H.E.
Z
5
I
i
z
UJ
t
E
UJ
CD
O
2
I
O
z
4
FPHf<:HK
When you see Mr. Welles, perhaps
you could give him the attached note which
summarizes the steps which the U.K.
authorities are contemplating putting into
force if Japan makes a move into southern
Indo-^hina.    At the same time perhaps you
could explain that the authorities in
London were most interested to get your
telegram No. 3255 (the draft of which is
attached) summarizing Mr. Welles' explanation
of the steps which the U.S.G. contemplated.
London are naturally most anxious to work in
step with Washington in the matter and
would naturally welcome any action parallel
to their own which the U.3.G. felt disposed
to take.   At the same time, however, they
feel that it is necessary that "both
Governments should always hear in mind the
importance of not taking action which might
drive Japan to desperation and encourage
them to take even more violent action to the
southward-    With a view to further
considering the matter, the authorities in
London would "be very grateful for some more
detailed information regarding the exact
intentions of the American authorities. For
example, is it the intention that the
contemplated embargo against Japan should be
imposed in one or more stages, exactly what
commodities will be affected by the export
embargo, and is it contemplated taking any
steps to freeze Japanese assets in the U.S.?
The authorities in London are
disposed to agree in thinking that an attempt
to secure bases in Thailand is less imminent
than a similar attempt in respect of Indo-
china.    They would, however, be interested
to know the reasons for which Mr. Welles
drew a distinction between the two cases in
his conversation on July llth»
July 11+th, 19W.