

TO REPRESENT AS SO

Agreement ... in judgement is part of communication. (*Investigations* §242)

Throughout Wittgenstein had Frege in mind. We should too, to understand him. This is as true for *Philosophical Investigations* as for the *Tractatus*. In fact, the later work is, in an important way, closer to Frege than the first—even though the *Investigations* makes a target of what *seems* a central Fregean idea. It directs Frege's own ideas at that target, using something deeply right in Frege to undo a misreading of what, rightly read, are mere truisms.

The *Tractatus* presents a view of what it is, essentially, to represent as so. The *Investigations*, I will suggest, presents a different view, but on the same topic. Wittgenstein, of course, rejects essences, on some conceptions, in some employments:

“You speak of language games ... but never arrive at saying what the essence of a language game, and thus of language, is. What is in common to all these processes and which makes them all language, or parts of language. So you let yourself off that part of the investigation which used to give you the biggest headache, namely what to say concerning the *general form of a proposition* and of language.”

And that is true.—Instead of specifying what is in common to all that which we call language, I say that all these phenomena have nothing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all ... (§65)

We see that what we call ‘proposition’, ‘language’, is not the formal unity I had imagined. (§108)

But he also says,

It is part of what communication is, not only that there is agreement

in definitions, but also (strange as this may sound) agreement in judgements. (§242)

It is hard to do philosophy, even of a new sort, while espousing no commitment to what things—in this case, propositions, representing—are as such. As we shall see, what I have just quoted *is* a view of this. The *Investigations* opens with a fundamental point—a thesis—which paves the way for this.

1. The Opening Move: The *Investigations* makes its first point by deploying a notion, *language game*. The items it thus deploys to make its point are fictions, precisely what they are said to be; best thought of as identified by how they are to be played. It will help *here* to think of each as containing some specified set of moves, each move governed by specified rules, these jointly fixing how the game is to be played. A game is thus *just* what its rules make it. Those rules spell out a notion of correctness: a move is correct, on this notion, if it conforms to the rules which govern it. A language game *may* have a given point; something to be achieved in playing it. Such *can* sometimes give sense to the idea that there is something its rules *ought* to be.

For present purposes, language games are (as Wittgenstein repeatedly insists) objects of comparison. We speak of them to serve philosophic ends. (See §§81, 130, 131.) To think of them as fixed by their rules, apart from any playing of them is just to assign them a particular role in the comparisons to be made. One thing they may accomplish, thus conceived, is to make perspicuous ways for representing to connect to action. For this end, and for suitably chosen games, we may think of the rules governing a move as dividing into introduction and elimination rules. An introduction rule specifies under what circumstances a move would be made correctly. It may say, say, that a player may say ‘Slab here’ only if there is a slab at some specific place. The elimination rule specifies what must, or may, be done if the move in question was correctly made. The prescribed consequences of the move may just be more talking. But they may be actions of various non-linguistic kinds. A correct move ‘Slab!’ in some game might, e.g., require bringing a slab to a certain point. In ways I will try to bring out, connections with action are central to a representation’s content being what it is (or, indeed, to its being anything at all). So, that a language game may connect words with action in a given way is an important feature of it, given the purposes it will serve in the *Investigations*.

I begin now on the basic point. One half of it is stated in §10:

Now what do the words of this language *designate*?—What is supposed to show what they signify, if not the kind of use they have? And we have already described that. So we are asking for the expression “This word designates *this*” to be made a part of the description. In other words the description ought to take the form: “The word ... designates ...”.

As said already, the fundamental point at the start of the *Investigations* departs from Frege. But we see already how the point is made by taking very seriously another on which Wittgenstein and Frege agree. Frege made the point this way:

What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’, and then immediately go on to introduce a thought as that to which the question ‘Is it true?’ is in principle applicable. So I do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgement; I come by the parts of a thought by analysing the thought. (Frege 1919/1979 p. 253)

A thought, for Frege, is, in this sense, the fundamental unit of analysis. In just this sense, a whole move in a language game is the fundamental unit of analysis when it comes to content. What does this mean?

Suppose that, taking a thought (judgement, proposition) as fundamental, we ask the question whether such-and-such is an element of such-and-such thought—for example, whether Frege, or something naming him, is an element of a proposition that Frege smoked. If the proposition comes first, we can begin with when *it* would be correct, in that distinctive way in which a proposition, as such, is liable to be correct. For a given proposition, there is such a thing as things being as they are according to it. The distinctive sort of correctness, seen one way, just consists, for it, in things being as they are according to it. So thinking, we can say: for Frege, or something representing him, to be an element of a given proposition just is for him, or it, to make (or be correctly viewable as making) a particular identifiable contribution to when things *would* be as that proposition has them: whether things being as they are *is* their being that way turns on how Frege thus is. The proposition has an element naming Frege just where that element so works to make the condition on that proposition’s correctness what it is.

As Frege notes, what the elements of a given proposition are is all relative to an analysis. There are two points here. First, there *might* be various alternative ways of carving up a whole proposition into parts. For to carve a proposition into parts is just to divide up *its* main task—being true (correct) just when it would be—into identifiable sub-tasks: the elements, on that carving, are just what perform, respectively, these sub-tasks. A thought that Sid grunts would be true just where Sid grunted. So it would be true just where *Sid* is a given way. A sub-task can thus be making its truth thus turn on Sid. It would be true just where someone was a grunter. So a sub-task can be to make its truth turn on whether someone or other grunts. These tasks, if performed jointly, make the whole true just where Sid grunts. To be an element of a proposition on this analysis just is to perform (or perhaps be) one of these sub-tasks. That a proposition's task *can* be parcelled out into sub-tasks in some given way does not preclude also parcelling it out differently. *Any* such parcelling out what the proposition does into sub-tasks would be a correct analysis on it, on which what performed some sub-task thus identified would be an element of the proposition.

If elements are what one thus carves out of a proposition, on some division of its job into sub-tasks, there is no intelligible question as to how the elements of a proposition (on an analysis) can form that unity which the proposition itself is. For there is nothing it could be for something to be an element other than to contribute to that unity. The element has no identity other than as that which performs such-and-such sub-task.

The second point here is Frege's context principle (cited by Wittgenstein in §49). An element of the thought that Sid grunts can make the truth of that whole turn on whether *Sid* is some way or other only in concert with some other element making the truth of that whole turn on whether *someone* is such-and-such way—say, a grunter. There is no such thing as making truth turn on how Sid is apart from any *way* it is so to turn. Words which made the truth of a whole turn on whether Sid was some way might be said to *name* Sid. Similarly, words making the truth of a whole turn on whether someone was a grunter might be said to name *being a grunter*. By analogy one might say the same for an element of a proposition, or of a thought. Where naming is of logical significance, to name X just is to perform some such role. Naming so conceived *could* be done only in the context of a whole in which elements, in naming what they did, jointly performed the task that whole did—here being true just when that whole would be. In that sense, naming cannot be done in isolation. This is the context principle.

A move in a language game is the basic unit in the game in just the same way as a proposition (thought) is the basic unit in thinking. For something to be an element of a move is for it to contribute, in some definite way, to the conditions for the correctness of

that whole move. All the above remarks apply to this. This is Wittgenstein's point in §49. For an element of a move to name something just is for it to play a particular logical role in that whole move—to have a particular place in a particular parcelling out of the task of the whole move into sub-tasks. If an element of a move *names* X, does that fact identify a unique role as the one it thus performs? That is the main question to be addressed. First, though, I will pause for a moment over a different conception of what it is to be an element.

2. Occam's Razor: This second conception is what Wittgenstein refers to in the *Tractatus* as 'Occam's Razor' (3.328, 5.47321). He stated it clearly in January 1930. (See Waismann 1979, p. 90.) It is there put thus. For something to be an element in a proposition is for that proposition itself to be an element in some specific system of propositions. For the proposition to contain that element is (*inter alia*) for there to be, within that system, a range of propositions which are *the same* in some determinate respect. The element thus shared is, or identifies, that respect. For there to be that element is for there to be that way for *those* propositions (the range) to be the same. For it to occur in that proposition is for that proposition to belong to that range, within this system.

To be an element of a proposition, on Frege's view, just is to contribute, in a way there is for *an* element *to* contribute, to the truth conditions of a whole. That way of contributing, Frege insists, is detachable from its occurrence in that whole. There *could* be a range of cases of an element contributing in that way. So far, this does not require there to be such a thing as *the* range (or set of them), or the system, which is that to which the whole thus analysed belongs. For one thing, for Frege, the same proposition may be analysed in many ways—and would fit in different ranges of propositions on each. Nor is it some Fregean quirk to allow for multiple analyses. If a proposition were, essentially, such-and-such construction out of such-and-such building blocks, it would not have the pride of place Frege sees for it. One could give no more than lip-service to that idea of pride of place.

Tractarian Wittgenstein cannot share this view. For, as he says in January 1930, "It is the essential feature of a proposition that it is *a picture* and has compositeness." (Ibid.) That is part of his conception, there, of what it is for a proposition to represent: it represents what its elements name as structured *just* as that proposition is by its elements. There is an *identity* of structure between that of what is *so* if the proposition is true and that proposition itself. Such a proposition *must* be built up in just one way, of just one set of parts. Different structurings of parts are *ipso facto* structurings of different propositions. Merely insisting that a proposition occupies a particular place in a

particular system does not guarantee that this is so. A whole system of propositions might divide into sets of ranges, each of propositions the same in some respect, in different ways on different analyses of *it*. The whole system might admit of multiple analyses just as, for Frege, a proposition does. If it is the system that is to guarantee the uniqueness Tractarian Wittgenstein needs, something else must guarantee that the *system* decomposes uniquely into some one set of such ranges.

We are left with this in common to Frege and Tractarian Wittgenstein: an element of a proposition performs a role which is one for *an* element to perform in *a* proposition; a role thus admitting of further exemplars. A role is essentially detachable from an occurrence of it. Let us now put this idea to new use. I have spoken, so far, of two ideas of an element, each of which leaves it open that the *same* proposition might be structured in different ways, out of different elements. What, aside from a particular structuring of particular elements, identifies a given proposition as the one it is? We began with one feature of a proposition: when things would be as it has them. We might cite that as an answer. But there is another (non-rival) view available.

Frege remarks in "Der Gedanke" (1918): to judge something is to expose oneself to the risk of error. (This happens in two steps. To judge of an *environment* is to run the risk of error; an environment (as he has just argued before making that point) is all there is, or could be, to judge about. (See my forthcoming.)) A proposition is the content of a judgement, detachable, Frege insists (1915/1979: 51), from any particular judging of it. So a proposition is *a* way for *a* thinker to be exposed to risk of error.

The idea of an element as a respect in which some range of items are the same can now come into play. A proposition represents a particular, determinate, exposure there is to suffer to the risk of error. So *it* is a way in which a range of things would be the same. Which things? Each of us, at a time, occupies his own position of exposure to risk: each of us is *exposed* to risk of error, and exposed as he is. For each, there is his own distinctive way in which plans may go awry, actions may miss their mark, surprises may be in store. If today is Friday, I am in my own particular sort of trouble. (Proofs due by noon.) A proposition represents a determinate way for such distinctive individual exposures to be the same; so a range of cases of a thinker being exposed in the same way. The proposition identifies, and is identified by, that understanding of *the same*. (This is already to rule out the possibility of 'private language'.)

I think today is Thursday. I am not alone. Each of us who thinks so is thus exposed to a different specific form of trouble. Which of us, in risking what we in fact do, instances just this particular shape of stance towards things? What risk *would* one run in judging today Thursday? I leave that, momentarily, open.

Language games are apt for capturing specifics of exposure to risk of error. A move in one identifies common elements in different thinkers differently than a proposition does. If a proposition is that the flat is dark, what risk does one run in supposing it? When would one be running just that risk? Well, you risk your hand just wherever *your* answer to the question what the thing for you to do is depends on whether things are as that proposition has it. Where is that?

Consider the film-developing game. Two players go through a series of moves, at the end of which, if all is well, film has been developed. In the game there is a move, 'The room is dark'. By its elimination rule, player 2 may remove film from its canister and place it in developer. When one removes film from a canister (for this purpose), there is a way in which darkness matters to whether one's project will go awry. So, with this project in view, there is a way in which darkness matters to whether removing the film is the thing for one to do. If we were designing a game that was to have this envisioned end, then, that elimination rule settled, there is something the move's introduction rule ought to be. Let us now suppose we have made the introduction rule accordingly. You are playing the game. The room is dark enough for you to bump into things unintentionally. Objects loom as shadows. May you make the move, 'The room is dark', correctly? Not according to the rule we would thus have made. Those conditions would spoil film.

If, in the game, you make the move, 'The room is dark', you are in error just in case you breach the imagined introduction rule. But now that will be just where relying on the room's being dark where it bears on the thing for you to do would lead to doing the wrong thing—what missed its mark—where that thing was what the elimination rule licensed, and the mark was what showed here what the introduction rule ought to be. In the case at hand, this is just where opening the canister would spoil film.

What of our envisioned *proposition* that the room is dark? Again, in supposing it you are in error just where, in fact, things are not as they are according to it. But that introduction rule for it has not yet been linked to any elimination rules by the route just covered for the above move in the game. So would (supposing) that proposition be in error in the circumstances just envisioned—objects looming as shadows, barked shins, etc.? Nothing said so far about what proposition it is decides this.

3. Frege's Limitations: Consider the proposition that Sid grunts. How might this decompose? Perhaps into a part which makes it about Sid, and one which makes it about being a grunter. Making a proposition about Sid could count as naming him. Similarly for naming being a grunter (a way for someone to be).

To be an element of a proposition is to play a logical role. So to name Sid is to play some logical role. To be an element of a proposition is to make some determinate contribution to its condition for correctness (truth). It is to be part of a particular way of parcelling out that condition into sub-parts. Is to name such-and-such to make some one such contribution? If I say that an element names such-and-such, have I thereby said what its contribution to its whole is?

Here we come to an idea of Frege's which, from late Wittgenstein's point of view, is a bad one (on one straightforward reading). It damages the good idea of a proposition enjoying pride of place which Frege and Wittgenstein share. If we accept everything Frege says on this question, then what an element of a proposition names does determine what its contribution to its whole is. There is just one such contribution thus to make. For Frege, in the simple sort of case now on hand, logical roles fall into two categories: naming objects, and naming concepts. If, in the present case, there is an element which names Sid, then there must be another which names a concept. This would be the element proposed, above, as naming being a grunter. Naming Sid is identifying what it is that has to be some way or other (for the proposition to be true); naming that other element is identifying which way something or other must be.

So far, so good. Now the fatal step. For Frege, a concept is a *function*, namely, one from objects to truth values. (See Frege 1891.) If words 'Sid grunts' decompose into an element 'Sid', which names an object, and an element 'grunts', which names a function from objects to truth-values, then the whole, 'Sid grunts', names the value of that function for a certain argument, namely, Sid. Which is to say that it names a truth-value: true if Sid grunts, false if he does not. Which is to say that for parts jointly to play these roles is, *ipso facto*, for them to decide a unique and determinate truth condition for their whole. *Mutatis mutandis* for propositions, of which words 'Sid grunts' could be but one instance, or expression. Which is why Frege's answer to the question must be yes.

Not that taking concepts for functions is at all quirky. It is a natural reading of a truism: to apply a concept to (predicate something of) an object is to say (or think) *the object* to be thus and so; which it is (if it is) or is not (if not) purely in being as *it* is. Only the object's being as it is makes that predication true or false. On the reading of this truism, a concept thus behaves as a function would: fix the object it applies to, and you fix the truth-value such application takes. To see this as misreading, one must first find another. To which task we now turn.

In matters of decomposition (on the view late Wittgenstein and Frege share), a proposition and a move in a language game raise exactly the same questions. So we may now ask this. Suppose there is a move in a language game—say, 'The room is

dark’—which we have decomposed, somehow, into parts, and that, for each part we have identified something it in fact names (on that analysis). For example, on our analysis, ‘the room’ names a certain room, ‘is dark’ names (the property, or concept, or whatever, of) being dark. Have we fixed what the correctness (truth) condition for the move is? Do our parts, in jointly *so* functioning, uniquely, or univocally, fix some one such condition?

Clearly not. For we can imagine two games. In the first, if I have made the move, ‘The room is dark’, correctly, then I am excused from carrying out certain orders. For example, I need not bring you your copy of *Zettel*, on grounds that I cannot see to find it. In the second, if I have made the move correctly, then you may remove the film from its canister (and rely on doing so safely). Let us suppose that each game is well constructed: the move is made correctly in it just in case there would, in fact, be those consequences (or at least such consequences would be to be expected). Then the correctness conditions for the move must differ from the one game to the other. For I may be, reasonably, unable to find your copy of *Zettel* (knowing it is on the shelf) where it is quite unsafe for you to remove the film.

One might correctly say of either game that in it ‘is dark’ names (speaks of) being dark. But the role it plays in naming this differs from the one game to the other. In the one game, but not the other, it contributes to a condition on being as said which is not satisfied if, where whether to remove film turns on whether the room is dark, removing film is not the thing to do. So if a move consists (on an analysis) of parts, for each of which there is a such-and-such it names, those facts about the move are compatible with any of indefinitely many mutually exclusive conditions on correctness (answers to the question when things would be as thus said).

The point is general. That words name such-and-such determines no unique contribution which is that which such words make to conditions on the correctness of the whole they thus are part of. Such is just part of what *naming* is. It holds equally for naming in the context of a move in a language game, and naming in the context of a proposition. The fact of my speaking of being dark is compatible with my saying any of many things in, and by, doing so. There are many different things, each of which being dark may, sometimes correctly, be taken to be (or come to). Being dark admits of understandings. The same goes for being a grunter. On Wittgenstein’s new view representation, these are to be taken as illustrating something intrinsic to the idea of a way for a thing to be; if a concept is identified by what it is of, then something intrinsic to the notion *concept*. *Investigations* opens with this point. It is the first point the idea of a language game is used to make. It advances us far towards our emerging new picture of

representing as so.

We needed a new reading of a truism to see how it could be a misreading to make concepts into functions. We now have it. It is on an *application* of a concept to an object, on an occasion, that one says the object to be thus and so. The rest of the truism then holds. The concept as such admits of many applications, each excluding others. So it alone cannot assign an object, in being as it is, a truth value.

4. Comparisons: Words may name in the context of a proposition (or its expression). May they also name in the context of a language (such as English or French)? Not in the same sense. For a language asserts nothing, thus neither correctly nor incorrectly. Our fundamental point about naming makes this no mere nicety. The words 'is dark', in the context of a move in a particular game, contribute to a particular condition of correctness. That is what it is for them to name, in the sense in which they may name in such a context. What the English words 'is dark' mean does not choose between different conditions of correctness such as the two just indicated. The English 'The room is dark' is governed no more by one such condition than by any other. So there cannot be 'the proposition they express'. They can be used to express *various* propositions, where the use in question fixes just how one may be in error in speaking of such-and-such as dark; some one such condition on correctness.

But there *is* truth to tell in saying the English 'is dark' to name (speak of) being dark. Here naming is not playing a role in some given thought. Aspects make the difference here. There is a switch in my kitchen which turns the dishwasher on and off. This does not make me apprehensive as to what the switch may be up to while I am away. If I did worry, I would be missing the aspect with which 'turns on' occurs in that expression of truth. The point thus made is: to turn the dishwasher on, or off, flip that switch. Turning the dishwasher on and off is what the switch is *for*. Similarly (at least at first approximation) for the English 'is dark'. English does not go around telling people things. I need not worry whether English can keep an Oxford secret. But if you want to tell someone something, and it is to your purpose to speak of something being dark, then, if you are speaking English, uttering the words 'is dark' will generally be a way of doing so. That is what they are for.

Crucially, there is no particular thing you have to be in course of saying in order to use 'is dark' to speak of being dark, just so long as speaking of being dark has a role in saying it. It does not matter whether you are speaking of a room being dark in a way that would license opening film canisters, or merely in a way that would excuse your failing to find *Zettel* on the shelf. English is indifferent to such things. It is, as one might

say, plastic. Which is why it is so useful. To put things (so far) picturesquely, we might say: the words 'is dark' would speak of what they do in English, in any move in any language game, provided only that, in that move, they speak of (name) being dark.

What language games *are* played in some speaking 'The room is dark' (in speaking English)? The notion *playing a language game in speaking English* is not yet defined. It is (normally) not as if, where I say, 'The room is dark', we have agreed to speak according to such-and-such rules. Nor does *English* provide the rules of some game for us then to play. But we can think of playing a game in another way. If, in given circumstances, I say of a given room, 'The room is dark', the rules of a game with that rule may be such that I would thus have spoken truly only if I would have moved correctly by those rules. Such rules identify some of what it would be for things to be as I said. We might speak of that move, so that game, as modelling my words.

In the game, if 'The room is dark' is said correctly, another player may remove film. A parallel condition can govern what someone said: things *are* as he said only if removing film (for developing) can be the thing to do, insofar as this turns on the present darkness of the room. (That there is no other way the film will be spoiled need not be in *this* bargain.) Such may be a condition on the correctness of what one says in calling the room dark. It contributes to *an* understanding of what it would be for the room to be as thus said. When I call the room dark, I may be said, in this sense, to be playing any game which thus captures some of what it would be for things to be as I thus say. By that measure, I might correctly be said to be playing indefinitely many different games.

Where I speak of the room being dark, I must do so on *some* understanding of it so being. The language games I thus play, on our current understanding of playing one, may make explicit some of what that understanding is. Their elimination rules show some of how things would be if as I said: what is licensed or demanded by them is what one can, or must, do so far as that turns on things being as said. Their introduction rules must then be what these elimination rules require. If I said things to be thus and so, things *would* be that way, on the understanding on which I said so just where *those* introduction rules permitted saying so.

Where I speak of a room as dark, there are things you may expect if I am right, among which ways you may, on the occasion, expect this to bear on the things for you to do. Licensing such expectations is a way of exposing oneself to risk of error. An identifiable such exposure may be a common element in a range of cases of thinkers taking things to be as they do. It may thus identify something to be thought or said—a proposition. For a given way *for* things to be—thus and so—there are many such

exposures to risk one may incur in taking things to be that way, so many propositions. There are many ways of exposing oneself in taking a room to be dark.

Supposing this point to hold for *any* things words might name (in speaking of sublunary affairs), and a concept to be what one names in speaking of a determinate way for things to be, a concept cannot be a function from objects to truth values. The fact of having named one cannot by itself fix when what one thus said of something would be true of it. Logic is so built that, when it speaks to particular thoughts, it requires treating what plays the role of a concept (on an analysis of a thought) to be such a function. Which means that when we apply logic, that to which we do so must be, for our purpose, viewable in those terms. So far as matters to an application, it may be as if 'is red', as such, has some definite extension. Concepts are sometimes treatable as functions. That is another way an identification may be understood. Which suggests, perhaps, another way of reading Frege.

There are as many games to play in calling a room dark as there are things one *might* understand by a room being dark. Who is 'one' here? When I speak, there are those my words are *for*; for whom they *should* be usable as they ought to be. I cannot speak to people on understandings of being dark they cannot grasp, or could not recognize as understandings of *being dark*. On the other hand, for anything those my words are for *would* sometimes understand being dark to be, I can sometimes speak of being dark on that understanding of it. This remark fits together with another. We sometimes recognize someone as having spoken of a room as dark, while also recognizing certain things as to when things would be as he said. We are constrained here by the limits of *our* ability to understand being dark in different ways. Those limits are also the limits of our ability to take an audience as having taken *being dark* to be what was spoken of. Our limits here, and those of those for whom I speak, are fixed by an entirely parochial sense for when it would be being dark that was in question. To call such a sense parochial is to say that sharing it is not part of being a thinker as such. A being would not fail to be a thinker merely in lacking it. The sense in question is part of *our* equipment for engaging with the world; for all of which, what it helps pull off is *engagement with the world*.

Where I did say 'The room is dark', what standard of correctness governed it? Only the parochial can answer this. I tell you the room is dark. You pry the lid from the canister. The light on the smoke detector blinks. No one will ever see that judge's peccadilloes. Did I speak on an understanding of being dark on which the room was that? *Is* there such an understanding? If I spoke understandably, there are those equipped to understand me. There are things such fellows would be prepared to recognize—say, that there is an understanding on which the room was dark, and

another on which it was not; that, circumstances what they were, I ought to have been taken, or one had a right to take me, to be speaking in the second way. In which case, things were not as I said.

There need not always be such outcomes. Those for whom I speak need not always see such things in one way rather than another. But sometimes there are. I call the room dark. The canister is opened. The tabloids have their field day. *Is* there an understanding of being dark on which, for all that, the room was not dark? That may be hard to say. But should I be so understood that things being as they were is things being as I said? About that there may be no doubt.

We have arrived at the new picture of what representing is. What I said to be so in representing things as some given way is what it ought to be given how one ought to expect to be able (or need) to act on what I said as the introduction rules of a *good* game with a *point* are what they ought to be given the elimination rules they mesh with. Questions as to what it is I said—where I spoke of things being thus and so, on what understanding of their so being I in fact spoke—are thus answered by our common parochial sense for what ought to be expected of my speaking as I did in the circumstances in which I did—in the artificial terms here used to make the point, by our parochial sense for the games I was, or would be, playing in speaking as I did, on our present notion of what it would be for me to be playing a language game in speaking, say, English.

5. Truth: A further contrast with Frege's view may help focus the new picture. Frege's conception of a truth bearer (1918) starts from this question:

Is a picture as bare visible, tangible, thing really true? And a stone,
or leaf, not true? (1918, p. 59)

The answer is, clearly, no. A picture, so conceived, might represent anything, or nothing, as so. So far, as Frege sees it, there is no intelligible question as to whether what it represented as so is so. There is no 'what it represented as so'. And (a critical assumption), one cannot ask whether words represented as so what is so except by asking of that which they represent as so (that such-and-such) whether *that* is so.

Suppose a painting does represent something as so—something, say, as to how the cathedral at Rouen looks. No question of truth arises, the idea is, until it is fixed just *how*

the cathedral is thus supposed to look. Only with that fixed can we ask whether the cathedral is as represented. Suppose the painting is a Monet. In its image of a wall is a patch of blue paint. Does this represent it as so that the cathedral has a partly blue wall? Or that the wall was in shadow at the time it was painted? Monet's ways aside, there is no saying. If not, the idea is, no (determinate) question of truth has arisen.

A question of truth thus arises for Frege only where there is no unanswered one of this form: 'Is the representation to be taken as representing *this* as so, or rather *that*?' For what raises a question of truth, there is no such open question as to what is so according to it; when things would be as it represents them. Frege thinks that beginning with visible, tangible representations we can arrive at non-visible, non-tangible, representations which meet this condition—and that any representation which did so *would* be neither visible nor tangible.

This conviction is another version of the idea from which I have already signalled Wittgenstein as departing: the idea that a concept is a function from objects to truth-values. Suppose there is an identifiable way for things to be such that if things were represented as that way, there can be no further open question as to whether they were thus represented as *this* way, or rather *that*. Such a way for things to be would admit no understandings. The zero-place concept of it would thus map *things* being as they are into a truth value. Where naming a (non-zero place) concept is a contribution to representing things as this way, the concept named could only behave as a function from objects to truth values would. What raises such a question of truth is a representation on a different understanding of that term: something *to* represent as so. Such a thing (as Frege argues) is neither visible nor tangible.

That the parochial decides *which* way words represented things is, for Frege, an anodyne idea. Whether 'is dark' then named one concept or another may all depend on us. But, on this conception, there is *no* role for the parochial once a question of truth has been raised. From the question when someone should be counted as having spoken truth—as having said no more than what is so—we have separated out a question which does not refer to him, or his utterance, at all: for a given thing that might be said, when *that* thing would be true. On the Fregean idea, such a thing—something *to represent* as so—is not susceptible to understandings, as mere visible, tangible representers—words, pictures, etc.—are. It *is* an understanding for such things to bear. So there is no role for the parochial, or anything else, in choosing between understandings of *it*.

A language game provides a different story. We can now abandon the idea that there are ways for things to be which brook no competing understandings; and the idea

that the only questions of truth are whether things are one or another of these ways. For any way for things to be, there may always be questions as to how one may expect to act on that, admitting of different, and competing answers on different occasions for considering a question how to act. On the other hand, on the new picture, words are true if one can do all they license, must do all they require if correct. How things are according to the words is then fixed by those standards for their introduction which such standards for their elimination impart.

If a painting represents part of a cathedral wall as blue, there is this question: Might it be true to represent the wall like that? The question *may* have a clear answer. Or, again, not. There are all sorts of things it *could* be for a wall to be blue there; all sorts of understandings of it so being. Would a crude *graffito* count? For each such thing, there are the language games in which it is what would so count. That there are such further understandings of being blue *need* not matter to truth in the case at hand (given the way the wall in fact is), though it might. As to whether the painting is subject to any such further standards of correctness—whether it is the playing of any such further games—this is a matter for the parochial to rule on, just as it does where Frege concedes it room to operate.

My calling the room dark raises a question of truth: *Is* it dark on the understanding on which I spoke of that? This question still leaves room for the parochial to work. There are things to be decided as to the understanding of that on which I did so speak. Now, the idea is, say what you like as to what that understanding is, and there is still the same sort of room for the parochial to work. There is always room for fresh questions of truth to arise. Find new circumstances of which my words might be true or not, and there are, correspondingly, new language games for me to have been playing or not; games which provide for such circumstances in any of many ways (or none). With that, there is more of the usual work for the parochial to do. The parochial, like rust, never sleeps. On this new picture, as opposed to Frege's, it never cancels out absolutely.

Invisible, intangible truth bearers thus lose the special status Frege accords them. The parochial takes on an ineliminable role in representing as so. Such a view must be seen as a picture of what representing is as such—though it is as yet unclear how it could be that. Which sets an agenda for much of what follows this opening move in the *Investigations*. I now turn to that agenda, and one bit of its execution.

6. Thinking, Meaning, Understanding: So far I have discussed the work of the first 27 paragraphs of the *Investigations*. It sets an agenda for much, if not all, of the rest.

, notably for the rule following discussion (§§84-87, §§138-242). Two issues are on that agenda.

One agenda item is to apply the new idea of representation to a sort not yet in the picture. I have spoken above of what belongs to representation as such. So far we have considered only linguistic representation: representation in, or by, vehicles. I utter some words, or make some signs by waving my hands, or use smoke signals, or whatever, to which one is to react in a certain way. The signs—the physical bearers of this way of being taken—make my representing perceivable, so that you can be aware of being represented to, and then, if things go well, take yourself to be represented to in a certain way. Where there is such a thing as how signs are to be taken, a parochial sensibility *may* decide that. Wittgenstein's point could then just be that there are no bounds on the room for such decision—what Frege suggests there *must* be for there to be questions of truth at all.

But representing with such a physical face to it—with bearers of content—is one case of two. There is representing to, or for, an audience—those who are to take the representing in one way or another. Then there is representing things to oneself as so. One *can* be the sole intended audience for representing of the first type: I leave myself a note (which, on finding, I *may* disbelieve). But there is a case where it is not that. Representing something as so may just be taking (holding) a certain view. I will call that *autorepresentation*. For me to think that my keys are in my pocket is, *per se*, for me to represent the world to myself as a certain way. For me to represent the world to myself as a certain way is for me to *stand* towards it in a certain way—in a certain posture. To write a note would not be so to stand. Representational vehicles have no clear role in my so standing (though some have postulated them by way of supposed empirical hypothesis). Nor, in any clear sense, is my representing something to myself as so something that is to be *taken* in one or another way, so that a parochial sensibility might decide how.

Where there is something which is to be taken in a certain way, there is a role for the parochial to have: determining *what* way. Autorepresentation seems to involve no such thing. So it is as yet unclear what role the parochial could have there; so how the new picture applies. The first agenda item is to see how it might.

The second is to see what calls for the new picture. This, I will argue, is the task of the rule following discussions (§§84-87 and §§138-242). This section treats the first item, the next section the second. As a preliminary, though, I now summarize that first discussion. §§84-87 discusses how the explanations we give one another can *explain*—

can say no less than what to do, or how things are. I tell you, 'To find the post office turn right at the second street', or, if that does not suffice, 'That alleyway is not a street.' I may thus tell you no less than what route to follow. The instruction, 'Turn right at the second street *admits of* competing understandings, as does every other. For all of which my giving of it need not. My explanations, the things I say, are *for* thinkers of the sort we are, or those I give (say) them to. Such thinkers *would* take them in a certain way. Such is part of being the sort they are. What explanations which are for such thinkers in fact say is what they would thus be taken to. Their content is formed by the sort of thinker they are for; thus by what is peculiar to thinkers of a certain sort—by what is *parochial*. "The sign-post is in order—if it meets its aims in normal circumstances" (§87). It is aimed at a certain sort of thinker. Its content is what its aims and their fulfilment make it. I will apply this idea to the first agenda item.

How, then, does the new picture apply to autorepresentation? I will focus on one case of it: someone meaning his words in a certain way—so as to say such-and-such. Here meaning is what *someone* does, not what what 'vrijgezel' does in meaning *bachelor*. It is non-factive, so unlike Pia's frown meaning Sid is driving. I *meant* to post the letter. I meant to say 'begleiten', not 'beledigen'. It aims at something, with all the usual accompaniments of that. If I mean to say X to be so, and for X to be so just is for Y to be so, I need not have meant to say Y to be so. Which need not mean that I can mean to say something where there is no such thing to say. What can one mean the words one speaks to say? One one view, anything one can think. Thus, as Wittgenstein portrays the view (§205),

"But it is just the queer thing about *intention*, about the mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it."

The counter idea here can be put: Ignorance is strength. A small child can jump off a tall building and try to fly—if, as may be with a small child, he does not know that he cannot do this. But only if that. I can jump off a tall building and flap my arms. But I cannot thus be trying to fly. For I know I cannot. You cannot try to do what you are fully convinced you cannot do. So I cannot, in the bakery, try to ask for bread by saying, 'Would you like to go for a drink?' At least not in normal circumstances. For, as I know full well, I will *not* have asked for bread in doing that. English does not work that way. I am a competent speaker of English. So I know what I will say (if anything) in the bakery in uttering 'Would you like to go for a drink?' So, contraposing 'Ignorance is strength', I

cannot try, in so speaking, to ask for bread. So I cannot mean my words to be asking for bread.

Insofar as I am competent—I know what would be said in speaking given words on a given occasion—I can only mean my words to say what they will, in fact, say. If I say ‘The room is dark’ in circumstances in which that would be taken to mean it is safe to remove film, and I know this is how it would be taken, I cannot, consistent with that, mean my words to say that the room is dark on some other understanding of it so being. The new picture of representation now applies. What would I say, on a given occasion, in saying, ‘The room is dark’? Refer to the new picture. Now insofar as I am competent, *that* is what I meant my words to say.

My readers and I are all competent in speaking English, but none of us perfectly so. Even where competent enough, we do not always see what we will say in uttering given words on a given occasion. We may always fail to appreciate fully the circumstances in which we speak. I may, say, misuse the word ‘careen’ because I do not know, or properly grasp, its nautical origins. Or I may misuse it in a particular situation because though I do know those origins, my audience does not, so that I am aiming for a metaphor unrealizable under the circumstances. A boat tilting from side to side in high seas may be said to be careening (on what is now, anyway, one recognized use). I might think of a truck heaped high, creeping from the dust bowl towards California, as like such a ship. So I speak of it as careening down the road. The metaphor falls flat. I do not say what I mean to. Equally, I might threaten someone, ‘I’ll careen you’, and not succeed in saying what I mean to say—that I will keelhaul him—because that meaning of ‘careen’ is currently unknown.

There is that much room for divergence between what I mean my words to say and what they do say. None of which spoils the core in the idea that ignorance is strength. I thought ‘careen’ meant *keelhaul*. In the context I used it, it did not. But we know what it would be (roughly) for a word to mean *keelhaul*. The word ‘keelhaul’ means that, for example. Suppose ‘careen’ had meant *keelhaul* (in that context). What would I then have said? In the above case, that is what I meant my words to say. Again, the new picture of representation stays in place. Suppose I drag you under my canoe. Would that be keelhauling on the understanding of this on which that is what I would have threatened my audience with?

My perceptions as to what I would say in given words may intelligibly deviate from what is so. They may be, understandably, that I would say such-and-else there is to be said. Then, in choosing my words as I did, *that* is what I meant to say. I was able to suppose I would then speak, in those words, of things being such-and-such way. So I

meant them to speak of that. I was able to suppose the circumstances to be thus and so. So I meant thus to say what one would in speaking of things as that way in such circumstances. When would things *be* as I thus meant to say they were? Well, what language games would I be playing were my suppositions so? Our new idea of what representation is now takes its grip. How I meant things were now falls within the scope of the parochial.

Here, then, one illustration of how the new picture can be a picture of autorepresentation. Details differ from case to case. There is a further point. In saying Sid to think the room is dark, one might say him to think any of various things, depending on what, for purposes of so saying, one is to understand by a room being dark. But not: What Sid thinks in thinking the room dark (where he so thinks) depends on what one understands by a room being dark. (Nor even, I think, on what *he* understands by this.) Rather, in thinking the room dark, Sid thinks something *so*. What can be *thought so* is what, *ceteris paribus*, either *is so* or not. Which it is can then only depend on how things are. Equally, then, for whether things are as he thus thinks. So equally again for what he thus thinks. There is (roughly) no room here for whether things are as Sid thinks to depend on what one understands by a room being dark; equally little for *what* he thus thinks to so depend.

So far *what* Sid thinks seems to follow the pattern of a Fregean truth-bearer. Such a truth-bearer represents things as such-and-such way, where there are just *no* competing understandings of something being that way; so whether something is that way *cannot* depend on what you understand by something so being. Similarly, what Sid thinks in thinking what he does here is that things are a certain way; whether things are as he thus thinks cannot, it seems depend on what one understands by things being such-and-such way, for *any* substitution for that 'such-and-such'. The phenomenon of thinking so *seems* to take this shape. Such may be one important source of the idea of a Fregean truth-bearer. But how *can* there be objects of thinking so—thoughts, or propositions—which thus admit of no competing understandings? We need to understand the terms of the line of thought, above, which can seem to suggest so.

Wittgenstein explores this topic in §§429-465. The key idea here is:

'An order orders its own execution.' So it knows its execution before it is there?—But that was a grammatical proposition, and it says: If the order runs 'Do such-and-such' then carrying out the order is called 'doing such-and-such'. (§458)

'If you said that Sid grunts, what you thus said would be true iff Sid grunts.' Whether this states truth depends on what one understands saying that Sid grunts to be. But if we understand this antecedent as speaking of your having said such-and-such to be so, where that *is* (presumably) something so or not—if, that is, we understand it as we did Sid's thinking something so, above—then the remark is a truism, unfolding part (though not all) of the concept of truth; a grammatical proposition in Wittgenstein's sense. But why? In the consequent, the words 'Sid grunts' speak of Sid being a way he (presumably) is or not. To do that, they must bear some particular understanding of being a grunter. If *I* made this remark, then I spoke, in that part of it, of Sid being a grunter, on some particular understanding of him so being. In the antecedent I speak of you speaking of Sid being a grunter. Again, if I thus speak of you saying things to be thus and so, then I *thus* speak of Sid being a grunter on some particular understanding of him so being. And now a grammatical point: it must be the same understanding both times, which guarantees the truth of the whole. Which is to say nothing as to just what understanding this might be. So far we have learned nothing as to just when you would be right.

Suppose now that I say 'If Sid thinks the room is dark, what he thinks is so just in case the room is dark.' If, in the antecedent, I speak of Sid thinking things to be thus and so, then all the above remarks apply. In the consequent I use the words 'the room is dark' to speak of a room as dark on some particular understanding of its so being. In the antecedent I do the same. In the consequent I do it to say how things must be for Sid to be right. In the antecedent I do it to say what it is he will be right or wrong about. Again, necessarily, one understanding of a room being dark is in force throughout. Again we so far know nothing as to what it is Sid thinks.

'In thinking the room dark, Sid thinks something so; which *is* so, or not, independent of what you understand by a room being dark, or by things being any other given way.' That is so in just the way it is so that if I *say* the room to be dark, I thus *say* something so; which *is* so, or not, independent of what you understand by a room being dark. So things are as I said, or not, independent of any such understanding, just as things are as Sid thus thought independent of this. Neither truism suggests Fregean truth-bearers. Rather, the parochial retains the role assigned it, on our new idea of representing, equally, in the one case, in making determinate *what* it is I said, and when things would *be* as thus said, and, in the other, what it is Sid thinks, and when things would be as thought. That role once played, there is no need for playing it anew in fixing those understanding which, as we saw above, are not there to be fixed. (But if Sid thinks the room dark, could it not turn out that whether he thus thinks *correctly* depends

on what you understand by *being* correct in so thinking? Of course.)

7. Particular and General: For Frege there is something on which the parochial *must* be silent: *when* (in what particular cases) things would be thus and so. A way for things to be speaks for itself in all such matters. If such speaking is meant to silence the parochial, then for Wittgenstein the idea is incoherent. Here is the key point:

We say “The order orders *this*—” and do it; but also “The order orders this: I am to” We translate it at one time into a proposition, at another into a demonstration, and at another into action.” (§459)

Such translation—from something to be done to a case of doing it, from things being such-and-such way to a case of their so being—is blocked where the parochial is so silenced—for reasons Frege himself identifies. The rule following discussion points this out. Wittgenstein is here most deeply Fregean.

There is, Frege notes, something intrinsically general about a thought:

A thought always contains something reaching out beyond the particular case so that this is presented to us as falling under something general. (Frege 1906? (1979): 175)

Reaching beyond the particular case: a thought true of things as they are might still have been true without things being *just* as they are (in every respect). Nor need things have been just as they are in order for there to have been such a thought at all. If it is true that my cup is empty, it might still have been had it just been drained of different tea. Were it undrained, there would still be the thought that it is empty.

The generality of thoughts is found in a notion of a way for things to be. Being empty is a way for a cup to be. Being fuller than is a way for an ordered pair of cups to be. My cup being empty is a way for *things* to be. My cup being as it is may *be* (or not) its being empty. As I will say, it may *instance* this (or not). Not everything about my cup matters to it, as it is, instancing being empty (whereas everything about it matters to its being as it is). What being empty is fixes what does matter and how; what is demanded

for qualifying as an instance. There is an indefinitely extensible range of cases of what would instance being empty; equally, a range of different ways of being (doing) what a thing thus must.

That my cup is now empty is not a way for things to be. It is the circumstance of things so being. In things being as they are, they are so. There is indefinite variety in the way things could be while so being (that my cup is empty). There is, again, a range of cases. So the generality of a way for things to be (as I will say, of the conceptual) is the generality of thoughts, equally, of that which is so according to them.

'A satisfies (falls under) the concept *W*' is here just a variant for 'A's being as it is is its being *W*.' A concept is, intrinsically, of being thus and so. A concept may be satisfied by single items, by order pairs, and so on. A zero-place concept is a thought, which is satisfied, or would be, by things being as they are, or were.

There is a class of concepts (the first-order ones) which are satisfied by what is not itself conceptual. The characteristic mark of the non-conceptual (the particular, as I will say) is that there is no *range* of cases of something's being as it is being *it* (much as there is no range of different items, each of which would be Frege on some satisfiable condition).

There is no satisfying the particular. It makes no demands on, so nothing could matter to, so doing. My cup is not a way for things to be. Nothing's being as it is would be its my cup. There is, by contrast, such a thing as being my cup. This *is* a way for things to be. To be sure, the only thing that could be that way is my cup. But my cup may do that chipped, in Dublin, and so forth. There is a range of cases here.

What satisfies a concept? In mathematics, one can say, 'an object'. The number 2 satisfies the concept *smallest prime*. In sublunary affairs this will not do. My cup satisfies the concept *empty*. *Now* it does. It is about to cease. Tea is on the way. It is my cup's being as it is now that is its being empty. *This* is what satisfies concepts. Equally for 0-place concepts. It is things being as they are which is its being so that my cup is empty. There is no range of cases of my cup being as it now is. To be that, a thing would need to be *that cup*, as it *now is*. There is just one case of that. So my cup's being as it is, things being as they are, belong to the particular. My cup is the way it is. But that is not a way for *a* thing to be; only a way for my cup now to be. Terminology should not mislead us into misclassifying my cup's being as it is with the conceptual.

In defending his idea of the invisibility of truth-bearers Frege points to a crucial difference between particular and conceptual. My cup—a particular—is visible. That my cup is empty is not visible on the same understanding of *visible*. For, for my cup to be empty is for things being as they are to belong to a certain range of cases. To see that

it is empty, one must recognize the membership. Neither such membership, nor the range thus joined, are visible things. One cannot *see* that to which precisely what would be cases of a cup being empty belong; nor are those other cases themselves in sight. (See Frege, 1897/1979, pp. 137-138, and 1918, p. 61.)

Frege tells us that the particular's relation to the general in belonging to ranges is the *fundamental* logical relation. In his words,

The fundamental logical relation is that of an object's falling under a concept: all relations between concepts reduce to it. (Frege 1892-1895/1979, p. 118.)

For a way for things to be, or concept, to bear this relation to given particulars is for a generality to reach all the way to the particular case—Wittgenstein's translation from order to action: I am to do such-and-such; I am to do *this* (doing it). A cup's being empty is a cup being empty; *this* is a cup being empty.

The rule-following discussion concerns this fundamental relation. What is it for this to hold? When would it? What might answer these questions? The relation holds between my cup as it now is and its being empty, but not between my cup as it is about to be and its being empty. What is the difference? The obvious answer: my cup is now empty, but is about not to be. But that is just to say: the relation holds where it holds, and does not where it does not. It does nothing to explain its holding: to say why it is, or how it can be, that the cases of its holding are just the ones they are. (Why, e.g., my cup's being as it is bears it to a cup being empty, while other things do not.) Suppose one answered *that* question by citing some condition *on* its holding: the relation would hold just where that condition was satisfied. Such a condition belongs to the conceptual. How does it translate to instances of *its* satisfaction? We might thus be told when the non-conceptual would relate to the conceptual if we already knew enough as to when it would. That there might be *such* an answer was never in doubt. But it is hard to see how *that* could answer the question posed.

What *is* to be said as to when the fundamental relation holds? We can explain a given instance of its holding in terms of other instances of its holding—my cup is empty if innocent of liquid. Or we may cite *examples* of its holding. But there seems nothing *else* to say. We understand relations within the conceptual in terms of the fundamental relation, falling under. We cannot understand *it* in the same way. But perhaps in no other way either. Which fits with Frege's conception of the zero-place case. For things

being as they are to fall under the zero-place concept of my cup's (now) being empty is just for it to be true that my cup is empty. Truth, Frege tells us, is indefinable (equivalently, truth is part of the content of *any* judgement). To know when it would be *true* that my cup is empty is just to know when my cup would be empty. But what we wanted to know in the first place is in just what instances this would be so. To know what would fall under *my cup being empty* is to know what the correct transitions are from the conceptual, *my cup being empty*, to the particular cases of what are, or not, its instances. But what is it for given transitions to be the right ones? How *can* there be something to be known here?

I can, it seems, only explain the instancing of the relation by my cup (as it is) and being empty by appeal to other instances of the relation. So perhaps asking for more than this is asking a bad question. Frege says something on these lines for questions as to why a law of logic holds. Such *may* admit of explanation within logic. But it admits of no extra-logical explanation. (See Frege 1893: xviii) In logical matters, there is no such thing as things being other than as logic has them. For, insofar as there were, there would be room for explanation as to why things were *not* otherwise; such explanation being, necessarily, extra-logical.

But if there is no such thing as saying why logic is not otherwise, one *can* say why this is so. Logic (on Frege's conception) unfolds the most general structure of judgement, or truth. What was not so structured would, *ipso facto*, not be judgement, nor truth. Being so structured *belongs* to the concept *judgement*, which we have just understood in terms of the fundamental relation. So there is no such thing as *thought* being otherwise than logic says; but all logic says is how thought must be. (I do not defend this story. What matters here is just its availability.)

Now the thought would be: perhaps there is no saying why the fundamental relation is instanced as it is and not otherwise in the same way as there is no saying why logic is as it is and not otherwise. We need to work out what this means. But there is at the start a crucial disanalogy. Logic traces relations within the conceptual. It does not speak to, but rather presupposes, the fundamental relation. If, as Frege says, truth is part of every judgement, then knowing when it would be true that my cup is empty is just knowing when my cup would be empty. So when it would be is part of what truth is. But logic is not concerned with that part. What we want to see, then, is whether those same ideas as to there being no such thing as otherwise, which find some application for that part of thought, or truth, which logic does unfold also apply for that part which it does not.

Logic, conceived so as to fit Frege's story, deals in a certain structure which is

intrinsic to the conceptual; a certain way in which given bits of the conceptual relate to others. To repeat, relations between bits of the conceptual are understandable in terms of the fundamental relation. It is in terms of such understanding that we can understand what it is for such a relation to hold intrinsically. If Frege's story fits, then this understanding of *intrinsic* will make sense of the relevant idea of there being no such thing as things being otherwise. But we do not have the same means at our disposal for understanding the fundamental relation itself; so nor for understanding what it could be for *it* to have a certain structure *intrinsically*.

This idea has work to do. Take any instance of the fundamental relation holding, or of it not, between some particular and some concept—say, between my cup as it now is and the concept *empty*. If the relation holds, then it is part of what being empty is that my cup's being as it is is so to count. That is *the* correct translation from being empty being such-and-such to its being *this*. Any competing one is a mistake. But there is no saying what makes this so. So that this is correct must be intrinsic to the structure of *falling under*: whatever did not have that feature simply could not be that relation. Similarly for every instance. How to understand that?

The picture is now this. There is no saying why *falling under* has the instances it does (except why it has certain ones given that it has certain others). For it is intrinsic to it to have *precisely* those instances that it does. Since the ordered pair, *<my cup as it now is, being empty>*, instances *falling under* just in case my cup as it now is instances *being empty*, the same goes for every concept. It is equally intrinsic to *being empty* to have just the instances it does. All of this is part of the *intrinsic* structure of the relation of the conceptual to the particular. But we do not yet understand what *intrinsic* could mean here. We understand its application within the conceptual because we understand the conceptual in terms of the fundamental relation. We cannot have *that* understanding of it applied to relations between the conceptual and something else. Which leaves us, so far, with no understanding at all.

If my cup's being as it is is its being empty, one *can* rightly say: it is part of what being empty is that *this* particular *is to count* as something being empty. What we want to understand is *what* truth we thus state. The wanted reading cannot plausibly be: anything which did not have just *this* instance would not be being empty. There are two reasons. The first is the point with which the *Investigations* opens. The concept *concept* does not work like that. My cup is at the bottom of the fish tank, along with others. The others are all filled with fish food. Mine is not. Is mine empty? We would still be speaking of *being empty* if we spoke so as to count it as that way, but also if we spoke so as to count it as not that way (water being what it is). It is *not* intrinsic to being empty to be instanced by precisely what may so count. This point points in several directions.

Here it makes vivid an understanding on which the conceptual does not relate intrinsically to the particulars which instance it—to *this* being as it happens to be. Whatever we count as its instances, a bit of the conceptual—a way for things to be—does not require just *those* for being the way for things to be it is. That would be a misreading of the correct idea that *this* just is what it *is* for something to be empty.

The second point. My cup might have been full. Had it been, there would, and *could*, not have been that very particular, my cup's being as it is, which in fact bears the falling under relation to being empty. Being empty would still have been the very thing it is. Ten minutes from now my cup will be as it then happens to be. Its being as it then is may *be* its being empty, or, again, may not. What way for a thing to be being empty is will be the same no matter what the outcome. So, again, there being such a thing as being empty, and its being what it is, does not turn on just which instances this turns out to have. That, again, is an understanding on which it is not *intrinsic* to being empty (or to any bit of the conceptual) to have just the instances it does.

What is *intrinsic* to being empty is what would belong to it no matter what its instances happened to be; ways one could *think* it to be while thoughts about any given instance of it were unavailable (while the instance was not available to think of). So it cannot be intrinsic to it to bear the fundamental relation to what might not have been: my cup's being as it now is. *Mutatis mutandis* for the fundamental relation. Nor could it be intrinsic to my cup's being as it now is that things being precisely *that* way bears the fundamental relation to that bit of the conceptual, the cup's being empty, as if were this not so to count my cup would not be as it now is.

Our aim is to understand (and not to impeach) the transition from what being empty is—being thus and so—to the particular case—my cup, as it will be in ten minutes, being that way, or, again, not. We have found no help in the idea that all instances of the fundamental relation are intrinsic to its structure, thus impervious to explanation. It is hard to see how 'intrinsic' could bear an understanding on which this was both true and an advance in understanding.

Which is just to develop Frege's idea. We can understand relations between bits of the conceptual in terms of the fundamental relation—one between particulars and the conceptual. We can thus give sense to the idea (whatever its merits) of such relations holding intrinsically. But we cannot understand the fundamental relation itself in such a way. So nor can we so understand what it would be for *it* to hold intrinsically between such-and-such particular and such-and-such bit of the conceptual. Nor would it accord with our understanding of the conceptual—of *concept*, of *way for things to be*—to equate 'holds intrinsically' with 'just does'. In fact, it is simply obscure what 'intrinsically'

could mean here.

One understands *falling under* in grasping, e.g., when things would count as my cup being empty; just as one grasps what truth is in grasping such things as how the world decides the correctness of a judgement that a cup is empty. Here the first rule-following discussion (§§84-87) comes into play. I *can* explain (rightly or wrongly) where the post office is by pointing the way. *What* I thus explain—how I say to go—is fixed by how such explanation would be taken by thinkers of the sort we are. As we saw in the previous section, with the parochial thus in operation, I can say, ‘The post office is closed’ and *mean* it in a certain way; and my meaning can stop nowhere short of the particular case: instances of the fundamental relation. So if one can walk into the building, but the counters are all closed, things being *just* as they thus are can be their being as I meant, or, again, their not. The explanations we give, so the things we say, and mean, are, normally, *for* thinkers like us; which fact shapes how it is they represent things; so what the correct translations are from ‘he meant that/to do ...’ to ‘he meant *this*’.

Thus does my meaning stop nowhere short of the facts. (Cf. §95.) But the point now is: *only* with the parochial thus in operation is this so. When would a cup count as being empty? Exactly which instances of a cup being as it was would be it being that? When, that is, would it be the way I just asked about? Which way did I ask about? Now the above point applies. Operating as per the first rule-following discussion, the parochial fixes which way it is I spoke of, or meant. In this it stops nowhere short of fixing that way’s participation in the fundamental relation: which instances of things being *thus* are instances of their being that way. Here stopping nowhere short is *stopping—nowhere—short*. Whatever the parochial achieves by way of relations between the bit of the conceptual I spoke of and other bits of the *conceptual*, this will not achieve relations between the way I spoke of and bits of the *particular*—those things which instance it. Such is just what it is for the fundamental relation not to be reducible to relations between concepts as relations between concepts are (on Frege’s view) reducible to it. Nor is there, operation of the parochial aside, any other way for there to be facts as to how being such-and-such way translates into being, for example, *thus*.

With the parochial at work, it can be correct to say that it is intrinsic to what being empty is that *this* is a cup being empty: things could not be any other way in that respect. For it to count as *true* that the cup is empty may well be for such instancing to count as thus mandated. Not that there is some other mandating than that which the parochial allows for. Nor does this exclude what is sometimes so: that it is intrinsic to what being empty is that *this* is being empty—*only* on a certain understanding of what

being empty is.

The parochial reaches all the way from the conceptual to the particular. With that idea properly in place there is no problem as to how rational relations, such as falling under, can have given instances. Our parochial equipment grants us understandings of what it is for the fundamental relation to hold. No others are to be had.

The parochial is precisely that of which one cannot say, 'There is no such thing as things being otherwise.' It is part of *human* thought; thus of human life, of *our* ways of going right or wrong in our projects in, or for, the world. So, it is something psychological; part of how *we are*, not part of how any thinker must be. If the parochial forges transitions from the conceptual to the particular, as just sketched, then, with this in mind, it can seem that:

We are at most under a psychological, not a logical, compulsion.
And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of case. (§140)

Logic does not treat relations between the conceptual and the particular. If logical compulsion is what *logic* must place us under, then there *is* no logical compulsion to count my cup's being as it is as its being empty. But, while one might turn my cup over to see whether it is empty, one would not do so to see whether its being as it is is its being empty. Nor would I pass out questionnaires on trams to see whether I am getting such transitions right. Except insofar as being empty admits of understandings, there are few or no open questions as to what would so count. If I say, truly, that my cup is empty, that is because it does so count. We are rationally compelled, in pursuing the goal truth, to recognize those instances of the fundamental relation which in fact obtain. This remains so even if, for those bits of the conceptual we think in terms of, those instances are what would so count for thinkers such as us. *Our* exposure to risk of error is shaped by what we would, or could, count as error; what might abash us. Still, *you* must count my cup's being as it is as its being empty (where that matters) if you are to reach the goal truth.

If it seems as though there must be some *other* sense in which our hand ought to be forced here—as if we knew of some other kind of compulsion than that just sketched—then we need to recall the fundamental point of this discussion. We understand how there can be compulsion in transitions from one bit of the conceptual to another; an understanding available to us by reference to the fundamental relation. In the case of the fundamental relation itself we cannot understand compulsion in the same way. We

do not have the same means available. It is this that casts suspicion on the idea that we *do* know of two kinds of case.

If we were different sorts of thinkers we would speak to, and for, different sorts. That *might* change which ways for things to be we spoke of. We would at least speak on different understandings of things being as we said. What it would be for things to be the ways we thus spoke of, so when the world would bear the fundamental relation to the concepts we thus expressed (deployed as thus deployed) would change accordingly. Which does not mean that if we thought differently, my cup might be as it is without being empty. The conceptual that figures in our thought—the ways we think of things as being or not—is *formed* by that thought. It is, for all that, the *conceptual*, relating to the particular as is the conceptual's prerogative. There is no *other* way of enjoying those prerogatives.

Such is the moral of the rule-following discussion. In drawing out this line of thought in the *Investigations* I have had two morals of my own in mind. First, to understand Wittgenstein it is always a good idea to think of Frege. Second, and correlatively, the *Investigations* treats the very same problems that concerned Frege. It speaks to his concerns. These morals are for those—both admirers and detractors—who share the view that at some point, probably around the summer of 1930, Wittgenstein had an experience like Saul's fall on the road, or Godard's, thus abandoning philosophy for some new form of self-help. The *Investigations* offers new approaches to problems very much philosophy's.

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