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Abstract

A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons


A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a role analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between considerations that move us to act in particular ways and considerations that favour our acting in particular ways.Article

Hornsby, Jennifer (2008) A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons.


Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Citation: In Haddock, A. and MacPherson, F. (eds.), "Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge".
Subjects:Philosophy
Keywords:Disjunctivism, Action
Divisions:Institute of Philosophy
Collections:London Philosophy Papers
Deposited By:Repository Administrator
Date Deposited:08 Oct 2010 11:35
Last Modified:12 Oct 2010 07:44
ItemID:815
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