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[C 3815/G]
(No. 256.) Foreign Office,
My Lord Marquess, March 11. 1940.
Mr. SUMNER WELLES, accompanied by tlhe United States Ambassador,
called to see the Prime Minister this evening. I was present at the interview.
The conversation followed very much the lines of the earlier conversation that
I had had with Mr. Sumner Welles this afternoon, although a great deal more
argument was devoted to the general question of disarmament. On this the
discussion largely turned upon whether disarmament could precede or at any
rate be the agent for restoring confidence, or whether it could only be the effect
of such confidence being in fact regained. After comparing the controversy
to that of the hen and the egg, Mr. Welles said he was inclined to agree with
the first; the Prime Minister argued vigorously for the second.
2. Mr. Welles made three interesting observations:—
(1) That, if and when the President took any step on the general basis of
the information that Mr. Welles would convey, he would tell us what
he proposed to do before he did it.
(2) Mr. Sumner Welles freely agreed that, if his labours bore any fruit
in the direction of showing the possibility of peace, it would be
unreasonable to expect the Allies to lift the blockade until, on his
plan, the actual stage of demobilisation was reached.
(3) In reply to a direct question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Welles said
that he had been profoundly shocked by Signor Mussolini's
appearance, but that there was no question of his having had a
stroke. He said that he gave the impression of a man suffering
under a severe strain.
3. The general outline of plan, if such can be called what Mr. Welles
seemed to have in mind, appeared to be the following:—
(a) That the Germans should agree to withdraw their troops from Poland
and Bohemia within an area to be agreed by discussion.
(b) That, inasmuch as paper assurances and signatures were valueless, a
scheme should be found for rapid and progressive disarmament of
the belligerents.
This to be accomplished by progressive destruction of offensive
weapons on land and in the air, and of the factories devoted to the
production of such weapons, and the creation of an international air
force.
(c) That, while this process was continuing up to a point to be agreed, armies
would remain mobilised and the blockade would continue.
(d) That there should be associated with this general lay-out a plan of
economic reconstruction.
4. Mr. Welles repeated, as he 'had said to me, that he thought that the
United States Government would be willing to associate itself both with the
20968—9
His Excellency, The Most Honourable
The Marquess of Lothian, C.H.
system of international inspection of disarmament that would be required, and
with the economic effort.   His idea seemed to be that:—
(i) The German people would realise that force did not pay as they saw
troops leaving Bohemia and Poland.
(ii) The pnysical destruction of weapons under a system of inspection with
which the United States was associated would give the physical
guarantee required against the resumption of the policy of aggression.
(iii) The economic carrot would be attractive to Germany as offering a future.
5. The Prime Minister laid great emphasis upon the impossibility of
trusting Hitler, and expressed grave doubts as to whether disarmament plans, as
suggested by Mr. Welles, were capable of being put into effect, or of being under-
taken in advance of the restoration of conndence. Even supposing that the
Germans could be brought to effect considerable disarmament, this would not
prevent them being still able to overrun a weak country like Roumania. In the
Prime Minister's view, restoration of confidence would be helped by nothing so
much as by a change of Government in Germany. On this point Mr. Welles said
that he had the impression that ideas of this sort were floating about in Germany,
but were not likely to take effective shape immediately, and that if what he called
the war of devastation started, would never take shape at all. He read an extract
from a letter that he had received from his Chargl d'Affaires in Berlin saying
that the Germans would be obliged to launch some great offensive during April.
The Prime Minister said that we, of course, never excluded such a possibility
from our minds, but we had had a long succession of dates given to us and thought
that Hitler might well be reluctant to stake all his fortunes on a last throw.
I am, with great truth and respect,
My Lord Marquess,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)