IN a conversation with the United States Ambassador to-day I told Mr. Winant that we felt considerable anxiety as to the effect which Mr. Matsuoka's tour and the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact might be expected to have on Japanese policy. At best it must discourage those in Japan who had resisted further military adventures, and we had from several sources disquieting information as to Japanese intentions in the near future (this information has been passed on to you for the United States Government). In the circumstances it was essential to consider whether any joint action was open to us to give pause to Japanese plans.

2. I then spoke to the Ambassador in the sense of my telegram No. 2105 to you. I asked Mr. Winant whether, if he concurred, he would support your approach to the United States Government. Mr. Winant appeared to agree with our view of the Far Eastern situation.

3. We then spoke of Singapore, when I told him that I had the impression from what I had read of the Staff talks that the United States naval authorities did not perhaps fully appreciate the political significance of Singapore. Mr. Winant at once agreed and said that there was need to make the United States military and naval authorities Singapore-minded. His own impression was that the President and Mr. Hull were both anxious to concentrate more important naval forces at Manila, but that the naval authorities were holding back. I think that Mr. Winant will give us all the help that he can in respect of the declaration.

I am, with great truth and respect,
My Lord,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)