Small Navigation Menu

Primary Menu

Intentional Objects

Citation: Crane, Tim (2001) Intentional Objects.

An intentional object is, by definition, the object of an intentional state: what it is that is thought about, wished for, feared etc. This short paper explains why a theory of intentionality should not dispense with the concept of an intentional object, and why the category of intentional object is not an ontological category.Article

Additional Information: Citation: Ratio (2001) 14: 336-349.
Creators: Crane, Tim and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Intentionality, Ontology
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
Dates:
  • 2001 (published)
Comments and Suggestions:
Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 T_Crane_Intentional.pdf: 168368 bytes, checksum: d43b4aec03026cd8d55f54e23112b829 (MD5); Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 T_Crane_Intentional.pdf: 168368 bytes, checksum: d43b4aec03026cd8d55f54e23112b829 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z; Date issued: 2001.

Statistics

View details