August 20, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

MEMORANDUM.

I GIVE below, for the information of the Cabinet, some account of the conversations which took place at my recent meeting with President Roosevelt. This indicates, in broad outline, the course of the discussions and the final results achieved under the various headings. To it is appended, in Annex III, a report on the conversations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff.

I also attach (Annex IV) a diary and record of the personnel of the Mission. I would draw special attention to the holding of Divine Service on the quarter-deck of H.M.S. Prince of Wales, attended by President Roosevelt, with his staff of officers and representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and Marines. All were impressed with this episode.

August 20, 1941.

W. S. C.
JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

AT one of our first conversations, the President told me that he thought it would be good if we could draw up a joint declaration laying down certain broad principles which would guide our policies along the same road.

Wishing to follow up this most hopeful suggestion, I gave him, on August 10, a tentative outline of such a declaration. The text was as follows:

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of Speech and Thought, without which such choice must be illusory; Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce, not only within their territorial boundaries, but between the nations of the world; Fifth, they seek a Peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective international organisation will afford to all States and Peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds, and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or the need of maintaining burdensome armaments.

At our meeting on the morning of August 11 the President gave me a revised draft (Annex I), which we took as a basis of discussion.

Before examining this document the President explained that his idea was that there should be issued simultaneously in Washington and London, perhaps on the 14th August, a short statement to the effect that the President and the Prime Minister had held conversations at sea, that they had been accompanied by members of their respective staffs; that the latter had discussed the working out of aid to the democracies in the Lease and Lend Act; that these naval and military conversations had in no way been concerned with future commitments other than as authorised by Act of Congress.

The statement would proceed to say that the Prime Minister and the President had discussed certain principles relating to the civilisation of the world and had agreed on a statement of them. I deprecated the emphasis which a statement on these lines would lay on the absence of commitments. This would be seized on by Germany and would be a source of profound discouragement to the neutrals and to the vanquished. I very much hoped, therefore, that the President could confine the statement to the positive portion which dealt with the question of aid to the democracies, more especially as the President had guarded himself by the reference to the Lease and Lend Act.

The President accepted this.

There followed a detailed discussion of the revised text of the declaration.

Several minor alterations were easily agreed.

The chief difficulties were presented by Points 4 and 7, especially the former. With regard to this, I pointed out that the words “without discrimination” might be held to call in question the Ottawa agreements, and that it was in no position to accept them. This text would certainly have to be referred to the Cabinet at home and, if it was desired to maintain the present wording, to the Governments in the Dominions. I should have little hope that it would be accepted.

Mr. Sumner Welles indicated that this was the core of the matter, and that this paragraph embodied the ideal for which the Administration had striven for the past nine years. I mentioned the British experience in adhering to Free Trade for eighty years. I said that, if the words “without discrimination” could disappear, and “trade” be substituted for “markets,” I should be able to refer the text to His Majesty’s Government with some hope that they would be able to accept it.

As regards Point 7, I pointed out that while I accepted this text, I was not able to accept it. In England I had been very much disappointed at the absence of any intention to establish an international organization of peace after the war. I promised to try to find a suitable modification, and later in the day I suggested to the President the addition to the second sentence of the words “pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security.”

I telegraphed these amendments for immediate submission to the Cabinet. I had not finished dictating the telegram much before 2 P.M., and that I should have had in my hands within the next 12 hours the Cabinet’s most helpful reply. The telegram reflects the utmost credit on all concerned.

The Cabinet, in their reply, suggested a further variant of Point 4, and desired the insertion of a new paragraph between Points 4 and 5.

Meanwhile, I had heard that the President had accepted all the amendments which I had submitted to him on 11th August.

On 12th August, about noon, I went to see the President, to agree with him the final form of the Declaration. I was accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook, who had arrived that morning. I put to the President the Cabinet’s revised version of Point 4, but he preferred to adhere to the phrasing already agreed.
Japanese Government:

to the short memorandum proposing a system of "parallel" communications against any further encroachment in the South-West Pacific, and to give to us and the Dutch an assurance that we should have the armed support of the United States.

The profound and far-reaching importance of this Joint Declaration is apparent. The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a Declaration is astonishing.

The inclusion in it of a reference to the "final destruction of the Nazi tyranny" (this was based on a phrase appearing in my original draft) amounts to a challenge which in ordinary times would imply warlike action.

Finally, not the least striking feature is the realism of the last paragraph, where there is a plain and bold intimation that, after the war, the United States will join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order.

FAR EAST.

Our hope had been to induce the President to give a strong warning to Japan against any further encroachment in the South-West Pacific, and to give to us and the Dutch an assurance that we should have the armed support of the United States in the event of our being attacked by the Japanese.

Accordingly on the 10th August I handed to the President the following short memorandum proposing a system of "parallel" communications to the Japanese Government:

Declaration by United States Government that—

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-West Pacific would precipitate a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter-measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to that Power.

Declaration by His Majesty's Government:

Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading:

their support of them. His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power.

Declaration by Dutch Government.

Same as that by His Majesty's Government.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

On the following morning, the 11th August, I discussed these proposals with the President.

It was clear at once that, on consideration, the President had decided that he would be unable to give an assurance that he would go to Congress for authority to give armed support.

He referred to certain negotiations that had been proceeding with the Japanese Government, culminating in a set of proposals by the latter. The Cabinet will have already seen the telegram in which I summarised these proposals. It is true that they included an assurance that Japan would station no further troops in the South-Western Pacific area except French Indo-China, and a contingent promise of ultimate withdrawal from the latter. But a number of the conditions attached were obviously wholly unacceptable.

The President declared that he was under no illusion as to the value or the sincerity of these proposals, but he thought it would be useful to pursue a discussion of them, if only for the sake of gaining, say, a month's time.

He assured me that the economic measures against Japan would meanwhile be maintained in full force, and he seemed to think that this was the most that he could do. He did not offer to give any further warning to Japan, and I think that in this he may have been under the influence of Mr. Sumner Welles, who seemed to be of the opinion that the time for warnings was past.

I pointed out that the Japanese promise to withdraw from Indo-China was conditional on "the settlement of the China incident." This plainly indicated that the Japanese intention was to attack Yunnan northward from Indo-China and to cut the Burma Road. It would, therefore, be essential to make it clear that a condition of continuing discussions with the Japanese would be that they should not use Indo-China as a base for operations against China.

The President readily agreed to this. He explained that, when the discussions were resumed, he would renew his proposals for the neutralisation of both Siam and Indo-China.

Most important of all, he finally agreed to end his communication to the Japanese Ambassador with a warning, in the words which I had given him on the previous day, that any further encroachment by Japan "would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan." He proposed to add that it was, of course, obvious that, the Soviet being a friendly Power, the United States Government would be similarly interested in any conflict in the North-West Pacific area.

I authorised the President to inform Japan that in this matter His Majesty's Government were in accord with the United States Government and would co-operate fully with them.
The President said that he would at once telegraph to Mr. Cordell Hull to arrange for the Japanese Ambassador to call upon him on his return to Washington, and to tell his Excellency that he would have an important message to deliver. He would see the Ambassador as soon as possible, and would give him the message in writing.

I later asked for a copy of this message, but I was told, at the time of our departure, that it had not yet been drafted. The President, however, assured me, on more than one occasion, that he would include in it the final words which I have quoted above. Evidently this is the crucial part of the message, and I am confident that the President will not tone it down. He has a copy of the record of our conversation in which this wording is reproduced. Mr. Sumner Welles undertook that a copy of the draft of the message would be given as soon as possible to His Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington.

Even taken by itself this warning should have a considerable deterrent effect on Japan. And when we remember that the Japanese will already have suffered the shock of the Anglo-American joint declaration, I think we may hope that they will pause before proceeding to further outrage.

ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

The President stated that he had indications from certain quarters that a German move might be made into the Peninsula about the 15th September. It would be possible for his forces, destined for the Azores, to be ready by approximately the same date; that is to say, it would take three weeks to embark them and five to six days to get the ships there. The President had received a note from Doctor Salazar, dated the 29th July, acknowledging his own communication, in which he had given assurances concerning respect for Portuguese Sovereignty over the islands. From a passage in this note, the President had inferred that Portugal would be ready to involve the aid of the United States if, in certain circumstances, His Majesty’s Government were unable to assist. The President said that in his view the way to proceed would be for His Majesty’s Government to intimate to Doctor Salazar that they, owing to their preoccupation elsewhere, would be unable to send him the assistance promised, and to ask whether he would therefore accept the assistance of the United States. If Doctor Salazar agreed, he would have to inform the United States that he would accept their assistance, together with a token contingent from Brazil. The President explained that it was essential for his own purposes that he should have a direct request from Doctor Salazar.

I said that we must recognise that the Operation “Pilgrim” might fire the whole train in the Peninsula. We must therefore have simultaneously a naval force to protect the Azores against forestalling German action pending the entry of American forces. The President pointed out that the United States Government would be unable to send forces to the Azores and to the Cape Verde Islands simultaneously. Moreover, there was this difference, that the former were in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the latter were east of 26 degrees. He might be able to work them into a scheme, but would make no definite promise here and now. He added that, unlike Operation “Pilgrim,” the occupation of the Azores could be done in any month of the year.

It was agreed that the first step would be for His Majesty’s Government to inform the United States Government that they had warned Doctor Salazar of the possibility that they would be precluded from giving Portugal the assistance promised.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENCE PLAN No. 4.

A Plan for early assistance by the United States Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic had previously been worked out and, as the President now stated that the United States were ready to implement this plan, the necessary steps to put it into force were agreed upon.

At an early date (it is hoped by the 1st September) the United States Navy will take over the responsibility for the safety of our North Atlantic Convoys to the West of 26° West. They will be assisted by units of the Royal Canadian Navy. With the exception of the occasional escorts necessary for our troop convoys, we shall thereby be enabled to withdraw the majority of the units of the Royal Navy now in the Western Atlantic for employment in other areas.

This unparalleled gesture of friendship by a neutral Power is to be made under the guise of protection for United States communications with Iceland (C). The measures taken will continue to be guided by our own experienced Officers. All details were worked out and agreed in detail by the Naval authorities.
Annex I.

Joint Declaration

(Revised draft handed to the Prime Minister by President Roosevelt, August 11, 1941)

THE President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see self-government restored to those from whom it has been forcibly removed.

Fourth, they will endeavour to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they hope to see established a peace after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance to all peoples that their future is not to be shaped by a closed group of nations using force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will further the adoption of all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Annex II.

Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister

August 12, 1941

THE President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due regard for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states of great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear.

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Annex III.

British-American Chiefs of Staff Discussions

The following is a summary of the ground covered by the Chiefs of Staff discussions with the Americans:

General Points.

2. During the three days at Placentia Bay, three joint and a number of individual discussions were held between the First Sea Lord, C.I.G.S., and V.C.A.S. on our side, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, C-in-C, Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval War Plans, General Marshall, Chief of Staff, and Major-General Arnold, Army Air Corps, on the American side.

3. The text of the Joint Declaration was subsequently agreed by telephone with His Majesty's Embassy at Washington (Telegram 3976 from Washington) and a number of alterations made. These were all verbal, except the omission of the word "more" in line 5 of paragraph 3.

* The text of the Joint Declaration was subsequently agreed by telephone with His Majesty's Embassy at Washington (Telegram 3976 from Washington) and a number of alterations made. These were all verbal, except the omission of the word "more" in line 5 of paragraph 3.
3. The discussions were conducted in a frank and friendly atmosphere. The Americans, while ready to listen to our point of view, took every opportunity of impressing upon us the many problems and difficulties which confronted them. These may be summarised as follows:

(i) America is as yet far from being prepared for active operations on a war footing. While the American Navy is in a more advanced state of readiness, the building up, training and equipping of the American army and air corps is still in embryo and the shortage of equipment is acute.

(ii) American public opinion, as well as their Chiefs of Staff, will insist upon a considerable measure of new equipment being allotted to their new army and air forces.

(iii) Subject to (i) and (ii) above, the Americans will in time give us much material.

(iv) We are not, however, the only claimants. The Russian demands and, to a lesser degree, the demands of other friends, e.g., China, cannot be set aside.

Strategical Discussions.

4. In their present non-belligerent state the American Chiefs of Staff are primarily concerned with questions of supply and organisation. They have, however, taken away with them, and will shortly comment on, a Review of general strategy which we had prepared for them. We think that their main comment will be that we attach too much importance to the bombing offensive and that we have given the production of heavy bombers an unduly high priority. We found that they had only vague ideas as to the employment of their forces if they came into the war.

5. We were successful in convincing the Americans of the correctness of our policy to fight in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in accepting this policy as sound, the Americans felt that we should not over-allot equipment to the Middle East at the expense of other vital theatres. The quantities of equipment available from the United States would be limited by (a) shipping, and (b) the rival claims of the United States Government and of other countries besides ourselves. Consequently, they think that we should be careful not to embark on a major extension of our effort in the Middle East which might be impossible to sustain.

Atlantic Islands.

6. (i) The President favours operation "Pilgrim" either in anticipation of, or after, a German move.

(ii) The President has interpreted a communication which he received from Dr. Salazar as meaning that, if the Germans move into the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese Government would make a token resistance in Portugal and then transfer to the Azores. On the assumption that we were too pre-occupied elsewhere, they would then be prepared to accept American protection for these Islands. The President has said that he is prepared for American forces to look after the Azores, if invited to do so, and that the necessary forces could be ready to move at fairly short notice, i.e., in about three weeks.

(iii) The Capes de Verde Islands are our responsibility.

(iv) The Americans would like us to leave sufficient of our troops in Iceland (C) to enable the United States Marine Brigade to be withdrawn and held in readiness for operations elsewhere. On the other hand, we, who are fighting, are anxious to release all our troops from Iceland (C) so as to avoid divided control and to free them for use elsewhere.

(Note.—The Americans make the point that Iceland (C) and the Azores are technically within the Western Hemisphere; the Cape de Verde Islands and the Canaries are not.)

North and West Africa.

7. The Americans think that the Germans can, and will, move down through Spain to North and West Africa whenever they wish. The Americans have only made a preliminary study of possible operations against Dakar, and they will have no forces available for many months.

Staff studies, which we had prepared on possible operations in Morocco and against Dakar, were given to the Americans.

South America.

8. The Americans showed concern, to an extent which we had not previously realised, at the possibility of Axis penetration into South American countries, particularly Brazil, in most of which active German organisations already exist. They are holding forces in readiness to occupy key points in South America and are negotiating with Brazil for a leased base.

Far East.

9. American Military planning is at present concerned almost entirely with the Western Hemisphere. Discussions about the Far East were, therefore, mainly confined to the naval aspect. The defences of the Philippines are weak, e.g., the A.A. defences of Manila have recently been increased from 2 to 4 guns. A squadron of flying fortresses (9 aircraft) and a few tanks have been sent there. The Americans have, we think, rather exaggerated hopes of the effect of operations, particularly air, from the Philippines against a Japanese expedition to the South China Sea.

Production and Equipment.

10. As explained above, the American Chiefs of Staff are very naturally obsessed with the shortage of equipment for their new forces. They are much exercised to arrive at a correct order of priority for their requirements and a fair allocation of new production.
11. They complain about our present methods of stating our requirements. They say that the Joint Staff Mission and the British purchasing commissions do not work hand in glove. As a result, the American authorities receive requests for material through more than one channel and these often conflict. Furthermore, they are not given a clear indication of the relative importance of the requirements of each Service, nor are the items on any one list given an order of priority.

12. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the allocation of war material between the various claimants should be done on the basis of strategical requirements. They think that our lists should come to them through the Joint Staff Mission, with whom there could be free and frank discussion of the military grounds for our demands, which could be weighed up along with their own and those of other friendly countries and an agreed allocation made. They would prefer this as an alternative to the present arrangement whereby they receive demands through civilian organizations who are not in a position to state the military case.

13. We are in sympathy with the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff in this matter, particularly as, to an increasing degree, our supplies of American equipment will be under lease-lend arrangements and not from our own contracts. We earnestly hope that our machinery can be adjusted to fit in with their methods as otherwise we do not feel that we shall get sympathetic consideration for our demands.

14. It is possible that a solution to this problem would be to appoint a prominent man as head of our Mission in the United States with the virtual status of a Minister of State. Under him the Joint Staff Mission would be responsible for discussing strategy and for putting forward our proposals for the allocation of war equipment; while a civilian staff would be responsible for dealing with the supply of raw materials, food, shipping, &c.

**Naval Points.**

15. — (i) **Pluto No. 4.** This is referred to in the Prime Minister's report.

(ii) **A.E.C.** — This is a report of the British-American Conference held in Washington in January 1941 and is looked upon by the Americans as their Bible. A number of minor points came to light during the discussion and were adjusted.

(iii) **A.B.D. Report.** — This is the report of the American, British and Dutch Conference at Singapore. The American Chiefs of Staff had previously expressed their disagreement with certain points, and these were cleared up in discussion with the exception of the initial dispositions of British Naval forces, and a fresh document is being prepared for the concurrence of the Americans.

**Army Points.**

16. — (i) The army discussions took the form of a general exchange of information.
our policy in the Middle East is sound. They, in turn, have made us understand their difficulties. A most distressing revelation is the reduction in heavy bomber and Catalina allocation to us. This we consider a serious matter. We are also concerned at the small number of Catalinas allocated to the United Kingdom during the next few months.

(Signed)

DUDLY POUND.

J. G. DILL.

W. R. FREEMAN, V.C.A.S.

H.M.S. Prince of Wales. August 15, 1941.

ANNEX IV.

I Sailed from Scapa on Monday, the 4th August, in H.M.S. Prince of Wales (Captain J. C. Leach, M.V.O.), accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, G.C.B., G.C.V.O. (First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff), General Sir John Dill, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Chief of Imperial General Staff), Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Vice-Chief of Air Staff), Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G.C.M.G., C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Lord Cherwell, Commander C. R. Thompson, O.B.E. (Personal Assistant), and Mr. J. M. Martin (Principal Private Secretary). My party also included Colonel L. C. Hollis, C.B.E., and Lieutenant-Colonel E. L. C. Jacob of the Office of the Minister of Defence, and the following Officers of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Forces: Captain B. B. Schofield, Director of Trade Division, Admiralty; Commander M. G. Goodenough, D.S.O., Plans Division, Admiralty, Paymaster-Captain R. V. Brockman; Brigadier V. Dukes, C.B.E., Director of Plans, War Office; Captain A. R. S. Nutting, M.C., Military Assistant to the C.I.G.S., and Group Captain W. M. Yool, C.B.E., Staff Officer to the Vice-Chief of Air Staff.

H.M.S. Prince of Wales arrived at our rendezvous with the flagship of the President of the United States (U.S.S. Augusta) in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, at 9 a.m. on Saturday, the 9th August. As soon as the customary naval courtesies had been exchanged, I went aboard the U.S.S. Augusta and greeted President Roosevelt, handing him a letter from His Majesty The King and presenting the members of my party. Conversations were then begun between the President and myself, Mr. Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan and the staff officers on both sides, which proceeded more or less continuously for the remaining days of our visit, sometimes tête-à-tête and sometimes in larger conferences.

3. On Sunday morning, the 10th August, Mr. Roosevelt came aboard H.M.S. Prince of Wales and, with his staff officers and several hundred representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and Marines, attended Divine Service on the quarterdeck, conducted by the ship's chaplain, Rev. W. G. Parker, and Rev. J. M. Martin, Chaplain, United States Navy. This Service was felt by us all to be a deeply moving expression of the unity of faith of our two peoples, and none who saw it will forget the spectacle presented that sunlit morning on the crowded quarterdeck—the symbolism of the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes draped side by side on the pulpit; the American and British chaplains sharing in the reading of the prayers; the highest naval and military officers of Britain and the United States grouped in one body behind the President and myself, the close packed ranks of British and American sailors, completely intermingled, sharing the same books and joining heartily together in the prayers and hymns familiar to both.

4. The President remained for a luncheon party to which I had invited some 30 British and American guests. Afterwards short but cordial speeches were made by Mr. Roosevelt and myself.

5. Our conferences continued throughout Sunday and Monday. On Monday afternoon I telegraphed to the Lord Privy Seal, for consideration by the Cabinet, the draft of the Joint Declaration further described in my main report. The remarkable speed with which my colleagues considered this telegram (at a midnight session) and telegraphed their comments enabled me to come to a final agreement with the President on Tuesday morning, the 12th August, and to take leave of him and sail for Iceland, on my way home, that afternoon. The voyage was uneventful, although at one point it became necessary to alter course owing to the reported presence of U-Boats in the vicinity. On this portion of the journey our escort included two United States destroyers, in one of which was Ensign Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., the President's son, who acted as Liaison Officer during our visit to Iceland.

6. H.M.S. Prince of Wales reached the island on Saturday morning, the 16th August, and anchored at Hvals Fjord, from which we travelled to Reykjavik in a destroyer. On arrival at the port, I received a remarkably warm and reverent welcome from a large crowd whose friendly greetings were repeated whenever our presence was recognised during our stay, culminating in scenes of great enthusiasm on our departure in the afternoon, to the accompaniment of such cheers and hand-clapping as have, I was assured, seldom been heard in the streets of Reykjavik.

7. I was greeted on the quay by His Majesty's Minister, Mr. C. Howard Smith, C.M.G., the General Officer Commanding Iceland Force, Major-General P. O. Curtis, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and other British and American Officers. After a short visit to the Althinghaus, to pay my respects to the Regent and the members of the Icelandic Cabinet, I proceeded to inspect a joint review of the
British and American Forces. I took the salute with the President’s son standing beside me, and the parade provided another remarkable demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity.

8. On return to Hvalfjord, I visited H.M.S. Ramilies (and addressed representatives of the crews of the British and American ships in the anchorage), H.M.S. Hecla and H.M.S. Churchill. H.M.S. Prince of Wales sailed from Iceland that evening, and reached Scapa on Monday morning, the 16th August. I arrived back in London on the following day.

W. S. C.