THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 1, 1941
My dear Lord Halifax:
I am transmitting herewith for your confidential V
information a secret message which the Prime Minister
sent to the President under date of November 30.
Believe me
YotirsVrery sincerely,
Bnc.
His Excellency
The Right Honorable
The Viscount Halifax,
British Ambassador.
SECRET
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:     American Embassy, London
DATED:   November 50, 1941
There is one important method remaining unused,
it seems to me, in averting war between Japan and our
two countries, namely, a plain declaration, either
public or secret - whichever is thought more desirable,
that the gravest consequences will result from any
further aggressive act by Japan.   Your constitutional
difficulties are fully understood but it would be
tragic should Japan drift into v/ar by encroachment
without having the dire character of a further act
of aggression squarely and fairly before her.   Will you
not consider whether, at the moment which you judge
propitious, which may be very near, you should not say
that any further aggressive act by Japan would compel
you to place the gravest issues before Congress. Great
Britain would of course make a similar declaration or
share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrange-
ments are being made so that our action and yours will
be simultaneous.   Will you forgive me for pressing such
a course upon you?   It is my conviction, however, that it
might make all the difference and might avert an extension
of the combat.

/
Telegram from the Foreign office, London, tyrrf
to the British Embassy, Washington, y
dated December 1st, 19U1.
We agree with the view expressed in
paragraph k>    But since we do not wish to lay
ourselves open to the charge of having been
unwilling at difficult stage of negotiations
to give any help in our power you should inform
the Secretary of State before definitely refusing
to see Japanese representative.
2. You might say that our feeling was
against your seeing the Japanese in order that
there should* be no opening for them to create
trouble by representing that there was any lack
of unity among the A B C D powers.    If, however,
the Secretary of State has any messages he would
like you to convey to them, you are fully
authorized to meet his wishes.
3. If Secretary of State agrees that it
would be better for you not to see the Japanese,
you should use some polite pretext or another but
in last resort you may state that you are not
authorized to intervene in any way in the
negotiations.