THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY CF'HIR 3RITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOV^HHBNT)
S S C R S T.
0.0.3. 832.
COPY NO
As,
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.
NEW ZEALAND CO-OPE?jVriON IN IMPERIAL 3EF2NCE
(Previous P?.^Sv No. C 0 3. 831).
Memorandum.
In a despatch dated 20th May, 1933 on the
subject of projected air routes across the Pacific
Ocean, the Governor-General of New Zealand made the
suggestion   that a conference between representatives
of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand might
be assembled to discuss Pacific Island matters.
2. Since that date various communications have
passed between the three Governments, on the subject
of this conference, and in particular certain
telegrams have been recei red from the Hew Zealand
Government outlining recent conclusions by the New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff (New Zealand telegram No. 145,
dated 24th December, 1938 ) and making px'oposals for
a wide agenda on defence matters for the conference
(New Zealand telegram No. 9 dated 2^nd January, 1939).
x Paragraph 8 of Annex 15, Enclosure to
C.I.D. Paper No. 1455-B.
/ Annex I.
$ Annex II.
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3.     Some of the items included in the list in the
above    telegram are.suitable for ministerial
discussion;    others are of such wide implication that
they could only be effectively dealt with at a conference
at which representatives of the other Dominions and of
India were present.       Consequently we are opinion that
it will not be possible for a conference, at which the
United Kingdom representatives would be confined to those
who can be made available by the middle of March, to
deal with the whole range of subjects by the Government of
New Zealand.       Nevertheless we fully appreciate the
value of an early conference, on the understanding that
it will deal with as much of the agenda as it finds
itseir-    competent to dincv.sa,    reserving the remainder
for report to the Governments concerned*
In order that the New Zealand Government may
be in possession of an up- to-date statement, not only of
our views on the general strategical situation, but
also on the contribution, which New Zealand might find
herself able to make to Imperial Defence, we have
prepared the present memorandum*     It is divided into
two parts dealing respectively-with these two aspects
of the problem*
PART I.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. WITH SPECIAL 3EF£lRlilC£ TO m\f ZEALAND.
4. in the present state of world affairs we have to
face the possibilities of a strategic situation in
which the British Empire, in alliance with France, while
at war in Europe, would also have to contend with the
hostility of Japan.     In the worst case we might he
engaged simultaneously with Germany, Italy and Japan.
5. Some indication of the gravity of such a
situation can be obtained by recalling the position in
1914, and the   events of the war which followed. Germany
calculated that, having regard to the strength of the
Triple Alliance, and to the improbability of British
intervention, her forces would be adequate to enable her
to conquer Franceo     In the event we intervened against
her, and were supported by Russia and Japan, and after
a brief interval by Italy, and ultimately by the
United States of America*       In spite of this there were
times during the war when the Germans came within
measurable distance of obtaining peace on favourable
terms.
6. Now Japan, together with an Italy far more
powerful than in 1914, might be against we instead of
against Germany.       A new factor would be that, for the
first time in history, the home resources of the
belligerents would be open to air attack upon a large
scale.     The effectiveness of such attack, and of the
defensive measures designed to meet it, can only be
determined as *he result of war experience.
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Our policy for the defence of the Empire has
been stated* as follows:-
"The security of the United Kingdom and the
security of Singapore would "be the keystones on
which the survival of the British Commonwealth
of Nations would depend......o. A British Fleet
v/ould have to proceed to the Par Sast leaving
sufficient strength in home waters to neutralise
the German Fleet >0 I7e could rely on Prance
to neutralise the Italian fleet in the
Mediterranean! to some extent, and to maintain
command of the   'estern Mediterranean*11
8r At the threat of war with Germany and Italy,
there are certain immediate steps which must be taken in
the Par Zasto     In particular, as the security of Singapore
is the vital factor in our strategic position in the Par
East, that base must be reinforced without delay by a
brigade from India, and by Air Forces from India and Iraq,
to bring the garrison up to war establishment* Detailed
Plans are maintained for these movements, the ships of the
China Fleet providing the necessary protection for the
transports in the Bay of Bengal*     The timely arrival of
these reinforcements should ensure that the fortress will
hold out against any scale of seaborne Japanese attack,
pending the arrival of the British Pleeto
9-•      If Japan then intervened on the side of our enemies
it would, £.s stated above, be imperative to send a British
Fleet to the far East where it v/ould give cover to Australia,
New Zealand, India and South Africa, and secure our
position in the Indian Ocean, protecting the vital sea
comiiiunications through that area to Egypt and the Middle
East from all parts of the limpire.
1CK        With the despatch #t a Fleet to the Par East, ttlQ
Mediterranean would be almost lenuded of British naval
forces, and Italy would obtain control of sea communications
* CM..Do Paper No. 1305-B.
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in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, subject to the
possibilities of French naval action.     So long, however,
as we could retain our position in Egypt, we should control
the Suez Canal.   I2gypt could be reinforced and supplied
through the Red Sea and by the overland routes from 3asra
and Mombasa, and a fleet in the Far East would give cover
to these communications from Japanese interruption which
could not be given by a Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean,
llr The Naval position must be largely governed by the
situation at the time when war with Japan breaks out, and
the action which our own and the naval forces of our
enemies in Europe have taken up to that time.     In the
worst case, Japan might enter the war before our naval
resources had been fully developed, and when German and
Italian naval forces had started to attack our trade in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and possibly elsewhere.
Our naval forces might be operating at strength in the
Atlantic, but considerably dispersed.     Some French
capital ships might be assisting is. these operations, v/hjle
a proportion of the allied forces would be in the
Mediterranean.       In these circumstances it could not be
guaranteed that the whole of the Fleet destined for the
Far East could be despatched immediately.     This would
depend upon the progress Of our operations to re-establish
control of communications in the Atlantic, and the
necessary redistribution of naval forces.
32.        To threaten the security of any Dominion or of
India, through invasion, Japan would require the control of
sea communications in the Pacific or Indian Oceans for an
indefinite period.       Japan is in the highest degree
unlikely to contemplate any operations of this nature in
view of the great distances involved and the threat of the
arrival of a British fleet   in far eastern waters. Raids
against sea communications in the Indian Ocean and raids
against ports by Japanese naval forces are always a
possibility, particularly before the fleet arrives. To
guard against raids on ports, reliance must be placed on
local resources for immediate protection, while ultimate
security is obtained by naval operations to destroy the
raiders«
13'       Without unduly restricting her campaign in China*
Japan could detach strong forces for an attack on Hong Kong.
It is almost certain that this attack would be made, and it
might be the first intimation we should receive that Japan
had decided to enter the war on the side of Germany and
Italy.     While she remains in military occupation of the
Canton area, she will be particularly well placed for starting
such an attack*
14*     Were she not so heavily involved in China, Japan might
attempt a "coup de main" or deliberate attack with the
object of capturing Singapore*     On the other hand she might
always attempt to destroy the docking and repair facilities
of the base by seabox-ne air raids, and by sabotage. The
arrival of the reinforcements from India and Iraq, should
make Singapore secure.
15. It is also possible that Japan might attempt
operations designed to capture North 3orneo to obtain
oil and to enable her to establish advanced bases for the
attack on Singapore;   this would involve her in keeping
strong naval forces in the South China Seas, at a distance
from her main bases.     Once a British fleet had arrived
it is unlikely that the Japanese would be able to maintain
such a position unless they were prepared to fight a fleet
action under conditions which would be strategically
advantageous to us.
16f   Furthermore in undertaking any overseas operations out-
side China Japan would require to make use of a considerable
tonnage of mercantile shipping; especially for operations
involving'long distances      This would probably restrict the
size of the force which could bo despatched and maintained to
moderate dimensions.     Finally any likelihood of war with
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tho,.U«uS6 S*Ro would probably dctor her from, overseas commitments
of any magnitudefi
17fl     The scale of attack which Japan could develop against
New Zealand v/ould depend on two factors:-
(1) Her ability to develop advanced naval and air
"bases within striking distance of New Zealand.
(2) The number and types of ships and aircraft
which she could spare for such operations.
18. If Japan was determined, notwithstanding the distance
and vulnerability of her long line of communication to raids by
cruiser forces, to establish advanced bases in New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, New Hebrides or even Fiji, immediately she
entered the war, it v/ould be difficult to stop her.
19. With regard to the forces which Japan would be likely to
spare for such operations, she would certainly hesitate to
disperse her main naval forces in view of the threat of the
arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore.   Uncertainty as to
the attitude of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. coupled with her probable
pre-occupation in China for some time to come, make it unlikely
that she would despatch large air forces overseas, particularly
when the advanced bases would be outside air striking distance
of the objective, and with insecure sea communications for
supplies.
20- >      With the arrival of the British Main Fleet in the Far
East these communications could be subjected to an increased
degree of interruption.     In fact the Japanese would then find
very great difficulty in maintaining their position in the
Islands, and the threat to New Zealand would fade.
Conclusion.
21- The British Empire allied to France might, in the
worst case, have to contend simultaneously with Germany, Italy
and Japan and we should be gravely threatened in Europe, the
Mediterranean and Far Bast.   Our broad strategic policy would
be to hold on to key positions, while developing our latent
strength.   The U.S.A. and perhaps U.S.S.R. might come to our
aid in which case our situation would be greatly improved.
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the..U*S. S.R. would probably dctor her from, overseas commitments
of any magnitude<>
17o     The scale of attack which Japan could develop against
New Zealand would depend on two factors:-
(1) Her ability to develop advanced naval and air
bases within striking distance of New Zealand.
(2) The number and types of ships and aircraft
which she could spare for such operations.
18«     If Japan was determined, notwithstanding the distance
and vulnerability of her long line of communication to raids by
cruiser forces, to establish advanced bases in New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, New Hebrides or even Fiji, immediately she
entered the war, it v/ould be difficult to stop her.
19- With regard to the forces which Japan would be likely to
spare for such operations, she v/ould certainly hesitate to
disperse her main naval forces in view of the threat of the
arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore.   Uncertainty as to
the attitude of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. coupled with her probable
pre-occupation in China for some time to come, make it unlikely
that she would despatch large air forces overseas, particularly
when the advanced bases would be outside air striking distance
of the objective, and with insecure sea communications for
supplies.
20- With the arrival of the British Main Fleet in the Far
Bast these communications could be subjected to an increased
degree of interruption.     In fact the Japanese would then find
very great difficulty in maintaining their position in the
Islands, and the threat to New Zealand would fade.
Conclusion.
21o        The British Empire allied to France might, in the
worst case, have to contend simultaneously with Germany, Italy
and Japan and v/e should be gravely threatened in Europe, the
Mediterranean and Far East.   Our broad strategic policy would
be to hold on to key positions, while developing our latent
strength.    The U.S.A. and perhaps U.S.S.R. might come to our
aid in which case our situation would be greatly improved.
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22. A British Fleet would have to "be sent to the
Par East to give cover to New Zealand, Australia, our
Eastern possessions and to communications in the
Indian Ocean, including those to Egypt and the Middle
East, while sufficient naval strength would "be retained
in home waters to contain the German Fleet.     We should
have to depend on the French Fleet to restrict Italian
naval action in the Mediterranean
23. It will thus "be seen that no change has occurred
to affect the considerations which governed the under-
talcing given at the Imperial Conference in 1937, that in
the event of war with Japan, we should send a Fleet to
Eastern waters irrespective of the situation elsewhere.
PART It.
NEW ZEALAND CO-OPERA': ION IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
24. It will be realised that the "burden of providing
the necessary forces for Home Defence, for Egypt and the
Middle East, and for the maintenance of imperial
communications, in addition to "building and maintaining
a Fleet of sufficient strength to oppose Germany, Italy
and Japan simultaneously is a very heavy one. The
greatest importance is therefore attached to the assistance
which can "be rendered "by the Dominions.     We consider,
therefore, in this part of our report, the manner in which
New Zealand might he able to co-operate further in
Imperial Defence in peace and in war, at sea, on land,
and in the air.
Ge ne ra1 C on s i de r a ti on s.
35.       We are not in a position to assess New Zealand's
financial resources and we have not therefore considered
the financial aspect of our proposals.
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26.       In August, 1937, when we last considered Defence
Expenditure in Hew Zealand3"" at the request of the New
Zealand Government, we defined her Defence Policy as
follows:-
"The security of iTew Zealand depends
ultimately on the command of sea communications
to New Zealand "by the British Fleet.    So long as
an adequate British Fleet is in "being the danger
of the invasion of Hew Zealand is very remote. The
provision of sea power for the defence of seaborne
trade simultaneously furnishe;  a deterrent against
seaborne raids.     As adequate naval strength is of
fundamental importance to Empire and New Zealand
defence, the New Zealand Division of the Royal
Navy should be maintained at a strength which is an
effective and fair contribution to Empire Naval
Defence.
The circumstances of a major war may be such
that the defence of New Zealand's interests may be
found to lie outside New Zealand altogether and her
ability to co-operate on land or in the air in the
Defence of the Empire may prove in the outcome the
most effective measure she can ta.;e for her own
security since the defeat of the United Kingdom
would mean the break up of the British Empire".
37.       We see no reason to modify the above principles
which we consider still hold good.
x   Paper No. CO. S. 609.
20.       The forms which, we suggest, further
co-operation "by Hew Zealand in Imperial Defence
might take are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
KaVY.
In time of peace.
29. If New Zealand could meet the cost of manning
and maintaining a third cruiser and two escort vessels,
this would represent a valuable contribution to
Imperial Defence.     An addition to defence expenditure
in this form would fit into the existing organisation
for administrative and maintenance purposes such
as personnel, refits and repairs, fuel, stores and
ammunition, without major additions to overhead
cost.
30. It would also be very desirable that the
New Zealand Government should provide asdic sets,
together with the necessary facilities for training
personnel for submarine detection, for which purpose
a trawler fitted for A/B would be needed.
31. It is recommended that merchant vessels
on the Hew Zealand register should be stiffened in
time of peace, to enable them quickly to mount a
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defensive armament in time of war. Particulars
of the scheme in the United Kingdom have "been £iven
to the Hew Zealand authorities.
32. While it is understood that some officers of
the two "big Hew Zealand shipping companies have "been
through the Defence Course for officers of the
Mercantile Marine in the United Kingdom, it is desired
to recommend to the attention of the New Zealand
authorities the need for sending e">l Merchant
Navy Officers through this course.     The lectures
have "been supplied to New Zealand,
In time of War.
33. In addition to placing the New Zealand
Division under the orders of the Admiralty, New
Zealand has hitherto agreed to provide and maintain
two armed merchant cruisers for trade protection
duties in time of war, including the manning in so far
as her personnel resources will allow.     This matter
has recently "been under discussion in correspondence
in connection with the employment of these ships,
and His Majesty1s Government in the United kingdom
have expressed the hope that Jiis Majesty's Government
in New Zealand will continue to accept full
responsibility for this commitment*
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1
ARiviYc
In time of "peacee
34.       The strength of our overseas garrisons is based
on the principle that v-*herever sea coi'iimunications are
liable to interruption by sea, land or air, the garrison
should be maintained in peace at a strength adequate for
defence at the outbreak of wara     Alternatively, the
necessary reserve should be held in the neighbourhood
available to reinforce at short notice*     It will be
obvious that the maintenance of overseas garrisons
has of late become a much heavier commitment owing to
the increased liability of sea communications to attack
by hostile submarines and aircraft*
3D«.       In order that the Government of New Zealand
may judge whether this would be a suitable field for
contribution towards Imperial Defence, we set out for
their consideration the present position of certain
garrisons v/hich lie on the main line of Imperial communi-
cations to the Par S&st, ¦ ¦hich is, of course, of vital
importance to New Zealand*
36.       The principal bases on this line are Hong Kong,
Penang, Singapore, and Trincomali-     In view of the
situation created by the present Sino-Japanese
hostilities, we do not think it a suitable time to suggest
the stationing of New Zealand troops at Hong Kong. The
garrison at Venang is formed by mixed un,'.ts of British,
Indian and Malays and no additional units are required.
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37, At Singapore the peace garrison is insufficient
for war requirements and relies on early reinforcement
by an infantry brigade group from India,     The safe
arrival of this force is dependent on the security,
at the time, of sea communications in the Bay of Bengal,
38. The defences are also deficient   of one of
the three anti-aircraft regiments •¦'hlch have been
approved.     Any addition, therefore, which New
Zealand found it possible to make to the peace-time
garrison would add appreciably to the security of the
base.
39.        The Government of New Zealand might wish to
consider, as an alternative, the relief of existing
British units at Singapore.     This form of assistance
could be given without the delays inseparable from the
construction of new barracks, which would be required
if the strength of the garrison were to be increased.
His Majesty's Government would in this event still have
to maintain the existing plan for the reinforcement of the
base in time of emergency, but British personnel would
be set free for use in other overseas bases. This
solution would admit of New Zealand troops taking over
existing armament as well as barracks.     We suggest that
units for which New Zealand troops might provide
personnel in whole or in part are:-
(a)   Cne British anti-aircraft regiment R.A.
(25 officers and 589 other ranks),
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(b)   The Changi Fire Command R.A.
(40 officers and 782 other ranks).
(a)   would provide a more   independent role than
(*).
40. Any contribution to the garrison of
Singapore would entail a mixed garrison of British,
New Zealanders and native troops*     At Trincomali,
on the other hand, New Zealand troops might be able
to find the complete regular garrison, which at
present consists of one 9.2-inch battery, one
6-inch battery and 3 Anti-Aircraft batteries.
The war establisliment of these units when fully
equipped will amount to an approximate total
of 27 officers and 7C0 other ranks, Royal Artillery.
41. If the Government °^ New Zealand had in mind
the provision of infantry units, the question of
periodical reliefs might necessitate the formation
of regular units in New Zealand for draft finding and
training of the troops:     this would materially increase
the cost of the maintenance of overseas infantry units.
Although there are no regular infantry units in
New Zealand, there is a regular artillery cadre which
could perhaps be expanded for service overseas.
42-       In any arrangement on the above lines which
might be made, consideration will have to be
given to the special problem raised by the possibility
of the calling out of New Zealand troops in aid of
the civil power*
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In time of War*
43. New Zealand has already undertaken an
oversea commitment.     Since August 1930 she has been
prepared to despatch a garrison of two platoons and
two machine guns to Panning Island at the request
of His Majesty's Government in the United kingdom*
Recently it was accepted that the force should be
increased to one company.
In a telegram from the l?ew Zealand Government
No. 145 of 24th December, 1938, the New Zealand
Chiefs of Staff recommend that a Brig£-v.e Group
should be held in readiness by New Zealand for use
as required in war in the Pacific Islands* This
would be a valuable contribution*
44. Once New Zealand is involved in war, the best
means by which her lend forces can co-operate is by
the formation of a division, as in 1914-18, and its
eventual despatch for operations overseas wherever
it can be employed most usefully-     We suggest that in
pe^ce time the New Zealand army should be organised
with tils role in view- so that the division could be
despatched in as short a time as possible*
AIR*
In time of pe^.qe.
45.      The fundtuMO-.tfi] nrcblem of Imperial Defence from
the air point of view   is ho;.' to meet the threat to
the United Kingdom from potential enemies in Europe.
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As we have remarked in paragraph 26 above, the security
of New Zealand depends upon the maintenance in being
of the British Fleet but that itself presumes the
security of the British Isles against all forms of
attack*
At the present time we are fully occupied in
developing from our own resources an adequate counter
to the heavy scale of air attack with which the
United Kingdom is threatened.   The most urgent
necessity, thereforet is to strengthen our air power
at home*
46«       it is not suggested that a direct contribution
to the air defence of Great Britain, in the form of
New Zealand squadrons maintained in England in peace,
is at present a practical proposition.    It is
possible that as an outcome of the conference which
is to be held on the Pacific Islands, the New
Zealand Government-may_j*nder:talc^^ commitments
in peace in the Islands.    If the New Zealand
Government should then feel itself in a position to
offer further ass:stance this would best be directed
towards relieving British air forces of certain
defence commitments in the Far East*
47*       The most important of these commitments is
the defence of Singapore for which 10 squadrons
are required uniler present estimates-    iCven when the
increases authorised for our i-ar Sast Command have
been provided a great measure of reliance is placed
upon the arrival of reinforcing units from India and
Iraq.
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48,       if therefore New Zealand were able to
contribute to the air forces stationed at Singapore
in time of peace, this would increase our strength at
that fortress, and would obviate some of the
uncertainty which is bound to result from relying on
reinforcing   units to complete first line defences.
49*       We welcome the scheme recently put forward by
the New Zealand Government for increasing the number
of trained pilots seconded to the ?.oyal Air Force each
year.
50. With the backing of the proposed war organisation
for training pilots referred to in paragraph 53, v/e
suggest that a valuable contribution in peace
would be an immediate intake of additional personnel,
both for flying duties and for maintenance, up to the
full capacity which New Zealand training establishments
can now develop-   This would be additional to the
increase of trained pilots seconded to the Royal Air
Force.
51. The New Zealand Government has recently
accepted an offer made by the fiome Government
suggesting that the Air Mission to Australia which
is to investigate possibilities of developing the
manufacture of aircraft in that Dominion should visit
New Zealand for a similar purpose.   If the Mission's
report is encouraging the establishment of an aircraft
manufacturing organisation in New Zealand would be a most
valuable asset to Imperial Defence-,   As a beginning
such an industry would probably be called upon to
manufacture aircraft of the elementary training type.
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In time of War.
52. If New Zealand could undertake the dispatch of
air reinforcements to Singapore during a period of
strained relations they would be of great assistance.
The moving of reinforcements by air however v/ould be
impracticable until such a time as New Zealand possesses
aircraft capable of making the flight from New Zealand
to Australia.
53. We have already considered and expressed our
appreciation of the proposal by the New Zealand
Government to set up an organisation to train 1,000
pilots a year in time of war, which should prove a
most valuable contribution-   The full output could not
be reached until the scheme   had been in full war-time
operation for 15 months.   The plan relies on sources in
the United Kingdom for the supply of aircraft, and
during the current year an appreciable portion of the
aircraft required has been promised;   but under present
arrangements the complete plan will not be operable for
nearly two years.
54. But before the first pilots so trained become
available New Zealand could assist by helping to make
good personnel wastage in Royal Air Force units in the
Par East.    Personnel could reach Singapore much more
rapidly from New Zealand than from England and even if
the fortress were invested it might be possible to fly
in personnel, reinforcements from Australian territory.
CONCLUSIONS.
55. Should His Majesty's Government in New Zealand
wish to review their present agreed contributions to
Imperial Defence in peace and wars the following are the
main forms of assistance which we should welcome.
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r
PgAgg.
Navy.
(a) The manning and maintenance of a third
cruiser and two escort vessels*
(b) The provision of asdic sets and training
in their use.
(c) Stiffening Hew Zealand merchant vessels
in peace so as to enable then to mount
defensive armament in time of war.
(d) The attendance of iTew Zealand Merchant
Navy Officers at the Defence Course for
officers of the mercantile marine.
Army.
(e) Co-operation in the defence of our Par
Eastern oases "by assisting in the
provision of garrisons.
Air.
(f) The provision of air forces at Singapore to
assist in the defence of the base.
(g) The use to capacity of existing training
facilities to increase reserves of flying
and maintenance personnel.
(h) The development in New Zealand of an
organisation for the manufacture of aircraft.
Navy.
Army
(i)   Action on the lines of (a), (b) and (c)
above if not already taken in peace.
(3)   In addition to placing the New Zealand
Division at our disposal, the provision
and maintenance of two Armed Merchant
Cruisers.
(k)   The provision of immediate reinforcements,
as outlined in New Zealand Telegram No.145
for use as required in the Pacific.
(1)   The provision of a division for dospabch
overseas.
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Air.
{m)   Operation in full of the scheme for
training 1,000 pilots per annum. The
scheme to "be extended to embrace the
training of flying crews and maintenance
personnel.
(n^ The further reinforcement of the garrison
at Singapore either by a complete unit,
or "by the provision of personnel reserves.
(Signed)      C.L. NET//ALL.
ROGER BACKHOUSE.
R.E1. ADAM.
D.C.I.G.S. for C.I.G.S.
Richmond Terrace, S.W.I.
1st February, 1939.
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ANNEX I,
PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM.
NEW ZEALAND.
From the Governor General of New Zealand.
Dated 24th December, 1903.   received 7.24 a.m.
24th December, IC3G.
No. 145. Secret.
Reference ray telegram No. 144 of to-day.    I am
asked by my Prime Minister to inform you that various
Pacific Islands have recently been visited by New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff who have now rendered a report on the
defences of Fiji and Tonga.   8ummary of their conclusions
is as follows:-   Begins:-   (a) They emphasise the
strategical importance of the Fiji and Tongan Groups,
(b) The scale of attacl: to be expected in these groups has
risen to one infantry brigade A (c) Fiji Defence Force
should be expanded from its present strength of 400 to a
total of 1,300 all ranks.    (d) Port of Suva should be
defended by two naval six inch guns,    (e) A Defence Force
of one battalion should be formed in Tonga.     (f) New
Zealand should have a brigade group in readiness in war
time to reinforce the Islands as required,    (g) In Suva
local forces are re Quired for minesv/eeping and for
examination services,    (h) New Zealand 3hould be prepared
to send aircraft to operate from these Islands in war.
(i) Tv/o landing grounds are required in Fiji, the
necessary surveys and estimates having been made, (j)
Tv/o landing grov-ndo are required in the Tonga Group;
¦
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the surveys should now be made bfv * New Zealand
aerodrome engineer.      (k) Part cf I«jw Zealand's
reserves of fuel? bombs and ammunition should be held
in Fiji and part of the reserves of fuel in Tonga.
It must be made clear that His Majesty's
Government in New Zealand have not yet approved
recommendations (f) (h) (j) and (k)»
Copy of the full report is being sent to you
by despatch and copies are being sent to His Majesty's
Government in the Co:.imonwealth of Australia and to the
High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.      It is
thought that this report will naturally be discussed
at the forthcoming conference on defence matters.
-22-
Al&iEX II.
Prom tho Governor-Genoral of Hew Zealand
Dated 32nd January, 1939.   received 9.30 a.n., 32nd January.
No. 9 Secret.
You:1 secret Hologram *.:o. 113 of 16th January.   Ky Prime
Minister dor.ires ..ic to inform you that so far as iew Zealand
Chiefs of Staff report is concornod it deals with a trate;;ic
survey of certain Pacific Islands only, and report is adequately
summarised in ray secret telegram of 24th December, I"o. 145.
At this star;e ;:is r.ajesty's Government in ITev; Zealand would
like to set out more precisely   the points which they surest
should he discussed at the Conference namely:-
(a) Possible Xines of action by enemy -powers against
Empire interests ir the south west .'acific in the period before
the arrival of naval reinforcements, including (i) operations to
capture bases in the Western Pacific,    (ii) ""c.ture and scale of
possible operations a; ainst Entire trade,    (iii) i'Taturc and soale
of possible operationa against Australian and ;?ev/ Zealand
territory*
(b) -[easures necessary "o defend - (i) Pacific Islands and
Mandated territories, notably Fiji Tonga '"ew   ehrides Solomon
Islands,    (ii) Shlp3 trading with United i:in;;dom Hew Zealand and
Australia.     (iii) Australian and i-Tew Zealand territories.
(c) Host effective -.v ans of co-operation with the United
Kingdom in the defence of British Commonwealth after providing
for security in the South   "ostern Pacific, including schemes for
mutual reinforcement.
(d) Co-ordination of dofence policy in peace and war.
-23-
(e) Sources of supplies of equipment after the
outbreak of war.
(f) Scales of reserves of sullies, i:\cludiv.c fuel
and equipment.
(s) Possible effect, of Gorman demand for the return
of L'andated territories.
(h) Economic aspects of war. including probable effect
on trade and shipping*
(j) Policy in relation to Trans Pacific Air route am"
the United states activities in the ..acific.
Ehie agenda is dependant only in a s$all dosroe on
report oi the i"ev/ Zealand Chiefs cf '.tavf which affects
poi?vt (b) above only.     His Majesty* s Government in '.Tew
Zealand had hoped thtt it would be possible to hold the
conference at latest by mid-March and they arc somewhc t
distrtibed at the proposal of His i ajesty'c Government in
the United Kingdom not to hold it before the middle of
April.     ;iis Majesty's Government in Sew Zealand still hope
this will he possible and in view of relatively small
importance of report of £ew Zealand Staff Chiefs already
referred to, surest that His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom may be able to decide on thoir representations
forthwith and arrange for the arrival of their representatives
"by the middle of Uarch.
The substance of this telegram is beinc; repeated to the
Hifih Commissioner for Western Pacific and to :1s Majesty's
Government in the Commonwealth of Australia*