1
XHB LIMA COHPERKKOK - 8UCCB83 OR FAILURE?
By Charles A. Thomson.
(The following article was sent from
Ecuador by Mr. Thomson . who la en route
to the United States after attending
the Blghth Pan-American Conference at
Lima* Peru.)
QUITO* Seuador, Bee. 30.-   The most lasting value
of the Una Conference may be its use as a ease study
in the application of democratic methods to international
relations.   It revealed the limitations of that method
in securing prompt and concrete results.   But It amy also
demonstrate the long-term value of suoh procedure for
the development of realistic understanding mad freely
giv«n cooperation.
The United States delegation came to the Conference
primarily concerned to forge inter-American unity against
commercial and cultural penetration and possible armed
agression by the totalitarian states*   Secretary Hull*
in his opening address* asserted that an "ominous shadow
falls athwart our own continent" and proclaimed repeatedly
that there should not be "a shadow of a doubt anywhere"
concerning the determination of the American nations to
oppose either a military or an ideological invasion of the
Western Hemisphere*     For this program the United States
found substantial support in a Caribbean bloo of twelve
nations* made up of Mexico* the Central American countries.
Panama* Colombia* Venezuela* and the throe West Indian
republics.
A distinctly different point of view was voiced by
a South American group headed by Argentina, and including
the neighboring states of Uruguay* Paraguay and Bolivia*
Chile, and* to a lessor degree* Brazil were also found
in/
la this camp* Argentina refused to show alarm at
the immediacy of the ITazl-Tasoist menace.   It was
unwilling   to sign any document which might be
Interpreted as a slap at a specific European nation*
This attitude, according to the Argentines, was
determined not by mysterious or sinister influences,
but by sound reasons of national self-interest. The
economic life of Argentina and the countries which
supported It depends to a major degree on European
markets.   A largo proportion of their population is Bade
up of European immigrants, whose ties with their home
lands still foster vital currents of sympathy and
interest.   Moreover, Argentine foreign polloy has
traditionally favored a universal rather than a regional
emphasis*   Buenos Aires has long viewed the United States
as its leading rival in the Western Hemisphere, a habit
of mind which five years of the Good Neighbor polloy have
not entirely erased*   Argentina consequently declared
its willingness at Lima to cooperate against any real
threat to the inter-American order, but at the same time
reserved its freedom of action.   It saw no need for spec-
ific pacts to maintain "continental solidarity*1* Thus
at the moment whom the United States gave indications
of offering to the American nations the typo of
"entangling alliance** which it had always refused to
Europe* Its proposal foil on deaf ears* Ironically
enough* Argentina*s polloy - general support of
International cooperation with opposition to specific
commitments «• was almost an exact parallel of what
Washington has demanded fbr itself in the past both in
European and inter-Amerloan affairs*   As lata as ths
1986/
//
-3-
1928 Havana Conference, the United States fought any
of any political ties with Hew world nations*
la view of the Argentine position. Secretary mil
and his colleagues were forced to choose between two
courses*   By pressure t so ties they might have marshalled
•a impressive numerical majority for the United States
program.   But this procedure would necessarily have
Isolated Argentina, made it the possible nucleus of a
future opposition bloc, and definitely disrupted Pan-
American unity*   Or the United States might have sought to
go only so far as common agreement would permit*   It was
deoided to follow the latter course, and Mr* Hull's
policy of unanimous support for important decisions,
initiated la 1933 at Montevideo, was continued at Lima*
Working harmony was thus maintained, bat only at
considerable cost to tangible achievement, particularly
la cementing an inter-American front*     The United
States delegation had brought to Lima a reported draft
for a protocol to the consultative pact signed at
Buenos Aires in 1936.   Vila draft provided for Joint
defense against s   external agression, with establishment
of a permanent consultative commission, made up of the
Foreign Ministers of the American countries. Opposition
from the Argentine bloc forced the scrapplag of this a
project, sad Instead, after protracted negotiations, a
Buenos Aires proposal for NA reparation of the Solidarity
of America" was finally adopted oa December 22, with
only slight changes from its original text*
this document substituted for any clear-cut obligation
to cooperate In mutual defense, a reaffirmation of
11 continental/
a
"continental solidarity* and a declaration on the part
of the Amerioan states that
"in ease the peace* security or territorial
integrity of any Amerioan Republic is thus
threatened by acts of any nature that may
Impair them, they proollam their common concern
and their determination to make effective their
solidarity* coordinating their respective
sovereign villa j|Qr means of the procedure of
consultation •••fusing the measures which in
each Case the circumstances may mate advisable."
It was further provided that* to facilitate
consultation "the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics, when deemed desirable and at the
initiative of any one of them* will meet in their several
capitals by rotation and without protocolary character".
This cautious pledge of cooperation did net go sub-
stantially beyond the Declaration of Inter-American
Solidarity adopted at Buenos Aires* la which the
American nations went on record in favor of consultation.
But the clause prescribing how consultation was to be
carried out represented a definite* If small* advance*
A second project approved at the Conference provided that
consultation might be invoked for economic and cultural
as well aa political questions*
while the Conference avoided any open expressions
of hostility to the Fascist states* various resolutions
adopted at Lima indicated determination to check the
tactics of divisive penetration*   A Brazilian resolution
opposed Introduction into the Western Hemisphere of the
principle of political minorities.   An Argentine resolution*
directed at the plebiscite of German residents recently held
in the Latin American countries, declared against the
collective exercise by foreigners of political rights
granted by countries of origin.   A Cuban proposal
condemning/
condemning racial and religious persecution, after
being watered down la sub commission, was finally
adopted*
In the economic field. Secretary Boll secured
lUHlim support for the introduction and approval
of a resolution recommending "reasonable tariffs in lieu
of other forms of trade restrictions" and "the negotia-
tion of trade agreements* embodying the principle of
non-discrimination".   This move, however, only reaffirmed
similejection taken at the Montevideo and Buenos Aires
Conference*
-On the previously controversial question of women's
rights, the Conference adopted compromise measures, which
may possibly presage an end to the struggle waged
between the advocates of "equal rights'1 and those
favoring protective legislation for women.   "The Lima
Declaration of Women's Rights" proclaims that women are
entitled to equal political and civil status with men*
but also "to the moBt ample opportunities for work and to
bo protected therein" and "to the most ample protection
as Mothers"*   Provision was made for continuance of the
Inter-American Commission of Women as a consultative body*
la tangible results, the Una Conference fell far
short of the too preceding Pan-American gatherings at
Montevideo and Buenos Aires*   Its failure to conclude
a single treaty or convention is Hatched by only one
other Pan-American Conference - the first, held la 1889.
It refused to take action on mediation in the Spanish
civil war and avoided discussion of the refugee question*
I
Its oautlous and limited affirmation of inter-Amerioen
solidarity revealed that the American republics are un-
willing to font aa opposing front* not only toward tfurope
in general* out against the totalitarian states In
particular.   Equally olaar was the reluctance of the
leading South American nations to support the typo of
idealogioal war apparently favored by many in Washington*
or to jolnJn any concerted program of rearmament against
the possible threat of external agression*
On the other hand* the Lima Conference was free
from the open manifestations of inter—American friction
which marked the 1983 and 1986 conferences at Santiago
and Havana.   It conserved the gains made at Montevideo
and Buenos Aires* and made some Improvements in the
machinery for inter-Amerioan consultation*   In positive
achievements, the Conference may be ranked as a failure*
Negatively* it may claim to be a success; for it at
least took no backward steps*   At a time when general
retreat characterizes the forces of peaceful cooperation
and international understanding, it held ground
previously won and kept the road open for further
advance In the future*