[C 3999/G]
(No. 274.) Foreign Office,
My Lord Marquess, March 13, 1940.
Mk. SUMNER WELLES and the American Ambassador had another
interview with the Prime Minister this evening, at which I was present.
2. After Mr. Welles had expressed his pleasure at the opportunity afforded
to him of making himself acquainted with all sections of opinion, the Prime
Minister observed that the events of the last twenty-four hours had justified his
prediction a day or two ago of the constant possibility of rapid changes in the
situation under which we all lay from day to day. The events in Finland had
profoundly modified both the immediate situation and what might otherwise have
been far-reaching developments. Without underestimating the gravity of what
had taken place, the Prime Minister thought that one effect, not wholly
unfavourable to us, might be to restore to Russia greater liberty of action
vis-a-vis Germany, which might in turn lead to certain divergence of policy.
In response to Mr. Welles's enquiry, he was told that we had no certain news
from Rome as to what had passed between Herr von Ribbentrop and Signor
Mussolini or between Herr von Ribbentrop and the Pope. Our Ambassador
had informed us that it was to be presumed that Herr von Ribbentrop had painted
a glowing picture for Signor Mussolini of the great strength of Germany and
the prospects of German victory, but the Ambassador had concluded that Signor
Mussolini had no intention of leaving the fence on which he at present rested.
3. The Prime Minister went on to say that he had been carefully con-
sidering everything that had been said when he last met Mr. Welles, and he
wished to emphasise what he had then said as to the impossibility of proceeding
on the assumption that disarmament could by itself breed confidence, whereas, in
fact, the opposite was in his judgment true, namely, that only from restored
confidence could you get disarmament.
4. In regard to disarmament, the distinction between offensive and defensive
weapons was one that was very difficult to draw, and he was satisfied that the
only practicable method of advance was to endeavour to pursue progressively
the way of qualitative limitation.
5. There was some discussion as to the reactions of the Russian attitude
towards any possible disarmament in the West. It was generally admitted that
no system of inspection could operate in Russia, and that the attitude of Russia
would in turn be greatly affected by that of Japan.
6. But all this seemed to the Prime Minister at this stage largely academic,
and the first practical requisite for security was that France and Great Britain
should be sufficiently strong in relation to Germany to make it clearly not worth
while for Germany to resume the practice of aggression to which she had so
frequently had resort. The implication of this was that Germany, since she
had in fact repeatedly taken the lead in aggression, should also take the lead
in disarmament. But it could readily be appreciated that the Germans might
well say : what about their own security as against France and Great Britain?
These countries might, indeed, give direct undertakings to Germany not to
attack her. but this might seem to the Germans insufficient.   And here the
10916—21 [20968—12]
Prime Minister thought the United States might possibly come in. Would
it be of any value if France and Great Britain were to bind themselves^ not
to attack Germany by formal undertaking given to the United States? This
would impose no responsibility on the United States, except that of being the
recipient of an undertaking which in the case of this country would be binding
on successive Governments. Its terms would, no doubt, have to be carefully
defined, in order not to exclude the case in which this country might be bound
by obligation to some third party itself the victim of German aggression.
7. But before anything was possible, it was necesary that, as had frequently
been said, this country should be convinced that there was a real change of
heart in Germany and that there should be some assurance that any arrangements
reached would be maintained. This was the consideration that led the Prime
Minister to feel it impossible to deal with the present regime which had so
effectively destroyed confidence.
8. Mr. Welles took note of the Prime Minister's suggestion concerning
the United States. He thought it would produce a profound impression in
Germany if it were known there, and, speaking for himself, saw no objection to
it from the point of view of the United States. He would submit it to the
President. He then put a direct question to the Prime Minister. On the
assumption that satisfactory arrangements could be reached for the restoration
and future status of Poland. Bohemia and Moravia, and supposing that other
provisions could be drawn up in regard to disarmament which made for security
on the lines that had been discussed, would the British Government feel it stiil
ini|x>sible to deal with the present regime? To this the Prime Minister replied
that in his own view this would be so, but this opinion he expressed not on any
personal ground, but because Herr Hitler personified a system and method with
which the British Government had learned from bitter experience it was
impossible to make terms. In any case what was quite essential was that any
settlement should not be such that Herr Hitler could represent it as having been
able to " get away with it." We could not be satisfied with any settlement from
which it did not clearly emerge that Herr Hitler's policy had been a failure.
9. I said that, in addition to what the Prime Minister had iust said, the
cardinal points, on which the action of any British Government would depend,
seemed to me to be :—
(1) Restoration and reparation for Poland. Bohemia and Moravia: and
freedom of decision for Austria;
{2) The relative strength of Great Britain and France vis-a-vis Germany;
and
(8) Real restoration of liberty to the German people, by which they would
be freed from the Gestapo and the whole system of persecution, and
be again permitted to have knowledge of the outside world.
10. I expressed my own view that, if it were ever possible to see these
several things realised, there would clearly be such a new situation, and one that
would indicate such a complete reversal of Herr Hitler's policy that we should
not be justified in refusing discussion. The Prime Minister said he would not
differ from this statement, out it was generally agreed that such a transformation
would be in the nature of a miracle. Mr. Welles, however, thought that on this
basis there was—as he put it—one chance in ten thousand, and he added that he
did not think he was going beyond his instructions in saying that the Duce had
expressed to him his view that a solution on these lines was not impossible. The
Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Welles was convinced that the German leaders
themselves thought that we wanted to destroy them and Germany. To this
Mr. Welles replied in the affirmative, but agreed that no responsible utterance
had given ground for this conclusion, and added that he had not found anv such
desire in his discussions with M. Daladier and M. Reynaud, both of whom he
had found very liberal and broad-minded. It had, however, been different with
the Senators whom he had met.
11. I said that I thought that, in addition to all this, we should require to
see evidence of German willingness to resume Kuropean co-operation not only as
Mr. Welles had suggested in the economic field, but also in the political held
through some instrument of international order, whether on the basis of the
League of Nations or some other to be devised.   Mr. Welles said that a similar
desire had been freely intimated to him with authority in Berlin. As regards
economic co-operation, Mr. Welles said that he thought the Germans had in mind
some kind of preferential position in countries adjoining Germany. The Prime
Minister said that before the war he had never felt that there ought to be any
real difficulty about making an arrangement between Germany and her neighbours
which might in some degree be held comparable to that between Great Britain
and parts of the British Empire.
12. All these preferential arrangements seemed to Mr. Welles undesirable,
but it was difficult to resist them in one area if they prevailed in another.
13. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Welles whether much had been said to
him in Berlin about the colonies. To this Mr. Welles replied that Hen- Hitler
had said very little, but Goring had said a great deal. The Prime Minister said
that, in his view, any action on this matter in the present atmosphere was quite
out of the question, and nothing would ever be possible by way of simple exchange
of sovereignty. He told Mr. Welles, however, of the general scheme that we
had discussed two years ago, which we had. indeed, put to Herr Hitler shortly
before he had gone into Austria, but he had not then been sufficiently
interested to send us the promised reply to the proposals we had made. These
proposals had been designed to establish an area in Africa within which some
kind of international arrangement under provisions for perpetual demilitarisa-
tion might be made, affording equal opportunity to nations participating in it
for capital investment and for access to raw materials. But this, no doubt, was
not at all what the Germans had in mind. With this observation Mr. Welles
agreed, adding the comment that before the war the Germans had not fortified
their colonies.
14. Before he left, Mr. Welles said that he expected to have a private
meeting with Count Ciano in Rome, when he would doubtless learn what passed
with Herr von Ribbentrop. This information he proposed to transmit
confidentially to the United States Ambassador in London for communication
to us.
I am, with great truth and respect,
My Lord,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)
4 He ipojz.