SECRKT
In view of the importance which the
Turkish question has assumed in recent months,
His Majesty's Government feel it desirable to
state for the information of the United States
Government the nature of their policy in regard
to Turkey and the strategic grounds on which it
is based.
It is vital to the Middle Eastern
position of the Allies, firstly, that the Germans
should not be allowed passage through Turkey and,
secondly, that Turkey should resist if attacked.
An Axis attack on Turkey would not be aimed at the
conquest of Turkey alone, though no doubt Germany
would be glad enough to obtain certain Turkish raw
materials.    The main objective of the attack would
be the destruction of the right flank of Great
Britain's position in the Middle East and the
capture of Egypt and the Suez Canal.    A further
aim might well be Iraq and the Persian Gulf, though
this is unlikely to be an immediate objective until
the Germans have occupied the Caucasus.    The best,
and so long as Great Britain holds Cyprus and has
control over Syria, the only method of turning the
British right flank is a drive through Anatolia*
Were the Turks to acquiesce in the passage
of German troops, the British forces would be obliged
to occupy defensive position   along the Northern
Syrian and Iraq frontiers, with the following grave
disadvantages:    (1) unsuitable country with no
natural strong defensive features, and a very
difficult/
WGH: HK
difficult divergent line of withdrawal through
Syria and Iraq;    (2) a heavy scale German air
attack from the Anatolian air fields on British
lines of communications and Egypt;    (3) a powerful
threat of air end sea invasion of Cyprus, and in
the event of its loss an increased air threat to
British positions in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and
the Canal itself.
In the event of Turkish resistance and
combined Turco-3ritlsh action a very much more satis-
factory system of defence in depth could be adopted
with the following advantages;    (1) topographically,
Turkey is much more suitable than Syria for defence,
and even if most of Anatolia were quickly overran
there are very strong natural defensive positions in
Turkey along the line of the Taurus mountains which the
Allied forces would be aule to occupy instead of
having to stand in Syria;    (2) the German air threat
to Syria would be kept at a distance, and the
Anatolian air fields would be at the disposal of the
Royal Air Force for attacks on Axis bases in the Aegean
Islands and Greece, German lines of communication
through the Balkans, and the ^oumaniar oil fields;
(3) Cyprus would be less vulnerable.
There are the following further advantages
of Turkish resistance;  (1) iiven if the resistance
were not prolonged, some toll would be taken of Axis
man &nd war material;    (8) A successful defence of
Anatolia would provide Allied bases for both land and
air forces for attacks on Greece, Crete, the Aegean
Islands/
-3-
Islands and the Dodecanese and could lead to
the developing of an offensive strategy through
the Balkan countries at a future date.
The above strategic considerations will
make it plain how important it is to His
Majesty's Government that the Turkish will end
capacity to resist should be maintained.    If she
is to resist, it is necessary to collaborate with
her whenever possible and generally try to build
her up militarily so that she may be in a position
to play a useful part if attacked.    It is from this
point of view that the maintenance of as large a
supply of war materials as possible in the period
before a German attack or German demands for transit
rights assumes particular importance.     Any hint or
suspicion in the Turkish mind that the present volume
of military supplies might be decreased would
seriously prejudice the chances of the Turks
resisting German demands or a German attack. During
the recent discussions with Turkey about the supply
of chrome, His Majesty's Government would have liked
to be able to use the threat of cutting off supplies
if a satisfactory chrome agreement were not concluded.
But in practice they could not afford to do so, for
the simple reason that strategically it is essential,
with a German attack in the Middle East as an ever-
present possibility, that His Majesty's Government
should/
should avoid any quarrel with Turkey sucn as
might lead the latter to adopt a policy of
isolation or to go over to the Axis.
TRB BRITISH KUBA33Y,
WASHINGTON, D. G. ,
October 22nd, 1941.
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