GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
Trinidad.
28lh December, 1940.
My Lord,
I have the honour to invite reference to the late Lord Lothian's
telegrams No. 2960 and No. 2961 of the 7th December to the Foreign
Office on the subject of United States bases in Trinidad and to give
the following summary of what passed at the interview referred to
therein. I should mention here that after studying the four
Memoranda which I had brought with me and which were enclcsed
with my Despatch of the 3rd December, 1940, to Your Lcrdship,
Lord Lothian had discussed the question very fully with me on the
previous day and had been sufficiently impressed by the facts of
the case to decide that it was necessary to give me this opportunity.
Besides the late Lord Lothian and myself there were present at the
interview on the British side the Naval Attache, Admiral Pott|
and the First Secretary, Mr. Hoyer Millar. The United States
delegation was composed of Mr. Hickerson of the State Department
(European Section), Captain Schurrman (Navy Department)
Colonel Crawfurd (War Department) and Admiral Greenslade.
The first three of these gentlemen are, I understand, members of
the Interdepartmental Committee referred to in Mr. Butler's
telegram No. 3106 of the 15th December to the Foreign Office.
2. The meeting opened with a few words from Lord Lothian,
who explained that he had thought it might be useful to give me
an opportunity of explaining informally the attitude of the
Government of Trinidad and the possible attitude of the people of
the Colony towards the proposals put forward by Admiral Greenslade
for the location of the United States bases, and then invited me to
speak. I started by saying that 1 understood it was rather an
unusual thing for the Governor of a British Colony to pay a visit to
the United States. If this really was so I was all the more pleased
to be one of the first to do so. My wife had been in Washington
a few months before with our youngest sen, who had just been
operated upon in St. Louis, and had told me so much, on her return,
of the extreme kindness of everyone there that I welcomed the
opportunity of making a personal visit. I then explained that,
while I represented His Majesty the King in Trinidad, I was in no
position to dictate either to the Government or the people of the
Colony. A British Colonial Governor was in no sense an autocrat.
It was his duty to consult the representatives of public opinion in
the Colony on all important matters and to interpret their views
whenever necessary to His Majesty's Government. I liked to think
that I was regarded by the people of Trinidad more as their friend
and counsellor than as a Governor, and it was as a democrat that
I was speaking to the representatives of a democratic Government.
I then described the people of the Colony, their loyalty to the
British Crown, their war effort, the diverse communities of which
they were made up, and the composition of the Executive and
Legislative Councils and of the Municipal bodies. I explained that
proposals were before Your Lordship for an amendment of the
Constitution on the general lines recommended by the Royal
Commission which had recently visited the West Indies, and
expressed the view that in making arrangements which were to hold
good for a century it would be prudent to bear in mind the degree
Till- Right Honourable
Lord Lloyd of Dolobran,
g.c.s.i., g.c.i.e., d.s.o.,
Colonial Office.
of self-government which might be attained by the people of the
Colony before the end of that long period. The guiding principle
that had informed the whole of my actions in the matter of the
proposed bases in Trinidad was that nothing should be done under
pressure of war conditions of a nature to impair Anglo-American
relations throughout the very much longer period that would
follow the conclusion of peace.
3. With regard to the question of urgency, I pointed out that
when representatives had been sent by the United States
Government to Trinidad only a week before the outbreak of war
to conclude secret arrangements for a seaplane base, the matter had
been arranged in thirty-six hours, even though this involved
obtaining the consent of what was not unfairly reported as being
a somewhat difficult body, namely the City Council of Port-of-Spain,
to hand back to the Colonial Government a much coveted area of
land in the heart of the Capital. I asked the United States
representatives to believe that I realised to the full the absolute
necessity of prompt decisions being taken in war time cn matters
affecting defence and the mutual interest of the British and United
States Governments. I told them that if I had been able to do a
similar lightning deal with Admiral Greenslade nothing would have
given me greater pleasure, and it hurt me to see the suggestion made
in certain American periodicals that the Government of Trinidad
did not appreciate the urgency of the situation but was holding
things up in order, to make the best possible bargain for the Colony.
4. The last general point that 1 impressed upon the United
States representatives before embarking upon details was that the
proximity of Trinidad to America naturally led the people of the
Colony to look up to the United States in a great many material
matters. For example, they regarded the United States as
leaders of the world in such matters as the construction of
automobiles, the provision of electric power, and every form of
public works. They read with interest of the vast schemes under-
taken by the United States Government in the way of reclamation
(such as that which was at the moment proceeding for the
Washington Airport), water works, dams, &c. They had been
very much impressed by the fact that schemes which had been
merely spoken of as dreams in Trinidad for the last 20 or 30 years
were now taking concrete shape under the guidance of the
distinguished American engineer who had generously offered his
services as Housing Commissioner and Town Planner at a nominal
salary for the period of the war. The people of Trinidad were
animated by the most friendly feelings towards the United States
of America and it was of the utmost importance that these feelings
should be cherished and developed to the greatest possible extent.
It was, therefore, vital that I should be in a position to explain to
them that any views put forward in their interest by the Trinidad
Government had been thoroughly and sympathetically examined
and that if the proposals of the Trinidad Government were not
accepted it was for unanswerable reasons which any sensible person
would at once accept.
5. I then asked whether the representatives would prefer that
I should first explain the Trinidad Government proposals or outline
the objections that were felt in Trinidad to certain of the proposals
put forward by the United States authorities. The general view
was that it would be more logical for mc to brgin by explaining
in what respect the proposals of the United States Government were
unacceptable and I accordingly did so, having first pointed out the
three reasons why I had not put forward my objections at the time
of Admiral Greenslade's visit. In the first place, my instructions
were to give the Mission every possible facility, which I had
endeavoured to do (at this point Admiral Greenslade interposed
with a hearty endorsement that he had been given all possible help),
but to incur no commitments of any kind ; as Admiral Grecnslade
would remember I had opened our final discussion by making it
clear that nothing I said should be interpreted as conveying either
acceptance or refusal of his requests. In the second place, I had
received no instructions at that time about the further facilities
which it is true I knew that the Mission were going to ask for, but
upon which His Majesty's Government had not, at that time,
expressed any opinion, namely an area for the cantonment of an
army of thirty to forty thousand men. In the third place.
Admiral Greenslade had naturally not been able to formulate his
proposals until the day before he was due to leave ; I had then to
discuss them with my advisers ; on the following clay there were
a number of questions I had to put to him in order to ascertain
exactly what they involved ; and his reply had only reached me
just as the ship was sailing.
6. I then went through the three Memoranda which formed
Enclosures 2, 3 and 4 to my Despatch of 3rd December, namely,
the Memorandum by Mr. Wharton on the subject of the suggestion
that the North-West peninsula should be leased to the United
States Government, that by Dr. Rankine on the health aspect of
the above proposal, and that by Mr. Brooks on the conditions in
the Long Stretch Reserve, Cumuto Reserve and environs. I asked
the Ambassador if he saw any objection to these Memoranda being
subsequently sent to the Committee so that they might have an
opportunity of refreshing their memories on the various points
raised, and it was arranged that this should be done. I found the
same difficulty during this conversation as I had experienced in
Trinidad in finding out what actual facilities the United States re-
quired both in the North-West peninsula and in the Cumuto Reserve.
With regard to the naval base, it apppcared that the number of
cruisers had risen from 4 to 6, but there still seemed to be the
same doubt whether there was to be a floating dock or not. In
reply to an enquiry from Mr. Hickerson, Admiral Greenslade
admitted that he would recommend that the risk should be taken
of allowing ships to lie in the anchorage without protection, as he
had no idea how long it would take for nets to be made available.
I also found the same reluctance to discuss the possibility of tempo-
rary arrangements being made to cover the war period, though I
had armed myself with reports, of which I enclose copies and of
which I communicated the contents over the table to the United „
States representatives, showing to what extent temporary facilitiesFi
could be made available both at Mucurapo and on the reclaimed
area in Port-of-Spain and in the vicinity of the Cumuto site, but
outside the area condemned by the Conservator of Forests. With
regard to the army and air facilities, Admiral Greenslade pointed
out, in the first place, that an air base would in any case require
a considerable area of land and that the eighteen square miles for
which he had asked could not fairly be ascribed to the new demand
for the accommodation of two army divisions. He said that he
wished to correct the incorrect impression that "naval and air
bases" meant naval bases and naval air bases ; it meant naval
bases and air bases both naval and military. With regard to the
area condemned by the Conservator of Forests he said that it had
never been intended to station troops there, but merely to use the
area for storage of supplies and ammunition. Upon my enquiring
at this point why in that case General Dcvers had insisted upon
the strip of land to the East of the Long Stretch, he replied that
hewas"dummcd"if he knew. He added that the demand for accom-
modation for troops had been reduced from 30/40,000 to 9,000, of
whom 3,500 would be airmen, and the Ambassador mentioned at
this stage that no objection would be raised to the leasing of an area
for land forces. It was not, however, made clear whether the area
of eighteen square miles that had been demanded would be corres-
pondingly reduced.
7. I then read out Mr. Grinnell's Memorandum, which formed
the first enclosure to my Despatch of 3rd December, and after
explaining it in great detail suggested that the United States Govern-
ment should send a competent representative down to examine
Mr. Grinnell's scheme and present an agreed report with him and
Mr. Beard in order to satisfy the people of Trinidad that it had
received proper consideration. I said that I made no claim to be
an engineer but that I had a great respect for the opinions of
Mr. Grinnell and Mr. Beard and that it did seem to me reasonable
to ask that their viewsshould be examined with rather more care than
was possible during the visitof the Greensladc Mission. I pointed out
that the objections raised by Commander Bragg on the ground of the
unsuitability of the soil to bear heavy weights had already been
disposed of by subsequent boring, and it seemed to me that further
investigation might still more strongly bear out the views of my
advisers. Alternative!}', I was ready to send Mr. Grinnell and
Mr. Beard to Washington to discuss the matter with United States
engineers. Neither of these proposals found favour with the United
States delegation. Capt. Schurrman said that he was a dredging
man and pointed out various difficulties in the way of dredging a
channel to the Caroni swamp, none of which when I related
them on my return to Trinidad carried any conviction with
Mr. Grinnell or Mr. Beard. Upon my asking whether it was true
that there were two large dredgers which could complete the work
in the time estimated, I was told that there were, in fact, two such
dredgers, one of which was on the Pacific coast and the other in
New York Harbour but that it would be very difficult to move
them in the open sea. I then said that Mr. Grinnell was under the
impression that there was a powerful dredging craft on the
Mississippi. Capt. Schurrman replied that this was one of the two
mentioned above and that it had been moved from the mouth of
tlie Mississippi to New York Harbour, presumably by the open sea.
The question of expense was then raised by Mr. Hickerson, who
explained that the people of the United States had unfortunately
assumed that they would be called upon to incur no expenditure
upon the bases in view of the fact that fifty destroyers had been
handed over in exchange for them. The Ambassador at once
pointed out that the Agreement of the 2nd September had made
the position perfectly clear, which Mr. Hickerson readily admitted.
He repeated however that the American public were under the
impression that no further money would have to be provided, and
appeared to anticipate some difficulty in removing it. I then threw
out the tentative suggestion that if their own proposals were
accepted the Trinidad Government might be prepared indue course to
refund to the United States Government the difference between the
actual cost of their operations in the Caroni area and an agreed
estimate of all the operations that they would otherwise have carried
out in the neighbourhood of the North-West peninsula and the
Cumuto area, but this suggestion was brushed aside.
8. My explanations, of which this is necessarily an imperfect
record, took nearly two hours to make and were listened to with
the greatest patience and good humour. When I had finished,
Mr. Hickerson told the Ambassador that the position was that the
President had accepted the recommendations of the Greenslade
Mission and that he did not see what the Committee could do about
the question of the choice of site. They had no power to consider
this at all, since their terms of reference were merely to advise the
President on all questions that might subsequently arise in relation
to the bases. I asked the Ambassador whether he knew that the
President had accepted the recommendations of the Greenslade
Mission and whether he had seen these recommendations, but he
had not, and I do not know whether their text has yet been
communicated to the British Embassy at Washington.   If it
has, I should be grateful if I might be furnished with a copy.
Mr. Hickerson did however undertake that the four Memoranda
would be carefully considered and answered in detail in a form
which I could if I wished lay upon the table of the Legislative
Council of this Colony.
9. As reported in my telegram No. 892 of the I Oth December,
I came away from the conference satisfied that it was virtually
certain that the United States Government were not prepared to
accept the Caroni alternative wholeheartedly or to use their full
resources to make a success of it, but I was under the impression,
as reported in my telegram No. 924 of the 21st December, that my
personal explanation had removed any suspicion from the minds
of the United States authorities that the Trinidad Government were
actuated by any motive other than to secure cordial relations
between the two Governments for the next hundred years, and
the best arrangement in the interest of both parties. Both the
Ambassador and Mr. Hickerson were kind enough to say that
they thought that the views of the people of this Colony had been
well expressed and there was, so far as I could see, no trace of
ill-feeling on the part of any individual present at the meeting. It
is true that at one stage Mr. Hickerson remarked that in the whole
course of his researches into the history of naval bases he had found
no precedent for the construction of an artificial naval base where
a natural one was available. To this I replied that I doubted
whether there had ever been an analogous case where one Power
had agreed to the establishment in a small island of a naval base by
the other and the only natural site was one the adoption of which
might lead to difficulties between them. I see from Mr. Butler's tele-
gram No. 3261 of the 24th December to the Foreign Office that the
Secretary for the Navy has quite recently expressed resentment at
the fact that the suggestion was made that^the United States com-
bined base might be situated in an area reavfimed from the Caroni
swamp. In view of the extreme cordiality that marked the pro-
ceedings and the patient and appreciative hearing that was given
to my arguments, it does not seem to me credible that any of
the individuals who were present at the meeting can have harboured
any resentment. It was unfortunate, and has since turned out to
be all the more unfortunate in view of the lamented death of
Lord Lothian, that the Secretary for the Navy was not in
Washington at the time and did  not attend the meeting.
It is also unfortunate that President Roosevelt was unable to extend
his tour of the Caribbean frcm Martinique to Trinidad, as I am
confident that if I had had the opportunity of discussing the question
with him in the general terms authorised in   Your Lordship's
telegram No. 884 of the 4th December and subsequently agreed
upon more specifically with the late Lord Lothian as foreshadowed
in  paragraph 3 of His  Lordship's telegram  No.   #955 of the
7th December to the Foreign Office, any feeling of resentment that
might previously have existed in his mind would certainly have
been dissipated. The last words that Admiral Greenslade him-
self said to me before leaving the room were "Almost thou
persuadest me".
10. I have sent copies of this despatch with enclosures to the
Charge d'Affaires, Washington, and to the Commander-in-Chief,
America and West Indies Station.
I have the honour to be.
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
HUBERT YOUNG,
Governor.