[W 8124/G]
(No. 530.) <Y' f Foreign Office,
My Lord Marquess, June 3, 1940.
WHEN" the United States Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, he
told me that, though he had not received any reply from his Government on the
question of the destroyers which were urgently needed by this country, he was
inclined to think that this in itself might be an encouraging sign. Thirty or
forty United States destroyers were at present being recommissioned, and his
own personal feeling was that President Roosevelt might be waiting for the entry
of Italy into the war to serve as the final pretext for sending us the assistance
which we needed.
2. I told his Excellency that, in view of all the recent indications that Italy
had now decided to enter the war, His Majesty's Government proposed to inform
the Italian Government to-morrow that certain Italian ships with important
cargoes of copper, toluol and lubricating oil would be held up at Gibraltar and
Aden until Italy's position had been made clearer. Meanwhile, we had informed
the French Government of our intention to take this step.
3. Mr. Kennedy, who agreed that, whatever the Italian reaction to this
might be, it could not really make us any worse off than we were at present, said
that, if Signor Mussolini did not now decide to take the plunge, he would find
it difficult to believe that it was, in fact, his intention to do so. He expressed
satisfaction when I told him that I should be telegraphing this information to
you for transmission to President Roosevelt, as it would be most useful to the
President to know in advance what the possibilities were.
4. The Ambassador went on to express his admiration of the manner in
which the evacuation of the B.E.F. from Flanders had been carried out. He
had yet, he said, to find anybody who could explain to him how it was that the
Germans, with their apparent superioritv in the air, had not been able to hamper
the evacuation more effectively. He still felt some doubts, however, with regard
to the spirit in France.
5. I told his Excellency that my impression was that the French knew that
they were in for a hard time, but fully intended to do their best. Whatever might
be happening in France, however, our information was that the Germans were
feeling a considerable strain on account of the lack of air pilots, as well as the
shortage of petrol and lubricating oil, and that, in spite of their victories, the
people were not very enthusiastic. I told his Excellency that the more President
Roosevelt could give out about the United States effort, the fact that they were
going into production, and so on, the better.
6. The Ambassador replied that I need have no fears on this score. Feeling
in America was running very high and, while there was still, of course, strong
opposition to any suggestion of sending men to help the Allies, there was no
longer any considerable body of opinion against affording the Allies all possible
help short of that. As regards the sending of destroyers, which he recognised as
being of vital importance to us, the question was, of course, whether it would be
possible for the United States Government to do this without a declaration of
war. Some step by Signor Mussolini in the near future, however, might make
things much easier for the President.
21351—4
I am, with great truth and respect,
My Lord,
Your most obedient Servant,
(for the secretary of State)
he Most Honourable
The Marquess of Lothian, C.H.,
e^c., etc., etc.,
WASHINGTON.