All that needs to be done about these last
letters from Tokyo and L.t. E. O., is that
Mr. Welles should be handed the attached
memorandum, which gives the substance of
Tokyo l.t. 2173 (1/60) and of papers 67 of
R. O. l.t. 6060 (1/64), and asked whether
Lt. C. F. approve the line which Sir R. Craigie
has been instructed to take with the Sea Lord
(see 4.6. l.t. 6009 - 1/65).
At a recent interview in Tokyo the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty's Ambassador that negotiations with the United States had now been proceeding since last April, and that his experience in such matters made him pessimistic about the outcome of so dilatory a process. In the Privy Council impatience was now taking the place of the hopes originally placed in the discussions, and it was therefore highly desirable to discover some way out before feeling became too exacerbated. Matters were being discussed which were of the utmost concern to British interests and Mr. Tojo said he was therefore somewhat surprised that His Majesty's Government were taking no part in the discussions. While he could understand that in the early stages we might prefer to have matters in the hands of the United States Government, a point had now been reached where a breakdown might have repercussions upon British interests. The Minister said he had a strong impression that, for reasons best known to themselves, the United States Government were deliberately dragging out the negotiations. If this were so it would of course be impossible for the Japanese Government to continue them.

Speaking for himself, Sir Robert Craigie told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he felt sure that there had been no desire in any quarter deliberately to drag out the negotiations. But as he understood the position, the United States Government had been unable to elicit sufficiently definite assurances and undertakings in regard to Japan's future.
future intentions, and this might lead to a hitch. The objective under discussion was an ambitious one — namely, the settlement of the situation as a whole — and it was obvious that a task of this magnitude would require time as well as patience on both sides. As regards the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the negotiations, Sir Robert Craigie suggested that it was one of helpful expectancy, and that while the Foreign Secretary was desirous of seeing a settlement reached which would be just to all the parties concerned, he was equally anxious not to intervene in any manner likely to hamper the discussions between the United States and Japan.

Upon receipt of the above report of his interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sir Robert Craigie was instructed to speak to him as follows.

Although His Majesty’s Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government towards a general settlement in the Far East. The British Government believe such a settlement to be in their own best interests as well as those of Japan and it is their earnest desire that it should be achieved. It cannot be expected however that all the giving should be on the British side, and no advantage is seen in entering upon negotiations unless some basis for/
for discussion can be agreed upon in advance which establishes principles upon which agreement will be sought. The British Government have been content to leave this part of the proceedings in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of the British position. Moreover the United States Government have assured the British Government (and it is believed that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that should actual negotiations become possible the British Government will at once be consulted. At that point the British Government will be very ready to collaborate with the United States and Japanese Governments in seeking a solution of their joint problems.

Sir R. Craigie was further authorised, at his own discretion, to urge upon the Japanese Government the advantage of a supreme effort to reach agreement with the United States, as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop in which it might no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
November 11th, 1941.