

Don's mind putting to 70.

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asking advice and reply.

saying that of course is true in the  
a somewhat different point

+ one only don't want to  
be helpful.

what's really behind the success.

John's answer to say to us, that is  
being his to don't be in words, but  
mean being committed to was?  
o status quo, before his arrival.

MED:PW

Mr. Hayter

I/

[OVER.]

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference G204/60 / 61 / 41  
62

**SECRET**

Reference G204/60, -/61 and -/62.

I think the Foreign Office might welcome observations on Sir R. Craigie's three telegrams from the American angle. In this connexion please see my minutes of September 10th (with G204/21) and October 7th (with G204/33 and -/34).

My inclination would be to show Mr. Hull a paraphrase of Tokyo telegram 2173 (-/60) without comment, and to ask him how he would be inclined to reply in similar circumstances.

It has been apparent from the very outset that there were certain dangers in allowing the Americans to conduct conversations with the Japanese on matters of the closest concern to us without insisting upon being kept informed of their nature and of the progress being made. To that extent Sir R. Craigie merely echoes what we ourselves have felt. But it is one thing to say one should insist and another to do it. The Americans have in fact treated us badly, but we have no means of forcing them to divulge what they have been doing. It is for that reason that I think it would be of advantage for us to show the record of Sir R. Craigie's interview with Mr. Togo to Mr. Hull.

TR:HOW

But when Sir R. Craigie goes on to argue that Japan could be induced to remain really neutral and to suggest that it is the rigidity of the United States which is responsible for the imminent breakdown of the talks, then I think he is going beyond practical politics. In a despatch dated September 21st he himself said that we could only expect from the then Japanese Government a change of tactics and not a change of objective. Since that Government has in the meantime been replaced by one more extreme, the statement is surely even more true to-day.

It is curious that the Japanese M.F.A. (not to mention the Japanese Ambassador here) should be trying to inveigle us into participation in the talks, for if there is one thing which Tokyo has never failed to emphasize (and quite rightly so) it is the Japanese dislike for multilateral negotiations.

*Yes - See paper 1  
33.55.*

*A. L. ...*

November 5th 1941.

H.E.  
Sir Ronald Campbell  
Mr. Hayter


MED:PW

I/

[OVER.]

I think it is clear that whether we adopt the procedure suggested in the second para. of Mr. Dening's minute or bring this question to the notice of the U.S.G. in any other way it will be clear enough to Mr. Hull that we are showing umbrage at being kept insufficiently informed of the nature of these conversations and might run the risk of another manifestation of displeasure from the Secretary. But I think this is a risk which we now ought to run. I feel that we should say frankly to Mr. Hull that however non-committal these conversations will be they are bound to touch on subjects which most vitally affect British interests in the Far East, and if he gets anywhere at all with them he will inevitably come to some understanding with the Japanese which will engage these interests. It would obviously be very awkward for all the parties concerned if this understanding were one which H.M.G. found themselves unable to accept.

I think that we might, as Mr. Dening suggests, propose to the F.O. some action on these lines, after H.E. has had time to consider these telegrams on his return.



November 6th, 1941.

WGH:NT

Mr. Hull has always assured us that as soon as the exploratory conversations reached the stage of establishing common ground on which negotiations could be based that he would bring us, China & the N.E. I. in, & that he had so told the Jee. There necessary common ground he has let us understand would be the acceptance of his well-known principles & abandonment of their own policy of expansion by force or forceful pressure, & of economic exclusiveness, in favour of the "good things" held before their eyes by

by Mr. Hull as the sure consequence  
of adhesion to Mr. Hull's principles.  
Further than this we have never  
learned; and ~~by~~ there has  
always been the danger that  
in order to reach the common  
ground interpretations of the  
principles + their application  
to particular cases would have  
to be broached in advance during  
the exploratory conversations:  
partial commitments or understandings  
might even be necessary.

The S.D. <sup>+ the Pres</sup> give us to understand  
that hardly any progress has been  
made in these exploratory conversations,  
+ that very little has been going on  
recently in the way of conversations.  
The fact <sup>se</sup> now, as on a previous  
occasion in similar circumstances  
have given us to understand that  
The

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

See eg.  
paper 31  
§ 2(a)

The conversations have been fairly detailed & rather continuous. Either the U.S.G. have been letting the Jap<sup>se</sup> suppose they mean more than they do, or they have been deliberately deceiving us (which I rather doubt), or the Jap<sup>se</sup> have been seeking to deceive us through Sir R. Craigie. The Jap<sup>se</sup> approaches <sup>on the subject of these weapons</sup> to us have seemed to me to smack, on each & particularly the last occasion, of attempts at wedge-driving between us & the U.S.A.

It is this point which I think ~~we~~ might be made with Mr. Hull if we hand him a paraphrase of paper No. 601 - as proposed by Mr. Dering.

R.C. 4/11.

Now see - 604 + 605

W.S.