

S E C R E T.

C.O.S. 832.

COPY NO. 28

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.  
CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.  
NEW ZEALAND CO-OPERATION IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

(Previous Paper No. C O S. 831).

Memorandum.

In a despatch dated 20th May, 1938 on the subject of projected air routes across the Pacific Ocean, the Governor-General of New Zealand made the suggestion\* that a conference between representatives of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand might be assembled to discuss Pacific Island matters.

2. Since that date various communications have passed between the three Governments, on the subject of this conference, and in particular certain telegrams have been received from the New Zealand Government outlining recent conclusions by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff (New Zealand telegram No. 145, dated 24th December, 1938<sup>+</sup>) and making proposals for a wide agenda on defence matters for the conference (New Zealand telegram No. 9 dated 22nd January, 1939)<sup>φ</sup>.

\* Paragraph 8 of Annex 15, Enclosure to  
C.I.D. Paper No. 1455-B.

<sup>+</sup> Annex I.

<sup>φ</sup> Annex II.

3. Some of the items included in the list in the above telegram are suitable for ministerial discussion; others are of such wide implication that they could only be effectively dealt with at a conference at which representatives of the other Dominions and of India were present. Consequently we are of opinion that it will not be possible for a conference, at which the United Kingdom representatives would be confined to those who can be made available by the middle of March, to deal with the whole range of subjects by the Government of New Zealand. Nevertheless we fully appreciate the value of an early conference, on the understanding that it will deal with as much of the agenda as it finds itself competent to discuss, reserving the remainder for report to the Governments concerned.

In order that the New Zealand Government may be in possession of an up-to-date statement, not only of our views on the general strategical situation, but also on the contribution which New Zealand might find herself able to make to Imperial Defence, we have prepared the present memorandum. It is divided into two parts dealing respectively with these two aspects of the problem.

PART I.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NEW ZEALAND.

4. In the present state of world affairs we have to face the possibilities of a strategic situation in which the British Empire, in alliance with France, while at war in Europe, would also have to contend with the hostility of Japan. In the worst case we might be engaged simultaneously with Germany, Italy and Japan.

5. Some indication of the gravity of such a situation can be obtained by recalling the position in 1914, and the events of the war which followed. Germany calculated that, having regard to the strength of the Triple Alliance, and to the improbability of British intervention, her forces would be adequate to enable her to conquer France. In the event we intervened against her, and were supported by Russia and Japan, and after a brief interval by Italy, and ultimately by the United States of America. In spite of this there were times during the war when the Germans came within measurable distance of obtaining peace on favourable terms.

6. Now Japan, together with an Italy far more powerful than in 1914, might be against us instead of against Germany. A new factor would be that, for the first time in history, the home resources of the belligerents would be open to air attack upon a large scale. The effectiveness of such attack, and of the defensive measures designed to meet it, can only be determined as the result of war experience.

7. Our policy for the defence of the Empire has been stated\* as follows:-

"The security of the United Kingdom and the security of Singapore would be the keystones on which the survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend ..... A British Fleet would have to proceed to the Far East leaving sufficient strength in home waters to neutralise the German Fleet ..... We could rely on France to neutralise the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, to some extent, and to maintain command of the Western Mediterranean."

8. At the threat of war with Germany and Italy, there are certain immediate steps which must be taken in the Far East. In particular, as the security of Singapore is the vital factor in our strategic position in the Far East, that base must be reinforced without delay by a brigade from India, and by Air Forces from India and Iraq, to bring the garrison up to war establishment. Detailed plans are maintained for these movements, the ships of the China Fleet providing the necessary protection for the transports in the Bay of Bengal. The timely arrival of these reinforcements should ensure that the fortress will hold out against any scale of seaborne Japanese attack, pending the arrival of the British Fleet.

9. If Japan then intervened on the side of our enemies it would, as stated above, be imperative to send a British Fleet to the far East where it would give cover to Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa, and secure our position in the Indian Ocean, protecting the vital sea communications through that area to Egypt and the Middle East from all parts of the Empire.

10. With the despatch of a Fleet to the Far East, the Mediterranean would be almost denuded of British naval forces, and Italy would obtain control of sea communications

\* C.I.D. Paper No. 1305-B.

in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, subject to the possibilities of French naval action. So long, however, as we could retain our position in Egypt, we should control the Suez Canal. Egypt could be reinforced and supplied through the Red Sea and by the overland routes from Basra and Mombasa, and a fleet in the Far East would give cover to these communications from Japanese interruption which could not be given by a Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

11. The Naval position must be largely governed by the situation at the time when war with Japan breaks out, and the action which our own and the naval forces of our enemies in Europe have taken up to that time. In the worst case, Japan might enter the war before our naval resources had been fully developed, and when German and Italian naval forces had started to attack our trade in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and possibly elsewhere. Our naval forces might be operating at strength in the Atlantic, but considerably dispersed. Some French capital ships might be assisting in these operations, while a proportion of the allied forces would be in the Mediterranean. In these circumstances it could not be guaranteed that the whole of the Fleet destined for the Far East could be despatched immediately. This would depend upon the progress of our operations to re-establish control of communications in the Atlantic, and the necessary redistribution of naval forces.

12. To threaten the security of any Dominion or of India, through invasion, Japan would require the control of sea communications in the Pacific or Indian Oceans for an indefinite period. Japan is in the highest degree unlikely to contemplate any operations of this nature in view of the great distances involved and the threat of the arrival of a British fleet in Far eastern waters. Raids against sea communications in the Indian Ocean and raids against ports by Japanese naval forces are always a

possibility, particularly before the fleet arrives. To guard against raids on ports, reliance must be placed on local resources for immediate protection, while ultimate security is obtained by naval operations to destroy the raiders.

13. Without unduly restricting her campaign in China, Japan could detach strong forces for an attack on Hong Kong. It is almost certain that this attack would be made, and it might be the first intimation we should receive that Japan had decided to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy. While she remains in military occupation of the Canton area, she will be particularly well placed for starting such an attack.

14. Were she not so heavily involved in China, Japan might attempt a "coup de main" or deliberate attack with the object of capturing Singapore. On the other hand she might always attempt to destroy the docking and repair facilities of the base by seaborne air raids, and by sabotage. The arrival of the reinforcements from India and Iraq should make Singapore secure.

15. It is also possible that Japan might attempt operations designed to capture North Borneo to obtain oil and to enable her to establish advanced bases for the attack on Singapore; this would involve her in keeping strong naval forces in the South China Seas, at a distance from her main bases. Once a British fleet had arrived it is unlikely that the Japanese would be able to maintain such a position unless they were prepared to fight a fleet action under conditions which would be strategically advantageous to us.

16. Furthermore in undertaking any overseas operations outside China Japan would require to make use of a considerable tonnage of mercantile shipping, especially for operations involving long distances. This would probably restrict the size of the force which could be despatched and maintained to moderate dimensions. Finally any likelihood of war with

the U.S.S.R. would probably deter her from overseas commitments of any magnitude.

17. The scale of attack which Japan could develop against New Zealand would depend on two factors:-

(1) Her ability to develop advanced naval and air bases within striking distance of New Zealand.

(2) The number and types of ships and aircraft which she could spare for such operations.

18. If Japan was determined, notwithstanding the distance and vulnerability of her long line of communication to raids by cruiser forces, to establish advanced bases in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides or even Fiji, immediately she entered the war, it would be difficult to stop her.

19. With regard to the forces which Japan would be likely to spare for such operations, she would certainly hesitate to disperse her main naval forces in view of the threat of the arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore. Uncertainty as to the attitude of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. coupled with her probable pre-occupation in China for some time to come, make it unlikely that she would despatch large air forces overseas, particularly when the advanced bases would be outside air striking distance of the objective, and with insecure sea communications for supplies.

20. With the arrival of the British Main Fleet in the Far East these communications could be subjected to an increased degree of interruption. In fact the Japanese would then find very great difficulty in maintaining their position in the Islands, and the threat to New Zealand would fade.

#### Conclusion.

21. The British Empire allied to France might, in the worst case, have to contend simultaneously with Germany, Italy and Japan and we should be gravely threatened in Europe, the Mediterranean and Far East. Our broad strategic policy would be to hold on to key positions, while developing our latent strength. The U.S.A. and perhaps U.S.S.R. might come to our aid in which case our situation would be greatly improved.

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22. A British Fleet would have to be sent to the Far East to give cover to New Zealand, Australia, our Eastern possessions and to communications in the Indian Ocean, including those to Egypt and the Middle East, while sufficient naval strength would be retained in home waters to contain the German Fleet. We should have to depend on the French Fleet to restrict Italian naval action in the Mediterranean.

23. It will thus be seen that no change has occurred to affect the considerations which governed the undertaking given at the Imperial Conference in 1937, that in the event of war with Japan, we should send a Fleet to Eastern waters irrespective of the situation elsewhere.

#### PART II.

##### NEW ZEALAND CO-OPERATION IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

24. It will be realised that the burden of providing the necessary forces for Home Defence, for Egypt and the Middle East, and for the maintenance of Imperial communications, in addition to building and maintaining a Fleet of sufficient strength to oppose Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously is a very heavy one. The greatest importance is therefore attached to the assistance which can be rendered by the Dominions. We consider, therefore, in this part of our report, the manner in which New Zealand might be able to co-operate further in Imperial Defence in peace and in war, at sea, on land, and in the air.

##### General Considerations.

25. We are not in a position to assess New Zealand's financial resources and we have not therefore considered the financial aspect of our proposals.

26. In August, 1937, when we last considered Defence Expenditure in New Zealand<sup>ii</sup> at the request of the New Zealand Government, we defined her Defence Policy as follows:-

"The security of New Zealand depends ultimately on the command of sea communications to New Zealand by the British Fleet. So long as an adequate British Fleet is in being the danger of the invasion of New Zealand is very remote. The provision of sea power for the defence of seaborne trade simultaneously furnishes a deterrent against seaborne raids. As adequate naval strength is of fundamental importance to Empire and New Zealand defence, the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy should be maintained at a strength which is an effective and fair contribution to Empire Naval Defence.

The circumstances of a major war may be such that the defence of New Zealand's interests may be found to lie outside New Zealand altogether and her ability to co-operate on land or in the air in the Defence of the Empire may prove in the outcome the most effective measure she can take for her own security since the defeat of the United Kingdom would mean the break up of the British Empire".

27. We see no reason to modify the above principles which we consider still hold good.

\* Paper No. C.O.S. 609.

28. The forms which, we suggest, further co-operation by New Zealand in Imperial Defence might take are discussed in the following paragraphs.

NAVY.

In time of peace.

29. If New Zealand could meet the cost of manning and maintaining a third cruiser and two escort vessels, this would represent a valuable contribution to Imperial Defence. An addition to defence expenditure in this form would fit into the existing organisation for administrative and maintenance purposes such as personnel, refits and repairs, fuel, stores and ammunition, without major additions to overhead cost.

30. It would also be very desirable that the New Zealand Government should provide asdic sets, together with the necessary facilities for training personnel for submarine detection, for which purpose a trawler fitted for A/S would be needed.

31. It is recommended that merchant vessels on the New Zealand register should be stiffened in time of peace, to enable them quickly to mount a

defensive armament in time of war. Particulars of the scheme in the United Kingdom have been given to the New Zealand authorities.

32. While it is understood that some officers of the two big New Zealand shipping companies have been through the Defence Course for officers of the Mercantile Marine in the United Kingdom, it is desired to recommend to the attention of the New Zealand authorities the need for sending all Merchant Navy Officers through this course. The lectures have been supplied to New Zealand.

In time of War.

33. In addition to placing the New Zealand Division under the orders of the Admiralty, New Zealand has hitherto agreed to provide and maintain two armed merchant cruisers for trade protection duties in time of war, including the manning in so far as her personnel resources will allow. This matter has recently been under discussion in correspondence in connection with the employment of these ships, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will continue to accept full responsibility for this commitment.

ARMY.

In time of peace.

34. The strength of our overseas garrisons is based on the principle that wherever sea communications are liable to interruption by sea, land or air, the garrison should be maintained in peace at a strength adequate for defence at the outbreak of war. Alternatively, the necessary reserve should be held in the neighbourhood available to reinforce at short notice. It will be obvious that the maintenance of overseas garrisons has of late become a much heavier commitment owing to the increased liability of sea communications to attack by hostile submarines and aircraft.

35. In order that the Government of New Zealand may judge whether this would be a suitable field for contribution towards Imperial Defence, we set out for their consideration the present position of certain garrisons which lie on the main line of Imperial communications to the Far East, which is, of course, of vital importance to New Zealand.

36. The principal bases on this line are Hong Kong, Penang, Singapore, and Trincomali. In view of the situation created by the present Sino-Japanese hostilities, we do not think it a suitable time to suggest the stationing of New Zealand troops at Hong Kong. The garrison at Penang is formed by mixed units of British, Indian and Malays and no additional units are required.

37. At Singapore the peace garrison is insufficient for war requirements and relies on early reinforcement by an infantry brigade group from India. The safe arrival of this force is dependent on the security, at the time, of sea communications in the Bay of Bengal.

38. The defences are also deficient of one of the three anti-aircraft regiments which have been approved. Any addition, therefore, which New Zealand found it possible to make to the peace-time garrison would add appreciably to the security of the base.

39. The Government of New Zealand might wish to consider, as an alternative, the relief of existing British units at Singapore. This form of assistance could be given without the delays inseparable from the construction of new barracks, which would be required if the strength of the garrison were to be increased. His Majesty's Government would in this event still have to maintain the existing plan for the reinforcement of the base in time of emergency, but British personnel would be set free for use in other overseas bases. This solution would admit of New Zealand troops taking over existing armament as well as barracks. We suggest that units for which New Zealand troops might provide personnel in whole or in part are:-

- (a) One British anti-aircraft regiment R.A.  
(25 officers and 589 other ranks).

(b) The Changi Fire Command R.A.  
(40 officers and 782 other ranks).

(a) would provide a more independent role than  
(b).

40. Any contribution to the garrison of Singapore would entail a mixed garrison of British, New Zealanders and native troops. At Trincomali, on the other hand, New Zealand troops might be able to find the complete regular garrison, which at present consists of one 9.2-inch battery, one 6-inch battery and 3 Anti-Aircraft batteries. The war establishment of these units when fully equipped will amount to an approximate total of 27 officers and 700 other ranks, Royal Artillery.

41. If the Government of New Zealand had in mind the provision of infantry units, the question of periodical reliefs might necessitate the formation of regular units in New Zealand for draft finding and training of the troops: this would materially increase the cost of the maintenance of overseas infantry units. Although there are no regular infantry units in New Zealand, there is a regular artillery cadre which could perhaps be expanded for service overseas.

42. In any arrangement on the above lines which might be made, consideration will have to be given to the special problem raised by the possibility of the calling out of New Zealand troops in aid of the civil power.

In time of War.

43. New Zealand has already undertaken an oversea commitment. Since August 1930 she has been prepared to despatch a garrison of two platoons and two machine guns to Fanning Island at the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Recently it was accepted that the force should be increased to one company.

In a telegram from the New Zealand Government No. 145 of 24th December, 1938, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff recommend that a Brigade Group should be held in readiness by New Zealand for use as required in war in the Pacific Islands. This would be a valuable contribution.

44. Once New Zealand is involved in war, the best means by which her land forces can co-operate is by the formation of a division, as in 1914-18, and its eventual despatch for operations overseas wherever it can be employed most usefully. We suggest that in peace time the New Zealand army should be organised with this role in view, so that the division could be despatched in as short a time as possible.

AIR.

In time of peace.

45. The fundamental problem of Imperial Defence from the air point of view is how to meet the threat to the United Kingdom from potential enemies in Europe.



As we have remarked in paragraph 26 above, the security of New Zealand depends upon the maintenance in being of the British Fleet but that itself presumes the security of the British Isles against all forms of attack.

At the present time we are fully occupied in developing from our own resources an adequate counter to the heavy scale of air attack with which the United Kingdom is threatened. The most urgent necessity, therefore, is to strengthen our air power at home.

46. It is not suggested that a direct contribution to the air defence of Great Britain, in the form of New Zealand squadrons maintained in England in peace, is at present a practical proposition. It is possible that as an outcome of the conference which is to be held on the Pacific Islands, the New Zealand Government ~~may undertake further air commitments~~ in peace in the Islands. If the New Zealand Government should then feel itself in a position to offer further assistance this would best be directed towards relieving British air forces of certain defence commitments in the Far East.

47. The most important of these commitments is the defence of Singapore for which 10 squadrons are required under present estimates. Even when the increases authorised for our Far East Command have been provided a great measure of reliance is placed upon the arrival of reinforcing units from India and Iraq.

48. If therefore New Zealand were able to contribute to the air forces stationed at Singapore in time of peace, this would increase our strength at that fortress, and would obviate some of the uncertainty which is bound to result from relying on reinforcing units to complete first line defences.

49. We welcome the scheme recently put forward by the New Zealand Government for increasing the number of trained pilots seconded to the Royal Air Force each year.

50. With the backing of the proposed war organisation for training pilots referred to in paragraph 53, we suggest that a valuable contribution in peace would be an immediate intake of additional personnel, both for flying duties and for maintenance, up to the full capacity which New Zealand training establishments can now develop. This would be additional to the increase of trained pilots seconded to the Royal Air Force.

51. The New Zealand Government has recently accepted an offer made by the Home Government suggesting that the Air Mission to Australia which is to investigate possibilities of developing the manufacture of aircraft in that Dominion should visit New Zealand for a similar purpose. If the Mission's report is encouraging the establishment of an aircraft manufacturing organisation in New Zealand would be a most valuable asset to Imperial Defence. As a beginning such an industry would probably be called upon to manufacture aircraft of the elementary training type.

In time of War.

52. If New Zealand could undertake the dispatch of air reinforcements to Singapore during a period of strained relations they would be of great assistance. The moving of reinforcements by air however would be impracticable until such a time as New Zealand possesses aircraft capable of making the flight from New Zealand to Australia.

53. We have already considered and expressed our appreciation of the proposal by the New Zealand Government to set up an organisation to train 1,000 pilots a year in time of war, which should prove a most valuable contribution. The full output could not be reached until the scheme had been in full war-time operation for 15 months. The plan relies on sources in the United Kingdom for the supply of aircraft, and during the current year an appreciable portion of the aircraft required has been promised; but under present arrangements the complete plan will not be operable for nearly two years.

54. But before the first pilots so trained become available New Zealand could assist by helping to make good personnel wastage in Royal Air Force units in the Far East. Personnel could reach Singapore much more rapidly from New Zealand than from England and even if the fortress were invested it might be possible to fly in personnel reinforcements from Australian territory.

CONCLUSIONS.

55. Should His Majesty's Government in New Zealand wish to review their present agreed contributions to Imperial Defence in peace and war, the following are the main forms of assistance which we should welcome.

PEACE.

Navy.

- (a) The manning and maintenance of a third cruiser and two escort vessels.
- (b) The provision of asdic sets and training in their use.
- (c) Stiffening New Zealand merchant vessels in peace so as to enable them to mount defensive armament in time of war.
- (d) The attendance of New Zealand Merchant Navy Officers at the Defence Course for officers of the mercantile marine.

Army.

- (e) Co-operation in the defence of our Far Eastern bases by assisting in the provision of garrisons.

Air.

- (f) The provision of air forces at Singapore to assist in the defence of the base.
- (g) The use to capacity of existing training facilities to increase reserves of flying and maintenance personnel.
- (h) The development in New Zealand of an organisation for the manufacture of aircraft.

WAR.

Navy.

- (i) Action on the lines of (a), (b) and (c) above if not already taken in peace.
- (j) In addition to placing the New Zealand Division at our disposal, the provision and maintenance of two Armed Merchant Cruisers.

Army.

- (k) The provision of immediate reinforcements, as outlined in New Zealand Telegram No.145 for use as required in the Pacific.
- (l) The provision of a division for despatch overseas.

Air.

- (m) Operation in full of the scheme for training 1,000 pilots per annum. The scheme to be extended to embrace the training of flying crews and maintenance personnel.
- (n) The further reinforcement of the garrison at Singapore either by a complete unit, or by the provision of personnel reserves.

(Signed) C.L. NEWALL.  
ROGER BACKHOUSE.  
R.F. ADAM.  
D.C.I.G.S. for C.I.G.S.

Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.

1st February, 1939.

ANNEX I.  
PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM.  
NEW ZEALAND.

From the Governor General of New Zealand.  
Dated 24th December, 1938. Received 7.24 a.m.  
24th December, 1938.

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No. 145. Secret.

Reference my telegram No. 144 of to-day. I am asked by my Prime Minister to inform you that various Pacific Islands have recently been visited by New Zealand Chiefs of Staff who have now rendered a report on the defences of Fiji and Tonga. Summary of their conclusions is as follows:- Begins:- (a) They emphasise the strategical importance of the Fiji and Tongan Groups. (b) The scale of attack to be expected in these groups has risen to one infantry brigade A (c) Fiji Defence Force should be expanded from its present strength of 400 to a total of 1,300 all ranks. (d) Port of Suva should be defended by two naval six inch guns. (e) A Defence Force of one battalion should be formed in Tonga. (f) New Zealand should have a brigade group in readiness in war time to reinforce the Islands as required. (g) In Suva local forces are required for minesweeping and for examination services. (h) New Zealand should be prepared to send aircraft to operate from these Islands in war. (i) Two landing grounds are required in Fiji, the necessary surveys and estimates having been made. (j) Two landing grounds are required in the Tonga Group;

the surveys should now be made by a New Zealand aerodrome engineer. (k) Part of New Zealand's reserves of fuel, bombs and ammunition should be held in Fiji and part of the reserves of fuel in Tonga.

It must be made clear that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have not yet approved recommendations (f) (h) (j) and (k).

Copy of the full report is being sent to you by despatch and copies are being sent to His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. It is thought that this report will naturally be discussed at the forthcoming conference on defence matters.

ANNEX II.

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM

NEW ZEALAND

From the Governor-General of New Zealand

Dated 22nd January, 1939. Received 9.30 a.m., 22nd January.

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No. 9 Secret.

Your secret telegram No. 12 of 16th January. My Prime Minister desires me to inform you that so far as New Zealand Chiefs of Staff report is concerned it deals with a strategic survey of certain Pacific Islands only, and report is adequately summarised in my secret telegram of 24th December, No. 145. At this stage His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would like to set out more precisely the points which they suggest should be discussed at the Conference namely:-

(a) Possible lines of action by enemy powers against Empire interests in the south west Pacific in the period before the arrival of naval reinforcements, including (i) operations to capture bases in the Western Pacific. (ii) Nature and scale of possible operations against Empire trade. (iii) Nature and scale of possible operations against Australian and New Zealand territory.

(b) Measures necessary to defend - (i) Pacific Islands and Mandated territories, notably Fiji Tonga New Hebrides Solomon Islands. (ii) Ships trading with United Kingdom New Zealand and Australia. (iii) Australian and New Zealand territories.

(c) Most effective means of co-operation with the United Kingdom in the defence of British Commonwealth after providing for security in the South Western Pacific, including schemes for mutual reinforcement.

(d) Co-ordination of defence policy in peace and war.



(e) Sources of supplies of equipment after the outbreak of war.

(f) Scales of reserves of supplies, including fuel and equipment.

(g) Possible effect of German demand for the return of Mandated Territories.

(h) Economic aspects of war, including probable effect on trade and shipping.

(j) Policy in relation to Trans Pacific Air route and the United States activities in the Pacific.

This agenda is dependant only in a small degree on report of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff which affects point (b) above only. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand had hoped that it would be possible to hold the conference at latest by mid-March and they are somewhat distrubed at the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom not to hold it before the middle of April. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand still hope this will be possible and in view of relatively small importance of report of New Zealand Staff Chiefs already referred to, suggest that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may be able to decide on their representations forthwith and arrange for the arrival of their representatives by the middle of March.

The substance of this telegram is being repeated to the High Commissioner for Western Pacific and to His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia.