THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND.
D.C.S. 1
45
SECRET.
FINAL IDftlOH.
Copy, No
18th April, 1939.
DEFENCE CONFERENCE,  1939.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure
the secrecy of this document.
Notes of Proceedings on the First Day of
Meeting of the Defence Conference, held
_on 1Uth April, 1939.__
PRESENT:
NEW ZEALAND
Delegates
Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, P.C.
Hon, P. Fraser
Hon. W. Nash
Hon. P. Jones
Hon. D. 0. Sullivan
Major-General J.E. Duigan, C.B., D.S.O.
Commodore H. E. Horan, D.S.O., R.N.
Group-Captain H.W.L. Saunders, M.C., D.F.C., M.M
C. A. Berendsen, Esq., C.M.G.
B. C. Ashwin, Esq.
L. J* Schmitt, Esq.
Lieut.-Col. W. G. Stevens.
Advisers
Commander A. B. Fanshawe, R.N.
Paymaster-Captain E.L. Tottenham, O.B.E., R.N.
Colonel 0. H. Mead, D.S.O.
H. Turner, Esq.
Group-Captain L. M.  Isitt, R.F.Z.A.F,
V/ing-Commander A. de T. Nevill, R.N.Z.A.F.
T. A. Barrow, Esq.
A. R. F. Mackay, Esq.
J. R. Middleton, Esq.
Squadron-Leader E. A. Gibson (afternoon only)
Secretariat^
R.N.
R.A.F.
Lieut.-Commander T. Ellis, R.N,
Captain D. T. Maxwell, N.Z.S.C.
Squadron-Leader E.M.F. Grundy,
F. Shanahan, Esq.
H. G. Nicholls, Esq,
2.
UNITED KINGDOM.
Delegates
Sir Harry Batterbee, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.
Sir Harry Luke, K.C.M.G.
Vice-Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, K.B.E., C.B., R.N.
Major-General P. J. Mackesy, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.
Air-Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Advisers
Captain W.D. McN. Graham
Major A. H. Stafford (afternoon only)
H. H. Vaskess, Esq., O.B.E.
Lt. P.R.J. Nicholls, R.A.
Secretariat
G. E. Boyd Shannon, Esq.
N. E. Costar, Esq.
AUSTRALIA.
Delegates
Vice-Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, K.B.E., C.B., R.N.
Colonel V. A. H. Sturdee, C.B.E., D.S.O.
Y/ing-Commander G. Jones, D.F.C., R.A.A.P.
Advisers
Commander J.CD. Esdaile, R.A.N.
Secretariat
Paymaster Captain J. B. Foley, O.B.E., R.A.N.
»
1. His Excellency the Governor-General, having opened the
Conference, withdrew.
2. The Right Hon. the Prime Minister was elected Chairman of
the Conference and the Hon. Mr. Praser as Deputy-Chairman.
3«       A welcoming address was delivered by the Chairman, s&fidh was
replied to by the heads of the United Kingdom and Australian
Delegations,
km       Approval for certain administrative arrangements having been
obtained, the Conference went into Committee to discuss the Agenda
on Strategical Problems as set forth in Paper D.C.12 (see annex
to this paper)
5»        After expressing New Zealand's desire regarding the
purposes of the Conference, the Chairman invited Mr. Berendsen
to express his views.
6. Mr. Berendsen, in his address, said he wished to confine
his remarks to one subject,, which appeared absolutely fundamental
to a proper consideration of items (a) and (b) on the Agenda -
the question of knowing the strength of the reinforcements and
the time in which they could be   expected to be available in the
Pacific.
7. In considering the problems set by (a) and (b) - the main
problems of the Conference - the Conference must, in ordinary
prudence, assume the worst possible situation, namely, a war with
Germany, Italy, and Japan simultaneously;     a war in which Japan
had joined from the very commencement,.     They might also assume
that an enemy would himself fix the date of the commencement of
hostilities, thereby having his forces in position beforehand.
8. He set out certain propositions from which he concluded
that the strength and time of arrival of reinforcements in the
Pacific was of primary importance in the consideration of Pacific
defence schemes.
9. He pointed out that in certain C.I.D. papers a "very
considerable delay" had been predicted before the fleet could
leave the Atlantic should certain conditions eventuate, and that
for a certain time naval forces in the Pacific would be inadequate
to match the Japanese.     It appeared that this period must be at
least seventy days, during which the Japanese would have
unquestionable naval control of the   Pacific, the only limitation
on their actions being their strength and the dictates of caution.
10. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, in replying, referred to
the reasons for the difficulty of definitely forecasting the
final number of ships to be allocated and their time of arrival
in the par East.       In dealing with the probable time of Japan's
entry into the war and subsequent strategy, he remarked or.
Japan's present preoccupation in China and the necessity for her
to take into account the potential threat both from the U.S.S*R.
and the United States of America.
11. Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin explained that while the present
combined naval forces of Australia and New Zealand are insufficient
to counter a strong enemy naval force, they are nevertheless:
reasonably adequate to afford a high degree of protection to trade
in the Tasman Sea.     He stated that the position regarding capital
ships available to be sent to the Par East by Great Britain would
be very much more satisfactory after
12. In answer to a question by Mr. Nash, Admiral Colvin stated
that Great Britain had at present nine capital ships building and
projected, and that this represented the maximum capacity of the
ship building industry in that countrye
13*   He also pointed out the distance Japan would be away from her
base should she decide to operate In the vicinity of Singapore;
he then explained certain aspects of trade war and trade protection.
The Hon.   Mr. Jones asked for information regarding the
probability of an attack on Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji
from the Caroline Islands,       He also asked the reason for
defending Port Moresby,       This was explained by Admiral Colvin,
15. Admiral Colvin considered that the Tasman ilea would be the
most probable area for Japanese operations should they decide to
go south.
5.
16. Major-General Mackesy made a statement regarding the length
of time Singapore could be held.     It was estimated that a period
not exceeding ninety days might elapse between the outbreak of
war and the arrival of the fleet.      A further twenty days might
elapse before the arrival of supply convoys*     He assured the
meeting that the arrangements at Singapore are adequate to enable
the garrison to hold out for this length of time.
17. Mr. Ashwin expressed the opinion that it would be to the
advantage of Japan to make an early attack on Singapore, which
might be pre-arranged with Germany and Italy,
18. Admiral Colvin expressed doubt as to the likelihood of a
simultaneous entry into war by Germany, Italy,and Japan, and
thought that Japan was more likely to "sit on the fence" until
i
the situation became favourable to her, and Ma.jor-General Mackesy
pointed out that such an attack would involve a very large
expedition with careful organisation of convoys, movements, etc«
19. The Hon. Mr. Nash then asked which was the nearest Japanese
base to Singapore from which an attack on Singapore could be made..
20. Admiral Colvin replied that the nearest first-class base was
in Japan itself, but it would be possible to embark troops in the
Pescadores.
21. Mr. Jones asked if the first attack would be on Hong Kong?
and Major-General Mackesy replied that that was anticipated.
6.
22. On re-assembling after the luncheon interval, Mr. Savage
stated that as he had an urgent call he would suggest that the
Minister of Defence, the Hon. Mr. Jones, should act in his absence.
Before retiring Mr. Savage referred to the need for setting up
special committees, but realised that there were certain diffi-
culties to this.       He would leave it to the Conference to
decide.
23. Sir Ragnar colvin continued the morning's discussion
by defining certain terms that were in common use, as it would
appear that there was some doubt as to the exact meaning of some
expressions, such as "base", "advance base", "dock", "floating
dock", etc.;     and after defining these terms Sir Ragnar indicated
the location of various types in various parts of the Empire*
Different types of warships were also explained.
2k»       To move a Japanese division would take some twenty to
twenty-five merchant ships, stated Sir Ragnar Colvin, and to
send a considerable force v/ould necessitate a very big convoy?
It should be borne in mind that such a   force would require a
continual stream of further ships to maintain supply.
25. Mr. Ashwin, dealing with the vulnerability of Singapore
and the experience gained by the Japanese in landing on the China
coast, requested information in regard to the possibility of the
Japanese embarking troops and landing sufficient of them in the
vicinity of Singapore before the latter could be reinforced.
26. Sir Arthur Longmore explained that the Japanese landings
in China had been made against very little opposition.     In the
defence of Singapore this v/ould not be the case, and it was
explained how   air reconnaissance would prevent any landing
being made undetected.
Mr. Ashwin asked as to the effect of weather conditions.
Sir Arthur Longmore explained that though Singapore was subject
7.
to tropical downpours the conditions were generally favourable
for air reconnaissance*
27. Mr. Ashwin asked if what he envisaged was a practicability*
28. Sir Arthur Longmore explained that the capture of Singapore
by the Japanese could not be entirely ruled out, but he was
trying to explain the measures by which its capture was being
made improbable.
Sir Ragnar Colvin added that it would be best if we could
be strong at every point, but we could not possibly do that, and
so must secure ourselves against the most probable operations-
29. The Hon. Mr. Sullivan asked for information as to the
relative strengths of Japanese air power and the Air Forces at
Singapore.
30. Sir Arthur Longmore explained that the actual aircraft at
Singapore after reinforcement amounted to some 160 (ten squadrons)*
The number that the Japanese could get to Singapore before the
establishment of an advance base was dependent on whether they
were using their aircraft carriers for that purpose, but be
considered that they would not be likely to risk their carriers
in the early stages of a war, and that the number of machines
available at the outset might be quite small*
31-       Mr. Nash asked for elucidation on the question of the
time that would elapse before the relief of Singapore-
32.       General Mackesy explained that this was ninety days from
the outbreak of war with Japan, but the period before re-provisioning
v/hich was something different, would be greater - perhaps twenty
days more.
33•       Mr. Nash asked if it was not likely that the three probable
enemy powers would synchronise their entry into the war and place
their forces in the most advantageous position and strike simul-
taneously.
8.
3k» Sir Arthur Longmore stated that much was guesswork in this
respect, and it would be difficult for the three powers concerned
to produce a concrete plan*
35. After some discussion on the degree of co-operation which
existed between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Mr* Jones suggested
that if the three clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) were discussed,
some idea could be gained of what is likely to happen if Japan
attempted to capture certain bases in the Western Pacific
36. Mr. Sullivan raised the question of food ships leaving
New Zealand and Australia, and Sir Ragnar thought that the majority
of the traffic would be maintained,.   He did not consider that we
need assume a complete isolation of New Zealand*
37-       Mr. Jones then asked if the Conference desired to discuss
item 1 of the Agenda,
38.       Sir Arthur Longmore, speaking for the United Kingdom delega-
tion, said that they would prefer to take the three items   1 to 3
together.       Excluding Singapore, the possible scales of attack
in the South-Western Pacific were reviewed by Sir Arthur, and it
was suggested that their application to the particular items on
the Agenda might then be consideredc
39»       After some discussion between Mr. Nash and Sir Arthur
Longmore as   to the effectiveness of commerce raiding, the chairman
referred to the expected scale of attack as laid down in C.I.D.
papers, and wished to know if this still held good with the British
Delegation.
h0»       Sir Arthur Longmore stated that there had been no change*
Sir Hagnar Colvin explained that Australia had mounted guns
as a protection for certain vulnerable points to keep off raiding
forces.    "Raiders will not risk damage as they are a long way from
home, and this is a point to be remembered."
^2.     Mr. Sullivan asked if the deduction from this was that
the only motive for raiding would be interference with trade,
43-     Admiral Colvin replied "No", and explained that raiders
might well attack vulnerable points (e,g* Port Kembla in
Australia) as well as tr£.dee
kUm In answer to a question by Mr. Ashy/5.n, Admiral Colvin
stated that Australia had been advised by the C.I*D0 to use
the same probable scale of attack as New Zealand,
1*5.     Commodore Horan stated that he considered that the
fact that Australia was defending Port ?4oresby '."'ould force the
Japanese to find a base further to the East, and that this
base would obviously be Fiji? into which they could walk
tomorrow.       From this base they would be able to menace
the trade of Australia and New Zealand-
10.
46. MB. BSHSNDSEN here interposed to ask if the United Kingdom
Delegation drew any distinction between the scaLe of attack before
and after the arrival of the fleet at Singapore.
47. *J)MI&,.I, COLVIN replied that,  though the intensity of attack
might be greater before, the scale would remain th6 same.
48. SIR ^.RTHUR L0N5M0RE then replied to Commodore Hofran' stating
that the question of the defence of Fiji was bound up with the scale
of attack.
49. SIH ^.HTHUR then went on to discuss the various scales of attack
and their application to Fiji, and, in particular, attack by armed
merchant cruisers in a hit-and-run raid.
50. C0MM0jX)RB HORi-N stressed the point that Fiji was the only
fuelling station for the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy outside
New Zealand, and also an important cable station on the ^11-Red Route
from Canada.    He considered that a garrison should be despatched before
the outbreak of war, because there would bo no escort for ships
available afterwards.
51. Lii.J0R"GEN3Ri*.L DUIGx-N agreed, but pointed out that this was a
matter for tho Government since no regular troops existed.
52. COLVIN said that, although he recognized the importance
of Fiji, he did not rate it as high as did the New Zealand Delegation,
because he considered that ovasive routeing would largely reduce the
threat to shipping,    ^ut he also pointed out that many of tho other
islands had suitable anchorages, although it would not be possible
for the enemy to live on the country as it would bo in Fiji.
53. GROTO-C^PT^IN SOUNDERS pointed out that if we could establish
a base in Fiji we could deny the use of the other islands to Japan.
54. The ADMIHiJj roplied that this point would be dealt with in a
later it em of tho ..genda.
11.
55. After some discussion, COMMODORE HORAN, in reply to
MAJOR-GENERAL MAOKESY„ said that it wa3 the view of the New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff that if we held Fiji we could keep the
other islands.
56. ADMIRAL CGLVIN then stated that Japan was known to
have fortified Palau and Truk, and that it was anticipated that
she had fortified also one island in the Marshall Group. This
would appear to "be a threat to the route of the American fleet
between Pearl Harbour, Honolulu and the Phillipines.
57- SIR ARTHUR LONGHORE then suggested that the whole of
Item (a) (1) of the AGENDA had been cleared up.     SIR RAGNAR
COLVIN agreed.
58. MR. NASH then raised the question of Western Samoa
and, after some discussion, it was agreed that Japan would not
gain much by an attack thereon.
59. SIR ARTHUR LONGMCI^ considered that if Fiji were properly
defended and had an air-striking force also this would help to
cover Western Samoa.
60. COLONEL STEVENS asked if the United Kingdom Delegation
had considered an intermediate scale of attack between actual
invasion and a tip-and-run raid.
61. ADMIRAL COLVIN replied that, although Australia was
raising an army of 70,000 men, he did not think that he, as a
member of the Service, could go beyond the officially envisaged
scale of attack.
62. MR. JONES then snoved that the discussion should proceed
to clause (b).
63. MAJOR-GENERAL DUIGAN stated that the strength of the
Fiji defence force was insufficient to protect Fiji and that, in
his opinion, a battalion of infantry could be in possession of
Suva a few hours after landing.     There were numerous gaps in the
reefs which had been worked by Japanese motor sampans on several
occasions, and he had no doubt that they had valuable information
regarding suitable landing places.
64.    MR. JONflS ..sked if aircraft could protect Fiji and
GHOUP CgggAIg s^UMDsas ropliod that ground forces would also be
necessary
65*    MR, N.*SH then raised the question of the New Hebrides and
Solomon Islands0
66. SIH K^BRY LTKH said that a paper on all the islands under his
jurisdiction, acs High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, was
being circulated to the Conference.
67. ^fter some discussion asked if it would be possible
to kick the Japanes-j out if "they gained possession of the islands.
SIR ARQHUR LONC&iOHB replied that the main object was to locate
the enerey.and that subsequently it was a. matter of uttacking them
with whatever forces were available,)
The Conference then adjourned until 4.15 p.m.
69. M:1l~J5^5£ -a-ised s. point in regard to procedure-   He considered
that, after goir.g right through the Agenda as at present, certain
matters could be referred to a Committee to prepare a report for the
nain Conference tc consider-*
70. SIR ARTHUR "LOKOMORS questLc.ied whether it was worth while taking
up the time of the Conference on matters capable of being settled by
a Committeer
MR. KtvSE explained that,so far as the pacific air routes were
concerned, it would be possible for the New Zealand Delegation to
give a curs cry account of what had been done, and then to discuss it.
72*   MR* J0KBS stated that it was understood that that matter was
to be held over until Captain Johnston1'* arrival on Monday*
73. The discussion was resumed on sub-clause (2* "Ships Trading
with the United Kingdom, Ifevi Zealand and Australian"
74. SIR ARJBUR IOKGM0BE sa^d that there was one point with regard to
(a) (1), (2) and (3), and he would like CTN^Ti &XKESY to read an
extract from a paper which dealt with the scale of attack on New Zealand*
13.
75«     GEMEKAIi Ivu'xCKSSy explained that he had some caterial which
threw some light on the matter,    it was one of the answers to the
New Zealand Delegation at the Imperial Conference of 1937. Dealing
with raids it said this:-
"The strength of a raiding party from a
single cruiser or armed merchant cruiser would
be unlikely to exceed 2C0 men, and the actual
scale of attack on any particular port or area
would probably be governed by the extent and
type of facilities which the enemy hoped to destroy."
The point was that the 200 men would be landed from one ship,
but there might be several Ships.    300 men was quite clearly not
the maximum.
76. MR. BERENDSEN: point ed out that the extract which had been read
came from the paper based on a ppecific naval strength which has not
been achieved.
77. iJ)MHUL COL VIM explained that it still might apply even if it
had been achieved*
78. MR. SCKMIT? then raised the question of the defence of Nauru
and Ocean Islands, and, after some discussion, SIR IUGNuR COLVIN
stated that it would be a hopeless defence policy that aimed at
making all these small islands seoure0   £he aim in to arm local
militia and make the taking oj~: them as unpleasant a job as possible
and to depend as far as wc can on our mobile forces to safeguard them.
79«   MR. JONGS then suggested that the Conference proceed to
sub-clause ( 2).
80. MR. SCHMITT asked for information as to the effect on trade should
ships be diverted to the Cape roate0
81. COMMODORE HORfeM explained that this should be avoided, if possible,
mainly due to fuel considerations^
82. SIR RAGNkg GOuVXN stated that the Admiralty would exercise control
over all British shipping in tim^ of war*
14.
Q3.       The position regarding Australian and New Zealand capabilities
as to the supply and arming of merchant ships was then discussed.
84>     SIR Rifcq&,R COLVIN explained the type of vessel that will be
required.
-
85. In roply to questions fiTOgRLL COLVIN stated that, in his opinion,
attacks on trade in Australian ana New Zealand waters were more
likely to be made by armed merchant cruisers tfian by submarines.
He expressed concern that New Zealand was unable to provide any armed
merchant cruisers, having regard to the importance of trade protection
in the Tasman Sea.
86. COMMODORE HORuN explained that there were no ships on the
New Zealand register that were entirely suitable for conversion to
armed merchant cruisers, and he expressed his concern as to possible
operations by enemy raiders immediately on the outbreak of war.
He cited the case of a German organisation for arming their merchant
ships, which mi^it have been used off tho Chilian coast hod war
broken out last September
87. ADMIft*L COLVIN explained that tho necessity for convoy in the
Pacific was unlikely, except in the case of troop transports.
88. With regard to evasive routoin^ in too pacific
COMMODORE HQH^N suggested that tho Navy Office, .^elbciirno, should
control the Tasman,and the Navy Officef Yi'allington. the waters to
tho East of New Zealand.
89. ADMIRAL COLVIN concurred in this suggestion*
The question of air assistance in tho defence of territories
was discussed.
90. xJ)MIR'*Tj COLVIN said that he looked upon aircraft as a most
valuable weapon for overseas reconnaissance,but pointed out that
they had inherent limitations, including their inability to "visit
and search", which is essential to establish the identity of vessels,
a*10 SIR ARTHUR LOlOMOgS explained the accepted policy for co-operation
between the three Servicor., where the work of ono is made more
effective by the help of another*
91. suggested statement for the Pa ess wa3 read *:y the Chairman, and
passed by the Conference, which then adjourned until Saturday,  15th ^pril
Annex to Notes of Proceedings on the First Day-
of Meeting of the Defence Conference, held on
_ _lUth April. 1939*
Provisional Agenda
(Second edition*!". *
D.C.12.
Item of Original
Agenda
Subject
Paper by Hew
Zealand Delega
tion.
1._Strategic Problems
a)
Possible lines of action by enemy
Powers against Bnpire interests in
the South V/estern Pacific in period
before arrival of naval reinforce-
ments, including:-
(i)   operations to capture bases
in the V/estern Pacific;
(ii)   nature and scale of possible
operations against Empire
Trade;
(iii)   nature and scale of possible
operations against Australian
and New Zealand territory.
(c)
(a)
(g)
Measures necessary to defend:-
(i)   Pacific Islands and Mandated
Territories, notably Fiji;
Tongar New Hebrides and
Solomon Islands;
(ii)    Ships trading with the United
Kingdom, New Zealand and
Australia;
(iii)   Australian and New Zealand
territories-
Most effective means of co-operation
with the United Kingdom in defence of
the British Commonwealth after pro-
viding for security in South Western
Pacific, including schemes for mutual
reinforcement*
Co-ordination of defence policy in
peace and war.
Possible effect of German demands
for Mandated Territories-
D.C.1.
D.C.2*
D.C.3.
D.C.5-
*   First edition v/as Paper D.C.8
2.
Item of Original
Agenda
Subject
Paper by New
Sealand Delega-
tion.
Supply Problems.
(e)
(f)
Sources of supply of equipment
after outbreak of war;
Scales of reserves of supplies,
including fuel and equipment;
(h)
Economic aspect of war, including
probable effect on trade and shipping* D. C. 6
Trans-Pacific Air
Route*
(J)
Policy in relation to Trans-Pacific
air route and United States activi-
ties in the Pacific*
D.C- 7c