MINUTE SHEET. R&rmc
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WGH:HK
In view of Mr. Welles*report that
Mr. Hull feels he has received insufficient
support from H.M.G. in regard to his proposals
for a modus Vivendi , it may be as well to
recapitulate
the American
the history of our knowledge of
talks with the Japanese.
2. It was on November 18th that we were
first brought into the picture.   On that day
Mr. Hull sent for Sir Ronald Campbell and told
him of a proposal by Mr. Kurusu that the
Japanese should withdraw from Indo China in /
return for a moderate relaxation of the embargo. / 60
3- The P.O. responded to this on November
21st, saying that they thought that if this was
a genuine offer it would be well to respond,
provided this could be done in such a way that .
there was no semblance of abandoning China.kL- t*o,G$$s\
1+. The next day Mr. Hull sent for H.E. and
the Chinese Ambassador and the Dutch and Australian
Ministers and told them of Mr. Kurusu's 5-point
proposal.   On this occasion he gave a rough sketch
of his counter proposals and asked for comments
and suggestions from the other Governments. H.E.
told Mr. Hull that on the basis of the P.O.'s
previous telegram he thought it was safe to say
that H.M.G. would be willing to consider an arrange-
ment on the lines suggested. £too*4*~.j4^ bJL, <sS"l^
5- On November 21*th Mr. Hull again sent for
the Heads of Missions and produced the modus Vivendi.
H.E. on that occasion raised certain points of
detail in regard to it, and said that he hoped it
would be possible to wait until H.M.G. had expressed
their views before giving it to the Japanese; but
he added that if Mr. Hull felt bound to go ahead
we should trust his discretion and that he could
count on our full support. ^O^tfbkfiZ. hlL .lb***J7l)
6. On returning to the iSnbassy that night,
H.E. found that the P.O.'s comments on Mr. Hull's
originally suggested counter-proposals (see paragraph
Uabove) had just come in.    These said that H.M.G.
had complete confidence in Mr. Hull's handling of the
negotiations and felt that he was in the best
position to Judge whether to proceed with counter
proposals or to reject the Japanese proposals out of
hand.    The instructions went on to make certain
suggestions in regard to the counter proposals;
the§e suggestions were somewhat stiffer than
Mr. Hull's own proposals (which the P.O. had not at
the time seen), but were not by any means
irreconcilable, and the P.O. was careful to make it
plain that they thought it desirable to ask a higher
initial price than they would later be prepared to
accept.   Finally, they felt obliged to demur to a
suggestion by Mr. Hull that diplomatic representatives
here should have discretion in regard to the extent
of the lifting of the embargo.   H.E. showed Mr. Hull
these/
[OVER.
-A?
these instructions the next morning, and the
differences on points of detail were discussed.
Mr. Hull undertook to consider them and did not
then suggest that anything in them made it
homeless to proceed with the modus Vivendi* /(F.O.hJl
7. This interview took place on the
morning of November 25th.    The next morning the
President received a message from the Prime
Minister which said, inter alia, "of course it is
for you to handle this business and we certainly
do not want an additional war.    There is only
one point that disquiets   us. -    What about
Chiang £ai-shek?,tx  That afternoon T. V. Soong
and the Chinese Ambassador saw the President and
delivered a message from Chiang Kai-shek which
took a strong line against.the modus Vivendi.
T. V. Soong himself also argued strongly against
it, and got the impression at the end of his
interview that the U.3.O. had given up the idea.
The same evening Mr. Hull telephoned to H.K. to
say that he had given the Japanese a statement
of general principles in regard to peace in the
Pacific, but that he had not given them the
modus Vivendi.    The next morning, November 27th,
Mr. Welles madeffcfe,charge of lack of support from
H. M. G.
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