

SECRET

August 20th, 1941

SECRET

2394/11/41

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

See by Mr. ...  
Mr. ...  
21.8.

SECRET

Mr. ...  
Mr. ... again  
12/8

Mr. ...

I took Mr. Duff Cooper to see the President this morning.

Talking of Japan Mr. Roosevelt said it had been agreed with Mr. Churchill at their recent meeting that a warning should be given to Japan in the terms of that recorded in H.E's telegram No. 3849. He said that Mr. Churchill had been in favour of a plain ultimatum which he thought would stop Japan. The President said he agreed to the extent that he thought there was a three to one chance Mr. Churchill was right but what was to be done if the Japanese nevertheless did not give way. Were we in a position to follow up our ultimatum?

As on the contrary it seemed necessary for us to gain time before the formula <sup>employed</sup> ~~implied~~ by the President <sup>in his conversation with Jap. Amb. on Aug 18</sup> was agreed upon; it was also agreed that this should be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador in the form of a memorandum. When Mr. Welles reached Washington on the 16th or 17th he found that meanwhile the Japanese Ambassador had made a suggestion about a meeting between Prince Konoye and the President.

When therefore the President received Mr. Nomura he first handed to him a memorandum in the sense agreed with Mr. Churchill, emphasizing it orally, and then asked Mr. Nomura if he had anything to say. The Japanese Ambassador made the suggestion for the Japanese-American meeting, whereupon the President handed him another memorandum in the sense recorded in H.E's telegram referred to above. He said that the next move was up to the Japanese and he would await their answer to the proposal

about/

about the status quo. The President doubted whether the answer would be very satisfactory, but he hoped that he was gaining time.

Mr. Duff Cooper asked whether the U.S. warning against the Japanese moving further South contemplated a move into Thailand and the President said in a positive tone that it did. I propose to mention this to Mr. Welles and to see what he says.

I will also ask Mr. Welles for the text of the two memoranda.

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PS.  
The President, <sup>also</sup> said that the reply of the Jap<sup>s</sup> to the neutralization proposal had made the condition, amongst others, that a special status for Japan in Indo-China sh<sup>d</sup> be recognized. Puro had told Jap<sup>s</sup> Amb<sup>s</sup> that this was non-sense. Referring to the economic side of this proposal he had said that all w<sup>s</sup> have equal status.

RC

Now see tel to FO.

-132 N<sup>o</sup> 3881 of Aug 21.

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