Confidential
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1941
J. PA. n/»h,
1 r/u.fLffu\ c^fcc^/
My dear Lord Halifax:
I am enclosing for your information a paraphrase
of a secret message which the President has received
from Mr. Churchill.
Believe me
YJurk very sincerely,
Enclosure:
Paraphrase•
His Excellency
The Right Honorable
The Viscount Halifax, K.G.,
British Ambassador.
PARAPHRASE OP TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PROM:   American Embassy, London.
DATED: November 5, 1941
A. There Is attached an appeal for air assistance,
addressed to us both, from Chiang-Kai-Shek.   As to our
air strength at Singapore, you are fully familiar. How-
ever, if they could arrive in time, I should be prepared
to send pilots and even some planes.
B. A deterrent of the most general and formidable
character is needed now.   You spoke of gaining time when
we talked about this at Placentia and so far this policy
has been brilliantly successful.   However, although the
Japanese have not as yet taken a final decision and al-
though the Emperor appears to be exercising restraint,
our joint embargo is steadily forcing the Japanese to
choose between war and peace.
C. Should the Japanese go into Yunnan and cut the
Burma Road, as now appears probable, the consequences for
Chiang-Kai-Shek would be disastrous.   Not only would the
collapse of his resistance be a world tragedy, but there
would be left for the Japanese large forces for attack
either to the south or to the north.
D. 'He have received from the Chinese, as I believe
you have, an appeal to communicate a warning against an
attack in Yunnan to the Japanese.   It is my hope that you
might remind them that such an attack, aimed at China from
-2-
a region in which we have never recognized that the
Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be in
direct opposition to the clearly indicated attitude of
the United States.   Of course a similar warning would
be given by us.
E.   As we are so much tied up elsewhere, Japan will
not be deterred by any independent action on our pa*t.
In whatever course you choose, of course, we will stand
with you and do our utmost to back you.   In my opinion,
Japan is more likely to drift into war than to go in
headlong.   What are your views?
The Prime Minister received on November 2, 1941,
the following message from General Chiang Kai-shek:
Information in which I have complete confidence
shows that in order to take Kunming and to cut China's
lines of communication with Great Britain and the United
States of America, the Japanese are determined upon an
attack against Yunnan from Indochina.   An attack may be
expected very shortly as preparations are already on
foot.    In my estimation this is the first step in their
policy of expansion either to the south or to the north.
As much of the future lies in your hands I feel it my
duty and right to impress certain facts and aspects of
the situation upon you.
-3-
a. The Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack
In the rear once Kunming is taken.    I am sure you will
be the first to see that its capture is a first and nec-
essary step to free Japan for American enterprises and
not merely one objective of her war of aggression on
China-   The vital bearing of the coming battle upon the
safety of all the countries in the Pacific—upon your-
selves and ourselves alike—is apparent to you.
b. I need not tell you that you may count upon me
to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when
I tell you that it can be done by my armies. However,
you know as well as I that I have no air force, and
without an air force, what can our army do against
another that has air strength?   If the city falls,, China
will be cut off from supplies from outside, her armies
encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and
those of her other friends, as a glance at the map will
showy and furthermore, the morale of the Chinese armies
and people will be shaken to the core.     On the eastern
fronts where the help of our friends cannot directly
reach us, our morale has stood for more than four years.
A Japanese triumph on the one front where, as all know,
the armed forces of our friends are at hand, would gravely
menace that morale.       A real collapse of resistance
would be possible for the first time in our long war.
-4-
The five million men which China has kept in the field
for more than four years now have immobilized Japan's
man-power.   You, and all other friends of China, I am
sure, recognize the implications of this.    Japan would
be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole
might elsehwere if Kunming fell.   Therefore, not only
the victory or defeat of China, but the peace and security
of the Pacific hangs upon the outcome of this battle. It
may indeed be the determining point of the whole war. I
should be making no appeal to you if China had the air
force she needs because I should feel confident of my
ability to defeat the enemy.   It Is certain that Japan
will use her fine (group indecipherable) and I have
nothing I can call an air force to pit against what they
would bring to bear upon me.    Japan's power to enter upon
what I have called fresh enterprises will be much
diminished if her air force can be checked or even smashed
in this battle.   While her navy, it is true, will remain
to her, there is little she can do with it, lacking
strength in the air, and thus her schemes of expansion
would be ended.   Following that, political and economic
pressure could bring about her submission.   Let us not
therefore make the same mistakes as (group undecipherable:
question mark have) been made elsewhere In this war and
let Japan attack us one after the other as is their

-5-
intention-   A declaration of war by you upon Japan is
not what I have in mind.   It is merely (group undecipher-
able:   question mark endeavor to) leave you in no doubt
about the situation in which I find myself, to make it
clear that I an no match for the enemy in the air, to tell
you what this means, and to suggest a course of action.
While the American volunteer air force now under training
is good, it is not large.   The British air force in Malay
and American cooperation in support of the American
volunteer and existing Chinese air force constitute our
only hope.    If the British air force could cooperate as
a part of Chinese air force or assume the role of an
international volunteer force, the result would be to
save the Pacific and to save China.
At first glance you might feel that at a time when
you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the
Middle East this would involve you in a war with Japan.
As I see it (?).   In my belief Japan does not feel that
she ha3 the strength to attack so long as the resistance
of China continues.   However, once 3he is rid of this,
whether or not she is given a pretext by such action on
your part, she will attack you as and when it suits her.
The importance of British air action in Yunnan cannot be
minimized for the fate of the democratic cause will turn
upon events in North China.   The most critical phase of
China13 war of resistance has now arrived. British
and American willingness to cooperate in the defense of
Yunnan will determine primarily China's ability to
defend her approaches to Singapore and Burma.   We shall
be cut off from you and the whole structure of your own
air and naval coordination with America and the Nether-
lands East Indies will be gravely threatened in new ways
and from a new direction if the Japanese can break our
front here*
With all the strength at my command I wish to express
the feeling that v/isdom and foresight demand that China
be given the help that I have outlined.
In no other way can the defeat of Japan and the
success of countries now resisting aggression be ensured.
Your reply is awaited eagerly.
I