Now York Tribiiae February 7.1939»
Today and Tomorrow
1 By WALTER LIPPMANN =
I
That the Peace Can Still Be Saved
LL observers seem to agree—
and the various polls confirm
what they report—that a
great majority of the American peo-
ple believe that a world war Is in
the making, and that the chances
are against the United States being
able to stay out of It. If this opin-
ion Is true the prospect Is Indeed
awful. For. whatever the outcome,
another world war would be one of
the great catastrophes of all time.
For my own part, I do not believe
that war is Inevitable, and, from
what I can learn, this is the view
of the men, here and abroad, who
haye the best means of knowing the
actual situation in the world. If the
governments, with the backing of
public opinion, are sufficiently cool,
clear-sighted, and resolute, the peace
can still be saved by diplomacy.
•    • ¦
The situation, though not at all
desperate, is critical. To say that It
is critical means more specifically
that, according to the most reliable
information available, there are now
In progress negotiations of one sort
and another among Germany, Italy,
: and Japan, and among factions
within these nations, on whioh de-
| pends the decision whether there
will or will not be war. Apparently,
It Is Japan which will cast the de-
ciding vote.
The reason why Japan has the de-
I elding vote is that Great Britain and
France are now too strong in Europe'
to be attacked by Germany and Italy
alone.  Though London and Paris
i would suffer terrific damage In an
attack.from the air, they cannot be
conquered from the air. Their naval
superiority is overwhelmingly greater,
and the- French Army, standing be-
hind ihe Maginot Line, is still the
best army in the world. Backed up
by the resources of the British Em-
pire which the navy and the mer-
chant marine can bring, the military
power of France is probably sufficient
ato make a European war an Impos-
sible adventure.
That Is where Japan comes Into It.
-If Japan were to Jojn in the attack
by striking at Singapore, at the Dutch
East Indies, and Australia, the
British would have more enemies
than they can handle. If they sent
enough warships to the Far East to
hold Japan, they would not have
enough warships left in "Europe to
hold Italy and Germany; if they did
not send warships to the Far East,
and so let Japan get to Singapore,
their Empire from India to Australia
would collapse.
a      • •
There Is a faction in Japan, It
would appear, which is greatly
tempted to try for this enormous
I prize: If Japan ever gets to Singa-
pore, she wffl control a great supply
of oil and one of the main supplies
; of rubber as against the whole
world. But there is another faction
In Japan who regard the adventure
as too dangerous because of the risk
that the United States might .enter
such a war. Their .argument-Is Jhat
Japan is not strong enough to take
the chance of a war with the United
States. For In such a war, the Jap-
anese Navy%mld not dare to go to
Singapore. And with Singapore held
bv the British and Panama held by
the United-Staler:. Japar^sauld be
caught in a' long-distance But tre-
mendously effective blockade. Mow-
over, a war In which the United
States took part would immediately
redouble  the resistance  of the
! -Chinese, and would probably cause
' eveh the Russians to move in the
Far East. . ... .
As long as, the Japanese trunk
there is better than an even chance
of the United States taking part in
a world war, they are not likely to
risk it. And if the Japanese will
not risk it, there Is a very good
j chance that Rome and Berlin will
j not risk It either.
I 1
Reduced to the simplest terms the
situation would seem to be this:
Italy-Germany vs. Britain-France,
two against two = no war.
Italy-Germany-Japan vs. Britain-
France, three against two — war
very likely. Italy-Germany-Japan
vs. Britain-France-United States-
Russia g no war.
If these are the calculations which
wfll decide the outcome, whether
there Is to be war or whether there
is not to be war, then it is not hard
to understand why the war party ip_
Rome, Berlin, and Toklo is so angry
at the American armament program,
and at the President for helping- the
French and British to get airplanes,
and the very best airplanes at that,
and at the report that he regards It
as a vital interest of the United
States that, the French Army and
British Navy should not be destroyed. I
The armament program has lm-j
pressed the peace party in Japan; the"
help that is being given to the British
and French, and also, one might add,
the Netherlands, has strengthened
the peace party, and there is such a
thing in Germany and Italy. As a
result, the chances of war are almost
certainly much less than they were
before the President began asking for
more armaments and began .helping
the British and French to strengthen
their defenses.
¦ * " ffl
There are many things that the
Administration has done which seem
to me unwise or badly done, it ought
to have gagged Secretary Ickes. It
ought not, I believe, to keep the coun-
try divided in a partisan struggle
by such provocative appointments as
that of Mr. Amite, or by such stub-
bornness as it displayed over the
deficiency appropriation for W. P. A.
It ought to put national unity ahead
of all other-considerations, and hav-
ing done that itself, it could ask the
Republicans and the rebellious
Democrats to do likewise. That is
fundamental to any policy.
On the question of "secrecy," the
problem is more difficult. For if the
President says publicly all that he
knows about the dangers of the world
situation, he may increase the
dangers by arousing passion and
he* will surely be accused of in-
citing to war; if he tries to tell
the Congress confidentially what he j
knows and fears, his confidences will i
be betrayed and he will be accused of
having concealed purposes. He is
damned if he does and damned If hej
doesn't. But all things considered,)
he would do well to go to Congress
and lay before it a full and frank ex-
position of what he Is doing to avert
a world war.
For that is undoubtedly what he is
trying to do. He is making mistakes.
But that he is trying to avert war,
that this is his whole purpose. Is, I
think, absolutely indisputable. Help-
ing France and Britain to buy arms
can have no other purpose but to
prevent war. Letting them get arms
is not going to make them start a
war. If we refuse to let them get
arms, they would still have to fight
if they were attacked. So letting
them have arms is one way of making
war less likely.
•    • •
. And since, almost every one, as Mr.
Hoover has made plain, thjnks 'we
could not stay out of a war, surely thej
prevention of war must be our object!
Is there any one who wishes, to go>
oh record as believing that he does
not care whether a world war breaks
out? Is there any one who thinks
the American government ought to
do nothing to prevent it? Is there
any one who wants to take the re-,
sponslbilty of saying that the United
States should tell Japan, Germany,
and Italy that, so far as we are con-
cerned, they are perfectly safe if
they decide to wage a world war?
Whoever creates that impression
abroad in these days of critical
decisions is taking an awful responsi-
bility upon himself.
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