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Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith

Citation: Hornsby, Jennifer (2008) Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith.

Frank Jackson and I each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind which is extremely difficult to sustain. My objective is more to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson’s opponents and the fragility of his own position than the truth of any particular doctrine. I bring to the surface an assumption in ontology which I see as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicalism. I think that when it is appreciated that this assumption may be rejected, Jackson's opponents are seen in a different light from the one in which they appear in his writings. (More generally, a connection is made between the vast literature on physicalism as a topic in philosophy of mind and the equally vast literature on material constitution as a topic in metaphysics.)Article

Additional Information: Citation: In Ravenscroft, I. (ed.), "Minds, Worlds & Conditionals: Essays in Honour of Frank Jackson".
Creators: Hornsby, Jennifer and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Physicalism, Jackson
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
Dates:
  • 2008 (published)
Comments and Suggestions:
Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2008-01-05T16:43:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 J_Hornsby_Physicalism.pdf: 248961 bytes, checksum: 53aa3f3102bcefad1af5d2b4a66d9784 (MD5); Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2008-01-05T16:43:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 J_Hornsby_Physicalism.pdf: 248961 bytes, checksum: 53aa3f3102bcefad1af5d2b4a66d9784 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008. Date accessioned: 2008-01-05T16:43:28Z; Date available: 2008-01-05T16:43:28Z; Date issued: 2008.

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