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Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle

Citation: Heinaman, Robert (1993) Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle.

I argue that Aristotle does not believe all rational action aims at securing eudaimonia (happiness) for the agent. Intrinsic goods are worth having independently of their promotion of any further ends, including eudaimonia. Aiming for such a good or avoiding evil may be rational even when eudaimonia is impossible and not the agent's goal. "Politics" 1332a7f suggests that even the happy agent may act rationally without aiming for eudaimonia. The final section argues that, given that an immoral agent secures the greatest of evils, an alleged conflict in the "Nicomachean Ethics" between the intellectualist Book X and earlier books disappears.Article

Additional Information: Citation: Phronesis (1993) 38: 31-56.
Creators: Heinaman, Robert and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Aristotle, Ethics
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
Dates:
  • 1993 (published)
Comments and Suggestions:
Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-31T13:57:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 R_Heinaman_Rationality.pdf: 1589261 bytes, checksum: d27d23c4003bd48c296dffc8e540dcbc (MD5); Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2007-10-31T13:57:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 R_Heinaman_Rationality.pdf: 1589261 bytes, checksum: d27d23c4003bd48c296dffc8e540dcbc (MD5) Previous issue date: 1993. Date accessioned: 2007-10-31T13:57:45Z; Date available: 2007-10-31T13:57:45Z; Date issued: 1993.

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