Abstract

This paper reviews the existing scholarship on internal displacement in Europe and Central Asia. It concentrates on research relating to internal displacement in European and Central Asian countries affected by conflict, and the responses to that phenomenon at the national and regional levels. The paper starts by describing the main recent internal displacement trends across those regions, and for particular countries therein. It then reviews how scholarship on internal displacement in Europe and Central Asia has developed, respectively, in the fields of law and policy, other social sciences and humanities, and health and medicine. It ends by offering conclusions on the scope of existing research and directions for future study.

This review of the scholarly literature seeks to identify principal trends, gaps and opportunities relating to research on internal displacement. Towards this end, the review concentrates on academic publications, including monographs, chapters in edited volumes and peer-reviewed articles, from the early 1990s until the start of 2020, a period of approximately 30 years. It thus offers not only a critical review of the state of the art in this field of study but also a key point of reference for researchers looking to develop our understanding of internal displacement from the standpoint of a variety of different disciplines and themes.

The paper forms part of a series of papers published in this Working Paper Series that review the state of the scholarship on internal displacement at the global level and in particular regions as we enter the decade of the 2020s. This research forms part of the Interdisciplinary Network on Displacement, Conflict and Protection (AH/T005351/1) and Global Engagement on Internal Displacement in sub-Saharan Africa (EP/T003227/1) projects, pilots of which were supported by the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). It should be read in conjunction with the other review papers in this series.

Keywords

Internal Displacement, IDPs, Conflict, Europe, Central Asia
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1. Introduction

As of the start of 2020, more than 2.8 million people were living in internal displacement in Europe and Central Asia because of unresolved armed conflicts and territorial disputes. While the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region is comparably small in relation to other regions, most notably Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, and the Americas, Europe, has been historically the site of massive displacement crises, and is currently the home to some of the most protracted cases of internal displacement in the world.

The most recent wave of internal forced migration in Europe occurred as a result of armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014. At the height of the crisis in 2015, Ukraine had close to 1.8 million IDPs. Georgia, The Balkans, Caucasus, and Cyprus also have been home to sizable IDP populations.

The majority of European IDPs originate from and live in urban settings. This is not surprising. Europe and Central Asia are some of the most urbanized regions in the world, with 72% of their populations living in towns and cities. Although their situation, in general, is less precarious than those of IDPs in less developed parts of the world, IDPs still face significant challenges. For the most part, these challenges revolve around issues of adequate housing, land and property rights, and the search for durable solutions in situations where there is no immediate political resolution to the underlying conflicts. Frequently, IDPs in Europe are subjected to discrimination and marginalization. In many countries they are not granted equal access to basic services, including education and health care, and many live in the margins of society because of discrimination and a lack of documentation. Europe's IDPs tend to settle in disadvantaged urban settings that, in turn, create new vulnerabilities. They are often traumatized by what they have witnessed in war, the loss of their homes and family members, and by the daily challenges of living in displacement. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that, in addition to these IDPs, around 101,000 people were displaced in the region in 2019 as a result of natural and man-made disasters. In comparison with other regions, Europe has put in place fairly advanced national and regional legal frameworks for the protection of IDPs. After the conflicts that erupted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, many European countries anticipated the 1998 institution of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by drafting laws and policies to protect and assist IDPs. These included: Russia (1993); Tajikistan (1994); Bosnia & Herzegovina (1995); Georgia (1996), and Armenia (1998). Since then, these countries have been joined by Azerbaijan (1999), Serbia (2002), Kyrgyzstan (2010), and the Ukraine (2014).

At the regional level, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have all endorsed the Guiding Principles and have taken an active role in promoting the protection of IDPs. In 2018, the Council of Europe issued a first report on internal displacement in Europe calling for a regional comprehensive approach to internal displacement, citing a number of committee of ministers' recommendations, parliamentary assembly resolutions, and European Court of Human Rights.
Rights judgements on internal displacement.8

The EU is a major donor to humanitarian projects designed for IDPs both inside and outside Europe. With regards to regional norms, all EU member states are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, which has very relevant provisions with regards to displacement, such as the right to property (Article 17) and the right to health care (Article 35) that may be invoked by European IDPs. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also has an ad hoc Committee on Migration, and special representatives on the South Caucasus that monitor internal displacement.9

European countries with IDPs generally recognize their displaced populations and the state’s responsibility to protect them. Historically, however, these countries have also focused almost exclusively on facilitating IDPs returns, with little emphasis on alternative, durable solutions, such as integration or resettlement, or even taking into account the preferences of IDPs. Displaced persons have been used as political pawns by countries with unresolved conflicts, such as Azerbaijan and Cyprus, to call international attention to their territorial claims.

The following review looks at the academic and gray literature written in English on internal displacement in Europe in the last twenty years. This includes reports published by international organizations, such as the European Commission and the OSCE, and NGOs such as the IDMC, as well as papers and articles published in peer-reviewed journals. The focus of the review is almost exclusively on internal displacement resulting from armed conflict, generalized violence, and human rights violations, as opposed to natural and human-made disasters which have attracted little scholarly attention.

After discussing the principal trends in internal displacement in Europe and Central Asia, this paper takes a closer look at the various countries affected. It then outlines and discusses the literature produced in the social sciences, law and policy, and finally health and medicine. The paper concludes by identifying gaps in the literature and suggesting opportunities for further research. This study complements the global overview and other regional studies reflecting on internal displacement and the state of literature on the subject.10

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9 Ibid.
10 See the other research reviews published in this Working Paper Series as part of the Interdisciplinary Network on Displacement, Conflict and Protection (INDcaP). The INDcaP pilot project (AH/T005351/1) was generously supported by the UK Research and Innovation Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). This study on Africa was also carried out under the auspices of the related Global Engagement Network on Internal Displacement in sub-Saharan Africa (GENIDA) project that was also supported by the GCRF (EP/T003227/1).
2. Principal internal displacement trends in Europe

According to IDMC, the number of persons displaced by conflict and violence in the region has fluctuated between 1.5 and a little over 3.0 million during the past two decades. The first large wave of displacement occurred in the 1990s as a result of a number of armed conflicts following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This included over 2.2 million people displaced in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia between 1992 and 1995 during the most devastating conflict seen in Europe since the end of World War II. The war in Kosovo, which began in February 1998 and lasted until June 1999, also triggered the displacement of up to 1.5 million people.

As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh were displaced as a result of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh during the early 1990s. In Russia, fighting in North Ossetia and Chechnya in the early 1990s displaced over 800,000 people. More than 370,000 people were displaced in Georgia by several waves of armed conflict, in particular the conflict in Abkhazia between 1992-1993.

A second large wave of displacement occurred in the mid-2010s when more than 1.7 million Ukrainians were forced to flee because of armed conflict in breakaway territories of Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 by the Russian Federation. Since the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, Cyprus has been home to over 200,000 IDPs living in protracted displacement. In Cyprus and other countries, the number of IDPs has increased over the years as those initially displaced are joined by children and grandchildren who have grown up in displacement.

While in the past twenty years millions of IDPs have been able to return to their homes or achieve other durable solutions, most notably in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Russia, a significant number of people are living in protracted displacement in Europe due to unresolved conflicts in the region, most notably in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and, of course, Cyprus.

Data on internal displacement in Europe is more available and reliable than data on displacement in other regions. This is partly because of the region’s comparatively high level of economic development and openness of their societies but also because of advanced monitoring of population movements by NGOs, as well as by national and international institutions. A number of limitations, however, affect an accurate estimation of displacement.

In protracted situations of displacement, it is very difficult to ascertain if and when IDPs have achieved durable solutions, particularly when IDPs choose to integrate in their place of displacement or resettle elsewhere. In some countries, such as Ukraine or Azerbaijan, IDPs who have partially achieved durable solutions and live in conditions similar to host communities may continue to be officially registered or counted as IDPs. This may be because they have not received proper restitution for lost property, have unaddressed land claims, or simply choose to remain officially registered as IDPs in order to receive social benefits. The risk here is that some countries may be overestimating the real size of their displaced populations.

Some countries may have a political incentive to understate or overstate the number of dis-

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12 IDMC, Kosovo: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GRID%202018%20-%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20KOSOVO.pdf.
13 IDMC, Armenia: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20ARMENIA.pdf.
placed persons. Overstating displacement allows them to call international attention to unresolved diplomatic claims. Azerbaijan, for example, historically publishes inflated numbers of IDPs that include people who by most measures have successfully resettled. Lack of third party and impartial monitoring in countries such as Russia makes it impossible to triangulate officially provided figures that can be overly conservative.\textsuperscript{15}

Some governments in Europe are unable to produce displacement estimates for areas outside of their control such as Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.\textsuperscript{16} Displaced persons without proper documentation, mostly Roma and those living on the margins of society, are often unable to register as IDPs.\textsuperscript{17} Internal displacement data relating to forced evictions and individualized political persecution of ethnic minorities in highly autocratic countries like Turkmenistan is also extremely scarce because of stringent controls on information.

Below are brief descriptions of the internal displacement situations in the various affected countries in the region.

2.1 Ukraine

Currently, Ukraine is home to the largest internal displacement crisis in the region. According to IDMC, as of the end of 2018, over 800,000 IDPs were displaced in Ukraine because of conflict and violence. Over 12,000 were displaced in 2018 alone.\textsuperscript{18}

Displacement is the result of armed conflict triggered in March 2014 by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, an autonomous republic of Ukraine, and the subsequent proclamation of independence by the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. The crisis began with the ouster of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Yanukovych in February 2014 and continued during the following referendum and annexation as many fled out of fear or because of threats, intimidation and discrimination based on their ethnicity or political association. Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from the rest of the country in May 2014, provoking a military response from Kiev. Despite numerous ceasefire agreements, hostilities have continued, and the two regions have remained beyond the Ukrainian government’s control.

IDPs in Ukraine are fleeing violence and human rights violations as well as reduced access to housing, livelihoods, welfare benefits, social services, healthcare, and education as a result of the conflict. While most of Ukraine’s IDPs fled the fighting in the eastern regions, a smaller number, mostly members of Crimea’s Muslim Tartar minority, fled the Crimean peninsula before annexation. The majority of Ukraine’s registered IDPs have settled in urban centers in the eastern part of the country. The security situation along this border with Ukraine’s eastern regions is particularly volatile, and IDPs’ reduced access to aid and local services puts them at risk of repeated displacement. An unknown number of people have also fled to Russia and other neighboring countries. A number of people are displaced within the regions of Ukraine that lie outside of the Ukrainian government’s control, including the Crimean peninsula, but very little is known about their number, location, or living conditions.\textsuperscript{19} Tragically, displacement has led to family separations as many men remain behind in conflict areas to take care of their property and continue

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, IDMC, Russia: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20RUSSIA.pdf.

\textsuperscript{16} See, for example, IDMC, Ukraine: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20UKRAINE.pdf.


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
to work while women and children flee to safety. The elderly and people with limited mobility, unable to withstand the long journey to safety, also remain behind.

Many IDPs are housed in collective accommodations such as summer camp facilities, hotels, or dormitories administered by regional authorities. Others live with friends and family, or in rented accommodations in host communities. A growing number of IDPs have been returning to areas outside of the Ukrainian government’s control because of the unsuitability of available housing or because they are unable to afford to live in government-controlled areas. Some of these returnees continue to be registered as IDPs, travelling regularly to government-controlled areas to collect welfare benefits. In 2018, the Ukraine’s eastern conflict line recorded a 15% increase in crossings through official checkpoints.20

As in other conflicts, lack of access to various forms of civil documentation remains a major challenge for many Ukrainian IDPs. Displaced Roma have been particularly affected because they tend not to carry national identity documents. This has prevented them from registering as IDPs, finding formal employment, or accessing healthcare and housing. The situation is made worse by the fact that Roma are the target of discrimination by local authorities and host communities.21 Very little is known about the current situation and needs of Tartars displaced from Crimea.

After more than five years of conflict, displacement in Ukraine has become protracted. A survey conducted by IOM in June 2018 revealed that for the first time a majority of the IDPs in Ukraine prefer to settle in the areas of displacement rather than return to their homes for both economic and security reasons.22 The Ukrainian government, in the hope of reclaiming its lost territories, however, has almost exclusively focused on IDP return as the only solution, although the political prospects for doing so are becoming increasingly unlikely.

Ukraine has put in place a law on IDPs’ rights and freedoms with support from the Global Protection Cluster led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This legislation, enacted in October 2014, upholds some core international standards reflected in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and addresses key protection concerns by incorporating an anti-discrimination provision, a guarantee of assistance for voluntary returns, and access to social and economic services including residence registration, employment and healthcare. Some important gaps, however, became apparent during implementation. These relate to IDPs’ registration, their access to social benefits and civil documentation, and the absence of a government institution to serve as a focal point on IDPs.23

2.2 Georgia

As of the end of 2018, there were an estimated 293,000 IDPs in the Republic of Georgia. These people were displaced in two major waves of armed conflict involving the Russian Federation in 1991-1992 and in 2008 in separatist regions.24 This fighting erupted in the early 1990s in South Ossetia and then Abkhazia as both autonomous areas moved to secede from Georgia. Since a ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, both regions have effectively remained outside the control of the Georgian government. Hostilities in the two regions continued sporadically until armed conflict broke out again in 2008 between Georgia and the Russian Federation over South

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23 IDMC, Ukraine: Translating IDPs’ Protection into Legislative Action.
Ossetia. Fighting ended soon after, however, the conflicts remain unresolved, and IDPs have largely been blocked from returning to these areas. The majority of Georgia’s IDPs (approximately 256,000) were displaced during the first wave of hostilities in the 1990s. A much smaller number became displaced in 2008 alone.25

Approximately 40% of Georgia’s displaced population lives in the capital, Tbilisi.26 The principal obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs located in areas controlled by the Georgian government include inadequate housing, displacement-related barriers to sources of livelihood, and segregated education. According to the Georgian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 59% of their IDPs do not have accommodation deemed sustainable and are therefore in need of humanitarian assistance.27 There is very little information on the number, status or location of people displaced within South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since August 2008, the de facto authorities in both regions, with significant backing from the Russian Federation, were left in complete control of these territories.

The government’s initial displacement strategy and public discourse were overwhelmingly focused on facilitating the return of IDPs to their place of origin. Since 2007, the government that came to power as a result of Georgia’s “rose revolution” has been increasingly invested in improving IDPs’ situations in places of resettlement.28 They have made some progress in addressing IDP housing issues, renovating the living spaces of collective centers, transferring ownership rights to current occupants, and financing the improvement and purchase of private homes. The majority of IDPs displaced during the first wave of violence, however, continue to live in inadequate conditions in collective centers or with relatives and friends. IDPs, particularly women, continue to suffer from long-term unemployment and have become, as a result, increasingly dependent on state benefits and external assistance.29

Georgia’s IDPs, for the most part, have been prevented from returning to South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the de facto authorities in control of these territories. There have been, however, a limited number of returns, particularly in Gali district of Abkhazia. Very little is known about returnees to South Ossetia because humanitarian organizations have had very limited access to the region since 2008. Returnees reportedly face continuing insecurity, barriers to freedom of movement, inadequate housing, lack of employment and obstacles to livelihoods, and poor education. Their situation was worsened with the suppression of the Georgian language in schools and a 2009 arrangement under which the Russian military began to guard the administrative lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including maritime waters.30

In 1996, Georgia became one of the first countries in the world to institute a law to protect the rights of IDPs.31 Since then, Georgia has developed a complex legal framework to regulate their rights and duties, established a national coordinating body in the form of the Ministry of IDPs from the Occupied Territories, trained government officials, raised national awareness of internal displacement, and collected data on the number and location of IDPs. The Georgian government, however, has been criticized for failing to allocate adequate resources to implement its programs, for ignoring IDPs living in private accommodations, and for not seeking the participation of IDPs in its strategy.32

25 IDMC, “Georgia: Partial Progress Towards Durable Solutions for IDPs.”
26 Ibid.
28 IDMC, “Georgia: Partial Progress Towards Durable Solutions for IDPs.”
29 Ibid.
31 Cardona-Fox, Exile within Borders: A Global Look at Commitment to the International Regime to Protect Internally Displaced Persons.
32 IDMC, “Georgia: Partial Progress Towards Durable Solutions for IDPs.”
2.3 The Balkans

The armed conflicts in the 1990s that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia produced a massive wave of displacement in the Balkans. The Bosnian War, which took place between 1992 and 1995, is estimated to have displaced over 2.2 million people, about half of the country’s population, making it the most devastating conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. The war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 that focused on peace-building activities, reconstruction, and democratization. The agreement also outlined restitution and return policies for displaced persons and established monitoring and intervention activities.\(^{33}\)

While the peace accord succeeded in providing durable solutions for most Bosnian IDPs, to this day, approximately 99,000 IDPs still live in protracted displacement. More than half of them live in the Republika Srpska, more than a third in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a minority in the Brcko district.\(^{34}\) Most IDPs live in private accommodations while a minority continue to live in collective centers. Most IDPs survive on small incomes derived from informal labor. Displaced Roma are particularly marginalized since they tend to lack the proper documentation with which to access public services and claim their housing and property rights.\(^{35}\) Returning IDPs have had to face a number of challenges, including high compensation for improvements made to their property by secondary occupants, damaged homes and insufficient aid, as well as meager employment opportunities, ethnically segregated school systems, and hostility from local communities.\(^{36}\)

Politicians in Bosnia have been accused of doing little to address the persistent ethnic divide in post-war political discourse and policies. Consequently, persons displaced from areas where they were among the ethnic minority tend to return or resettle in communities where they are the majority or chose to remain displaced.\(^{37}\)

As of the end of 2018, there were an estimated 16,000 IDPs in Kosovo. More than 1.5 million people were displaced by the war in 1998-1999 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Albanian allies.\(^{38}\) Kosovo declared independence in 2008 despite Serbian opposition, and has since been recognized by 115 states.\(^{39}\)

The vast majority of Kosovo's IDPs live in private accommodations. A small minority (less than 500 individuals) are housed in 29 dilapidated collective centers. Most IDPs have been displaced for over 17 years, living under precarious economic conditions, characterized by high unemployment and a heavy dependence on social assistance. A profiling exercise conducted in 2016 by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) with the support of the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) found that minority Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, and women IDPs had much lower access to education.\(^{40}\)

While most Albanian IDPs would like to return to their place of origin, they have reported difficulties reclaiming their abandoned property because it was damaged, destroyed, or occupied by

\(^{33}\) IDMC, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Figure Analysis*, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GRID%202018%20-%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20BOSNIA%20-%20HERZEGOVINA.pdf.


\(^{35}\) IDMC, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethno-political agendas still prolonging displacement.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.


\(^{38}\) IDMC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019."

\(^{39}\) IDMC, *Kosovo: Figure Analysis."

Widespread discrimination against Serbs and Roma has also prevented them from returning to areas where they are in the minority. Consequently, these populations have chosen to integrate in their place of displacement and have indicated a need for housing assistance.

The Republic of North Macedonia is reported to have a residual number of 140 IDPs displaced in 2001 by ethnic conflict between the Macedonian majority and an Albanian ethnic minority. As of the end of 2018, both Serbia and Croatia claim not to have any IDPs remaining from the conflicts fought in the 1990s.

According to the Global Protection Cluster’s Database on Laws and Policies, Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina have put in place laws and policies on internal displacement, and Serbia and Montenegro have instituted several displacement protection policies. Kosovo and Macedonia have yet to institute any legislation.

2.4 Armenia/Azerbaijan

The Government of Azerbaijan reports that as of December 2018, an estimated 644,000 persons remain displaced as a result of its unresolved conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. IDMC considers that about half of this caseload (300,000) have achieved a partial solution to displacement by successfully relocating with government assistance. A much smaller number of Armenians (8,400) are believed to remain displaced, although there is very little information about them.

The conflict began in 1988 when Karabakh Armenians demanded that Karabakh be transferred from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The situation then escalated into a full-scale war after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A ceasefire in 1994 placed the enclave and about 9% of Azerbaijan’s territory under Armenian control. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh displaced as many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh. To this day, tensions between the two countries remain high, and a ceasefire is often broken by sporadic clashes. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were some of the first countries to institute laws and policies on internal displacement in line with the Guiding Principles.

While Armenia has largely ignored the small number of IDPs living in protracted displacement in its territory, the government of Azerbaijan has made IDP protection a priority and tends to publicize their existence, often inflating the reported numbers, in an effort perhaps to call international attention to the unresolved conflict. The government of Azerbaijan has put in place a number of official state programs for the improvement of IDPs’ living standards and the generation of employment for refugees and IDPs. IDPs are also granted temporary housing assistance pending the implementation of a “Great Return Programme,” announced in 2005, to promote the return of IDPs in the eventuality of a future settlement of the armed conflict with Armenia.

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41 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 See statistics available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries.
47 IDMC, Armenia: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GRID%202018%20-%20Figure20Analysis%20-%20ARMENIA.pdf.
48 Cardona-Fox, Exile within Borders: A Global Look at Commitment to the International Regime to Protect Internally Displaced Persons.
49 See reporting by IDMC, for example, IDMC, Azerbaijan: Figure Analysis, n.d., available at: https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/GRID%202018%20-%20Figure20Analysis%20-%20AZERBAIJAN_0.pdf.
50 IDMC, Azerbaijan: Figure Analysis.
The government has prioritized the return of IDPs to the disputed region although a growing number of younger IDPs prefer to remain in their place of refuge. The likelihood of retuning is further complicated by the fact that the Armenian government has been resettling Syrian-Armenian refugees escaping violence in Syria in Nagorno-Karabakh.

IDPs principal concern has long been inadequate housing. Although the government of Azerbaijan has recently made efforts to provide IDPs with better housing arrangements, home ownership rights remain problematic. Government-built IDP settlements tend to be remotely located with little access to services, jobs, and sources of livelihood. IDPs suffer higher rates of unemployment and are more dependent on government benefits as their principal source of income than the general population.

2.5 Cyprus

Cyprus is home to an estimated 228,000 IDPs living in protracted displacement since the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. The Cypriot-Turkish dispute began in 1974 when a group backed by the Greek military junta ousted the Cypriot leader, prompting Turkey to respond by sending troops and occupying the northern part of the country. While Greek Cypriots fled to the south, Turkish Cypriots fled to the north. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), established by Turkey but otherwise not recognized by the international community, does not report having any IDPs within its borders, claiming that residents were given the opportunity to move into the TRNC with assistance or to remain in their place of refuge with protections and guarantees. The Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, maintains that a sizable displaced population has not achieved durable solutions because they have not received proper compensation for lost or stolen property.

2.6 Others: Russia, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

In Russia, 2,300 remain displaced as a result of armed conflict and violence in Chechnya and North Ossetia. At their height, the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus displaced over 800,000 people. Although large-scale fighting ended in 2009, violence and human rights abuses have continued as an expanded insurgency intermittently clashes with law enforcement authorities. The Russian government maintains a registry of “forced migrants.” The Russian government has over time removed people from the registry as it institutes protection policies and housing programs, but there is very little third-party monitoring in Russia to confirm that IDPs removed from the registry have in fact achieved durable solutions.

Approximately 130,000 people were displaced from the Moldovan region of Transistria by armed conflict in eastern Moldova between 1990 and 1992. In 2016, UNHCR estimated that 2,300 remained displaced. There is very little information about their current situation or whether this population received proper compensation for property lost. IDMC has ceased reporting on this caseload.

National authorities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have, at different times, subjected various
communities to arbitrary displacement. In 2003, Turkmenistan’s President, Saparmurat Niyazov, began to use forced relocation to punish persons he suspected of disloyalty to his regime. Over 2,000 Uzbeks were removed from the border with Uzbekistan to the Balkan region. Those displaced were housed in settlements with no reliable access to electricity, gas, communication facilities, or sources of livelihood.\textsuperscript{59}

In 2000, the government of Uzbekistan forcibly relocated as many as 4,000 people, mostly ethnic Tajiks, along the border with Tajikistan in response to an armed incursion from an Islamic insurgent group from Tajikistan. These IDPs were last reported to be living in deplorable conditions with little access to humanitarian assistance and constantly subjected to harassment and intimidation by government authorities. IDMC stopped reporting on these caseloads, and very little is known about the fate of these populations.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
3. Research scholarship on internal displacement in Europe

3.1 Social sciences, arts and humanities

The European/Central Asian context has produced a rich body of research on internal displacement even though levels of displacement have been comparatively low and the humanitarian situations have been less critical than in other regions given the affected countries’ more advanced level of development. The richness of the research is due to several major factors. One is the relative ease of access to displaced populations. The countries affected by displacement, with some exceptions, tend to be relatively open societies with a plethora of advocacy and research institutions. All of these factors facilitate monitoring and research. Most significantly, Europe and Central Asia are home to a number of protracted crises in which IDPs have been living in relatively stable situations of displacement for decades. Greek Cypriot communities, for example, have been displaced since 1974. Others from the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union date their displacement to the 1990s and early 2000s. Ukraine’s IDPs have been displaced for over five years. These crises have been the subject of study in areas of political science, social anthropology, sociology, geography, medicine, and gender and legal studies. Much of this research has examined the challenges of living in protracted displacement and finding durable solutions when there are no imminent resolutions to conflicts.

In the social sciences, a significant amount of scholarship targets displacement in Georgia. In the 1990s, it became apparent that separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, supported by Russia, were engaged in an ethnic cleansing campaign, and that the international community was unable to put a stop to it.61 People who fled the conflict became stuck in protracted situations of displacement as the Georgian government, insisting on returning all IDPs, lost control over some territories and a flare-up of hostilities caused a second wave of displacement in 2008.62 While the government refrained from publicly promoting integration, it did support a number of temporary practical measures such as the transformation of hotels into collective housing centers and assistance to IDPs to purchase private homes.63 Inadequate housing and access to basic services and sources of livelihood have remained major problems, particularly within the context of an impoverished economy. Most IDPs have been unable to claim restitution or mutual recognition of property.64

Within this context, a group of scholars including Kabachnik, Mitchneck, Mayorova and others, have published a series of sociological, geographical, and gender-focused studies on IDPs struggling to survive and integrate into Georgian society.65 Mitchnek, Mayorova, and Regulska look at issues of isolation and integration of IDP communities from Abkhazia, analyzing the composition, size and density of social networks in the post-conflict environment and the socio-spatial characteristics of social interactions and social networks.66 While they recognized that the chal-

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62 NRC, “Trapped in Displacement: Internally Displaced People in the Osce Area.”
63 Ibid.
66 “Post-Conflict Displacement: Isolation and Integration in Georgia.”
Challenges of integration are complex, they found that the ability to find employment was the most important factor facilitating IDP integration. On average, IDPs living near the capital Tbilisi are better off and have higher functioning personal social networks than those living in more remote areas because they have more access to job opportunities.

Mitchnek, Mayorova and Regulska suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, IDPs living in collective centers are less isolated than those living in private accommodations. Kabachnik and others support this idea, and found that IDPs living in collective centers are often better off despite living in often unsanitary and overcrowded conditions. This is because IDPs living in private accommodations – the majority of Georgia’s IDPs – have less visibility and less access to assistance from government programs and non-governmental agencies, particularly with regards to healthcare. IDPs living in collective centers also benefit from a collective economy of sharing resources, which provides them, and particularly women, with a safety net that is otherwise unavailable to IDPs living in private accommodations.

The critical geographic lens of these studies calls into question the commonly held view that housing automatically resolves most of the problems associated with displacement. The gender-geographical focus also shows how men and women IDPs experience displacement differently. The loss of livelihood and changing gender roles caused by displacement produce what Kabachnik et, al. refer to as “traumatic masculinities.” As a result of displacement, men suffer from a loss of status and challenges to their traditional family roles, yet continue to maintain a hegemonic masculine discourse. A clear implication of this study is that humanitarians need to be more sensitive and inclusive to the participation of men in their programming. Seguin and her colleagues also apply a gender-based approach to explore IDPs’ experience of loss and coping strategies and conclude that when addressing displacement it is critical to foster strong social networks and sustainable livelihoods.

Kabachnik and his colleagues argue that IDPs’ identities and their idea of “home” and “place” are fluid and that it is essential to understand IDPs’ coping strategies when addressing durable solutions. Seen together, studies by Kabachnik, Seguin and others make clear the importance of including access to decent livelihood opportunities as a central component in the search for durable solutions to displacement, and for the inclusion of IDPs themselves in the design and implementation of policies aimed to assist them.

Other studies echo this strong critique of Georgia’s Action plan and its policy of relocation. Kurshitashivi also laments the Georgian government’s efforts to provide IDPs with durable housing solutions. He finds that while their policies partially provided IDPs with housing and land, they eroded IDPs most important asset – labor – by resettling them in remote rural areas where employment opportunities were scarce. He distinguishes between the “old” and “new” waves of displacement and argues against the government’s “one size fits all” approach to resettlement.

An ethnographical study conducted by Koch goes even further, arguing that Georgia’s IDPs are

67 Ibid.
68 Kabachnik et al., “The Multiple Geographies of Internal Displacement: The Case of Georgia.”
69 “Post-Conflict Displacement: Isolation and Integration in Georgia.”
70 “The Multiple Geographies of Internal Displacement: The Case of Georgia.”
71 “Traumatic Masculinities: The Gendered Geographies of Georgian Idps from Abkhazia.”
73 Kabachnik, Regulska, and Mitchneck, “Where and When Is Home? The Double Displacement of Georgian Idps from Abkhazia.”
74 “The Impact of Socially Ir/Responsible Resettlement on the Livelihoods of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia.”
marginalized by the very system of interventions designed to assist them. The lives of IDPs living in protracted displacement in Georgia evidence a form of what she refers to as “sanctioned abandonment” that cements their structural vulnerability, making it virtually impossible for them to achieve social mobility and condemning them to live in the margins of society. She argues that the state’s housing strategies keep IDPs “entangled and embroiled in ambiguous bureaucratic processes and everyday lives that are fraught with uncertainty.” IDPs are not only uninformed in the design and implementation of state interventions but are also uninformed about their rights under changing action plans and are ultimately hurt by these policies.

A wider examination of long-term market integration of IDPs in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia from a business management perspective demonstrates the cumulative disadvantage of forced displacement. Using multiple regression analysis, Ivlevs and Veliziotis show that in 2010, people that had been displaced for 10 or 15 years were much more likely than the general population to experience long-term unemployment, a recent job loss, or work in the informal sector. Women also evidenced greater “employment scarring” than men.

Studies such as these should prompt policymakers in countries with protracted displacement to look beyond the housing needs of IDPs and actively support their re-entry into the labor market by investing in education and training, particularly for women, and harboring IDPs in areas with greater access to employment opportunities.

Social sciences studies on the Balkans region focus on the wider effects of returns and resettlement in countries with fragile multi-ethnic societies. Unlike in Georgia, the conflicts in the Balkans concluded with political outcomes that allowed for IDP returns and reparation, most notably though the Dayton Peace Accords. Studies have found, however, that post-war returns in the Balkans have been marred by a dominant pattern of ethnic entrenchment and continuous discrimination.

During the conflict that erupted in 1992 in Bosnia, the various warring parties, refusing to live with other ethnic groups, engaged in a campaign of “ethnic cleansing” with the objective of creating territorially contiguous and homogenous ethnic states. Additional post-conflict displacement occurred in 1999 following the transfer of territories between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Since the end of the conflict in 1995, more than one million refugees and IDPs were able to return to their homes because of an effective property repossession process directed by the international community that allowed 90% of owners to repossess their pre-war homes. Most returnees returned to areas where they were among the ethnic majority. Many IDPs who effectively took possession sold their properties without actually returning to their pre-war homes. Minority IDPs and returnees continued to face discrimination from local authorities who gave preferential treatment to majority groups with regards to housing assistance, services, education, health and employment.

Twenty years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Pasic lamented that return patterns were perpetuating demographic changes initiated by the war, further embedding ethnic homogeneity. He decried that this entrenching of ethnic division would result in almost mono-ethnic communities with little intermingling of the populations, perpetuating mistrust and ethnic intolerance, diminishing the prospects for reconciliation, the creation of multi-ethnic societies, and the renewal of political instability in Bosnia.

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75 “Protracted Displacement in Georgia: Structural Vulnerability and “Existing Not Living”.”
77 NRC, “Trapped in Displacement: Internally Displaced People in the Osce Area.”
A similar dynamic applied to the Serb minority displaced from Croatia. According to Djuric, the post-war reparation process for Serbs in Croatia was marred by discriminatory policies at the institutional level and resistance from local communities. While the Tudman administration in the 1990s was generally unwilling to welcome back the Serb minority, the succeeding coalition government was too weak to overcome local resistance to minority returns. The tide eventually changed after 2003 when an HDZ government, in political coalition with Serb parties, became more open and affirming of the Serbian population. The government’s repatriation policy ceased to be a politically charged issue and was treated mostly as a practical matter. By that time, however, IDP returns had naturally begun to slow down, as forced migrants integrated and resettled elsewhere, essentially producing a post-war Croatian society that was more ethnically homogeneous.

Dordevic documents a similar process in other parts of the former Yugoslavia where different policies of return produced inequalities and unevenness of citizenship. In Kosovo, insistence on group-differentiated rights has led to discrimination and deeper ethnic divisions. Although Kosovo went to great lengths to implement important security sector reforms to include minorities, build confidence, and promote reconciliation, it was not enough to create a truly multi-ethnic and impartial justice and security system. Unfortunately, aside from these studies, there has been little other empirical research published in English on return patterns and IDP preferences with regards to Serbia and Kosovo.

It is also unclear whether Pasic’s fears are, in fact, materializing and that increased ethnically homogeneous communities in the Balkan region is leading to more political instability and ethnic antagonism. Perhaps it is too early to tell, but the evidence seems to suggest, as pointed out by Djuric, and Philpott, that the search for durable solutions to displacement is becoming depoliticized as policymakers shift their focus from addressing ethnic divisions to protecting the rights of individuals.

In an important study, Zic suggests that displacement can become an obstacle to reconciliation and democracy-building as IDPs become more religiously and politically polarized in response to their experience. Specifically, he argues that Bosnian Muslims who became displaced during the conflict used their religious faith to cope with the trauma of displacement, thereby strengthening their religiosity. This, in turn, led them to favor religiously oriented parties in post-war elections. Using a combination of survey data and matching analysis, he shows that IDP respondents were more likely than others to vote for the nationalist Party of Democratic Action a decade after the conflict.

An interesting historical study on the dynamics of resettlement in Catalonia during the civil war (1936–39) also suggested that displacement led to political polarization that fed further cycles of violence. By running a set of multivariate statistical tests on a historical dataset from the Span-

83 “The Post-War Repatriation of Serb Minority Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in Croatia—between Discrimination and Political Settlement.”
ish Civil War, Balcells shows how political identities had a significant impact on resettlement. People tended to relocate to places where they found others who shared their political and/or ethnic identities, thus reinforcing political and ethnic alignments at the municipal level. This study also suggests that the arrival of IDPs in a new locality was associated with an increase in levels of violence. Balcells believes that these spikes in violence after the arrival of displaced persons may have been fueled by their dissemination of credible news of atrocities committed by the other side. One may wonder whether this dynamic would still be valid in our more advanced technological era with ubiquitous access to social media and channels of mass communication. Balcells’ case also contrasts with post-war resettlement in the Balkans since she examines a case of resettlement during a time of active conflict when outbreaks in violence are more likely to occur. Her research, however, raises important questions about the effects of resettlement on post-war political stability.

This is an important area and warrants further research. Europe offers an ideal context in which to examine this question on a comparative basis because there is a wealth of data on human mobility, IDPs are relatively easy to access, and a number of similar IDP crises emerged almost simultaneously in post-socialist countries in the 1990s with different resettlement outcomes.

There has been surprisingly little written in English on the internal displacement crisis in the Ukraine, notwithstanding the fact that, since 2014, it has been the largest crisis in the region. Despite years of negotiations and a signed ceasefire agreement, frequent shelling and hostilities have become a reality for millions of people living near the line of contact between the independent regions and the rest of the country. With the conflict still ongoing, IDPs face a number of important humanitarian challenges. Yet Ukraine appears to have become “Europe’s forgotten war.”

Most of the gray literature published on the situation in the Ukraine has tended to focus on the humanitarian needs of IDPs, issues with registration of IDPs and estimation of displacement figures, and problems with Ukraine’s IDP legislation. Scholarship published by Ukrainians in English has examined the dynamics and make-up of the displaced population, the problems of IDP assistance through Ukraine’s labyrinthine bureaucracy, and the political disenfranchisement of IDPs under Ukrainian law. These studies highlight serious problems in Ukraine’s IDP official registration and data collection systems as well as some gaps in the country’s IDP legislation.

An article by Zaverukha in an international law publication argues that IDPs from the Crimea, having fled a foreign occupation, should be considered refugees rather than IDPs. Although there are serious problems with this argument, it does point to legal questions of responsibility

87 Ibid.
92 IDMC, Ukraine: Translating IDPs’ Protection into Legislative Action.
and IDP assistance in internationalized conflicts.

Comparatively few in-depth studies have been written in English on the IDP situations in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia. Most of what is available are international calls for attention to these crises in the Caucasus, highlighting how IDPs are frequently stuck in “purgatory-like” situations, as combatants, who prefer protracted deadlock to necessary diplomatic compromise, and exploitation of IDPs as visible reminders of victimization, even at the cost of promoting their hardship. There is almost no information available on the fate of IDPs in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

3.2 Law and policy

Europe has some of the most developed legal and policy frameworks for the protection of IDPs in the world. The countries that emerged from the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were, in fact, some of the first to implement laws and policies in line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in the 1990s. This region, consequently, presents a good context in which to compare different countries’ approaches to IDP protection, returns, and restitution.

There has been, for example, some debate regarding the process of IDP returns and restitution set up by the Dayton Peace Agreement after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More than four years into the peace process, some observers lamented that the international community was failing to reverse the ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out during the war and failing to re-establish multi-ethnic societies. Phuong traces these failures to inadequate policies and political obstruction by local officials. She also notes, but somewhat discounts, the fact that displaced Bosnian Muslims were also inclined to remain in the Federation because of comparatively bleak economic conditions in the Republika Srpska and because continuing discrimination made minority returns unattractive. The overwhelming majority of IDPs returned to areas controlled by their own ethnic group, even when international organizations strongly encouraged them to return to their pre-war homes. Although she remains committed to reversing the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Phuong recognizes that ethnic reconciliation in that country will need to be encouraged through other means than IDP returns. She urges the international community to become more pragmatic and creative in devising alternatives. Analyzing the legal obstacles faced by returning Croatian Serbs, Wak-Woya also recognizes that the prospects of returning to the old status quo are very unlikely.

Philpott, on the other hand, hails the Dayton Agreement as a successful model of post-war reconciliation. He notes that less than a decade after the end of the war, over 90% of the approximately 216,026 property and land restitution claims made by refugees and IDPs had been successfully resolved. He credits the concerted action by the international community for this success. However, he mostly credits a shift from a process focusing primarily on ethnically-linked
returns, at the expense of individual rights, to one driven by the recognition of property rights and the rule of law. In his view, de-politicizing the IDP issue was key to ensuring success of the restitution process.

Philpott makes a good case for using the Bosnian model in other protracted displacement crises around the world. Unfortunately, IDPs are frequently used as pawns in slow moving, inconclusive diplomatic “chess games” by governments and international organizations pursuing lofty political goals. IDPs are consequently left in a state of limbo with little input on the matter. Policies focusing on the property rights of IDPs, that facilitate processes of restitution and integration, could provide IDPs with a more efficient end to their displacement.

Unfortunately, governments hoping to change the political status quo continue to prioritize returns to the detriment of their IDP populations. Twenty years after the introduction of the Guiding Principles, Georgia is failing to fully implement them as its government continues to favor return over other solutions.104 The few efforts made to facilitate integration have predominantly focused on providing IDPs with housing, failing to take their other needs into account. IDPs in Georgia remain isolated and excluded from larger social networks. They lack livelihood opportunities and access to land near their settlements. They have poor access to healthcare services or information about their rights and the services available to them. Funke and Bolkvadze blame the Georgian government’s almost exclusive focus on returns for the poor condition of IDPs, but they also make note of the government’s lack of institutional and financial capacity to meet the needs of IDPs, and its failure to involve IDPs themselves in the policy-making and implementation.105 The abolition of Georgia’s Ministry for IDPs in July 2018 also suggested that internal displacement is unfortunately becoming less of a government priority.

A similar situation has been documented in the Ukraine, where the government, unwilling to accept a loss of control over some of its territories, is failing to provide IDPs with permanent housing arrangements.106 Dean and others have also noted a number of problems with Ukraine’s existing law, including obstacles to the IDP registration process.107

### 3.3 Public health and medicine

The scarce literature on health and medicine with regards to IDPs in Europe has been focused primarily on mental health issues, commonly associated with forced displacement, and on IDPs’ coping mechanisms. These disorders include post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), depression, anxiety disorders, and other co-morbidities. Looking at a sample of women forced to migrate during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Schmidt, Kravic and Ehert find that IDPs were more likely to suffer from PTSD than refugees and the general population.108 Their results support previous findings that, in the long-run, IDPs suffer from worse mental health than refugees. Schmidt and her colleagues conclude that long-term psychopathology among forced migrants does not result from war-related stressors alone, but reflects contextual factors of displacement that could be avoided though interventions by governments and humanitarian agencies.

This conclusion is collaborated by another study on mental disorders and related disabilities among IDPs and returnees in Georgia, that documents persistent PTSD among IDPs and return-

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105 Ibid.
107 IDMC, Ukraine: Translating IDPs’ Protection into Legislative Action.
ees, with high levels of co-morbidity with anxiety and depression.\textsuperscript{109} IDPs’ poor living conditions appear to exacerbate these disorders, which is particularly concerning in a country where the government has been unable to provide IDPs with durable solutions.\textsuperscript{110}

Studies in Bosnia and Georgia call for more comprehensive approaches to treating trauma-related mental disorders among the displaced population, including strengthening the psychological assistance, social support networks, and socio-economic conditions of IDPs. After tracing the case histories of mental health care-seeking and recovery among long-term IDPs in Georgia, Singh and her colleagues argue that recovery from trauma is ultimately a complex journey that involves many components.\textsuperscript{111} Their study documents how individuals move cyclically among self-care, household support, lay care and formal services domains to understand and manage their problems.\textsuperscript{112}

Protracted displacement crises offer a rich opportunity in which to study the long-term effects of displacement on the health of IDPs. In an important book, the anthropologist Loizos provides a rich longitudinal account of how Greek Cypriot villagers coped with over thirty years of displacement.\textsuperscript{113} His study considers the long-term impact of forced migration and highlights the chain of effects of economic destitution caused by displacement and its impacts on the type of work IDPs perform, their work hours, and age of retirement. Loizos finds that while Cypriot IDPs were not necessarily dying younger than the general population, they did suffer from a greater prevalence of cardiovascular illness. Loizos cautions that, unlike other IDP caseloads, displaced Cypriots were partially cushioned by measures taken by the state to protect them since 1974 and by the fact that they experienced comparatively less violence than others. Most importantly, however, he demonstrates that a combination of work, family, and social integration kept most IDPs sane over three decades of displacement.

\textsuperscript{109} Nino Makhashvili et al., “Mental Disorders and Their Association with Disability among Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees in Georgia,” \textit{Journal of traumatic stress} 27, no. 5 (2014).
\textsuperscript{110} Kurshitashvili, “The Impact of Socially Ir/Responsible Resettlement on the Livelihoods of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia”; Koch, “Protracted Displacement in Georgia: Structural Vulnerability and “Existing Not Living””.
\textsuperscript{111} “Finding a Way Out”: Case Histories of Mental Health Care-Seeking and Recovery among Long-Term Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, \textit{Transcultural psychiatry} 53, no. 2 (2016).
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Iron in the Soul: Displacement, Livelihood and Health in Cyprus}, vol. 23 (Berghahn Books, 2008).
4. Conclusions

Despite its relatively small number of IDPs, the European /Central Asian context has produced a rich body of literature on internal displacement in the social sciences, humanities, and in the fields of law and medicine. Research regarding the effects and challenges of protracted situations of displacement and the search for durable solutions has been particularly valuable. A review of the literature produced during the past twenty years, however, makes evident a number of existing gaps and unexploited opportunities.

Most of the research on displacement in Europe has focused on the Balkans and Georgia. Scholars have paid comparatively less attention to other crises in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, most notably Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is very little scholarship available in English on Ukraine. Its displacement crisis is admittedly more recent than the others, but with no obvious solution to the conflict in sight, Ukraine is looking to be the home of a sizable, protracted crisis for many years to come. As policy-makers shift their focus from the humanitarian needs of IDPs to the search for durable solutions, researchers will need to take a closer look at this population. Other obvious geographical blind spots include: Russia, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The past ten years, unfortunately, have seen a drastic drop in displacement monitoring activity and the international community is becoming more reliant on self-reporting by governments. We are consequently in danger of losing complete track of certain displaced populations – particularly ones living in more autocratic societies where governments deny their existence.

Europe’s wealth of data on human mobility, political and economic conditions, relatively easy access to IDPs, long history and stability of displacement crises also provide ideal opportunities to pursue important questions about the dynamics of internal displacement and its wider effects on societies. European countries tend to maintain fairly advanced IDP registers, and do a fairly good job keeping track of their displaced populations. There is a wealth of social, economic, conflict, and health data – some of it dating to before World War II. This should encourage researchers who want to pursue big-data and longitudinal analysis on important questions regarding: the search for durable solutions; the evolution of IDP coping strategies; IDPs’ economic, mental and physical wellbeing; the economic effects of displacement on host communities and countries at large; and the effects of internal displacement on political polarization, security and social cohesion, among other things. Stable protracted crises can allow us to take a better look at how IDPs’ needs, attitudes, and coping strategies evolve over time, and how the attitudes of host communities evolve. These areas can contribute to a better understand what successful integration really looks like.

Finally, Europe offers an ideal setting in which to conduct comparative analysis. Most European countries affected by displacement are post-socialist societies with shared histories, similar levels of development, similar ethnic-related conflicts, but different displacement-related outcomes. They can provide an opportunity to compare the effects of government interventions and strategies to achieve durable solutions and end displacement.
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