WASHINGTON
July 25, 1941.
My dear Lord Halifax:
I am enclosing herewith for your information
a paraphrase of a message received here today for
the President from the Prime Minister.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM
FROM:     American Embassy, London.
TO: Secretary of State, Washington.
DATED:   July 25, 1941.
The message from you concerning the tank programme
was most gratefully received.    we are very happy to
have, in the critical months ahead, this addition to
our tank resources.    Our plan ought to be to enlarge the
production of medium tanks, even though curtailing the
production of light tanks, under the longer term policy,
since our experience proves that modern battle requires
vehicles of the more heavily armed and armoured type.
However, your own air programme should not be hampered
by this action.
Second.    Your suggestion regarding the training
in the United States of men for our tank corps interests
me very much.    It is being examined here and as soon as
we can we will advise you of our views.
Third.    Our war plans for the fighting of 1943 as
well as for the fighting of 1942 have been receiving our
consideration here.    It is necessary, after making provi-
sion for the security of essential bases, to plan the
forces required for victory on the largest scale. The
intensification of propaganda and blockade must,   in broad
outline, be our first aim.   We must then subject Italy
and Germany to bombardment from the air of ceaseless
and ever growing intensity.   An internal collapse or
convulsion may occur as a result of these measures. Plans
should also be formulated however for aiding the peoples
conquered, when the correct time arrives, by means of
landing armies of liberation.   It will be essential for
this purpose to have large quantities of tanks as well
as of ships able to transport them and land them direct
upon beaches.    The required adaptation of some of the
immense quantities of merchant ships being constructed
by you in order to fit them for fast ships capable of
landing tanks should not be difficult for you.
Fourth. We ought not lose any time at all, if you
agree with this broad conception of bringing Germany to
submission, inJ
(A) agreeing to an appraisal of our joint require-
ments of primary war materiel; e.g., tanks, aircraft, and
so on.
(B) considering therefore in what manner such require-
ments may be met by the production of our two countries.
Fifth.    My suggestion is that meanwhile our combined
staffs in London should as soon as possible begin working
on (A), and that (B) should be proceeded with thereafter
by our technical experts.