I spoke to Mr. Hull this morning on the lines of the attached aide-memoire, which I left with him. The Australian Minister accompanied me.

Mr. Hull began by saying that he thought there was some difference of view between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on this matter. The United States Government were disposed to feel that Germany had such a stranglehold on France that it was difficult to do much about Indo-China, and that in the same way Japan had her claws so deeply into Thailand as to make it doubtful whether that position could be restored.

Both Casey and I told him that we did not think there was necessarily any difference of view between the two Governments in this matter. We fully recognised how deeply Japanese claws were stuck into Thailand, but the interests involved were so vital that it seemed essential to make every effort to hold the situation. These efforts might or might not succeed, but we should never forgive ourselves if we didn't make them.

Mr. Hull became more sympathetic to the ideas outlined in F.O. telegram 2101 of April 18th, and concluded by saying that he would certainly consider our proposals in the light of the several aide-memoires we had furnished, and the United States Government would certainly do their best to take any action that they deemed useful.

It was, however, still evident that he thought the position had perhaps gone too far, and he said that he anticipated that we should shortly see the announcement of some military, economic and political partnership between Japan and Thailand.