[M2U0] 184S4/30S
800m 10/83 700
G&S 1H 210
(REGIMIHT)
Code 6-3* *
MINUTE SHEET.
Reference.................................././J^/'^
I
Memorandum:
*5S
indicated to him H.M.G.'s agreement to the/proposed
conference on refugees in Washington, ape thatAord
Winterton and possibly Sir Herbert Emerson w^uld
attend.   Confidentially he expresse/f the v£ew that
the President would be very delighted if/Emerson
could come.
(2) I gave him the ai6)6-memo^£e about the
reported arming of merchantmen in fcne Caribbean.
He replied that the American Government was already
investigating the question so^ar as it concerned
Samara Bay, but that he tho/ght that the rumour about
Haiti was extremely unlik/iy
(3) I told him /hat I had not yet had any
reply about his infor/fial representation about the
that my own investigations of the law in the Chancery
had led me i>6 i&e conclusion that under existing
int ernat i ohayiaw it was lawful to remove enemy subjects
who formed^>art of embodied military formations and
notorioujT enemy agents.   He accepted the first view
but reminded me of the Trent affair to which I replied
thayl thought that most people would agre$ that a
mi
"nniLr----        ~   U   ii i fc'll^iTTTl BjiBi
tl
like von Papen was a more dangerous tmoiuj "a&owJ;
(4)     He told me that the Polish Ambassador had
been in great distress to see him this morning, and
complained that they had an agreement with Great Britain
to send aeroplanes to Poland which had not been fulfilled
and that it was understood that the Polish Ambassador
in London had been informed that the bombing operations
had / [over.
MINUTE SHEET.
Reference.
(814) 31567/WJ
2.200.000 1/37 JCftSUd
GpM4/229
(RBOIMINTj
CODEMWl
-2-
had not been inaugurated by the British Government for
fear of possible repercussions on American public opinion.
Mr. Welles said that there was no ground whatever for
thinking that the American Government had made such
representations, apart from the general plea against the
bombing of civilian populations.     He showed me a telegram
from Biddle in Poland indicating that the Germans were
bombing factories and industrial establishments without
regard for neighbouring civilian populations.
The conversation then turned on the general
problem of the war in which I set forth the present
British view as to the probability of the war being a
long one, and of the undesirability of weakening France
and England for such a purpose in order to render
spectacular and ineffective aid to Poland.   He did not
in any way dissent from this view.   He added that he
thought that Rome was the key to the immediate future.
L
September 12th, 1939.
[OVER