Citation: Martin, Michael (2002) The Transparency of Experience.
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Abstract
A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
Metadata
| Additional Information: | Citation: Mind & Language (2002) 17: 376-425. |
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| Creators: | Martin, Michael and |
| Subjects: | Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Perception, Naive realism, Transparency |
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
| Dates: |
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-11-07T11:36:00Z
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Previous issue date: 2002. Date accessioned: 2007-11-07T11:36:00Z; Date available: 2007-11-07T11:36:00Z; Date issued: 2002. |