Reconsidering the Nature of Moral Reality: Goal Theory Unpacked and Evaluated

When we survey the metaethical and normative landscape, we observe a problem, with each of the familiar theories facing serious and at least partially unresolved challenges, and all scoring poorly on certain widely accepted criteria for theoretical adequacy. This thesis argues that there is a novel theory, viz. Richard Carrier’s Goal Theory of morality, which fares much better in this regard, plausibly satisfying all of the applicable adequacy criteria, in addition to being resistant to the dominant challenges faced by accounts of its type.

I argue that if there is a true moral system, then it is probably Goal Theory. The theory’s first and second-order commitments are unpacked, and a number of important questions and objections answered. Three of these objections I deem substantial enough to warrant more detailed treatments: (1) that there are categorical normative reasons, contra Goal Theory’s Humean account; (2) that normative facts and properties are ‘just too different’ from natural facts and properties to be reducible or identical to them, contra Goal Theory’s naturalistic account of normativity; (3) and that ethical egoism succumbs to a number of internal and external criticisms, undermining Goal Theory’s egoist account. I argue that none of these objections defeats Goal Theory. With regard to theoretical adequacy, I argue that Goal Theory plausibly satisfies all of the criteria identified.

Having unpacked and evaluated Goal Theory, I conclude that it plausibly succeeds where existing theories do not. In so doing, it yields an outcome that is both highly surprising and resistant to easy refutation, making a substantial contribution to our quest to establish the true nature of moral reality and the true content of morality.