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Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence

Citation: Crane, Tim (2006) Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence.

What Brentano meant by ‘intentional inexistence’ is explained, as is Brentano’s change of mind about this notion. It is only when we understand the metaphysical and methodological assumptions lying behind Brentano’s original doctrine that we can understand why we have a problem of intentionality in a way Brentano does not.Article

Creators: Crane, Tim and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Brentano, Intentionality
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
Dates:
  • 2006 (published)
Comments and Suggestions:
Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 T_Crane_Brentano.pdf: 251774 bytes, checksum: 923012ee07d8a165f84f4f3519dc2c71 (MD5); Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 T_Crane_Brentano.pdf: 251774 bytes, checksum: 923012ee07d8a165f84f4f3519dc2c71 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z; Date issued: 2006.

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