Jttia' CtufA.-. PaS- QaSu^p Personal and Secret December 23rd, 19U1 My dear Welles, You will remember that at our last conversation I gave you the substance of the telegrams which I had received from Mr. Eden giving an account of his conversa- tions with M« Stalin in Moscow. A few more telegrams have now come in from Moscow and I think you will be interested to know their contents. In the first place, as regards Mr. Eden's general discussions with the Soviet representatives, you will remember that I explained that M. Stalin was insistent that any agreement that might be signed should include a reference to the restoration of the Russian/ The Honourable Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. C« *?.Hi..:iiK Russian pre-war frontiers. In a telegram dated December 20th, Mr. Kden reported that at a further meeting with M. Stalin on that day it had been agreed to postpone the negotiation of any actual agreements. Instead, M. Stalin had proposed that a full communique1 should be issued. Mr. Eden concurred in this suggestion, end I enclose herein a copy of the text of the communique as finally agreed upon. It would seem that it has also been agreed that this communique shall be broadcast at midnight, Greenwich Mean Time, on December 28th/29th, and that for reasons of security nothing should be published before that time. In his telegram of December 20th Mr. Eden stated that the meeting that day had been cordial, and in a subsequent telegram dated December 22nd Mr. Eden reported that his discussions had ended on a friendly note. The final talks with M. Stalin had been most satisfactory, and Mr. Eden felt sure that/ -3- that his visit had been worthwhile and that some at least of past suspicions on the part of the Russians had been allayed. Mr. Eden expressed the view that M. Stalin was sincerely anxious to conclude some definite agreement with the British Government. M. Stalin would, however, definitely not sign until the British Government recognised the Russian frontiers, and continued pressure on this question was to be anticipated. Mr. Eden added that meanwhile the positions of Great Britain and of the United States were completely safeguarded. Secondly, as regards the Par East, you will remember that I told you that M. Stalin had ex- plained to Mr. Eden that while he would be in a position to give assistance in the spring he was most anxious not to provoke Japan at the present moment. A subsequent telegram from Mr. Eden dated December 22nd reported a further conver- sation with M. Stalin in which the latter confirmed his previous attitude. M. Stalin had stated that a Soviet declaration of war on Japan would involve Russia in serious fighting for which they were not at present ready. Preparations were being made to replace/ rfQuprrna' IlIws as tfuods JjaixiqsijjsIsJ rtl replace the Russian troops now being moved onw oilnarisomlT" .svsa. asbli ,..rn.s $ Hi J tc from the Par East, but the necessary arrange- ments would not be completed for about four months. M. Stalin haa gone on to say that he ."sla'icm rijjnnsv -WmI a&iasriuma thought that from the point of view of Russian opinion it would be much better if Japan were left to attack:" the U.S.S.R. - a possibility which he thought very likely, though not just at the present moment but rather later on. Mr. Eden pointed out to M. Stalin that in the meantime the Japanese might adopt the policy of dealing with their enemies piecemeal and that the next few months would be very difficult in the Par East. M. Stalin had then concluded by saying that he would like the discussions regarding the Par East to be resumed in the spring when the Soviet Government would be in a better state of preparation. He thought however that the Japanese might attack the U.S.S.R. earlier, in which case the position would be clarified. . , , Yours very sincerely, (SGD) HALIFAX jr. o • \ o ve r) P.S. You know most of this already from Wi riant, "but I thought it might be useful to you to have our stuff in order. In telegraphing about an awful banquet that Eden had the last night and which went on till 5 a.m., Eden says, "Timoshenko who was present was most confident of Russian prospects in South. Both he and Stalin emphasise fall in lierrnan morale". H. 23.12.U1