No. 119

My Lord,

In previous despatches I have endeavoured to record the movement of American public opinion about international affairs since the war began. I say "public opinion" deliberately because in this country, owing to the constitutional equality of status of the Executive and the Legislature it is public opinion itself which is continually decisive. Under the Parliamentary system the government of the day, provided it can keep the support of its own majority, and does not provoke by its policy a violent agitation in the country, can make its own policy prevail. Under the American system, whatever the policy of the Administration, Congress, and in the case of foreign affairs, the Senate, both of which are always extremely jealous of their independent responsibility, can always in fundamentals block the Executive until public opinion expressing itself through the newspapers, through deluges of telegrams to Washington, and through ordinary party and political channels, expresses a clear opinion.

2. Before the war broke out American public opinion, thanks to the newspapers and the radio had watched events in Europe with all the keenness and intimate knowledge of the personalities and the moves in the diplomatic game characteristic of spectators at
a football match. On the one hand it constantly shouted to the British and French players that unless they stood up to the Dictatorships they would themselves be devoured. On the other hand it believed that if the war came it would take the form of frightful air attacks on the great cities of Western Europe and the immediate entry into the war on Germany's side of Japan, Italy and possibly Spain. There was, therefore, a widespread conviction, as revealed in the Gallup and Fortune polls, that if and when war came America would fairly rapidly be drawn into it. The experience of the war has falsified these expectations. There has been no serious air war on cities in Europe, Japan was driven out of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the German-Russian treaty, Italy and Spain, largely for the same reason, have pursued a policy of determined neutrality. The war itself has become a purely internal European war beyond the Rhine. In its actual 1939 form the war was clearly not America's immediate concern. And the long view that intervention now would prevent far greater sacrifices later is one which most democracies find it extremely difficult to take. At the same time, American public opinion itself, suddenly realizing that it was watching not a gigantic football show but a game immensely in which the footballs were immeasurably destructive bombs, was swept by a wave of emotional pacifism, springing at first largely from mothers and wives who, in the interest of their children and husbands, demanded that at all costs the United States itself should be kept out of the war. At one time it looked as if this wave might defeat the President's policy of repealing the arms embargo in order to place American machine industry at the disposal of/
of the Allies. But gradually the recognition prevailed among all clear-sighted people that the best way of keeping America out of the war was to help Great Britain and France to defeat Hitler by selling them arms and at the same time to remove some of those causes which had led to the entry of America into the last war, e.g. torpedoing of American ships and the increasing dependence of American industry on vast war orders financed by American loans, by enacting the cash and carry provisions. In the end the President got his bill by larger majorities than at one time seemed likely.

3. Industrial assistance to the Allies, subject to the most rigid conditions designed to prevent the United States from being drawn into the war, thus became the settled policy of the United States, as the result of the long Neutrality debate.

4. Since the repeal of the arms embargo American public opinion has been slowly developing in response to events in Europe and the Far East. It gradually became convinced that the risk of its being drawn into the European war was rapidly lessening, that Hitler had made a profound mistake in his pact with Stalin, which had lost him all his old Allies and had imprisoned Germany between the rapidly strengthening French and British forces and a Russia whose ostensible friendship really concealed long-distance suspicion and hostility. With the New Year therefore American public opinion began to turn with gusto to the always entertaining drama of the Presidential elections. Presidential aspirants announced their candidacies and began speech making tours throughout the country. The limelight was turned ever more intensively upon their private lives.
The political and personal manoeuvres going on behind the scenes were daily and hourly exposed to the public by columnists and radio speakers. The problem on the Republican side was to produce a candidate who inspired confidence by his abilities and his record and who could produce a constructive alternative to the New Deal. The problem of the Democrats was to get anybody to take seriously any alternative candidacy so long as the President had not declared that he would not accept a third term.

5. Today, however, there are four factors making for a further change in opinion. In the first place, practically all the experts have begun to declare that a great intensification of the war is inevitable in the early Spring. There are endless hypotheses about possible developments in Scandinavia and the Balkans, and about the possibility of the Allies wresting the initiative from Hitler. But from the American point of view the essence of the war is the duel between Britain and Germany, for that is what mainly affects themselves. On this two points of view are attracting attention. One assumes that there will be a terrific air and sea assault on Great Britain through a direct attack on her navy, shipping and ports, with or without a simultaneous blitzkrieg on France, Belgium and Holland, as indirect roads of attack on Britain, with the ultimate objective of forcing the surrender to Germany of the British Navy and of British naval bases, as the quickest and decisive road to world empire. The other considers that the German High Command has already made up its mind that it cannot succeed in forcing Great Britain to capitulate and that/
that its main objective will be to prove that Great Britain also cannot force the capitulation of Germany by her blockade, partly because Germany can develop sufficient economic sources of supply in Russia and the Balkans, and partly because she can force on Britain such an expensive defensive organisation to protect its own imports that Germany will be able to stand the strain of war longer than Britain. These considerations, and many variants of them, have created an undertone of alarm about the future, which has been intensified by Admiral Stark's statement to a Congressional Committee that in preparing its defence programme the United States of America had to take into account the possibility of a British defeat at sea.

6. In the second place the attack of Russia on Finland has stirred American emotions to the depths. The Finns have long been regarded as the most outstanding small democracy in Europe. The popularity it has won by its achievements has been increased because alone among the nations of the world it had performed that most acceptable of all public acts to the American democracy, it had paid its debts. In consequence the spectacle of the heroic courage of the Finns in refusing to be intimidated by the vast Russian power and then in successfully repelling on all fronts the Russian attack, inspired a universal and profound admiration everywhere and a desire to help. Together with the German atrocities in Poland as revealed by the Vatican it has undermined what is left of the argument that the war was a struggle between British and German imperialism, and has strengthened the conviction that the war is at bottom a struggle of the free peoples against/
against totalitarianism in all its forms. But even this deep and genuine emotion has not been able to prevail against the deeper current of determination to avoid involvement in the war in Europe. This determination is due partly to the historic isolationism based on Washington's warning against entangling alliances. But it is also due to the fact that American public opinion has been educated in the last twenty years to believe that its participation in the last war was a profound mistake; that its entry then had been induced by astute British and French propagandists, supported by the buccaneers of Wall Street who wanted to make gigantic profits for themselves; that all the world's troubles since have sprung from the Treaty of Versailles, which is believed to have been passed by the crooked statesmen of the old world in defiance of American idealism, and which has now been lifted into a kind of symbol of European wickedness; that Europe is incorrigible so that under no circumstances whatever will it do any good either to America or to Europe itself that the United States should once more entangle itself in Europe's internal problems. Of course there are plenty of American people who continuously proclaim that the United States is one of the main authors of the present catastrophe because of its withdrawal from cooperation in 1920. But they have had little effect as yet on the general stream of American public opinion, probably because the Versailles legend is a valuable underpinning of the alibi that has been created about their own conduct since 1920 and of their instinctive desire to avoid being drawn into the war. While the
people of the United States are therefore anxious to help the Finns and are continuously told that the only help that matters today is munitions of war, the considerations just described have been strong enough to compel the President to abandon his original idea of asking Congress to make a direct gift or loan to Finland for armaments. And it is now uncertain whether Congress will do anything at all through fear that any loan, even for supplies other than implements of war, would be a first step towards involvement in Europe and towards giving loans to Britain and France by reversal of the Johnson Act.

In the third place, in the last week or two there has been the sudden outburst against British interferences with American trade and communications. This has been brewing for some time. There has been the growing resentment felt by individuals, businessmen and others, all over the country who have had their mails delayed, their cable communications prevented, their consignment of goods held up by the often unexplained action of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and more recently by the serious and even disastrous effect on certain classes of producers of the cessation of British purchases. This resentment has been increased by the suspicion that Great Britain is using the war as an excuse to transfer trade from the United States of America to its own Empire and to foreign countries or in favour of countries like Italy who have more nuisance value. All this discontent was exploded by the statement in Parliament which made the impression here that Great Britain was transferring the purchase of tobacco from the Southern States of the United States to Turkey for twenty years, and was beginning to educate
the British public to accept a permanent change in its tobacco taste. Americans understand in a general way that these interferences and restrictions are necessary, and do not want to make trouble for the reason that from every point of view they want Hitler defeated. They understand too rather vaguely that we are buying much more than usual of other things, like aeroplanes. But it is no consolation to the tobacco grower who finds his market suddenly destroyed to be told that the aeroplane manufacturers are doing much better, and endless numbers of them have been rushing to the State Department and to Congress inviting action in redress. Mr. Hull, who has been our most consistent friend, was bitterly chagrined that these ruthless changes in the channels of trade, many of them technically in violation of the British American Trade Treaty, should have been published just at the moment when he was fighting a back to the wall battle for the Trade Agreement policy against violent opposition both from the Republicans and from members of his own party. The Administration had further gradually become convinced that while it had shown every possible assistance to the Allies within the limits of the Neutrality Act, that assistance was being taken for granted by us, so that we imposed restrictions affecting Americans without much regard for their susceptibilities, that we paid little attention to their protests about forcing American ships into the combat area, e.g. at Kirkwall, about delay and forcible examination of neutral mails, and about delays and discrimination in favour of Italy at Gibraltar, because "they had made a nuisance of themselves and we had not". All these grievances came to a head at the same time.
as our rejection of the American protest about examining the mails. The State Department then deliberately "turned the heat on us" for three or four days, partly to compel us to pay attention, and partly to prove to offended elements in Congress and the country that it was not as a Senator said, a "mere doormat" for the British. If we can give the Administration some practical redress on some of these points the storm will die down. But there is no doubt that in future we shall have to pay much more attention to the possible effect of our actions on American opinion. So long as we can prove that they are necessary to winning the war America will acquiesce. But we shall have to prove that to the satisfaction both of the Administration and of public opinion. If we cannot prove it public opinion will rapidly react against us and will demand positive action to compel us to respect their neutral views and rights.

Thus the United States today is less afraid of being drawn against its will into the European war and is emerging from the somewhat humiliating attitude of abandoning all its rights which it adopted when the fear of war was strongest upon it. It is therefore beginning to reassert itself as a positive influence in the international situation. The danger to us lies in the fact that the Neutrality Act has eliminated almost all points of friction with Germany so that minor American grievances and controversies are almost exclusively against ourselves. In the last war however irritated the United States got through the arbitrary exercise of our command of the sea we could be certain that the Germans would soon do something far more exasperating.
exasperating. Today this factor no longer exists. This imposes upon us the necessity of walking extremely warily in our interferences with American trade and of doing everything we can to convince the Administration beforehand that what we propose to do is really an important contribution towards winning the war.

4. In the fourth place there is the Far Eastern question. In the past the United States has been inclined to expect us to take the lead in the Far East on the ground that our interests there were far greater, without promising any support. That phase is passing away. Both the Administration and public opinion realise that we are fully preoccupied in Europe. They are beginning to lose the suspicion, deeply ingrained since the event of 1931, that we are only awaiting a favourable opportunity to abandon the Chinese and sell out to the Japanese. They have come to recognise that the main initiative and responsibility there now rests squarely upon their own shoulders. They have now begun to realise that if they press the Japanese to the point of retaliation that retaliation will be directed not against themselves but southward against ourselves, the French and the Dutch, which would confront them with the awkward dilemma of coming to our assistance or acquiescing in Japanese expansion towards the South Pacific, and abandoning the rest of us to our fate.

American public opinion of course has long been very friendly to China and bitterly hostile to the present Japanese policy. A large proportion of America has been interested in missionary activities in China and has been constantly kept informed of the terrible atrocities committed by the Japanese in China
in the last few years. This section of America is deeply ashamed of the fact that during all the Chinese-Japanese war Japan has been able to obtain from the United States, and only in a much less degree from the British Empire, the raw materials indispensable to the conduct of its war against China. There has been, therefore, a widespread demand that on the expiration on January 26th, of the old American-Japanese Trade Treaty the United States should embargo, on neutral grounds, the export of these war materials to Japan. It is unlikely that either the Administration or Congress will take any such drastic action, partly through fear of its leading the United States into war, and partly through a realisation by the Navy Department and the President that it is undesirable to provoke collision with Japan so long as there is any possibility of the British and French navies finding themselves in serious difficulties this summer with Germany and Italy. Naval opinion, of course, sees perfectly clearly that they are holding the fort for the British Empire in the Pacific, while we hold it for them in the Atlantic. Any positive American action in the Pacific is clearly dependent on the certainty that Great Britain holds the Atlantic. The policy of the United States therefore is likely to be confined to rendering further financial help to China and to exercising continued diplomatic and gradually increasing economic pressure on Japan with the ostensible object of insisting on the restoration of American rights especially to the open door in China but with the real purpose of ultimately convincing the Japanese people that the military party has been leading/
leading them to disaster, and of eventually compelling an abandonment, without provoking a war, of the Japanese policy of "the New Order in East Asia" in order to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek for the restoration to China of its sovereignty south of the Wall, and the open door for foreign trade. But in pursuing this general policy the United States has got itself into a somewhat dangerous situation. When it gave notice last July to terminate the American-Japanese trade treaty on January 26th it committed itself to a policy of commercial pressure against Japan to force it to restore the open door and the principle of the Nine Power Treaty, confident that Japan, exhausted by two and half years of war, could not withstand it. This, of course, was to challenge not only the Military Party in Japan but the very basis of Japanese policy in the Far East. Though the economy of Japan is certainly very strained there is no sign as yet that the Japanese will yield. On the contrary they are pursuing their attack on China and setting up the Wang Ching Wei regime at Nanking, are said to be talking again to the Germans, and are clearly hoping that events in Europe this Spring may paralyse the capacity of the United States of America to act in the Far East because of uncertainty about the effect of the German attack on Britain's naval position. If it presses on with its policy of commercial pressure it may find itself confronted with the necessity of taking simultaneous action in both oceans if Great Britain and France get into difficulties or of beating a somewhat humiliating diplomatic retreat with consequential...
consequential depressing effects on China and encouragement to Japan. The probabilities will become clearer during the Congressional discussions of the next few weeks.

9. Perhaps I may conclude by a few observations on the probable future of American policy. The policy of the Administration is what it has always been - to help the Allies to defeat the totalitarians by every means short of war. The President is utterly convinced that the United States would be in deadly peril if the Allies failed and would go to almost any length to secure the overthrow of Hitler and Company, as being essential to the future of his own country. But public opinion, rather like opinion in Great Britain in the Baldwin era, is still mainly preoccupied with avoiding war, and the isolationist elements in Congress, who are well organised and vigorously led, are in a position, not only to obstruct but to inflame public opinion against any move which looks like a step toward involvement. The "fixation" about non-involvement is still dominant and no politician, especially in a Presidential election year, dares to incur the consequences of being assailed as pro-British, which is much the same as being called pro-war, by raising some of the fundamental questions which are constantly propounded in private.
I think it is true to say that the American people has now immunised itself against being drawn into war by emotional storms prompted by such horrors as the sinking of the "Athenia", the bombing of open towns or the persecution of the Poles. It is deeply impressed by the feeling that with a Europe as mad as it is at present and with the Far East also aflame with war, there is much to be said for preserving the Western Hemisphere as an oasis in which the virtues and institutions of peace and democracy can be maintained and not twisted and perhaps destroyed by the necessities of war. It will only abandon its present attitude if cool calculation convinces it that events are challenging its own vital interests. Then it will fight and fight vehemently for it is in no sense pacifist. It is already arming as hard as it can.

That challenge may come in several ways. On the one hand there may be a direct physical threat.

That direct threat, so far as I can judge can only come from two quarters. The first would appear if there was any serious risk of a defeat of the British Navy; the second from an attempt by the Japanese navy to break into the East or South Pacific. As regards the first, the President and the Navy Department realise perfectly well that the first line of defence both of American security and of the Monroe Doctrine is the British Navy; that if Germany were to obtain naval supremacy in the Atlantic and control of British naval bases all over the world there would immediately follow an alliance with Japan, which would compel the United States Navy to retire at once to its own coasts and leave the outer Pacific/...
Pacific and the outer Atlantic to the control of Germany, Japan and their allies. Such a disaster would probably end the Monroe Doctrine, for two reasons. On the one hand America being unwilling to buy South American and especially Argentine products because they compete with its own, the totalitarian States would offer a market on a barter basis which would give them a large measure of control over South American economy. On the other hand the United States Navy would be unable to control the passage from the North to the South Atlantic and protect its Pacific coast as well unless it was both very much bigger than it is today and was possessed of powerful naval bases in Brazil.

The unwritten naval alliance with Great Britain is therefore almost essential to the United States of America to continue to enjoy the kind of existence it has led since 1814 as it is to ourselves. Public opinion is instinctively aware of this but no politician of importance - even the President, especially in election year - can point openly to these facts for the reason that the logical conclusion is that America must abandon isolation for good and make a permanent naval arrangement with ourselves, with the commitment to war which that implies. It is easier to say nothing and build up a final line of defence along her own coasts behind which the United States of America can fall back if we were defeated. Of course if there arose any serious reason to suppose that Germany alone, or Germany and Italy were likely to destroy our fleet, the effect on the United States of America would be immediate and profound. The isolationists would, of course,
course, preach that the United States had better stand aside and stick to its own continent. But in my view public opinion would rapidly come to the view that it was cheaper and safer to go to the assistance of the British than let its navy be taken by Hitler or its bases by Japan.

But another and probably more likely issue may arise. Suppose Germany and her allies succeeded in multiplying their attacks on and under and over the seas on our communications to the point that the strain of organising our defence and of maintaining our imports and exports at the level which would enable us to continue our war effort at full power, was becoming insupportable and that we and France seemed to have less economic staying power than the totalitarians and suppose it also became clear that the United States could supply enough aeroplanes, aeroplane carriers, destroyers and merchant vessels to save the position, would they do so. My answer is that if the Administration had time to educate public opinion as to the real facts as they did in the case of the Neutrality Act, they probably would do so. But would it have time, especially in a Presidential election year? That depends on events.

11. The second point at which their vital interests might be directly challenged would be if Japan thrust southwards to Hong Kong, the Dutch Islands, Singapore and the South Pacific. In this case also I think the United States would go to war, though probably after a little delay. If the Japanese began to be threatening the United States would certainly mobilise its whole fleet in the Pacific and station a formidable squadron and air fleet in the Philippines,
and if Japan ignored it and undertook the dangerous act of thrusting past it, I doubt if American temper would stand it, especially as it does not believe that a war in the Far East implies sending a vast army, as intervention in Europe did in 1917.

12. There is one other practical consideration which if the war lasts another year will certainly arise. Assuming that the United States can keep out of the war for the next six months or till the end of this year, the next crisis in Anglo-American or Allied-American relations will arise as our dollar resources become exhausted. The larger the orders we place for munitions the more we lessen our capacity to purchases of agricultural and other supplies, and the nearer comes the day when we shall be forced to go to the United States and say that we must cut down our war effort, with all the tremendous consequences and dangers to itself which would be involved, unless we can in some way obtain credits. Fortunately it does not seem likely that that crisis will arise till after the Presidential election in November, 1940, for the issue of the Johnson Act raises many fierce memories, war debts, the futile adventure in Europe of 1917-18, the isolationist war cry "First arms, then your money, then your boys". If it ever comes to a direct issue the fight to repeal the Johnson Act will be more bitter and probably more prolonged than that over the arms embargo. But in the end the same logic, I believe, will prevail. If money can help Britain and France to repel Hitlerism and the want of money will bring about their defeat and the destruction of the bulwark they now interpose between Hitler and the United States, the
money will be found, if not by a direct repeal of the
Johnson and the present Neutrality Acts, then in some less
difficult way. But here again no one can prophesy how
long it would take to convince American opinion that it
was in its own vital interest to do so.

At the moment, therefore, and unless some
of the contingencies involved in the foregoing paragraphs
mature, the United States will do everything in its power
to keep out of war. But there is another possibility
more difficult to assess. Some of the best judges of
American opinion are convinced that behind the surface
facade of isolationism the people of the United States
are slowly making up their minds that if their own
future and a free civilization are to be maintained
they have got to intervene. That is my own conviction.

There are many signs of this. There was the remarkable
manifesto of a body of leading churchmen a few days ago
saying that no Christian could be a neutral in the issue
between totalitarianism and the free peoples, and that
support of the cause of freedom in some active way was
inevitable for a Christian. There is the response at
public meetings that now greets the thesis that it is
better to fight the monster at a distance now and with
friends than to face it alone on our own later on. There
is the fact now obvious to everybody that unless Finland
can be saved today Sweden and Norway will fall tomorrow
and that the United States of America is now the champion
of that policy of appeasement they used so
vehemently to condemn. There is the rising feeling
that the United States is playing an unworthy part in one
of the greatest dramas of history and is in danger of
losing her soul unless she shoulders her share of the
growing burden. There is the rising conviction that life for
everybody/......
everybody is going to be intolerable unless Hitlerism is
destroyed, and that the entry of the United States would
rally almost all the neutral world to the cause of freedom
whereas isolation may end in some neutrals joining Germany.
It is, of course, easy to indulge in wishful thinking
in a matter of this kind. But I think that essentially
the same process is going on in the United States today
as went on in Britain and France in the past few years,
the process which gradually led them from the retreats
and paralysis of the pre-Munich era to the violent
action of today.

In the last war America re-elected Wilson
in November, 1916, on the ticket "He kept us out of war". In April, 1917, after the unlimited German submarine
campaign, he took an united but fundamentally ignorant
country into the war. Today, if the United States
decide that victory for the Allies is essential, that
a deadlock is fatal to its own future, and that it
must cast its weight into the scale, it will do so
because public opinion itself, now extraordinarily well
informed about world affairs, has gradually itself come
to the conviction that, on a long view of its own
interests, it must act. If it does so isolationism will
be over for good. But the developments in this direction
cannot be predicted. They depend upon the march of events.

Finally there is the question of peace. There is no doubt that like the President, the American
public would like to see an early end to the war. But
up to the present, except for a few voices which preach
that any peace now is better for the world than what it
will get after another year's fighting, there is a
general conviction that no peace will be lasting

which/...
which does not restore some degree of independence to Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and which does not create real guarantees against a renewal of Nazi aggression. Practically nobody thinks that Hitler is yet ready for such a peace, and the President's gestures, like the Pope's, are almost certainly more "for the record" and to placate anti-Semitic sentiment than because he believes that any practical result can come of them.

There are a great many societies considering the problem of the peace and arriving at very much the same conclusions as similar societies in Britain. But public opinion has, as yet, formulated no ideas. It is waiting to see how the war goes. There are many who think that one essential foundation for peace is that the United States and the American Republics should join with the British democracies not only in defending the Monroe Doctrine but the democratic command of the seas, as the necessary basis of a new world order. But public opinion is not yet concerning itself with these ultimates and the politician does not discuss them. But the number of individuals and societies who realise that, if the world is to get peace the United States must be willing to contribute responsibly to its maintenance not merely by disarmament but by helping to supply the overwhelming force which must stand behind any just settlement, is steadily growing.

One final word about Anglo-American relations. The one fatal thing is for us to offer the United States advice as to what she ought to do. We have never listened to the advice of foreigners. Nor will the Americans. They only differ in that we ignore such advice and the Americans get extremely angry when
it is offered to them by any Briton. She is going to work out the problem for herself. She is glad of information. She is quite ready to listen - indeed is anxious to listen - to our views, provided they are expressed as our own opinions and do not include any expression of opinion as to what the United States should do. But just because the British have a power of emotional appeal, due to common ancestry, common language, common ideals, anything that looks like British propaganda designed to influence American policy creates a cold fury in the American mind. It resents not being left alone to make up its mind on the most important issue before it, for itself and by itself. It has often been said that patience is the most difficult of the statesman’s arts. There is certainly no field in which it is more essential to exercise it if you believe, as I do that, for naval and moral reasons the destinies of the two countries and of the Dominions are now inextricably involved and that the future of our civilization depends upon our gradually discovering the basis upon which we can confidently cooperate for our own and the common good.

I have the honour to be,

with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship’s most obedient,

humble servant,

(33D) LOTHIAN

P.S. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada.