Cl7/r/uc.
-- >!-»
2^/3
(ft " '
[C 3814/G]
(Xo. 253.) Foreign Office,
My Lord Marquess, March 11, 1940.
I HAD a talk to Mr. Sumner Welles this afternoon. He began by saying
that he wished to make it plain that his visit was, of course, exploratory, and
that the President was not at all interested in helping anything of the nature of
a patched-up peace. The only thing that mattered was the establishment of
security.
2. He thought that Signor Mussolini wished to keep out of the war, felt
that, if the war was intensified, this would be likely to become progressively more
difficult, and that, accordingly, Signor Mussolini was anxious to lend his
assistance in finding the way by which the war might be brought to an end.
The Duce has asked Mr. Welles to see him again on his way back, which
Mr. Welles had not originally meant to do, and had said that he thought by
then he might have information that would be useful to the President. While
speaking of Italy Mr. Welles asked my view about what might be expected to
be the Italian demands in any peace conference. I said that, of course, Tunis
and Djibuti principally concerned the French, that the Suez Canal perhaps
principally concerned us, and that, like a great many other things, the request
for an Italian directorship would present very much less difficulty if we were
living in a secure world where people trusted one another than in a world where
everybody was looking over their shoulder at somebody else. Mr. Welles then
said something about Gibraltar, to which 1 replied that, if the suggestion was
that we should hand back Gibraltar to Spain or agree to «ome international
arrangement for it, I could give him very little encouragement. I found it
difficult to think that the British people would be prepared to let go of something
that might be an element of considerable strength in war, unless they could really
feel that the age of possible war had passed away.  That time was not yet.
3. With regard to Germany, Mr. Welles said we should be surprised
to know how frequently the word "security" had occurred in what had been
said to him by leaders of the German Government, and that there was no doubt
the German people were entirely convinced of the Allied intention to destroy
and disrupt Germany if they secured the victory.
4. In the conversation that ensued I did my best to make the British point
of view plain, emphasising our complete solidarity with the French, our com-
plete loss of confidence in anything that Herr Hitler or the present German
Government might say, and our determination, so far as it was humanly possible,
to prevent this war finishing on terms that left Germany free to continue the
policy that had induced it. At some point in the conversation Mr. Welles inter-
jected to say that his judgment as to the unreliability of the present German
Government did not differ from our own : " Any signature of Herr Hitler upon
any paper that you might get obviously is not worth the paper it is written
on." I told Mr. Welles that, while it might be possible to put down on paper,
as we had in general terms, indeed, often sought to do, the political issues to be
secured', i.e., restoration of liberty to Poles and Czechs, possible plebiscite for
20968—6
His Excellency, The Most Honourable
'i'he Marquess of Lothian, C.H.
Austria, disarmament, &c, the fundamental question was how were any of these
settlements to be judged reliable so long as we were dealing with the present
regime in Germany. Many, indeed, felt that it was not only a question of the
present regime but of something much more fundamental- Thus it was that
both the French and ourselves were constantly seeking to find effective guarantees
for the future that we did not feel to be forthcoming from any promises and
undertakings. . .....
5. This led Mr. Welles to ask, on the assumption that the political issues
could be settled, was it impossible to find such material guarantees as would give
general confidence. He developed this to mean disarmament by the gradual
destruction of offensive weapons on some qualitative basis, the restriction of
national air forces and the creation of an international air police force. On this
I made two comments, the first that I found it impossible to reconcile Hitler's
present behaviour in Poland with the suggestion that he might be all the time
willing genuinely to reconstitute and repair Poland in any fashion that would
seem to us approaching to just, and, secondly, that, although I had grave doubts
about the practicability of an international air force, all of us here would wish
to see developed any effective measures of disarmament. These must, however,
take time, and the degree to which they could be put into operation would also
depend upon the degree of real confidence that could attach to the whole
proceeding. Whether and how far this could l>e achieved by any system of inter-
national inspection or any other machinery that could be devised was a matter
that would require much consideration. lie expressed the view that the United
States Government would be prepared to take its due part in the work of inter-
national inspection of the process of disarmament, as they would also in the task
of economic effort and reconstruction.
6. On the first of my observations, Mr. Welles made the not uninteresting
comment that he would not have assumed a possible settlement of the political
issues if he had not felt this to be possible. Did we not, on our side, think it
might he possible that Herr Hitler, feeling that general war was imminent and
unavoidable, was anxious to strengthen himself on the East by making it
impossible for elements to remain there to cause him trouble when the time
came? He would himself have thought that Bohemia was more difficult of settle-
ment than Poland. In his view it all turned upon whether or not such measures
could be felt to give real security, still on the assumption that the political issues
had not been found impossible of settlement.
7. Mr. Welles thought anything in the nature of armistice was impossible,
and demobilisation could only be expected after the political issues had been
settled and as progress was made in the destruction of the main offensive
weapons. He quoted one of those high in the German Government as having
said to him : 1 The Allies want to make us return to the early 19th century,
when we were separate and small units, and say that in those days we produced
musicians and writers. If we were to return to that state to-day. it is not writers
and artists that we should produce, but Bolsheviks and Communists." The
conclusion, as he thought, generally throughout Germany was that it was felt
that the unity of Germany was essential to avoid worse disasters, and that the
object of the Allies in the destruction of the present regime was to destroy the
unity of Germany. I took the opportunity of telling Mr. Welles that there was
no British opinion in favour of the disruption, dismemberment and destruction
of Germany, and that, apart from the settlement of precise political issues to
which we were pledged, the whole problem was one of continuing security. All
this, however, was without reference to the other great elements that were now
involved in the problem, namely, Russia and Finland, which we did not have time
to discuss.
I am, with great truth and respect.
My Lord Marquess,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)