33 pr. I»IED:Pr; MINUTE SHEET. Reference Reference G204/60, -/61 and -/62. I think the Foreign Office mighty welcome observations-on Sir-R. Craigie's three.....;* telegrams•from the American angle. In this connexion please see my minutes of September 10th (with G204/21) and October 7th (with G204/33 and :ai£» lo no im My inclination would be to show Mr.Hull a paraphrase of Tokyo telegram £173 (-/60) without comment, and to ask him how he would be inclined to reply in similar circumstances; 'T» srfi rij-t hag been apparent from the - very outset that there were certain dangers in allowing the iimericans to conduct conversations with the v/ssv od Japanese on-matters of the closest concern to us without insisting upon being kept informed of their nature and of the progress being made. To that ';Q^ten|"SfiSGR;''Craigie merely echoes what we ourselves have:felt. Eut it is one thing-to say one should insist and another to do it. The Americans have- in fact treated us badly, but we have no means of forcing them to divulge what they have been doing. It is for that reason that I think it would be of advantage for" us' to «sjibw the record of Sir R. Craigie's interview with Mr. Togo to Mr. Hull. But when Sir R. Craigie goes on to argue that Japan could be induced to remain really neutral and to suggest that it is the rigidity of the United States which is responsible for the imminent break- down of the talks, then I think he is going beyond practical politics. In a despatch dated September.Hist he himself said that we could only expect from the then Japanese Government a change of tactics and not a change of objective. Since that Government has in the meantime been replaced by one more extreme, the statement is surely even more true to-day• It is curious that the Japanese M.F*A* (not to mention the Japanese ambassador here) should be trying to inveigle us into participation in the talks, for if there is one thing which Tokyo has never failed to emphasize (and quite rightly so) it is the Japanese dislike for multilateral negotiationso November 5th 1941 1 Ronald Campbell Mr. Hayt* 1/ [OVER. I think it is clear that whether we adopt the procedure suggested in the second para, of Mr. Dening's minute or "bring this question to the notice of the U.S.G. in any other way it will be clear enough to Mr. Hull that we are showing umbrage at being kept insufficiently informed of the nature of these conversations and might run the risk of another manifestation of displeasure from the Secretary. But I think this is a risk which we now ought to run. I feel that we should say frankly to Mr. Hull that however non-committal these conversations will be they are bound to touch on subjects which most vitally affect British interests in the Par East, and if he gets anywhere at all with them he will inevitably come to some understanding with the Japanese which will engage these interests. It would obviously be very awkward for all the parties concerned if this understanding were one which H.M.G. found themselves unable to accept. I think that we might, as Mr. Dening suggests, propose to the P.O. some action on these lines, after H.E. has had time to consider these telegrams on his return. Minutes. U ^>v-^c<<*dL*^ C*-*-^> kT^zUJ- £-