1. The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously
this morning for an interview with me, and came to see me
this afternoon;
He began by recalling a conversation that we had had
when he had first arrived in Washington as to the desirability
of maintaining peace in the Pacific.      Since then, as I knew,
he had for some time been talking with Mr. Hull, and from these
talks three principal points of difficulty had emerged.
2. The first point concerned the Tri-Partite Pact. The
Ambassador did not develop this in detail beyond saying that the
United States Government wished for some more precise definition
of the Japanese attitude than they had hitherto felt able to give,
but he thought that the United States Government understood the
Japanese position pretty well.
The second point concerned non-discrimination and
equality of treatment in economic matters.     These he thought
could be adjusted.
The third point, which was the only one on which he
anticipated serious difficulty, concerned the admission of a
right for Japan, secured by agreement with China, to station
troops for an agreed period, in Worth China and Inner Mongolia
to control the Communist armies there.
3. So far no solution had -emerged in his conversations
with Mr. Hull on this third point.
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to
internal differences between on the one hand the Prime Minister
anu those who Wished to reach agreement with the United States
by not insisting on the third point mentioned above, and on the
other /
one point in our talk the Ambassador remarked that
some Americans spolte of finishing off the Japanese Wavy in a few
days.     But the Japanese   Navy was well trained, and,as I knew
never surrendered, and he thought it could be relied upon to
give a good account of itself.
I disclaimed any desire to appraise the relative
merits of Nsvies, and told him that British policy had been
repeatedly defined.      I could define it for him again by
repeating that we were anxious to find the way to friendly
relations with Japan, but we could not hope to resume those
friendly relations so long as Japanese policy retained the
direction it had recently followed.
I asked him whether Mr. Shigemitsu might be expected
shortly to return to London.     As to this, he was without
information, but he knew that Mr. Shigeroitsu was in frequent
conference at the Japanese Foreign Office.
I also asked him whether he had any opinion as to
what might be General Chiang Kai shek's view of his third point
as to temporary occupation by Japanese troops of an area in
North China by agreement with the Chinese Government.
He said he had not, but he had an impression that
though the Chinese army were not now very keen on fighting,
Chinese diplomacy was extremely shrewd, and vastly better than
that of Japan.
The whole conversation was very friendly, and left
on my mind the clear impression that the Japanese Government,
or certainly that part of it for which Admiral Nomura can be
held to speak, felt their position to be one of extreme difficulty.
k
16th October, 19U1