IS? h> 670/**/*%
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SECRET.
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MEMORANDUM ON SEA-POWER * 1939.
To Germany, the command of the Baltic is vital.
Scandinavian supplies, Swedish ore, and above all,
protection against Russian descents on the long, undefended
northern coast-line of Germany, (in one place little more
than a hundred miles from Berlin), make it imperative for
Germany to dominate the Baltic.     We may therefore be sure
thatf^fix'the opening phase, she will not compromise her
command of this Sea.     Thus, while submarines and raiding
cruisers, or perhaps one pocket battleship, may be sent out
to disturb our traffic, no ships will be risked which are i^e
necessary to the Baltic command.     The German Fleet, as at
present developed, aims at this as its prime and almost its
sole objective.
If this be true, no very large British naval forces will
be needed to watch the debouches from the Baltic or from the
Heligoland Bight.     British security would be markedly
increased if an air attack upon the Kiel Canal rendered that
side door useless, even if only at intervals.
Assuming Italy is hostile, which we may perhaps hope
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will not be the case., England's first battlefield is the
Mediterranean.     All plans for sealing up the ends,
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must be discarded in favour of decisive victory there.
Our forces alone should be sufficient to drive the Italian
ships from the sea, and secure complete command of the
Mediterranean, certainly within two months, possibly
sooner.
The submarine has been mastered, thanks very largely
to Lord Chatfield's long efforts at the Admiralty. It
should be quite controllable in the outer seas, aMS(?j
Germany.      SotM^V a ''fetter    = few*
certainly in the Mediterranean.     There will be5 losses?*
but nothing to affect the scale of events. $0*.-
In ray ©piaion, given with great humility, (because
thes&a$hings areeyery dif^e^t to^jju&g&Kan air attack
«^on British warships armed and prote,e|;ed as they now are,
M&1 not prevent fuig. ^exercise of their superior sea
powersChe; B;i&tffc&sh domination of the Mediterranean will
infU&ct inevitably injuries upon Ital&,which may be fatal
to her power of continuing the war.     All her troops in
Libya and in Abyssinia will be, as I said:    "cut flowers
in a vase."    tffihe Freneji 'and our own people in Egypt
S&ktld be,8Be£aiforced to any extent desired, while theirs
wou;M'3b-ei:overweighted, iW not starved.     If the French
Fleetuand French naval bases are added to our own, this
tas£i£s what the Admiralty should readily acceptI     Not to
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hold the Mediterranean would be to expose Egypt and the
Canal, as well as the French possessions, to' invasion
by Italian troops.with German leadership. We cannot
tolerate this on any account*     Moreover a series of
swift and striking victories in this theatre, which might
be obtainable in the early weeks of a war, would have a
most healt^gc and helpful bearing upon'Tob main'struggle
with. Germany/ir.^,e'Wothing should stand between us and these
results, both naval and military*
On no account must anything which threatens in
the Par East divert us from this prime objective..-) In
war one only has to compare one evil with another, and
-l)c of
the lesser evil ranks as a blessing*
If Japan joins the hostile combination, which is
by no means certain, for she has her hands full^all
our interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea will be
temporarily effaced.     We must not be drawn from our
main theme by any effort to protect them.     Only if the
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United States comes in against Japan could we supply even
a squadron of cruisers to operate with them.     On this
tableau we must bear the losses and punishment, awaiting
the final result of the struggle.
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(4) The farthest point we can hold in thp conditions
imagined is Singapore.     This should be easy.     A fortress
of this character, with cannon which can hold any fleet
at arm's length only requires an adequate garrison and
supgpgLes of food- and ammunition, preferably,yfjjov a^iear;
but even six months would probably do.     Singapore must
hold out till the Mediterranean is safe, and the Italian
fleet liquidated.
Consider how vain is the menace that Japan &111 send
a fleet and army to conquer Singapore.     It ia;as far from
Japan as Southampton from New York.     Over these two
thousand miles of salt-water, Japan would have to send
the bulk of her fleet, escort at least sixty thousand
men in transports in order to effect a landing and
begin a siege which would end only in disaster if the
si a a good guara-t,- dangs?*
Japanese sea-communications were cut at any stage.
One can take it as quite certain that Japan would
not run such a risk.     They are an extremely sensible
people.     They would have the opportunity of obtaining
for the time being complete satisfaction for all their
ambitions in the Yellow Seas.     Their fleet protects
their homeland and overseas empire from the worst perils.
To send a large part of their strictly limited naval
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naval forces on a wild adventure such as -the siege and
reduction of Singapore, will never commend itself to them
until England has been decisively beaten, which will not
be the case in the first year of the war.     If, per
imposaibile, they were to attempt it, a British victory in
the Mediterranean might be followed a few months ^atg^, by
a decisive naval celief of Singapore.     ®o tb£&&fi$re
let usai/orry about .this bugbear.    ;rMinor naval dispositions
may be made to increase the deterrents against an attack on
Singapore, but you may be sure that provided it is fully
armed, .gar&i'soned and supplied, there will be no attack
in any period which our foresight can measure.
As long as the British Navy is undefeated, and as
long as we hold Singapore, no invasion of Australia or
ful fie     to the i ftc •   ¦ .•
New Zealand by Japan is possible.     We could give Austra-
lasia a good guarantee to protect them from this danger,
but we must do it in our own way, and in the proper
sequence of operations.     Can one suppose that Japan,
enjoying herself in the mastery 6t the Yellow Sea, would
send afloat a conquering and colonising expedition to'
be in ate* :s.   j m[\
Australia?   It is ludicrous.     More than one hundred
thousand men would be needed to make any impression
upon Australian manhood.     The sending of such an expedition
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would require the improvident diversion of the Japanese
fleet, and their engagement, in a*long, desultory struggle
in Australia.     At any moment a decision in the Mediter-
ranean would liberate overwhelming naval forees to-cut any
such expedition from its base.
One does not,know whatathe attitude of the United
States woujfed.be to an attempt by Japan to conquer andn,
colonise Australia.     It would be easy for thenlffnited
States to tell Japan that they would regard the sending
Assuming that the foregoing argument opted,
of Japanese fleets and transports south of the Equator
anc       t events generally ewsfott*"'"t^r wiafc- our (Sfcraaiend
as an act of war.     They might well be disposed to make
j> *v—. n»Ai ¦*-      .-. - &or\ ¦ i ei i,rt';n^fv*t "   '¦and     '¦ t: -no -escpedi tion
such a declaration, and there would be no harm in sounding
has been launched affair      I'lftyspwe or Australia, the
them upon this very remote contingency.
question would ariee where fee next eperation of fee Britieia
I am aware of the promise that we made to send a
Pl*t    ;honld This i ter we eeittot e t %o |
powerful fleet to the Pacific, but this would be folly in
decide      1&*      t»ge.     But e&ttjM&.    he ot& gv mw."
the opening stages of the war, and I am sure if the
offensive t G the Lc...     Xf, for Instance?;
strategic argument is laid before the Australian Common- I
we had to*"day a superior fleet in the Baltic* one niij^ht
wealth, they will play the game by us as they have
always done.     Tell them the whole story, and they will
We have not got the xa        jwer %c     tempt mis \
come along.     In the first year of a world war, they would
;*tan &f      aen conquered, 'm$ th •        ; no bgf&M
be in no danger whatever in their homeland, and by the
fieai *a w&ich should be pA mere Caj$ei
end of the first year, we may hope to have cleaned up the
fop t&iSuh ?ir;=" be made fo>r uee shov. it! aarisUtioiE** ¦
seas and oceans.
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My main conclusion in thiB section is that there is
no danger of Japan sending large expeditions against
Singapore or Australia until matters have "been decided in
Europe;   and that if they did so, so long as we hold
Singapore, they would he placing themselves at a great
disadvantage.     No, they will take Hong Kong and Shanghai,
and cleanfcus out of all our interests there. 'W But then,
if we are still alive, we will put that right later on.
Assuming that the foregoing argument is accepted,
and that events generally conform to it, that our command
of the Mediterranean is unquestioned and that no expedition
has been launched against Singapore or Australia, the
question would arise where the next operation of the British
Fleet should he.     This is a matter we cannot attempt to
decide at this stage.     But clearly the one great naval
offensive against Germany is the Baltic.     If, for instance,
we had to-day a superior fleet in the Baltic, one might
almost say for certain that Germany would not declare war.
We have not got the naval power to attempt this before the ]
Mediterranean has been conquered, but there is no hypothe-
tical operation which should be studied more e'arefully, and
for which plans should be made for use should conditions
allow, than the domination of the Baltic.     Here is the
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sole great offensive against Germany of British sea-power. I
Ardent officers should be set to work for a year upon the
problems of entering the Baltic and living there in indefi-
nite ascendancy.     Kronstadt presents itself as the chief
base.     However, much blood will have flowed under the
bridges before any question of application can arise. But
if we are happy in the Mediterranean, and no Japanese
expedition had been launched (which it will not be) in the
Pacific, this would be the sovr'an plan.
(Initialled) W.S.C.
25.3.1939,
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