

14th March

There seem like two risks - one that
 the USA may take precipitate action as by the
 caution: the idea that we may precipitate action
 by putting too much on a guy, too much information.
 As against the first there is the fact that it's better
 there and elsewhere is there is far more than of
 British occupation than there was at Caen, and
 a USA occupation in the face of British occupation
 and circumstances would be a far more serious
 matter. As regards the second as to the second
 since the second of the others may precipitate
 action ^{which} to failure to action may be described later
 as "stealing a march". However as it is only
 the carrying out of a fixed ground which was
 given 1st November and the action took place
 in December the best course would seem not to
 mention it. For the same reason, say not
 to precipitate action. I hope we will take

+PR.

[OVER.]

no dip really re vs. landing rights in NZ
at present, we can keep that card by us.

The admin has calculated 1% schidy re
VBA and present perspective admin will
be a prompt ^{now} acquiescence / given expected
proposal for a general discussion. ^{then} / Could we
not take the time that we have asked
re reference to Canton I³ in the Hephner
report and if by really require it for
defense purposes we would be prepared to
cede it to them by unannounced withdrawal
then discuss it in the Hephner. (I am
assuming that we are not satisfied
that if we keep Hull and Christmas we
do not need Canton ?). We might then
offer landing rights at Hull and ^{Christmas} ~~Canton~~
in exchange for landing rights at
Canton and --- ?

H.E.

VW 17/11