Copy
(P 4849/3918/10)
083/6126 (MO.l.).
SECRET.
THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.V.I.
19th May, 1939
Sir,
I am commanded "by the Army Council to state for
the information of Lord Halifax that they have had under
consideration the points raised in Foreign Office letter
No. F 3949/3918/10, dated 4th May, 1939, concerning the
position of British nationals in Shanghai in the event
of war with Japan*
2. The Council note that two issues have in fact been
raised, namely, the situation arising from war between this
country and Japan and that arising should the Japanese insist
on occupying the international Settlement as part of their
present campaign in China*
They would observe, however, that in the former
circumstances at all events, namely that of war between this
country and Japan, there will be for consideration the position
not only of British nationals in Shanghai but equally that of
those in other parts of China.
3. The Council agree to the proposal that the French
and united States Governments should be consulted. The
Foreign Office letter under reference was not received until
after the conclusion of the Staff Conversations recently held
with the French in London, but further conversations are to be
held between the local British and French Commanders in the
Far/
The under-secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.I*
4/
resistance might influence the Japanese troops to commit
against foreign civilians excesses which might otherwise
he avoided.
8.      The question of the previous evacuation of
British civilians appears to he primarily a political and
naval one hut the Council agree that in the circumstances
it cannot he regarded as a practical solution.   In the
opinion of the Council, however, it must he accepted that
in the event of war with Japan British civilians can
expect no effective protection from British or French
troops.
9*     It seems possible however that in stations in
which there are American garrisons, if indeed in the
event of war these garrisons were not withdrawn, that
the United States G
jrnment might he induced to approach
the Japanese authorities with a view to British nationals
"being interned under American protection.
10.       There remains to he considered the situation
which might arise if in the course of the present campaign
against China, although still at peace with Great Britain,
the Japanese should attempt to occupy the International
Settlement in Shanghai.
icil agree that the French and United
ertainl
States
to he made aware that
the British Commander has been instructed that in such
an event no forcible opposition should be offered. They
are, moreover, strongly of the opinion that the Italians
should not be informed since they would without doubt
pass the information on to the Japanese.
11.     In the view of the Council however the position
of/
of the British garrison is not entirely analogous to that
of the French*   The French are protecting their own
concession and if its occupation were attempted by the
Japanese would presumably have a legal right to resist,
should they so choose. Whether they would he prepared
to join the British and Americans in offering resistance
to a Japanese occupation of the International Settlement
which did not involve violation of the French concession
seems open to doubt*
- On the other hand it would appear that the only
legal right which the British and American forces possess
in the International Settlement is to protect their own
nationals and that Individually the Japanese have an equal
right to introduce troops into any part of the Settlement.
Resistance to an attempted Japanese occupation of
the Settlement could not be successful if the Japanese
were determined to press their attempt whatever the
consequences and in such circumstances resistance, in the
opinion of the Council, could only lead to an armed
clash and possibly to war.
On the other hand, if confronted by a show of
force the Japanese might not press their attempted
occupation, despite the loss of prestige involved, if
they considered it contrary to their interests to embark
on war with the Powers concerned*
Owing to the situation in Europe it seems likely
that at present the Japanese would have less hesitation in
incurring war with Great Britain than with the United
States.   Should therefore the latter demur at the British
policy of offering no forcible resistance, it might be
suggested/
43
suggested to them that that policy could only he reversed
on condition that if the British forces offered resistance
they would he supported hy the American forces in Shanghai
and further, that if war resulted, the United States would
forthwith enter it as our ally»
Moreover unless it was known to the Japanese that
such an Agreement had been reached there would be no
deterrent to a forceful occupation of the Settlement.
13.       Assuming, however, that it remains the accepted
policy not to resist hy force, the situation of British
civilians in Shanghai in the event of a Japanese occupation
Settlement would he no worse than that of British
, for example,
nationa
in Hankow. If the British
it seems possible that the
their employment in the
protection
lawlessness o
this might be regarded as an I
inability to maintain order*
ter natively, if the Pr
the French might agree t
remained in Shanghai
acquiesce in
for the
individuals against
though even
of Japanese
on remained
er
ing their evacuation from Shanghai to any British
onals who feared to remain under Japanese jurisdiction.
In conclusion I am to state that the first
conversations^ between the local commanders in the Far
East are likely to take place at an early date. If,
therefore, in the opinion of Lord Halifax it is desirable
to include in the agenda discussion of the position of
British/
British civilian nationals in China in event of war
with Japan or of a Japanese occupation of International
Settlement of Shanghai, an early decision will be necessary.
15.     I am to add that copies of this letter are being
sent to the Admiralty and to Colonel Hollis, Committee of
Imperial Defence*
I am, etc.
( Signed) .E. W.LAMBERT.