BRITISH   PASSPORT  CONTROL OFFICE.
CABLE;
ROOM 757. 25 BROADWAY
SUBSIDED.   NEW YORK.
NEW YORK.
NEW YORK
MOST SECRET.
15th Uay 19U-
Dear Hoyer-Miller,
The attached is the opinion of the Ecuadorian '/dnister
in Vichy on the Husso-Japanese Pact vfhich has been obtained
from a most secret source.
It should be noted that the vievrs v/ere expressed in
mid-April of this year.
F.R. Hoyer-Miller Esq., C.M.G
British Embassy,
WASHINOION.
c.v.o
V.TB/PV.D
EFFECT OF THIi KUSSO-JAPAN FACT.
As was very natural, the pact and the accompanying declaration has been
the subject of much comment, sometimes contradictory in the countries of this
continent.   In those of the so-called "AXIS" the press and Government welcome
it as a three power pact, the certainty of success of the politics of the
"new order" a diplomatic triumph which proves more than ever the British
defeat.   For the Allies it is merely an instrument of vain diplomatic activity
without real force or meaning and of no more object than to stimulate the
faith of the nations already worn out by the war and the easy victories.
The people are disillusioned by these solemn documents which the Governments
disregard or contradict as soon as they become useful.
It is said, however, that the Russian promise leaves greater liberty of acti
to the Japanese Empire in Asia:   it seems that such is the opinion of Washington^
and London who are more than ever determined to arrest any bellicose undertaking
by Japan.   It seems to us that the promise of neutrality, in the event of one
or other parties being the object of hostile military measures, destroys the pact
of the value and scope of the Trhee Power Pact which obliges Japan, Germany,
Italy and adherent countries to intervene immediately.   If for its own account
or in agreement with other powers Russia intervenes in the conflict against
Germany, Japan could not fulfil the pact engagements, the latter signature having
already cancelled the previous engagement.
This supposition is not unlikely since Germany has not kept step with
Moscow:   it has brusquely demanded economic concessions, has exercised pressure
in such a way as to disgust the whole world and reveal the rancour of Stalin1 s
Government for a procedure which can be qualified as blackmail.   In this way it
obtained the last commercial agreement which displeases Russia.   The advance in
the Balkans, the occupation of Bulgaria, the attack on Yugoslavia, the possible
menace to Turkey, the possibility or probability of a British victory modifies the
opinion and projects of Moscow in such a way that it would be an error not to
consider the change and foresee the consequences.
Germany is concentrating some of its finest divisions on the Eastern
frontier" and well informed circles repeat the opinion of one of the confidential
diplomatists of Moscow who speaks of the probability of a conflict between the <«•
two countries.     The inquietude of this Bolshevik Russia, which thinks like Peter
the Great or Catherine 11 when it concerns international matters, has already
manifested itself:    it disapproved the transit of German troops across Bulgaria;
it accentuated the reprobation to Hungary when she attacked Yugoslavia and accordi
to rumours, actively negotiated with Turkey, which is not very tranquilising
in view of all that is occuring in the Balkans;   who knows whether this may not
be the precursor of some demand for free passage for German troops.
Russia, Japan and other interested countries affirm, naturally, that the
new pact is for the limitation of the war, a pact of peace which all should
celebrate.
Itiis to be feared that in the conversations between Moscow and Japan,
they considered the situation and present conditions of the Dutch East Indies,
a constant and tremendous temptation for the Nippon Empire which will find no
consolation if, in the event of a "change in European events, Holland returns
to her previous status. It would not be surprising if Stalin were to incite
immediate occupation, since it finds advantage in all disorder or conflict,
and in the event of finding herself involved in the war the Japanese
Guarantee tould be very useful.
It is said that Matsuoka proposed the transformation of the Three Power
Pact into a Quadruple Treaty which the Government of Moscow denied, as
although it was always ready to offer neutrality and even friendship, it would
conserve its liberty of action in China.   Actually it would seem that the
Soviets think of continuing to aid Marshall Chiang-Kai-Shek in his valorous
resistance which is withholding Japan from aggression to Great Britain, U.S.A.
end the Dutch East Indies.
Vi'hatever value the new document may have, recognition must be given to the
good result obtained by the Japanese Minister, which is much more notable
when it is remembered that it is the first time that a Chanceller of the Far
East has come to Europe to negotiate, not only as an equal to the Aryans
but with a certain pre-eminence.
The three most powerful men of the Continent, Hitler, Mussoline and Stalin
rendered him homage before an amazed public.   On b'f the most respected, Marshal
Petain, invited him to come to France, an invitation which for reasons of
time and special circumstances Matsuoka could not accept,   *hese are
successes that arouse a certain rellection and consideration regarding the state
of -^rope.
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