D 6/62.
CYPHER
To the United ittngdora High Commissioners in
the oonmonivealth' of Australia and Hew Zealand.
Gent 4.0 p.:i, lat ..pril, 1939.
Moat Secret.
, % immediately preceding telegram. Brief
begins.
The main purpose of the conference, in so far as
defence cuestions are concerned, will, it is assumed, be to
consider from the technical point of view what methods of
further co-operation "between the three Governments in
defence measures of common concern are possible with .a view
to subsequent decisions of policy by the Governments.
2. A list of the questions suggested by the New
Zealand Government for discussion at the Conference in
attached (Annex 1).
3. The general strategical background against which
the discussions'will tfe conducted has been set out in a
Report by the chiefs of Staff prepared at the time of the
Imperial Conference of 1937 and in the recent Reports by
the Chiefs of Staff on Australian and New Zealand Co-
operation in Imperial Dcfsnce (paragraphs G - 21 of the
former and paragraphs 4-23 of the latter).     The general
policy in the event of a war in which we were engaged against
Geircany. Italy and Japan has been briefly stated as fellows
"The security of the United vingdom and the Security
of iUngnpore would be the keystone on which the
survival of the British Commonwealth of rations would
depend......, A British Fleet would have to proceed
fio
to the Par Kasfc leaving sufficient strength in
home vvaters to neutralise the German Fleet......11
4.        The above statement of policy hao recently "been
elaborated in s personal telegram addressed to the Prime Minister
of the Commonwealth of   ustrelia by the Prime minister of the
United Kingdom, the following extract from which may he
communicated to the Hew Zealand Government in the course of
discussions at the Conference.
* In the event of war with Germany and Italy, should Japan
join in against us it would still he His Majesty's
Government's full intention to despatch a fleet to
Singapore.     If. we were fighting against such a combination
- never envisaged in our earlier plans* the size of that
fleet would necessarily he dependent on:-
(a)   the moment that Japan entered the war and
(h) what losses, if any, our opponents or ourselves
had previously sustained.
It would, however, he our intention to achieve three
main objects:-
(i) The prevention of any major operation against
Australia, Hew Zealand and India,
open
(ii) To keep/our sea communications
(iii) to prevent the fall of Singapore.
5. In the light of these general considerations it is
considered that the security of Australia and Hen Zealand depends
ultimately upon the com.nnd of sea ccmrronicationsDy the British
Fleet and that, so long as an adequate British Fleet is in
"being, the danger of the invasion of Australia and New Zealand
is very remote*     The provision of sea power for the defence of
seaborne trade simultaneously furnishes a deterrent against
seaborne raids.     (These conceptions are further developed in
the papers referred to in paragraph 2).     This* in effect,
supplies the answer to questions (a) and (b) (ii) and (iii)
in
Ill Annex I.
6. As regards question (c), the particular forms of
co-operation on the part of Australia and New Zealand, which,
it is thought, would "be most helpful from the point of view of
the United Kingdom, having regard to the factors mentioned
above, are described in the papers referred to in paragraph
2. The United Kingdom representatives should emphasize the
desire pf the United Kingdom Government to develop co-
operation v/ith Australia and Hew Zealand in any way possible
and should draw attention to the particular suggestions made
in those papers. They should ascertain as - far as possible
the views of the Commonweolt* and New Zealand Governments
towards the measures recommended.
7. So far as concerns the defence of the Pacific
Islands - i.e. question   (b) (i) in Annex I - certain
particular questions raised in relation to Fiji and Tonga
have been dealt with in O.P.C. .:inute Ho.334     The United
Kingdom representatives should base themselves on the
recommendations in that "inute.      If any suggestions are put
forward falling outside the O.D.Q Minute, the United
Kingdom representatives should take note of those with a view
to reporting them to the United Kingdom Government for
consideration.
8. As regards the questions raised by the New Zealand
Government of the sources of supply of equipment after an
outbreak of war and the scales of reserves of supplies,
including fuel and equipment - questions (e) and (f) ¦ in
Annex I - a separate note i3 attached (Annex II).
9. The United Kingdom Government have already made
it clear that questions (d), (g) and (h) in the Annex are in
their view beyond the scope of the present Conference and
that discussions of these questions at the Conference can
only be exploratory.      (The Coraionv/ealth Government have
indicated
indicated that they take a similar view as regards questions
(d) and (h)).     If therefore any of these questions arise,
the United Kingdom representatives should take note of the
points raised with a view to furnishing a report to the
United kingdom Government.
Annex I sets out '-uestions (a) to (h) in telegram
from Governor-General of New Zealand of 22nd January Iio.9.
Annex II reads as follows. Begins.
The questions raised are:-
(e) .   Sources of supplies of equipment after the outbreak
of war.
(f) Scales of reserves of supplies, including fuel
and equipment*
These two questions are closely related.     In the
event of a war in which the United .Kingdom, the Commonwealth
of Australia and Hew Zealand were involved, the former
would naturally do everything in its power to supply
Australia and Kew Zealand with their requirements;     It would
not, however, be possible at the present time to supply in
the early dnjrs of war the majority of items covered by the
general terra "munitions".     In deciding as to the scope of the
war potentiul to be set up by. His linjesty's Government in
the United Kingdom, it has been for obvious reasons possible
only to have regard to the United Kingdom forces. The
adequate provision of such a potential implies the use of
many works not normally engaged in munitions production and
it is necessary that such works should be trained for war
in
production by receiving/§eace orders for the supplies
which they are to produce in war.     If, therefore, the
Commonwealth and Kew Sealand Governments wish to ensure that
their munitions requirements also a,re to be met in war from
the United Kingdom without large delays, it would be
necessary
necessary that they should in peace form some ostimate of
what these requirements are likely to "be and be prepared,
in co-operation with the Government of the United Kingdom,
to ylo.ee the nscccon^r educational orflnra in poac^a
With regard to supplies of such items a3 fuel and
foodstuffs, the possibility of supply from other parts of the
yorld will depend upon the naval situation at the time, and
ant  opinion on the subject can only "be "based upon the
views of the Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in the i.iemorandura
which has "been supplied*
Some guide as to the reserves which should he
maintained against the outbreak of war wiill he found in
C.I.D. P-'iper No.460-0, a copy of which was included with
C.I.D. papers sent to the Prime Ministers of the
Commonwealth of Australia and Hew Zealand on the 24th Kerch
1933.     In this gaper a "period "before re-provisioning"
was calculated for Singapore amounting to 90 days. The
arguments on which this figure was "based hold cood to some
extent in the case of Australia and IJew Zealand, though
some period might "be added to allow for the greater distance
involved.
Any figure for reserves must "be "based on arbitrary
assumptions, and those r.-ade in the case of Singapore should
prove a useful guide.
Any arrangements which it night be found possible to
make for the supply of munitions or other equipment from the
United States of America would obviously ease the situation,
though in this sphere the difficulty at present caused by the
neutrality Act will be appreciated.     Similarly, the better
provisions it may be fpunZ possible to made for the manufacture
of
of   equipment of all kinds in Australia and Now r.caland
the more easily will their wartime problems "be solved*
Any arrangements which could be made "between the
Cora tonwea1th of Australia and New Zealand for mutual
assistance in record to supplies would also "be of creat
value*
It appears that these questions can only "be
discussed in very General terms at the proposed Conference.
Guides on the above lines raieht he given to the Commonwealth
and Hew Zealand representatives, and any further matters which
may arise in the discussion could "be referred home. It
will of course, "be realised that any matters dealing with
supply can make little or no headway without concrete
demands, so that the sooner definito orders can he placed
for     requirements the sooner will the material needed be
received, and the more likely is potential to he available
to meet their wartime requirements.     Brief ends.
Addressed to High Commissioner in Commonwealth
of Aust2tt'i£a Ko.VO   lUch Commissioner in New Zealand Ho.29.