

SECRET

Sir Ronald Campbell

This record of the conversations on H.M.S. "Prince of Wales" does not add very much to our previous knowledge, and I must confess seems to me rather a meagre account of conversations which lasted for three days.

The description of the discussions leading up to the adoption of the final draft of the 8 points is interesting, although not, I think, surprising. It is, however, rather sinister that the President should have opened the ball by saying that the talks would in no way involve any future commitments. The President was eventually dissuaded from including some statement to this effect in the public announcement, but he has of course made up for this by the various things which he has said about "no new commitments" on his return to this country. It seems odd that despite this clear indication of the way in which the President's mind was working the Prime Minister should have been quite so enthusiastic about the outcome of the meeting.

As regards the Far East, we know that despite the Prime Minister's confidence that the President would not tone down the message to the Japanese Ambassador he did in fact do so, and avoided any reference to the possibility of war breaking out. This, as we have told the F.O., he did largely because of Mr. Hull's insistence.

As regards the Atlantic islands, the F.O. told us just a few days ago that in view of the latest developments in our talks with the Portuguese, they thought it would be a mistake to take action on the lines agreed on between the President and the Prime Minister. It is, incidentally, interesting to see that the President has apparently managed to persuade himself that the Azores are in the Western Hemisphere and therefore that selectees could be sent there. I wonder if he would in fact use this argument with Congress? He has not, I think, attempted to send selectees to Iceland, though apparently he claims that that is in the Western Hemisphere too. It is also interesting to see that the President is really apparently contemplating with favour the possibility of some Brazilians occupying the Portuguese islands. Perhaps, however, the political effect of this example of Pan American solidarity might outweigh the obvious disadvantages.

May we show this paper to Mr. Hall and Commander Coleridge for the Joint Staff Mission?

Atkinson
September 8th, 1941.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*But surely he c? not make "commitments" i.e. arrangements having binding force & therefore the character of treaties, without Congressional sanction?
RC.*

Commander Coleridge has seen.

Seen 11/11/41

*Yes
RC.*

FRHM:HK