THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet.  August 1941.
MOST SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (41) 202.
A ugust 20, 1941.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET.
MEMORANDUM.
I GIVE below, for the information of the Cabinet, some account of the
conversations which took place at my recent meeting with President Roosevelt.
This indicates, in broad outline, the course of the discussions and the final results
achieved under the various headings. To it is appended, in Annex III, a report
on the conversations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff.
I also attach (Annex IV) a diary and record of the personnel of the Mission.
I would draw special attention to the holding of Divine Service on the quarter-
deck of H.M.S. Prince of Wales, attended by President Roosevelt, with his staff
of officers and representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and
Marines.  All were impressed with this episode.
w. s. c.
August 20, 1941.
i
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B
JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN  DECLARATION  OF PRINCIPLES.
AT one of our first conversations, the President told me that he thought it
would be good if we could draw up a joint declaration laying down certain broad
principles which guide our policies along the same road.
Wishing to follow up this most hopeful suggestion. I gave him, on
August 10. a tentative outline of such a declaration.  The text was as follows :—
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister,
Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing
for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German
aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right
to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in
the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better
future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see.no territorial changes that do not accord with
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples tc choose the form of Govern-
ment under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights
of freedom of Speech and Thought, without which such choice must be
illusory;
Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution
of essential produce, not only within their territorial boundaries, but between
the nations of the world;
Fifth, they seek a Peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi
tyranny, but by effective international organisation will afford to all States
and Peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds, and
of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or the need
of maintaining burdensome armaments.
At our meeting on the morning of August 11 the President gave me a
revised draft (Annex I), which we took as a basis of discussion.
Before examining this document the President explained that his idea was
that there should Iw issued simultaneously in Washington and London, perhaps
on the 14th August, a short statement to the effect that the President and the
Prime Minister had held conversations at sea. that, they had been accompanied
by members of their respective staffs; that the latter had discussed the working
out of aid to the democracies in the Lease and Lend Act; that these naval and
military conversations had in no way been concerned with future commitments
Other tnan as authorised by Act of Congress.
3
I he statement would proceed to say that the Prime Minister and the
President had discussed certain principles relating to the civilisation of the world
and had agreed on a statement of them.
I deprecated the emphasis which a statement on these lines would lay on the
absence of commitments. This would be seized on by Germany and would be a
source of profound discouragement to the neutrals and to the vanquished. I
very much hoped, therefore, that the President could confine the statement to the
positive portion which dealt with the question of aid to the democracies, more
especially as the President iiad guarded himself by the reference to the Lease-
and-Lend Act.
The President accepted this.
There followed a detailed discussion of the revised text of the declaration.
Several minor alterations were easily agreed.
The chief difficulties were presented by Points 4 and 7. especially the former.
With regard to this. I pointed out that the words " without discrimination "
might be held to call in question the Ottawa agreements, and I was in no position
to accept them. This text would certainly have to be referred to the Govern-
ment at home and, if it was desired to maintain the present wording, to the
Governments in the Dominions. I should have little hope that it would l>e
accepted. Mr. Sumner Welles indicated that this was the core of the matter, and
that this paragraph embodied the ideal for which the Administration had striven
for the past nine years. I mentioned the Hritish experience in adhering to Free
Trade for eighty years. I said that, if the words " with due respect for their
existing obligations" could be inserted, and if the words " without discrimina-
tion " could disappear, and " trade " be substituted for " markets," I should be
able to refer the text to His Majesty's Government with some hope that they
would be able to accept it.
As regards Point 7, I pointed out that while I accepted this text, opinion
in England would be disappointed at the absence of any intention to establish an
international organization of peace after the war. I promised to try to find a
suitable modification, and later in the day I suggested to the President the
addition to the second sentence of the words " pending the establishment of a
wider and more permanent system of general security."
I telegraphed these amendments for immediate submission to the Cabinet.
I had not finished dictating the telegram much before 2 p.m., and that I should
have had in my hands within the next 12 hours the Cabinet's most helpful
reply reflects the utmost credit on all concerned.
The Cabinet, in their reply, suggested a further variant of Point 4, and
desired the insertion of a new paragraph between Points 4 and 5.
Meanwhile. I had heard that the President had accepted a!! the amendments
which I had submitted to him on 11th August.
On 12th August, about noon. I went to see the President, to agree with
him the final form of the Declaration.  I was accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook,
who had arrived that morning.   I put to the President tfie Cabinet's revised
version of Point 4, but he preferred to adhere to the phrasing already agreed,
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i
and I did not like to press him further on the point. He readily accepted the
insertion of the new paragraph desired by the Cabinet. A number of verbal
alterationswereagreed.andthelJeclaration'was then in its final shape (Annex II).
It was only after this that I received the telegram (Abbey 35) giving the
results of the further meeting of the Cabinet on the morning of 12th August.
This telegram made clear the reasons for the misgivings which the Cabinet felt
on the subject of Point 4. But I feel that the final text with the words " with due
respect for their existing obligations " governing, as they do. the whole para-
graph, sufficiently safeguards our position.
The profound and far-reaching importance of this Joint Declaration is
apparent.
The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with
a belligerent Power in making such a Declaration is astonishing.
The inclusion in it of a reference to " the final destruction of the Nazi
tyranny" (this was based on a phrase appearing in my original draft) amounts
to a challenge which in ordinary times would imply warlike action.
Finally, not the least striking feature is the realism of the last paragraph
where there is a plain and bold intimation that, after the war. the United States
will join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order.
FAR EAST.
Our hope had been to induce the President to give a strong warning to Japan
against any further encroachment in the South-West Pacific, and to give to us
and the Dutch an assurance that we should have the armed support of the
United States in the event of our being attacked by the .Japanese.
Accordingly on the 10th August I handed to the President the following
short memorandum proposing a system of " parallel " communications to the
Japanese Government:—
Declaration by Untied States Government that—
1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-West Pacific
would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be
compelled to take counter-measures even though these might lead to war
between the United States and Japan.
2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in
consequence of such counter-measures or of their support of' them, the
President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give
aid to such Power.
Declaration by I/is Majesty's Government.
Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading :—
" . . . . their support of them. His Majesty's Government would
give all possible aid to such Power."
5
Declaration by Dutch Government.
Same as that by His Majesty's Government.
Keep the Soviet Government informed.   It will be for consideration
whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.
On the following morning, the llih August. I discussed these proposals with
the President.
It was clear at once that, on consideration, the President had decided that
he would l>e unable to give an assurance that he would go to Congress for authority
to give armed support.
He referred to certain negotiations that had been proceeding with the
Japanese Government, culminating in a set of proposals by the latter. The
Cabinet will have already seen the telegram in which I summarised these
proposals. It is true that they included an assurance that Japan would station
no further troops in the Soutn-Western Pacific area except French Indo-China,
and a contingent promise of ultimate withdrawal from the latter. But a number
of the conditions attached were obviously wholly unacceptable.
The President declared that he was under "no illusion as to the value or the
sincerity of these proposals, but he thought it would be useful to pursue a
discussion of them, if only for the sake of gaining, say, a month's time.
He assured me that the economic measures against Japan would meanwhile
be maintained in full force, and he seemed to think that this was the most that
he could do. He did not offer to give any further warning to Japan, and I think
that in this he may have Iwen under the influence of ifr. Sumner Welles, who
seemed to be of the opinion that the time for warnings was past.
I pointed out that the Japanese promise to withdraw from Indo-China was
conditional on "the settlement of the China incident." This plainly indicated
that the Japanese intention was to attack Yunnan northward from Indo-China
and to cut the Banna Road. It would, therefore, be essential to make it clear
that a condition of continuing discussions with the Japanese would be that they
should not use Indo-China as a base for operations against China.
The President read it v agreed to this. He explained that, when the
discussions were resumed, "he would renew his proposals for the neutralisation
of boln Siam and Indo-China.
Most important of all. he finally agreed to end his communication to the
Japanese Ambassador with a warning, in the words which I had given him on
the previous day, that any further encroachment by Japan "would produce a
situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take
counter measures, even though these might lead fo war between the United States
and Japan." He proposed to add that it was, of course, obvious that, the Soviet
being a friendly Power, the United States Government would be similarly
interested in any conflict in the North-West Pacific area.
I authorised the President to inform Japan that in this matter His Majesty's
Government were in accord with the United States Government and would
co-operate fully with them.
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fi
The President said that he would at once telegraph to Mr. Cordell Hull to
arrange for the Japanese Ambassador to call upon him on his return to
Washington, and to tell his Excellency that he would have an important message
to deliver. He would see the Ambassador as soon as possible, and would give him
the message in writing.
I later asked for a copy of this message, hut I was told, at the time of our
departure, that it had not yet been drafted.
The President, however, assured me, on more than one occasion, that he
would include in it the final words which I have quoted above. Evidently this
is the crucial part of the message, and I am confident that the President will not
tone it down. He has a copy of the record of our conversation in which this
wording is reproduced. Mr. Sumner Welles undertook that a copy of the draft
of the message would be given as soon as possible to His Majesty's Ambassador
in Washington.
Even taken by itself this warning should have a considerable deterrent effect
on Japan. And when we remember that the Japanese will already have suffered
the shock of the Anglo-American joint declaration, I think we may hope that
they will pause before proceeding to further outrage.
ATLANTIC ISLANDS.
The President stated that he had indications from certain quarters that a
German move might be made into the Peninsula about the 15th September. It
would be possible for his forces, destined for the Azores, to be ready by approxi-
mately the same date; that is to say. it would take three weeks to embark them
and five to six days to get the ships there. The President had received a note
from Doctor Salazar, dated the 29th July, acknowledging his own communica-
tion, in which he had given assurances concerning respect for Portuguese
Sovereignty over the islands. From a passage in this note, the President had
inferred that Portugal would be ready to involve the aid of the United States if.
in certain circumstances. His Majesty's Government were unable to assist. The
President said that in his view the way to proceed would be for His Majesty's
Government to intimate to Doctor Salazar that they, owing to their preoccupa-
tion elsewhere, would be unable to send him the assistance promised, and to ask
whether he would therefore accept the assistance of the United States. If
Doctor Salazar agreed, he would have to inform the United States that he would
accept their assistance, together with a token contingent from Brazil. The
President explained that it was essential for his own purposes that he should
have a direct request from Doctor Salazar.
I said that we must recognise that the Operation " Pilgrim " might fire
the whole train in the Peninsula. We must therefore have simultaneously a
naval force to protect the Azores against forestalling German action pending
the entry of American forces.  The President pointed out that the United States
Government would be unable to send forces to the Azores and to the Cape Verde
Islands simultaneously. Moreover, there was this difference, that the former
were in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the latter were east of 26 degrees.
He might be able to work them into a scheme, but would make no definite promise
here and now. He added that, unlike Operation "Pilgrim," the occupation
of the Azores could be done in any month of the year.
It was agreed that the first'step would l>e "for His Majesty's Government
to inform the United States Government that they had warned Doctor Salazar of
the possibility that they would be precluded from giving Portugal the assistance
promised.
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC DEFENCE PLAN No. 4.
A Plan for early assistance by the United States Navy in the Battle of the
Atlantic had previously been worked out and, as the President now stated that
the United States were ready to implement this plan, the necessary steps to put it
into force were agreed upon.
At an early date (it is hoped by the 1st September) the United States Navy
will take over the responsibility for the safety of our North Atlantic Convoys
to the West of 26u West. Thev will be assisted by units of the Royal Canadian
Navy. With the exception oi" the occasional escorts necessary for our troop
convoys, we shall thereby be enabled to withdraw the majority of the units of the
Royal Navy now in the Western Atlantic for employment in other areas.
This unparalleled gesture of friendship by a neutral Power is to be made
under the guise of protection for United States communications with Iceland (C).
The measures taken will continue to l>e guided by our own experienced Officers.
All details were worked out and agreed in detail by the Naval authorities.
W. S. C.
22827]
r'2
Annex I.
JOINT DECLARATION.
(Revised draft handed to the Prime Minister by President Roosecelt,
August 11. 1941.)
THE President of the United Slates of America and the Prime Minister.
Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in
the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes
for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the
freely expressed wishes of the |>eoples concerned.
'Fhird, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live; and they wish to see self-government restored
to those from whom it has been forcihlv removed.
Fourth, they will endeavour to further the enjoyment by all peoples oi
access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the
raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic pros|>erity.
Fifth, they hope to see established a peace, after the final destruction of the
Nazi tyranny, which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in security
within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance to all peoples that
they may live out their lives in freedom from fear.
Sixth, they desire such a peace to establish for all safety on the high seas
and oceans.
Seventh, they believe that all of the nations of the world must l>e guided
in spirit to the abandonment of the use of force. Because no future peace can
be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed bv nations
which threaten, or may threaten, to use force outside of their frontiers, thev
believe that the disarmament of such nations is essential. Thev will further the
adoption of all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving
peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
Annex II.
JOIXT DECLARATION' BY Till-; PRESIDENT AND THE
PRIMK MINISTER.
August 12, 1941.
THE President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister,
Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in
the national policies of their res|>ective countries on which thev base their hopes
for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the
freely expressed wishes of the i>eoples concerned.
Third, they respect the right of all i>eoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have l>een forcibly deprived of them.
Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations,
to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of
access, on equal terms, to the trade and to t|ie raw materials of the world which
are needed for their economic prosperity.
Fifth, they desire to bring alxmt the fullest collaboration between all nations
in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards,
economic advancement and social security.
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see
established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the
men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and
oceans without hindrance.
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well
as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no
future pence can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be
employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of
their frontiers, they believe, ponding the establishment of a wider and more
permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of sucli nations is
essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures
which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.*
Annex III.
BRITISH-AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STAFF DISCUSSIONS.
THE following is a summary of the ground covered by the Chiefs of Staff
discussions with the Americans :—
General Points.
2. During the three days at Placcntia Hay, three joint and a number of
individual discussions were held between the First Sea Lord, C.I.G.S., and
V.C.A.S. on our side, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral King, C.-in-C, Atlantic Fleet. Rear-Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval
War Plans, General Marshall. Chief of Staff, and Major-General Arnold. Army
Air Corps, on the American side.
• The text of the Joint Declaration was subsequently agreed by telephono with Sit
Majesty's Embassy at Washington (Telegram 8798 from Washington) and a number of
Alterations made. These were all verbal, except the omission of the word " moro " in line 5 of
paragraph 8.
10
3. The discussions were conducted in a frank and friendly atmosphere. The
Americans, while ready to listen to our point of view, took every opportunity of
impressing upon us the many problems and difficulties which confronted them.
These may be summarised as follows:—
(i) America is as yet far from being prepared for active operations on a
war footing.' While the American Navy is in a more advanced state
of readiness, the building up, training and equipping of the American
army and air corps is still in embryo and the shortage of equipment
is acute.
(ii) American public opinion, as well as their Chiefs of Staff, will insist
upon a considerable measure of new equipment being allotted to their
new army and air forces.
(iii) Subject to"(i) and (ii) above, the Americans will in time give us much
material.
(iv) We are not, however, the only claimants.   The Russian demands and.
to a lesser degree, the demands of other friends, e.g., China, cannot
be set aside.
Strategical Discussions.
4. In their present non-belligerent state the American Chiefs of Staff are
primarily concerned with questions of supply and organisation. They have,
however," taken away with them, and will shortly comment on, a Review of general
strategy which we nad prepared for them. We think that their main comment
will be that we attach too much importance to the bombing offensive and that
we have given the production of heavy bombers an unduly nigh priority. We
found that they had only vague ideas as to the employment of their forces if they
came into the war.
5. We were successful in convincing the Americans of the correctness of our
policy to fight in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in accepting this policy as
souna\ the Americans felt that we should not over-allot equipment to the Middle
East at the expense of other vital theatres. The Quantities of equipment available
from the United States would be limited by (a) shipping, and (b) the rival claims
of the United States rearmament and of other countries besides ourselves.
Consequently, they think that we should be careful not to embark on a major
extension of our effort in the Middle East which it might be impossible to sustain.
Atlantic Islands.
6. —(i) The President favours operation " Pilgrim " either in anticipation
of, or after, a German move.
(ii) The President has interpreted a communication which he received from
Dr. Salazar as meaning that, if the Germans move into the Iberian Peninsula,
the Portuguese Government would make a token resistance in Portugal and then
transfer to the Azores. On the assumption that we were too pre-occupied
elsewhere, they would then be prepared to accept American protection for these
11
Islands. The President has said that he is prepared for American forces to look
after the Azores, if invited to do so, and that the necessary forces could be ready
to move at fairly short notice, i.e., in about three weeks.
(iii) The Cape de Verde Islands are our responsibility.
(iv) The Americans would like us to leave sufficient of our troops in Iceland
(C) to enable the United States Marine Brigade to be withdrawn and held in
readiness for operations elsewhere. On the other hand we, who are fighting, are
anxious to release all our troops from Iceland (C) so as to avoid divided control
and to free them for use elsewhere.
(Note.—The Americans make the point that Iceland (C) and the Azores are
technically within the Western Hemisphere: the Cape de Verde
Islands and the Canaries are not.)
North ami West A frica.
7. The Americans think that the Germans can, and will, move down through
Spain to North and West Africa whenever they wish. The Americans have only
made a preliminary study of possible operations against Dakar, and they will
have no forces available for many months.
Staff studies, which we had "prepared on possible operations in Morocco and
against Dakar, were given to the Americans.
South America.
8. The Americans showed concern, to an extent which we had not previously
realised, at the possibility of Axis penetration into South American countries,
particularly Brazil, in most of which active German organizations already exist.
They are holding forces in readiness to occupy key points in South America
and are negotiating with Brazil for a leased base.
Far East.
9. American Military planning is at present concerned almost entirely with
the Western Hemisphere. Discussions about the Far Kast were, therefore, mainly
confined to the naval aspect. The defences of the Philippines are weak, e.g., the
A.A. defences of Manila have recently been increased from 2 to 4 guns. A
squadron of flying fortresses (9 aircraft) and a few tanks have been sent there.
Tlie Americans have, we think, rather exaggerated hopes of the effect of opera-
tions, particularly air, from the Philippines against a Japanese expedition to
the South China Sea.
Production and Equipment.
10. As explained above, the American Chiefs of Staff are very naturally
obsessed with the shortage of equipment for their new forces. They are much
exercised to arrive at a correct order of priority for our requirements and a fair
allocation of new production.
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11. They complain about our present methods of stating our requirements.
They say that the Joint Staff Mission and the British purchasing commissions
do not work hand in glove. As a result, the American authorities receive requests
for material through more than one channel and these often conflict. Further-
more, they are not given a clear indication of the relative importance of the
requirements of each Service, nor are the items on any one list given an order
of priority.
12. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the allocation of war
material between the various claimants should be done on the basis of strategical
requirements. They think that our lists should come to them through the Joint
Staff Mission, with whom there could be free and frank discussion of the military
grounds for our demands, which could be weighed up along with their own and
those of other friendly countries and an agreed allocation made. They would
prefer this as an alternative to the present arrangement whereby they receive
demands through civilian organizations who are not in a position to state the
military case.
13. We are in sympathy with the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff
in this matter, particularly as. to an increasing degree, our supplies of American
equipment will be under lease-lend arrangements and not from our own contracts.
We earnestly hope that our machinery can be adjusted to fit in with their methods,
as otherwise we do not feel that we shall get sympathetic consideration for our
demands.
14. It is possible that a solution to this problem would be to appoint a
prominent man as head of our Mission in the United States with the virtual status
of a Minister of State. Under him the Joint Staff Mission would be responsible
for discussing strategv and for putting forward our proposals for the allocation
of war equipment; while a civil staff would be responsible for dealing with the
supply of raw materials, food, shipping, &c.
Naval Points.
15. —(i) Plan No. 4.—This is referred to in the Prime Minister's report.
(ii) A.B.C. 1.—This is a report of the British-American Conference held in
Washington in January 1941 and is looked upon by the Americans as their Bible.
A number of minor points came to light during the discussion and were adjusted.
(iii) A.B.D. Report.—This is the report of the American, British and Dutch
Conference at Singapore. The American Chiefs of Staff had previously expressed
their disagreement with certain points, and these were cleared up in discussion
with the exception of the initial dispositions of British Naval forces, and a fresh
document is being prepared for the concurrence of the Americans.
A rmy Points.
16. —(i) The army discussions took the form of a general exchange of
information.
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(ii) The Americans aim at a first expansion programme amounting to a
total, including army air arm. of about 1.700.000 men to provide primarily for
the needs of home defence, garrisons overseas and forces to support Canada; also
to occupy strategic points in South America to protect the Panamd Canal The
rogramme allows for 35 Divisions in all. including 6 armoured Divisions,
wo Marine Divisions, well trained and equipped, are the only forces ready for
war at the present time.
(iii) Equipment and (rained personnel for the new formations are still
lacking, and there is a grave ammunition shortage, particularly of 37mm..
¦50-inch and -30-inch. No jump in production is likely before November.
(iv) The President has released a further 150.000 * 30-inch rifles to us.
Additional -30-inch ammunition could be rushed over if signs of invasion become
evident
(v) The Americans propose to release to us 760 light and 700 medium tanks
between now and the end of December. They also hope to give us a number of
Garand semi-automatic rifles.
A ir Points.
17. (i) The discussions were mainly al>out the production and allocation of
heavy bombers. It became evident, although they did not state this officially,
that the Americans do not intend to ratify the agreement arrived at during
the United States-British Staff conversations, under which the major part of the
American heavy bomber production was to be allocated to the United Kingdom.
All that we can definitely count on between now and June 1943 is some 1.100
aircraft out of a total production of about 4,600, whereas we require during this
period some 6,000 heavy bombers in addition to British production.
(ii} Mr. Harriman and Major-General Arnold are examining the possibility
of turning over capacity at present allocated to the production of medium bombers
to producing heavy bombers, but this would not necessarily mean an increased
allocation to us.
(iii) The various forms of technical assistance which we should like were
discussed, and also the question of the ferrying of aircraft across the North and
South Atlantic by the United States. In general the Americans appeared willing
to afford us the assistance we asked for, particularly in the Middle East. An
Officer is being sent forthwith to consult on the spot with the A.O.C.-in-C,
Middle East. *
Summary.
18. To sum up, we neither expected nor achieved startling results. The
American Chiefs of Staff are quite clearly thinking in terms of the defence of
the Western Hemisphere and have so far not formulated any joint strategy for
the defeat of Germanv in the event of their entry into the war. Nevertheless, the
personal contacts with our American colleagues" will prove of the greatest value
for our future collaboration.   We have, we think, convinced the Americans that
14
our policy in the Middle East is sound. They, in turn, have made us understand
their difficulties. A most distressing revelation is the reduction in heavy bomber
and Cataliua allocation to us. This we consider a serious matter. We are also
concerned at the small number of Catalinas allocated to the United Kingdom
during the next few months.
(Signed) DUDLEY POUND.
J. G. DILL.
W. R. FREEMAN, V.C.A.S.
H.M.S. Prince of Wales, August 15, 1941.
Annex IV.
I SAILED from Scapa on Monday, the 4th August, in H.M.S. Prince of
Wales (Captain J. C. Leach, M.V.O.), accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound, G.C.B., G.C.V.O. (First Sea Lord aiid Chief of Naval Staff),
General Sir John Dill, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Chief of Imperial General Staff),
Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, K.C.B., D.S.O,. M.C. (Vice-Chief of
Air Staff), Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G.C.M.G., C.B. (Permanent Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Lord Cherwell, Commander C. R.
Thompson, O.B.E. (Personal Assistant), and Mr. J. M. Martin (Principal Private
Secretary). My party also included Colonel L. C. Hollis, C.B.E., and Lieutenant-
Colonel E. I. C. Jacoo of the Office of the Minister of Defence, and the following
Officers of the Royal Navy, Army and Roval Air Force : Captain B. B. Schofield,
Director of Trade Division, Admiralty; Commander M. G. Goodenough, D.S.O.,
Plans Division, Admiralty; Pavmas'ter-Captain R. V. Brockman; Brigadier
V. Dykes, C.B.E., Director of Plans, War Office: Captain A. R. S. Nutting, M.C,
Military Assistant to the C.I.G.S.; and Group Captain W. M. Yool, C.B.E., Staff
Officer to the Vice-Chief of Air Staff.
2. H.M.S. Prince of Wales arrived at our rendezvous with the flagship
of the President of the United States (tJ.S.S. Augusta) in Placentia Bay.
Newfoundland, at 9 a.m. on Saturday, the 9th August. As soon as the customary
naval courtesies had been exchanged, I went aboard the U.S.S. Augusta anil
greeted President Roosevelt, handing him a letter from His Majesty The King
and presenting the members of my party. Conversations were then begun
between the President and myself, Mr. Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander
Cadogan and the staff officers on both sides, which proceeded more or less
continuously for the remaining days of our visit, sometimes tete-a-tete and
sometimes m larger conferences.
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3. On Sunday morning, the 10th August. Mr. Roosevelt came aboard
H.M.S. Prince of Wales and. with his staff officers and several hundred
representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and Marines, attended
Divine Service on the quarterdeck, conducted by the ship's chaplain, Rev.
W. G. Parker, and Rev. R. W. Shrum, Chaplain, United States Navy. This
Service was felt by us all to be a deeply moving expression of the unity of faith
of our two peoples, and none who saw it will forget the spectacle presented that
sunlit morning on the crowded quarterdeck—the symbolism of the Union Jack
and the Stars and Stripes draped side by side on the pulpit; the American
and British chaplains sharing in the reading of the prayers; the highest naval
and military oflicers of Britain and the United States grouped in one body
behind the President and myself; the close packed ranks of British and American
sailors, completely intermingled, sharing the same books and joining heartily
together in the prayers and hymns familiar to both.
4. The President remained for a luncheon party to which I had invited
some 30 British and American guests. Afterwards short but cordial speeches
were made by Mr. Roosevelt and myself.
5. Our conferences continued throughout Sundav and Monday. On
Monday afternoon I telegraphed to the Lord Privy Seal", for consideration by
the Cabinet, the draft of the Joint Declaration further described in my main
report. The remarkable speed with which my colleagues considered this telegram
(at a midnight session) and telegraphed their comments enabled me to cometoa final
agreement with the President on Tuesday morning, the 12th August, and to take
leave of him and sail for Iceland, on my way home, that afternoon. The voyage
was uneventful, although at one point it became necessary to alter course owing
to the reported presence of U-Boats in the vicinity. 6n this portion of the
journey our escort included two United States destroyers, in one of which was
Ensign Franklin D. Roosevelt. Jnr.. the President's son, who acted as Liaison
Officer during our visit to Iceland.
6. H.M.S. Prince of Wales reached the island on Saturday morning, the
16th August, and anchored at Hvals Fiord, from which we travelled to Reykjavik
in a destrover. On arrival at the port, I received a remarkably warm and
vociferous welcome from a large crowd, whose friendly greetings were repeated
whenever our presence was recognised during our stay, culminating in scenes of
great enthusiasm on our departure in the afternoon, to the accompaniment of such
cheers and hand-clapping as have, I was assured, seldoAbeen heard in the streets
of Reykjavik.
7. I was greeted on the quay by His Majesty's Minister, Mr. C. Howard
Smith. C.M.G., the General Officer Commanding Iceland Force. Major-General
H. 0. Curtis, C.B.. D.S.O.. M.C, and other British and American Officers. After
a short visit to the Althinghaus. to pay my respects to the Regent and the
members of the Icelandic Cabinet. I proceeded to inspect a joint review of the
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British and American Forces. I took the salute with the President's son standing
beside me. and the parade provided another remarkable demonstration of
Anglo-American solidarity.
8. On return to Hvnls Fiord. I visited H.M.S. RamiUies (and addressed
representatives of the crews of the Hritish and American ships in the anchorage),
11 M.S. Ilecla and H.M.S. Churchill. H.M.S. Prince of Wales sailed from
Iceland that evening, and readied Scapa on Monday morning, the 18th August.
I arrived hack in London on the following day.
w. s. c.