5.2, I also argued that the TRJN were fully conscious of the fact that they were creating an ahistorical myth and that this mythical narrative was intended purely for domestic ‘consumption’. Since 1989, Polish historians have led the way in deconstructing this version of events and I am not aware of any scholar anywhere in the world still currently promoting the Piast Formula as historical fact. Similarly, the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission has, albeit with laudable intent, produced a highly selective history of the region (see Sections 2.1, 4.2, and 4.6). Both of these histories have had an influence on the relevant collective memory discourse and, whilst neither can be said to be wholly falsified, both employ various narrative strategies, including conflation and omission, to present a subset of the known facts such as to create a narrative that supports a specific, highly biased, world view (see Section 4.5).

The German Bund der Vertriebenen has also produced a history of the ZO and of other former German communities in Central and Eastern Europe (see Section 1.6). As the central representative umbrella organisation of Germans and ethnic Germans expelled from these regions in the wake of WWII, however, it is clear that the BdV also constitutes an interested stakeholder collective. Consequently, one ought to exercise caution in relation to this corpus. On the other hand, to independently verify or refute every statement of purported fact presented within this vast body of work is beyond the capacities of a single researcher. For, whereas the work of the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission and that of historians working in the service of the TRJN involves a certain amount of omission, and therefore simplification, that of the BdV is almost overwhelmingly comprehensive, including such a wealth of arcane data that much of it resembles an archive of statistics or a catalogue of ‘facts’. Nevertheless, one must remain cognisant of the fact that this corpus has been produced in the service of a well-defined agenda.

Whilst this focus on facts – collecting and cataloguing them in the case of the BdV, or sieving and/or omitting them in the case of the TRJN and the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission – invites analysis at the ontological level, the explanatory level is more interesting in the current context. For, even when there is widespread agreement on the basic facts (and compendious tomes,
produced by multi-national collectives, such as the *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, suggest that the basic facts relating to the Polish and German postwar population and territorial transfers have been established on a broad, consensual basis), these are still open to different interpretations or explanations.

It is in this context that the fourth stakeholder collective to which I have alluded in this thesis, which consists of Anglophone historians, is interesting. As I argued and demonstrated in Section 1.6, certain Anglophone authors have chosen to interpret the events in question from within an essentialist paradigm. In this view of the world, the notion of German victimhood *per se* is suspect on the basis that all Germans (and, in the crassest examples, ethnic Germans) can be held accountable for the horrors of WWII in general and the Holocaust in particular. The conscious or unconscious acceptance of this essentialist paradigm can result in accounts of the events in question which, at one extreme, tend to be narrated with a severe degree of scholarly disinterest that can verge on the accusatory or even reveal a certain amount of *Schadenfreude* and lack of empathy. Depending on the degree to which one subscribes to or rejects the underlying paradigm, such narratives can be distressing to read, but more importantly from an analytical perspective, they can also result in an unhelpful conflation of separate historical events. For if one accepts the implicit notion that ‘the Germans’ deserved their fate (i.e., *Vertreibung* and loss of *Heimat*), then one must necessarily explain why. If the answer to this question is ‘because of what they did to the Jews’, as some of the examples I provided above demonstrate is often the case, then this implies a process of cause and effect, which, as I argued in Section 1.6, and reemphasised in Section 7.2.1, is wholly untenable on the basis of the historical record and eyewitness testimony.

Thus, from a ‘folk epistemological’ perspective, what we currently believe we know about the central trauma complex with which this thesis is concerned can, at best, be regarded as a work in progress. However, one of the insights I have gained in the course of my research for this thesis is that it is fundamentally impossible to change the epistemological status in relation to this geographic region and this period of history: it will continue to be a work in progress. In the following, final, section, I would like to take the opportunity to point out some of the directions in which this work might productively progress.
8.4 Further Research Potential

In the Introduction to this thesis, I briefly alluded to the fact that Lower Silesia not only became a permanent home to Polish transferees from the Kresy and other Polish immigrants from elsewhere in Poland, but also to Ukrainians and members of smaller nations such as the Łemkowie. It would be interesting to look into interactions between these different collectives, both in relation to each other and to the ‘post-German Germans’, during the resettlement era. In addition, one can imagine a number of productive projects involving studies of the subsequent linguistic and cultural legacy of these disparate groups within the region. Were they all Polonized, i.e., did they lose their cultural and linguistic identities, during the postwar period, or did they leave discernible traces in the current linguistic and cultural practice within the region? According to the 2010 version of the GUGiK’s *Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map Editors and Other Users*, the ZO is home to ‘new mixed dialects’ (nowy dialekty mieszane).

Some relevant questions of interest are, for example: to what extent is a convergence on an emergent regional dialect, as opposed to, for example, a standardised Polish dialect, discernible in this region? To what extent is it possible to discern a Ukrainian and/or Łemki substrate within the dialect(s) developing within this region? Similar questions, relating to an implicit or ‘background’ influence of these immigrants could be asked in relation to other forms of cultural production in the ZO. Within this context, it would also be useful to investigate the cultural and linguistic impact of the ‘post-German Germans’ within this region.

On a related issue, I noted in Chapter 5 that, in addition to expunging all traces of the region’s recent German presence throughout the ZO, the Polonization of the region also involved the suppression of minority Slavic interests and aspirations in the area. The scope of the current thesis has not allowed for an investigation into the extent to which this was the result of a conscious policy on the part of the TRJN as well as the degree of, and official reaction to, resistance to this development on the part of the affected communities.

Focusing on the specific experience of individuals during, and in the wake of, the various episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, there are

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several lines of investigation that could prove fruitful for researchers with the requisite background knowledge. One of these involves the economic impact of immigrants, refugees, repatriates, transferees etc., within their respective destination communities. How great a role, for example, did the influx of rootless, mobile, refugees in the American, British and French zones play in the subsequent *Wirtschaftswunder*? One imagines that the presence of a highly mobile workforce with no vested interest in any given region would prove beneficial in the reconstruction of each of the regions in question. To what extent can such an influence be verified and quantified for each of the regions concerned, and to what extent can any measurable differences be attributed to differences between the prevailing economic-political systems and/or the immigrant communities themselves?

A related question concerns the demographic makeup of the various expellee/transferee collectives. Within the immediate postwar context, for example, it made a difference whether a given family was headed by a father, a mother, or some other adult relation. One, often overlooked aspect of *Flucht und Vertreibung* in the German context, for example, is the fact that the majority of refugee families consisted of a mother with young children and older dependents. This situation is not always adequately reflected in commemorative images of the events in question. In some cases, such images appear to ignore the actual situation in the interests of a ‘sanitised’ version of history designed to present the flight and expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe as a simple, not particularly dramatic, movement of people from one region to another.

One particularly interesting example of such a reimagining of the relevant historic situation concerned images of the *Vertreibungen* in stamps issued by the West German *Bundespost* in 1965.905 Because these images did not reflect popular ideas about the war’s end and the resettlement of (ethnic) Germans promulgated, and no doubt widely believed, within the Soviet Bloc, many postal services in countries to the east of the Iron Curtain refused to forward letters bearing the stamps in question.906 This reaction is the more surprising given the fairly innocuous imagery used on the offending stamps. One stamp, for example, depicts a healthy-looking family, consisting of three generations, all walking

906 Ibid. pp. 50-51.
briskly against a light to moderate wind, seemingly well dressed and only lightly burdened by rucksacks. 907 This imagery is far removed from the reality of the situation. In general, the men of the middle generation, i.e. those of ‘fighting age’ (see Chapter 6), were not present during the *Vertreibungen*. Moreover, those old men not drafted into the army or the *Volkssturm* by that time would certainly not have cut such a sprightly figure as that of the old grandfather bringing up the rear of the group on the stamp in question. The reality for women and children contrasted sharply with the hale and homely security suggested in this design. 908

In addition, there is also no sign, within the image, of material destruction or loss and, significantly, perpetrators too are conspicuous by their absence (unless of course one accepts the essentialist view of the German nation as a ‘perpetrator collective’). 909

This example illustrates the discrepancy between ‘official’ or ‘sanitised’ versions of sociocide and eyewitness accounts. Without necessarily assuming that the ‘official’ version is any less accurate than eyewitness accounts, the mere fact that such a discrepancy exists raises a number of research questions such as: what accounts for the discrepancy? Who controls the production of narratives and images of *Flucht und Vertreibung*? Are similar differences between official and private narratives evident in Polish, German (West and East), Ukrainian and Lemki accounts of the various episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned? And, in instances in which private and public narratives of the events in question differ significantly, *cui bono*?

In terms of those aspects of the relevant discourse to which I have alluded in the foregoing chapters, there remains a broad potential for future research in the field of cartography. For example, it is by no means obvious in which specific cases seemingly politically-motivated cartographic decisions, or those which are amenable to interpretation as such within the discourse in question, were taken in response to overt political pressures to conform to a certain narrative or are the result of an unconscious acceptance of dominant cultural paradigms or, alternatively, reflect more mundane economic concerns. It is highly likely that at

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907 Ibid. p. 48. Abb. 3
least a subset of all cases examined are the result of a combination of several or all of these factors. It has not been possible, within the narrow scope of the current study, to do more than draw attention to the different ways in which the relevant situation is capable of being portrayed and to reflect upon the potential impact of contrasting cartographic representations of the region and associated events on the associated collective memory discourse. My inclusion of a large selection of the relevant cartography has necessarily precluded any detailed investigation into the production history of any one specific text.

And finally, there remains ample scope for research in relation to the relevant literature. It would, for example, be interesting to compare Polish texts relating to the loss of the Kresy with those of Germans that turn on loss of Heimat in the ZO. In addition to chronological and thematic approaches, it would be highly interesting to compare and contrast these corpuses on the basis of author biographies. Are there, for example, discernible differences between literature produced by eyewitnesses to the events in question and that produced by later generations or contemporary authors who had no direct involvement? And what of women authors? I have already pointed out that, in the majority of cases, women were the dominant adults among expellee groups: this is very much a women’s history and that is an angle which I have not felt able to adequately address in the current thesis.
Appendix A: Historic Polish Nation Building

A.1 Piast Poland (1025-1370)

The Piast Dynasty is generally regarded as having begun with Mieszko I (c. 960-992) and ended with King Kazimierz III Wielki (1333-1370). The historical dynasty took its name from a legendary leader thought to have started life as a peasant boy but who later became the tribal chief of the Polanians at around the time of Alfred the Great of Wessex (849-899). The Polane (also referred to variously as the Polanians or, less frequently, the Polians) were a people inhabiting the region later known as Great Poland (Latin: polonia maior; Polish: Wielkopolska) after whom the Poles and Poland were named. The first leader within the region that was to become Poland, for whose existence historical sources exist, was Mieszko I. He is known to have been baptised into the Catholic faith in 965, and to have married a Czech princess in the same year. Mieszko I continued to expand the area under his rule by conquest and treaty until his death in 992, by which time he ruled over Great Poland, Kuyawy and the central Polish regions of Łęczyca and Sieradz, and the entire area between the Rivers Oder and Bug, and from the Sudeten and Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic. Towards the end of his reign Mieszko I was able to annex the region around modern Kraków. It was during this period (981) that the first recorded contact between Poles (known as the Liakhs in Ruthenian historiography) and Ruthenians (the forebears of today’s Byelorussians and Ukrainians) took place as a result of an expedition into Mieszko I’s lands under the Ruthenian Prince Volodymyr the Great (c. 958-1015).

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911 Halecki, O., History of Poland, p. 8.
912 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
915 Both Byelorussians and Ukrainians are often referred to as Ruthenians in the relevant sources (White and Red Ruthenians respectively). For an overview of the terminological and geographic complexity involved in the use of this term as well as for a general understanding of Ukrainohphile nationalism as a geo-political movement see: Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 3-7, 39, 73; Radytsky, I. I., et al., Rethinking Ukrainian History (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981); Rogg, I. et al., Die Völker der Erde: Kulturen und Nationalitäten von A-Z (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1992), p. 402; Barracough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 139; Himka, J. P., Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900 (Montreal; London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 2-3, 15-19, 164-65,
However, despite the considerable extent of Mieszko I’s dominion, he failed to convert his landholdings into a formal kingdom in the European sense (i.e., as recognised by the Papacy). This was left to his son Bolesław I Chrobry (ruled 992-1025), who presided over the formal integration of the region into the Catholic Church hierarchy through the founding of the See of Gniezno in AD1000 (effectively the ecclesiastical province of Poland). His efforts in consolidating and further expanding the territories of his father’s dominion and success in bringing the region into the sphere of the Roman Catholic Church were rewarded with a crown in 1025 (the year of his death). His son Mieszko II Lambert (c. 990-1034) was crowned in the same year, and ruled, as King of Poland, from 1025 to 1034.

At the height of Piast power, a period of 42 years straddling the reigns of Bolesław I Chrobry and Mieszko II Lambert, this family ruled a core area, which encompassed most of modern Silesia, Kraków, Sandomierz, Wyszegrod, and Poznań. During and overlapping with this period they had also held temporary control of Pomerania (966-1001), Bohemia (1003-1004) and Moravia (1003-1029) and their hegemony had extended briefly as far to the North West as Lübeck, to Pressburg in the South and Brest in the East.

However, this rapid expansion had not been accompanied by the establishment of sufficiently robust state structures to provide for the effective control and administration of so vast a territory. Immediately following the death of Mieszko II Lambert, in 1034, the Kingdom collapsed under a combination of external and internal pressures. The chief external competitors were dukes of the Holy Roman Empire as well as the Kaiser (who demanded fealty from the Polish Kings for parts of their territory); the Kievan Rus; Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Prussians (i.e., the Slavic, pre-German Prussians); Czechs, Slovaks, and

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917 Some sources cite 1024 as the date in which Bolesław I was crowned. Cf. Prażmowska, A. J., A History of Poland, pp. 11-12; Other sources cite 1025 as the correct year. Cf. Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 22.


919 I define ‘the height of Piast power’ as the period during which the Polish Crown enjoyed formal international recognition coupled with the maximum contiguous territorial expanse centrally controlled by the dynasty for a decade or more. For a detailed graphic overview of this area, with notes on the permanency and/or duration of Piast control in the relevant areas, see: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 70-71; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, pp. 117-19; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, pp. 9-10.

Hungarians.\textsuperscript{921} Internally the dominance of the Polanians met with resistance from other related tribes such as the Sorbs, Kashubians, Slovincians, and Polabians.\textsuperscript{922} Apart from the brief reign of Bolesław II Szczodry (1076-1079), none of the Polish dukes was able to claim the Polish crown between 1034 and 1295 at which time Przemysł II became King of Poland for a year until his death in 1296.\textsuperscript{923}

The intervening 261-year period was so chaotic, in terms of failed state formation, that it is known as the ‘Period of Feudal Disintegration’ in Polish historiography.\textsuperscript{924} During this time the senior princes attempted to rule from Kraków. However, the entire area, once united under the Kings of Poland, had splintered into an ever-changing set of duchies and smaller polities incapable of implementing a concerted foreign policy.\textsuperscript{925}

It was during this time that many of the events took place that would re-emerge as topoi in the collective memory discourse following the postwar movement of Poland’s borders, and concomitant population expulsions. In 1157 Kaiser Friedrich I Barbarossa (1122-1190) forced Bolesław IV Kędzierzawy (1146-1173) to pay homage for Silesia.\textsuperscript{926} Shortly afterwards, with the backing of the Holy Roman Empire, Silesia became an independent polity under Mieszko I Płatonogi (c. 1130-1211) and his descendants.\textsuperscript{927} One of the Polish Dukes of Silesia, Henryk I Brodaty (1232-1238), invited German settlers to populate the duchy during his reign. This was the start of an influx of non-Poles into various Polish-ruled territories including Wielkopolska and Małopolska, most of Pomerania, the Neumark and Lower Silesia.\textsuperscript{928} In 1264, the Statute of Kalisz provided ‘a general charter of Jewish liberties in Poland.’\textsuperscript{929} In 1226 Konrad I Mazowiecki (Duke of Mazovia 1194-1247 and High Duke of Poland 1229-1232 and 1241-1243) invited the Order of the Teutonic Knights into the Piast

\textsuperscript{922} Zamoyski, A., \textit{The Polish Way}, pp. 8-20; For information on the current status of these peoples see: Wolnicz-Pawlowska, E., \textit{et al.}, Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{923} Halecki, O., \textit{History of Poland}, pp. 18-21, 45; Kuczyński, S. K., \textit{et al.}, \textit{A Panorama of Polish History}, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{924} Kuczyński, S. K., \textit{et al.}, \textit{A Panorama of Polish History}, pp. 22, 33-37.
\textsuperscript{925} Halecki, O., \textit{History of Poland}, pp. 21-30.
\textsuperscript{926} Pohanka, R., \textit{Herrscher und Gestalten des Mittelalters}, pp. 82-85.
\textsuperscript{927} Siebel-Achenbach, S., \textit{Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland}, p. 7. NB: Not to be confused or conflated with Mieszko I (c. 960-992).
territories, as vassals of the Polish princes, to help defend against the Slavic Prussians. The Order completed the conquest of (Slavic) Prussia in 1283.930 Two Mongol invasions in 1241 and 1259, which reached as far as Silesia, almost put an end to the Piasts’ control over any part of Poland; the fact that the Ruthenians actively supported the second of these has never been forgotten in Polish tradition.931 After these Mongol incursions had destroyed the unity of the Kievan Rus, several Piast dukes took advantage of the situation, and of various dynastic squabbles that ensued, to begin an eastward expansion. This movement reached a high point in 1340 when King Kazimierz III Wielki (1310-1370) invaded Red Ruthenia and annexed the Ruthenian principality of Halych (roughly coextensive with Galicia with which it shares an etymological origin), which was fully under Polish dominion by 1366.932

The end of Kazimierz’ reign and life (1370) also marked the end of Piast Poland as well as the start of Poland’s long-term, collaborative association with Lithuania.933

A.2 The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1569-1795)

Given Lithuania’s current relative lack of significance in international diplomacy, it might appear a little odd that its association and eventual union with the small, landlocked Kingdom of Poland would result in one of the most powerful polities in the world. It is stranger still that cultural memories of this, now completely dissolved (since 1795) power would still be influencing the actions of Ukrainians and Poles in the mid-twentieth century, a full 150 years after its dissolution. It is yet more surprising that such a powerful state has been all but forgotten, over the past half century, outside of the core territories it encompassed. Nevertheless, as I explain in more detail below, it was cultural memories of the differential socio-political positions of Poles and Ukrainians, both within the Commonwealth and within its various successor states, that fuelled the ethnic antagonisms in East Galicia during WWII which resulted in the Ukrainian-led sociocide/genocide carried out against the province’s Polish population. Moreover, it was the

traditional east-facing outlook engendered by cultural memories of this polity that caused the London Poles to oppose Stalin’s postwar offer of a west-shifted Poland circumscribed by the Oder and Bug Rivers, the Carpathian Mountains and a sphere of Soviet interest that encompassed Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, as well as the northern part of East Prussia.

My use of the term ‘cultural memory’ in this context is deliberate and is specifically intended to express a clear distinction between the socio-political forces at work in this context, which are based on a popular knowledge of hegemonic historical narratives, and the process to which I refer as ‘collective memory’ throughout this thesis, which involves a contested discourse that takes place prior to the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. Because these modern events were informed by cultural memories of the Commonwealth, it is necessary to briefly survey the history of this, largely forgotten, polity and the aftermath of its demise.

Following the death of Kazimierz III Wielki in 1370, the Polish crown passed to King Louis d’Anjou of Hungary and Croatia (1342-1382), who then ruled as King of Poland from 1370 to 1382.934 This legal transfer of Poland to a foreign potentate was the result of the Angevin Agreement concluded between Kazimierz and the then King of Hungary during the second Congress of Višegrad in 1339.935 At that time, Lithuania, the last pagan country in Europe, was struggling against the Knights of the Teutonic Order (Deutscher Orden), whose mission was the Christianisation of the Northern European pagans. Since Konrad I Mazowiecki invited the Order into North-East Europe in 1226, successive Polish Dukes and Kings had lost effective control over the Teutonic Knights. Their crusader state was blocking Polish expansion to the North. It also barred the way to the lucrative Baltic Sea trade, the majority of which was in the hands of North German merchants united in the Hanseatic League.936 It therefore made political sense for the Lithuanians and Poles to join forces against the Teutonic Order.

934 King of Hungary and Croatia (1342-1382) and King of Poland (1370-1382)
An opportunity to bring about just such an arrangement arose upon the
death of Louis of Hungary and the ascendency to the throne of his daughter
Jadwiga d’Anjou (c.1383-1399). By marrying her in 1385 (Union of Krevo), and
accepting the Christian religion, Jagiello, the Grand Duke of Lithuania (c. 1351-
1434) solved several problems at a stroke. He had removed the ideological
justification for the Order’s crusade against the Lithuanians, whilst extending his
influence into Central and Eastern Europe through a dynastic match with the
powerful Angevin dynasty. Calling himself Władysław II, Jagiello of Lithuania
then ruled Poland, firstly as King jure uxoris (1386-1399) and later as king in his
own right (1399-1434), and Lithuania as Grand Duke, in personal union until his
death in 1434.937 With minor interruptions (1440, 1447 and 1492) successive
members of the Jagiellon Dynasty continued to rule Poland, as King, and
Lithuania, as Grand Duke, until the last of the dynasty, Sigismund II, died in
1572.938

The first attempt to convert this union of crowns to a formal merger
between the two polities, the Union of Mielnik (1501), failed due to a lack of
support among the Polish and Lithuanian nobility.939 However, a second attempt
in 1569 (Union of Lublin) succeeded and the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania
was formally inaugurated. The new state encompassed a vast area from Danzig in
the North-West to Porogen on the border of the Crimean Khanate in the South-
East, and included Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians (White and
Red Ruthenians).940 Between 1468 and 1493, Poland-Lithuania had already been
informally organised as a rzeczpospolita, which is usually translated as
‘commonwealth’ but is actually etymologically identical with Latin res publica.941
This organisational model was formalised in 1569, as of which time all Polish
Crown-lands and lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania owed allegiance to a

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937 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 7; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 139;
Kotljarchuk, A., In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis
939 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 37; Kotljarchuk, A., In the Shadows of Poland and Russia, p.
134.
940 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 7, 39; See map in: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger
Historischer Weltatlas, p. 115.
941 According to Reddaway, ‘source material on this point is not quite reliable’: Reddaway, W. F., et al., Cambridge
History of Poland: (to 1696), p. 423.
single ruler, who, as of 1573, was a jointly elected King. Representatives from every region of this vast area met periodically in a central Diet, or Sejm.\textsuperscript{942}

As was the case in the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), the election of the King was not subject to ethno-national restrictions, which made it the focus of European attention. The Commonwealth became a den of intrigue every time a new election took place or was imminent. A further similarity between the Commonwealth and the HRE was that the history of both polities was largely characterised by an on-going antagonism between the centralising efforts and aspirations of the Crown, and the particularistic tendencies of powerful magnates and the nobility. In the case of Poland-Lithuania, the latter had a vested interest in their own latifundia and none whatsoever in the fate of the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{943}

In other ways the Commonwealth resembled the United States of America (USA). The elected King ruled the polity in conjunction with a General Assembly consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Thus the King’s power was circumscribed in a manner similar to that of the President of the USA, albeit there was no restriction on the length of time he could hold office.\textsuperscript{944} According to Davies, ‘[in] their slogan of Nic o nas bez nas [derived from the Latin nihil novi sine communi consensus] … the Polish nobles … had anticipated the ideas of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, and the American Revolution of 1776’.\textsuperscript{945}

However, despite this ostensibly progressive model of government and the immense size of the Commonwealth, the state had ceased to exist by 1795 following three events generally referred to as the Partitions. Each of these involved the annexation of territory by Prussia and Russia (1772, 1793 and 1795) and Austria (1772, 1795).\textsuperscript{946}


\textsuperscript{944} Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 131-33; Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, pp. 92-104.

\textsuperscript{945} Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, p. 99; Lukowski, J., Liberty's Folly, pp. 9-11; The Polish 'nothing about us without us' was a pithy re-interpretation of the Latin 'nothing new without common consent'. Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 261.

A.3 The Partition Era (1772-1918)
Tadeusz Lalik and Henryk Rutkowski identify a ‘crisis of sovereignty’ between 1648 and 1763, followed by the ‘downfall of the Commonwealth’ between 1764 and 1795.\(^{947}\) Norman Davies on the other hand describes a ‘Noble Republic’ (1569-1795), during whose existence the ‘Partitions of Poland’ took place, the inaugural events of which happened as early 1764, followed by several distinct acts of partition ending in 1795.\(^{948}\) Davies’ uncritical use of the word 'Poland' in this context for the multi-ethnic Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is a problematic but common conflation, to which I have already alluded in Chapter 4.

In fact one could argue that the Commonwealth contained the seeds of its own eventual destruction right from its inception. There were several inherent structural problems within the polity. Uppermost among them were a deficiency of central authority and military power. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that its nobles jealously guarded their *libertas* against the demands of the state.\(^{949}\) As Davies explains, ‘[the] principle of *liberum veto* in conjunction with the requirement for unanimity [in the decision-making process of the *Sejm*] provided a tool with which ill-disposed individuals could effectively halt the exercise of government.’\(^{950}\) During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries both the territorial integrity of the Commonwealth and the ability of the Crown to wield its nominal resources effectively were weakened by the establishment of extensive latifundia by self-interested magnates (the *Szlachta*). Some of the most powerful, the so-called ‘little kings’ of the Ukrainian marchlands, maintained their own armies and effectively pursued their own foreign policy.\(^{951}\)

In addition to external pressures exerted whenever it was necessary to elect a new monarch, the Commonwealth Kings involved themselves in foreign wars and continuously pursued policies of territorial expansion, rather than consolidation.\(^{952}\) This resulted in a number of serious foreign interventions and episodes of long-term occupation, which any state would have found difficult to

\(^{948}\) Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*, pp. 269-73.
withstand intact. Invasions by Cossacks, Swedes, Muscovites, Transylvanians, Tartars, and Brandenburgers during the twenty-year reign of John Casimir Vasa (1648-1668) left a quarter of the population dead. In 1654, Ruthenian magnates accepted the protectorate of the Russian Tsar against the King of the Commonwealth (Treaty of Pereiaslav). Russian forces occupied most of Lithuania from 1654 to 1656. 1655 was the year of the ‘Swedish Deluge’ during which Swedish troops occupied most of the Commonwealth not already occupied by Russians or Cossack forces. Plans to partition the Commonwealth between Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania, and the Cossack states (a number of short-lived independent Ukrainian polities - see Appendix C below) were put forward as early as 1656 (Swedish-Brandenburgish Treaty). Transylvanian forces invaded the Commonwealth in 1657, and a full-scale Turkish invasion of the Commonwealth under Sultan Mohammed IV (1642-1693) in 1672 resulted in the capture of Podolia and the southern Kiev region. Thus the polity was politically divided and, in fact, barely viable, long before the Partitions. These problems were exacerbated by rising nationalist aspirations among some of the subject peoples, notably the Red (or Southern) Ruthenians (see below).

In Church matters too the ecumenical constitution of the Commonwealth eventually resulted in a push-and-pull between Rome and Moscow, which coincided with ethnic divisions between Catholic Poles and Lithuanians on the one hand, and Orthodox Ruthenians on the other. These extra-territorial or supra-national religious antagonisms had a negative impact on the internal integrity of the polity and stifled the formation of a shared identity. This situation was only made worse by the establishment of the Ukrainian Uniate Church in 1596 (Union of Brest). As early as 1624 Iov Boretskyi, Metropolitan of the restored Orthodox Church in Kiev, appealed to the Russian Tsar for protection against Polish (Catholic) persecution, presaging the kind of invited foreign intervention in Commonwealth affairs that would eventually result in the Partitions.

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954 Wilson, A., *Unexpected Nation*, p. 51.
958 Wilson, A., *Unexpected Nation*, p. 50.
As we have seen, the first plan to partition the Commonwealth was mooted at the time of the Swedish-Brandenburgish Treaty in 1656. This was reiterated in the Compact of Radnoth (December 06, 1696), which envisaged a partition between ‘Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania, the Cossack Ukraine, and the Lithuanian magnate Bogusław Radziwill’. However, more concrete plans emerged during the early part of the reign of Augustus II the Strong (1697-1706 and 1709-1733), a member of the Saxon Wettin dynasty and King of Poland-Lithuania. The King himself even entertained such plans with a view to consolidating his position and ensuring the succession of his son by jettisoning troublesome areas of the Commonwealth, which were difficult to govern or prone to war. Ironically, the so-called Alliance of the Black Eagles, encompassing Russia, Austria and Prussia (1732), which was directed against the interests of Poland-Lithuania, was based on the preservation of the legitimate, constitutionally guaranteed system of government in Poland to ‘ensure her [continued] political weakness.’ This was superseded by the Löwenwolde Treaty (1733), which pursued the same objectives.

During the reign of King Frederick II the Great of Prussia (1740-1786), and following unilateral annexations of parts of Commonwealth territory by Austria in 1769-1770, specific plans were conceived and implemented resulting in the First Partition of the Commonwealth (Convention of Partition: August 05, 1772). Inasmuch as the Sejm ratified it, nolens volens, the First Partition was legalised on September 18, 1773.

Despite this, widespread resistance both within what remained of the Commonwealth and in the areas annexed by the partitioning powers, resulted in a two-decade long period of insurrection. This period was characterised by severe military reprisals and occupation on the part of Russia, Austria and Prussia. However, the partitioning powers rarely collaborated to their mutual advantage.

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960 Lukowski, J., The Partitions of Poland, p. 11.
962 Lukowski, J., The Partitions of Poland, pp. 11-18.
Working in secret collusion with Prussia, for example, the ‘Four-Year’ Diet, which convened on October 06, 1788 and remained in session until 1792, instituted major constitutional reforms that ran counter to Russian interests. It abolished the Permanent Council, approved the expansion of the armed forces to 100,000 men and entered into a defensive treaty with Prussia (March 29, 1790). A new constitution introduced on May 03, 1791, represented 'a sort of peaceful, parliamentary coup d’état. It instituted hereditary monarchy and abrogated the *liberum veto*.' The result was a concentration of power in the centre and a, for Russia and Austria, intolerable enmeshment of Prussia in Commonwealth affairs. Disaffected nobles, whose own interests were, as they always had been, best served by a weak monarch and ineffective democratic institutions, conspired with the Russian Empress and united in the Confederation of Targowica (1792).

Pledging to restore the 1775 constitution, the confederates and Russia declared war on the Commonwealth. Catherine II of Russia dispatched 100,000 soldiers into the Kingdom (May 18, 1792). The Crown forces were quickly subdued between May and July 1792, and plans were drawn up for a Second Partition. Having hastily dropped their Polish-Lithuanian allies, the Prussians entered into an alliance with Russia on January 23, 1793 (Treaty of St Petersburg) and agreed to the Second Partition, in which the Commonwealth lost another third of its former territory. All that remained of the former polity after this was ‘a thin band of territory running from Kurland south through Warsaw to Cracow, and southeast to western Volhynia.’ Much to her ‘collective chagrin’ Austria was not involved in the Second Partition, which had been completed by the end of 1793. The *Sejm* assembled for the final time at Grodno on November 24, 1793 at which time it annulled the constitution and proclaimed the Second Partition. Thus this Partition too had been legalised within the very polity that had been partitioned, once again demonstrating its inherent structural weaknesses.

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968 Wicklum, E., ‘*Britain and the Second and Third Partitions of Poland*’, p. 18.
969 *Ibid*.
975 Lord, R. H., ‘*Third Partition of Poland*’, pp. 483-84.
976 Wicklum, E., ‘*Britain and the Second and Third Partitions of Poland*’, pp. 8-15, 137-76.
Crucially however, the greatest fracture between the constituent parts of the Commonwealth took place along ethnic lines this time. This was the start of an era of specifically Polish resistance. The first concrete acts of rebellion against the partitioning powers were the march of the Madaliński Brigade on Kraków (March 12, 1794) and the Act of Insurrection, proclaimed by Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746-1817). There were minor Polish victories at Racławice and Warsaw in April 1794, the latter won under the leadership of Jan Kiliński (1760-1819). Another Polish force led by Jakub Jasiński (1761-1794) managed to disarm Russian soldiers garrisoned in Vilna. In an attempt to overcome the traditional antagonism between peasants and the (mostly Polish) nobility in the hope of recruiting more peasant ‘scythe-men’ to fight the oppressors, Kościuszko ‘issued the Polaniec Manifesto (May 07, 1794). This constitutional programme abolished serfdom and lowered labour dues’ but came too late to provide the means of any effective defence against the partitioning powers.

By November 1794, Russian forces had recaptured Warsaw and slaughtered thousands of civilians.

Once again the movement of Russian troops towards their borders caused discomfort in Prussia and Austria, and triggered military interventions by both these great powers. Any permanent occupation of the remainder of the Commonwealth would inevitably bring the three powers, Austria, Russia and Prussia face to face, and none of them wanted to tolerate the de facto annexation of the remaining Commonwealth territory by any of the others. The wheels of diplomacy ground into action and the Third (and final) Partition was agreed in principle.

The Treaties of Partition were signed on October 24, 1795 but it took until November 23, 1796 to complete the annexation and deal with the remaining territorial issues.

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980 Łukowski, J., The Partitions of Poland, pp. 178-79.
A.4 Partition Era Polish Polities (1795-1918)

For historical accuracy, it is worth noting that a number of minor Polish polities came into being between 1795 and the founding of the Second Republic in 1918. Each had a different constitution, territorial coverage, and varying degrees of sovereignty. Briefly, these were the Kingdom of Galicia-Lodomeria (1773-1867/1918), the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815), the (Congress) Kingdom of Poland (1815-1864/1918), the Grand Duchy of Posen (1815-1848) and the Republic of Cracow (1815-1848). As the dates show, several of the other post-Partition polities existed simultaneously. For example, there were four Polish states in existence between 1815 and 1848. In November 1916 the Central Powers declared the creation of a new Kingdom of Poland before the Russian Kingdom of Poland (the Congress Kingdom) had been formally abolished. Thus, between 1916 and 1918 there nominally existed two Kingdoms of Poland, both virtually co-extensive but formally and constitutionally separate.

A.5 Concluding Remarks

The historic developments described above are of paramount importance for a full appreciation of postwar Polish state-building and the official discourse relating to the two episodes of sociocide, with which this thesis is concerned. Cultural memories of Piast Poland contributed to the discourse and explanatory framework surrounding the *Vertreibung* of Germans from Lower Silesia, and are in fact the origin of the contentious term ‘the Regained Territories’ or *Ziemie Odzyskane* (ZO) in its modern, postwar meaning. The notion of the lost *Kresy*, an equally problematic term for those regions beyond the River Bug annexed by the USSR at the end of WWII, is also rooted in memories of the eastward-facing Commonwealth.

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983 Where two end dates are separated by a forward slash, the first date marks the point at which any real Polish sovereignty or autonomy ceased to exist within the polity in question, whilst the latter date indicates the point at which the polity was formally abolished.

984 A period of 33 years, which is not much less than the 42-year duration of the ‘height of Piast power’ alluded to above and serves to put the latter in context.


Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia

B.1 Introduction

The historical region of German Silesia consisted of an oak-leaf-shaped strip of land running in a north-westerly to south-easterly direction roughly parallel with the Sudeten Mountains across the north-eastern edge of the modern Czech Republic. It was irrigated by the River Oder, which formed the main artery or backbone of the ‘oak leaf’ with several of its major tributaries extending out to the edges of the ‘leaf’. It is this riverine network that characterises the landscape and which has shaped settlement patterns over the centuries leading to the establishment of frontiers dictated by proximity to water and the related commerce rather than other natural barriers like mountain ranges or oceans. This underlying geological cohesion accounts for the fact that, despite internal divisions resulting from dynastic inheritance issues, Silesia ‘ist immer eine geschichtliche Einheit geblieben’.

Because of its strategic position, navigable rivers, and extensive system of pathways and roads, Silesia has always been seen as a thoroughfare or bridge between the surrounding powers and between Germans and Slavs. For the same reasons, however, it has been subjected to multiple invasions over the centuries and has been incorporated into, and occasionally split between, a number of historical polities. Nevertheless, as Helmut Neubach rightly points out, however often Silesia changed hands, it always remained on the periphery of the states that laid claim to it. It was the northernmost possession of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns’ southernmost territory. Prior to WWII it marked Germany’s eastern frontier. Today it lies on the western edge of Poland.


Of course, these tributaries flowed downhill away from the edges of the ‘oak leaf’ and into the Oder but this does not affect the bird’s eye view one gets of the area on a static map. See, for example, the map on the inside cover and Abb. 1 & 2 in: ibid.

Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 33.


Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 3.
By the outbreak of WWII, the greater part of Silesia (all of Lower Silesia and over half of Upper Silesia) were part of Germany. Some of Upper Silesia had been integrated into the Second Republic in the wake of WWI.\(^993\) Another part, Cieszyn Silesia, formed part of Czechoslovakia.\(^994\) However, this complexity is often ignored in the relevant historiography, much of which, as detailed in Chapter 4, conflates these various Silesian provinces and refer simply to ‘Silesia’ with no qualifying adjectives.

At the end of the WWII, and prior to its incorporation into the people’s Republic of Poland, German Silesia covered an area of approximately 48,000 km\(^2\) and had been an integral part of Germany since at least 1335 (Treaty of Trentschin).\(^995\) This appendix presents a short overview of the main phases and events in the development of Silesia up until its annexation by Poland in 1945 and the concomitant sociocide.

**B.2 Early History: c. 100 BCE to 1335 CE**

The early history of the province is shrouded in the mists of time but it is generally accepted that the name ‘Silesia’ is probably derived from a Germanic tribe related to the Vandals known as the *Silingen*, who settled the area around the Zobtenberg (Ślęża) between 100 BCE and 400 CE.\(^996\) However, the majority of this tribe appears to have moved out of the area in a westerly direction leaving the area largely empty.\(^997\) By about 500-600 the area around the Zobtenberg was inhabited by a Slavic tribe known as the *Slenzanen*, who possibly derived their name from the *Silingen*. Other Slavic tribes took control of most of the surrounding area, which later became Silesia. The fact that the name ‘Silesia’ is derived from the *Silingen* probably via the *Slenzanen* suggests that the entire area

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\(^{994}\) This was the de jure status of Cieszyn Silesia. De facto, Germany had annexed Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1938, after which Poland occupied the Cieszyn Silesia between October 2 and 9 the same year. Slovakia then declared independence on March 14, 1939 effectively abolishing Czechoslovakia. See: Ostrowski, M., ‘To Return to Poland or Not to Return’, p. 146; Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 308; Stackelberg, R., et al., The Nazi Germany Source Book, pp. xviii, 219-21; Hegenheinth-Neadrovická, E., *Die Slowakei den Slowaken!,* pp. 88-89.

\(^{995}\) Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 3.

\(^{996}\) Werner, K., ‘Schlesien unsere Heimat’.

\(^{997}\) Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 4.
gradually fell under the hegemony of some polity or dynasty that grew up around the Zobtenberg area.\textsuperscript{998} In the tenth century (by around 930), most of what eventually became German Silesia had fallen under the hegemony of the Bohemians under the leadership of Wratislaus I (894-921).\textsuperscript{999} However, the Poles conquered the territory under Mieszko I (c. 930-992) and his successor Bolesław Chrobry (992-1025).\textsuperscript{1000} Upper Silesia came under Polish rule around 1000 at a time when it was only thinly settled by the decedents of the Germanic Vandals and Slavic Opolans.\textsuperscript{1001} Bohemia and Poland continued to fight over possession of Silesia until the \textit{Glatzer Pfingstfrieden} (1137), which fixed the boundaries between Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia.\textsuperscript{1002} Most of Silesia remained under Polish rule at that time.\textsuperscript{1003}

By 1163, however, the Silesian Piasts had renounced all ties with the Polish branch of the dynasty and the entire province of Silesia had become independent from the Polish Piasts during the reign of Mieszko I Płatonoj (c. 1130-1211).\textsuperscript{1004} This was during the Period of Feudal Disintegration (1138-1295) during which there was no King of Poland.\textsuperscript{1005} Thus, although still held by a branch of the Piast dynasty, Silesia no longer formed part of the Kingdom of Poland when the kingdom was restored under Przemysł II (1257-1296) in 1295.\textsuperscript{1006} Upper Silesia became the \textit{Herzogtum} of Ratibor in 1163 and, after annexing Oppeln in 1202, it was renamed the \textit{Herzogtum} of Oppeln, which had splintered into seven smaller duchies by 1281.\textsuperscript{1007}

The first German settlers had been invited to Silesia as early as 1138 where they founded towns on the basis of the Magdeburg borough rights (Magdeburger Stadtrecht).\textsuperscript{1008} In Lower Silesia, Germans built some 1500 villages

\textsuperscript{999} It is likely that Breslau/Wrocław is named after Wratislaus I (from Wratislavia). See: Neubach, H., \textit{Geschichte Schlesiens}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{1001} Leuschner, M., \textit{Heimat und Schickal}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{1002} Bahlke, J., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Schlesien und die Schlesier}, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{1003} \textit{Ibid}., Neubach, H., \textit{Geschichte Schlesiens}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{1004} Bethell, N. W., \textit{Gomulka}, p. 106; Siebel-Achenbach, S., \textit{Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland}, p. 7; Bahlke, J., \textit{et al.}, \textit{Schlesien und die Schlesier}, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{1006} Kuczyński, S. K., \textit{et al.}, \textit{A Panorama of Polish History}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{1008} Neubach, H., \textit{Geschichte Schlesiens}, p. 5.
and 63 towns in accordance with the Magdeburger Stadtrecht, including Breslau. Similarly, within a hundred and fifty years of the first German colonists settling in Upper Silesia (1217-1367) they had already founded twenty towns and 200 villages ‘nach deutschem Recht’. In addition, the German farmers who settled in Silesia under the Piast dynasty between 1138 and 1335 introduced new agricultural practices that gave them an early economic advantage over their new Slavic neighbours. These included the use of metal plough shears and a system of triennial crop rotation.

B.3 German Silesia: 1335 to 1763

Dynastic inheritance settlements, throughout the twelfth century and into the 1300s, resulted in an on-going splintering of Silesia into ever smaller and continuously changing polities. This breakup caused both internal political difficulties and undermined the province’s ability to assert its independence against the Polish Piasts. Upon his ascent to the throne in 1333, for example, Kazimierz III attempted to assert control over the province after 170 years of independence. Faced with the loss of autonomy, increasing numbers of Silesian princes turned to Bohemia for assistance, eventually accepting King Johann (1296-1346) of Bohemia, an Imperial Prince, as their feudal overlord during the first Congress of Višegrad (1335). This arrangement, in turn, led to the secession of Silesia from Poland, which Kazimierz III (1310-1370) of Poland formally acknowledged in the Treaty of Trentschin (August 24, 1335). In the treaty Kazimierz stated under oath that Poland had no current pretentions to Silesia and never would have. Kazimierz reaffirmed this in the Peace of Namyslau (1348). The status quo was reconfirmed by Ludwig I of Hungary and Poland in 1372.

Thus, by 1335 the majority of Silesia had become an Imperial province and no longer formed part of the Kingdom of Poland. The whole of Silesia received a unified political and military organisation following the signing of ‘Die Strehlener Einnung’ (February 14, 1427). The Upper Silesian Duchy of Auschwitz was ceded to Poland 1457 followed by the Zator region in 1479, during the brief rule of Hungary in the second half of the fifteenth century. The remainder of the province reverted to Bohemia following the death of King Matthias Corvinus (1469-1490).

According to Markus Leuschner, after 1479 ‘die schlesisch-polnische Grenze [war] für beinahe ein halbes Jahrtausend eine der unumstrittensten und friedlichsten ganz Europas’. This long period of peace and stability was due in part to the fact that the all members of the Piast dynasty, who may potentially have laid claim to some parts of Silesia, died out between 1532 and 1625.

From 1526 to 1740 most of Silesia came into the Austrian (Habsburg) sphere of influence after Archduke Ferdinand (1503-1564 [Ferdinand I of HRE from 1531 to 1564]) inherited Hungary and Bohemia and therefore Silesia in 1526. However, under the Hohenzollern dynasty Prussia took most of Silesia, except for the Duchies of Troppau, Jägerndorf and Teschen, by force of arms in the course of the three Silesian Wars between Prussia and Austria. These wars were fought between 1740 and 1763 and culminated in the Frieden von Hubertusburg (1763). The incorporation of Silesia into Prussia virtually doubled the size of Prussia setting it on the path to becoming one of the major European powers.

B.4 The Divided Province: 1763 to 1933
Following the three Silesian Wars, the King of Prussia, Friedrich II (1712-1786), reformed the political structure of Silesia by installing a Provinzialminister, ‘a

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1019 Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 20.
1020 Ibid.
1022 The dates of the wars in question were 1740-1742, 1744-1745, and 1756-1763. The latter is known as the Seven Years’ War. See: Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 74-81; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 8; Clark, C. M., Iron Kingdom, pp. 186, 206; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 21.
kind of viceroy with wide-ranging powers’, in Breslau and Landräte at the head of forty Landkreise. He also reinforced the existing fortifications at several cities and had new fortifications built. In addition, the King invited tens of thousands of new, mostly German, settlers into the country to replace the manpower lost during the wars against Austria. Despite these reforms, until Karl Heinrich von und zum Stein (1757-1831) was able to introduce sweeping changes to the Prussian constitution under the protection, and acting on behalf, of Napoleon I (1769-1821) in 1807, the whole of Prussia, including Silesia, was ruled on a feudal basis.

Politically, Silesia had always been subject to foreign intervention. One example of this was when the Swedish king Karl XII forced Kaiser Ferdinand III of Austria to permit Silesian Protestants to build several so-called Gnadenkirchen over and above the three Friedenskirchen agreed in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) in the Altranstädtler Konvention of 1707. Another good example of the role Silesia has always played as a pawn within the greater scheme of European politics can be seen in Napoleon’s response to the Prussian declaration of war on March 27, 1813, which was simply to offer the whole of Silesia to Austria in return for her support. If nothing else, this demonstrates that Silesia was a well-defined province that was never really in control of its own destiny and could be traded and bartered to suit the political situation as well as being appended to outside polities without necessarily becoming an integral part of them or losing its core identity. However, because of its strategic location between Tsarist Russia, the Austrian Empire and Prussia, Silesia also became the centre of German resistance to Napoleon. In 1813 the King of Prussia moved his operational base to Breslau from where he, in alliance with the Russian Tsar, launched the counter offensive that resulted in the liberation of all of the German states.

Silesia also played an important role in the formation of the modern European political landscape, being the birthplace of many radical often left-wing political parties. Peasant revolts shook the province during the revolutionary years...
of 1848-49, but the best-known example of quasi revolutionary direct action against the exploitation of the emerging Working Class in the wake of industrialisation was the Silesian Weavers’ Rising in June 1844. This revolt was the result of social pressures rooted in the plight of the working poor in and around Bielau in Lower Silesia. It exploded in a series of incidents, which helped to galvanise early left wing movements throughout Europe and ignited the indignation or pioneering figures in the socialist movement. One of these was Wilhelm Wolff (1809-1864), a political radical to whom Marx dedicated his first volume of *Das Kapital*. Wolff ensured that news of the revolt reached the outside world, thereby putting Silesia at the centre of international affairs once again, as it had been so often in the past.

Upper Silesia too was radicalised in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Yet, although this part of the province was rich in natural resources such as coal, and other minerals, the development of the relevant industries only really reached its full potential after the introduction of railway links between Brieg and Breslau (1842) and from Gleiwitz to Brieg (1845). This delayed start to industrialisation in the region contrasted sharply with the situation in Germany’s other major coalfields in the Ruhrgebiet, which was adequately connected to the rest of the world via the major river and canal systems of Western Europe. The rapidly expanding industrialisation of Upper Silesia which followed the construction of improved rail links between 1842 and 1845 resulted in a pressing demand for a much greater workforce than the province could supply. The shortfall was met by a period of state-led immigration. The majority of immigrant workers came from Russia, Russian-dominated Congress Poland and Galicia, a development that introduced nationalist tensions into the already simmering social situation that characterised the decades leading up to German unification in 1871.

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1032 For an understanding of the socio-political background to the Weavers’ Revolt see: Eyck, F., *The Revolutions of 1848-49* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1972), pp. 19-23; On political parties founded in Silesia see: Neubach, H., *Geschichte Schlesiens*, pp. 11-12; Significant episodes in Silesian history include the Napoleonic wars in which Silesia formed the rallying point for the German forces that engaged the French occupiers in the so-called Befreiungskriege (1813-14). It is also well-known as one of the early sites of proletarian resistance to exploitation and oppression by the inidual elite (e.g. the Silesian Weavers’ Revolt in 1844). See: Haifer, J., *Epochen der deutschen Geschichte*, pp. 188-93; Holborn, H., *A History of Modern Germany 1648-1840* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), pp. 424-34.


These tensions, and Prussia’s heavy-handed approach to enforcing cultural homogeneity throughout the state, culminated in the so-called *Kulturkampf* (1871-1887). This period was characterised by a struggle for the hearts and minds of all sectors of society and was ultimately aimed at the continuance of Prussian culture and power throughout Silesia. The main parties were Slavic-oriented, mostly Polish, Catholics, who enjoyed Austrian support on the one side, and Lutheran Prussians on the other, whereby the former had their powerbase in Upper Silesia and the latter were concentrated in Lower Silesia.\textsuperscript{1035} Whereas the ethno-linguistic dominance of the Germans in Lower Silesia never really came under threat as this part of the province experienced a lesser degree of industrialisation and, therefore, less immigration, the Polish influence in Upper Silesia was significant and continued to be consolidated right from the *Reichsgründung* through to the plebiscites of the 1920s.\textsuperscript{1036}

As a direct result of the political unrest during the so-called *Nachmärz* Period (1848-c.1871) four of the most significant political parties in modern German history were founded in Silesia, including: the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter Verein (1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle); the Deutsche Reichspartei (1866 by Count Eduard von Bethusy-Huc); the Nationalliberale Partei (1866 by Rudolf Haym et al.), and the Zentrumspartei (Count Lazy Henckel von Donnersmark et al.).\textsuperscript{1037} All of these went on to inform, and serve as models for, a whole raft of political parties that proliferated during the Weimar Republic era. According to Neubach, Lower Silesia became a staunch bastion of the SPD during the late 1800s and remained so right up until 1932. During the same period, however, Upper Silesian politics was dominated by the archconservative *Zentrumspartei*.\textsuperscript{1038}

In addition to these essentially German movements, a Polish nationalist movement began to gather momentum in Upper Silesia around 1885 in response to Bismarck’s increasingly anti-Polish policies. At the turn of the century, Polish nationalists from Posen and West Prussia began agitating for more autonomy within Upper Silesia, which resulted in greater political representation for Poles

\textsuperscript{1035} Neubach, H., *Geschichte Schlesiens*, pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{1036} Bahlcke, J., *et al.*, *Schlesien und die Schlesier*, pp. 102-33.
\textsuperscript{1037} Neubach, H., *Geschichte Schlesiens*, pp. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{1038} Ibid. p. 14.
throughout Upper Silesia by the outbreak of war in 1914. This movement culminated in the Polish minority’s highest ever showing (14.3%) in the Reichstagswahlen in 1907, which gave them five seats in the Reichstag, although support for their cause had fallen again to 11.1% in the 1912 elections.

In areas in which German Silesians felt their culture to be most under threat from Polish influence, they attempted to boost their sense of German identity, largely by peaceful means, by forming associations such as the so-called Trachtengruppen which celebrated German costume and customs. However, the protracted Kulturkampf in Upper Silesia was not always contested on the grounds of such more or less self-conscious ‘performances’ of culture. Following WWI, both the newly reconstituted Poland and Czechoslovakia raised territorial claims to parts of Upper Silesia, with Polish politicians openly agitating for the secession of Upper Silesia from Germany and its incorporation into the recently founded Second Republic.

Under the Treaty of Versailles (1919) Germany was forced to cede the southern part of the Ratibor administrative district, covering an area of some 315km² and home to 48,500 people, to Czechoslovakia. Most of these people spoke Moravian, a Czech dialect. Yet, according to German nationalists, they were ‘deutsch gesinnt’. Germans in Lower Silesia and beyond protested that this territorial arrangement and the concomitant population transfer had been imposed upon the population by external powers with no democratic consultation. Their protest was successful and the victorious powers granted them a plebiscite to decide over their own fate. At the same time, demands for an independent Silesia grew louder and the Prussian government responded by once again dividing Silesia into two provinces: Lower Silesia, governed from Breslau, and Upper Silesia governed from Oppeln.

During the lead up to the plebiscite, Poles and Germans contested ownership of Upper Silesia, the former concentrating on the social question

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1039 Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 21.
1041 See, for example the Trachtengruppe that was photographed in the administrative district of Leobschütz in Upper Silesia in 1921 in: Schwarz, W., Bilder aus Schlesien, p. 196.
1042 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 100-10; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 16.
1043 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, pp. 16-17.
1044 Ibid. p. 17.
1045 Ibid.
(German = Protestant = rich) whilst the latter focused on nationalism. The plebiscite took place on the 20th of March 1921 in the shadow of a campaign of terrorism by Polish nationals. Prior to the plebiscites, the government of the newly founded Poland worked politically and militarily towards the forced annexation of the majority of Upper Silesia. Their actions in the area resulted in three ‘Polish Revolts’ (1919, 1920 and 1921), in which Polish insurgents attempted to seize de facto control of the province, with the support of regular Polish armed forces and the more or less open support of the French occupying forces. All three attempted annexations were put down by German Selbstschutzverbände.

The result of the plebiscite was 60:40% in favour of a continued membership within the German state. This result in favour of Germany was achieved despite the fact that entire German populations in various regions were prevented from participating in the vote, such as those from the administrative districts of Neisse, Grottkau and Falkenberg as well as the western part of the Neustadt region. Disregarding the results of this democratic process, Polish insurgents under Albert Korfanty (1873-1939) occupied the area claimed by Poland in a final attempt to annex the area on the basis of the maxim ‘possession is nine tenths of the law’. Korfanty’s forces were finally beaten by German volunteers led by General Karl Hoefer (1862-1939).

However, the matter was still far from settled. Once again flouting the democratic tradition, the Geneva Arbitral Verdict of October 20, 1921 (which was arrived at by ‘a committee of four – a Brazilian, a Chinese, a Belgian and a Spaniard’) removed two fifths of the contested area from Germany and placed it under Polish control. In a further plebiscite held in 1922 within the two thirds of Upper Silesia that had not until then been ceded to Poland, over 90% of the population voted against independence within the German Reich in favour of remaining part of Prussia.

1046 Ibid.
1047 Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 22.
1048 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 17.
1049 Ibid.
1050 Waites, B., The Impact of World War I, AA312 (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2000), 2, pp. 70-72; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 59; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 17.
1052 Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 36.
In total Germany’s losses to Poland following the First World War dealt a serious blow to the German economy. Germany was compelled to cede 3,213 Km² of territory; 893,000 residents; 92% of the Upper Silesian coal reserves; 79.1% of all collieries in Upper Silesia (there were 67 active collieries at the time); 59.5% of all blast furnaces in Upper Silesia (total = 37); 66.7% of all zinc and lead ore mines (total = 15), and 100% of all zinc and lead ore smelters (total = 24).1053

According to censuses taken in the late 1930s, there was a total of around 490,000 ethnic Germans living in Eastern (Polish) Upper Silesia of which around 360,000 were bilingual (German and Polish). Based on figures produced in 1925 for the Western part of the province (German Upper Silesia) there remained over 830,000 Germans of which c. 390,000 were either bi- or trilingual (speaking various combinations of German, Polish and so-called *Wasserpolnisch*).1054

However, as Markus Leuschner stresses, the linguistic affinities of specific Silesians did not always coincide with their feelings of national and ethnic belonging. This was proven in the plebiscite of 1921 when, for example, areas such as Groß-Strehlitz and Kreuzburg, with German-speaking populations of only 17% and 47% respectively, voted, sometimes overwhelmingly, to remain part of Prussia (49.3% and 92% respectively). This shows that Polish-speakers in Silesia often saw themselves as Germans or else expected a better future for themselves under German rule.1055 In fact, the overall linguistic situation in the Prussian province of Silesia was never particularly clear-cut and it would be a mistake to generically equate linguistic practice with ethnic affinity.1056

There were, moreover, no rigid linguistic boundaries in Silesia, which is to say that there were no sharp delineations between the languages spoken in various parts of Silesia and the neighbouring countries. Until 1945, various dialects of German, Polish and Moravian were spoken in different regions of Silesia, producing a linguistic patchwork not unlike that found in Switzerland today.1057

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1056 In general, the expectation that linguistic practice and ethnicity will necessarily coincide is naïve. One need only consider the case of Irish and Scottish nationalists, the majority of whom speak English rather than the languages of their putative ancestors (Gaeilge and Gàidhilig respectively). For a rather whimsical exposition of the linguistic situation in Upper Silesia, see Hartung, H., *Deutschland deine Schlesier*, pp. 98-103.
1057 Neubach, H., *Geschichte Schlesiens*, p. 3.
As a result of Hussite incursions into Upper Silesia in the early fifteenth century, which curtailed German colonisation in that region and promoted the immigration of Slavs, mainly Poles, German was spoken mostly in the larger towns in Upper Silesia whilst the rural population spoke a Polish dialect known as Wasserpolnisch. Overall, the ethno-linguistic situation throughout Silesia, but more so in Upper Silesia, was fluid and not easily definable in modern, nationalistic terms. Nevertheless, the choices people made in respect to their cultural and ethnic affinities would have serious consequences as the turbulent Weimar Republic gave way to the Third Reich, and the NSDAP consolidated their power (see my discussion of the Deutsche Volksliste and the Polish weryfikacja narodowościowa in Section 1.6 above).

B.5 Brown Silesia: 1933 to 1945
Helmut Brückner, Silesia’s first Gauleiter, founded the Silesian NSDAP in 1925. During the economic downturn of the 1930s, the NSDAP dramatically increased its share of the vote from, for example 1% in Breslau in 1928 to 43.5% by July 1932. According to Neubach, the main reason for this notable swing to the political right was, in addition to the economic misery that characterised the Weimar Republic, Hitler’s promise to denounce, and by implication, reverse the Treaty of Versailles and, by implication, rectify the post-WWI transfer of parts of Silesia to Poland. Despite the apparently solid right-wing support within the Silesian population that these results would seem to indicate, the NSDAP found it necessary to import political leaders such as Gauleiter from other parts of Germany due to a lack of ‘home-grown’ (right-wing) political ‘talent’.

B.6 Heim ins Reich: 1939 to 1945
Within days of the outbreak of WWII, German troops had conquered all of the territory lost to Poland as a result of the controversial Genfer Schiedsspruch

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1058 The term Wasserpolnisch need not, but often is considered to have, perjorative connotations. See: Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schicksal, p. 21.
1059 Weryfikacja narodowościowa = national verification
1060 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 18.
1061 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
In order to improve the economic potential of Upper Silesia, Hitler also ordered the annexation of neighbouring, purely Polish, territories, thereby augmenting the province of Silesia by some 10,500 km² and increasing the population by 2.7 million ethnic Poles. As a result, Silesia became so large and politically unwieldy that the NSDAP once again divided it into two provinces on the 1st of April 1941. By contrast with the more westerly parts of Germany, Silesia experienced very little aerial bombardment during WWII. The only parts of Silesia to suffer significant (although, in the greater scheme of things, relatively minor, bombing campaigns) were industrial Upper Silesia around Heyderbreck, and Breslau in Lower Silesia. Both of these areas were bombed during 1944 by the USA and the USSR respectively. By comparison with the rest of Germany, Silesia was considered so safe, that it came to be known as the ‘Reichsluftschutzkeller’. As the War progressed, the province became a refuge for private citizens and officials fleeing from the harder hit areas of Germany. In the final days of WWII, Hitler declared the Silesian towns of Breslau and Glogau to be Festungen (redoubts) and ordered them to stand firm down to the last man and bullet in the service of Germany.

B.7 Annexation and Vertreibung: 1945-1952

As explained in the Introduction to this thesis, the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) represents all Germans and ethnic Germans forced or encouraged to ‘return’ to Germany from ancestral homes beyond the current borders of the FRG. However, they reserve the term ‘Vertriebene’ for those expelled from Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of WWII and up to December 31, 1952. The years 1945-1952 therefore constitute a key period in the collective memory discourse triggered by Poland’s annexation of German Silesia and the concomitant sociocide.

1063 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 23.
1065 Ibid. p. 25.
1066 Ibid.
1068 These groups are defined in the German Federal Expellee Act or Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), which regulates the rights and status of those represented by the BDV within the FRG. Specifically the following paragraphs are relevant: Vertriebene (§ 1), Aussiedler (§ 1 Section 3), and Spätaussiedler (§ 4). See: Anon., Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler, p. 2.
Having been spared much of the misery of the aerial bombardments suffered by their fellow Germans elsewhere in Germany, Silesians suddenly found themselves on the front line when the Russians launched their major offensive against the German Reich in January 1945.\textsuperscript{1069} The civilian population immediately began a mass exodus which, however, was too late to save them from the wrath of the Soviet soldiers, who, according to Neubach, instigated a regime of ‘barely imaginable terror’ resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians.\textsuperscript{1070} Of those who managed to escape the unstoppable ‘eastern hordes’ by fleeing to the West, several thousands lost their lives in Dresden in February 1945, which was full of refugees when it was bombed by the British and American air forces.\textsuperscript{1071} Many thousands of Silesians had fled the province as fighting intensified, in the van of the Soviet advance and motivated by reports of Russian atrocities, mostly to Saxony and the Sudetenland. Most of those who fled expected to be able to be allowed to return to their homes after the cessation of hostilities and started to do so as soon as the major battles had finished and the remains of the German forces had fallen back beyond the Oder and the (Lausitzer) Neisse rivers.\textsuperscript{1072} However, the Soviet authorities had left the administration of occupied Silesia to the Polish militia, who immediately instigated a reign of terror aimed not just at known war criminals and members of the NSDAP, but at all ethnic Germans within the province. According to German sources, apart from random violence and summary justice against individuals, this phase of Soviet-Polish occupation also involved the torture and murder of tens of thousands of Germans in militia-run concentration camps, most of which had been built by the NSDAP, such as those at Myslowitz, Lamsdorf, and Schientochlowitz.\textsuperscript{1073}

In some areas in Lower Silesia, the so-called ‘\textit{wilde Vertreibungen}’ i.e., the unofficial expulsion of the German population from their homes and property at the hands of local Poles, had begun as early as June 1945.\textsuperscript{1074} These pogroms were followed by officially sanctioned expulsions in accordance with the Potsdam Agreements beginning on August 02, 1945 and lasting until the early winter.

\textsuperscript{1069} Hürten, H., ed. \textit{Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich}, p. 452.

\textsuperscript{1070} Neubach, H., \textit{Geschichte Schlesiens}, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{1072} Theisen, A., \textit{Die Vertreibung der Deutschen}, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{1074} Theisen, A., \textit{Die Vertreibung der Deutschen}, p. 6.
months of 1947. Whilst the majority of the Vertriebenen were driven westwards beyond the ‘frontier’ formed by the River Neisse and the River Oder as of its confluence with the Neisse near Neuzelle (which still forms the border between Germany and Poland today), several tens of thousands were deported to Russia as forced labourers. Nevertheless, the Polish authorities also retained many thousands of German Silesians to help with the reconstruction of the province before finally expelling them to Germany years later. About a million bilingual Silesians in Upper Silesia were classified as being autochthonous and were permitted/forced to stay but were forbidden to speak German or cultivate their tradition: of these people, a small number voluntarily emigrated to Germany at a later date, (55,000 to the FRG and 115,000 to the GDR) often taking their Polish wives and children with them. According to Neubach, around a half a million ethnic Germans were killed during, or died as direct result of, the expulsion treks out of Silesia (Leuschner quotes a slightly lower figure of 466,000).

To summarise the fate of the Silesian Germans in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War: about 1.6 million Silesians were able to flee to Czechoslovakia; many fled to Saxony and the Sudetenland to avoid the fighting as the Soviet forces swept through Silesia in 1945; of these, several thousand were killed in Dresden during the firebombing campaign of 1945; many returned to Silesia as soon as the fighting had finished; some were murdered in spontaneous acts of revenge; of these people, some were guilty of war crimes, some were members of the NSDAP, and can therefore be said to have supported the foregoing oppression of the Poles, whilst others were indigenous Germans not guilty of any specific crime. Some of the expellees were tortured and killed in organised acts of revenge in concentration camps, run by the Polish militia, to which entire villages were sometimes relocated.

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1076 There are several Neiße rivers in old Silesia; the specific river referred to here is known as the Lausitzer Neiße in German and is often called the Western Neisse in English. Ibid.
1077 Ibid; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 36.
Of the Germans still living in Silesia after the Potsdam Conference, which ended on August 02, 1945, most (3,197,000) were driven out of the province and into occupied Germany, where they finally settled in all four occupied zones. According to Theisen, about 1.5 million Silesians managed to reach the western part of the German Reich via a direct route. Around 1.6 million Silesians were captured by the Red Army either at their homes or whilst fleeing the province. Some 350,000 were deported to the Soviet Union as forced labour although it is not known how many died en route or in Soviet labour camps, lost within the Gulag system. Theisen quotes the figure of 400,000 Germans from the west of the Oder-Neisse line who were taken into Russian captivity as forced labourers of whom some 200,000 died en route and in Soviet camps.

**B.8 Concluding Remarks**

Those ethnic Germans, who remained in Silesia after the Vertreibungen fall into two broad groups. The first group consisted of skilled workers and their families (60-80,000 people) held back by the Soviet/Polish authorities, mainly in the vicinity of Waldenburg in Lower Silesia and the industrialised areas of Upper Silesia, to carry out specialised work involving the maintenance of infrastructure and plant not destroyed in the War, as well as the rebuilding and repair of industry and infrastructure necessary to make the region habitable. The second, far more numerous, group consisted of indigenous people, who cannot be defined as being either Polish or German, most of whom lived to the east of the Oder in Upper Silesia. Many of these people either had no time to flee or refused to do so (over 1 million people); despite their mixed heritage, these people were forcibly made to embrace all aspects of Polish culture. Including the language The numbers of ethnic Germans remaining in former Silesia declined steadily from 870,000 in 1950 to 107,000 by 2002.
Two interesting footnotes to the history of Silesia as a centre of German life and culture stand out during the period immediately predating its integration into Poland. The first is that Silesia was intimately involved in the Second World War literally from the first hour on. For it was in response to an attack on a radio station in Gleiwitz, Upper Silesia, on the 1st of September 1939, purportedly by Polish soldiers, that Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland.\textsuperscript{1087} And the final action by the German military during WWII was the defence of Breslau (see Chapter 6), which continued even after Hitler’s suicide. The second is that the most serious German plot to assassinate Hitler was hatched at Graf von Moltke’s (1907-1945) estates near Groß Rosen in Lower Silesia.\textsuperscript{1088} Thus, despite its position on the geographical outskirts of Germany, Silesia continued to play a central role in German politics until its integration into Poland in 1945.


Appendix C: Anti-Polish Pogroms in East Galicia

C.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I explained how the Lublin Poles benefited by accepting Stalin’s offer of a new state based on the Piast Formula. I argued that the logical corollary of this was the need to reject the traditional understanding of the Commonwealth as the non plus ultra of Polish statehood. I have also explained why it proved politic to accept the loss of East Galicia to the Ukrainian SSR. However, this still does not explain why Ukrainian nationalists were so adamant about seizing control of the province. It is worth looking into this in some detail for two main reasons. First, the circumstances under which those Poles who replaced the outgoing Germans in Lower Silesia were forced to leave their own homes is directly relevant to the concomitant collective memory discourse. Second, one of my objectives throughout this thesis has been to situate the postwar Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO within longer-term geopolitical problems centred on accommodating Poland within Central Europe. Considering this problem with reference to a frontier other than that shared with Germany will provide interesting insights into the relevant issues beyond the pall of the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{1089} In addition, forming a comprehensive understanding of Ukrainian-Polish border conflicts throughout the twentieth-century will help illuminate some of the concepts of Polish statehood and self-stereotyping that have informed Polish contributions to the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned.

I have already briefly alluded to the frontier wars fought between Poland and neighbouring states between 1918 and 1921, two of which involved Ukrainians. In the first, Poland fought against the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1919). In the second, Poland formed an alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1920-1921) in order to wage war against Soviet Russia. From a Ukrainian perspective, the result of these conflicts was a loss of

\textsuperscript{1089} Whilst the shadow of the Holocaust cannot be said to hang over the Ukrainian SSR itself, its penumbra certainly reached into certain elements of Ukrainian society. However, an exposition of the relevant facts is outwith the scope of this thesis. For some interesting views on this subject see: Copsey, N., ‘Informed Public Opinion in South-Eastern Poland and Western Ukraine’, pp. 109-17; Marples, D. R., Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2007), p. 1ff; Lehmann, R., ‘The Strength of Diversity’, pp. 510-25; Rossolinski-Liebe, G., ‘Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN–UPA and Other Nationalist Movements’, East European Jewish Affairs, 42 (2012), 199-241.
independence, the only concession to Ukrainian statehood being some measure of autonomy under Russian domination. This development provided the immediate incentive for the OUN-UPA anti-Polish pogroms during WWII and I briefly review these frontier conflicts in Section C.3 in light of Ukrainian state building aspirations. First however, it is necessary to review the longer-term causes of Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms in the East Galicia region.

C.2 Galicia as the Ukrainian Piedmont (1772-1918)

As a result of the Partitions (see Appendix A, Section A.3), most Ukrainians from the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (around 15 million) became subjects either of the Russian Empire (1721-1917) or of Austria (1526-1804). Austria, in this context, refers to three distinct polities: the Habsburg ‘Empire’ (1526-1804) and the Austrian Empire (1804-1867), both of which overlapped with, and were integral to the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806), and Austria-Hungary (1867-1918). The majority of Ukrainians who had lived in the Commonwealth (12.5 million) were engulfed by Russia. Historically, Russians had frequently referred to Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians’ and did not recognise their separate ethnic identity. Indeed, many Ukrainian nobles who became Russian subjects following the Partitions appeared to acquiesce in this view. Many such men were rapidly assimilated into the Russian state apparatus and became Russified. Ukrainian peasants, by contrast lost their freedom in 1783 when they were reduced to a state of serfdom. However, those Ukrainians who fell under the Habsburg sceptre in the wake of the Partitions fared considerably better in the longer term.

Small numbers of Ukrainians were spread across a number of minor Austrian provinces, with major Ukrainian centres in Volhynia, Transcarpathia.

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1090 Since the final phase of the Italian Risorgimento was launched from Piedmont, historians have referred to various national strongholds throughout Europe as ‘the Piedmont of such-and-such’. The trope highlights the potential of the place in question to serve as a centre from which a large-scale unification or re-unification process might be launched. For details of the actual Piedmont and the final phase of Italian reunification see: Beales, D. E. D., et al., The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 114-33.


1092 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 106.

1093 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 247; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 4.

and Bukovyna. However, the majority were concentrated in the Kingdom of Galicia-Lodomeria (1773-1867/1918), a Polish-dominated province in which they formed a minority. There too the Nobility chose to merge with their Polish counterparts, relegating the Ukrainian peasantry to an inferior social position due to a lack of leadership. Education was only offered in Polish or German until 1893 when the use of Ukrainian was officially sanctioned in Austrian schools. However, only the elite benefited from such academic facilities and remained correspondingly ambivalent about their sense of identity. The overwhelming masses of the common peasantry (serfdom was abolished in the Austrian Empire in 1848) remained staunchly Ruthenian/Ukrainian. In fact ‘Galician peasants were notorious for sticking pitchforks in the hated Polish landlords whenever they got the chance’, an ominous precursor to the pogroms of 1943 to 1946.

In modern times, Poles and Ukrainians first clashed in Galicia during the 1848 revolutions when Ukrainian nationalists advocated splitting Galicia-Lodomeria along ethnic lines. This would have left Western Galicia as part of Poland whilst East Galicia would have been homogenously Ukrainian. However, like the London Poles almost a century later, Polish nationalists considered the whole of Galicia to be Polish. Moreover, like the Russians, they ‘did not even recognize the existence of a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nationality’. The 1848 revolutions increased national awareness throughout Europe. About that time, Ukrainian peasants in Galicia-Lodomeria began thinking of themselves as ‘part of a great Ruthenian people that speaks the same language and numbers 15 million’. However, due to their servile condition in Russia, where their identity as a separate ethnic group was largely denied, the 12.5 million Russian Ukrainians could not be mobilised in the service of Ukrainian independence. The Austrians, on the other hand, had expressly recognised the

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1095 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 111-18.
1097 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 103.
1098 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 15; Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 102, 08.
1099 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 102.
1100 Hellbig, A., et al., Culture and Customs of Ukraine, pp. 21-22.
1101 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 18.
1102 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 106.
existence of a separate Ruthenian nationality in 1848. In addition, state-led nationalising projects, aimed at the eradication of minority identities, were largely absent in Austria, or were extremely attenuated compared with the situation in Russia. Indeed, ‘[the] equality of all the subject nationalities and languages in Cisleithania [Austria] was formally recognized in the Basic Law of 1867’. Moreover, Austrian officials frequently favoured and promoted Ukrainians in the state service ‘as a counterweight to the Poles’. Thus, right up to the outbreak of war in 1914, Ukrainians enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and many opportunities for national development within Austria that were denied to them elsewhere. In Galicia-Lodomeria they even succeeded in obtaining a separate Ukrainian chamber in the local diet as well as a Ukrainian board of education.

These developments, and the freedoms and opportunities they represented, were centred upon the Kingdom of Galicia-Lodomeria. As a result, this area became a rallying point for Ukrainians and ‘a conditio sine qua non for national independence’. Nevertheless, ‘the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, acting for the Allied Powers, awarded sovereignty over eastern Galicia to Poland’ on the 14th of March 1923 following the post-WWI frontier conflicts outlined above. Given the central importance of this province in the Ukrainian psyche as a kind of ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’, this was an ill-informed decision. It would prove disastrous two decades later.

C.3 Ukrainian State-building in the Interbellum Era (1918-1939)

C.3.1 Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1921)
During, and in the immediate aftermath of, WWI, Ukrainians, who had been living as minority populations in Russia and Austria-Hungary since the time of the Partitions, attempted to achieve independence within a nation state of their

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1105 Clark, C. M., *The Sleepwalkers*, p. 70.

1106 Wilson, A., *Unexpected Nation*, pp. 101, 05-06.

1107 Ibid. p. 108.


own. At first it had seemed as if the Austrian Ukrainians would simply be swallowed up by Russia as the Tsarist forces swept westward. The Russian Count Gregorii Bobrinskii (dates unknown) was placed in charge of, and attempted to Russify, the province of Galicia when it came under Russian occupation between September 1914 and June 1915.\footnote{Wilson, A., \textit{Unexpected Nation}, pp. 120-21.} Further to the east, the Ukrainian People’s (Central) Council (Ukrainian: Центральна Рада) was established in Kiev in March 1917. Later it was renamed as the Ukrainian People’s Republic or Українська Народна Республіка (UNR) and declared autonomy within a federated Russia in June 1917. The area of Ukrainian autonomy recognised by the Russian authorities, known as the Central Rada, comprised the regions of Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Podolia, and Volhynia. Its leaders went on to declare full independence on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of January 1918. This ‘virtual republic’ (as Andrew Wilson calls it) eventually increased beyond the Central Rada to include Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Taurida. It was expanded by the German High Command in March 1918 under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (9\textsuperscript{th} of February 1918) to include Kholm, Minsk, and Grodno. However, the Germans then replaced it with a smaller Hetmanate in April 1918, which they placed under the command of Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873-1945). This polity collapsed in December 1918 after which the UNR was restored as the ‘Directory’.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 122-24, 26-27.} On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of April 1920, the UNR and the Polish Republic joined forces against Soviet Russia, but Poland changed sides and signed the Treaty of Riga on the 18\textsuperscript{th} March 1921, as a result of which the independent Ukrainian territories were partitioned between Poland and Russia.\footnote{Potichnyj, P. J., \textit{Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present}, p. 22.} The Allies placed East Galicia under Polish suzerainty for a period of 25 years starting on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of the November 1919, which they changed to full sovereignty on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of March 1923.\footnote{Zemella, G., \textit{Deutschland im Fadenkreuz}, p. 121.}

\textbf{C.3.2 The West Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1919)}

The West Ukrainian People’s Republic or Західноукраїнська Народна Республіка (ZUNR) was established in November 1918 and encompassed East Galicia, Transcarpathia, and part of Bukovina.\footnote{Wilson, A., \textit{Unexpected Nation}, p. 127.} This area, home to some 18

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Wilson, A., \textit{Unexpected Nation}, pp. 120-21.
\item Ibid. pp. 122-24, 26-27.
\item Potichnyj, P. J., \textit{Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present}, p. 22.
\item Zemella, G., \textit{Deutschland im Fadenkreuz}, p. 121.
\item Wilson, A., \textit{Unexpected Nation}, p. 127.
\end{thebibliography}
million Poles and only 3.5 Ukrainians, immediately became a bone of contention between the ZUNR and the Second Republic, which was founded at the same time and laid claim to most of the same region. War broke out when a Polish army led by General Josef Haller de Hallenberg occupied East Galicia prompting Ukrainian forces to attempt to take the Lwów (Lviv) region by force.\textsuperscript{1115} Fighting had ceased by the 17\textsuperscript{th} of July 1919 at which time the ZUNR also ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{1116}

C.3.3 The Ukrainian SSR (1919-1941 / 1943-1991)

On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of January 1919 the UNR and the ZUNR united shortly before the establishment of the first Ukrainian SSR on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of March 1919, but only on paper.\textsuperscript{1117} Overlapping this development, a second, more successful, Ukrainian SSR grew out of the first Soviet Ukrainian government which had been established in December 1917. However, this polity could not be stabilised until 1921 in the wake of the demise of the UNR following the Treaty of Riga. It acceded to the USSR in 1922.\textsuperscript{1118}

C.4 Concluding Remarks

Thus, at the same time as Polish nationals were fighting to establish the Second Republic, they effectively dashed Ukrainians hopes for a fully independent state of their own. During the interbellum period (1921-1938) various Polish governments implemented a series of repressive measures against ethnic Ukrainians in East Galicia.\textsuperscript{1119} All of this contributed towards decisions taken by the UPA and OUN first to expel, then to murder the Polish inhabitants of the region during WWII, primarily between the spring of 1943 and the end of 1944.\textsuperscript{1120}

The Ukrainian part of the population had already gained the upper hand following the Soviet invasion in September 1939 and had continued their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1115} Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz, p. 121.
\item \textsuperscript{1116} Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 20-21.
\item \textsuperscript{1117} Ibid. p. 21; Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 127.
\item \textsuperscript{1118} Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. xvii, 134.
\item \textsuperscript{1119} ‘Interbellum’ in this context refers to the period following the Treaty of Riga and the Polish incursion into Czechoslovakia in 1938.
\item \textsuperscript{1120} Ascherson, N., The Struggles for Poland, pp. 59-79.
\end{itemize}
dominance under German occupation between 1941 and September 1944. Despite occasional episodes of mutual resistance to German occupation, conflict between Polish and Ukrainian irregular forces erupted and rapidly worsened in the course of 1942. The OUN often collaborated openly with the German occupiers during this period. As explained above, anti-Polish sentiment among Ukrainians was partially fed by news of the exile Polish Government’s insistence on retaining East Galicia within any postwar Polish state and soon degenerated into sociocide/genocide.
Appendix D: The Piast Formula in Anglophone Texts

D.1 Objective
The objective of this distant reading exercise is to assess the extent to which the Piast Formula, as discussed in Chapter 3, has been addressed in the relevant Anglophone historiography.\textsuperscript{1124}

D.2 Method
To assess the extent to which the Piast Formula has been addressed in the relevant Anglophone historiography, I carried out a distant reading of Anglophone historiography in two parts. In the first part of the exercise I performed an ‘Any Field’ search at the British Library and the Library of Congress, using specific search terms in conjunction with the term ‘Piast Formula’. The second part of the exercise involved a full-text search of the JSTOR database. Prior to beginning the exercise, I performed a control check using other search terms in various combinations.\textsuperscript{1125}

D.3 Search Tools

EndNote X6.0.1 (Bld 8432)
RMIT University
2091600762
www.endnote.com

JSTOR
©2000-2015 ITHAKA
www.jstor.org


\textsuperscript{1125} The following controls prove that the search engine is producing the desired results (i.e. that it is finding the full phrase and not the individual words) ‘hits’ at the British Library for Piast = 103, Poland = 5000, Piast Poland = 77, Piast Poland Badger = 0. In the case of JSTOR I used the following test (search term in Title or Abstract): ‘Poland’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 3328 pages x 25, ‘Poland’ (French, post 01.01.1945) = 3 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 418 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (French, post 01.01.1945) = 4 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (English, pre 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 3, ‘Computer’ + ‘Mouse’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 3, Computer Mouse’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 1.
D.4 Search Terms

A – Piast Poland
B – Piast Myth
C – Regained Territories
D – Recovered Territories
E – TRJN
F – German Expulsion
G – Oder-Neisse Line
H – Poland’s Eastern Territories
I – Kresy

D.5 Results Step 1 (single phrase searches)


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<th>Search Term Combination</th>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Search Term Combination</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>C</td>
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### D.6 Step 2 (multiple phrase searches)


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<td>F + D</td>
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<tr>
<td>G + D</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F + I</td>
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<tr>
<td>G + D</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G + I</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D + I</td>
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<tr>
<td>D + A</td>
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<th>Abstract</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A + D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A + G</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>D + E</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D + G + H</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>D + G + I</td>
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</table>

D.7 Results

The results of this distant reading exercise show that the phrases ‘Piast Poland’ and ‘Piast Myth’ do not occur together with any of the other search terms within the corpus searched. The most significant combination of the selected search terms is ‘Recovered Territories’ + ‘Oder-Neisse Line’ + ‘Poland’s Eastern Territories’. These occur together in just six journal articles but no books.\(^{1126}\)

Controlling for duplicates in the volumes held at the British Library and the Library of Congress, a total of just 67 books include at least one of the search terms in any of the searchable fields. Of these volumes, just 15 contain any of the search terms in the title (Piast Poland x 2; Recovered Territories x 4; Oder-Neisse Line x 9). The full-text search at JSTOR produced a total of 368 matches for single terms (the majority being for the term ‘Oder-Neisse Line’), yet only 17 matches for more than one term combined.

These results, whilst by no means conclusive, do suggest that Anglophone historiography has not engaged directly, to any significant extent, with the Piast Formula as defined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The results of similar distant reading exercises involving other key pieces of information in the relevant

Anglophone historiography were similarly suggestive of a lack of interest in the historic detail of the region and there of the merits of the Piast Formula. One important text in relation to the historic status of Silesia, for example, is the Treaty of Trentschin, which is rarely mentioned in the Anglophone scholarship on Poland, but which is a important element in German historic claims to the province.\footnote{For example, I carried out a full electronic text search for the word ‘Trentschin’ on a total of 8 books, 3 PhD theses, and 6 journal articles, and 2 with relevant titles and containing the words ‘Schlesien’ and ‘Potsdam’. I repeated the search on 8 books, 2 theses, and 8 journal articles with relevant titles and containing the words ‘recovered territories’. Only one of these texts (Kamusella, 1999) referred to the Treaty of Trentschin. The books sampled were: Kühnl, R., *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage*; Kamusella, T., *Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries*; Davies, N., *Heart of Europe*; Moeller, R. G., *War stories: the search for a usable past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 2001); Krivat, K., *Der andere Holocaust*; MacDonogh, G., *After the Reich*; Frank, M. J., *Expelling the Germans*; Hayashi, T. *et al., Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007); Čepič, Z., *1945 - A Break with the Past*; Niven, W. J., *et al., Memorialization in Germany since 1945*; Prażmowska, A., *Poland: a Modern History*; The theses sampled were: Harmel, S., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den Ostgebieten 1945-48*; Ostrowski, M., *To Return to Poland or Not to Return*; Copsey, N., *Informed Public Opinion in South-Eastern Poland and Western Ukraine*; Bard, R., *Historical Memory and the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in Europe, 1944-1947*; Berger, K. L., *The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present*; The journal articles sampled were: Moeller, R. G., *War Stories*; Kostrowicki, J., *Geography in Poland Since the War*; Leszczycki, S., *The Application of Geography in Poland*; Ther, P., *Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after WW II*; Werblan, A., *Gomulka and the Dilemma of Polish Communist*; Thum, G., *Die fremde Stadt - Breslau 1945*, (2003); Linek, B., *Recent Debates on the Fate of the German Population in Upper Silesia 1945-1950*, *German History*, 22 (2004), 372-405; Yoshioka, J., *Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II*; Stańczyk, E., *Polish Contact Zones*; Kamusella, T., *International Treaties and the Imagining of Poland's Post-1945 Western Border*; Alvis, R. E., *Holy Homeland: The Discourse of Place and Displacement among Silesian Catholics in Postwar West Germany*, *Church History*, 79 (2010), 827-59; Demska, A., *Reinscribing Silesien as Śląsk*.}
## Appendix E: Timeline – Silesia, Poland, Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germans in Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Silesia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>World Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>963</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kaiser Otto I of the HRE gives Silesia to the Polish prince Mieszko I as an Imperial Fief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>960 start of Sung Dynasty and unification of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>965</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baptism of Mieszko I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>965 Byzantium takes possession of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>981</td>
<td></td>
<td>First recorded contact between Poles (&quot;Liakhs&quot;) and Ukrainians: expedition led by the Ukrainian Prince Volodymyr the Great (c. 958-1015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Silesia begins to develop separately from the remainder of Silesia</td>
<td>Founding of the See of Gniezno (the ecclesiastical province of Poland)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Venice starts to dominate trade in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1003-1018</td>
<td></td>
<td>War between the HRE and Boleslaus the Brave (992-1025) – ends with the Peace of Budziszyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway and Iceland Christianised and Leif Erikson discovers Vinland (Nova Scotia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1025</td>
<td></td>
<td>Founding of Kingdom of Poland: Mieszko II Lambert (c. 990-1034) was crowned in the same year, and ruled, as King of Poland, from 1025 to 1034</td>
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<tr>
<td>1037</td>
<td></td>
<td>The great pagan rebellion</td>
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<tr>
<td>1079</td>
<td></td>
<td>Murder of Bishop Stanislaw of Cracow, the ‘Polish Becket’</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1142</td>
<td></td>
<td>The king of Hungary invites Westerners to settle in his country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1150 the Aztecs become settled and take up farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1157</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emperor Barbarossa forces Boleslaus the Curly to pay homage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1163</td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Silesia becomes the Duchy of Ratibor</td>
<td>The kingdom of Poland loses effective control of Silesia.</td>
<td>1187 Barbarossa forces Boleslaus the Curly to pay homage</td>
<td>The Holy Roman Empire of German Nations provides backing for an independent (but still Polish-run Silesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of Silesian rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Work begins on the Cathedral of Notre-Dame in Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>World Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1201</td>
<td>Bishop Albert of Bremen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. 1200 Nibelungenlied composed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>founds Riga. The Order of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1201 Bulgaria recognised by Byzantium</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the Brothers of the Sword</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conquers Livonia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1202</td>
<td>The Duchy of Ratibor annexes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oppeln and the new polity is</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>renamed the Duchy of Oppeln</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1201-1238</td>
<td>The Polish Duke of Silesia,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1206-1227 reign of Genghis Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heinrich I, invites German</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>settlers</td>
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<td>1217</td>
<td>Oppeln given ‘deutsches</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stadtrecht’</td>
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<tr>
<td>1226</td>
<td>The Knights of the Teutonic</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Order conquer Prussia having</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>been invited in by Conrad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Mazovia (reigned 1229-1232)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1228</td>
<td>Duke Henryk I Brodaty (c. 1165-1238) grants German Law to the city of Breslau and exempts it from services and tax payments to Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1241</td>
<td>Mongols invade Silesia Europe</td>
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<td>First Mongolian incursion into Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1254</td>
<td>Beuthen given ‘deutsches</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1255-1269 Marco Polo travels to Peking and back</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Stadtrecht’</td>
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<td>1256</td>
<td>A charter of liberties gave Jews the right to reside in Poland under certain conditions and marks their first official appearance in the area</td>
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<td>1259</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Second Mongolian incursion into Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1261</td>
<td>Breslau receives Magdeburger Recht</td>
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<td>Iceland and Greenland annexed to Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>1281</td>
<td>The Duchy of Oppeln splits into seven smaller duchies:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mongols attempt to conquer Japan but fail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1295</td>
<td>Beuthen, Oppeln, Ratibor, Teschen, Cosel, Auschwitz &amp; Zator</td>
<td>Re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland under Przemysl II (reigned 1295-1296)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1299</td>
<td>Ratibor given ‘deutsches Stadtrecht’</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
<td>King Wenzel II of Bohemia crowned King of Poland</td>
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<td>Battle of the Golden Spurs near Kortrijk</td>
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<tr>
<td>1308</td>
<td>The knights of Teutonic Order capture Gdańsk (henceforth ‘Danzig’)</td>
<td>Treaty of Trentschin – formal renunciation of claims or pretentions to Silesia for ever by Kasimir the III (1310-1370) of Poland – Silesia becomes feudal property of King John of Bohemia and therefore ultimately of the Kaiser of the HRE</td>
<td></td>
<td>1338 start of Hundred Years' War between England and France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1335</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland occupies Galicia</td>
<td>Kaiser Karl IV and the Pope ratify Silesia's integration into the HRE</td>
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<td>1340</td>
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<td>King Kasimir III invades Red Ruthenia and annexes the Ukrainian principality of Halych</td>
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<td>1347-1348</td>
<td>Upper Silesia devastated by plague</td>
<td>Formal renunciation of Polish sovereignty in Silesia – Treaty of Namysłów. Silesia officially part of the Holy Roman Empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>1348</td>
<td>The King of Bohemia, Karl IV (also ruled as Kaiser from 1355) incorporates Silesia into the HRE</td>
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<td>1349</td>
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<td>the HRE</td>
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<td>1370</td>
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<tr>
<td>1374</td>
<td>Foundation of the Cracovian Academy (later called the Jagiellonian University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1366</td>
<td>Ruthenia comes under Polish dominion</td>
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<tr>
<td>1370</td>
<td>Start of Polish expansion into Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>1374</td>
<td>Teschen given ‘deutsches Stadtrecht’</td>
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<td>1378-1417 Great Schism</td>
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<td>1385</td>
<td>Union of Krevo: first dynastic link between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania</td>
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<td>1386</td>
<td>Queen Jadwiga (1382-1399) of Poland marries Jagiello of Lithuania, who called himself Władysław II – Poland and Lithuania ruled in personal union</td>
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<td>1387</td>
<td>Latest date for Breslau’s accession to the Hanseatic League</td>
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<td>1388</td>
<td>The King issues ‘a royal undertaking that no member of the nobility could be imprisoned without due process of law’</td>
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<td>1410</td>
<td>War between Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic Order (1409-1410) ended with the defeat of the latter at the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) on July 15, 1410</td>
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<td>1425-1435</td>
<td>Hussite incursions into Upper Silesia result in widespread devastation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1429 Portuguese start settling the Azores</td>
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<td>1434</td>
<td>Statute of neminem captivabimus the Polish version of habeas corpus</td>
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<td>1431 Joan of Arc burnt as a witch</td>
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<tr>
<td>1453</td>
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<td></td>
<td>End of Hundred Years’ War between England and France</td>
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<td>1454-</td>
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<td>1466</td>
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<td>Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic Order, ended with the Peace of Toruń</td>
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<td>1455 start of the War of the Roses in England</td>
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<td>1457</td>
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<td>The Duchy of Auschwitz in</td>
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<td>1479 Christian Spain united under Ferdinand V</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Upper Silesia is ceded to</td>
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<td>1483 Russians start expanding into Siberia</td>
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<td>1479</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1492</td>
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<td>Columbus discovers the Americas</td>
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<td>1496</td>
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<td>Introduction of institutional serfdom in Poland as a result of King John</td>
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<td>Albert (1492-1501) 'privilege' granted to the landowning gentry</td>
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<td>1501</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Union of Mielnik: the first (failed) attempt to unite Poland and Lithuania</td>
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<td>1505</td>
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<td>Parliamentary statute of nihil novi ... 'nic o nas bez nas' ('nothing</td>
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<td>concerning us can be settled without us')</td>
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<td>1515</td>
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<td>Sigismund I the Old (1506-1548) renounces his dynastic claims to the</td>
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<td>thrones of Bohemia and Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>1519-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>War between Poland and Teutonic Prussia, in which Poland was victorious</td>
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<td>1521</td>
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<td>1525</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Kraków signed on April 08, 1525 and effectively broke Prussia</td>
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<td>out of the Empire and removed it from the Catholic sphere of influence</td>
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<td>(the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order accepted the Lutheran faith)</td>
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<td>1526</td>
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<td>The thrones of Bohemia and</td>
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<td>Hungary fell to the Habsburgs</td>
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<td>in 1526</td>
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<tr>
<td>1537</td>
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<td>First Polish Rebellion (‘War of the Hens’): gentry versus the crown</td>
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<td>1563-</td>
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<td>1563-1570: Livonian War involved Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, the</td>
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<tr>
<td>1565</td>
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<td>Jesuits permitted to operate in Poland</td>
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<td>1569</td>
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<td>July 01, Union of Lublin: formal foundation of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (included Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians)</td>
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<td>1570</td>
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<td>Union of Sandomierz – a union of non-Catholics directed against the Counter Reformation</td>
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<td>1573</td>
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<td>First free election (Convocation Seym) in the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. The Convocation Seym signed off a new constitution known as the Henrician Articles Following the Confederation of Warsaw in 1573, Poland became one of the most religiously tolerant places in Europe</td>
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<td>1578</td>
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<td>Jesuit College in Vilna becomes an academy</td>
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<td>1583</td>
<td>The Siebenbürger Saxons receive their own ‘Landrecht’</td>
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<td>1582 introduction of the Gregorian calendar in Catholic countries 1583 Start of British Empire: English colony established in Newfoundland 1584 Walter Raleigh founds the first English colony on the North American mainland (Virginia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1595</td>
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<td>Jan Zamoyski establishes an academy at Zamość</td>
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<td>1596</td>
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<td>Union of Brest – foundation of the Uniate Church causes a lasting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1604-1606</td>
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<td>schism in Orthodox Christianity</td>
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<td>False Dmitri’s invasion of Muscovy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1606</td>
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<td>Zebrzydowski Rebellion (1606-1608)</td>
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<td>First recorded sighting of Australia by Willem Janszoon</td>
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<tr>
<td>1618</td>
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<td>Start of Thirty Years’ War</td>
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<td>1616 Dirk Hartog lands in Australia</td>
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<td>1624</td>
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<td>Iov Boretskyi, metropolitan of the restored Orthodox Church in Kiev appeals to the Russian Tsar for protection against Polish persecution</td>
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<td>1632</td>
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<td>1632 – Restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy</td>
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<td>Kievian Academy: first institution of higher learning in the Orthodox Eastern Slav region</td>
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<td>1634</td>
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<td>Treaty of Polanowo: Ladislaus IV (reigned 1632-1648) renounced his claim to the title of Tsar and to the throne of Muscovy</td>
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<td>1639</td>
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<td>Start of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms</td>
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<td>1648</td>
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<td>The great Cossack Revolution under Hetman Bohdan: Ukrainians against the Polish regime</td>
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<td>1644 Abel Tasman discovers Tasmania</td>
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<td>1648-1657: Cossack Rebellion under Bohdan Chmielnicki</td>
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<td>1648 – Cossack massacre of Jews</td>
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<td>1649</td>
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<td>Poles forced to recognise the rule of Hetman Chmielnicki in the Ukraine</td>
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<td>1651-1653</td>
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<td>Polish-Cossack war: ended with the Zborów Agreement, which confirmed rule of Hetman Chmielnicki in the Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms</td>
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<td>1654</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Pereiaslav: Ukraine accepts the protectorate of the Russian Tsar – beginning of the end for the Commonwealth of Poland -Lithuania</td>
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<td>1654-1656</td>
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<td>War between Muscovy and the Commonwealth over possession of</td>
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<td>the Ukraine: Most of Lithuania occupied by the Russians. Ends in truce</td>
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<td>1655</td>
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<td>Swedish invasion of Poland-Lithuania (the Swedish Deluge)</td>
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<td>1657</td>
<td>Treaty of Wehlau: Brandenburg-Prussia gains independence under the Hohenzollerns</td>
<td>Transylvanian invasion of Poland</td>
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<td>1658</td>
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<td>Union of Hadiach: intended to raise the Ukraine, under the name of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, to the status of an equal partner within a Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania-Ukraine (the project failed)</td>
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<td>Agreement of Hadziacz: this enabled the creation of an autonomous Duchy of Ruthenia within Poland-Lithuania</td>
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<td>Polish Brethren and Czech Brethren banished</td>
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<td>1660</td>
<td>Treaty of Oliwa: end of long-term hostilities with Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>Treaty of Andrusovo: Ukraine divided along the Dnieper between Russia and Poland: end of long-term hostilities with Muscovy</td>
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<td>1672</td>
<td>Sultan Mohammed IV invades Poland – the Turks captured Podolia the southern Kiev region</td>
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<td>1683</td>
<td>Polish army and other Christian forces victorious against Kara Mustafa, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire</td>
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<td>1686</td>
<td>Muscovy retains de facto possession of Ukraine</td>
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<td>Grzymułtowski Peace: formal recognition of territorial changes</td>
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<td>agreed in the Truce of Andrusovo (1667)</td>
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<td>1699</td>
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<td>Treaty of Karlowitz: Podolia returned by the Turks</td>
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<td>1700-1721</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Great Northern War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>Friedrich I of Prussia crowned in Königsberg</td>
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<td>Prussian independence recognised internationally</td>
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<td>Brandenburg proclaimed as a Prussian Kingdom</td>
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<td>1718</td>
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<td>Last Calvinist delegate expelled from the Diet</td>
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<td>1724</td>
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<td>Blood-bath of Thorn – Catholics v. Lutherans</td>
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<td>1732</td>
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<td>Black Eagles (Russia, Austria and Prussia) directed against the interests of Poland-Lithuania</td>
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<td>1733-1735</td>
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<td>War of the Polish Succession</td>
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<tr>
<td>1740-1742</td>
<td>First Silesian War: Prussia annexes parts of Silesia (from Austria)</td>
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<td>1741 Bering discovers the Aleuts and the coast of Alaska</td>
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<td>1744-1745</td>
<td>Second Silesian War: Prussia v. Austria</td>
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<td>War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1756-1763</td>
<td>Third Silesian War: Prussia v. Austria</td>
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<td></td>
<td>English-French colonial wars in Canada, Louisiana and India</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Frieden von Hubertusburg; most of Silesia to Prussia (Hohenzollern dynasty)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1755-1763 War between France and England</td>
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<td>1767</td>
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<td>Russian-supported confederations of Lithuanians and Poles Culminating in the General Confederation (aka Confederation of Radom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1768</td>
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<td>Large-scale peasant rebellion in the</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1769</td>
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<td>Ukraine (Koliivshchyna) following the Haidamak revolts directed against the Polish nobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>1772/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Habsburgs occupy Galicia</td>
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<td>Confederation of Bar (1768-1772)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1774</td>
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<td>Habsburgs occupy Bukovyna</td>
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<td>Turkey declares war on Russia in support of the Confederation of Bar</td>
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<td>1775</td>
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<td>Captain Cook arrives in Australia</td>
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<td>1777</td>
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<td>Start of American War of Independence</td>
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<td>1783</td>
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<td>End of American War of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1791</td>
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<td>Constitution of May Third</td>
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<td>1792</td>
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<td>Confederation of Targowica: Polish oligarchs within landholdings in Ukraine accept the protection of Catherine II of Russia</td>
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<td>1793</td>
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<td>First telegrams sent</td>
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<td>1794</td>
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<td>Second Polish Partition</td>
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<td>1795</td>
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<td>Louis XVI beheaded</td>
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<td>1797</td>
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<td>Work starts on the Capitol in Washington DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1806-1807</td>
<td></td>
<td>Napoleonic wars in Silesia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National uprising under Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746-1817)</td>
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<td>1806-1807</td>
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<td>Third Polish Partition</td>
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<tr>
<td>1807</td>
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<td>The Partitioning Powers tried to abolish the word ‘Poland’ by treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1807</td>
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<td>Establishment of the Duchy of Tilsiter Frieden: between</td>
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<td>1807</td>
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<td>1806 American pioneers reach the Pacific coast</td>
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<td>1807</td>
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<td>First steam ship</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1811-1823</td>
<td>Abolition of serfdom and affranchisement of peasants in Prussia</td>
<td>France and Prussia, which resulted in a considerable loss of Prussian territory</td>
<td>Warsaw and the introduction of the Napoleonic Constitution</td>
<td>Breslau: March 17: King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia (1770-1840) – An mein Volk – evokes the unity between the Crown, the state and the nation</td>
<td>USA and Britain ban maritime slave trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>Battle of Katzbach: French driven out of Silesia by combined Russian and Prussian troops under Marschall Blücher</td>
<td>Abolition of the Duchy of Warsaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of explorations of Australian interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Silesia annexes part of the Oberlausitz from Saxony under the aegis of the Congress of Vienna</td>
<td>Establishment of the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) and the Commonwealth of Cracow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress of Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>Prussian Province of Silesia founded incorporating Upper Silesia as a Regierungsbezirk</td>
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<td>A British fleet attacks Algeria and frees Christian slaves</td>
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<td>1830-31</td>
<td></td>
<td>Polish uprising November 29, 1939: start of the November Insurrection 1831: The Great Emigration following the collapse of the November Insurrection</td>
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<td>Indian Removal Act in USA inaugurates the gradual but permanent forced resettlement of Native Americans in Indian Reservations July Revolution in Paris Secession of Belgium from the United Netherlands</td>
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<td>1831</td>
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<td>Russo-Polish War</td>
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<td>1844</td>
<td>Silesian Weavers’ Revolt</td>
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<td>Britain seizes power from the Boers in Natal</td>
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<td>1846</td>
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<td>Polish uprising (including the Cracow Uprising) Peasant uprising against the Polish landowners and bailiffs (‘the Galician Slaughter’) Abolition of the Commonwealth of</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1847</td>
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<td>Cracow and annexation of Cracow by Austria</td>
<td>Berlin Trial</td>
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<td>Galician Jacquerie</td>
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<td>1848</td>
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<td>Austrian government recognises the existence of a separate Ruthenian nationality</td>
<td>Serfdom abolished in the Austrian Empire</td>
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<td>Polish uprising</td>
<td>Abolition of serfdom and affranchisement of peasants in Austria</td>
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<td>Founding of the National Committee in Poznań</td>
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<td>Founding of the Polish League in Poznań</td>
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<td>1853-1856</td>
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<td>Crimean War</td>
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<td>1861</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Polish uprising</td>
<td>Proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy (Unification of Italy)</td>
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<td>1863-1864</td>
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<td>General Red uprising against the Tsar. Led by Poles but also encompassing the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania</td>
<td>Abolition of serfdom and affranchisement of peasants in Russia</td>
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<td>The Great January Rising</td>
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<td>1864</td>
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<td>Abolition of the autonomous Kingdom of Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1865</td>
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<td>All slaves freed in USA</td>
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<td>1867</td>
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<td>Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich (creation of Austria-Hungary)</td>
<td>British Columbia merges with Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silesia part of German Reich</td>
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<td>Unification of Germany</td>
<td>First Jim Crow laws in the USA</td>
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<td>1876</td>
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<td>1878</td>
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<tr>
<td>1882</td>
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<td>Congress of Berlin</td>
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<td>1882</td>
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<td>The International Social Revolutionary Party was founded in Warsaw</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892</td>
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<td>Founding of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893</td>
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<td>Founding of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Formation of the Polish Peasant Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
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<td>SDKP renamed as the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
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<td>Vernacular version of the Bible published in Ukrainian</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905-06</td>
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<td>Russian Revolution</td>
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<td>1908</td>
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<td>1908 founding of the clandestine Active Combat Union in Galicia under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
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<td>Start of WWI</td>
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<td>1914-15</td>
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<td>Bobrinski’s occupation of Galicia</td>
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<td>1916</td>
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<td>November: Central Powers declare the creation of a Kingdom of Poland</td>
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<td>1917</td>
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<td>Russian Revolution</td>
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<td>March: Ukrainian Central Council founded (forerunner of UNR)</td>
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<td>November 20: Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR)</td>
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<td>December: Establishment of First Soviet Ukrainian government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>January: UNR declares independence</td>
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<td>November: Polish Second Republic</td>
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<td>November 01: West Ukrainian National Republic established</td>
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<td>Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern</td>
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<td>February: Treaty of Brest-Litowsk</td>
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<td>January 08: Wilson’s 14-point speech</td>
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<td>November: End of WWI</td>
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<td>Galicia: On November 01, 1918 Ukrainians staged a putsch in eastern Galicia around the Lwów (L’viv) region, which triggered a war between Poland and the newly formed Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, which lasted until July 1919 December 16: formation of the Communist Worker’s Party of Poland</td>
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<td>1919–1921</td>
<td>Three ‘Polish Revolts’ put down by German Selbsschutzverbände</td>
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<td>Civil war in Ireland Lloyd George v. de Valera</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>April 22: Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Polish Republic joined forces against Soviet Russia</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ireland with the exception of Northern Ireland becomes a British Dominion Ukrainian SSR stabilised</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Oct 20: Genfer Schiedspruch – large parts of German Upper Silesia ceded to Poland despite a plebiscite in favour of remaining part of Germany March 17: inauguration of new constitution March 18: Treaty of Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia as a result of which the Ukraine is partitioned between the two states</td>
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<td>Proclamation of the Irish Free State – British troops withdraw The Ukrainian SSR joins USSR</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>Upper Silesia divided following plebiscite</td>
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<td>July 24, Treaty of Lausanne</td>
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<td>1923</td>
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<td>March 14: the Allied Council of</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>Silesian NSDAP founded by Helmut Brückner – later first Gauleiter of Silesia</td>
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<td>Ambassadors award sovereignty over eastern Galicia to Poland</td>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>Cyprus becomes a British crown colony</td>
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<td>1929</td>
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<td>May 12: military putsch by Piłsudski</td>
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<td>1932</td>
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<td>January 25: Piłsudski signs a ten-year pact of non aggression with the USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
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<td>January 26: Piłsudski signs a ten-year pact of non aggression with Germany</td>
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<td>1936</td>
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<td>July 17: start of the Spanish Civil War</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>April 01, 1938: Upper and Lower Silesia are reunited as a single province under the NSDAP Following the annexation of the Sudetenland, the Silesian territories lost to Czechoslovakia under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were returned to Silesia The new province (Reichsgau) of Silesia was enlarged by the addition of territories formerly belonging to the now dissolved Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 1939 British guarantee to Poland</td>
<td>September 1938: Munich Agreement (Great Britain, Germany, France &amp; Italy) October 1938: Germany annexes the Sudetenland November 09: anti-Jewish rioting throughout Germany resulting in serious personal injury and damage to property</td>
<td>Great Britain recognises Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>Ethnic Germans expelled from the Baltic States under NSDAP auspices in order to relieve the state of having to protect ethnic Germans under Russian dominion following the May: census records 4.8 million residents in Silesia 10,500km² of formerly Polish territory and 2.7 million Poles annexed to Silesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>April 06: Polish-British bilateral mutual aid declaration April 28, 1939: German abrogation of the German-Polish non-aggression pact</td>
<td>Hitler-Stalin Pact of Steel (August 23, 1939) September 01: Hitler orders the full-scale invasion of Poland September 03: Britain and France declare war on Germany</td>
<td>April 01: end of Spanish Civil War Great Britain blocks Jewish immigration to Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>division of Europe into Soviet and German controlled spheres of interest</td>
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<td>September 19: German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 07, 1939</td>
<td>Hitler issues the Decree on the relocation of the German population from European states to the German Reich and the eingegliederten Gebiete</td>
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<td>German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation (September 28, 1939)</td>
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<td>May 19: French-Polish protocol 'concerning the principles of joint operations’ in the event of German aggression</td>
<td></td>
<td>August 25: Polish-British Treaty of Mutual Assistance</td>
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<td>August 29: proclamation of the general mobilization of the Polish army</td>
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<td>September 17: Soviet invasion</td>
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<td>Sep 01: Hitler responds to an attack on Gleiwitz radio station with the full-scale invasion of Poland</td>
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<td>September 27: Polish surrender</td>
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<td>Sep 19: German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship</td>
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<td>September 28: Eastern Poland annexed by the Soviet Union; the remainder declared a German Reichsprotektorat</td>
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<td>End of Second Republic – Fourth Partition by Germany and the Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>September 30: formation of the exile Polish government in London</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October 08, 1939 Generalgouvernement set up in south eastern Poland</td>
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<td>October 08, 1939 Generalgouvernement set up in south eastern Poland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October 12, 1939 eingegliederte Ostgebiete (remainder of German annexed Poland) subdivided into two Reichsgaue, Danzig-Westpreußen</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 12, 1939 eingegliederte Ostgebiete (remainder of German annexed Poland) subdivided into two Reichsgaue, Danzig-Westpreußen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>World Events</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and the Wartheland, and two Regierungsbezirke, Kattowitz and Zichenau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>First Soviet occupation of western Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939-41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Apr 01: Silesia re-divided into two provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>German invasion of Soviet Union on June 22, 1941</td>
<td>Anglo-Soviet Agreement July 12, 1941</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>October 1941: Start of organised deportation of the Jews from the German Reich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany declares war on the USA on December 11, 1941</td>
<td>The OUN declares independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Britischer Kabinettsbeschluss zum Transfer der Deutschen aus Ostmittel-und Südosteuropa (06.07.1942)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November 28-December 01, 1943: Tehran Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Britisches Regierungskomitee zum Transfer deutscher Bevölkerungen (1943/44)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1943-54</td>
<td>UPA insurgency</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>July 26: Secret agreement between the Soviet Union and the Polish Lublin Committee to expel all Germans living to the east of Oder-Neisse Line</td>
<td>Second Soviet occupation of western Ukraine</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>December 31: USSR recognises the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1944-45</td>
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<td>February 04-11, Yalta Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan: Russian offensive overruns Silesia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>The part of Silesia to the west of the Neisse (Ober Lausitz)</td>
<td>June 28, 1945 the communist provisional government takes control of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>World Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>part of the Soviet zone of occupation under a Russian military dictatorship</td>
<td>effective control of Poland</td>
<td>July 05, 1945 the communist provisional government recognised by London and Washington as the de jure government of Poland&lt;br&gt;July 07, 1945 the Polish government signs an agreement with Moscow which regulated the new border and recognised significant territorial losses to the Soviet Union&lt;br&gt;Nov 09, 1945: Polish-Soviet agreement to transfer Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians to the Soviet territories&lt;br&gt;Nov 11, 1945: Polish-Soviet agreement to transfer Poles and Jews from the Soviet annexed territories to Poland</td>
<td>Potsdam Conference (17.07-02.08.1945): the Allies reset the German-Polish border to run along the line formed by the rivers Oder and Neisse&lt;br&gt;Ethnic Germans driven out of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Ethnic Poles expelled from Galicia in the Ukraine and resettled in Silesia</td>
<td>October 24, Poland becomes a member of the UN</td>
<td>German expellees and refugees from Eastern Europe arrive in large numbers in the western zones</td>
<td>Singapore becomes a British crown colony</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Start of Apartheid in South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>New Polish constitution</td>
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<td>1948</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The part of Silesia to the west of the Neisse (Ober Lausitz) part of the GDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of the FRG</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>March: foundation of Landsmannschaft Schlesien, Nieder and Oberschlesien 1949/50: foundation of the Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier</td>
<td>Görlitzer Vertrag: GDR recognises the Oder-Neisse line as the official border between Germany and Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of Korean War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>New Polish constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1953 end of Korean War (armistice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of Vietnam War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>France recognises the Oder-Neisse Line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Warsaw: FRG recognises Poland’s borders as inviolable</td>
<td>De jure end of racial segregation based on Jim Crow laws in the USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grundlagenvertrag  December 21, 1972: the FRG and the GDR formally recognise each other as sovereign states</td>
<td>Civil disturbances in Northern Ireland – British Army deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>September 18, FRG joins the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>September 18, GDR joins the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRG lends money to Poland in the wake of which several tens of thousands of ethnic Germans are allowed to leave Poland for the FRG</td>
<td>Britain holds referendum on its continued membership in the EC End of Vietnam War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>FRG and GDR reunified - Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>End of Vietnam War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two Plus Four Agreement): the eastern border of the reunited Germany is fixed for good (Oder-Neisse line)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaftsvertrag</td>
<td>The Ukraine gains full independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Germans in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Handover of Hong Kong – End of British Empire – (apart from 14 British Overseas Territories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of the Preußische Treuhand GmbH</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Poland accedes to the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Border controls abolished between Germany and Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F: Maps

F.1 The Piast Territories
F.2 Piast Territories as a Mythical Composite (see the Piast Formula)
F.3 The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (Maximum Extension)
F.4 Post-Partition Polish Polities

F.4.1 Galicia Lodomeria (1773-1867/1918)
F.4.2 Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815)
F.4.3 (Congress) Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duchy of Posen, Republic of Cracow (1815-1864/1918)
F.5 The Second Republic
F.6 The Polish People’s Republic
F.7 The ‘Regained Territories’ (Ziemie Odzyskane)
F.8 The Kresy
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