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The Transparency of Experience

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The Transparency of Experience

A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.

Martin, Michael (2002) The Transparency of Experience.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Citation: Mind & Language (2002) 17: 376-425.
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Perception, Naive realism, Transparency
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
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