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Abstract

The Transparency of Experience


A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.

Martin, Michael (2002) The Transparency of Experience.


Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Citation: Mind & Language (2002) 17: 376-425.
Subjects:Philosophy
Keywords:Perception, Naive realism, Transparency
Divisions:Institute of Philosophy
Collections:London Philosophy Papers
Deposited By:Repository Administrator
Date Deposited:08 Oct 2010 12:02
Last Modified:12 Oct 2010 07:47
ItemID:628
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