SECRET
Mr. Denying:
Here is a cockshy,
Any amendments or sug-
gestions etc. would "be
welcome.
St	.CRET
	
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SECRET
about thes
than about
My impress
shared by
of the Far
Department
something
I confess I do not feel happy
e talks;    even less so, in fact,
the talks which preceded them,
ion is that my feelings are
Dr. Hornbeck and other members
Eastern Division in the State
, of whom I
socially in
have been seeing
the past few days.
Mr. Hull seems to be talking in
the air, without any solid foundation for
what he says.       Japan will not withdraw
her troops from China until she is certain
that China will fulfil any agreement
reached.       Of that I would be inclined to
be as doubtful as the Japanese, since
Chiang Kai-Shek at best exercises only a
partial control over the country, which
would decrease the moment the Japanese
menace disappeared.       Many people who know
rifcina    KaHova   tViat    a    r\*ar.a Chinese
would be followed
hina believe that a peace
terms or a Chinese victory
by bloody civil war.
Restitution of equality
opportunity and the open door are
we and the United States want
Chinese.
of
things
not the
When the Burma Road was closed
last year one of the conditions was that
the Japanese would join with us in attempting
to achieve a general settlement of Far
Eastern problems.     At that time the Far
Eastern Department in the Foreign Office
were instructed to draw up the basis on which
they considered a general settlement might
be achieved.     This they did, without any .
conviction whatever that what they postulated
was practicable.     The plan was submitted
to other Government Departments, v/ho, by
and large, tore it to shreds.     In the mean-
while Japan had joined the Axis and we
reopened the Burma Road, so that the idea
of a general settlement was happily dropped.
It will be remembered that the United States
Government at that time sternly refused to
play in any circumstances.
From the experience gained at the
time that we ourselves explored the
possibilities of a general settlement, it
is safe to say that a real settlement in
present war conditions is not possible for
the simple reason that we cannot give Japan
an adequate ouid pro quo.
If we cannot give Japan an
adequate cuid pro quoit follows either
that Japan is talking ^to gain time for a
specific purpose, just as we are, or that
her circumstances are so much worse than
even we conceive that she is faced with
the prospect of having to retreat all the
way along the line without a fight. From
/the
Minutes.
the news available from Japan it would seem
that the first may be the case.     On the
other hand, it is very clear that the
internal adjustments necessary before a
general retreat could take place are totally
lacking.     Japan has fed on success for
nearly half a century,and she is not going
to abandon her gains for v/hat she may v/ell
consider to be a few empty promises and a
back-door admission to the realm of the
sanctified and blessed.
My interpretation of what is
happening in Japan is that Prince Konoye,
properly conscious of the dangers ahead, has
sought the consent of his colleagues and of
all the various factions, to try and placate
the United States. The colleagues and
the factions have consented, without however
being prepared to give anything away. The
Extremists probably feel, and not without
reason, that Prince Konoyefs failure to
achieve anything with the Democracies on such
a basis will afford them ample justification
for proceeding on the course which they them-
selves advocate.
If I am wrong, and if some American-
made settlement is achieved, then it can only
ultimately be at our expense.     Nor will it
ease our position in the least degree in the
Far East, since without a complete revolution
in Japan, we shall not be able, while the
war lasts, to trust that country to honour
her obligations any more than we could trust
Germany.     If the present dispersal of our
forces is to be maintained at the price of
an uneasy truce, then I think that is too
high a price to pay.
Mr. Eull was not quite honest over
the earlier negotiations, and he is not being
quite honest now.     It is all very v/ell to
say that the conversations with the Japanese
have not reached a stage where consultation
with us is necessary or desirable. There
can be no conversations about the general
Far Eastern situation between Japan and the
United States which are not of close and
vital concern to us, and though we cannot
force the United States Government to disclose
to us what is going on, I feel the time is
coming when we might take just a little
umbrage at the way we are being kept completely
in the dark.
In the meanwhile the talks appear
to be causing uneasiness to the Chinese and
the Dutch (if not to many Americans) und they
heighten the tendency to set the United States
"off the boil".       They are off the boil over
Europe and to go- off the boil over the Far
East will only increase the general lassitude.
/The
The Chinese are, I believe, quite alarmed,
and the talks may well have the effect of
weakening their resistance at a time when
its maintenance is of first importance.
Believing that they hold most,
if not all, the cards, the President and
Mr. Hull seem to have decided upon playing
a lone hand in diplomacy with the Japanese.
I hope they do not overplay it.       One of
the results of their tactics is to leave
us and the Dutch in an embarrassing state
of unceEtainiy over the question of
September 10th 1941.