Extraot from "Army Count: il Instructions
for the General Officer Commanding the
British Troops in China,: dated December,1938
6.     British Garrisons in China*
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(c) Shanghai*
The r61e of the garrison is, in co-operation with
the forces of other interested Powers,2 the defence of the
International Settlement from outside aggression by Chinese
forces, and the protection of foreign lives and property
within the area covered by the tactical dispositions
necessary for the security of the Settlement.
(d) Tientsin.
In addition to the duties for which the Boxer
Protoool of 1901 provides (vide paragraph 4 above), the
British Garrison in Tientsin has the further duty of
protecting the British Concession.
(e) It must be realised that the primary object in the
establishment of garrisons in Tientsin, Peking and Shanghai
was the defence of British interests against the Chinese, It
may not be militarily practicable or politically desirable to
offer the same degree of resistance to encroachment on
British interests by other Powers (e.g. Japan).
In the event of Japanese troops seeking to enter
British Sectors of the defences of the International
Settlement at Shanghai, they should.be asked what are their
/intentions
NOTE: x Whilst the Frenoh are concerned primarily with their
own Concession, the security of that concession is of
considerable importance to that of the International
Settlement and vice versa.   Plans for the defence of
the Settlement and of the French Concession therefore
require co-ordination.
intentions.   It should be pointed out that the British troops
are responsible for the sectors which have been allotted to
them.   If the Japanese admit that their entry is with a view
to further operations against Chinese, the British Commander
should protest and state that he fl referring home for
instructions.   No forcible opposition should be offered.
In Tientsin, although the status of the British
Concession differs widely from that of the International
Settlement in Shanghai, yet the fundamental principle of
avoiding armed conflict is equally applicable. Opposition
to any Japanese claim to enter the Concession must not be
carried to a point where arrsd conflict is likely to result.
In the last resort the Japanese should be permitted entry
subject to strong protest and notification that the matter is
being referred home for instructions*
Should any question of principle arise which is
not covered by these instructions, reference should be made
to the Waff Office, since any precipitate action may have far
reaching international repercussions.   In the last resort,
however, force may always be employed against any Power in
defence of British lives,
(f)        Though in peace a political neoessity, the
maintenance of garrisons in Shanghai and Tientsin is
strategically a liability.   In the event of war, either in
the Far East or elsewhere, it will probably be desirable to
withdraw all or part of these garrisons if the military and
political, situation permits.   Kxcept, however, in case of
grave and obvious emergency demanding immediate action,
these garrisons are not to be withdrawn without reference to
the V/ar Office.
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